PETER M. AREN -VS- PLATEAU STATE COLLEGE OF HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ZAWAN & 4 ORS- National Industrial Court of Nigeria

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT JOS

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. I.S. GALADIMA – JUDGE

DATE: Friday 23 January 2026 SUIT NO: NICN/JOS/10/2022

BETWEEN:

PETER M. AREN CLAIMANT

AND

1. PLATEAU STATE COLLEGE OF HEALTH

TECHNOLOGY ZAWAN

2. GOVERNOR OF PLATEAU STATE DEFENDANTS

3. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PLATEAU STATE

4. MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION PLATEAU STATE

5. HONOURABLE AUGUSTINE PWAKIM CHOJI

Representation:

· E. C. Ehimen for the claimant.

· P.A. Daffi (HAG); Joel Tahvan; Sabo Longji; Shetak Becklang; P.A. Kasham; P.N. Dashak; D.N. Yilji; L.S. Shaibu; C.R. Parlong; Peter Panwal for the defendants.

JUDGMENT

1) This matter was initially heard in part by my learned brother, Justice Bassi (now a JCA), from March 2, 2022, to January 30, 2023, before his elevation to the appellate court. After my transfer to this court, the case began afresh before me on January 27, 2025, and has continued until this judgment, which is delivered today.

2) At its core, this suit challenges the validity of the decision by the 1st through 4th Defendants to remove the Claimant as Registrar—and to appoint the 5th Defendant in his place—before the Claimant’s fixed term (15 October 2020 to 14 October 2024) had expired. In support of his claim, the Claimant led evidence that this premature replacement was ultra vires, unlawful and contrary to the statute governing the institution. The Defendants, however, insist that their actions fully complied with the law and followed the proper procedures.

3) Relying on the facts set out in his pleadings, the Claimant commenced this action by Writ of Complaint on 13 March 2022 and, with the leave of this Honourable Court, filed a Further Amended Complaint on 13 July 2022, seeking the following reliefs:

(1) A DECLARATION that the purported appointment of the 5^th Defendant to the office of Registrar of the 1st Defendant, while the Claimant’s term of office is still subsisting, is unlawful, illegal, null, and void.

(2) A DECLARATION that any purported appointment of the 5^th Defendant as Registrar before the expiration of the Claimant’s guaranteed statutory term of four (4) years under the law is a gross violation of his legal rights and therefore unlawful, illegal, null, and void.

(3) A DECLARATION that the premature removal of the Claimant before the expiration of his guaranteed statutory term of four (4) years is unlawful, illegal, null, and void.

(4) An order setting aside and/or nullifying the letter of appointment of principal officers, especially for the office of Registrar of the 1st Defendant dated 22nd February 2022, or any letters of appointment issued to the 5^th Defendant by the Defendants for being unlawful, null, and void.

(5) An ORDER compelling the 1^st to 4^th Defendants jointly and severally to reinstate the Claimant and restore him to his office as Registrar.

(6) A mandatory order compelling the 1^st to 4^th Defendants jointly and severally to reinstate the Claimant and restore him to his office as Registrar.

(7) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1^st to 5^th Defendants jointly and severally by themselves, their members, their agents, privies or assigns or any other person acting on or upon the letter of appointment of principal officers especially for the office of the Registrar of the 1^st Defendant dated the 22^nd February, 2022 or any letter of appointment issued to the 5^th Defendant by the 1^st to 4^th Defendant for the office of the Registrar; until the expiration of the Claimant’s guaranteed statutory term of 4years.

(8) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1^st to 4^th Defendants jointly and severally by themselves, their members, their agents, privies or assigns or any other person acting through them, or however from removing, replacing or terminating the appointments of the Claimant herein as Registrar until the expiration of his guaranteed statutory term of 4years.

(9) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 5^th Defendant from taking over and parading himself or acting as Registrar.

(10) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1^st to 5^th Defendants jointly and severally by themselves, their members, agents, privies, or assigns or any other person acting through them, or however from obstructing the claimant from exercising and/or executing the functions of his office as Registrar.

(11) The sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million naira) only to be paid to the Claimant as exemplary/aggravated damages for the embarrassment and ridicule the action of the 1st to 4^th Defendants has caused him.

(12) The cost of N2,000,000.00 (Two Million naira) for institution of this action.

(13) Plus 10% interest per annum on the judgment sum until the total indebtedness of the Defendants is finally and totally liquidated.

b) In the alternative to the reliefs above, the Claimant prays for the following:

(1) A declaration that any removal of the claimant prematurely before the expiration of his guaranteed statutory term of four years is a gross violation of his legal rights and therefore unlawful, illegal, null, and void.

(2) A declaration that having unlawfully removed the claimant from the appointment before the expiration of his statutory tenure of four years, the first to fourth defendants are liable to pay as compensation to the claimant his total consolidated salaries from the date of his forceful removal to the date of expiration of their tenure.

(3) A mandatory order compelling the 1st to 4th defendants to pay the claimant his consolidated salary from the month of March 2022 to October 2024 in the sum of N13,375,840 (Thirteen million, three hundred and seventy-five thousand, eight hundred and forty Naira) only.

(4) A mandatory order compelling the 1st to 4th defendants to pay the claimant his severance allowance as determinable by them.

(5) A mandatory order compelling the 1st to 4rth defendants to pay the claimant his furniture allowance in the sum of N1,200,000 (One Million, Two Hundred Thousand Naira) only.

(6) A mandatory order compelling the 1st to 4th defendants to release to the claimant his official car.

(7) The sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) only to be paid to the claimant as exemplary or aggravated damages for the embarrassment and ridicule the action of the 1^st to 4^th defendants has caused him.

(8) The cost of N2,000,000 (Two Million Naira only) for institution of this action.

(9) Plus 10% interest per annum on the judgment sum until the total indebtedness of the defendants is finally and totally liquidated.

SUMMARY OF THE CLAIMANT’S CASE:

4) The claimant was initially appointed Acting Registrar of the First Defendant on 22 June 2020 (Exhibit C1). His role was made Substantive Registrar effective 13 October 2020, set to run until 14 October 2024 (Exhibit C2).

5) On 1 March 2022, he received a handover letter dated 28 February 2022 (Exhibit C8). Via his lawyers (letter dated 11 March 2022,), he notified the Defendants of ongoing litigation and insisted on maintaining the status quo. The Defendants then issued queries on 6 April 2022 and 23 May 2022 concerning the alleged failure to hand over, which the claimant addressed through legal counsel.

6) Despite the pending suit, the First Defendant suspended the claimant on 6 June 2022, precipitating this claim.

7) The evidentiary hearing began on January 27, 2025, when the Claimant opened his case. Upon adopting his sworn depositions of 13/7/2022 and 1/11/2022, he testified as the sole witness in support of his claim, and the documents he relied upon were admitted and marked as exhibits. After giving evidence and undergoing cross-examination, the Claimant formally closed his case on that same date.

8) CW1 tendered a total of 15 documents all admitted and labelled as follows:

i) Exhibit C1 – Appointment letter as Ag. Registrar dated 22/06/2020.

ii) Exhibit C2 – Confirmation letter dated 13/10/2020.

iii) Exhibit C3 – appointment as substantive registrar dated 16/10/2020.

iv) Exhibit C4 – Newspaper print dated 1/2/2021.

v) Exhibit C5 – letter dated 23/2/22 addressed to the 1^st defendant from the claimant’s solicitors.

vi) Exhibit C6 – appointment of principal officers letter dated 22/2/22.

vii) Exhibit C7 – Plateau State College of Health Technology Law 2003.

viii) Exhibit C8 – handing over instrument (taking over of office of the registrar dated 28/2/2022.

ix) Exhibit C9 – letter of handover dated 11/3/2022.

x) Exhibit C10 – renewal of appointment of the Deputy Provost dated 16/12/2020.

xi) Exhibit C11 – notification of confirmation of appointment. Dated 1/9/2021.

xii) Exhibit C12 – minutes of expanded management committee meeting dated 15/10/2020.

xiii) Exhibit C13 – minutes and proceedings of meetings and interview for the selection of the principal officers dated 29/12/2021; January 6, 2022, and concluded on January 7, 2022.

xiv) Exhibit C14 – appointment of deputy provost dated 24/11/2020.

xv) Exhibit C15 – appointment as Ag. Provost 30/11/2021.

