IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

OF THE JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT JOS

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE I.S GALADIMA.

 

DATE: THURSDAY 5TH JUNE 2025                              SUIT NO: NICN/JOS/06/2024

 

BETWEEN:

 

1. NGUEREP NANGONG BITRUS

2. JENNIFER MATLONG SANDA

3. THADDEUS PONJUL LABONG

4. EZEKIEL EMMANUEL AZI

5. DABE GRACE

6. GEOFFREY DANUNG POFUNG

7.             ITSE PAUL IZANG

8. RAMBONG PONJUL MICHAEL

9. CHARLES PONMAK FELIX

10.          ALFRED KUNGRAP RAWANSHEL

11.          CHINKE TONGSHINUNG ALEX

12.          DUNG ERIC INNOCENT

13.          TELDIR LADAP KWAMKUR

14.          YILLAT ESTHER                                                               APPLICANTS

15.          JOHN JOY NAUNIYA

16.          ROTSHAK GEOFFREY GOMAM

17.          GODIT JACOB CLEMENT

18.          ADANGHA LINUS ISHAKU

19.          TWAMSEN BONIFACE

20.          ADUNDU AZI AHINCHE

21.          ABADU RUEBEN SUNIMUM

22.          KANGKWAP SHINSAN JOHN

23.          DAMWAN ELIZABETH MICAH

24.          MANKO STEPHEN YARKUM

25.          LATGOE TITUS HANGDAP

26.          MORGAN MOHORRET MUTLA

27.          NENGYI GOMPIL GOTAR

28.          GODWIN BARRY

39.          YUSUF PANGYUK ADAMS

30.          SAMUEL DAYAK

31.          AWURUMDAT A. DAYA

32.          KAZUL NSHE BENEDICT                      

33.          NENMANE TUNKUDU GOSHIT

34.          AWOS HOPE ABEL

35.          ABIGAIL IBRAHIM IGYEM

36.          NANDI MATHEW MOVEN       

37.          LETAN NANSHANG DAMIAN

                

AND:

 

1. GOVERNOR OF PLATEAU STATE 

2. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PLATEAU STATE                                  RESPONDENTS

3. PLATEAU STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE   

 

REPRESENTATION:

·     NANTOK DASHUWAR; E.S.  BUF FOR THE APPLICANTS

·     PHILEMON DAFFI (HONORABLE ATTORNEY GENERAL PLATEAU STATE), SABO LONGJI, L.P. FOMBOT; P.N. DASHAK, K.B BAWUN FOR THE RESPONDENTS.

 

JUDGMENT:

1.  The applicants (referred to by the parties as the claimants in this suit), commenced this action via an originating summons filed on 13/3/2024 wherein they raise the following questions for determination:

1.     Whether the 1st respondent is possessed of or clothed with the powers or authority to unilaterally suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the employments and appointments of the Applicants through Exhibits D and E, the Applicants having been in the service and employment of the 3rd Respondent. 

2.     By virtue of the various letters of appointments issued to the Applicants attached as Exhibits A1 – A37, whether the Applicants are not entitled to maintain and retain their employment with the 3rd Respondent in line with the extant laws regulating their employment with the 3rd Respondent.

3.     Whether the failure and refusal of the 3rd Respondent to pay the Applicants their salaries and allowances thereby retaining same from the month of January 2023 till date or any period of time at all is not unlawful, unjust, illegal and a violation of the 3rd Respondent’s duties and obligations.

2.  The Applicants seek the following reliefs:

1.     A Declaration that the 1st Respondent has no power or authority to suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the employments and appointments of the Applicants duly engaged in the services and employment of the 3rd Respondent.

2.     A Declaration that the purported termination, nullification and cancellation of the employment and appointment of the Applicants by the 1st Respondent through Exhibits D and E, is unlawful, illegal, null and void with no legal effect whatsoever.

3.     A Declaration that the Applicants are entitled to maintain and retain their respective employments with the 3rd Respondent in line with the extant laws regulating their employment with the 3rd Respondent.

4.     A Declaration that the failure and refusal of the 3rd Respondent to pay the Applicants their respective salaries and allowances thereby retaining same from the month of January 2023 till date is unlawful, unjust, illegal and in violation of the 3rd Respondent’s duties and obligations.

5.     An Order setting aside the purported suspension and subsequent termination, nullification and cancellation of the Applicant’s various Appointments and Employments made by the 1st Respondent through the publications made at his instance attached as Exhibits D and E, same having been done ultra vires and therefore unlawful, null and void.

6.      An Order reinstating the Applicants back to their respective positions as staff and employees of the 3rd Respondent in line with their respective letters of appointments attached as Exhibits A1 – A37 respectively.

7.     An Order directing the Respondents to pay the Applicants their respective monthly salaries and allowances as specified by the terms of their employment from the month of January 2023 till date, as follows:

a.      2nd – 4th Applicants each the sum of N1, 873, 551. 00 annually, paid in monthly instalments of N156, 129. 25 per month. 

b.     5th – 13th Applicants each the sum of N1, 407, 470. 13 annually paid in monthly instalments of N117, 289. 17.  per month. 

c.      1st, 14th – 19th Applicants each the sum of N1, 360, 160. 86 annually paid in monthly instalments of N113, 346. 78 per month. 

d.     20th – 26th Applicants; each the sum of N873, 551. 00 annually paid in monthly instalments of N72, 795. 91 per month.

e.      27th – 37th Applicant; each the sum of N390, 724. 00 annually paid in monthly instalments of N32, 569. 33 per month.

