IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

OF THE JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE, I.S GALADIMA

 

DATE: 5th June 2025                                         SUITNO: NICN/JOS/07/2024

                                                                       

BETWEEN:                                                

 

1.        BULUS GEORGE LAMBERT

2.        RUTH APENE

3.        KANGYANG CHOJI

4.        MATHEW THOMAS JWASKUKA

5.        MARTIN BARJE

6.        PWAKIM CHRISTAL CHUNDUNG

7.        FILIBUS RUTH

8.        TIMBYEN FELIX DENFA

9.        WIKADASON GEOFFREY MAGDALENE

10.      DESHI JOSEPH DOGARA

11.      PWASONG ESTHER DUNG

12.      CHUNGN BRYAN DAVOU                                                                     APPLICANTS

13       DALYOP EMMANUEL PETER

14.      RWANG HWERE

15.      ISHAYA MANJI DADING

16.      LORRITA GOFWEN YUSUF

17.      DAVOU PIUS JOAN

18.      KOPJI RHODA SIMON

19.      KUMYAP MORGAK GOPEP

20.      NANLIR FWAWANG JOSHUA

21.      CHUWANG JOSEPH

22.      MERCY EMMANUEL DUNG

23.      MASHAT AMOS MACHIEF

24.      DABONG NANMET DAUDA

25.      ZAINAB ALIYU IDRIS

26.      ABDULMUMIN ABDULHAMID

27.      MANCHA PAM JOHN

28.      JOSEPH ARIN NYAM

29.      NATHANIEL NENDIMA GOBONG

30.      JEMIMA NDOOH MANN

31.      JOSEPH KENNETH WARKWAP

32.      MAKUT MARGRET ACHIMUS

33.      JIKDANG CLETUS

34.      LAWAM CHINTAK DANIEL

35.      TONGRET BAKZAK JONAH

36.      CECILIA TURGAK SHEHU

37.      YILWADA GODFREY DANIEL

38.      JOSEPH PETER MACKWIN

39.      VONKE JOY SAMUEL

40.      YAKSON DAZE PAUL

41.      AMOS ENDURANCE LOKMUKAT

42.      DUNG PATRICIA LYOP

43.      FELICIA SAMUEL GOBAK

44.      TURBA SAMSON BAKA

45.      THOMAS GIDEON PAM

46.      RENKAT SYLVANUS DAMAR

47.      DOKBISH LONGWALL GUJOR

48.      DAKIM JOHN CHOLLOM

49.      KOOMLONG KWARAMNAAN

50.      DEBORAH SAMUEL DASEN

51.      RAKIYA GARBO

52.      DANGKUM EZRA SINGDEP

53.      CHANGFA JAMES BINGANG

54.      DANLAMI NA’ANMAN

55.      MERMWAKAK JINGSHIWA W.

56.      JIKATWE M. WAKJI

                       

AND:

1.        GOVERNOR OF PLATEAU STATE 

2.        ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PLATEAU STATE                      RESPONDENTS

3.        PLATEAU STATE COLLEGE OF HEALTH TECHNOLOGY   

 

REPRESENTATION:

·        Nantok Dashuwar for the applicants.

·        P.A. Daffi (HAG Plateau State), Sabo Longji, L.P. Fombot, P.N. Dashak, K.B Bawun for the respondents

 

JUDGMENT:

1.  The applicants (referred to by the parties as the claimants), commenced this suit via an originating summons filed on 14/3/2024 wherein they raised the following questions for determination by this court:       

                                                              i.      Whether the 1st defendant (respondent) is possessed of or clothed with the powers or authority to unilaterally suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the employments and appointments of the applicants through Exhibits D and E, the applicants having been in the service and employment of the 3rd defendant (respondent). 

                                                           ii.      By virtue of the various letters of appointments issued to the applicants attached as Exhibits A1 – A56, whether the applicants are not entitled to maintain and retain their employment with the 3rd respondent in line with the extant laws regulating their employment with the 3rd respondent.

                                                         iii.      Whether the failure and refusal of the 3rd respondent to pay the applicants their salaries and allowances thereby retaining same from the month of January, 2023 to date or any period of time at all is not unlawful, unjust, illegal and a violation of the 3rd respondent’s duties and obligations.

2.  Thus, the applicants, seek the following reliefs:

1.     A declaration that the 1st defendant (respondent) has no power or authority to suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the employments and appointments of the applicants duly engaged in the services and employment of the 3rd respondent.

2.     A declaration that the purported termination, nullification and cancellation of the employments and appointments of the applicants by the 1st respondent through Exhibits D and E, is unlawful, illegal, null and void with no legal effect whatsoever.

3.     A declaration that the applicants are entitled to maintain and retain their respective employments with the 3rd respondent in line with the extant laws regulating their employment with the 3rd respondent.

4.     A declaration that the failure and refusal of the 3rd respondent to pay the applicants their respective salaries and allowances thereby retaining same from the month of January, 2023 to date is unlawful, unjust, illegal and in violation of the 3rd respondent’s duties and obligations.

5.     An order setting aside the purported suspension and subsequent termination, nullification and cancellation of the applicant’s various appointments and employments made by the 1st respondent through the publications made at his instance attached as Exhibits D and E, same having been done ultra vires and therefore unlawful, null and void.

6.     An order reinstating the applicants back to their respective positions as staff and employees of the 3rd respondent in line with their respective letters of appointments attached as Exhibits A1 – A56 respectively.

