IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HONOURABLE JUSTICE I.S
GALADIMA
DATE: 5TH
JUNE 2025 SUIT
NO: NICN/JOS/10/2024
BETWEEN:
1. JILKAT
GAMBO JAMES
2.
HARUNA KAMALUDEEN
3.
SYLVANUS NANYIL
PATIENCE
4.
MAKPLANG DASBAK D.
5.
MANYAS KIM DAYAS
6.
MARTIN GOLBE GOKAT
7.
FABIAN DANGLAT
SHALSEN APPLICANTS
8.
SUNDAY JOSHUA YELWA
9.
NAFOR UCHAM MALLAH
10.
ELISHA DORCAS GYANG
11.
ROSE JEREMIAH
MAFUYAI
12.
ISHAKU SHIKDIMA T.
13.
ABARI SANDRA MOSES
14.
FELIX YOHANNA VWAMSE
AND
1.
GOVERNOR OF PLATEAU STATE
2.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PLATEAU STATE RESPONDENTS
3.
COLLEGE OF ARTS, SCIENCE AND
REMEDIAL
STUDIES
REPRESENTATION:
·
NANTOK DASHUWAR; E.S BUF; M.L. KYEMANG FOR THE
APPLICANTS.
·
PHILEMON DAFFI (HAG); SABO LONGJI (DIRECTOR CIVIL
LITIGATIONS PLATEAU STATE MOJ) ; P.N. DASHAK; K.B. BAWUN; M.P MWANSAT FOR THE
RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT:
1. Between October 2022
and February 2023, the applicants (referred to as claimants by the parties),
accepted offers to fill several roles at the College of Arts, Science, and
Remedial Studies (the 3rd respondent). After they began work, the 1st
respondent (as the Governor of the State of Plateau and Visitor to the
institution), suspended their appointments and later announced their
termination. The applicants maintain that those terminations were unlawful and
beyond the 1st respondent’s authority, and that they have not
received any salaries since January 2023. The respondents, for their part,
insist the employments were irregular, deny owing any back pay, and ask the
court to dismiss the suit in its entirety.
QUESTIONS
FOR DETERMINATION:
2.
The applicants’
originating summons was duly filed on 21/3/2024 wherein they seek the
determination of the following questions:
i.
Whether the 1st
respondent is possessed of or clothed with the powers or authority to
unilaterally suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the
employment and appointment of the applicants through Exhibits D and E, the
applicants having been in the service and employment of the 3rd
respondent.
ii.
By virtue of the
various letters of appointment issued to the applicants attached as Exhibits A1
– A14, whether the applicants are not entitled to maintain and retain their
employment with the 3rd respondent in line the extant laws
regulating their employment with the 3rd respondent.
iii.
Whether the failure
and refusal of the 3rd respondent to pay the applicants their
salaries and allowances thereby retaining same from the month of January 2023
till date or any period of time at all is not unlawful, unjust, illegal and a
violation of the 3rd respondent’s duties and obligations.
3.
The applicants thus seek the following 10 reliefs:
1. A declaration that the 1st respondent
has no power or authority to suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way
interfere with the employments and appointments of the applicants duly engaged
in the services and employment of the 3rd respondent.
2. A declaration that the purported termination,
nullification and cancellation of the employment and appointment of the
applicants by the 1st respondent through exhibits D and E, is
unlawful, illegal, null and void with no legal effect whatsoever.
3. A declaration that the applicants are entitled to
maintain and retain their respective employments with the 3rd respondent
in line with the extant laws regulating their employment with the 3rd
respondent.
4. A declaration that the failure and refusal of the
3rd respondent to pay the applicants their respective salaries and
allowances thereby retaining same from the month of January 2023 to date is
unlawful, unjust, illegal and in violation of the 3rd respondent’s
duties and obligations.
5. An order setting aside the purported suspension
and subsequent termination, nullification and cancellation of the applicants’
various appointments and employments made by the 1st respondent
through the publications made at his instance attached as Exhibits D and E,
same having been done ultra vires and therefore unlawful, null and void.
6. An order reinstating the applicants back to their
respective positions as staff and employees of the 3rd respondent in
line with their respective letters of appointments attached as exhibits A1 to
A14 respectively.
7. An order directing the respondents to pay the
applicants their respective monthly salaries and allowances as specified by the
terms of their employment from the month of January 2023 till date, as follows:
a. 2nd – 10th applicants, each
the sum of N1,407,470.00 annually, paid in monthly instalments of N117,289.00
per month each.
b. 1st, 11th – 13th
applicants, each the sum of N873,551.00 annually, paid in monthly instalments
of N72,795.91
c. 14TH applicant, the sum of N378,391.00
annually, paid in monthly instalments of N31,532.62
8. An order of
perpetual injunction, restraining the respondents, whether by themselves, their
agents, privies, assigns or representatives howsoever described, from
victimizing, terminating or interfering with the applicants’ respective
appointment and employments with the 3rd respondent, without any
wrongdoing or violations of the terms of service on the part of the applicants.
9. N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) general
damages against the Respondents jointly and severally for the collective pain
and suffering imposed on the applicants by the respondents.
10.
Costs of this suit
as may be assessed by this honourable court.
4.
The originating summons is supported by an
affidavit of 27 paragraphs deposed to by the 1st applicant, 7
documents were exhibited therein and lettered A1 – A14, B, C, D, and E.
5.
The applicants went on to file a motion for
interlocutory injunction on 21/3/2024.
6.
The respondents jointly brought a notice of
preliminary objection dated 30/4/2024 but filed on 2/5/2024.
7.
The respondents filed a memorandum of conditional
appearance. They also filed a counter affidavit of 5 paragraphs and a written
address in opposition to the applicants’ motion for interlocutory injunction,
all dated 30/4/2024 but filed on 7/5/2024. These processes were out of time but
duly regularized vide the respondents’ motion dated 6/5/2024 but filed on
7/5/2024.
8.
The applicants reacted to the notice of
preliminary objection in their 13 paragraphs counter affidavit filed on
9/5/2024.
9.
The applicants also filed a further affidavit and
a Reply on 14/5/2024.
10.
The respondents went on to file a further
affidavit and a written address on 16/5/2024 in support of their preliminary
objection.
11.
Issues were joined at the end of pleadings, and on
the 19th May 2025, the parties’ counsel adopted their respective
arguments and submissions whereupon this court reserved this judgment to today.
APPLICANTS’ FACTS:
12.
In a joint affidavit sworn on March 21, 2024, and
a further and better affidavit sworn on May 14, 2024—both signed by the 1st
applicant on behalf of himself and the other 13 applicants—the applicants state
that they were each employed by the 3rd respondent at various times
in 2022. They produced their appointment letters, marked Exhibits A1 through
A14, as evidence.
13.
The applicants contend that they were duly engaged
in providing services to the 3rd respondent in line with their
respective employment terms and the 3rd respondent’s Revised Terms and Conditions of
Service for Staff of the College of Arts, Science and Remedial Studies, Kurgwi
Law, 2000 (marked as Exhibits B and C respectively).
14.
The applicants assert that, following a change of
leadership in the 1st respondent’s office, the Governor suspended all Plateau
State government staff appointed between October 2022 and May 29, 2023,
including themselves.
15.
The applicants maintain that, before the suspension,
the third respondent failed to pay their monthly salaries from January 2023 and
barred them from accessing their work premises.
16.
The applicants aver that they are owed salaries as
follows:
a. 2nd – 10th Applicants, each
the sum of N1,407,470.00 annually, paid in monthly instalments of N117,289.00
per month each.
b. 1st, 11th – 13th
Applicants, each the sum of N873,551.00 annually, paid in monthly instalments
of N72,795.91
c. 14TH Applicant, the sum of N378,391.00
annually, paid in monthly instalments of N31,532.62
17.