9) On the day of hearing, defendants’ counsel informed the court that the fifth defendant was no longer employed by the first to fourth defendants and asked that his name be struck from the court records and all filed processes amended accordingly. The claimant’s counsel opposed the request. The court noted defendants’ application but directed both parties to proceed with opening their cases so as to avoid further delay in the prosecution of the suit.

SUMMARY OF THE DEFENDANTS’ CASE:

10) On 20 May 2025, the Defendants opened their defence. Their first witness was Mr. Laya Andrew Aminu, a retired staff member of the first Defendant. He adopted his sworn deposition and testified as DW1, during which the documents pleaded by the Defendants were tendered and admitted by the Court. Following cross-examination by Counsel for the Claimant, DW1 was discharged.

11) On July 3, 2025, the Defendants called their second witness, Mr. Maanlat Ishaya Yonchi, the Acting Registrar of the first Defendant. He testified as DW2, was cross-examined, and then discharged by the Court. That same day the Defendants closed their case, and the Court ordered both parties to file their respective final written addresses.

12) A total of 11 documents were tendered by the defendants as follows:

i) Exhibit D1 – list of screened candidates for the position of registrar of the 1^st defendant institution.

ii) Exhibit D2 – general terms and conditions of service for the 1^st defendant institution.

iii) Exhibit D3 – Internal and external adverts for the position of the registrar, librarian, and bursar.

iv) Exhibit D4 – letter of 8/9/2021.

v) Exhibit D5 – letter written by the Joint Union of Plateau State Owned Tertiary Institutions dated 7/3/2022.

vi) Exhibit D6 – Another letter dated 11/1/2022 by the union.

vii) Exhibit D7 – another union letter dated 28/10/2021.

viii) Exhibit D8 – another letter dated 5/10/2021.

ix) Exhibit D9 – reminder letter dated 5/9/2021.

x) Exhibit D10 – letter from the Plateau State Government, Ministry of Higher Education dated 30/12/2020 addressed to the Provost College of Health Zawan (the 1^st defendant).

xi) Exhibit D11 – another letter dated 28/11/2020.

13) The parties counsel eventually adopted their respective final written addresses and submissions on 23 January 2026 and this court thereafter delivered judgment instantly.

DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL’S SUBMISSIONS

14) On 15 September 2025, defence counsel, led by the Honourable Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice of Plateau State, P.A. Daffi, filed their final addresses. Although submitted out of time, the court granted leave upon a formal application filed the same day. In those addresses, he identified the following issues for determination:

a) Whether the Claimant was validly appointed as substantive Registrar of the 1st Defendant and is entitled to the reliefs sought?

b) Whether the Claimant is estopped by his conduct, having terminated his illegal appointment made by EMAC without the Governing Council and the Visitor of the Institution (the Governor of the State)?

15) Issue One asks whether the Claimant was validly appointed as Substantive Registrar of the first Defendant and is therefore entitled to the remedies claimed. The Defendants’ Counsel notes that the Claimant’s case is that his appointment was made by the Expanded Management Advisory Committee (EMAC). He insists, however, that under Section 14 of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law 2003 only the Governing Council may appoint principal officers, and since no Council existed at the time, both the Management Advisory Committee (MAC) and EMAC—being internal administrative committees—had no statutory authority to make that appointment.

16) Counsel contends that Exhibits C1, C2, and C3, as tendered by the Claimant, are without merit, lack credibility, and fail to demonstrate any lawful or recognized appointment of the Claimant as the Substantive Registrar of the 1st Defendant.

17) Thus, it is firmly established that a statutory body or committee may only exercise the powers expressly granted by its enabling statute. Any action beyond those powers is ultra vires, unlawful, and void. EMAC, being solely an academic advisory and monitoring committee—not the Governing Council nor any government organ with appointment authority under the law—had no legal power to appoint the Claimant. Consequently, its purported appointment is void ab initio.

18) In Attorney-General of Bendel State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (1981) 10 SC 1, the Supreme Court made clear that any exercise of power beyond what the statute or constitution allows is ultra vires and therefore void. Obaseki JSC (as he then was) explained the principle this way: a court will not generally enforce obligations arising from an illegal act, and where an act is void it is, in the eyes of the law, a complete nullity that cannot support any claim.

19) The Claimant’s purported appointment is legally defective, having been made by an entity without authority, and no later ratification, however well-intentioned, can cure that fundamental lack of power.

20) Counsel further argues that a basic tenet of law and administrative justice demands strict compliance with any procedure the statute prescribes. Here, the Claimant contests his removal and insists he was validly appointed Substantive Registrar of the College. Yet the evidence and documents before this Honourable Court demonstrate that the steps taken to install him plainly flouted the statutory scheme governing that office. In Mobil Producing (Nig) Ltd v Johnson (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1639) 329, the Supreme Court underscored this principle, holding that “where a statute has provided for the method of doing anything, it must be done in accordance with the express provision of the statute. Unless such a law is altered or amended by a legitimate authority, then whatever is done in contravention of those provisions amounts to a nullity and of no effect whatsoever.” Also see UDE v. NWARA (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) 638, where the Supreme Court held that once a statute prescribes a specific procedure for exercising a power, no other method may be used.

21) Accordingly, learned counsel contends that the Claimant’s alleged appointment as Substantive Registrar of the 1st Defendant is void ab initio, since Part III of the College of Health Zawan’s General Terms and Conditions vests that power exclusively in the Governing Council—and no such Council was in place when the appointment was made.

22) The Institution’s General Terms and Conditions of Service prescribe a clear, mandatory procedure for appointing a Substantive Registrar, which includes:

a) Internal and External Advertisement;

b) the recommendation of Interested Candidates by the Appointment and Promotion Committee, (the Appointment and Promotion Committee is the product of the Governing Council);

c) approval by the Governing Council;

d) final approval by the Visitor of the Institution, who is the Governor of the State.

23) Defendants’ counsel submits that none of these conditions was fulfilled in the Claimant’s purported appointment. In BAMIGBOYE v. UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 290 (SC), the Court held that, once a statute creates an office or employment with statutory status, any termination or action affecting that office must strictly comply with the statutory provisions; failure to do so renders the act ultra vires, null and void.

24) Counsel also cites Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341, in which the Supreme Court held that an act or proceeding is valid only if every condition precedent has been met; if any is omitted, the act is void.

25) The Claimant seeks to derive his status as Substantive Registrar of the 1st Defendant solely from Exhibits C1, C2 and C3. Learned counsel maintains that an appointment procured in breach of the governing statute is void ab initio and cannot give rise to any enforceable right. Where the law has not been complied with, the resulting act is a nullity, and no valid claim can be erected upon such a defective basis. In short, attempting to place something on nothing is bound to fail. As was held in Macfoy v. United Africa Company Ltd (1962) AC 152, a court will not uphold an arrangement founded on an unlawful process.

26) Similarly, in OJOKWU v MILITARY GOVERNOR OF LAGOS STATE (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 621 SC, Eso JSC declared: “The Court is no respecter of persons … and the Nigerian Courts will not give their stamp of approval to an illegality.”

27) Learned counsel stressed that in GENERAL & AVIATION SERVICES LTD v THAHAL (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt.880) 50 SC, the Court reaffirmed that where a contract is tainted by illegality, it must be dismissed. And in AMAECHI v INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt.1080) 227 SC, the Supreme Court stressed that it will not serve as an instrument for perpetuating illegality.

28) He maintained that since the enabling statute was not complied with, the claimant’s case is devoid of merit and should be dismissed. Finally, defendants’ counsel submits that neither MAC nor EMAC had power to make a valid appointment.

29) On the second issue—whether the Claimant’s own conduct prevents him from challenging the invalidity of his appointment—counsel argues that, in addition to the appointment being illegal, the Claimant’s actions estops him from claiming entitlement to the substantive Registrar position.

30) The evidence further shows that, after EMAC’s purported appointment, the Claimant opened the Registrar and Bursar vacancies to qualified applicants—and even submitted an application for Registrar himself—thereby admitting that his earlier appointment was invalid and unlawful.