8.     An order of perpetual injunction, restraining the respondents, whether by themselves, their agents, privies, assigns or representatives howsoever described, from victimizing, terminating or interfering with the Applicants’ respective appointments and employments with the 3rd Respondent, without any wrongdoing or violations of the terms of service on the part of the Applicants.

9.     N250,000,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Million Naira) General Damages against the Respondents jointly and severally for the collective pain and suffering imposed on the Applicants by the Respondents.

10.         Costs of this Suit as may be assessed by this Honourable Court.

3.  To support the originating summons, the applicants’ counsel relied on a 27-paragraph affidavit sworn by Nguerep Nangong Bitrus, the first applicant, together with 39 exhibits marked A1–A37, B and C.

 

 

4.  The applicants also filed a motion for interlocutory injunction on 21/3/2024.

 

5.  In response, the respondents filed a memorandum of conditional appearance, counter-affidavits to both the motion for an injunction and the originating summons, and a notice of preliminary objection. Although these documents were lodged on May 9, 2024, after the deadline, they were properly regularized by the respondents’ motion dated April 30, 2024, which was also filed on May 9, 2024.

 

 

6.  The applicants in response to the Notice of Preliminary objection filed a counter affidavit of 14 paragraphs and written address dated 7/5/2024 but filed on 9/5/2024.

 

7.  The applicants filed a further affidavit and a Reply on points of law on 14/5/2024.

 

8.  The respondents ahead to file a further affidavit and a written address on 12/7/2024 in support of their Notice of Preliminary Objection out of time but was regularized vide Respondents’ motion dated 12/7/2024 and filed 12/7/2024.

 

 

9.  After the exchange of processes, the court directed counsel to adopt them on 19/5/2025 and reserved judgment to today.

 

THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT:

10.                     The applicants explain that in 2022 they each received and accepted separate offers of employment at Plateau State College of Agriculture (the 3rd respondent). After completing all required paperwork, they took up their respective posts and carried out their duties faithfully, in line with their appointment letters, the College’s Conditions of Service for Staff, and the Plateau State College of Agriculture Establishment Edict of 1998. Following a change in leadership of the office of the state governor, (1st respondent), however, they were suspended and subsequently terminated by the 1st respondent’s publication. The applicants maintain that this suspension and termination were unlawful because the 1st respondent had no authority to effect their termination, and they further assert that they have been deprived of their salaries by the respondents since January 2023.

 

11.                      The respondents contend that the applicants’ posts were never advertised before their appointments, in breach of the 3rd respondent’s rules. They further maintain that the applicants did not undergo the required interviews by the Appointment and Promotion Committee under the institution’s governing law. The applicants are said to have accepted their offers on various dates and only then completed the necessary documentation with the 3rd respondent. Finally, the respondents assert that the applicants did not commence work on the dates set out in their letters of appointment and that their appointments were never formally confirmed.

 

12.                     The respondents maintain that, after a change in Plateau State’s leadership, an investigative panel was convened to assess the lawfulness of the applicants’ temporary appointments. That inquiry uncovered multiple procedural irregularities, prompting the 1st respondent—acting in his capacity as visitor to the 3rd respondent—to suspend the applicants. The respondents further deny owing any remuneration and ask the court to dismiss the suit in its entirety.

THE APPLICANTS’ COUNSEL’S SUBMISSIONS:

13.                     In the written address in support of the originating summons, the applicants' counsel, led by Nantok Dashuwar, Esq., formulated 3 issues for determination, thus:

                                                    i.      Whether the 1st respondent is possessed of or clothed with the powers or authority to unilaterally suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the employments and appointments of the Applicants through Exhibits D and E, the applicants having been in the service and employment of the 3rd Respondent.

                                                  ii.      By virtue of the various letters of appointments issued to the Applicants by the 3rd Respondent attached as Exhibits A1 – A37, whether the Applicants are not entitled to maintain and retain their employment with the 3rd Respondent in line with the extant laws regulating their employment with the 3rd Respondent.

                                               iii.      Whether the failure and refusal of the 3rd Respondent to pay the Applicants their salaries and allowances thereby retaining same from the month of January 2023 till date or any period of time at all is not unlawful, unjust, illegal and a violation of the 3rd Respondent’s duties and obligations.

 

14.                     In addressing issues 1, 2, and 3 collectively, the learned counsel argued that the applicants' case is encapsulated within these issues, which have been presented for the court's consideration. These questions aim to determine whether the 1st respondent possesses the authority to unilaterally suspend or terminate the applicants' employment with the 3rd respondent. The applicants' main argument is that the 1st respondent is not granted any power by the relevant statutes or instruments concerning their employment to suspend, terminate, or otherwise interfere with their employment.

 

15.                     He stated that the employment relationship between the applicants and the 3rd respondent is not a typical master-servant arrangement; rather, it is governed by statutory provisions. This is evident from the various documents establishing the relationship, specifically Exhibits A1 – A37, which state in paragraph 1(c) that the employees are subject to the conditions and regulations outlined in the College’s Conditions and Scheme of Service.

 

16.                     Counsel argued that the quoted sections of the employment letters imply that any instruments relevant to a case of unlawful termination must be those referenced in the employment agreements. Therefore, it is necessary to review these instruments to determine if any provisions empower the 1st Respondent to undertake actions such as termination, suspension, nullification, or cancellation of the Applicants’ employment as indicated in Exhibits D and E.

 

17.                     Accordingly, the first most relevant document to interpret and apply is the 3rd respondent’s conditions of service for staff of March 2022. Under section III, paragraph O (1) (a) under "Termination of Appointment" states that an appointment may be terminated before its expiration date by the Council in accordance with the Edict/Law and the statutes establishing the institution.