The applicants further contend that, following
their suspension, the 1st respondent set up a committee to examine
issues surrounding their employment and advise him on the matter. They maintain
that none of them were invited to participate in the committee’s meetings, nor
was its report ever made public.
18.
The applicants contend that the 1st respondent
later issued a further publication purportedly terminating their employment at
the 3rd respondent’s institution, as evidenced by Exhibits D and E.
19.
The applicants contend that the 1st respondent’s
decision to terminate their employment was not backed by any regulatory
instrument or applicable law governing their service at the 3rd respondent. In
response to this alleged termination, they held a meeting on February 9, 2024,
at which they appointed several members—including the 1st applicant—to
challenge the 1st respondent’s action.
20.
The applicants contend that it was not the 3rd
respondent who ended their employment, but the 1st respondent—who, they insist,
has no authority to hire or dismiss them.
21.
Moreover, it was noted that every applicant
consented to bringing this action. They maintain that none of them are
politicians and that the 3rd respondent lawfully hired them
following interviews it conducted.
22.
The applicants contend that their roles with the
third respondent were permanent and pensionable, and that none of them
underwent any disciplinary proceedings before their employment was terminated.
23.
The applicants further aver that there was no
publication made on the termination of their appointment, safe for the Press
Release (Exhibits D and E).
24.
The applicants additionally contend that the 3rd
respondent is understaffed and requires their services.
25.
In total
the applicants exhibited 20 documents which were marked as follows:
i.
Letters of appointment for each of the 14
applicants marked as Exhibits “A1 –
A14”.
ii.
The 3rd
respondent’s Revised Terms and Condition of Service for Staff, “Exhibit B”.
iii.
The College of Arts, Science and Remedial Studies,
Kurgwi Law, 2000, ”marked as Exhibits C respectively.
iv.
Publications purportedly terminating the
appointment of the applicants by cancellation and nullification. “Exhibits D
and E respectively”.
v.
The overleaf of the 11th and 13th
applicants’ appointment letters wherein they signed and indicated their consent
for this suit to be instituted on their behalf - “Exhibits 1 and 2
respectively”.
RESPONDENTS’ FACTS:
26.
After being served with the originating summons
and accompanying processes, the respondents, with the deposition of Binjin
Yildep—a litigation secretary in the Plateau State Ministry of Justice—filed a
five-paragraph counter-affidavit on May 7, 2024.
27.
In their defence, the respondents contend that not
every applicant consented to the filing of this suit on their behalf. They
further state that the 11th applicant, Rose Jeremiah Mafuyai, and the 13th
applicant, Abari Sandra Moses, each swore affidavits denying any involvement in
the suit and asserting that it was instituted without first obtaining their
consent. The respondents rely on those affidavits, marked Exhibits A and B
respectively.
28.
The respondents contend that the applicants’ roles
were never advertised before their appointments, in breach of the 3rd
respondent’s rules and regulations. They further maintain that, as required by
the law governing the 3rd respondent, the applicants did not appear before the
Appointment and Promotion Committee for interview. The respondents have
tendered that law as Exhibit C.
29.
Accordingly, the applicants accepted their
employment offers on separate dates and proceeded with their documentation with
the 3rd respondent. They also mentioned that the applicants did not commence
their duties immediately, as specified in their respective employment letters,
and that their appointments remained unconfirmed. The respondents submitted
these letters of acceptance as evidence, labeled as Exhibit D.
30.
The respondents contend that, following the change
of government in the State, a fact-finding panel was established to review the
legality of the temporary appointments made by the previous administration.
That committee found the entire appointment process to be riddled with
irregularities. Consequently, the 1st respondent, acting in his capacity as
Visitor to the institution, suspended the applicants’ employment.
31.
The respondents aver that the applicants were
never denied entrance into the 3rd respondent’s premises, which is
an open public institution.
32.
They further contend that no salaries are
outstanding for January 2023, asserting instead that payments for the period
January through April 2023 were duly made. In support, they produced a
spreadsheet detailing those payments, which they tendered as “Exhibit E.”
33.
The respondents further contend that the 1st
respondent appointed a preliminary committee both before and after the
applicants’ suspension. They allege the applicants were invited to its sittings
but failed to attend, and that their suspension was duly communicated via
internal notices and external publications.
34.
The respondents also contend that, when the
applicants were suspended, they were still serving their probationary period
and had not yet become permanent employees of the 3rd respondent. Therefore,
the institution’s full-service rules did not apply to them. Under the
Conditions of Service and the terms of their appointment letters, the
applicants were required to complete a two-year probation from their date of
appointment—a period that had not expired before they were suspended and later
terminated.
35.
The respondents contend that they publicly
announced the applicants’ suspension in a press release, which they consider to
constitute adequate notice.
36.
The respondents reject the assertion that the 3rd
respondent is understaffed and maintain that the applicants’ appointments were
validly terminated.
37.
In total, the respondents produced 2 documents
before this court, they are:
i.
Affidavits of non-participation of the 11th
and 13th respondents- “Exhibits
A and B”, respectively.
ii.
The applicants’ letters of acceptance marked as
“Exhibit D”.
THE APPLICANTS’ COUNSEL’ S WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS:
38.
Nantok Dashuwar,
Esq., as lead counsel for the applicants, submitted along with the originating
summons, a written address dated 23/3/2024 but filed on 21/3/2024, wherein he
formulated 3 issues for determination thus:
i.
whether the 1st respondent is possessed
of or clothed with the powers or authority to unilaterally suspend, terminate,
nullify or in any way interfere with the employments and appointments of the
claimants through Exhibits D and E, who have been in the service and employment
of the 3rd respondent.
ii.
by virtue of the various letters of appointments
issued to the applicants by the 3rd respondent attached as Exhibits
A1 – A14, whether the applicants are not entitled to maintain and retain their
employment with the 3rd respondent in line with the extant laws
regulating their employment with the 3rd respondent.
iii.
Whether the failure and refusal of the 3rd
respondent to pay the claimants their salaries and allowances thereby retaining
same from the month of January, 2023 till date or any period of time at all is
not unlawful, unjust, illegal and a violation of the 3rd
respondent’s duties and obligations.
39.
Learned counsel addressed together the three
issues he had identified for determination. He pinpointed the central question
in this suit as whether the first respondent has the authority to terminate the
applicants’ employment at the third respondent institution. Counsel then
referred the court to paragraph 2(i) of Exhibits A1–A14, arguing that the
applicants occupy statutory appointments with the third respondent.
40.
Counsel further submits that, under Chapter
II(Y)(a) on page 19—titled “Termination of Appointment”—the first respondent
has no power to employ, suspend or dismiss the applicants. On the statutory
character of their appointments, counsel invokes sections 5(n), 10(1)(b), 33
and 38(10) of the third respondent’s enabling law, together with the
authorities in BOB v. The Council, Abia State University Uturu & Anor
(2015) LPELR-25611 (CA) and Haruna v. UniAgric, Makurdi (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 912)
233 at 275 paras. D–A, to show that any action affecting employment
protected by statute must follow the specific legal provisions governing such
removals.
41.
He contends that,
under Sections 5(n), 10(1)(b), 33 and 38(1) of the 3rd respondent’s enabling
law, only its Governing Council has the authority the 1st respondent purported
to exercise in appointing the applicants. Counsel further submits that neither
the College of Arts, Science and Remedial Studies, Kurgwi 2000, nor the 3rd
respondent’s Terms and Conditions confer any hiring or dismissal powers on the
1st respondent. Accordingly, any such actions by the 1st respondent are null
and void. In support of this position, applicants’ counsel relied on the
decision in MOBIL PRODUCING NIGERIA UNLIMITED v. OKON JOHNSON & ORS
(2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1639) 329 at 359.