31) Defendants’ counsel submitted that his actions plainly signified acceptance of the need for a fresh, lawful appointment process and showed he did not regard his own appointment as final or binding. Consequently, the doctrine of estoppel by conduct squarely applies.

32) Counsel argues that estoppel by conduct bars anyone from asserting a right or fact that conflicts with their own prior words, actions or omissions once another person has relied on them. In A.G. Nasarawa State v. A.G. Plateau State (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1309) 470, the Supreme Court explained that, under section 252 of the Evidence Act, estoppel by conduct forbids a party from leading an opponent to believe a particular state of affairs and act on it, then later denying that very state of affairs. In Nsirim v. Nsirim (2002) 3 NWLR (Pt. 755) 697, the Court held that if one person, by words or behaviour, causes another to believe in a certain condition and alters that person’s position on that belief, the first person cannot simultaneously assert a different condition. Likewise, in Chukwuma v. Ifeloye (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 204, the Supreme Court confirmed that when someone makes a clear and unequivocal representation—knowing it may be false or intending it to be acted upon—and another person, reasonably believing it, changes their situation to their detriment, an estoppel in pais arises, preventing the representor from denying the representation.

33) Counsel submits that the Claimant cannot both approve and disapprove the same process. Having initiated and taken part in a procedure he endorsed, he may not now attack its outcome simply because he was unsuccessful. This principle—often described as the rule against approbation and reprobation or “blowing hot and cold”—was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Ude v. Nwara & Another (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) 638.

34) Counsel also stressed that the Claimant’s own conduct precludes him from pursuing the present claim. He explained that estoppel by conduct arises when one party, by words or actions, leads another to assume a particular state of affairs and that party, relying on the representation, changes its position to its detriment. Here, the Claimant voluntarily engaged in conduct that contradicts the position he now seeks to advance.

35) After the purported substantive appointment, the Claimant behaved as if that appointment were neither final nor binding. While still serving as Acting Registrar, he arranged for the Registrar’s post to be advertised and even entered himself as a candidate. The Governing Council then included him on its shortlist of applicants.

36) Because the Claimant freely joined the selection process for the very post he now says is indisputably his—and by doing so gave everyone (including the person ultimately chosen) the clear impression that the vacancy was open to competition—he may not today dispute the result. Allowing him to do so would be both unjust and inconsistent with the rule that one should not be permitted to approve and disapprove the same transaction.

37) By his own actions, the Claimant signaled to all concerned—including the Defendants—that he accepted the open competition for the office. Having participated on that basis, he cannot now adopt a contrary position, and so counsel submits that the Court should find him estopped from doing so. He finally urged this Honourable Court to dismiss the claimant’s suit in its entirety and award substantial costs to the Defendants.

CLAIMANT’S COUNSEL’S SUBMISSIONS:

38) The claimant’s counsel filed his final written submissions and arguments on 24/10/2025 wherein he raised four issues for determination, thus:

i) Whether the Claimant’s appointment as the Registrar of the 1^st Defendant which was for a fixed term of 4 years can be terminated before the expiration of his tenure which was to elapse on 14/10/2024?

ii) Whether the 2^nd Defendant can unilaterally appoint the 5^th Defendant as the Registrar of the 1^st Defendant without revoking or ratifying the appointment of the Claimant?

iii) Whether the 2^nd Defendant was empowered by law to appoint the 5^th Defendant as the Registrar of the 1^st Defendant’s institution?

iv) Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in this suit?

39) On the first two issues, the claimant’s counsel submits that the court must decide:

a) Whether the Claimant’s fixed four-year term as Registrar of the 1st Defendant—due to expire on 14 October 2024—can lawfully be cut short before that date, and

b) Whether the 1st–4th Defendants may, without first revoking or ratifying the Claimant’s appointment, unilaterally install the 5th Defendant as Registrar of the 1st Defendant.

40) The Claimant maintains that, on 16 October 2020, he was appointed substantive Registrar of the First Defendant under Exhibit C3, having first had his appointment confirmed by the First Defendant’s Expanded Management Advisory Committee (EMAC) and then approved by its Appointment and Promotion Committee (A&PC) (see Exhibits C1 and C2).

41) Before becoming the substantive Registrar of the 1st Defendant, the Claimant first served in an acting capacity from 18 June 2020. According to Exhibit C3, his four-year substantive term was to run from 15 October 2020 to 14 October 2024, at a consolidated annual salary of ?5,010,534.00.

42) As submitted by the Claimant’s counsel, the sole issue for determination by this Honourable Court is whether a fixed-term contract of service—namely his appointment as Registrar of the 1st Defendant, set to expire on 14 October 2024—may lawfully be terminated before its agreed end date.

43) He submitted that it is a well-settled principle of law that parties who freely enter into a contract are strictly bound by its terms and may not act beyond them. He urged the Court to consider the Supreme Court’s ruling in A.G. Ferrero & Company Ltd v. Henkel Chemicals Nigeria Ltd (2011) LPELR-12(SC) at p. 20, paras. B–C (per Onnoghen, JSC), where this doctrine was reaffirmed as follows:

“It is settled law that parties are bound by the contract they voluntarily entered into and cannot act outside the terms and conditions contained in the said contract” .

44) Counsel added that it is well settled that where a contract’s language is plain and unambiguous, the court will give effect to its ordinary grammatical meaning. See DALECK (Nig.) Ltd v. OMPADEC (2007) LPELR-916 (SC), p. 49, paras. E–F (per Ogbuagu JSC).

45) Counsel referred to Exhibit C3 and observed that it is a fixed-term contract for services. It is well settled that a fixed-term service contract must specify its duration at inception, so that all parties know in advance how long it will run. (See Shena Security Co. Ltd v. Afropak (Nig) Ltd & Ors (2008) LPELR-3052 (SC) 26 A–C.)

46) According to the Claimant, once he was appointed substantive Registrar of the 1st Defendant on 16 October 2020, he accepted the role, immediately assumed its duties and began drawing his monthly salary. Moreover, the letter marked Exhibit C10, entitled “Renewal of Appointment as Deputy Provost,” bears his signature and was drafted by him in his official capacity as Registrar.

47) Counsel submitted that, despite the extensive evidence on record, the Defendants—through DW1 and DW2—insisted the Claimant was never appointed substantive Registrar of the first Defendant. Yet, under rigorous cross-examination, DW2 conceded that Exhibits C1, C2 and C3 originated from the first Defendant and that he was unaware of any withdrawal of those documents. He testified as follows:

Q see exhibits C1, C2 and C3. (Appointment as ag. Registrar – C1, confirmation – C2 and appointment as substantive registrar – C3)

A I have seen them

Q these documents emanated from the 1^st defendant

A yes

Q those documents have they been withdrawn by the 1^st defendant?

A I am not aware if they have been withdrawn

48) Counsel for the Claimant argues that the Defendants’ assertion—that he was never substantively appointed Registrar of the first Defendant despite Exhibit C3—is immaterial and should be rejected by the Honourable Court.

49) In reply to paragraph 4.01 of the Defendant’s final written address, he argues that, far from being baseless or unreliable, Exhibits C1, C2 and C3 were never withdrawn by the 1st Defendant that issued them. Accordingly, those documents remain reliable and constitute prima facie evidence of the Claimant’s appointment as Registrar of the 1st Defendant.

50) He further submitted that it is well settled that documentary evidence, such as Exhibit C3, constitutes the best proof of its contents; accordingly, no oral evidence may be admitted to challenge or contradict those contents unless fraud is specifically pleaded. See Skye Bank & Anor v. Akinpelu (2010) LPELR-3073 (SC) 39–40, paras. E–B.

51) According to the Claimant’s evidence, on 25 January 2021—barely three months after his appointment—the 1st Defendant, without any lawful justification, advertised the Claimant’s post in the Leadership Newspaper (Exhibit C4). Notably, that advert was placed by Dr. Toma Reng Ali, the Provost of the 1st Defendant, who had also signed the Claimant’s appointment.

