THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM

 

DATED: 11TH JUNE, 2025                       SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/97/2024

 

BETWEEN        

                            

1.                 COMRADE ADEDAMOLA ADENIRAN

2.                 AMALGAMATED UNION OF APP                CLAIMANTS

BASED TRANSPORTERS OF NIGERIA  

               AFFILIATE

 

AND

 

AYOADE MUSLIM IBRAHIM                         -                  DEFENDANT                                                                                 

REPRESENTATIONS:

Austin J. Otah, Esq., with Philia E. Ijeta, Esq., for the Claimants.

Ifeoluwa Adigun, Esq., with Ayodeji Timothy, Esq., for the Defendant.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

1.     This action was commenced by way of an Originating Summons which was filed on the 8th day of April, 2024 and subsequently amended on 28th day of November 2024 praying this Court to determine the following questions against the Defendant:

 

1.     Whether by virtue of a combined reading of Articles 2, 3, 4, 4(h), 4(n), 6, 6B, 8, 9, 16A, 16D, 24 and 30 [3(2),(3)], [4], [5(d)],[8],[9], [12],[14] of the Constitution of the Amalgamated Union of APP Based Transporters of Nigeria (AUATON), the 2nd Claimant in this suit, the Defendant as General Secretary of AUNTON was singularly and/or collectively entitled and/or empowered to act arbitrarily without regard to the Constitution of AUNTON in the performance or neglect of his duties.   

 

2.     Whether by virtue of a combined provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, 4(h), 4(n), 6, 6B, 8, 9, 16A, 16D, 24 and 30 [3(2),(3)], [4], [5(d)],[8],[9], [12],[14] of the AUATON, the Defendant having not complied with the provisions of the said Constitution could validly be said to be acting in the best interests of the 2nd Claimant and not in breach of his role as General Secretary and had not misconducted himself.

 

3.     Whether by virtue of a combined provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, 4(h), 4(n), 6, 6B, 8, 9, 16A, 16D, 24 and 30 [3(2), (3)], [4], [5(d)],[8],[9], [12],[14] of the AUATON, the Defendant is not bound by law, regulation and the said Constitution to constitutionally adhere to the dictates and requirements of his role as General Secretary of the 2nd Claimant.

 

4.     Whether by virtue of a combined provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, 4(h), 4(n), 6, 6B, 8, 9, 16A, 16D, 24, 30 and 30 [3(2),(3)], [4], [5(d)],[8],[9], [12],[14] of the AUATON, the 2nd Claimant was validly empowered to institute investigatory proceedings against the Defendant upon receipt of a petition by at least one of its members and if found guilty.

 

5.     Whether by virtue of a combined provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, 4(h), 4(n), 6, 6B, 8, 9, 16A, 16D, 24 and 30 [3(2), (3)], [4], [5(d)],[8],[9], [12],[14] of the AUATON, the Defendant has the right and power to continue to act against the interests of the 2nd Claimant and in breach of the terms of its Constitution; and

 

6.     Whether by virtue of a combined provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, 4(h), 4(n), 6, 6B, 8, 9, 16A, 16D, 24 and 30 [3(2), (3)], [4], [5(d)],[8],[9], [12],[14] of the AUATON, the 2nd Claimant has the power to and can sack and/or remove the Defendant from the office of General Secretary.

 

7.     Whether by virtue of a combined provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, 4(h), 4(n), 6, 6B, 8, 9, 16A, 16D, 24, 30 and 30 [3(2),(3)], [4], [5(d)],[8],[9], [12],[14] of the AUATON, the 2nd Claimant acted in accordance with the said provisions therein, in taking disciplinary action against the Defendant after he had been found guilty and followed the correct Constitutional protocols which eventually led to his removal from office and role of General Secretary of the 2nd Claimant.

 

2.     It is upon the determination of the issues raised above that the Claimant urged the Court to grant the following reliefs;

 

i.                   A DECLARATION that the Defendant failed to adhere to the provisions of the 2nd Claimant’s Constitution whilst acting in the office of General Secretary of the 2nd Claimant having failed to adhere to his Constitutional role therein thereby misconducting himself.

 

ii.                 A DECLARATION that all the Defendant’s acts whilst misconducting himself are nugatory, misleading, fraudulent and therefore null and void having failed to act in accordance with extant laws. Regulations and the 2nd Claimant’s Constitution.

 

iii.              A DECLARATION that the 2nd Claimant’s removal of the Defendant as its General Secretary having gone through an investigatory and disciplinary process is valid and subsisting, having followed all due constitutional protocols and the 2nd Claimant’s decision is hereby upheld.

 

iv.              A DECLARATION that by misconducting himself the Defendant committed a breach of the combine provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, 4(h), 4(n), 6, 6B, 8.9. 16A, 16D, and 30 [3(2),(3)], [4], [5(d)],[8],[9], [12],[14] of the 2nd Claimant’s Constitution and applicable extant laws where applicable and is ordered to immediately hand over all or any official property of the 2nd Claimant including intellectual property, personal and official bank accounts which has any evidence of the 2nd Claimants financial assets flowing inwards and outwards where applicable in whatsoever format, and any other such property or assets still in his possession up till date.

 

v.                 A DECLARATION that the Defendant directly and/or indirectly, since he is still a member of the 2nd Claimant must fully adhere to the provisions of the Constitution of the 2nd Claimant immediately and return all assets of the Union. Failure of which he will immediately be expelled from the Union and cease to be a member of the 2nd Claimant.

 

vi.              AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendant, his officers, servants, organs, agents, contractors or privies and representatives howsoever called, directly and/or indirectly from holding himself out publicly as still being the General Secretary of the 2nd Claimant but to immediately send out a public advertorial and disclaimer by traditional media and by online/internet media formally confirming that since 28 March 2024 he is no the longer General Secretary of the Amalgamated Union of APP-Based Transporters of Nigeria (AUNTON), the 2nd Claimant.

 

vii.            AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining and suspending the Defendant, his officers, servants, organs, agents, contractors or privies and representatives howsoever called from working, transferring, selling or conducting any business and contractual transactions by himself and/or with any third party in any manner howsoever and whatsoever and whensoever, in the name of the Amalgamated Union of APP-Based Transporters of Nigeria (AUNTON), the 2nd Claimant.