 

18.                     Counsel argues that the 1st respondent possesses no statutory power to appoint, suspend or terminate the applicants. Those functions are exclusively entrusted to the Governing Council of the 3rd respondent under Sections 8(1)(c) & (d) and 36(a), (b) & (c) of the relevant law. Those provisions accordingly confer statutory protection to the applicants’ employment.

 

19.                     Counsel relied on the Court of Appeal’s decision in BOB v. The Council, Abia State University Uturu & Anor (2015) LPELR-25611(CA), submitting that where an employment relationship has a statutory basis, the enabling instrument must be strictly complied with before any termination can be valid. In other words, every step taken to end such employment must be expressly authorized by the relevant statute. Counsel further cited Haruna v. Uniagric, Makurdi (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 912) 233 at 275 to reinforce this principle. He urges this court to answer all the questions raised in this originating summons in favour of the applicants and to grant all the reliefs sought by them.

 

THE RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL’S SUBMISSIONS:

20.                     In the written address accompanying the counter affidavit against the applicants’ originating summons, the respondents' counsel led by the Honourable Attorney General of the State and Sabo Longji, a director in the Plateau State Ministry of Justice, formulated 3 issues for determination:

a.      Whether this Honourable Court can hear this matter in view of the fact that the applicants were employed separately, at different times and for different positions?

b.     Whether this Honourable Court can hear the matter in view of the fact the 5th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 23rd, 26th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 35th, 36th, and 39th applicants have dissociated themselves from the suit?

c.       Whether this Honourable Court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear this matter in view of the fact that the employment of the Applicants have not been confirmed?

 

21.                     On issue one, counsel referred to Ebo-Ade & Ors. v. Ojo-Ojiro & Ors. (2018) LPELR-51498 (CA), submitting that it is settled law that this Court may only hear employment claims brought by individuals, not groups. He argued that each applicant, having been engaged separately, at different times, and for different posts, should have instituted their own suit. Because their duties and work schedules differ, they cannot properly be joined in a single action. Counsel further relied on Padawa & Ors. v. Jatau (2002) LPELR-5380 (CA) (pp. 9–11) to reinforce this point.

 

22.                     On the second issue, learned counsel submit that it is settled law that an applicant must expressly grant his consent before a lawyer can institute proceedings on his behalf. Such consent is particularly crucial when several applicants join together to seek reliefs. Relying on Akinbode v. Oyebamiji & Anor. (2014) LPELR-24410 (CA) and Scheep & Anor. v. The MV “S.ARAZ” & Anor. (2000) LPELR-1866 (SC), counsel points out that the 5th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 23rd, 26th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 35th, 36th and 39th applicants never gave their consent to be joined in this suit. As a result, the claim is incurably defective in respect of the reliefs sought, and those applicants’ names should be struck out.

 

 

23.                     Regarding issue 3, the respondents’ counsel argue that it is well-established law that any employee hired will undergo a probationary period of at least three (3) years, which may be extended. During this probationary period, the employer has the authority to either terminate the employment or extend the probation. However, if the employment becomes permanent within this period, the employee cannot be subject to the employer's arbitrary decisions, as outlined in Civil Service Rules 020303.

 

24.                     That it is also the principle of law that an Employee cannot force himself on an unwilling employer relying on the authority of Ibrahim & Anor. v. National Commissioner for College of Education & Anor. (2017) LPELR-45407 (CA).

 

25.                     Counsel ultimately argue that the applicants in this case cannot maintain their claims against the respondents because they have been employed by the 3rd Respondent for less than two years and are still within their probationary period, making the cause of action premature for adjudication. They urge this court to dismiss the suit accordingly.

 

APPLICANTS’ REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW:

26.                     On 14/5/2024, the applicants’ counsel filed their further and better affidavit together with a written address and a reply on points of law, in response to the respondents’ written address supporting their counter-affidavit. They submitted that the respondents’ legal arguments overlooked the central issues in this case. At the heart of their contention is whether the first respondent possessed any statutory authority to interfere with the applicants’ employment, as he purported to do through Exhibits D and E.

 

27.                     The applicants’ counsel further submitted that by failing to dispute the points they raised, the respondents have effectively conceded them. He relied on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Golden Construction Company Ltd v. Stateco Nig. Ltd & Anor (2013) LPELR-22832 (CA) to underline that the 1st respondent cannot exercise a power that he does not lawfully possess.

 

 

28.                     The applicants' counsel further referenced Order 13 Rules 1 of the court's rules, emphasizing that joint actions against a common respondent are permissible when:

a.      The cause of action is common among the applicants,

b.     The transactions leading to the cause of action are the same,

c.      The rights being asserted by the applicants are the same,

d.     The instruments of evidence being interpreted are the same,

e.      The reliefs sought against the respondents are the same.

 

29.                     They further argued that the case of EBO-ADE & ORS V. OJO-ONIRO & ORS (2018) LPELR – 51498 (CA), relied upon by the respondents, actually supports the applicants' case. This authority suggests that joinder of parties is desirable to avoid multiple actions when there is a common interest or question of law, but not when the parties have distinct interests.

 

30.                     The applicants’ counsel argued that all of the claimants have an identical cause of action, were terminated by the same instrument, served for the same duration and under identical terms and conditions. To require each applicant to file a separate suit would therefore result in an unnecessary multiplicity of actions.