7.     An order directing the respondents to pay the applicants their respective monthly salaries and allowances as specified by the terms of their employments from the month of January, 2023 till date, as follows:

a.      2nd – 3rd ­ applicants; each the sum of N1,579, 805.67 annually, paid in monthly instalments of N131, 650. 47 per month. 

b.     1st, 4th – 40th applicants; each the sum of N1, 360, 160. 86 annually paid in monthly instalments of N113, 346. 73.  per month.

c.       41th – 42nd applicants; each the sum of N1,212,735.21 annually paid in monthly instalments of N101, 061. 26 per month.

d.       43rd – 45th applicants; each the sum of N1,020, 050. 61 annually paid in monthly instalments of N85, 004. 21 per month.

e.      46th – 54th applicants; each the sum of N873,551.00 annually paid in monthly instalments of N72, 795. 91 per month.

f.       55th applicant; the sum of N498,965.00 annually paid in monthly instalments of N72, 795. 91 per month.

g.      56th applicant; the sum of N378,391.00 annually paid in monthly instalments of N31,532. 58 per month.

8.     An order of perpetual injunction, restraining the respondents, whether by themselves, their agents, privies, assigns or representatives howsoever described, from victimizing, terminating or interfering with the applicants’ respective appointments and employments with the 3rd respondent, without any wrong doing or violations of the terms of service on the part of the applicants.

9.     N250,000,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Million Naira) general damages against the respondents jointly and severally for the collective pain and suffering imposed on the applicants by the respondents.

10.                       Costs of this suit as may be assessed by this Honourable Court.

 

3.  In support of the originating summons, the learned counsel for the applicants relied on the supporting affidavit of 28 paragraphs deposed to by the Bulus George Lambert, the 1st applicant in this suit, with 56 annexures marked A1-A56, D and E.

 

4.  The applicants also filed a motion for interlocutory injunction on 21/3/2024.

 

5.  The respondents (also referred to as the defendants by the parties’ counsel), collectively submitted a memorandum of conditional appearance, a counter affidavit in response to the motion for injunction, a counter affidavit opposing the originating summons, and a notice of preliminary objection. These documents were filed on May 9, 2024, beyond the deadline but were properly regularized through the respondents’ motion dated April 30, 2024, and filed on May 9, 2024.

 

6.  The applicants again reacted to the notice of preliminary objection by filing a counter affidavit of 14 paragraphs and written address dated 7/5/2024 but filed on 9/5/2024. They further filed a further affidavit and better affidavit as well as a reply on points of law on 14/5/2024.

 

7.  The respondents proceeded to file a further affidavit and a written address on 12/7/2024 in support of their notice of preliminary objection out of time which was regularized vide a motion dated 12/7/2024 and filed 12/7/2024.

 

8.  After exchanges of the parties’ processes, respective counsel adopted their pleadings on May 19, 2025, the court reserved its judgment for pronouncement today.

SUMMARY OF CASE:

9.  The applicants say that in 2022 they received and accepted offers of various posts at the 3rd respondent’s institution, completed all required paperwork, and began work. They maintain they carried out their duties faithfully in accordance with their appointment letters, the 3rd respondent’s Staff Conditions of Service, and the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law 2003. They further allege that, after the newly elected governor (the 1st respondent) took office, he suspended them and then publicly announced their termination. The applicants insist this dismissal was unlawful because the governor lacked authority to end their employment on his own. They also state that they have not been paid any salary since January 2023.

 

10.                     The respondents argue that no advertisements were issued for the positions the applicants were supposedly hired for, making their employments inconsistent with the rules and regulations of the 3rd respondent institution. Additionally, the applicants were never interviewed by the Appointments and Promotions Committee as required by the law governing the 3rd respondent institution. They assert that these applicants accepted their job offers on different days and proceeded with their documentation with the 3rd respondent. Furthermore, they claim that the applicants did not start their duties immediately as specified in their respective employment letters, and that their appointments were never confirmed.

 

11.                     The respondents argue that, contrary to the applicants' assertions, the 1st respondent established an investigative panel to examine the legality of the temporary appointments granted to the applicants by the previous administration. The investigation revealed irregularities in the appointment process, prompting the 1st respondent, in his capacity as the Visitor of the 3rd respondent institution, to suspend the applicants. The respondents denied any financial obligations to the applicants and requested this court to dismiss the suit in its entirety.

 

THE APPLICANTS’ ARGUMENTS ON THEIR CLAIMS:

12.                     The applicants’ counsel formulated the following issues for determination thus:

                                                              i.      Whether the 1st respondent is possessed of or clothed with the powers or authority to unilaterally suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the employments and appointments of the Applicants through Exhibits D and E, the Applicants having been in the service and employment of the 3rd Respondent. 

                                                           ii.      By virtue of the various letters of appointments issued to the Applicants attached as Exhibits A1 – A56, whether the Applicants are not entitled to maintain and retain their employment with the 3rd Respondent in line with the extant laws regulating their employment with the 3rd Respondent.

                                                         iii.       Whether the failure and refusal of the 3rd Respondent to pay the Applicants their salaries and allowances thereby retaining same from the month of January 2023 till date or any period of time at all is not unlawful, unjust, illegal and a violation of the 3rd Respondent’s duties and obligations.

 

13.                     Counsel for the applicants treated issues 1, 2 and 3 as forming the heart of their case, inviting the court to determine whether the 1st respondent has any statutory or other authority to suspend or terminate their employment with the 3rd respondent. Their fundamental contention is that no law or instrument grants the 1st respondent power to interfere with, suspend or terminate their employment.

 

14.                     Accordingly, the relationship between the applicants and the 3rd respondent is not a simple master?and?servant arrangement but one governed by statute. This is confirmed by the instruments establishing their employment—Exhibits A1–A56—which in paragraph 2(vii) stipulate that the employees are subject in all respects to the conditions of service set out in the Scheme of Service and any College regulations or instructions as may be amended by the Council from time to time.