 

viii.         AN ORDER OF PERPETUL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendant, his officers, servants, organs, agents, contractors or privies and representatives howsoever called from carrying out any act, omission, conduct directly or indirectly that is against the interest/s of the Amalgamated Union of APP-Based Transporters of Nigeria (AUNTON), the 2nd Claimant in this suit.

 

ix.              SUCH FURTHER ORDERS as this Court Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance.

 

 

 

CLAIMANT’S BRIEF FACTS OF THE  CASE

 

3.     Claimants filed alongside their Originating process a 14-paragraph affidavit deposed to by the 1st Claimant himself. The case of the Claimants as deposed in the Affidavit in support of Originating Summons is that 1st Claimant is the National President of the 2nd Claimant and that the 2nd Claimant is a duly registered trade union. 1st Claimant averred that on the 14th of March 2024 an official WhatsApp group was opened by the National Executive Council (NEC) after a resolution by the Central Working Committee (CWC). Claimants averred for no justifiable reason, the General Secretary started to threatened some CWC and NEC to the extent of making derogatory remarks and threats to life and security of CWC and NEC members of the 2nd Claimant. It is also the averment of the 1st Claimant that the NEC inaugural meeting was held successfully with 30 out of 38 members in attendance. The NEC was also inaugurated a Disciplinary Committee (DC) to investigate the General Secretary (GS) to explain his reasons for creating another WhatsApp link, inciting members and also uttering derogatory remarks which is against article 24 (B) of the constitution of the 2nd Claimant. The 1st claimant avers that the investigation committee was set up in accordance with the constitution of the of the 2nd Claimant. The DC was able to ascertained that the General Secretary is guilty of breach of the constitution of the 2nd Claimant and consequently recommended for his removal. He went on to aver that the NEC has the statutory power to remove the General Secretary when legally constituted and inaugurated by the 2nd Claimant. When the quorum was formed, the said recommendation of the DC for removal was adopted by CWC and further presented to a legally constituted NEC for ratification. He further avers that the General Secretary was engaged in anti-union practices by failing to carry out CWC resolutions and started carrying out unauthorized representation of the 2nd Claimant after he was removed from office. This was what led to the 2nd claimant’s issuance of letter for his arrest addressed to the Inspector General of Police. 1st claimant avers that this court is empowered to uphold the interest of the union and its members as enshrined in the constitution of the 2nd Claimant and that the interest of justice will be served if this application is granted to preserve public peace and to equally serve as deterrent against public threat of the union’s image.

 

DEFENDANT’S CASE

 

4.     The Defendant in opposition to the Originating Summons filed an eleven (11) paragraphs counter affidavit dated 31st day of January 2025, deposed to by the Defendant himself. Defendant deposed to the effect that the issue of whether the 1st Claimant can still continue to parade himself as President of the 2nd Claimant is already before a Court of law. He went on to state that the resolution in Exhibit B1 has nothing to do with his role as the General Secretary of the 2nd Claimant but was rather meant to clarify the position of all Executives of the 2nd Claimant being a young union, iterating that there has never any concern raised as to how he conducts his role as General Secretary. He posited that Exhibit B1A is not valid as he was never suspended and or dismissed by the 2nd Claimant and that the 1st Claimant unilaterally instituted this suit without the consent of members and or executives/officials of the 2nd Claimant. Defendant argued that he was never invited by the DC nor to the CWC of the 2nd Claimant with regards to any petition. And that the rapid succession of events and the speed at which the alleged decision was made without his presence or input is prejudicial to him and also not in accordance with the rules of fair hearing which is essential for any disciplinary action. Defendant further stated that no NEC meeting was held via any medium and neither did he disrupt any NEC meeting. Defendant contended that Exhibit D clearly shows that his purported removal does not have a voting pattern as provided by Article 8B (4) of 2nd Claimant constitution. He equally stated that the alleged petition was never served on him, and looking at the date on the face of the document, it was served during a weekend. Defendant stated that the news about him were all sponsored by the 1st Claimant which does not reflect the resolutions of the 2nd Claimant. Defendant averred that membership of 2nd Claimant is open only to persons who are self-employed and not public office holders. He stated that it is against Public Service Rules for a public servant to engage in other works such as transporter business which is the case of the 1st Claimant. Defendant avers that claimant is an employee of National Institute of Police Studies and the 2nd Claimant is in receipt of a petition on the status of the 1st Claimant. That it is in the interest of justice to refuse to grant this Originating Summons and equally refuse the claims of the Claimants.

 

 

 

CLAIMANT’S WRITTEN SUBMISSION

  

5.     Also filed along the Originating Summons is a Written Address, wherein Learned Counsel for the Claimants raised a sole issue for determination thus;

 

Whether the Claimants are entitled to the reliefs/s sought in this Originating Summons

 

6.     On this issue formulated by way of introduction it is the position of Counsel that the constitution of the 2nd Claimant is the final authority that regulates the propriety or otherwise of the actions of any official or organ of the union; and that is the constitution by which all of its members are bound. Counsel to claimant went on to state that the office of the general secretary is a statutory provision and that the secretary is an officer of 2nd Claimant whose duties and responsibilities are provided by the constitution. Failure of the defendant to fulfill these responsibilities amounts to incompetency and neglegence of duties by the secretary which makes him liable to be removed. He relied on Article 24 (b), Article 16 (D) and Article 24 D of the 2nd Claimant’s constitution. It is equally the contention of Counsel that although the constitution of the 2nd Claimant does not contain a definition of what amounts to detrimental behavior, however the law on interpretation and construction of clear and unambiguous words in a statute that are to be given their natural, ordinary, grammatical and literal meaning. He placed reliance on the following cases Ikpana v. RTPCN [2006] 3 NWLR (Pt. 966) 106 @ 128 D-F; Natural Inland Waterways Authority v. Governing Council ITF [2009] 17 NLLR (Pt. 47) 143 @ 156 D-E and 157 D-E and Attorney General of Lagos State v. Attorney General of the Federation [2004] 18 NWLR (Pt. 904) 1 @ 132 E-F.