42.
The applicants'
counsel argues that in cases where employment has statutory protection, any
wrongful, unlawful, or illegal termination warrants a court order for
reinstatement. They reference the cases of OMIDIORA
V. F.C.S.C (2007) 14 NWLR (PT. 1053) P.17 AT 32 – 33. PARA. E-A; MOGAJI V.
BENUE STATE UNIVERSITY (2022) LPELR-56727 (CA); UMA & ORS V. ANONGO (2021)
LPELR-57912 (CA). The counsel urges the court to grant the reliefs
requested by the applicants in this case.
THE RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL’S WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS:
43.
Accompanying their
counter-affidavit, the respondents’ counsel led by the Attorney General of the
State, filed a written address dated April 30, 2024 (filed August 9, 2024), in
which they set out three issues for determination, as follows:
i.
whether this honourable court can hear this matter
in view of the fact that the applicants were employed separately, at different
times and for different position?
ii.
Whether this honourable court can hear the matter
in view of the fact that the 11th and 13th applicants
have dissociated themselves from the suit?
iii.
Whether this honourable court has the requisite
jurisdiction to hear this matter in view of the fact that the employments of
the applicants have not been confirmed.
44.
The respondents’ counsel opened his submissions by
asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction. He maintained that this type of
dispute could only be brought by an individual litigant—not by multiple
claimants in a single suit—and relied on the decision in Ebo-Ade & Ors v
Ojo-Oniro & Ors (2018) LPELR-51498 (CA) at pages 7–10, paragraph A. He
also argued that, because each of the applicants had a separate employment
contract, they were required to file individual actions, citing Padawa &
Ors v Jatau (2002) LPELR-5380 (CA) at pages 9–11, paragraph D.
45.
On the second issue, counsel submitted that the
suit should only have been filed after first securing and recording the consent
of each applicant. He relied on AKINBODE v. OYEBAMIJI & ANOR. (2024)
LPELR-24410 (CA) and SCHEEP & ANOR v. THE MV SARAZ & ANOR (2000)
LPELR-1866 (SC) in support of this proposition.
46.
In relation to issue
three, counsel submits that every employee must serve a three-year probation,
which the employer may extend or end at its discretion. Once, however, the
employee’s status is made permanent, the employer cannot lawfully terminate the
appointment on a whim. This position is supported by Rule 020303 of the Civil
Service Rules.
47.
The learned counsel
also argues that an employee cannot impose themselves on an employer who does
not wish to retain them. The learned counsel points out that the applicants had
only served the 3rd respondent for two years and were still in their
probationary period. He referenced the case of IBRAHIM & ANOR V. NATIONAL
COMMISSIONER FOR COLLEGES OF EDUCATION & ANOR (2017) LPELR-45497 (CA) to
support this argument and concluded that the case should be dismissed in the
interest of justice.
APPLICANTS’ REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW:
48.
Following the
respondents’ counter-affidavit and written address, the applicants, in their
further affidavit dated 14 May 2024, also filed a Reply on Points of Law. They
submitted that the respondents’ legal arguments entirely overlooked the core
issues of the suit. As learned counsel for the applicants pointed out, the
fundamental question—on which all other issues hinge—is whether the 1st
respondent had the power, by means of Exhibits D and E, to interfere with the
applicants’ employment.
49.
Accordingly, the
respondents, having failed to contend or challenge the issues argued by the
applicants, have consequently conceded to them. Counsel cites in aid the case
law of GOLDEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD V. STATECO NIG LTD & ANOR (2013)
LPELR-22832 (CA). He contends that the 1st respondent cannot
exercise a power he does not have.
50.
Learned counsel
refers this court to Order 13 Rules 1 of the Rules of this court to submit that
parties are allowed to file a joint action against a common respondent where:
a.
The cause of
action is common between the applicants.
b.
The transaction
or series of transactions leading to the cause of action are the same.
c.
The rights
sought to be asserted by the claimants are the same.
d.
The instrument
of evidence sought to be interpreted are the same.
e.
The reliefs
sought by the applicants against the respondents are the same.
51.
Counsel submits that
the respondents’ reliance on Ebo-Ade & Ors v. Ojo-Oniro & Ors (supra)
actually bolsters the applicants’ position rather than theirs. He points out
that the decision makes clear that parties may be joined in one suit to prevent
multiple actions only when they share a common interest or raise the same
question of law; it does not apply where each party’s interest in the subject
matter is separate and distinct. He also invokes the Court of Appeal’s decision
in United Geophysical (Nig) Ltd & Ors v. Osiobe & Ors (2024)
LPELR-24528 (CA).
52.
Counsel submits that
all the applicants have a single cause of action, since they were each
terminated by the same instrument. They served under identical tenures, terms
and conditions, and raise the same issues and seek the same reliefs against the
respondents. Counsel further warns that pursuing separate suits would only
multiply the proceedings.
53.
With respect to the
respondents’ assertion that certain applicants have withdrawn from the action,
learned counsel relies on Exhibits 1 and 2 to dispel that argument. He further
submits that, even if a few applicants had truly dissociated, it would not
impair the court’s jurisdiction to hear the matter; depriving the court of
competence on that basis would amount to a miscarriage of justice against those
who have diligently prosecuted their claim. At most, any bona fide withdrawal
would result only in the excision of the names of the withdrawing applicants.
54.
With respect to
Civil Service Rule 020303, counsel for the applicants contends that those
provisions do not apply to their appointments. Rather, their service is regulated
by the College’s Staff Scheme and Terms and Conditions of Service, together
with the relevant state laws and edicts. Counsel further maintains that their
employment is statutory in character and must comply with the enabling statutes
and subsidiary legislation. To illustrate the nature of statutory employment,
counsel relies on the Court of Appeal’s decision in BABATUNDE v. Governing
Council, Federal Polytechnic, Ede & Anor (2014) LPELR-24236 (CA).
55.
He also contends
that, even if one assumes (without conceding) that the applicants were still on
probation when their employment was ended, the statutory procedures governing
their engagement should have been observed and only the true employer has the
power to terminate them. Learned counsel submits that the real issue is that
the first respondent who purported to dismiss them is not their employer.
56.
Regarding whether
the applicants were employed following the correct procedure, the learned
counsel argues that the respondents have not demonstrated to the court what
constitutes the due procedure they are referring to. The counsel urges the
court not to make assumptions, as the respondents have not specified the
provisions outlining the proper employment procedure for the applicants. The
counsel cites the case of AWOLOLA V. GOVERNOR OF EKITI STATE & ORS. (2018)
LPELR-46364 (SC) to support this point. The learned counsel further contends
that even if the employment procedure was not properly followed, as claimed by
the respondents, they are barred from using this argument to undermine the
applicants' case, since the 3rd respondent is responsible for adhering to the
employment procedure. The counsel references section 169 of the Evidence Act
2004 and the case of BENUE STATE UNIVERSITY V. MOGAJI (2022) LPELR-56729 (CA)
to bolster this argument.
57.
The applicants'
counsel argues that if the court upholds the termination of the applicants'
employment by the 1st respondent, it would unjustly allow the respondents to
benefit from their misconduct. This is because it is the responsibility of the
3rd respondent, not the employees, to adhere to proper procedures regarding
employment. The counsel cited the case of NKECHI & ANOR V. ANYALEWECHI
(2021) LPELR-55611 (CA) to support their point.
58.
Counsel finally
enjoins this court to find in favour of the applicants.
RESPONDENTS’ PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
59.