15.                      Counsel emphasized that, based on the quoted sections of the employment letters, it is clear that the documents referenced in those letters should be considered in a case of unlawful termination. Therefore, it is necessary to scrutinize these documents to determine if any provisions grant the 1st respondent the authority to terminate, suspend, nullify, or cancel the applicants' employment, as was attempted through Exhibits D and E.

16.                     He maintained that the Scheme of Service is the starting point. A careful review shows it contains no specific procedure for terminating an employee’s appointment, only the method of entry—via direct appointment. Consequently, one must look to the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law 2003 for guidance.

17.                     Counsel argued that the Governor (the 1st respondent), has no statutory authority over the applicants’ appointment or employment. Instead, those powers are exclusively vested in the 3rd respondent’s Governing Council under Sections 6(1)(r), 10(1), 10(2)(g) and 18(1) of the Law. 24.            That these provisions indicate clearly that the applicants’ employments are statutorily protected. 

18.                     On what qualifies an employment to enjoy the special status of statutory protection, Counsel referred to the case of BOB v. THE COUNCIL, ABIA STATE UNIVERSITY UTURU & ANOR (2015) LPELR-25611(CA) to submit that the implication of an employment with statutory flavour is that strict adherence to the governing instrument must be followed before any valid termination of such employment can be achieved. All powers to do or act in relation to termination of such employment must be derived from the applicable laws. Counsel also referred to the case of HARUNA V. UNIAGRIC, MAKURDI (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 912) Pg.  233 at 275 – 275.

19.                     Based on established legal principles, the counsel argued that the 1st respondent's purported termination of the applicants' employment is beyond his legal authority, as no relevant laws grant him such powers. Therefore, the termination is ultra vires, unlawful, illegal, null, and should be invalidated.

20.                     Counsel argued that the law establishing the 3rd respondent grants its Council the authority to appoint all academic and non-academic staff of the College. Therefore, only the council of the 3rd respondent has the power to undertake the actions attempted by the 1st respondent, in accordance with the relevant laws. Counsel further asserted that the authority that hires employees is the only one that can lawfully terminate their employment. In this case, since the council of the 3rd respondent employed the applicants, only the council or its authorized representatives can validly terminate or nullify the Applicants' employment, following the established rules and procedures as stipulated in Section 11 of the Interpretation Act. Reference was made to the case of LONGE V. FBN (2006) NWLR (Pt. 967) pg. 228 at 273.

21.                     Counsel referenced the case of MOBIL PRODUCING NIGERIA UNLIMITED V. OKON JOHNSON & ORS (2018) 14 NWLR (PT. 1639) 329 at 359, arguing that the applicants can only be lawfully removed from their positions by the College Governing Council. According to counsel, the Governing Council is the sole authority capable of terminating the applicants' appointments, and this power does not extend to the 1st Respondent, who lacks any statutory role in this process.

 

22.                     That as a corollary from the above submissions, Counsel argued further that by necessary inference, since the employment of the applicants has been wrongly interfered with by the 1st respondent, it follows naturally that the applicants are entitled to be reinstated back to their respective positions as staff in the services of the 3rd respondent. That this submission gains its potency from the trite position of the law that in a contract of employment with statutory flavour, the consequence of wrongful, invalid and unlawful termination is an order of reinstatement back to service. This trite position has gained judicial blessings in numerous case laws. Counsel referred to the case of OMIDIORA v. F.C.S.C (2207) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1053) p17 at 32 – 33.

23.                     Counsel contended that, in view of the legal principles just outlined, the applicants should be reinstated to the positions specified in their letters of appointment and paid all salaries withheld from the date of their alleged suspension and termination/nullification of employment to today. In support, counsel relied on MOGAJI v. BENUE STATE UNIVERSITY (2022) LPELR-56727(CA) and UAM & ORS v. ANONGO (2021) LPELR-57912(CA).

24.                     On the strength of the foregoing submissions, Counsel submits that the Applicants are entitled to favorable answers on all the issues raised and to the grant of the reliefs sought. Counsel therefore respectfully urges this Honourable Court to grant the reliefs prayed for.

 

THE RESPONDENTS’ PRELIMINARY OBJECTION:

25.                     In their Notice of Preliminary Objection, the respondents argued on two grounds: first, that the honourable court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit; and second, that the names of the 32nd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 46th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 55th and 56th applicants should be struck out of the proceedings.

 

26.                     The applicant’s counsel filed a counter affidavit in response to the Preliminary Objection on 9th May 2024 and Further Affidavit dated 14/5/2024.

 

27.                     Based on their written address in support of the notice of preliminary objection, the respondents formulated 3 issues for preliminary determination, as follows:

                                                              i.      Whether this Honourable Court can hear this matter in view of the fact that the Applicants were employed separately, at different times and for different positions?

                                                           ii.      Whether this Honourable Court can hear the matter in view of the fact the 32nd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 46th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th and 56th Applicants have dissociated themselves from the suit?

                                                         iii.      Whether this Honourable Court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear this matter in view of the fact that the employment of the applicants has not been confirmed?

 

28.                     On the first issue, the honorable Attorney General of the State, cited the case of Ebo-Ade & Ors. V. Ojo-Ojiro & Ors. (2018) LPELR-51498 (CA) to argue that it is well-established law that this Honourable Court can only hear employment cases on an individual basis, not jointly. He contended that each applicant should have filed a separate suit because they were employed at different times, for different positions, and their work schedules are distinct. This argument was supported by the case of Padawa & Ors. V. Jatau (2002) LPELR-5380 (CA) (PP. 9-11).