 

7.     It is equally Claimant’s position that it is trite that all statutes and case laws recognizing Trade Unions recognize the supremacy of the rules and regulations guiding the Unions over their members. Counsel submitted that in the Nigerian legal landscape, industrial disputes are common place with labour unions and trade unions and they are often at the forefront of championing the rights and interest of its members when conflicts arise. He went on to state that there is an imperative which is both legal and pragmatic which necessitates that any pending suits against union members must be dispensed with internally before an aggrieved member can embark on any other action. It is the contention of Counsel that the Defendant did not appeal his sack and dismissal from the office of General Secretary but intensified efforts to factionalize the Union engaging in further anti-Union activities leading to this suit. He placed reliance on the case of Union Bank of Nigeria Limited v. Edet [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) 288 and Adeyemi v. National Iron Ore Mining Co. Ltd [1999]6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 504.

 

8.     Furthermore, learned Counsel posited that the Constitution of the 2nd Claimant is the final authority that regulates the propriety or otherwise of the actions of any official or organ of the union as a whole and that its provisions are clear as to their implication. He relied on Article 16 (D) and Article 24 (b) of AUNTON which provides for the office of General Secretary and disqualification of members and removal from office. That even though Article 24(b) may not contain a definition of what amount to detrimental behavior, the position of law on interpretation and construction of clear and unambiguous words in a statute has not changed over the years. He cited in support of his assertion the case of Ikpana v. RTPCN [2006] 3 NWLR (Pt. 966) 106 @ 128 D-F; Natural Inland Waterways Authority v. Governing Council ITF [2009] 17 NLLR (Pt. 47) 143@ 156 D-E and 157 D-E and Attorney General of Lagos State v. Attorney General of the Federation [2004] 18 NWLR (Pt. 904)1@ 132 E-F. That the actions of the Defendant are clearly harmful to the growth, development and progress of the 2nd Defendant justifying his removal as General Secretary pursuant to Article 24 (b) of AUNTON Constitution as he was deemed by the 2nd Claimant’s NEC as no longer fit for the office. Thus accommodating Defendant may lead to the collapse of the Union. That it is clear from paragraphs 5-6 of the affidavit in support that the Defendant had grievances despite attempts to harmonize all the differences between members and officials, the Defendant remained implacable and insisted in indulging and continuing in anti-Union and fractionalization misconduct without resolving his grievances with the Union. He relied on the case of Chairman and Members of Customary Court Mbawsi & Ors v. The State Ex Parte Ndimele Nwosu [2014] LPELR- 22852 (CA) 1. On the whole, it is the submission of learned Counsel that in view of the foregoing argument and submissions, this Court has power to grant the reliefs of the Claimants to preserve the internal workings and decisions of the 2nd Claimant as it concerns parties in this suit. He urges the Court to uphold this suit in favour of the Claimants on the ground that it has merit.

 

DEFENDANT’S WRITTEN SUBMISSION

 

9.     Accompanying the Counter Affidavit is a written address wherein learned counsel formulated the two issues for the Court’s determination thus:

 

a.     Whether the 1st Claimant qualifies as a member and has locus to institute this action.

b.     Whether the Defendant was allegedly removed in the proper manner

 

10.                        Learned counsel on issue one posited that the 1st Claimant by virtue of his status as a public officer, does not qualify to be a member of the 2nd Claimant, an association restricted to self-employed App-Based Transporters, consequently 1st Claimant cannot depose to an affidavit representing himself as a member or president of 2nd Claimant. He placed reliance on Article 4 and 30 (5) of the Constitution of 2nd Claimant and the case of Utih v. Egorr [1990] 5 NWLR (Pt. 153) 771 @ P.781; CBN v. Njemanze [2015] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1449) 276 @ P.287 Paras. C-D; 287-288 Paras. H-G and Section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He argued that 1st claimant is not a qualified member of the 2nd Claimant due to his public service employment and dismiss any affidavit sworn by him before the Court.

  

11.                        On issue two, learned counsel contended that there was no invitation to the Defendant to attend meetings of the Disciplinary Committee (DC) or CWC where decisions regarding the Defendant’s suspension were made which is a clear breach of Defendant’s right to fair hearing. He relied on the following State v. Ajayi [1997] 5 NWLR (Pt. 505) 283 @ P.400 Para. C; Awuse v. Odili II [2005] 16 NWLR (Pt. 952) 515 @P.534 Paras D-F. It is equally the contention of Counsel that the 1st Claimant who was also subject to alleged petition, presided over the NEC meeting where decisions were made about the Defendant’s removal which directly conflict with the principles of nemo judex in causa sua. He relied on the case of Ani v. Effiok [2023] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1887) 463. Counsel went on to call the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that the dates wherein the petition was served was a weekend thus making the physical submission and hearing of the petition implausible, reiterating that the Defendant cannot be allegedly removed by NEC of the 2nd Claimant without a vote at the said NEC. He cited in support of his assertion the case of Bamidele v. Bello [2020] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1748) 506 @ P. 525 and Article 8 Rule B (4) of the Constitution of the 2nd Claimant. Furthermore, there is nothing at all showing the Defendant’s purported removal through a voting pattern in compliance with the Constitution of the 2nd Claimant. He urges the Court to discountenance all the reliefs as contained on the face of the Originating Summons.

 

CLAIMANT’S REPLY IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S COUNTER AFFIDAVIT

 

12.                        Claimants on the 6th day of March 2025 filed a written address in opposition to the Defendant’s Counter Affidavit where Counsel on their behalf distilled a sole issue for the determination of this Court thus;

Whether the Claimants are entitled to the declaratory relief/s they seek in their Originating Summons in the light of the Defendant’s counter affidavit?