The respondents
submitted a notice of preliminary objection dated 30/4/2024 and filed on
2/5/2024. In support is an 8 paragraphed affidavit, and counsel’s written
submissions. Within the notice of preliminary objection, the respondents seek
the following orders:
a.
An order
dismissing this suit for want of requisite jurisdiction.
b.
An order
striking out the names of the 11th and 13th applicants in
this suit.
c.
And for such
further order(s) this honourable court may deem fit to make in the
circumstance.
60.
The affidavit
supporting the motion is sworn to by Binjing M. Yildep, a litigation clerk from
the Ministry of Justice in Plateau State. The respondents argued, among other
things, that the applicants' employment had not been confirmed, as such
confirmation was contingent upon their conduct. They claimed that the
applicants were hired without undergoing interviews. The respondents also
mentioned that the applicants' employment with the 3rd respondent was political
and needed to be annulled, with reemployment conducted through proper
procedures. Additionally, they argued that the applicants were hired
individually and could not pursue a joint suit. They further noted that the
11th and 13th applicants did not consent to be part of the suit and have
applied for new employment.
61.
The legal
submissions made by the respondents' counsel merely reiterate the arguments
presented in support of their counter affidavit to the originating summons.
Since these submissions have already been detailed earlier in this judgment, it
would be redundant and unnecessary to repeat them here.
APPLICANT’S REPLY TO THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION:
62.
After receiving the
respondents' notice for a preliminary objection, the applicants submitted a
14-paragraph counter affidavit on 9/5/2024, sworn to by the 1st applicant. This
affidavit contains the same facts and exhibits (exhibits 1 and 2) as those in
the applicants' further affidavit dated 14/5/2024, which the court had
referenced earlier in this judgment. The legal arguments presented by the
applicants' counsel in support of the counter affidavit are essentially a
repetition of the arguments made in support of the applicants' further
affidavit of 14/5/2024 and thus do not need to be repeated here.
RESPONDENTS’ FURTHER AND BETTER AFFIDAVIT:
63.
The respondents
proceeded to file an 8-paragraph additional affidavit in further support of
their notice of preliminary objection. This affidavit was filed on 16/5/2024
and was sworn by Bonjing Michael Yildep. In their brief of arguments, the
respondents reiterated that, according to the affidavits of the 11th and 13th
applicants, these applicants did not authorize the filing of the suit on their
behalf. The respondents claim that the applicants' documents (Exhibits 1 and
2), which supposedly contain the signatures of the 11th and 13th applicants,
are not authentic. They further assert that the signatures attributed to these
applicants differ from those in their affidavit of non-participation. Other details
in this additional affidavit, as well as the counsel’s arguments supporting it,
either repeat previously stated facts and arguments or introduce new issues not
related to the applicants' counter affidavit. The court must disregard these
new facts and submissions.
COURT’S DECISION:
64.
I have thoroughly
reviewed the documents submitted by both parties in this case and have
thoughtfully considered the issues and questions raised by their respective
counsel. This court believes that the two central and primary issues requiring
comprehensive resolution in this case, which encompass the other issues
presented by the counsel, are as follows:
i.
Whether this
court lacks requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit.
ii.
Whether
considering the facts and evidence before this court, the applicants have
proven their claims in this suit?
ON ISSUE 1:
65.
Before proceeding,
it is important to note that this court previously adjudicated some cases with
similar facts and circumstances: Wulkwap Hooman Danjuma and 181 Others v.
The Governor of Plateau State and 2 Others (unreported) suit number
NICN/JOS/09/2024, with a judgment delivered on 26/9/2024 and Chendu and 99
ors v Governor of Plateau State and ors (unreported) suit number
NICN/JOS/08/2024 delivered on 18/11/2024. As legal precedence, those cases will
heavily influence my decision in this matter as well.
66.
The first issue
raises a jurisdictional question, one which principally stems from the notice
of preliminary objection of the respondents. It is apposite and trite that the
preliminary objection be given the foremost attention at this stage since it
challenges the jurisdiction of this court to hear and determine this suit. Thus
said, issue no. 1 being a jurisdictional matter merits the pride of place of
being taken first for the simple reason that it is a threshold issue - BRONIK
MOTORS LIMITED AND ANOTHER V. WEMA BANK LIMITED (1983) 1 SCNLR (P. 296); OKOYA
V. SANTILLI (1990) 2 NWLR (PART 131) P.172.
67.
The respondents
challenge the jurisdiction of this court to hear and determine this suit on
three fronts, as gleaned from the grounds upon which they premise their
objections. The said grounds are reproduced hereunder:
1. That the honourable court lacks the jurisdiction
to entertain this suit.
Particulars
a. That the applicants were employed by the 3rd
respondent, but their appointment were yet to be confirmed by the respondent.
b. That their employment was not advertised before
the exercise commenced.
c. That no interview was conducted by the appointment
and promotion committee as envisaged by the law creating the institution.
2. That the 11th, and 13th
applicants be struck out from the suit.
Particulars
a. That the consent of the 11th and 13th
applicants was not sought and obtained before the suit was filed on their
behalf.
b. That the 11th and 13th
applicants have dissociated themselves from this suit.
3. That this suit cannot be sustained by the
applicants jointly
Particulars
a. That the applicants were employed separately and
not jointly.
b. That the applicants were employed at different
times.
c. That the applicants were employed for different
positions.
68.
For the
determination of their preliminary objection, the respondents advanced three
issues—all of which were adopted by the applicants’ counsel. They are:
i.
Whether the court
can entertain this matter in view of the fact that the applicants were employed
separately, at different times and for different positions;
ii.
Whether this court
can hear the matter in view of the fact that the 11th and 13th
applicants have disassociated themselves from the suit; and
iii.
Whether this court
has the requisite jurisdiction to hear the matter in view of the fact that the
employment of the applicants have not been confirmed.
69.
Respecting these
issues, first it is clear from exhibits A1 – A14 (Letters of Offer of
Employment) that these applicants were offered various employments by the 3rd
respondent on different days. In the same vein their letters of acceptance of
employment (marked Exhibits D1 – D13) produced by the respondents are dated
differently. These documents speak for themselves, as it is well established
that documentary evidence is the best evidence, for the reason that it speaks
for itself – A.G BENDEL STATE v. U.B.A ltd (1986) 4 NWLR (PART
37) 547; AKINBISADE v. THE STATE (20060 17 NWLR (PART 1007)184 SC. In the face of these documentary evidence
before this court, the applicants were employed at different times in the 3rd
respondent institution.
70.
The respondents
contend that these applicants cannot sue jointly since they were employed separately
and not jointly. They also based their argument on the ground that the
applicants were employed in different positions in the 3rd
respondent institution. In my mind, it will be overbearing for each of these 14
applicants to institute separate but similar actions in this court, seeking the
same reliefs against same parties. This court and indeed all courts are duty
bound to exercise their powers in preventing multiplicity of suits by utilizing
the instrumentality of joinder of parties to determine such matters in a single
suit. See: AKPAMGBO OKADIGBO & ORS. V. CHIDI & ORS. (2015) LPELR-
24564 (SC).
71.
At this point, I
would like to note that the respondents have both misunderstood and misapplied
the authority of EBO-ADE & ORS V. OJO-ONIRO & ORS (Supra), which
they heavily relied upon. In fact, this authority actually endorses and
encourages joint action, even though its facts differ from those of the current
case. Therefore, it is essential to state that, considering the circumstances
of this suit, the applicants are appropriately before this court under joint
action, and I affirm this position.
72.