 

29.                     On the second issue, the objectors’ lead counsel argued that it is well-established law that an applicant's consent must be sought and obtained before a counsel can file a suit on his behalf. It is essential that a party gives his consent before being represented in court, particularly in a case where the applicants are jointly seeking reliefs. Citing the cases of Akinbode v. Oyebamiji & Anor. (2014) LPELR-24410 (CA), and Scheep & Anor. v. The MV “S.ARAZ” & Anor (2000) LPELR-1866 (SC), counsel asserted that without the consents of the 32nd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 46th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, and 56th applicants to join the suit, the suit is incompetent regarding the reliefs claimed, and the names of these applicants should be struck out from the suit.

30.                     Regarding the third issue, the respondents’ counsel argued that, according to the law, any employee must undergo a probationary period of at least three (3) years, which may be extended. During this period, the employer has the right to terminate the employment or extend the probation. However, if the employment becomes permanent within this timeframe, then the employee cannot be subject to the employer's arbitrary decisions, as stipulated in Civil Service Rules 020303.

31.                     That it is also the principle of law that an Employee cannot force himself on an unwilling employer relying on the case of Ibrahim & Anor. v. National Commissioner for College of Education & Anor. (2017) LPELR-45407 (CA).

32.                     In conclusion, the respondents’ counsel argued that the applicants cannot uphold their claims against them because they had only been employed at the 3rd respondent institution for approximately two years, which falls within their probationary period. Therefore, the cause of action is not yet ready for adjudication and should be dismissed accordingly.

APPLICANTS’ REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW

33.                     In reaction to the respondents’ further affidavit and written address, the applicants filed along with their further-affidavit of 14/5/2024, a written address and reply on points of law in response to respondents’ Counter Affidavit and Written Address and argued therein that the respondents abandoned the issues for determination in this suit. Learned Counsel iterated that, the crux of this suit is whether the 1st respondent has any statutory role to play or is empowered to interfere with the employments of the applicants, as he sought to do by Exhibit D and E.

 

34.                     Learned Counsel argued that because the respondents did not dispute the points raised by the applicants, they have effectively conceded them. He relied on the decision in GOLDEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD v. STATECO NIG LTD & ANOR (2013) LPELR-22832 (CA). Counsel further maintained that the 1st respondent cannot exercise a power that he does not lawfully possess.

35.                     Counsel for the applicants directs the court to Order 13, Rule 1 of its Rules and contends that those Rules permit multiple parties to bring a joint action against a common respondent where:

a.     The cause of action is common between the applicants.

b.      The transaction or series of transactions leading to the cause of action are the same.

c.      The rights sought to be asserted by the applicants are the same.

d.     The instrument of evidence sought to be interpreted are the same.

e.     The reliefs sought by the Applicants against the respondents are the same.

36.                     Counsel for the applicants argues that the case of Ebo-Ade & Ors v. Ojo-Oniro & Ors (2018) LPELR-51498 (CA), which the respondents have cited, in fact supports the applicants’ position rather than theirs. That decision makes clear that joinder of parties is appropriate to avoid multiplicity of proceedings where the parties share a common interest or raise the same question of law, but does not apply when each party has a separate and distinct interest in the subject matter. Counsel also relied on United Geophysical (Nig.) Ltd & Ors v. Osiobe & Ors (2024) LPELR-24528 (CA).

 

37.                     Counsel argues further that in this case all the Applicants share an identical cause of action: they were unlawfully dismissed by the same instrument, under the same terms and conditions of service and for the same period of employment. They raise the same issues and seek identical reliefs against the respondents. Counsel submits that launching separate suits would therefore give rise to an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings.

 

38.                     Counsel argued that the respondents’ claim—that some applicants have withdrawn from this suit—is already disproved by Exhibits 1–5. He further maintained that even if certain applicants had in fact dissociated themselves, that would not undermine the court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter, and treating it as such would amount to a miscarriage of justice against those applicants who have prosecuted the case diligently. At most, he submitted, any applicant who truly withdrew could simply have their name struck out, without affecting the suit as a whole.

 

39.                     With respect to Rule 020303 of the Civil Service Rules, counsel for the applicants argues that their employment is not governed by that provision but rather by the College’s Staff Scheme, its Terms and Conditions of Service, and the applicable state laws and edicts. He further submits that their appointments are statutory in character and must therefore adhere to the relevant statutes and subsidiary legislation. In support, counsel relies on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Babatunde v. The Governing Council, Federal Polytechnic, Ede & Anor (2014) LPELR-24236 (CA) for the principles defining statutory employment.

 

40.                     Learned Counsel further contended that even if it were assumed (without conceding) that the applicants remained on probation when their employments were purportedly terminated, the statutory procedure for ending their service should have been followed, and only the employer has the authority to dismiss them. The central point, counsel submitted, is that the 1st respondent who purported to fire them is not their employer.

 

41.                     Regarding whether the applicants’ engagement complied with proper procedure, learned counsel submits that the respondents have not identified any statute or regulation prescribing the “due procedure” they allege was breached. In the absence of such a reference, counsel urges the court not to speculate on what those procedural requirements might be. He relies on AWOLOLA v. Governor of Ekiti State & Ors. (2018) LPELR-46364 (SC).

 

42.                     Counsel further argues that, even if—without conceding—the respondents’ contention were correct, they would still be estopped from raising it to defeat the applicants’ claim. That is because it was the third respondent’s duty to observe the proper hiring procedure. To support this estoppel argument, he invokes section 169 of the Evidence Act 2004 and the decision in BENUE STATE UNIVERSITY v. MOGAJI (2022) LPELR-56729 (CA).