13.                        Learned Counsel started by answering the above question in the affirmative reiterating that the Defendant has been unable to discharge the burden of proving his assertions in his defence with infallible proofs and that the law does not aid his position. He placed reliance on Section 131 of the Evidence Act 2011 and Ajibi v. Olaewe [2003] 8 NWLR (Pt. 822) 233. He went on to state that the Defendant made heavy weather on the status of a Public Officer without foundation and with no nexus established with the 1st Claimant. That Section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (CFRN), does assist him as it refers to ‘Federation’ which the CFRN defines as the Federal Republic of Nigeria and not a ‘Public Officer’ thereby failing to demonstrate why Claimants are not entitled to the reliefs sought hence not able to discharge the burden of proof on him to prove that the 1st Claimant is a Public Officer. It is equally the position of Counsel that Defendant has also contradicted himself severally where he recognises 1st Claimant as President of AUNTON and also that being familiar with Constitution of AUNTON he did not use the 2nd Claimant’s grievance procedure to air his grievances internally. Again, Counsel stated that the Defendant was unable to prove the truth of his Exhibit AM3 having declared that 1st Claimant is a full-time member of staff of National Institute of Police Studies because it contradicts the Defendant’s assertions as 1st Claimant only perform research last in 2020. He equally posited that Defendant was invited by the 2nd Claimant to participate in disciplinary committee hearing which contradicts his argument that he was not invited thereby denied fair hearing.

 

14.                        Furthermore, Counsel cited the case of Adegoke Motors Ltd v. Adesanya [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 @ 266; Federal Inland Revenue Service v. Haliburton (West Africa) Ltd [2014] LPELR Pg. 24230 (CA); Ogunleye v. Federal Civil Service Commission [1999] and Adebayo v. Federal Civil Service Commission [2016] and submitted that since there is no clear judicial ruling on whether a part-time worker can be a Public Service Officer the general understanding base on PSR and other related rules regulations and statute is that part-time workers are not typically classified as full public officers thus, from the aforementioned definition a public service officer or public servant and its characteristic ingredients cannot be classified as one . He urge the Court to so hold. In conclusion, Counsel submitted that, in view of all arguments and submissions hereinabove, the interest of justice will be best served if the Court dismisses the argument of the Defendant having failed to establish any meaningful defence. He urge the Court to grant the reliefs the Claimants seeks and confirm that the Defendant is dismissed and no longer the General Secretary of 2nd Claimant to prevent his current anti-union activities against the 2nd Claimant.

 

COURT’S DECISION

 

15.                        After a careful consideration of the amended Originating Summons, the accompanying processes filed in this suit by the Claimants, the counter affidavits of the defendant and the claimants’ written address in opposition to the defendant’s counter affidavit on point of law, I am of the view that the sole issue for determination of which will meet the justice of this suit is;

Whether or not the Claimants are entitled to the reliefs sought.

16.                        In form of an introduction, the Trade Unions Act Cap T14 LFN 2004 spells out in detail the process of coming into existence of trade unions and compulsory provisions that should be in the rules (that is constitution) of a trade union. Section 4 (1) of the Trade Unions Act clearly stated these compulsory provisions. By Section 3(6) of the Act, a trade union will not operate except its rules have been submitted to the Registrar of Trade Unions and are approved as being in compliance with the Act. The constitution of a trade union, therefore, is of paramount importance under our labour laws because it serves as the foundational document that governs the union’s operations, ensuring its legality, accountability, and the protection of its members’ rights.

 

17.                        Before delving into the main substance of this suit, let me first address a fundamental issue raised by counsel to the defendant which touches on the competence of the 1st Claimant to so act in the capacity of the President of the 2nd Claimant and initiate this action against the Defendant. In other words, counsel to Defendant in his brief of argument contended that the 1st Claimant by virtue of his status as a ‘public officer’, does not qualify to be a member of the 2nd Claimant. His simple reason is that the 2nd Claimant is an association restricted to self-employed App-Based Transporters, consequently 1st Claimant does not have the capacity to even depose to an affidavit presenting himself as a member or president of 2nd Claimant. Counsel Defendant placed reliance on Article 4 and Article 30 (5) of the constitution of 2nd Claimant. Defendant referred this court to the case of Utih v. Egorr [1990] 5 NWLR (Pt. 153) 771 @ P.781; CBN v. Njemanze [2015] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1449) 276 @ P.287 Paras. C-D; 287-288 Paras. H-G and Section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended. In reacting to this argument, counsel to the claimants submitted that the defendant has the burden of prove to establish the status of the 1st claimant that disqualifies him to hold the office of the president of the 2nd claimant. Counsel argued that the defendant fails to bring the position of the 1st claimant within the meaning of a public officer as define under section 318 of the 1999 Constitution as amended. It is the argument of counsel to claimants that defendant contradicted himself when he referred to 1st claimant as president and at the same time fail to utilize the internal mechanisms in the 2nd claimant’s constitution to channel his grievances.

 

18.                        I have taken my time to read Article 4 and Article 30 (5) (a) of 1st claimant’s constitution. While Article 4 (n) specifically deals with membership and qualification, Article 30 deals with Code of Conducts of the Union. Article 4 (n) generally provides that no member shall be allowed to conduct himself in a way that will bring the Union into dispute. The defendant in his affidavit raised two strong accusations against the claimants to the effect that Exhibit D (Minutes of National Executive Council Members) attached to claimants’ affidavit is a forged document; and Exhibit AM 1 (an investigation report against the 1st Claimant) alleging that he committed rape in the United States of America in Baltimore Maryland. Defendant submitted that investigation committee found the rape allegation to be true. Defendant did not stop there but went on to argue that by Exhibit AM 4, 1st Claimant is a public officer and therefore contravene Article 30 (5) of the constitution.

 