52) Moreover, the Claimant testified that the 1st Defendant, acting on the advertisement published in the Leadership Newspaper on January 25, 2021 (Exhibit C4), organized and held interviews for the Registrar’s post on January 6 and 7, 2022. He further alleges that he was led to believe the exercise was merely a formality and that he would continue in his substantive role as Registrar, thereby inducing him to apply and participate.

53) On 23 February 2022, and in direct contravention of the College of Health Technology Law, 2003 (Exhibit C7), the Governor of Plateau State unlawfully appointed the 5th Defendant as Registrar of the 1st Defendant without observing the required procedures. As a result, the Claimant was removed from office after just one year and three months of his guaranteed four-year term.

54) It is a well-established principle that where an employment contract is for a fixed term, the appointee may not be prematurely removed before the expiry of that term except for proven misconduct or upon the death of either party. Counsel invited the Honorable Court’s attention to the decision of the Court of Appeal, delivered by Shoremi JCA in College of Education, Ekiadolor v. Osayande (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1191) 449, paragraph G, which reaffirmed this rule as follows:

The second situation is where the contract of service is for a fixed term. This is where the term of service is predetermined at the commencement of the contract. Notice may or may not be given. The preposition here is that in such a contract the employee cannot be removed during the period of the term contracted except for misconduct or where the employer dies.

55) Similarly, in Governor of Ekiti State v. Akinyemi (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1276) 414, paras. E–G, the Court of Appeal, per Abba–Aji JCA, reaffirmed the law as follows:

A person appointed to a post for a fixed term by statute has a right to serve out the statutory term of his appointment. He cannot be removed from the office by any person during the period of the term except for misconduct. In the instant case the respondents could only be removed from office of the provision of section 4 (1) of the Ekiti State Local Government Service Commission No. 2 of 2000 was complied with [Obeta v. Okpe (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt. 473) 401 refereed to.]

56) Counsel submits that there is absolutely no evidence before this Honourable Court indicating that the Claimant was guilty of any misconduct justifying his removal as Registrar of the 1st Defendant a mere one year and three months into his four-year term and urges the Court to so hold.

57) Accordingly, drawing on the authorities cited above, counsel contends that the claimant’s removal as Registrar of the first Defendant and his replacement by the fifth Defendant was unlawful and a clear breach of the College of Health Technology Law, 2003 (Exhibit C7).

58) Counsel for the Defendants pointed out in their defence and at paragraph 4.01 of their final written address that, on 16 October 2020 when the Claimant was appointed Registrar, the first Defendant had no Governing Council in place to make that appointment under the College of Health Technology Law, 2003 (Exhibit C7), because the previous councils had been dissolved in May 2019.

59) He also observed that the Defendants argued the 1st Defendant’s governing council could delegate its authority to only two bodies under the College of Health Technology Law, 2003 (Exhibit C7): the Appointment and Promotion Committee and the Finance and General-Purpose Committee.

60) It is undisputed that when the Claimant was confirmed as substantive Registrar of the 1st Defendant, the Governing Council had already been dissolved (May 2019). However, in paragraphs 4(a)–(j) of his Reply to the Defence, the Claimant rightly submitted that this dissolution created a governance gap. He demonstrated that it is the established practice of the 1st Defendant for the Expanded Management Advisory Council (E.M.A.C.) and the Appointment & Promotion Committee to assume the Council’s functions in its absence, thereby ensuring the College continues to run smoothly. DW2 confirmed this under cross-examination.

Q as at 16^th October, 2020, there was no governing council?

A I do not recall when the Governing Council was inaugurated

Q despite the fact that the Governing Council was not appointed, the institution ran by itself?

A yes

Q member of Expanded Management Advisory Committee EMAC are also members of the Governing Council.

A yes

61) Learned counsel observed that DW1 also confirmed unequivocally that despite the fact that as at 16/10/20, the 1^st Defendant did not have a Governing Council, the 1^st Defendant’s institution still ran successfully. These were his exact words:

Q despite the fact that as at 16/10/20, the institution did not have a governing council, the institution still ran successfully?

A yes

62) Accordingly, the functions of the governing council of the 1^st Defendant is clearly spelt out at Section 10 (1) (2) of the College of Health Technology Law, 2003 (Exhibit C7). Section 10 (1) (2) provides thus:

10 (1) The Council shall-

(a) be the governing body of the College

(b) be charged with general control and superintendence of the policies, Finances and property of the College; and

(c) on behalf of the College perform and exercise all the functions and powers conferred upon the College by this Law or any other enactment.

(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of subsection (1) of this section and in furtherance of these provisions, the Council shall-

(a) ensure that the courses of instruction provided by the College conform to the required standard;

(b) regulate the teaching and courses offered by the College and regulate the conduct of examination with respect to these Courses;

(d) maintain the premises and other property of the College

(e) formulate policies and initiate programs in all fields of learning conducted by the College

(f) asses from time to time the courses offered by the College; and

(g) perform such other functions as necessarily expedient being functions incidental or supplementary to the functions of the college.

63) Counsel submits that a close examination of Section 10(1) and (2) of the College of Health Technology Law, 2003 (Exhibit C7) shows that, without a duly appointed Governing Council, the college cannot practically carry on its day-to-day administration.

64) Furthermore, counsel submits that, having effectively served as the substantive Registrar of the 1st Defendant from 16 October 2020 to 23 February 2022—well within his four-year term—the only body empowered to ratify or rescind the Claimant’s appointment was the duly appointed Council. It was therefore improper for the 2nd Defendant to appoint the 5th Defendant while the Claimant’s tenure remained in force.

65) Counsel for the claimant submitted that a meticulous review of the record shows the Council never amended or revoked the Claimant’s substantive appointment as Registrar of the First Defendant; instead, it brazenly proceeded to hold a fresh interview.

66) The undisputed evidence on record shows that a new Governing Council for the first defendant was appointed on May 4, 2021, and that the claimant continued to serve as substantive Registrar for eight months and twelve days—until the fifth defendant was purportedly appointed Registrar on February 23, 2022.

67) It is a well?settled principle that when a party, by its conduct, deliberately causes or allows another to assume a fact and to act on that assumption, neither that party nor its representatives may later deny its truth. See Young Shall Grow Motors Ltd v. Madam Nimota Onalada & Ors (2020) LPELR-51706 (SC) p.10 paras. C–E.

68) In paragraph 4.1, the Defendants, in an effort to mislead this Honourable Court, contended that the First Defendant’s General Terms and Conditions of Service require, among other things, the Visitor of the institution—the State Governor—to give final approval for the appointment of a Substantive Registrar.

69) Counsel strongly contends that appointing a substantive Registrar for the 1st Defendant does not require the Governor of Plateau State’s approval and urges this Court to so hold.

70) Relying on the authorities already cited, counsel contends that the First Defendant’s Governing Council is estopped by its own conduct from removing the Claimant as substantive Registrar, since he served in that capacity alongside the newly appointed Council for eight months and twelve days.

71) Accordingly, counsel urges the Court to declare that the Claimant’s four-year appointment as Registrar of the First Defendant, which runs until 14 October 2024, could not lawfully be cut short by the Defendants prior to its expiry.

72) On Issue 3, counsel submitted that the court must determine whether the second defendant had the legal authority to appoint the fifth defendant as registrar of the first defendant’s institution.

73) Thus, it is well established that both the parties to an action and the Court itself are confined to the issues as framed in the respective pleadings. This principle was succinctly reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal, per Ige JCA, in FBN v. M. O. Nwadialu & Sons Ltd & Ors (2015) LPELR-24760 (CA) at pages 69–70, paras. C–B, as follows:

"The Court is always bound by the pleadings of the parties as much as the parties are bound by their pleadings and neither the Court nor the parties can travel or stray outside the confines of the pleadings and evidence led in support thereof."

74) In a similar vein, the Supreme Court Per Katsina-Alu, JSC in ADEMESO v. OKORO & ANOR (2005) LPELR-121 (SC) Pp 13 – 13 Paras D – E, reiterated the law thus:

"Just as the parties are bound by their pleadings, the trial courts are equally bound by the pleadings and the issues raised by and in those pleadings. The trial court therefore has no right to ignore the pleadings of the parties and proceed to consider issues not pleaded by the parties."