 

43.                     Counsel for the applicants argues that upholding the 1st respondent’s termination of their employment would allow the respondents to profit from their own misconduct, since it is the 3rd respondent—not the employees—who is charged with observing the proper procedures for hiring. He relies on the decision in NKECHI & ANOR v. ANYALEWECHI (2021) LPELR-55611 (CA). he finally urges this court to dismiss the NPO and grant the reliefs sought by the applicants.

 

COURT’S DECISION:

44.                     After reviewing the parties’ arguments, submissions and all filed processes, the court has identified the following questions for determination:

                                                              i.      Does this court lack the necessary jurisdiction to hear and decide this suit?

                                                           ii.      Have the applicants proven their claims sufficiently to merit the reliefs they seek?

45.                     On issue 1, Learned Counsel to the respondents filed a Notice of preliminary objection and raised three grounds for the objection:

                                                              i.      That the honourable court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this suit.

                                                           ii.      That the names of the 32nd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 46th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 55th and 56th Applicants be struck out from the suit.

                                                         iii.      That this suit cannot be sustained by the applicants jointly claiming the reliefs against the Respondents individually.

 

46.                     Jurisdiction is a threshold matter in any action and must be resolved before delving into other issues. In determining this Court’s jurisdiction to hear the present suit, it is settled law that one looks to the applicants’ pleadings. A review of the affidavit supporting the Originating Summons clearly shows that all the reliefs claimed arise from the same transaction—the alleged termination of the applicants’ employment by the 1st Respondent. Moreover, the central legal question—whether the 1st Respondent had the power to terminate the applicants—is identical for each applicant. These core issues are employment-related and fall squarely within this Court’s constitutional jurisdiction under Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

 

47.                     The respondents also contend that the 32nd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 46th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 55th and 56th applicants did not consent to this suit being instituted on their behalf. The respondents attached an application of withdrawal dated 18/04/2024 with the names, date and signatures of the applicants seeking to withdraw from the suit attached to the counter affidavit in opposition to the originating summons: 32nd applicant (Makut Margret Achimus), 34th Applicant (Lawam Chintak Daniel), 35th applicant (Tongret Bakzak Jonah), 36th applicant (Cecilia Turgak Shehu), 37th applicant (Yilwada Godfrey Daniel), 38th applicant (Joseph Peter Mackwin), 46th applicant (Renkat Sylvanus Damar), 48th applicant (Dakim John Chollom), 49th applicant (Koomlong Kwaramnaan), 50th applicant (Deborah Samuel Dasen), 51st applicant (Rakiya Gambo), 52nd applicant (Dangkum Ezra Singdep), 53rd applicant (Changfa James Bingang), 54th applicant (Danlami Na’anman), 55th applicant (Mermwakak Jingshiwa W.) and 56th applicant (Jikatwe M. Wakji).

 

48.                     In paragraphs 5, 6, and 8 of their counter-affidavit opposing the preliminary objection, the applicants challenged the respondents’ assertion that any withdrawal had been made in this suit, stating as follows:

 

(5). Upon receipt of a copy of the preliminary objection of the respondents, I discovered that the respondents deposed that the 32nd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 46th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 55th and 56th Applicants applied to this Court by a letter to withdraw from the suit.

 

(6). I personally received photocopies of the appointment letters of the 32nd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 46th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 55th and 56th Applicants upon which they signed and consented to the filing of the instant suit when we all agreed to file the suit challenging the Governor’s power to terminate our employment.

 

(7). To satisfy my curiosity on the truth or otherwise of the depositions contained in the respondent’s affidavit, I posted a notice on our Whatsapp platform where all the Applicants are members, inviting any person who desired to discontinue the suit for him or herself to contact our Counsel and discuss terms so that our counsel can formally take steps, but till date none of the Applicants has showed up.

 

49.                     There is no dispute that the withdrawal letter and the attached list—bearing the applicants’ names and signatures—were duly signed by them. Had any of the applicants named in the affidavits wished to continue the suit, they would have filed their own affidavits to counter those submitted by the respondents.

 

50.                     Regarding the letter of withdrawal and affidavit submitted by Ishaya Manji Dadin (the 15th Applicant), and the letter of withdrawal filed by Yakson Dazee Paul (the 40th Applicant), the respondents’ affidavit in support of their preliminary objection says nothing about the purpose or effect of those documents. In effect, those withdrawal letters and the accompanying affidavit were simply dumped before the court in breach of established procedure. It is well settled that a court is not obliged to embark on its own fact?finding mission or act as an investigator. Investigation is not among the court’s duties. See Alapa & Anor v. INEC & Anor (2015) LPELR-41775; Bakut & Anor v. Ishaku & Ors. (2015) LPELR-41858 (SC). Consequently, this court will not countenance the withdrawal letters or the affidavit of the 15th and 40th applicants.

 

51.                     Accordingly, the respondents’ letter of withdrawal, together with the list and signatures of the 32nd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 46th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 55th and 56th Applicants, results only in the removal of those individuals from the proceedings. Their withdrawal does not invalidate the suit. The respondents’ preliminary objection therefore succeeds only to the extent that the following names are struck out of this action for having indicated they no longer wish to participate:

  • 32nd Applicant: Makut Margret Achimus
  • 34th Applicant: Lawam Chintak Daniel
  • 35th Applicant: Tongret Bakzak Jonah
  • 36th Applicant: Cecilia Turgak Shehu
  • 37th Applicant: Yilwada Godfrey Daniel
  • 38th Applicant: Joseph Peter Mackwin
  • 46th Applicant: Renkat Sylvanus Damar
  • 48th Applicant: Dakim John Chollom
  • 49th Applicant: Koomlong Kwaramnaan
  • 50th Applicant: Deborah Samuel Dasen
  • 51st Applicant: Rakiya Gambo
  • 52nd Applicant: Dangkum Ezra Singdep
  • 53rd Applicant: Changfa James Bingang
  • 54th Applicant: Danlami Na’anman
  • 55th Applicant: Mermwakak Jingshiwa W.
  • 56th Applicant: Jikatwe M. Wakji.