19.                        From the facts presented and the evidence before this court, parties are in agreement that Exhibit B (Constitution of 2nd Claimant) binds all members of the Union inclusive of 1st Claimant and Defendant. A careful reading of the constitution and particularly Article 8B, 9, 24 and 30 (5) provides for disciplinary procedure regarding officers/members of the Union alleged to have been found to have committed any misconduct. The procedure can be summed up in a nutshell shell as follows: once a complaint is received a DC is set up to investigate the allegations and the report of the DC shall be submitted to the NWC who shall forward the recommendation of the DC to the NEC. From the facts available before this court the defendant fails to take us through this procedure based on evidence to substantiate how these provisions were complied with to warrant the conclusion that 1st defendant was removed as president of 2nd Claimant. The allegations of forgery and rape are serious criminal offences that require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The defendant made bare allegations without substantiating and pointing to the role played by the organs of 2nd Claimant instituted to so act as provided under the constitution. The issue raised concerning the competence of the 1st claimant to be a member of 2nd Defendant because the Defendant alleged that he is a public servant. To prove this, defendant relied on Exhibit AM 4 which is a letter explaining that 1st claimant is “contract staff” and a “part time staff” of the institute. To prove an employment contract, the law is trite that the letter of engagement and the condition of service are the principal documents to determine the nature of the contract. The defendant presented a letter  (Exhibit AM 4) which was addressed to no one, and which has no context but urge this court to hold that 1st claimant is a public servant as defined under section 318 of the 1999 CFRN and therefore not eligible to be a member of the 2nd Claimant. The defendant fails to tender before the court the employment letter of the 1st claimant and the terms and conditions of service between 1st claimant and the institute. It therefore follows that the claim by defendant that 1st Claimant is a public servant and therefore not eligible to hold any of 2nd Claimant’s office all remain a bare assertion and un reliable. See Baba v. NCATC [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 388 and also Emmanuel John v. Rock King Ltd Unreported SUIT NO: NICN/BEN/29/2019 delivered on 28TH FEBRUARY, 2023. Article 30 (5) (a) of the 2nd Claimant’s constitution makes special provision as to responsibilities of elected and appointed officers of the union and what disqualifies one from so becoming. The constitution also clearly provides a procedure of addressing concerns regarding membership of the 2nd claimant with specific organs charged with that responsibility but which in this case was never put into use to act as mandatorily provided by the constitution (Exhibit B). See sections 4, 8, 9 and 24. I have had cause in this judgment to held that a trade union’s constitution is its supreme law. It therefore follows that any action, including removal of its officers, which contravenes the procedure laid down in the constitution is null and void. The Trade Union Act in Item 7 of the First Schedule stipulated that a trade union constitution should provide for the procedure for the appointment and removal of appointed officers. It follows that every trade union constitution in Nigeria contains provisions for discipline of erring members and staff. And in view of the fact that a trade union constitution has a statutory flavour, its provisions are sacrosanct and are to be observed to the letter. In effect any flaunting of the constitution, as in the instant case, the absence of any due process as spelt out in the constitution to relieve the 1st Claimant as president of 2nd Defendant, remain in the imagination of the defendant as it is a nullity. Therefore the assertions of the defendant remain only in the realm of an allegation as defendant only succeeded in specifying the purported misconduct without the disciplinary measures initiated and taken in line with the provisions of the constitution. It trite that in cases such as this, the court usually looks into the union’s rules and where it acts outside or contrary to its rules, the action remains null and void. In the case of Comrade Samuel Tuoyo v. Incorporated Trustees of the Fitters Senior Staff Union Of Nigeria Unreported SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/208/2024, delivered on March 04, 2025 this Court per Haastrup J. held that a purported suspension of a Claimant from office by a person or organ of the union not saddled with the responsibility and without giving him the opportunity to be heard of any allegation of fraud is a violation of the union’s constitution and the principle of fair hearing. In the instant case the as noted above the organs saddled with the responsibility to act were never invoked or activated. See also Imote v. Fidelity Bank Plc (2019) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1690) 211. On this score, I find that 1st Claimant remain the president of the 2nd Claimant and competent to initiate this suit and also swore to the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons. The objection therefore raised as to his competence to initiate this suit is hereby discountenanced. I so hold.

 

20.                        Now coming to the issues or questions raised in the Originating Summons, it is apparent that this dispute centers around the interpretation and supremacy of 2nd Claimant’s constitution (Exhibit B). The 1st Claimant herein and the Defendant are members of the 2nd Claimant. At risk of repeating myself, the constitution of a trade union, such as Exhibit B, is commonly referred to as the Rule Book as it is the supreme governing document that has a significant impact on its members. It defines their rights, responsibilities, and obligations within the union. It also outlines the union's governance structure, financial practices, and membership procedures, ensuring a transparent and accountable system for members. In other words, any disciplinary action, suspension, or expulsion of a member, or removal of an officer, must strictly adhere to the procedures outlined in that constitution. The Constitution has an inference of a contract which binds all the members of the Union. As such, the rules are binding on each and every member of the Union. See the case of Nigerian Civil Service Union & Anor v. O.C. Essien & Anor [1985]3NWLR (Pt. 12) 306.

 

21.                        To put it in other words, the provisions of the 2nd Claimant Constitution bind its members including the parties in this suit. This is because the relationship between a member of a trade union and the union itself is contractual, and the terms of the contract are to be found in the rules of the Union. See the case of Elufioye v. Halilu [1993]6NWLR (Pt. 301)570@596, Para A. By this I mean the clauses or articles of the constitution are the laws between the members and any neglect of their respective obligations are deem as violations of the contract. This Court is of the opinion that since parties in this case are ad idem or in agreement that Exhibit B is the Constitution of the 2nd Claimant, I therefore find that this constitution is the article of faith that bind members of the union including the 1st Claimant and the Defendant. For the reaffirmation of this conclusion, the Preamble and Article 2 of the constitution (herein marked as Exhibit B) clearly restated this in the following words:

PREAMBLE

THE AMALGAMATED UNION OF APP-BASED TRANSPORTERS OF NIGERIA having firmly and solemnly agreed to come together as one united and indivisible body dedicated to the promotion of labor and industrial relations activities that would improve the welfare of its members and promote solidarity, peace, equity and justice, resist oppressive practices and policies by app-based companies, right for social justice among  App-based transpoters and other Nigerians do hereby enact, promulgate and give to ourselves this Constitution whose provision shall be binding on all members and hereby willingly resolve to be governed by the provisions herein contained, in accordance with federal republic of Nigeria constitution.  

ARTICLE 2: SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION:

(i)                This document shall be known as the Constitution of AUNTON. This Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all organs, officers and members of AUNTON. It shall be deemed to be the basis of the bond between members in governance and operation of the Union.

 

(ii)             The Supreme Authority of the Union shall be exercised by the National Delegates Conference (NDC)/Special National Delegates Conference.

 

(iii)           The Union shall be governed only in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution set up rules and regulations as maybe agreed by members.

 

(iv)           The Constitution shall be amended from time to time, as the need may arises.

 

 

Therefore, there is no doubt that Exhibit B is supreme and binds all members of the 2nd Claimant.  