 

 

31.                     Regarding the issue of some applicants dissociating themselves from the suit, the applicants' counsel pointed to exhibits 1–5, which counter this claim. They argued that this issue does not affect the court's jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit. If any applicants have indeed dissociated themselves, it would result in the striking out of their names only.

 

32.                     On the application of Rules 020303 of the Civil Service Rules, the applicants' counsel argued that the applicants' employment is governed by the Staff Scheme, Terms and Conditions of Service, and state laws, not by the Civil Service Rules. They referenced BABATUNDE V. THE GOVERNING COUNCIL FEDERAL POLYTECHNIC, EDE & ANOR (2014) LPELR-24236 (CA) to support their position on statutory employment.

 

33.                     Learned counsel further argued that even if the applicants were on probation at the time of their termination, the due procedure of law should have been followed, and only the employer has the authority to terminate their employment. The main issue is that the 1st respondent, who exercised the power to terminate, is not the applicants' employer.

 

34.                     On the question of what the correct hiring process should be, counsel contend that the respondents never defined the “due procedure.” Relying on AWOLOLA v. GOVERNOR OF EKITI STATE & ORS. (2018) LPELR-46364 (SC), they urged the court not to fill that gap by speculation. They further submitted that, if the mandated procedure was in fact ignored, the respondents cannot rely on that omission to defeat the applicants’ case—especially since it was the 3rd respondent’s duty to ensure that the proper steps were taken.

 

 

35.                     The applicants' counsel argued that validating the termination of the applicants' employment by the 1st respondent would allow the respondents to benefit from their own wrongdoing. They relied on the case of NKECHI & ANOR V. ANYALEWECHI (2021) LPELR-55611 (CA).

 

36.                     The applicants' counsel reiterated that the issues in this suit should be resolved in favor of the applicants and against the respondents.

 

 

RESPONDENTS’ PRELIMINARY OBJECTION:

37.                     The respondents submitted a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 6/5/2024 and filed on 7/5/2024. Accompanying the notice was an 8 -paragraph affidavit and written submissions from Counsel. Through this notice, the respondents sought the following orders:

                                                    i.      An order dismissing the suit for lack of requisite jurisdiction.

                                                  ii.      An order striking out the names of the 5th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 23rd, 26th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 35th, 36th, and 39th Applicants from the suit.

                                               iii.      A declaration that the suit cannot be sustained by the applicants jointly claiming reliefs against the respondents individually.

38.                     The supporting affidavit was sworn by Binjing M. Yildep, a litigation clerk from the Plateau State Ministry of Justice. It is noteworthy that the facts presented in this affidavit are already included in the respondents' affidavit responding to the originating summons. Attached to the affidavit are 14 separate affidavits, each deposed to on different dates by the following individuals:

1.     Grace Dabe (5th Applicant) on April 19, 2024

2.     Charles Ponmak Felix (9th Applicant) on April 24, 2024

3.     Chinke Tongshinung Alex (11th Applicant) on April 18, 2024

4.     Dung Eric (12th Applicant) on April 18, 2024

5.     Geoffrey Rotshok Gonam (16th Applicant) on April 18, 2024

6.     Damwan Elizabeth Micah (23rd Applicant) on April 17, 2024

7.     Mutla Mohorret Morgan (26th Applicant) on April 25, 2024

8.     Nengyi Gompil Gotar (27th Applicant) on April 18, 2024

9.     Pangyuk Yusuf Adams (29th Applicant mistakenly listed as 39th Applicant) on April 19, 2024

10.                        Dayak Samuel (30th Applicant) on April 19, 2024

11.                        Awurumdat Abraham Dayah (31st Applicant) on April 24, 2024

12.                        Kazul Nshe Benedict (32nd Applicant) on April 19, 2024

13.                        Abigail Ibrahim Igyen (35th Applicant) on April 18, 2024

14.                        Nandi Matthew Moven (36th Applicant) on April 22, 2024.

 

 

THE APPLICANTS’ RESPONSE TO THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION:

39.                     On 9/5/2024, the applicants’ counsel filed a counter-affidavit and written reply to the preliminary objection. The arguments they advance are identical to those already made in response to the respondents’ counter-affidavit to the originating summons, so repeating them here would be redundant. The court will refer to any relevant points in the written brief as the need arises.

 

COURT’S DECISION:

40.                     Having considered all the arguments and submissions of the parties as well as the processes filed in this suit, it is the court’s view that the issues that arise for determination are as follows:

a.      Whether this court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit?

b.     Whether the applicants have proved their claims in this suit to be entitled to the reliefs sought?

 

41.                     On issue 1, learned counsel for the respondents filed a notice of preliminary objection and raised 3 grounds for the objection:

                                                    i.      That the honourable court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this suit.

                                                  ii.      That the names of the 5th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 23rd, 26th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 35th, 36th, and 39th Applicants be struck out from the suit.

                                               iii.      That this suit cannot be sustained by the applicants jointly claiming the reliefs against the Respondents individually.