75) Counsel submits that, in an attempt to validate the 5th Defendant’s appointment as Registrar of the 1st Defendant, the Defendants averred in paragraph 10(viii) of their Statement of Defence that, after shortlisting both the Claimant and the 5th Defendant from a pool of qualified candidates, the Governor of Plateau State exercised his discretion to appoint the 5th Defendant as the substantive Registrar of the 1st Defendant. Paragraph 10(viii) of the Defendants’ Statement of Defence is reproduced below:

viii. the Claimant placed adverts on behalf of the 1^st Defendant, the Claimant as well as the 5^th Defendant submitted Applications they were shortlisted via a list of qualified Candidates and Interviewed, then His Excellency, the Governor of Plateau State, exercised his discretionary powers and appointed the 5^th Defendant as the Substantive Registrar of the 1^st Defendant. A copy of the list of shortlisted candidates is hereby pleaded and shall be relied upon during the trial.

76) With reference to paragraph 10(viii) of the Defence, DW1 and DW2 each stated in paragraph 18 of their sworn witness statements that, after both the Claimant and the 5th Defendant were shortlisted from the list of qualified candidates, the Governor of Plateau State exercised his discretionary authority to appoint the 5th Defendant as the substantive Registrar of the 1st Defendant.

77) The issue before the Honorable Court is whether the Second Defendant lawfully possessed the authority to appoint the Fifth Defendant as Registrar of the First Defendant’s institution.

78) Section 14(1) of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003 establishes the office of Registrar of the College. It then defines the Registrar’s duties and sets out the procedure for appointing that officer. The full text of Section 14(1) is reproduced below:

(2) The Registrar shall be in addition to the duties assigned to him under the provisions of this Law, be responsible for –

(a) the day -to-day administration of the College;

(b) keeping records and conducting correspondence of the college; and

(3) The Registrar of the College shall be appointed by Council and shall hold office for four years from the date of his appointment upon such terms and conditions as may be specified in the letter of appointment and shall be eligible for re-appointment for a second term and no more.

79) Counsel submitted that when a statutory provision—such as Section 14(3) of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law 2003—is clear and unambiguous, the courts are bound to apply its plain, ordinary meaning. He relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling per Iguh JSC in ADISA v. OYINWOLA & ORS (2000) LPELR-186 (SC) at 94 E–F, which held that:

80) Counsel argues that Section 14(3) of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law 2003 unambiguously vests the authority to appoint the Registrar exclusively in the College’s Governing Council, to the exclusion of any other body or person.

81) Learned counsel relies on the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (also expressed as expressum facit cessare taciturn), which teaches that by expressly stating one thing, anything inconsistent is thereby excluded. He invited attention to the Supreme Court’s decision per Uwaifo JSC in BUHARI & ANOR v. YUSUF & ANOR (2003) LPELR-812(SC) at page 20, paragraphs B–E, where the Court held unequivocally that:

"The principle is well settled that in the construction of statutory provisions, where a statute mentions specific things or persons, the intention is that those not mentioned are not intended to be included. This is the expressio unius est exclusio alterius rule, meaning that the express mention of one thing in a statutory provision automatically excludes any other which otherwise would have been included by implication. see Ogbunyiya v. Okudo (1976) 6-9 SC 32; Udoh v. Orthopaedic Hospital Management Board (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 304) 139."

82) Counsel also referred to the case of AG ONDO STATE v. AG EKITI STATE (2001) LPELR-622 (SC) Pp 66 - 66 Paras B – E.

83) Counsel submits, on the strength of the authorities cited and the arguments advanced, that neither Section 14(3) nor any other provision of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law empowered the 2nd Defendant (the then Governor) to appoint the 5th Defendant as Registrar of the College. Consequently, that appointment is null and void ab initio.

84) Counsel also argues that when a statute—such as the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law 2003—prescribes a particular procedure for carrying out an act, no alternative method may be used. This principle was affirmed by the Supreme Court in NWANKWO & ORS v. YAR’ADUA & ORS (2010) LPELR-2109(SC) at pages 42, paras. B–E.

85) Learned counsel further submits that the use of the word “shall” in Section 14(3) of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law imposes a mandatory obligation. It is well established that when a statute employs “shall,” the legislature intends strict compliance. There is no scope for deviation or evasion—whatever the provision requires must be done in full, without negotiation. He referred to the the Court of Appeal Per Aboki, JCA in FCDA v. THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL TRAINING FUND & ANOR (2009) LPELR-8148 (CA) Pp 33 - 33 Paras B – D . he also cited and referred to the Court of Appeal decision Per Lokulo-Sodipe, JCA in INT'L STANDARD SECURITIES LTD v. UNILEVER (NIG) PLC (2009) LPELR-8779 (CA) Pp 20 - 21 Paras B – B.

86) Overall, the claimant’s counsel asked the court to decide in the claimant’s favour and against the defendants, declaring that the 2nd defendant’s appointment of the 5th defendant was null and void because the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law does not authorize the 2nd defendant to make such an appointment.

87) On his fourth and last issue, the claimant’s counsel referred back to his arguments on issues one through three and maintained that the claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought, especially the nine alternative remedies claimed.

88) It is well established that if an employee’s fixed?term contract—like the Claimant’s—is terminated before its agreed expiry date, the employer must pay the full salary the employee would have earned for the remainder of that term.

89) Counsel relied on the Supreme Court’s decision per Muhammad, JSC in Shena Security Co. Ltd. v. Afropak (Nig.) Ltd. & Ors (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 103, paras. C–G, which reaffirmed that where an employment contract specifies a fixed term from its outset, the employee may not be removed during that term except for proven misconduct or the employer’s death. If the employer lawfully determines the contract before the agreed expiry date, the employer must pay the employee the full salary that would have accrued for the unexpired portion of the fixed term. In assessing that compensation, the trial court may also consider factors such as the bulk, advance nature of the payment and the employee’s opportunity to invest it. (See Igbe v. Governor of Bendel State (1983) 1 SCNLR 73; Swiss Nigeria Wood Industries Ltd. v. Bogo (1970) NCLR 423; Haidar v. Berini Bank Ltd. All NLR 40; Garabedian v. Jamakani (1961) All NLR 177; Oransaye v. Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (1969) NSCC 128.)

90) The Court of Appeal, per Shoremi JCA in College of Education, Ekiadolor v. Osayande (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1191) 449, paras. G–H, further held that if an employee’s fixed-term contract is terminated before its agreed expiry date, the employer must pay the employee the full salary they would have earned for the remainder of that term.

91) Drawing on the authorities cited above, the Claimant is entitled to ?13,375,840.00 as consolidated salary for the period March 2022 to October 2024. He is also entitled to a furniture allowance of ?1,200,000.00, exemplary damages of ?10,000,000.00, costs of ?2,000,000.00, and the other reliefs claimed. Counsel therefore urges the court to grant the alternative reliefs sought in this suit.

COURT’S DECISION:

92) After considering the parties’ pleadings, witness evidence and counsels’ submissions, the Court is satisfied that the dispute can be resolved by addressing the following 4 issues:

(1) Issue 1 – Validity of the Claimant’s Appointment – The first question is whether Exhibits C1–C3 demonstrate that the Claimant was validly appointed Acting Registrar on 22 June 2020 and thereafter confirmed as Substantive Registrar for a fixed four-year term pursuant to section 14(3) of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003, without any valid withdrawal or revocation of that appointment.

(2) Issue 2 – Power to Appoint the Registrar – The second issue is whether any body other than the Governing Council—specifically the Extended Management and Administrative Committee (EMAC), the Management and Administrative Committee (MAC) or the Governor—enjoyed statutory authority under the Law to confirm or appoint the Registrar. If no such authority existed, the question follows whether the Fifth Defendant’s appointment on 23 February 2022 must be regarded as void ab initio.

(3) Issue 3 – Lawfulness of the Claimant’s Premature Removal – The third matter for determination is whether the hand-over directives issued to the Claimant, his suspension on 6 June 2022 and the subsequent appointment of the Fifth Defendant constituted a lawful termination of the Claimant’s fixed-term contract. In this regard, the Court must inquire whether any misconduct was established to justify early removal and, in the absence of proven misconduct, whether the College’s actions violated the Claimant’s contractual and statutory rights.