 

22.                        The Claimants by Question One in the Amended Originating Summons wants the Court to interpret the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, 4(h), 4(n), 6, 6B, 8, 9, 16A, 16D, 24, 30 and 30[3(2),(3)], [4], [5(d)],[8],[9], [12],[14] of the Constitution of AUATON as to legal competence of General Secretary to singularly and or collectively entitled and/or empowered him to act arbitrarily without regard to the Constitution of AUNTON in the performance or neglect of his duties. It is the Claimant’s case vide the amended affidavit in support of the amended Originating Summons that in the course of administering the affairs of the 2nd Claimant, issues arose concerning the manner the Defendant was conducting the affairs of his office as General Secretary which other Executive Officials were not satisfied. The claimant stated that this issue had to be settled by the Executives of 2nd Claimant together with the Registrar of Trade Unions on the 13th December 2023. See paragraph 5 of affidavit in support of Originating Summons. Claimants submitted that the Defendant rather than abide by the resolutions reached on 13/12/2023 but disregarded it and continue to repeat the same mistakes addressed and it began to cause major rift amongst Union Executives. The Defendant on the other hand contended that the resolution in Exhibit B1 of 13/12/2023 was not about his role as the General Secretary of the 2nd Claimant but about clarifying the position of all Executives of the 2nd Claimant. Defendant submitted that during the meeting 2nd Claimant was newly registered as at the time Exhibit B1 was made, iterating that there was never any form of concern raised as to how he conducts his role as General Secretary. 

 

23.                         A look at Article 2 (i) of Exhibit B (Constitution), it provides that the Constitution is supreme and that its provisions are binding on all organs, officers and members of AUNTON. It went further to state in Article 2 (iii) that the Union shall be governed only by the provisions of the Constitution. There is no doubt from the provisions of Article 2(i) and (iii) of the Constitution that 1st Claimant and Defendant cannot act arbitrarily or act without recourse to the Constitution of AUNTON in the performance of their official duties having voluntarily submitted to its supremacy.  It is trite that in the interpretation of clear and unambiguous statutory provisions, the words used are to be given their clear and ordinary meanings. See the following cases; Oloja v. Gov. Benue State [2022]3NWLR (Pt 1816)1@24,Paras C-E; N.U.P. v. I.N.E.C [2021]17 NWLR (Pt 1805)305@342, Paras F-H; Bayero v. Agundi [2021]16NWLR (Pt 1802)347@371, Paras D-E and; Abegunde v. O.S.H.A. [2015]8NWLR (Pt 1461)314@353, Paras D-F, 364, Paras E-H. It therefore follows that the above provisions of Article 2 (i) and (iii) are clear and require no special aid to understand. It is on the above reasoning that I find that the Defendant as General Secretary has no power or legal competence to act arbitrarily without regard to the Constitution of AUNTON in the performance or discharge of his official duties. This I so hold.

  

24.                        Now to Question 2 in the amended Originating Summons, the claimant wants this Court to interpret the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, 4(n), 6B, 16D, 24 and 30[3(2),(3)], [4], [5(d)],[8],[9], [12],[14] of Exhibit B (Constitution) as regards validity of the Defendant actions having not complied with the provisions of the said Exhibit B; whether he could validly be said to be acting in the best interests of the 2nd Claimant and not in breach of his role as General Secretary. It is the deposition of the Claimants vide paragraphs 7 (a) (b) (c) of the amended affidavit in support of the amended originating summons that the Defendant being member of NEC went out of his way and setup secretly another WhatsApp group/platform called ‘AUNTON INFO [NEC]’ platform. And that he equally set up a rebel website to mirror the Union’s official website. It is the deposition of the 1st Claimant that the Defendant use his unofficial WhatsApp group and other property of the Union to engage in strong anti-union activities including racketeering, poaching or raiding of members, corrupt practices, anti-Union activities on the official WhatsApp portal breaching his responsibilities as General Secretary. Claimants in support of their position attached Exhibit BO which is official AUNTON NEC group/platform; and Exhibit B1 which is a resolution reached at the NEC meeting held on the 13th day of December, 2023. The defendant vides paragraph 4 of his amended Counter Affidavit deny paragraphs 7 (a) - (j) of the Claimant’s affidavit and stated that he did not open any secret WhatsApp group nor set up any rebel website, neither did he engaged in any anti-union activities. He contended that Exhibit G1which shows that he was allegedly suspended and that the NEC reviewed the report of the DC submitted to it by the CWC and passed a resolution to that effect; the DC that made the recommendation never invited him to appear before it to answer any petition. Defendant further avers that he was not served with any of the critical documents like Exhibit B1A and this is a fundamental breach of his right to fair hearing. Defendant argued that the timeline for the disciplinary action was unreasonably brief, with the petition dated 23/03/2024 and decision made the following day. This rapid progression lacks the essential element of due process.

25.                        Faced with these arguments, I consider it necessary and pertinent at this stage to reproduce Article 24 of Exhibit B which deals with disqualification of members and removal from office. The constitution provides thus;

 

“Article 24: DISQUALIFICATION OF MEMBERS AND REMOVAL FROM OFFICE

a)    Any member engaging in activity detrimental to the interest of the Union such as; commission of fraud by way of personalizing the union business to make profit, forgery of official documents to cause deceit in the interest of the perpetrator, diversion of funds specifically for official purpose into personal use, mismanagement of funds, commission of any state or federal crimes at least  a misdemeanor offence category while in an elected position of the union, such act that is capable of jeopardizing the reputation of the union, conspiracy to defraud the union, conspiracy to commit any of the above listed actions having been given fair hearing by the disciplinary committee shall be removed and expelled from the union and cannot seek re-election or be appointed into any office in the union in the future.

b)    Any Officer of the Union proving incompetent, neglecting his/her duty behaving in any way detrimental to the union shall be removed from the office on the recommendation of the disciplinary committee.

c)     An Appeal against any disciplinary action from the disciplinary committee shall lies to the Central Working Committee who shall determine the merit or otherwise of the disciplinary action of any member.