42.                     Jurisdiction is a threshold issue in any proceeding and must be resolved before all others. To determine whether this Court may hear the present suit, one looks to the applicants’ pleadings. A perusal of the affidavit in support of the originating summons makes it plain that all the reliefs sought arise from the same transaction—the alleged termination of the applicants’ employment by the first respondent. Equally, the central legal question—whether the first respondent had the power to terminate those employments—is identical for every applicant. These matters are clearly employment-related and fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court under section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

 

43.                     The respondents also contend that 14 of the applicants listed on the originating summons (i.e. the  5th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 23rd, 26th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 35th, 36th, and 39th applicants), did not consent to this suit being instituted on their behalf. The respondents attached 14 affidavits to the counter affidavit in opposition to the originating summons. These 14 affidavits are respectively deposed to by Grace Dabe deposed on 19/4/2024 (5th Applicant), Charles Ponmak Felix deposed on 24/4/2024 (9th Applicant), Chinke Tongshinung Alex deposed on 18/4/2024 (11th Applicant), Dung Eric deposed on 18/4/2024 (12th Applicant), Geoffrey Rotshok Gonam deposed on 18/4/2024 (16th Applicant), Damwan Elizabeth Micah deposed on 17/4/2024 (23rd Applicant), Mutla Mohorret Morgan deposed on 25/4/2024 (26th Applicant), Nengyi Gompil Gotar deposed on 18/4/2024 (27th Applicant), Pangyuk Yusuf Adams deposed on 19/4/2024, (29th Applicant mistakenly listed as 39th Applicant), Dayak Samuel deposed on 19/4/2024 (30th Applicant), Awurumdat Abraham Dayah deposed on 24/4/2024 (31st Applicant), Kazul Nshe Benedict deposed on 19/4/2024  (32nd Applicant), Abigail Ibrahim Igyen deposed on 18/4/2024 (35th Applicant), Nandi Matthew Moven deposed 22/4/2024 (36th Applicant).

 

44.                     In the applicants’ counter affidavit in opposition to the respondents’ notice of preliminary objection, the applicants produced yet another 14 documents, which they refer to as the overleaf of the letters of employment of Grace Dabe (5th Applicant), Charles Ponmak Felix (9th Applicant), Chinke Tongshinung Alex (11th Applicant), Dung Eric Innocent (12th Applicant), and Nengyi Gotar Gompil (27th Applicant), Kazul Nshe Benedict (32nd Applicant), Nandi Matthew Moven (36th Applicant),  (Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11 and 13 respectively). Each of these documents contain the inscription “With My Consent”, a name, a mobile phone number, a date and a signature. The Applicants produced these documents in the bid to controvert and dislodge the respondents claim that the 5th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 27th, 32nd and 36th applicants did not consent to this suit being instituted on their behalf.

 

45.                     The applicants also averred in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of their counter affidavit in opposition to the notice of preliminary objection thus:

(5). Upon receipt of a copy of the preliminary objection of the respondents, I discovered that the respondents deposed that the 5th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 23rd, 26th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 35th, 36th, and 39th applicants denied giving consent  for filing of the instant suit and that they deposed to affidavits to that effect.

 

(6). I have not seen copies of the said affidavits, however, I personally received photocopies of the appointment letters of the 5th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 23rd, 26th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 35th, 36th, and 39th applicants upon which they signed and consented to the filing of the instant suit when we all agreed to file the suit challenging the Governor’s powers to terminate our employment.

 

(7). To satisfy my curiosity on the truth or otherwise of the depositions contained in the respondent’s affidavit, I posted a notice on our WhatsApp platform where all the Applicants are members, inviting any person who desired to discontinue the suit for him or herself to contact our counsel and discuss terms so that our counsel can formally take steps, but till date none of the Applicants has showed up.

 

46.                     It is undisputed that the affidavits of non-participation were sworn by the individual applicants. Had any of those applicants wished to pursue the suit, they should have filed affidavits in reply to challenge those submitted by the respondents.

 

47.                     Thus said, I find that the affidavits of non-interest in the suit by the 5th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 23rd, 26th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 35th, 36th, and 39th applicants filed by the respondents shall only attract the striking out of the names of the affected applicants. In other words, the fact that the 5th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 23rd, 26th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 35th, 36th, and 39th applicants are pulling out or are showing no interest in the suit is not sufficient to vitiate this suit. In effect, the respondents’ preliminary objection succeeds only in part. The names of Grace Dabe (5th Applicant), Charles Ponmak Felix (9th Applicant), Chinke Tongshinung Alex (11th Applicant), Dung Eric (12th Applicant), Geoffrey Rotshok Gonam (16th Applicant), Damwan Elizabeth Micah (23rd Applicant), Mutla Mohorret Morgan (26th Applicant), Nengyi Gompil Gotar (27th Applicant), Pangyuk Yusuf Adams (29th Applicant mistakenly listed as 39th Applicant), Dayak Samuel (30th Applicant), Awurumdat Abraham Dayah (31st Applicant), Kazul Nshe Benedict (32nd Applicant), Abigail Ibrahim Igyen (35th Applicant), Nandi Matthew Moven (36th Applicant) are hereby struck out from the other names of applicants in this suit on the basis of their indication of withdrawal. I so hold. 

 

48.                     It is again the contention of the respondents that the applicants cannot sue jointly since they were employed separately and not jointly. They also base their argument on the ground that the applicants were employed in different positions in the 3rd respondent institution. It is my honest opinion that it would amount to a waste of precious but scarce judicial time and also overbearing feat for each of these 37 applicants here to institute separate actions in the same court, seeking the same reliefs against the same parties. This court and indeed all courts are duty bound to exercise their judicial powers in preventing multiplicity of suits by utilizing the instrumentality of joinder of parties to determine such matters in a single suit – UNITED GEOPHYSICAL (NIG.) LTD & ORS. V. OSIOBE & ORS (2014) LPELR-24528 (CA). Respecting the authority of EBO-ADE & ORS V. OJO-ONIRO & ORS (supra) heavily relied on by the respondents, it would reveal that the case does not support the respondents’ arguments rather it actually supports and encourages joint actions, even as the fact of that authority is at variance with the facts of the instant suit. Therefore, it is imperative to declare that giving the circumstances of this suit, these applicants are proper before this court under joint action, and I so hold.