(4) Issue 4 – Appropriate Reliefs – Finally, having resolved the foregoing questions, the Court must determine the nature and extent of the reliefs to which the Claimant is entitled. This includes any declarations of nullity, mandatory orders for reinstatement, awards of back pay and allowances, exemplary or aggravated damages, costs and interest.

ISSUE ONE:

93) Regarding issue one, which concerns the validity of the Claimant’s appointment, the question is whether Exhibits C1–C3 establish that he was properly appointed Acting Registrar on 22 June 2020 and thereafter confirmed as Substantive Registrar for a fixed four-year term under section 14(3) of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003, without any valid revocation.

94) Here, the Court must decide whether Exhibits C1–C3, taken together, demonstrate that Mr. Peter M. Aren was validly appointed first as Acting Registrar on 22 June 2020 and thereafter confirmed as Substantive Registrar for a four-year term under section 14(3) of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003, and that no valid withdrawal or revocation of that appointment ever occurred.

95) Exhibit C1 is a letter dated 22 June 2020, issued by the Provost of the College, appointing the Claimant as Acting Registrar with immediate effect. Exhibit C2 is a letter of 13 October 2020 from the same office, confirming the Claimant’s appointment on the recommendation of the Expanded Management Advisory Committee (EMAC). Exhibit C3, dated 16 October 2020, formally appoints the Claimant as Registrar for an initial four-year period terminable on 14 October 2024, at a consolidated annual salary of ?5,010,534, “effective 15 October 2020 in line with section 14(3) of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003.”

96) For emphasis, the contents of Exhibit C3 is hereunder reproduced:

I am pleased to inform you that at the meeting of the Expanded Management Advisory Committee (EMAC) of the College, held on 15^th October, 2020 at the E.U Prime, the Appointment and Promotion Committee of the College (A&PC) approved your appointment as Substantive Registrar of the College.

Your appointment is on a consolidated salary of N5, 010,534 per annum and takes effect from 15^th October, 2020. Also, the appointment is for an initial period of four (4) years to terminate on 14^th October, 2024.

Other conditions of service are as obtainable in other similar Tertiary Institutions.

Please accept my congratulations.

Dr. Toma Reng Ali

PROVOST.

97) Now, section 14(3) of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003 provides:

“The Registrar of the college shall be appointed by [the Governing] Council and shall hold office for four years from the date of his appointment upon such terms and conditions as may be specified in the letter of appointment and shall be eligible for re-appointment for a second term and no more.”

98) Although on its face the power of appointment lies with the Governing Council, the unchallenged documentary chain culminating in Exhibit C3 invokes the statutory four-year tenure. The Court is not at this stage determining whether EMAC or the Governor had power to effect the appointment (Issue Two), but simply whether, on the face of Exhibits C1–C3, a fixed-term contract arose.

99) In College of Education, Ekiadolor v. Osayande (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1191) 449 at 467, the Supreme Court ruled that when a statute grants an office for a fixed period and the incumbent is properly appointed, that tenure acquires contractual force and cannot be cut short except on grounds the statute itself allows. The court stressed the necessity of a “valid appointment.” Similarly, in Governor of Ekiti State v. Akinyemi (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1276) 414 at 432, it was reaffirmed that a statutory fixed-term public appointment creates a legally enforceable right to remain in office for the full term, unless there is established misconduct or the officer fails to meet other removal conditions specified by law.

100) The parties’ conduct at the time shows that the Claimant continued to draw his consolidated Registrar’s salary up to February 2022 (Exhibits C5 & C6), indicating that his appointment was still recognized. He carried out Registrar duties—signing official minutes and correspondence (Exhibit C10). Under cross-examination, DW2 admitted there was no record of any revocation of Exhibits C1–C3, and no letter, directive or other instrument withdrawing the appointment was ever produced to the Court.

101) When taken together, Exhibits C1–C3 appear to meet every requirement of a proper statutory appointment: they are dated and signed on official letterhead, cite the empowering provision, and specify the four-year term prescribed by section 14(3). No contemporaneous notice rescinded the appointment, and the Claimant continued to draw a salary and perform the Registrar’s duties, further confirming its validity. Applying the authorities in Ekiadolor and Akinyemi, the Court would ordinarily conclude on the first issue that these documents establish a valid appointment as Acting Registrar followed by confirmation as Substantive Registrar for a fixed four-year term, without any effective withdrawal. Accordingly, it is initially clear he acquired a legally enforceable right to hold office until 14 October 2024.

102) However, the question is whether the Claimant’s appointment as Registrar of the Plateau State College of Health Technology was valid—more precisely, whether the steps recorded in Exhibits C1–C3 met the criteria laid down in Section 14(3) of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003. In other words, it requires an analysis of the statutory appointment procedure and the rule of strict compliance with the enabling statute.

103) We must note that Section 14(3) of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003 provides that the Registrar “shall be appointed by [the Governing] Council and shall hold office for four years from the date of his appointment upon such terms and conditions as may be specified in the letter of appointment and shall be eligible for re-appointment for a second term and no more.” The key phrase “shall be appointed by [the Governing] Council” vests the appointment power exclusively in the Council and imposes a mandatory requirement of strict compliance.

104) A closer look at the documents shows that Exhibit C1 (22 June 2020) is a Provost’s letter making an interim appointment of the Claimant as Acting Registrar. Exhibit C2 (13 October 2020), also from the Provost’s office, confirms that appointment based on the Expanded Management Advisory Committee’s (EMAC) recommendation. Exhibit C3 (16 October 2020) is the formal letter appointing him as substantive Registrar for four years “effective 15 October 2020 in line with section 14(3) of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003.” Like the earlier letters, it was issued by the Provost and records that EMAC (at its 15 October 2020 meeting) and the College’s Appointment and Promotion Committee both approved the appointment.

105) The central question here is the mismatch between the statute’s requirement that the Governing Council make the appointment and the evidence showing the Provost actually did so—with only EMAC and A&PC approval. Whenever a statute creates an office and prescribes a specific appointment procedure, that procedure must be followed to the letter. Any departure from it is ultra vires and renders the appointment void.

106) An office that derives its authority from statute—like a college Registrar—must be appointed and, if necessary, removed in exact accordance with the enabling law. Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal have repeatedly held that where a statute prescribes the terms and procedures for hiring and dismissal, any action taken outside those provisions is void. In KULU v. CAC & ANOR (2020) LPELR-50466(CA), the courts reiterated that for employment to bear a “statutory flavour,” its conditions of service and any removal process must strictly follow the statute, and any deviation is fatal to its validity.

107) Under Section 14(3), the power to appoint the Registrar lies exclusively with the Governing Council. Although the Provost, EMAC or A&PC may review candidates and make recommendations, they have no statutory authority to make the actual appointment. Appointment is a formal legal act that must be undertaken by the body specifically empowered by the statute. Consequently, if the Claimant was never formally appointed by the Governing Council—even if one might argue the Council could later ratify such an appointment—but was instead appointed by the Provost with committee approvals, that appointment would almost certainly be invalid for failing to comply with the statute.

108) In AUCHI POLYTECHNIC v. OKUOGHAE (2005) LPELR-11221(CA), the Court underscored that any removal of staff in a tertiary institution must strictly comply with the relevant statutory provisions. Likewise, in NDILI v. AKINSUMADE & ORS (2000) LPELR-6910(CA) and GILE & ORS v. UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE MAKURDI & ORS (2015) LPELR-45808(CA), the appellate court stressed that appointments and dismissals in bodies created by statute must follow the exact procedures laid down by law. An appointment made by anyone other than the authority designated in the statute is a nullity and cannot be validated by subsequent approvals or actions of non-statutory bodies.

109) Accordingly, under a strict reading of Section 14(3) of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law 2003 and in light of Exhibits C1–C3, any substantive appointment not formally made by the Governing Council is likely void. Merely describing the appointment as “in line with section 14(3)” in Exhibit C3 does not cure a defect if the Council itself did not effect it. Similarly, a Provost’s letter acknowledging EMAC/A&PC approval cannot substitute for a genuine Governing Council appointment. An appointment that was void from the outset cannot later be validly revoked, since it never legally existed.