 

26.                        In the light of the facts and evidence presented upon which the Claimants are calling on the Court to interpret in Question Two particularly as it relates to Article 24 (b), I am mindful that by virtue of Article 2 the Constitution of AUNTON is supreme.  Thus, any violation of any part of the said Constitution by any member of 2nd Claimant such member shall cease to a member after due process has been followed.  And the law is trite that when an act is illegal, it is a nullity. An illegal act cannot be the basis of any official act as same cannot be enforced. See the case of Alao v. A.C.B [1998]3 NWLR (Pt 542)339@355; Oyenehin v. Akinkugbe [2010]4NWLR (Pt. 1184)265@285. Flowing from the foregoing pages 2-3 of Exhibit BO, Pages 1and 2 of Exhibit B2, Pages 1 and 2 of Exhibit B3 attached to the affidavit in support of Originating Summons, the Defendant was said to be carrying out activities of the 2nd Claimant in breach of the precepts of its Constitution. All these are pieces of documentary evidences which defendant generally denied without any document to contradict the case of the claimants. The law is trite that documentary evidence is often described as the best evidence. Indeed, Courts use documents as a hanger to test the veracity of oral evidence. In the case of Egharevba v. Osagie (2010) 1255 SC the Supreme Court held that documentary evidence is more reliable than oral evidence and it is used to test the credibility of oral testimony. Documents, once admitted, speak for themselves and are not subject to distortion. The case as presented by the claimants stand strong in the face of that of the defendant who fail to adduce credible evidence to rebut the case of the claimants. I have no hesitation in accepting the case of the claimant as the truth and I am convinced that with the evidence presented, the defendant was and is indeed involved in anti-union activities in contravention of the provisions of the constitution.

 

27.                        I am mindful of the fact that the Defendant in his defence argued that he was also not given a fair hearing. The Claimants in his response in paragraph 2.10 of their written address on point of law in opposition to the Defendant’s Counter Affidavit stated that the Defendant was duly invited via WhatsApp message to participate in the disciplinary committee hearing through goggle link. However, my effort to confirm the filing of any further and better affidavit as submitted by counsel proves abortive as I could not lay my hands on any further and better affidavit dated 7/11/2024 and Exhibit 4. Neither is this shown in my record of proceedings of 06/05/2025 where I recorded counsel to Claimant as filing a reply on point of law only. No mention was made of any further and better affidavit. I am tempted to believe that the submission of counsel in paragraph 2.10 of the reply on point of law is nothing but an effort to mislead this court if not a genuine mistake on the part of the claimants’ counsel. I will not say more.

 

28.                        As noted earlier, Defendant made heavy weather on the legal point that he was not giving a fair hearing throughout the sitting of the DC and the CWC. I have noted the depositions of the defendant in the counter affidavit. I have also noted Claimants deposition in paragraph 6 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons and which was not specifically denied in any way by the defendant. The Claimant stated that defendant exited the official WhatsApp platform created at the instance of the NEC which was the channel of communicating with all the Executive officials about the activities of the 2nd Claimant. This was immediately after resolving that defendant was engaged in anti-union activities typically mentioned by the Claimants.

                  

29.                        It is the law that if a party is embarking deliberately on dilatory tactics the Court can lawfully stop him in his tracks and take action against his interest without flouting the provisions of Section 36(1) of the Constitution. See Chidoka v First City Finance Ltd [2013] All FWLR (Pt. 659) 1024. It is expected that a party faced with a matter is always expected to be vigilant. In other words, the law is that each party to any pending action must be vigilant and if he is not so vigilant he may deprive himself of fair hearing without remedy. In this case the defendant was giving all the opportunity to be integrated into the system but he decided not to take advantage of it. Defendant who is in breach of the standing order of the NEC to belong to a platform to be served with updates cannot now be heard to have been denied any fair hearing, he will be deemed to have waived his right. See Ariori v. Elemo [1983] 1 SCNLR 1; First Bank of Nigeria Plc. v. T.S.A. (supra); Olufeagba v. Abdul-Raheem [2010] All FWLR (Pt.512) 1033 at 1019: Chukwuma v. FRN [2011] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1264) 391. As noted above, I am incline to believe the version of the claimants in the light of the available evidence substantiated by the exhibits attached than the unsubstantiated evidence of the defendant. The right to a fair hearing is not a talisman that can be waved magically to forestall proceedings or as a delay tactic. The Apex Court in the case of Eze v. FRN [2017] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1589) 433 P. 499 Paras. D-E had held that the right to fair hearing can be waived just as in the instant case. The Defendant who want this Court to believe that he was not given fair hearing also failed to place before the Court evidence that he had appeal against the proceedings of the Disciplinary Committee to the NWC in order to determine the merit or otherwise of the sanction meted against him as provided in Article 24 (c). I find that it too late in the day for the Defendant to start arguing that he was not giving fair hearing without doing invoking the provisions of the constitution. As noted above the law only aid the vigilant and not the indolent. It is in the light of the above that I find that the activities of the Defendant are not in consonance with the letters and the spirit of the Constitution. This in my view is not in the best interest of the 2nd Claimant. Thus, question two is resolved against the Defendant.

 

30.                        Next is Question Three in the amended Originating Summons. The Claimants wants this Court to interpret the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, 4(h), 4(n), 6, 6B, 8, 9, 16A, 16D, 24, 30 and 30 [3(2),(3)], [4], [5(d)],[8],[9], [12],[14] of Exhibit B as regards whether the Defendant is not bound to adhere to the dictates and requirements of his role as General Secretary of the 2nd Claimant. It is trite law that the rights and obligations of members of an association are defined by their Constitution. Both the Association and its members are bound by its provisions and their rights and obligation created by their Constitution can be remedied as provided by the Constitution if breached either by the Association or any of its members. See Oshiomole v. Salihu (No.2) [2021] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1778) 380 (CA). Flowing from the above authority, there is no doubt that the Defendant having agreed to and equally submitted himself to be a member and executive officer of the 2nd Claimant is bound to adhere to the dictates and requirements of the Constitution of the 2nd Claimant.  It is consequent upon this that I find and hold that the Defendant is bound by the Constitution of the 2nd Defendant.