Secondly, this court observes that the
respondents contend that the 11th and 13th applicants did
not consent to this suit being instituted on their behalf. However, the
respondents did not attach the 2 affidavits of non-participation they referred
in their affidavit in support of the notice of preliminary objection. The said
2 affidavits are instead, produced in their counter affidavit in response to
the applicants’ originating summons. It must be emphasized that these documents
are in the file of this court, although in the counter affidavit against the
originating summons. Regardless of the omission, the said affidavit of
non-participation of the 11th applicant (Rose Jeremiah Mafuyai) and
13th applicant (Abari Sandra Moses) are noted and duly recognized by
this court, as the court is at liberty to use documents in its file to
adjudicate over a matter. SEE: IKEME & ANOR. V. SULAYMAN & ORS.
(2022) LPELR – 58258 (CA).
73.
In the applicants’
counter affidavit in opposition to the respondents’ notice of preliminary
objection, the applicants produced 2 documents, which they refer to as the
overleaf of the letters of employment of the 11th and 13th
applicants. Each of these documents contains the inscription “With My Consent”,
a name, a mobile phone number, a date and a signature. The applicants produced
these documents in the bid to controvert and dislodge the respondents’ claim
that the 11th and 13th applicants did not consent to this
suit being instituted on their behalf.
74.
The applicants’
efforts to extricate the claim by the respondents regarding the said affidavits
of non-participation by the 11th and 13th named
applicants in this suit, can be seen from their paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the
counter affidavit in opposition to the notice of preliminary objection which
read as follows:
(5). Upon receipt of a copy of the preliminary
objection of the defendants, I discovered that the defendants deposed that the
11th and 13th applicants denied giving consent for the
filing of the instant suit and that they deposed to affidavit to that effect.
(6). I have not seen copies of the said affidavits
however; I personally received photocopies of the appointment letters of the 11th
and 13th applicants upon which they signed and consented to the
filing of the instant suit when we all agreed to file the suit challenging the
Governor’s power to terminate our employment. The overleaf of their respective
appointment letters where they signed, granting their consent is hereby
attached and marked as Exhibits 1 and 2 respectively.
(7). To satisfy my curiosity on the truth or
otherwise of the deposition contained in the defendant’s affidavit, I posted a
notice on our Whatsapp platform where all the applicants are members, inviting
any person who desire to discontinue the suit for him or herself to contact our
counsel and discuss terms so that our counsel can formally take steps, but till
date none of the applicants has showed up.
75.
It should be noted
at this juncture that it appears there is no denial of the fact that these affidavit of non-participation were deposed to
by the respective 11th and 13th applicants. I think that
it would not be difficult for any applicant whose name is on any of these 2
affidavits of non-participation to actually depose to an affidavit dislodging
the ones produced by the respondents. It need be emphasized that there is a
presumption of regularity in favour of the respondents with respect to the said
affidavits of non-participation before this court. Indeed, section 168 of the
Evidence Act provides that “when any judicial or official act is shown to
have been done in a manner substantially regular, it is presumed that formal
requisites for its validity were complied with”.
76.
It is clear that the
formal requirements outlined in section 168 entail the deponent being
personally present and swearing an oath in accordance with the Act's
provisions. Undoubtedly, given the current circumstances, the court will appropriately
recognize the evidential value of the affidavits indicating the
non-participation of the 11th and 13th applicants.
77.
That said, it is
important to note that the affidavit of non-participation submitted by the
respondents concerning the 11th and 13th applicants will result only in the
removal of their names from the suit, as they have expressed no interest in
continuing. In other words, the withdrawal or lack of interest from the 11th
and 13th applicants does not invalidate the entire suit. This decision is
supported by Order 13 Rule 1 of the court's Rules, which clearly addresses the
issue of joining applicants or claimants in a single case. The Rules state: "All
persons may be joined in one action as claimants in whom any right to relief is
alleged to exist whether jointly or severally and judgment may be given for
such claimant(s) as may be found to be entitled to relief and for such relief
as the claimant may be entitled to without any amendment." Refer also
to: IBIGBAMI & ANOR V. MILITARY GOVERNOR, EKITI STATE & ORS. (2003)
LPELR-5619 (CA); REGISTERED TRUSTEE, N.A.C.H.P.N V. M.H.W.U.N (2008) ALL FWLR (PT. 412) P.1013.
78.
Accordingly, the
11th and 13th applicants’ names are removed from this suit, and no finding or
order in this judgment will in any way affect their rights or interests. I so
hold.
79.
I also observed that
the counsel for the respondents raised more jurisdictional issues in their
legal submissions accompanying the respondents’ further and better affidavit to
the notice of preliminary objection filed on 16/5/2024. Particularly, they
submit that the applicants commenced this suit by originating summons, which
they believe to be the wrong procedure. According to them, there are
contentious issues between the parties in this suit thus necessitating the use
of a formal writ of complaint.
80.
In this regard, I
wish to emphasize that originating summons is one of the originating processes
recognized by this court. SEE: ORDER 3 (1)(b) NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT (CIVIL
PROCEDURE) RULES 2017. Order 3(3) of the said Rules which states that: “Civil
proceedings that may be commenced by way of originating summons include matters
relating principally to the interpretation of any constitution, enactment,
agreements or any other instrument relating to employment, labour, industrial
relations in respect of which the court has jurisdiction by virtue of the
provisions of section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria 1999 (as amended) or by any Act or Law in force in Nigeria.”
81.
The position of the
law as enshrined in the rules of this court gained judicial blessing in
numerous case laws. Oguntade, JSC stated in PAM & ANOR V. NASIRU
MOHAMMED & ANOR (2008) 16 NWLR (PART 1112)1 as follows: “It is trite
therefore that originating summons is the appropriate procedure where what is
in dispute is the simple construction or interpretation of document in respect
of which pleadings are unnecessary”.
82.
I have briefly
reviewed the affidavit supporting the applicants' originating summons. I am
confident that the applicants' right to the reliefs they seek in this case
stems from the same incident, specifically, the alleged termination of their
employment by the 1st respondent. Additionally, the legal question concerning
the 1st respondent's authority to terminate the applicants' employment is
consistent for all applicants. These are the primary issues in this case, which
are clearly employment-related matters that this court is constitutionally
authorized to hear and resolve. Other issues, at most, are secondary. Refer to
section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as
amended).
83.
This case revolves
around issues concerning the employment of the applicants, specifically
focusing on the statutory authority of the 1st respondent to terminate their
employment. The primary concerns involve the statutory powers of the 1st
respondent regarding the applicants' employment and the nature, terms, and
conditions of that employment. These questions can be resolved by examining
relevant statutes, regulatory instruments, and employment documents. I find no
issue with the applicants' use of an Originating Summons.
84.
The respondents
further dispute this court’s jurisdiction, arguing that although the applicants
were on the payroll of the 3rd respondent, their appointments had not yet been
formally confirmed. They contend that the positions were never advertised prior
to the recruitment exercise and that the Appointments and Promotions Committee
did not conduct the mandatory interviews prescribed by the institution’s
founding law.
85.
At page 12 of their
written address in support of the preliminary objection filed on 2/5/2024,
counsel for the respondents submitted that any employee still within a two-year
probationary term may be terminated at the employer’s discretion before
attaining permanent status just like in a master/servant relationship. Relying
on Rule 020303 of the Civil Service Rules, they pointed out that a probationary
officer must, during that period, pass any prescribed examinations and complete
the probation satisfactorily in the eyes of the appointing authority before
becoming eligible for confirmation. On that basis, they argued, none of the
applicants has yet served two years with the respondents, so their claimed
reliefs are premature, and the suit is unripe for adjudication.
86.