110) Upon examination of the evidence before this court, the Claimant testified as CW1 and tendered fifteen exhibits in support of his claim, the most material of which include Exhibit C1, a letter of appointment as Acting Registrar dated 22 June 2020; Exhibit C2, a confirmation letter dated 13 October 2020; Exhibit C3, a substantive letter of appointment dated 16 October 2020 expressly conferring a four-year tenure from 15 October 2020 to 14 October 2024; and Exhibit C7, the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003 (“2003 Law”), which prescribes the procedure and authority for appointing the Registrar. No document revoking or varying the terms of Exhibits C1–C3 was produced by the Defendants, and under cross-examination DW2 conceded that he was unaware of any withdrawal of those letters. Although the Claimant participated in the newspaper advertisement of 25 January 2021 (Exhibit C4) for the post of Registrar, he maintained that this did not conflict with his subsisting four-year appointment but was merely a formal process in which he chose to engage.

111) In advancing the validity of his appointment, counsel for the Claimant submitted and argued that Section 14(3) of the 2003 Law vests the exclusive authority to appoint the Registrar in the Governing Council and that once a four-year term has been validly conferred, it cannot be abridged except on grounds of misconduct or death. Counsel contended that Exhibits C1–C3 complied fully with the requirements of Section 14(3) by bearing the correct dates, emanating from the appropriate college authority, and specifying the duration of the tenure, and that the Defendants’ failure to produce any revocation document left those letters unchallenged. Relying on the principle that “documentary evidence is supreme and uncontradicted” as established in Skye Bank PLC v. Akinpelu (2010), counsel argued that the Claimant’s fixed-term appointment is immutable in the absence of any allegation or proof of misconduct or other lawful ground for early termination, citing College of Education, Ekiadolor v. Osayande (2010) and Governor of Ekiti v. Akinyemi (2011) in support of the proposition that statutory fixed-term appointments enjoy security of tenure.

112) In their defence the Defendants maintained that nothing about the Claimant’s purported appointment satisfied the clear requirements of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law of 2003 and that the entire sequence of Exhibits C1 through C3 was therefore ultra vires and void from the outset. They pointed out that Section 14(3) of the 2003 Law vests the power to appoint the Registrar solely in the Governing Council, whereas the Claimant’s initial acting?Registrar letter of 22 June 2020, his confirmation of October 2020 and his four-year appointment of 16 October 2020 issued instead from the Expanded Management Advisory Committee. According to DW1 and DW2, who testified for the Defendants and tendered eleven exhibits—including copies of newspaper adverts for the Registrar’s post, correspondence from the recognized staff unions, and official government communications—no valid Governing Council resolution was ever passed to ratify those steps, nor was any instrument of revocation produced to countermand them.

113) Counsel for the Defendants drew the court’s attention to the authorities of the Attorney-General of Bendel State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (1981) and Mobil Producing Nigeria v. Johnson (2018) to stress that where the statute prescribes a mode of appointment that particular procedure must be followed to the letter. They submitted further that the Claimant’s own conduct in treating the public advertisement of 25 January 2021 as a live opportunity, responding to it alongside other applicants and thereby implicitly disavowing the earlier EMAC appointment, amounted to an equitable bar. Reliance was placed on the principle of approbation and reprobation as applied in A.G. Nasarawa State v. A.G. Plateau State (2012) and Ude v. Nwara (1993), showing that the Claimant cannot both assert a continuing incumbency and at the same time pursue a fresh appointment process.

114) On the question of the 5th Defendant’s appointment, the Defendants’ counsel submitted that once the Claimant’s tenure was already void, any subsequent action by the erstwhile Governor of Plateau State to install the 5^th defendant on 22 February 2022, lacked any lawful foundation. They relied upon DW2’s evidence that the freshly constituted Governing Council, which only came into office in May 2021, never considered or ratified the nomination of a new Registrar.

115) Finally, having challenged the Claimant’s entitlement to any relief, they urged the court to dismiss the suit with substantial costs, arguing that the Claimant’s prayers for damages, reinstatement, back pay and allowances were predicated entirely on appointments which never satisfied the statutory requirements for the office of Registrar.

116) Having considered the foregoing, the court must determine whether the claimant has, by credible evidence, established the validity of his appointment. This obligation reflects the court’s duty to base its decision squarely on facts that have been properly pleaded and proven. Such a requirement is fundamental to justice, ensuring that outcomes arise from the particular circumstances of each case and the applicable law, rather than from conjecture or undisclosed facts.

117) As the Court of Appeal held in OROGBEMI v. STATE (2022) LPELR-58185(CA) P.35, Para. A, a court’s findings must derive from evidence adduced by the parties. The court cannot introduce its own facts, speculate, or rely on material not formally presented at trial. Instead, each party bears the burden of setting out its facts in the pleadings and substantiating them with credible proof. Consequently, any judgment, ruling or order must be a logical deduction from those facts and the law applied.

118) This principle has been consistently reaffirmed. In AG OF THE FEDERATION v. AG OF ABIA STATE & ORS (2024) LPELR-62576(SC) and AKINLEYE v. STATE (2024) LPELR-62541(CA), the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal alike stressed that judicial decisions must be firmly anchored in a thorough assessment of the evidence and its legal implications.

119) In assessing whether, on a balance of probabilities, Exhibits C1–C3 amount to a valid four-year appointment of the Claimant as Registrar, the Court must start with the plain wording of section 14(3) of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law 2003, which vests appointment power solely in the Governing Council. Although Exhibits C1 and C2 display the formal features of acting and substantive appointment letters and Exhibit C3 purports to fix the term from 15 October 2020 to 14 October 2024, those letters were issued when no Governing Council was in office. The record contains no evidence of a Council’s existence before, on, or after the dates of those letters, nor is there any proof that a properly convened Council later ratified them.

120) It is well established, as this Court and the appellate courts have confirmed, that any statutory authority to appoint or remove officers must be exercised exactly as the enabling law prescribes. An appointment made in the absence of the required statutory body is void from the outset. It is a fundamental principle of Nigerian administrative law, firmly established by both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, that any statutory power to appoint or remove officers must be exercised strictly in accordance with the enabling law. Failure to adhere to the prescribed procedure renders such an appointment or removal null and void from its inception, or void ab initio. This principle ensures legality, prevents arbitrary actions, and upholds the rule of law in public administration and corporate governance.

121) The Interpretation Act of 1964, specifically Section 11, provides a general framework for the exercise of powers of appointment. It states that where an enactment confers a power to appoint a person to an office or to exercise any functions, this power inherently includes the power to remove or suspend that person. However, this power is not unfettered; it must be exercised "in the manner and subject to the limitations and conditions (if any) applicable to the power to appoint." This statutory provision underscores the necessity of procedural compliance, making it clear that the power to appoint or remove is not absolute but conditional upon adherence to the specific dictates of the enabling statute.

122) As held in Attorney-General, Bendel State & Ors v. Attorney-General of the Federation (1992) 8 SCNJ 1, no amount of later acquiescence or duty performance by the appointee can validate something that was void ab initio.

123) Even though the Claimant remained in office and received emoluments, the de facto officer doctrine—which may protect third parties who deal with an officeholder—cannot supply the missing legal authority for his appointment. As the Court held in College of Education, Ekiadolor v. Osayande (supra), mere performance of duties does not cure a defective appointment process. And because there is no evidence that any Governing Council subsequently endorsed or ratified Exhibits C1–C3—no minutes, no ratification letter, no fresh council resolution—the Claimant has failed to discharge the burden of proof required to establish a lawful appointment.

124) Accordingly, the Court finds that although Exhibits C1–C3 appear valid on their face, they do not establish a lawful tenure for the Claimant. Therefore, Issue One is decided against him: he has not shown, on the balance of probabilities, that he was properly appointed to a fixed four-year term as Registrar. I so hold.

ISSUE TWO:

125) Issue 2 asks who lawfully had the power to appoint the Registrar. In particular, it must be decided whether any body other than the Governing Council—namely EMAC, MAC or the Governor—was granted authority by the College’s Establishment Law to confirm or appoint the Registrar. If no such authority existed, then the Fifth Defendant’s appointment of 23 February 2022 was void ab initio.