 

31.                        By Question Four, the Claimant wants the Court to interpret the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, 4(h), 4(n), 6, 6B, 8.9. 16A, 16D, 24 and 30 [3(2), (3)], [4], [5(d)],[8],[9], [12],[14] as regards the legal competence and capacity of the 2nd Claimant to institute investigatory proceedings against the Defendant upon receipt of a petition by its member.  I have painstakingly considered the provisions of the Constitution enumerated hereinabove; it is my humble view that the 2nd Claimant is validly empowered by virtue of the clear provision of section 24 of its constitution to constitute an investigatory committee and proceed against any of its member, the Defendant inclusive upon receipt of a complaint from any one of its members. It is in view of this that I answer question four in the affirmative.

 

32.                        Claimants by their Question Five are asking this Court to interpret the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, 4(h), 4(n), 6, 6B, 8.9. 16A, 16D, 24 and 30 [3(2), (3)], [4], [5(d)],[8],[9], [12],[14] as regards the legal competence and capacity of the Defendant to continue to act against the interest of the 2nd Claimant and in breach of its Constitution. I have earlier held in this judgment that the Constitution of the 2nd Claimant is supreme. I have equally held that both Defendants and Claimants are bound by the said Constitution. It goes therefore without saying that the Defendant has no right to continue to act against the interest of the 2nd Claimant and in breach of the terms of the said Constitution he voluntarily subscribed. I so hold.

 

33.                        In respect of Question Six, Claimants wants the Court to interpret the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, 4(h), 4(n), 6, 6B, 8.9. 16A, 16D, 24 and 30 [3(2), (3)], [4], [5(d)], [8], [9], [12],[14] as regards the legal competence and capacity of the 2nd Claimant to sack and or remove the Defendant from the office of General Secretary. By the provision of Article 8B (4), the NEC can expel, suspend or remove any appointed or elected officers by affirmative vote of 2/3 of those present upon satisfactory evidence that an elected officer or a member of CWC is guilty of misconduct or anything not in accordance with the principles, aims and purpose of the union. This position is further reinforced by the Provisions of Article 24. In the instant case NEC met and 30 out of 38 were present and unanimously approved Defendant’s removal. The law is established that where the legislative intention is clearly expressed and therefore known, there is no need to look or search for the legislative intention by any means. See Sylvester v. Ohiakwu [2014] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1401) 467 (CA). I do not hesitate to hold that the 2nd Claimant has the power to sack and or remove any member or elected or appointed officer under the constitution, the Defendant inclusive, if found guilty of misconduct. For the above reasons, I answer question six in the affirmative.

 

34.                        Regarding Question Seven, Claimants want this Court to interpret the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, 4(h), 4(n), 6, 6B, 8.9. 16A, 16D, 24 and 30 [3(2), (3)], [4], [5(d)],[8],[9], [12],[14] as regards the legal competence and capacity of the 2nd Claimant whether it acted in accordance with the provisions of its Constitution in taking disciplinary action against the Defendant after he had been found guilty and followed its Constitutional protocols that eventually led to the removal of the Defendant from the office of General Secretary of the 2nd Claimant. Article 24 of the AUNTON Constitution deals with disqualification of members and removal from office. I have earlier in this judgment reproduce the said provisions. I have equally held hereinbefore that the actions of the Defendant are not in the best interest of the 2nd Claimant and therefore in breach of same. It is clear by Exhibit B1A that the Defendant was petitioned, there is equally no doubt that disciplinary committee was instituted to investigate the allegation against the Defendant. Exhibit D is the NEC meeting that considered the NWC recommendation of DC report. During the NEC meeting, report of the Disciplinary Committee was presented recommending removal of the Defendant. The report was deliberated and motions and counter motions were moved and at the end, the position of DC and CWC was unanimously approved. The above in my view have complied with the principles, spirit and letters of the 2nd Claimant’s Constitution. Therefore the 2nd Claimant acted in accordance with its Constitution against the Defendant and effected Defendant’s eventual removal from office as General Secretary. It is in the light of reasoning above that question seven is resolve in favour of the Claimants.

 

35.                        Coming to the reliefs, I will take reliefs i, ii and iv together. There is no doubt that reliefs i and ii are based on questions 2 and 3 in the amended Originating Summons. This Court has found that questions 2 and 3 are resolved against the Defendant. It is only logical that this Court grants reliefs ‘i’ and ‘ii’ to the effect that the Defendant failed to adhere to the provisions of the 2nd Claimants’ Constitution whilst acting in the office of General Secretary: engaging in actions that negates the letters and spirit of 2nd claimants’ constitution and engaging in anti-union activities. Consequently, in line with relief (iv) the Defendant is ordered to immediately hand over all official property of the 2nd Claimant to relevant officers.

 

36.                        In respect reliefs ‘iii’, it is based on questions 4, 6 and 7 of the amended Originating Summons. I have found and resolve questions 4, 5 and 6 against the Defendant. It then goes without saying that this Court grants relief “iii”. Consequently, I find that the removal of the Defendant as the 2nd Claimant’s General Secretary having duly complied with its Constitutional protocol is hereby upheld. This I so hold.

 

37.                        The Claimants by their relief ‘v’ wants this Court to declare that the Defendant, being a member of the 2nd Claimant, to fully comply and adhere to the provisions of the Constitution of the 2nd Claimant immediately and return all assets of the Union. The Defendant having been duly removed in accordance with the Constitution of the 2nd Claimant is bound to hand over and or return all assets in his possession by virtue of the office of the General Secretary of the 2nd Claimant. It is consequent upon this that I resolve relief ‘v’ in favour of the Claimants.

 

38.                        As regards relief ‘vi’ ‘vii’ and ‘viii’, there is no doubt that these reliefs are injunctive reliefs which are ancillary and dependent upon the main claims. See Kuti v. Alashe [2005]17NWLR (Pt 955)625. This Court has found that the Defendant do not have the vires to occupy the position of General Secretary having been duly removed by the 2nd Claimant in accordance with its Constitutional protocols or procedure. Thus, relief ‘vi’, ‘vii’ and ‘viii’ succeeds. I so find and hold.

 

39.                        Judgment is accordingly hereby entered. There is no order as to cost.

 

 

 

                                                                                                                                       ……………………………

                                                                                 Hon. Justice E. D. Subilim

                                                                                                  JUDGE