In his written
submissions at paragraph 28, counsel for the applicants pointed out that even
the respondents acknowledge that only the actual employer can lawfully
terminate a probationary appointment—and here the governor is not that
employer. He submitted that, notwithstanding his office, the 1st
respondent has no authority to suspend or terminate the applicants because he
is not a party to their contracts with the 3rd respondent. Counsel
further emphasized that the applicants’ appointments fall under the college’s
own revised Terms and Conditions of Service—approved by the Council of the
College of Arts, Science and Technology, Kurgwi, Plateau State and annexed to
the substantive application—not the civil service rules cited by the
respondents.
87.
Notably, the
respondents abandoned their remaining objection—that this court should decline
jurisdiction because the state government never advertised the positions and
the 3rd respondent’s Appointments and Promotions Committee never interviewed
the applicants. Obviously, when a defendant claims that a pre-employment
requirement was not satisfied, he bears the burden of proving that allegation
with concrete facts and applicable law. Having defaulted in reinforcing their
arguments with both facts and law, that ground of objection is deemed abandoned
and is hereby struck out.
88.
In considering
whether the respondents lawfully ended the applicants’ probationary employment,
the court agrees that an employer may terminate or dismiss a probationary
employee only for just cause and in strict compliance with any employment
contract or the statute establishing such position. The applicants’ exhibit—a
copy of the College’s revised terms and conditions of service effective March
14, 2019—confirms this. Under Section III, page 14, paragraph “N,” item 3, it
provides that if, at any time during probation, the Council finds a staff
member unfit for service, the appointment may be terminated on three months’
notice (or three months’ salary in lieu) for senior staff, and one month’s
notice (or one month’s salary in lieu) for junior staff.
89.
This court therefore
concurs with the applicants’ counsel that only the employer may terminate an
employee’s contract. Accordingly, the court must decide whether the 1st
respondent was empowered to act in that capacity, an issue that will be
addressed under the second issue identified for determination. At present, the
respondents have not sufficiently proven that the civil service rules govern
the applicants’ contracts of employment.
90.
Moreover, no
provision in the civil service rules or in the revised terms and conditions of
the 3rd respondent has been shown, nor have I found any basis, to justify the
applicants’ termination on the ground that they were probationary staff.
Accordingly, I am satisfied that the applicants’ claim is not premature, and
this court retains jurisdiction to hear the matter. The third and final limb of
the objection is therefore overruled and dismissed. See also Kanyip PNICN’s
observations in NICN/ABJ/173/2024 (Sunday Nyam Bot & Ors v Nigeria
Christian Pilgrims Commission), delivered 19/2/2025, at p.10, para.47.
91.
Ultimately, the
respondents’ preliminary objection succeeds only insofar as it removes the 11th
applicant, Rose Jeremiah Mafuyai, and the 13th applicant, Abari Sandra Moses,
from this action on account of their non-participation. All other objections to
the court’s jurisdiction are hereby dismissed.
ON ISSSUE TWO:
92.
Respecting this
issue, the court is tasked with deciding if the applicants have substantiated
their claims and are rightfully entitled to the reliefs they are seeking. It is
crucial to highlight that, in addressing issue number 2, the court will focus
on the questions the applicants have presented for determination and resolve
them accordingly. The questions posed by the applicants through the originating
summons are as follows:
i.
Whether the 1st
respondent is possessed of or clothed with the powers or authority to
unilaterally suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the
employment and appointment of the applicants through Exhibits D and E, the
applicants having been in the service and employment of the 3rd
respondent.
ii.
By virtue of the
various letters of appointment issued to the applicants attached as Exhibits A1
– A14, whether the applicants are not entitled to maintain and retain their
employment with the 3rd respondent in line the extant laws
regulating their employment with the 3rd respondent.
iii.
Whether the failure
and refusal of the 3rd respondent to pay the applicants their
salaries and allowances thereby retaining same from the month of January 2023
till date or any period of time at all is not unlawful, unjust, illegal and a
violation of the 3rd respondent’s duties and obligations.
93.
Considering these
issues, the court finds it appropriate to address questions 1 and 2 together,
as they are closely related. Essentially, these questions aim to determine
whether the 1st respondent possesses the necessary authority to terminate the
applicants' employment and, if not, whether the applicants are entitled to
retain their positions at the 3rd respondent institution.
94.
It is essential to
always remember that under the current Nigerian legal framework, a claimant in
a civil case is responsible for bearing the burden of proof. Until this burden
is met, the respondent or defendant may not need to provide any evidence. In
other words, the party alleging a violation of rights or claiming entitlement
to legal rights or remedies must succeed based on the strength of their
evidence. The standard of proof required is the balance of probabilities, as
outlined in sections 131 and 135 of the Evidence Act 2011. Additionally, it is
well-established that for a claimant to win a case of wrongful termination,
they must demonstrate the terms and conditions of the contractual relationship
and specify how the defendant breached these terms. For further reference, see:
KATTO v. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (1999) 6 NWLR (PART. 607) 390 – 394.
95.
To support their
claims, the applicants leaned on the affidavit accompanying the Originating
Summons, their additional affidavit, and arguments from their counsel. In
paragraph 5 of the applicants' affidavit supporting the originating summons,
they assert that they fulfilled their responsibilities with the 3rd respondent
in accordance with its revised Staff Terms and Conditions, as well as the
College of Arts, Science and Remedial Studies, Kurgwi Law, 2019.
96.
Exhibits A1 – A14 is
luminous of the state of the applicants’ nature of employment and status. I deem it imperative to reproduce the similar
paragraphs 2(i), (ii), (iii), (iv) of Exhibits A1 – A14 (Offer of Appointment
Letters). These are as follows:
1. Your appointment would be subject to the following
conditions:
(i). That you will be subject in all respect to
the provisions of
the law establishing the college and to the
conditions of service stipulated in the scheme of service and other Regulations
governing the appointment of Senior Staff, as may be made or reviewed by the
Governing Council from time to time.
(ii). That you
serve a period of two (2) years of probation initially after which you may be
considered confirmation based on your satisfactory performance.
(iii). That you
or the college may terminate your appointment by three months’ notice or by
payment of three months’ salary in lieu.
(iv). That the
college may terminate your appointment without compensation in line with the
provisions of the Conditions of Service and/or the law establishing the
college.
97.
To emphasize
clearly, the information above applies similarly to exhibits A1 - A14,
differing only in the dates, employees' names, job titles, employment levels,
salaries, and other personal details. From the facts presented in the pleadings
by both parties, it is clear that there is no disagreement regarding the
applicants being employed by the 3rd respondent. The respondents have not
contested this fact.
98.
The respondents
argue that the applicants' employment were plagued with irregularities and were
not established through proper procedures. It is also undisputed that the 1st
respondent allegedly terminated the applicants' employment. The only point of
contention is the respondents' assertion that the applicants were lawfully
dismissed by the 1st respondent following due process, which involved forming a
preliminary committee before and after the applicants' suspension.
99.
It is needful to state that there are three categories of employments,
these are: a pure master/servant relationship under the common law; employment
where the office is held at pleasure; and employment protected by statute. SEE: IDERIMA v.
R.S.C.S.C. (2005) 7 SC (PART 111) 135; OLANIYAN v. UNILAG (1985) 2 NWLR (PART
9) 599.
100.
When an employment is one at the pleasure of the employer, it is said to
be at will. Hence, the employer reserves the discretion to disengage the
employee capriciously regardless of tenure of the office in the contract. This
was well captured in the case of OLANIYAN & ORS v. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (SUPRA)
AT 599/612.
101.
On the other hand, it is trite that where an employment is one with
statutory flavor, the employer and employee relationship is governed by a
statute or a regulation derived from a statute. The apex court while expounding the law in the case of IMOLOAME V.