52.                     The respondents say the applicants cannot sue together because each was employed separately in different positions at the 3rd respondent’s institution. I disagree. Requiring all 56 applicants to bring individual suits for the same reliefs against the same parties would waste scarce judicial time and create unnecessary duplication. Courts are obliged to prevent multiplicity of actions by ordering the joinder of parties where claims arise from the same set of facts (see United Geophysical (Nig.) Ltd & Ors v. Osiobe & Ors (2014) LPELR-24528 (CA)). The respondents’ reliance on Ebo-Ade & Ors v. Ojo-Oniro & Ors is misplaced, as that decision actually supports joint actions and its facts differ significantly from those before this court. Accordingly, these applicants are properly joined in a single suit, and I so hold.

 

53.                     In their further affidavit the respondents contend that the applicants erred in commencing this suit by originating summons. Counsel argues that because there are alleged disputes of fact between the parties, a formal writ of summons should have been employed. I respectfully disagree. This action turns solely on questions of law – namely, the 1st respondent’s statutory authority to terminate the applicants’ employment, the nature and terms of that employment, and the proper interpretation of their letters of appointment and the relevant statutes and regulations. Those issues are textbook subjects for originating summons. Indeed, Order 3(1)(b) and 3(3) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 expressly authorise commencing proceedings by originating summons where the principal question is the interpretation of any constitution, enactment, agreement or other instrument relating to employment, labour or industrial relations within this Court’s jurisdiction under section 254C of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) or any other law in force. The preliminary objections raised do not succeed in dismissing this suit and I so affirm.

 

On issue 2:

54.                     Reliefs 1–4 seek declaratory orders. Declaratory relief is not granted automatically; the applicants must prove their entitlement on the merits of their case. They contend that the first respondent lacked any authority to terminate their appointments and that those terminations were unlawful, illegal, null, void, and of no legal effect.

 

55.                     Exhibits A1–A56, being the applicants’ appointment letters, plainly show that they were offered employment by the 3rd respondent during the same period and set out the terms and conditions of their service. The applicants returned their letters of acceptance within that same timeframe, as reflected in Annexure C produced by the respondents. These documents are self?authenticating and constitute the best evidence, since they speak for themselves (see AKINBISADE v. THE STATE (2006) 17 NWLR (Pt.1007) 184 SC). Consequently, it is beyond dispute that the 3rd respondent is the employer of the applicants.

 

56.                     It is well settled that in a civil action the claimant bears the burden of proof, and until he meets that burden the defendant need not lead any evidence. Under Sections 131 and 135 of the Evidence Act 2011, the applicable standard is proof on a balance of probabilities. Where an employee asserts that his dismissal or termination breached the terms and conditions of his contract of service, he must both plead and prove those contractual conditions. Those terms and conditions form the very foundation for assessing the lawfulness of any termination or dismissal. (See Texaco Nigeria Plc v. Kehinde (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 708) 224.)

 

57.                     In arguing their case the Applicants relied on the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, their written address and further affidavit. Attached to the Originating Summons are 56 documents marked Exhibits A1-A56 which are letters of employment, Plateau State College of Health Technology Law 2003, and Exhibit D & E (Press Release).

 

58.                     Both parties’ pleadings plainly acknowledge that the 3rd Respondent employed the Applicants—a fact the respondents do not dispute. Their only contention is that those appointments were tainted by irregularities and did not follow due process. It is likewise undisputed that the 1st respondent purported to terminate the applicants’ employment. The real issue, therefore, is whether the 1st respondent lawfully disengaged the applicants after observing the required procedures, including setting up a preliminary committee before and after their suspension.

 

59.                     Notably, the respondents never produced any evidence to support their claim that the applicants’ employment was irregular. Consequently, the court must immediately reject this unsubstantiated allegation.

 

60.                     It is well established that where an employment relationship has a statutory basis, it is governed by the statute itself or by regulations made under that statute. When a contract of service is regulated by statutory provisions, or when the terms and conditions of service are set out in regulations derived from a statute, the employee thereby gains a legal status superior to that of an ordinary master-and-servant, as held in Mobil Producing (Nig.) Unltd v. Okon Johnson & 14 Ors. (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1639) 329 at 359.

 

61.                     In this case, the third respondent—who employs the applicants—was established by statute. The applicants maintain that their employment is governed by the third respondent’s Conditions of Service for Staff and the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003 (see paragraph 4 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons). This fact is not disputed. It also corresponds with paragraph 2(vii) of the applicants’ letters of offer of appointment (Exhibits A1–A56), which provides: “That you will be subject in all respects, to all conditions of Service stipulated in the scheme of service and other College Regulations and Instructions, as may be reviewed by the Council from time to time”.

 

62.                     From the foregoing, the applicants’ employment is governed by statute. It is well established that where an employment relationship has a statutory basis, the rights and obligations of the parties are defined by the enabling law or regulations made under it. As held in BOB v. THE COUNCIL, ABIA STATE UNIVERSITY UTURU & ANOR. (2015) LPELR-25611 (CA), the applicants are statutory employees of the third respondent, meaning that only the procedures set out in its establishing statute or subsidiary instruments can lawfully terminate their service. It is therefore necessary to examine how the respondents purported to determine the applicants’ employment.

 

63.                     The answer can only be found from the pleadings of the parties. Paragraph 7, 11, 12 and 13 of the applicants’ affidavit in support of the originating summons state as follows:

“7. Upon the change in leadership in the office of the 1st respondent, the 1st respondent proceeded to announce the suspension of all the staff of the Plateau State Government and other statutory agencies newly employed from October 2022 till 29th May, 2023, including the Applicants.