 

49.                     Furthermore, the respondents in their further affidavit submit that commencement of this suit by originating summons, is a wrong procedure. According to counsel, there are contentious issues between the parties here, hence necessitating the use of a formal writ of complaint. The applicants’ counsel animadverts this claim altogether.

 

50.                     It is my considered opinion that in the instant case, there are no contentious issues to be resolved. This suit centers on the suspension and termination of the applicants’ employments and whether it is the statutory function of the 1st respondent to exercise. The nature of their employments and the terms and conditions for which those employments can be determined considering their respective letters of employment, relevant statutes and regulatory laws, are the focus for determining the questions raised by the applicants. So, the use of originating summons is indeed appropriate by the applicants. The rules of this court also give support to the use of originating summons suits like this when it provides under ORDER 3 (1) (b) NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT (CIVIL PROCEDURE) RULES 2017 and Order 3(3) thus: “Civil proceedings that may be commenced by way of originating summons include matters relating principally to the interpretation of any constitution, enactment, agreements or any other instrument relating to employment, labour, industrial relations in respect of which the court has jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) or by any Act or Law in force in Nigeria.”.

 

51.                     Based on the forgone therefore, this court partially upholds the preliminary objection by granting an order to strike out the names of the parties who indicated their non-interest in the suit only. The other reliefs sought by the respondents are incompetent and are hereby dismissed.

 

52.                     Respecting the issue 2 raised by this court for determination, reliefs 1, 2, 3, 4 seek declaratory orders. By their nature, declaratory reliefs are not granted as a matter of course. The applicants need to establish their entitlement to them on the strength of their own case. Here, they allege that the 1st respondent has no power to terminate their appointments/employments and that such termination is unlawful, illegal, null and void of no legal consequence whatsoever.

 

53.                     Exhibits A1 - A37 which are the appointment letters of the applicants, clearly establish that they were offered employments by the 3rd respondent institution within the same periods. Besides, the employment letters also contain the terms and conditions of service governing their employments. The applicants forwarded their letters of acceptance within the same period as shown in Annexure C produced by the respondents. These documents speak for themselves and in line with the well-established principle of law, documentary evidence is the best evidence because it speaks for itself – AKINBISADE v. THE STATE (2006) 17 NWLR (PART 1007) 184 SC. There is no disputing the fact that the 3rd respondent is the employer of the applicants.

 

54.                     In arguing their case the applicants relied on the affidavit in support of the originating summons, their written address and further affidavit. Attached to the originating summons are 37 documents marked Exhibits A1 - A37 which are letters of employment, Exhibit D (conditions of service of the 3rd respondent) and Exhibit E (press release).

 

 

55.                     The parties’ pleadings unanimously show that the applicants were employed by the 3rd respondent’s council—a fact the respondents have not challenged. The respondents’ sole defence is that those appointments were invalid due to procedural irregularities. It is likewise undisputed that the 1st respondent purportedly terminated the applicants’ contracts of employment. The real dispute, therefore, is whether the 1st respondent lawfully effected those terminations by convening a preliminary committee before and after suspending the applicants and then formally terminating them.

 

56.                     It is well-established that when employment has statutory backing, the relationship between employer and employee is regulated by a statute or regulations derived from it. It is now recognized that if a service contract is dictated by statutory provisions or if the service conditions are outlined in regulations originating from statutory provisions, the employee is given a legal status superior to that of a typical employer-employee relationship, as stated in MOBIL PRODUCING (NIG.) UNLTD V. OKON JOHNSON & 14 ORS. (2018) 14 NWLR (PT. 1639) 329 AT 359.

 

 

57.                     It is common ground that the 3rd respondent—the applicants’ employer—is a statutory body. The applicants contend (and without dispute) that their employment is governed by the College’s Conditions of Service for Staff and the Plateau State College of Agriculture Establishment Edict, 1998 (see paragraph 5 of the affidavit supporting the originating summons). This position is further confirmed by Clause 1C of each applicant’s letter of appointment (Exhibits A1–A37), which provides that they “will at all times be subject to the College’s Conditions and Scheme of Service.”

 

 

58.                     It follows from the foregoing that the applicants’ employment are statutory in nature. As is well established, where employment carries a statutory flavour, the terms of the employer–employee relationship are governed by the statute or regulations made under it. This principle was affirmed by the Court in BOB v. THE COUNCIL, ABIA STATE UNIVERSITY UTURU & ANOR. (2015) LPELR-25611 (CA). Having found that the applicants are statutory employees of the 3rd respondent—whose appointments and dismissals can only occur in the manner prescribed by the enabling statute, or any regulations or subsidiary instruments derived from it—it is therefore necessary to determine how the respondents actually terminated the applicants’ employment.

 

59.                     The answer can be found from the pleadings of the parties. Paragraphs 6, 11, 12 and 13 of the applicants’ affidavit in support of the originating summons state as follows:

 

“7. Upon the change in leadership in the office of the 1st respondent, the 1st respondent proceeded to announce the suspension of all the staff of the Plateau State Government and other statutory agencies newly employed from October 2022 till 29th May, 2023, including the applicants.

 

10. After our purported suspension from the service of the 3rd respondent, the 1st respondent constituted a committee allegedly to look into the issue of our employment and advise him among other terms of reference.

 

11. None of us the Applicants was ever invited nor interviewed or heard from by the said committee and the outcome of the assignment of the committee was never served on us or made public till date.