WEST AFRICAN EXAMINATIONS COUNCIL (1999) 9 NWLR (265) 303 stated as
follows: “there is an employment with statutory flavor when the appointment
and termination is governed by statutory provision. It is accepted that where
the contract of service is governed by provision of statute or where the
conditions of service are contained in regulation derived statutory provisions,
they invest the employee with a legal status higher than the ordinary one of
master and servant. They accordingly enjoy statutory flavour”.
102.
Having considered
the legal framework, we can now pose the following questions:
(a) Is the 3rd respondent an entity
established by statute?
(b) Does the relevant statute or its accompanying
regulations explicitly govern the employment of the applicants in question?
103.
It is undeniable
that the 3rd respondent, the employer of the applicants, was established by
statute: A Law to provide for the establishment of the College of Arts, Science
and Remedial Studies, Kurgwi 2000. The applicants assert that their employment
is governed by the 3rd defendant's Terms and Conditions for Staff, as noted in
Paragraph 5 of the Affidavit in Support of the Originating Summons. These facts
remain uncontested.
104.
Concerning the status
of the applicants' employment with the 3rd respondent institution, I am
completely confident that their employment is governed by statutory provisions.
This remains true despite the respondents' assertions that the applicants were
still in the probationary phase when their employment was allegedly terminated.
The appellate court's decision in the case of BABATUNDE V. THE GOVERNING
COUNCIL FEDERAL POLYTECHNIC, EDE & ANOR (Supra) is relevant here, and I
will quote the pertinent part of the judgment, which states:
“the question that determines whether an
employment has statutory flavour is not whether
the status of the employee is on the higher echelon or low ladder of the
service. It is also not determined by whether an employee is on probation or a
permanent or a confirmed employee. It is rather whether the term of engagement
is controlled and determined by statute as relating engagement and
termination.”
105.
The relevant
sections of the 3rd respondent's General Terms and Conditions of Service for
Staff (Exhibit B) are outlined in Section III(y)(1)(a). This section states
that an appointment can be terminated before its scheduled end date by the
Council, in accordance with the Law and the Statutes. A similar clause is
included in paragraph (iv) of exhibits A1 – A14 (Letters of Offer of
Employment). The key question here is whether the applicants' employments with
the 3rd respondent were terminated in line with the enabling statute and the
existing regulations of the 3rd respondent.
106.
To resolve this, I
shall reproduce the relevant portion of exhibit D (Press Release by the
Government of Plateau State), which states inter alia as follows:
“PRESS RELEASE
His Excellency, the governor of Plateau State
Barr. Caleb M. Mutfwang has approved the dissolution of the Governing Council
of the Plateau State University, Bokkos with immediate effect, Similarly, the
Governor has also approved the removal of the following Heads of Tertiary
Institutions:
1. Plateau State University, Bokkos
2. Plateau State Polytechnic, Barkin Ladi
3. College of Education, Gindiri
4. College of Health Technology, Zawan
5. College of Health Technology, Pankshin
All affected should take note
and hand over any government property in their possession to the next most
Senior Officer of the Institution immediately.
In addition, the Governor has
approved the cancellation of recruitments earlier conducted by Tertiary
Institutions in October 2022 and early 2023 that haven under suspension.
Consequently, applicants for an all-inclusive recruitment for all Tertiary Institutions
will be advertised… ”
107.
The pleadings from
the parties in this case provide additional clarity to the question. Paragraphs
6, 10, 11, and 12 of the applicants’ affidavit supporting the originating
summons state:
“6. Upon the change in leadership in the office of
the 1st respondent proceeded to announce the suspension of all the
staff of the Plateau State Government and other statutory agencies newly
employed from October 2022 till 29th May, 2023, including the
applicants.
10. after our purported suspension from the
service of the 1st respondent, the 1st respondent
constituted a committee allegedly to look into the issue of our employment and
advise him among other terms of reference.
11. none of us the applicants was invited nor
interviewed or heard from by the said committee and the outcome of the
assignment of the committee was never served on us or made public till date
12. subsequently, by another publication by the 1st
respondent, the 1st respondent purported to terminate our employment
and appointment from the services of the 3rd respondent by
announcing its cancellation and nullification…”
108.
In response to these
averments by the applicants the respondents aver in paragraphs 4(i), (j), (o)
and (p) as follows:
“4(i). That paragraph 6 is not true and state that
because of the said change of leadership in the state, a panel of investigation
was set up by the 1st respondent to investigate the legality of the
applicants’ temporary employment.
4(j). in further response to paragraph 6, based on
the panel’s investigation, the 1st respondent who is the visitor of
the institution (3rd respondent) looked at the report of the panel
and consequently suspended the applicants employment which employment process
was marred by irregularities.
4(o). we admit paragraph 10 of the applicants’
affidavit.
4(p).that I know of a fact that paragraph 11 is
not true and state that the Committee invited the claimants during its
investigation, but the applicants failed to honour the committee’s invitation.”
109.
Based on the
statements in the pleadings from both the applicants and the respondents, it is
clear that the 1st respondent allegedly suspended the applicants and later
claimed to terminate their employment through certain publications. This
suspension by the 1st respondent is central to the case, raising the question
of whether the 1st respondent had the rightful legal authority to terminate the
applicants' employment.
110.
The applicants
strongly contest the 1st respondent's authority to dismiss them. It is a
well-established principle that the entity that hires has the authority to
fire, which is a fundamental rule of employment. This court previously
determined that the 3rd respondent is the actual employer of the applicants,
and indeed, the one recognized by the applicants as their employer. However,
the respondents claim that the 1st respondent acts as the visitor to the 3rd
respondent, which they argue justifies the decision to terminate the
applicants' employment.
111.
Given the
substantial evidence presented by the applicants in this case, the
responsibility to disprove now moves from the applicants to the respondents. It
is the respondents' duty to demonstrate the legitimacy of the authority
exercised by the 1st respondent in allegedly terminating the applicants'
employment. The appellate court, in the case of ALIYU & ORS v. YOLA &
ORS (2022) LCN/16188 (CA), clarified the obligation of a litigant to
substantiate their claims, stating:
“the burden is on the plaintiff to establish his
claim. This is the evidential burden of proof. It is only after the plaintiff
has adduced sufficient credible evidence that the burden of proof would shift
to the defendant. The shifting burden of proof is enacted in Section 136
of the Evidence Act 2011 and it provides that the burden of proof as to
any particular fact lies on the person who wishes the Court to believe in its
existence unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall
lie on any particular person. But the burden may in the course of a case be
shifted from one side to the other. As explained in ADIGHIJE v.
NWAOGU (2010) 12 NWLR (PT.1209) 419 @ 463: “Section 137 of the Evidence
Act, 2004 (now Section 133 (1) Evidence Act, 2011)”.
112.
Regarding the
respondent's defense claiming that the applicants were still on probation at
the 3rd respondent institution at the time their employment was terminated,
Exhibits 1A – A14 provide important insights into the issue of probation and
related matters. At this point, it's pertinent to reproduce the relevant
section of paragraph 2(ii) from the applicants' employment offer letter:
“ That you
serve a period of two (2) years’ probation initially after which you may be
considered for confirmation based on your satisfactory performance.”
113.
The applicants did
not specify the exact dates of their suspension or the alleged termination of
their employment. However, from the pleadings, it is evident that the
employment letters (Exhibits A1 – A14) are dated between October 2022 and February
2023. This case was filed on March 21, 2024, approximately one year and five
months later (less than two years). I concur with the respondents' assertion
that the applicants' employment was allegedly terminated during their
probationary period.
114.
I want to
reemphasize at this point that the applicants being on probation did not
nullify or remove the rights associated with their statutory employment. Such
employment must be handled according to the statutes and relevant instruments
of the 3rd respondent institution. For more on the status of the applicants’
employment within the 3rd defendant institution, refer to: BABATUNDE V. THE
GOVERNING COUNCIL FEDERAL POLYTECHNIC, EDE & ANOR (Supra).