 

11. After our purported suspension from the service of the 3rd Respondent, the 1st Respondent constituted a committee allegedly to look into the issue of our employment and advise him among other terms of reference.

 

12. None of us the Applicants was ever invited nor interviewed or heard from by the said committee and the outcome of the assignment of the committee was never served on us or made public till date.

 

13. Subsequently, by another publication by the 1st Respondent, the 1st Respondent purported to terminate our employment and appointment from the services of the 3rd Respondent by announcing its cancellation and nullification…”

 

64.                     In response to these averments, the respondents aver in paragraphs 4 (i), (j), (o) and (p) as follows:

 

“4 (i). That paragraph 7 is not true and state that because of the said change of leadership in the state, a panel of investigation was set up by the 1st respondent to investigate the legality of the applicants’ temporary employment.

 

4 (j). In further response to paragraph 7, based on the Panel’s investigation, the 1st respondent who is the visitor of the institution (3rd respondent) looked at the Report of the Panel and consequently suspended the Applicants’ employment which employment process was marred with irregularities.

 

4 (o). we admit paragraph 11 of the Applicants’ affidavit.

 

4 (p). that I know of a fact that paragraph 12 is not true and state that the Committee invited the Applicants during its investigation, but the Applicants failed to honour the committee’s invitation.”

65.                     From the parties’ pleadings, it is evident that the 1st respondent allegedly suspended the applicants and then purportedly ended their employment by way of a publication. That suspension prompted this suit and raises the central question: did the 1st respondent lawfully and validly terminate the applicants’ employment?

 

66.                     The applicants dispute the 1st respondent’s authority to dismiss them. As a basic principle of employment law, the party that makes an appointment also holds the power to terminate it. The 3rd respondent is the applicants’ recognized employer. Nevertheless, the respondents argue in their pleadings that, by virtue of the 1st respondent’s role as Visitor to the 3rd respondent, he was entitled to end the applicants’ employment.

 

67.                     Having led sufficient evidence, the applicants have shifted the evidential onus to the respondents, who must now justify the 1st respondent’s claimed authority to terminate their employment. In ALIYU & ORS v. YOLA & ORS (2022) LCN/16188 (CA), the Court of Appeal explained that while the plaintiff initially bears the burden of proof, once credible evidence is adduced that burden transfers to the opponent. Section 136 of the Evidence Act 2011 formalises this rule, stipulating that proof of any fact lies with the party asserting it—unless another law provides otherwise—and that the onus may move between parties as the case unfolds. See also ADIGHIJE v. NWAOGU (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt.1209) 419 at 463 (applying Section 133(1) of the Evidence Act 2011).

 

68.                     In their counter-affidavit, the respondents contend that, at the time their contracts were ended, the applicants were still serving their probationary period with the third respondent institution. The appointment letters make this clear: clause 2(iii) states that each appointee “shall serve on probation for two years or for such longer period as may be deemed appropriate.” Although the applicants did not specify the exact dates of their suspension or dismissal, their letters of appointment (Exhibits A1–A56) are dated between September and November 2022, and this suit was filed on March 14, 2024—approximately one year and five months later, which is still within the two-year probation. Nonetheless, being on probation does not undermine their statutory employment rights. Any decision regarding their employment must therefore follow the applicable statutes and governing instruments of the third respondent institution.

 

69.                     The content of exhibits A1 – A56 and the provisions of the Conditions of Service of the 3rd Respondent is clear on issues of disengagement during probationary periods. The following excerpt from Paragraph 2 (iv) and (v) of the letters of appointment is relevant to the current discuss:

 

iv.       That within your probationary period, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Governing Council/College Management that are not qualified for efficient service, your appointment may be terminated at any time without any compensation other than a passage, for yourself only to the place from which you were engaged; such passage will be granted only if your conduct has been good and will lapse if not claimed with two months of the date of termination of your appointment.

 

v.         That while you remain on probation, unless you are summarily dismissed, your engagement may any time be terminated by you or by the College subject to one Calendar Months’ Notice or, with the consent of the College by the payment of a Month’s salary in Lieu of Notice.       

 

70.                     This passage makes clear that, during probation, the applicants’ employment could only be ended by giving notice (or pay in lieu of notice) and only if the Council was satisfied that the employee was unsuitable for service. There is no evidence before this court suggesting that the third respondent’s Council took part in suspending or terminating the applicants without such notice.

 

71.                     The respondents maintained that a committee had been set up both before and after the applicants were suspended. They further claimed the applicants were invited to appear before this committee but failed to do so. The applicants, however, emphatically denied this, and there is no evidence before the court showing that they—or anyone on their behalf—were ever summoned by any committee. Likewise, no record of any committee resolution has been produced. On the evidence, the court is unconvinced that any invitation was extended to the applicants either before or after their alleged terminations. Finally, the respondents’ contention that the applicants’ positions were not advertised and were beset by procedural irregularities rests with the 3rd respondent and cannot be ascribed to the applicants. Besides, this has not even been proven by the respondents.

 

72.                     It is firmly established that when statute vests a specific function in a designated body or authority, no other person or entity may lawfully perform that function except as the statute expressly permits. Here, Sections 10 and 18 of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003, confer on the Governing Council of the 3rd respondent the sole power to appoint, discipline, or remove its staff. By issuing public pronouncements (Exhibits D and E) purporting to suspend and terminate the applicants, the 1st respondent acted without any legal mandate. An act carried out without jurisdiction is a nullity, however well-intentioned—see Macfoy v. U.A.C. Ltd (1962) AC 152 at 160 and Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR 587. Under the ultra vires doctrine, any assumption of power not granted by law is void ab initio. Accordingly, the 1st Respondent’s suspension and termination of the applicants are ultra vires, unlawful, null and void, and of no legal effect.