 

12. Subsequently, by another publication by the 1st Respondent, the 1st Respondent purported to terminate our employment and appointment from the services of the 3rd Respondent by announcing its cancellation and nullification…”

 

60.                     In response to these averments by the applicants, the respondents aver in paragraphs 4(h), (i), (n) and (o) as follows:

 

“4(h). That paragraph 6 is not true and state that because of the said change of leadership in the state, a panel of investigation was set up by the 1st respondent to investigate the legality of the applicants’ temporary employment.

 

4(i). In further response to paragraph 6, based on the Panel’s investigation, the 1st respondent who is the visitor of the institution (3rd respondent) looked at the Report of the Panel and consequently suspended the Applicants’ employment which employment process was marred with irregularities.

 

4(n). we admit paragraph 10 of the applicants’ affidavit.

4(o).that I know of a fact that paragraph 11 is not true and state that the Committee invited the Applicants during its investigation, but the applicants failed to honour the committee’s invitation.”

 

61.                     The parties’ pleadings make it clear that the first respondent allegedly suspended the applicants and then purportedly terminated their employment by means of a published notice. That suspension gave rise to this suit and raises the question whether the first respondent validly and lawfully ended the applicants’ employment.

 

62.                     The applicants dispute the 1st respondent’s authority to terminate them. As a general rule of employment law—and under the Interpretation Act—the power to hire ordinarily carries with it the power to fire. In this case, the 3rd respondent is the applicants’ employer and the only employing authority they recognize. The respondents nonetheless contend in their pleadings that, by virtue of the 1st respondent’s position as Visitor of the 3rd respondent, he legitimately exercised the power to terminate the applicants’ employment.

 

63.                     Based on the evidence presented by the applicants in this case, it is natural for the burden of proof to shift to the respondents. It becomes the responsibility of the respondents to demonstrate the legitimacy of the 1st respondent's authority in the alleged termination of the applicants' employment. The appellate court in the case of ALIYU & ORS v. YOLA & ORS (2022) LCN/16188 (CA) clarified this duty, stating: “The plaintiff carries the initial burden of proof to establish their claim. This evidential burden only shifts to the defendant once the plaintiff has provided sufficient credible evidence. Section 136 of the Evidence Act 2011 outlines this shifting burden of proof, stating that the burden lies on the party who wants the court to believe a fact exists, unless a law specifies otherwise. This burden can shift during a case, as further explained in ADIGHIJE v. NWAOGU (2010) 12 NWLR (PT.1209) 419 @ 463: 'Section 133 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011.”

 

64.                     In their counter-affidavit, the respondents contend that when the applicants’ employment was terminated, they were still within the probationary period at the third respondent’s institution. Section III, paragraph M(1) of the third respondent’s Conditions of Service provides that every appointment begins with a two-year probation from the date of engagement. Although the applicants did not pinpoint the exact dates of suspension or termination, their appointment letters (Exhibits A1–A37) bear dates between September and November 2022, and this suit was filed on March 14, 2024—only about one year and five months later, which falls short of the two-year probation term. Consequently, it appears their service was ended while they were still on probation. Nevertheless, their probationary status does not deprive them of the rights conferred by their statutory employment, which must be respected and enforced in line with the relevant statutes and institutional regulations.

 

65.                     Exhibits A1–A37, together with the 3rd respondent’s Conditions of Service, explicitly deal with disengagement during probation. The relevant provision appears in Section III, paragraph M(3), and reads as follows:

(3). If at any time during the period of probation the Council is satisfied that a member of staff is not suitable for service the Institution, the appointment shall be terminated with three months’ notice or three months’ salary in lieu of notice in the case of Senior staff and one months’ notice or one month’s salary in lieu of notice in the case of junior staff.

 

66.                     This excerpt highlights that the applicants' employment could be terminated with either notice or salary in place of notice during their probationary period, but only if the council is convinced that the employee is not fit for service. There is no evidence before this court indicating that the council of the 3rd respondent was involved in the alleged suspension and termination of the applicants' employment without notice.

67.                     The respondents maintain that a committee was set up both before and after the applicants’ suspension and that the applicants were invited to meet with it but failed to respond. The applicants, however, flatly deny this, and the court record contains no evidence—no invitation, minutes, or resolutions—to show that they or their representatives were ever asked to appear. On that basis, the court is not persuaded that any such committee meeting was convened or that the applicants were summoned to it either before or after their alleged termination.

 

68.                     The respondents’ allegation that the applicants’ positions were neither advertised nor free from irregularity rests on unsupported assertions. It was for the respondents—not the applicants—to supervise and, if necessary, challenge the recruitment process. No principal officer of the 3rd respondent has complained or been joined as a party to this suit. Nor have the respondents identified any statutory provision requiring such vacancies to be advertised or shown how the applicants’ appointments were tainted by manifest irregularities. Since the burden of proof lies squarely with the respondents, and they have adduced no evidence, the court must presume that the recruitment was carried out fairly and in compliance with all relevant guidelines.

 

69.                     Accordingly, this court finds that the respondents did not observe the statutory requirements and regulatory guidelines governing the determination of the applicants’ employment—particularly in the way they suspended and later terminated them. The suspension and termination are therefore unlawful, illegal, null and void and have no effect whatsoever. I so hold.

 

70.                     Addressing the matter of the applicants' claim for unpaid salaries, they contend that they are owed salaries from January 2023 up to the filing of this suit. The respondents, however, refute this claim, asserting that the applicants were fully paid their salaries from January 2023 through April 2023. The respondents also referenced a spreadsheet detailing these payments, but this document was not presented to the court. In response, the applicants’ counsel served additional authorities to support their claim for unpaid wages. I have reviewed those decisions and will now deliver my opinion.