115.
In my examination, I
found no evidence presented to this court indicating that the Governing Council
of the 3rd respondent was involved in the alleged suspension and termination of
the applicants' employment without notice or compensation.
116.
I am aware that the
respondents claimed a committee was formed before and after the suspension of
the applicants' employment. They also alleged that the applicants were invited
to meet with the committee but did not attend. These claims were strongly
denied by the applicants in their pleadings. Notably, there is no evidence presented
to this court indicating that these applicants or their representatives were
ever invited to any committee meeting. Furthermore, there is no documentation
showing the committee's conclusions. This court is not persuaded that the
applicants were invited to appear before any committee either before or after
their employment was supposedly terminated.
117.
As previously noted,
the respondents argued that the applicants’ appointments were irregular and
unadvertised. They failed, however, to acknowledge that any lapse in following
proper recruitment procedures rested with the 3rd respondent, not
the applicants. Accordingly, the respondents did not demonstrate how such a
precondition—if it truly existed—impacted the applicants’ employment status.
118.
The court is not
persuaded that the respondents adhered to the statutory and regulatory
requirements concerning the discipline of the applicants, particularly
regarding their suspension and termination. The alleged suspension and
termination of the applicants' employment are deemed unlawful, illegal, null,
void, and without any effect. I affirm this position.
119.
On the issue of
unpaid salaries, the applicants maintain that they have not been paid from
January 2023 through the date they filed this suit. The respondents deny this,
insisting that all salaries due between January and April 2023 were paid in
full and pointing to a spreadsheet as proof—though that document was never
before the court. In response, the applicants’ counsel served additional
authorities to support their claim for unpaid wages. I have reviewed those
decisions and will now deliver my opinion.
120.
Aside from the
statements made by the applicants in their affidavit, which the respondents
refuted in their counter affidavit, there is no evidence, such as an account
statement or other documentation, to support the claim that the applicants were
not paid their salaries or to indicate the last month in which they received
their salaries. It is well-established that evidence serves as the means of
proof, and proof is the fundamental purpose of evidence, as noted in ANEKWE
V. STATE (2014) ALL FWLR (PART 744) 92 AT 109 (SC).
121.
The question of the
applicants' unpaid salaries becomes even more doubtful when comparing their
pleadings with the evidence they presented. For instance, Exhibit A10, which is
the Letter of Offer of Employment for the 10th applicant, Elisha Dorcas Gyang,
is clearly dated 6th February 2023. It puzzles the court how this 10th
applicant could be among those claiming unpaid salaries from January 2023, given
that she was not employed until February 2023.
122.
It's crucial to
highlight that there is no method to ascertain what the applicants in
the instant case received as their monthly salaries, let alone when they were
paid. It must be recalled that they chose to commence this action by way of
originating summons instead of a general writ of complaint. Therefore, for the
court to assume the figures stated in their supporting affidavit are accurate
would be speculative even if the respondents did not deny them. The fact that a
respondent either acknowledges or fails to defend such a claim is irrelevant,
as the claimant is required to provide strict proof of the monetary claim made,
and nothing less. This is supported by the decision in NNPC V. CLIFCO NIG
Ltd. (2011) 4 MJSC 142 at 174, which stated that "a claim for special
damages will not succeed merely due to admission of the claim; special damages
are never inferred from the nature of the act complained of... They are
exceptional and must be specifically claimed and strictly proven."
123.
The term 'strict
proof' denotes the necessity for evidence to distinctly support and verify the
facts detailed in the statement of facts. This evidence should directly and
accurately align with the claimant's assertions. While the required standard
isn't excessively high, it demands evidence that is appropriate and substantial
enough for clear evaluation. This involves offering detailed evidence needed to
thoroughly substantiate the pleadings and the calculated amount claimed. The
extent of strict proof is significantly influenced by the specific facts and
unique circumstances of each case. This burden is satisfied only when credible
evidence is presented, allowing for a precise assessment or quantification of
the alleged losses or damages. Refer to OFEM AND ORS V. UBANA OBETAN
(unreported) suit number NICN/CA/11/2018 Per Kado, J judgment delivered on
18/8/2022. Also, Chendu and ors v. Governor of Plateau State and ors
(unreported) suit number NICN/JOS/09/2024 on pages 36/37 paragraphs 110 to 111.
124.
The dearth of credible and compelling
evidence to support this claim of salary in arrears by the applicants is fatal
to the case of the applicants, unfortunately for them. Consequently, this court
is not convinced that the applicants are being owed salary from January 2023 –
date. I so hold.
125.
Essentially, the
second issue for determination is partially resolved in favor of the
applicants. As a result, the first question in the originating summons, which
asks, "whether the 1st respondent has the power or authority to
unilaterally suspend, terminate, nullify, or otherwise interfere with the
employment and appointments of the applicants through Exhibits D and E, given
that the applicants were employed by the 3rd respondent," is answered negatively.
126.
Question 2 of the
originating summons which is, “by virtue of the various letters of appointment
issued to the applicants attached as Exhibits A1 – A14, whether the applicants
are not entitled to maintain and retain their employment with the 3rd
respondent in line with extant laws regulating their employment with the 3rd
respondent”, is answered in the affirmative.
127.
Question 3 of the
originating summons which is “whether the failure and refusal of the 3rd
respondent to pay the applicants their salaries and allowances thereby
retaining same from the month of January 2023 till date or any period of time
at all is not unlawful, unjust, illegal and a violation of the 3rd
respondent’s duties and obligations,” is answered in the negative.”
128.
It must be reiterated
before I conclude that the applicants filed a motion seeking interlocutory
injunction from this court. The said motion and all accompanying processes
dated 21/3/2024 and filed on the same date are hereby struck out, having been
overtaken by the event of this judgment.
129.
To emphasize
clearly, I would like to state the reliefs now granted by this court thus:
a.
A declaration
that the 1st Respondent has no power or authority to suspend,
terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the employments and
appointments of the applicants duly engaged in the services and employment of
the 3rd respondent.
b.
A declaration
that the purported termination, nullification and cancellation of the
employments and appointments of the applicants by the 1st respondent
through exhibits D, and E, is unlawful, illegal, null and void with no legal
effect whatsoever.
c.
A declaration
that the applicants are entitled to maintain and retain their respective
employments with the 3rd respondent in line with the extant laws
regulating their employments.
d.
An order
setting aside the purported suspensions and subsequent terminations,
nullifications and cancellations of the applicants’ appointments and
employments made by the 1st respondent through the publications made
at his instance attached as exhibits D and E, same having been done ultra vires
and therefore unlawful, null and void.
e.
An order
reinstating the applicants back to their respective positions as staff and
employees of the 3rd respondent in line with their respective
letters of appointments attached as exhibits A1 – A14 respectively.
f.
N5,000,000.00
(Five Million Naira only) as general damages against the respondents jointly
and severally for the collective pain and suffering imposed on the applicants
by the respondents.
130.
This court awards to
the applicants the sum of N500,000.00 cost for filing this suit.
131.
This judgement shall
be complied with within 30 days, and the monetary
sums awarded shall in default of payment, attract a 10% interest per annum
until fully liquidated.
132.
Based therefore on
the above findings, this court is satisfied that the applicants’ case succeeds
in part. I hereby enter judgment for them as stated hereinbefore.
DELIVERED IN JOS THIS 5TH DAY OF JUNE 2025.
……………………………………..
Hon. Justice I.S. Galadima
Judge.
Public
access to NICN decisions:
Judgments
and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://nicnadr.gov.ng. NICN decisions are available to the
general public shortly after a copy each has been sent to the claimant(s) and
defendant(s) in a case.