 

73.                     Accordingly, this Court finds that the respondents did not comply with the relevant statutory provisions and regulatory requirements governing the discipline of the applicants, particularly in relation to their suspension and dismissal. The purported suspension and termination of the applicants’ employment are therefore unlawful, null and void, and of no legal effect. I so hold.

 

74.                     On the question of unpaid salaries, the applicants allege they have not been paid from January 2023 to the date this suit was filed. The respondents, however, insist that all salaries due between January and April 2023 were fully paid and refer to a payment spreadsheet—which was never produced in evidence. Aside from the applicants’ sworn averments (flatly denied by the respondents), there is no supporting documentation—such as bank statements or payroll records—to show non-payment or to identify the last month in which salaries were received. It is settled law that evidence is the medium of proof and proof is its essence (Anekwe v. State (2014) All FWLR (Pt.744) 92 at 109 (SC)). In the absence of any credible proof, this court is not satisfied that any salary remains owing from January 2023 to date. I so hold.

 

75.                     With respect to relief 9, general damages are awarded to remedy losses that naturally flow from the respondent’s wrongful act and are presumed by law to be its direct, probable and reasonable consequences (see UBN Ltd v. Chimaeze (2014) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1411) 166 at 196; A.T.E. Co. Ltd v. Mil. Gov., Ogun State (2009) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1163) 26). In this case, although the applicants did not produce documentary evidence of unpaid salaries, their uncontradicted affidavit testimony establishes that they have been deprived of their livelihood as a result of the unlawful and procedurally flawed termination of their appointments.

 

76.                     It is well established that when reinstatement by itself does not fully address the injustice suffered, a court may, in its discretion, award general damages to compensate for the economic and emotional hardship caused by the wrongful act. In IBAMA v. SPDC (2005) 17 NWLR (Pt. 954) 364 at 378 and Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited v. Udo (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 415) 1809 at 1845, the courts held that in employment disputes of a statutory nature, general damages are appropriate where the claimant proves genuine hardship, even though arrears of salary cannot be recovered.

 

77.                     In Udegbunam v. F.C.D.A. (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt. 829) 487 at 507, the Supreme Court made clear that the purpose of damages is to restore a successful claimant, so far as money can, to the position he would have occupied but for the wrong. In this case, the 1st respondent’s unlawful dismissal of the applicants—which deprived them of their salaries and subjected them to anxiety and hardship—cannot be overlooked by this court.

 

78.                     Accordingly, and in the exercise of this court’s equitable discretion, I award the applicants general damages of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) against the respondents, jointly and severally. This sum compensates the applicants for the hardship, inconvenience and emotional distress they suffered as a result of their unlawful termination. The respondents are to pay this amount within 30 days of this judgment. If payment is not made by that deadline, interest will accrue on the outstanding balance at 10% per annum until the award is fully satisfied.

 

79.                     The questions raised here for determination are therefore answered thus:

 

80.                     Question 1 which is “whether the 1st respondent is possessed of or clothed with the powers or authority to unilaterally suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the employments and appointments of the applicants through Exhibits D and E, the applicants having been in the service and employment of the 3rd respondent”, is answered in the negative.

 

81.                     Question 2 which is “by virtue of the various letters of appointments issued to the applicants attached as Exhibits A1 – A56, whether the applicants are not entitled to maintain and retain their employment with the 3rd respondent in line with the extant laws regulating their employment with the 3rd respondent”, answered in the affirmative.

 

82.                     Question 3 of the originating summons, which is “whether the failure and refusal of the 3rd respondent to pay the applicants their salaries and allowances thereby retaining same from the month of January, 2023 till date or any period of time at all is not unlawful, unjust, illegal and a violation of the 3rd respondent’s duties and obligations”, is refused having been answered in the negative.”

 

83.                     The applicants’ motion for an interlocutory injunction, together with all processes dated and filed on 21 March 2024, is hereby struck out as it has been overtaken by this judgment.

 

84.                     Ultimately, relief numbers 4, 7 & 8 are denied while reliefs numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9 and 10 are granted thus;

1.     A declaration that the first respondent lacks any legal power or authority to suspend, dismiss, annul, or in any other way interfere with the applicants’ appointments and employment in the service of the third respondent.

2.     A declaration that the first respondent’s purported termination, nullification, and cancellation of the applicants’ employments and appointments by way of Exhibits D and E is unlawful, void ab initio, and of no legal effect.

3.     A declaration that, under the existing laws governing employment with the 3rd respondent, the applicants have the right to continue in and retain their respective positions.

4.     An order quashing the 1st respondent’s alleged suspension and subsequent termination of the applicant, and annulling the various appointments and employments effected by the 1st respondent through the publications attached as Exhibits D and E, those acts having been ultra vires and therefore unlawful, null and void.

5.     An order restoring each applicant to their former position with the 3rd respondent, in accordance with their respective letters of appointment (Exhibits A1–A56).

6.     An award of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) in general damages, to be paid jointly and severally by the respondents, for the applicants’ collective pain and suffering.

7.     The Honourable Court assesses the costs of this suit at N500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira only).

8.     The judgment, including the monetary awards, must be satisfied within 30 days of this decision. Should the respondents fail to comply, interest will accrue on the unpaid awards at 10% per annum until full payment is made.

85.                     Judgment is entered accordingly.

Delivered in Jos this 5th day of June 2025.

 

Hon. Justice Ibrahim S. Galadima,

Judge.