 

71.                     Besides the applicants' statements in their affidavit, which the respondents countered in their affidavit, there is no concrete evidence, such as account statements or other documents, to substantiate the claim that the applicants were unpaid or to indicate the last month they received their salaries. It must be recalled that they chose to commence this action by way of originating summons instead of a general writ of complaint. Therefore, for the court to assume the figures stated in their supporting affidavit are accurate would be speculative even if the respondents did not deny them. The fact that a respondent either acknowledges or fails to defend such a claim is irrelevant, as the claimant is required to provide strict proof of the monetary claim made, and nothing less. This is supported by the decision in NNPC V. CLIFCO NIG Ltd. (2011) 4 MJSC 142 at 174, which stated that "a claim for special damages will not succeed merely due to admission of the claim; special damages are never inferred from the nature of the act complained of... They are exceptional and must be specifically claimed and strictly proven."

 

72.                     The term 'strict proof' denotes the necessity for evidence to distinctly support and verify the facts detailed in the statement of facts. This evidence should directly and accurately align with the claimant's assertions. While the required standard isn't excessively high, it demands evidence that is appropriate and substantial enough for clear evaluation. This involves offering detailed evidence needed to thoroughly substantiate the pleadings and the calculated amount claimed. The extent of strict proof is significantly influenced by the specific facts and unique circumstances of each case. This burden is satisfied only when credible evidence is presented, allowing for a precise assessment or quantification of the alleged losses or damages. Refer to OFEM AND ORS V. UBANA OBETAN (unreported) suit number NICN/CA/11/2018 Per Kado, J judgment delivered on 18/8/2022. Also, the judgments of this court in Chendu and ors v. Governor of Plateau State and others (unreported) suit number NICN/JOS/09/2024 on pages 36/37 paragraphs 110 to 111 and Jilkat Gambo James and 13 others v Governor of Plateau State and others (unreported) suit number NICN/JOS/10/2024 delivered on 5/6/2025.

 

73.                     The dearth of credible and compelling oral testimony and other evidence to support this claim of salary in arrears by the applicants is fatal to them. Consequently, this court is not convinced that the applicants are owed salaries from January 2023 to date, as claimed in their relief 7. I so hold.

 

74.                     It should be noted, however, that following their reinstatement by this court, the applicants will begin receiving their salaries, and they will be entitled to receive them monthly accordingly.

 

 

75.                     The questions raised for determination are hereby resolved by this court, thus:

76.                     Question 1 of the originating summons which is “whether the 1st respondent is possessed of or clothed with the powers or authority to unilaterally suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the employments and appointments of the Applicants through Exhibits D and E, the applicants having been in the service and employment of the 3rd Respondent.”, is answered in the negative.

 

77.                     Question 2 of the originating summons which is “by virtue of the various letters of appointment issued to the Applicants attached as Exhibits A1 – A37, whether the applicants are not entitled to maintain and retain their employment with the 3rd respondent in line with extant laws regulating their employment with the 3rd respondent”, is answered in the affirmative.

 

 

78.                     Question 3 of the originating summons which is “whether the failure and refusal of the 3rd respondent to pay the applicants their salaries and allowances thereby retaining same from the month of January 2023 till date or any period of time at all is not unlawful, unjust, illegal and a violation of the 3rd respondent’s duties and obligations,” is determined in the negative.

 

79.                     With respect to the applicants’ motion for interlocutory injunction of this court, the said motion and all accompanying processes dated 21/3/2024 and filed on the same date are hereby struck out, having been overtaken by the event of this judgment. The same fate meets the request for perpetual injunctions against the respondents craved under relief 8 of the applicants’ prayers.

 

 

80.                     Therefore, for the sake of clarity and the avoidance of any doubt whatsoever, this court hereby grants only the following reliefs sought:

 

1.     A declaration that the 1st respondent  has no power or authority to suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the employments and appointments of the applicants duly engaged in the services and employment of the 3rd respondent.

2.     A declaration that the purported termination, nullification and cancellation of the employments and appointments of the applicants by the 1st respondent  through exhibits D, and E, is unlawful, illegal, null and void with no legal effect whatsoever.

3.     A declaration that the applicants are entitled to maintain and retain their respective employments with the 3rd respondent in line with the extant laws regulating their employments.

4.     An order setting aside the purported suspensions and subsequent terminations, nullifications and cancellations of the applicants’ appointments and employments made by the 1st respondent through the publications made at his instance attached as exhibits D and E, same having been done ultra vires and therefore unlawful, null and void.

5.     An order reinstating the applicants back to their respective positions as staff and employees of the 3rd respondent in line with their respective letters of appointments attached as exhibits A1 – A182 respectively.

6.     N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) general damages against the respondents jointly and severally for the collective pain and suffering imposed on the applicants by the respondents.

7.     Cost of this suit is awarded in favour of the applicants in the sum of N500,000.00 only.

 

81.                     This judgment shall be complied with, and the monetary awards paid by the respondents within 30 days and shall in default, attract a 10% interest per annum until fully liquidated.

 

82.                     Based therefore on the above findings, this court is satisfied that the applicants’ case succeeds in part. I hereby enter judgment for them as stated hereinbefore.

 

DELIVERED IN JOS THIS 5TH DAY OF JUNE 2025.

 

 

………………………………………………………

Hon. Justice I.S. Galadima

Judge.

 

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Judgments and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://nicnadr.gov.ng. NICN decisions are available to the general public shortly after a copy each has been sent to the claimant(s) and defendant(s) in a case.