126) When addressing this question, it is clear from the plain wording of section 14(3) that only the Governing Council may make appointments. As pointed out under Issue One, neither the text nor the structure of the Law allows that power to be delegated to bodies like EMAC or MAC, much less to the Governor. Although the Claimant’s appointment letters (Exhibits C1–C3) cite section 14(3) and purport to grant him a four-year term, the court’s preliminary finding shows they were signed by the Provost on the recommendation of EMAC or MAC rather than by a properly convened, quorate Council. That failure to comply with the statutory procedure is a fundamental defect that renders the appointments void ab initio under the well-established ultra vires doctrine (see AUCHI Polytechnic v. Okuoghae (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 841) 573; Gile v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi (2017) LPELR-42351(CA)).

127) When the Claimant was confirmed as substantive Registrar of the 1st Defendant, the Governing Council had already been dissolved (May 2019). In paragraphs 4(a)–(j) of his Reply to the Defence, the Claimant correctly argued that this dissolution created a governance vacuum. He demonstrated that, by established practice, the Expanded Management Advisory Council (E.M.A.C.) and the Appointment & Promotion Committee step in to perform the Council’s functions in its absence, thereby ensuring the College continues to operate smoothly.

128) DW2 also confirmed position this under cross-examination.

Q as at 16^th October, 2020, there was no governing council?

A I do not recall when the Governing Council was inaugurated

Q despite the fact that the Governing Council was not appointed, the institution ran by itself?

A yes

Q member of Expanded Management Advisory Committee EMAC are also members of the Governing Council.

A yes

129) DW1 further testified that even though, as of October 16, 2020, the 1st Defendant did not have a Governing Council, the institution continued to function effectively. The Claimant never challenged this fact, and his counsel appeared to concede it in their final submissions to the Court.

130) Accordingly, the Governing Council of the first Defendant derives its powers from Section 10(1) and (2) of the 2003 law (Exhibit C7), which provides as follows:

10 (1) The Council shall-

(a) be the governing body of the College

(b) be charged with general control and superintendence of the policies, Finances and property of the College; and

(c) on behalf of the College perform and exercise all the functions and powers conferred upon the College by this Law or any other enactment.

(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of subsection (1) of this section and in furtherance of these provisions, the Council shall-

(a) ensure that the courses of instruction provided by the College conform to the required standard;

(b) regulate the teaching and courses offered by the College and regulate the conduct of examination with respect to these Courses;

(d) maintain the premises and other property of the College

(e) formulate policies and initiate programs in all fields of learning conducted by the College

(f) asses from time to time the courses offered by the College; and

(g) perform such other functions as necessarily expedient being functions incidental or supplementary to the functions of the college.

131) The claimant’s counsel acknowledged that a close reading of Section 10(1) and (2) of the College of Health Technology Law, 2003 (Exhibit C7) makes clear that, without a properly constituted Governing Council, the college cannot effectively carry out its day-to-day administration.

132) Additionally, the claimant’s counsel conceded that, having served as substantive Registrar from 16 October 2020 until 23 February 2022—still well within his four-year term—the sole authority entitled to confirm or revoke his appointment was the duly constituted Governing Council. Consequently, it was improper for the Governor to appoint the 5th Defendant while the claimant’s tenure remained in force.

133) The Defendants’ witnesses (DW1 & DW2) confirmed that no Governing Council was in place when Exhibits C1–C3 issued, and that EMAC and MAC functioned only as administrative bodies without power to make substantive appointments. Their reliance on EMAC/A&PC recommendations or on the Governor’s subsequent hand-over letter cannot cure the absence of a Council resolution. The authorities on strict compliance (UDE v. NWARA (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1316) 1; Bamigboye v. University of Ilorin (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt. 910) 162) compel invalidation of any purported exercise of council powers by inferior bodies.

134) The court is not satisfied by any evidence showing how the Fifth Defendant was appointed or by what instrument his appointment became substantive. That uncertainty leads the court to accept the claimant’s contention that the Fifth Defendant’s appointment was also defective, having been made by the former governor without the governing council’s approval. Since only the governing council has the statutory authority to appoint or confirm the Registrar, the Fifth Defendant’s appointment letter of 23 February 2022—issued without a valid council resolution—is void ab initio. The court hereby orders the necessary declarations setting aside the appointment of the 5^th defendant and any acts performed by him in that position.

ISSUE THREE:

135) Regarding the third issue—whether the Claimant’s removal was lawful—the Court must determine if the hand-over directives given to the Claimant, his suspension on 6 June 2022, and the subsequent appointment of the Fifth Defendant amounted to a valid termination of his fixed-term contract. In doing so, the Court will examine whether any misconduct was proven to justify an early removal and, if not, whether the College’s actions infringed the Claimant’s contractual and statutory rights.

136) Based on the court’s preliminary findings on Issues 1 and 2, the next steps turn on a close review of the evidence about the Claimant’s appointment and the proper application of statutory-compliance and estoppel principles. The court has mapped out two possible paths, each hinging on whether the original appointment is ultimately upheld.

137) Firstly, the court must undertake a comprehensive review of the College's records, including minutes of the Governing Council meetings, any Visitor’s sign-off, or evidence of subsequent ratification by the Council. This is crucial to ascertain whether the statutory procedures outlined in Section 14(3) of the College Law, which vests the power of appointment solely in the Governing Council, were strictly adhered to. If this examination reveals that the appointment was indeed made solely by the Provost and EMAC without the requisite approval or lawful delegation from the Governing Council, then the Claimant’s “appointment” would be declared void ab initio. In such a scenario, there would have been no legally subsisting contract of employment capable of being terminated, as the foundational act of appointment itself was ultra vires. Consequently, the Claimant’s primary claim for reinstatement as Registrar would fail, and the court would be compelled to dismiss the action for want of title, as one cannot enforce rights stemming from a non-existent legal relationship. This aligns with the general principle that where a statute prescribes a method for doing an act, that method, and no other, must be adopted, and any deviation renders the act a nullity.

138) Conversely, if the evidence, particularly from the Council’s records, demonstrates that the Governing Council, or EMAC acting under a lawful and valid delegation of the Council’s powers, did in fact approve the Claimant’s appointment in strict conformity with Section 14, then the Claimant would be deemed to possess an unassailable four-year tenure. In this event, the Exhibits C1–C3 would not be considered a mere informal exercise of power but rather a valid expression of the College's authority. Under this finding, every subsequent act by the Defendants purporting to suspend the Claimant, declare the office vacant, advertise the post, and install the 5th Defendant would stand in direct contravention of the statutory terms of the Claimant’s employment. Such actions would be set aside by the court as unlawful and void. The Claimant would then be entitled to the declarations, reinstatement, injunctions, and damages as claimed, consistent with the court's duty to uphold statutory provisions and protect vested rights.

139) Upon a close review of all the testimonies and evidence presented before me, however, I find that the claimant was not duly appointed by the governing council in accordance with Section 14(3) of the 2003 law. The court would not invest further resources in repeating what had already been incorporated in issues 1 and 2 above. Suffice to say that the claimant has not proven that he was duly appointed by the governing counsel, and I so find and hold.

140) The Defendants’ submission that the Claimant “declared the office vacant” by taking part in the re-advertisement and is therefore estopped from contesting the process cannot succeed. At no point in his pleadings or testimony did the Claimant concede that he had lost his post; to the contrary, he consistently maintained that his statutory four-year term remained in force. Unlike someone who clearly withdraws a prior claim or by conduct treats an earlier appointment as terminated, the Claimant continued to perform Registrar duties until his formal suspension, drew his salary throughout, and never renounced his tenure. Estoppel by conduct—or the “blowing hot and cold” principle—requires a clear, unequivocal act or representation by the Claimant that the office was vacant, on which the Defendants relied to their detriment. His participation in the fresh recruitment exercise, coupled with his simultaneous insistence on an existing term, does not amount to such an act. Just as a criminal court must weigh the evidence before granting relief under Section 303 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 or Section 287 of the Criminal Procedure Act, so too must a civil court scrutinize the Claimant’s words and deeds. Given his unwavering assertion of a subsisting contract, the estoppel defence fails.

141) Having found that his appointment was void ab initio, the Claimant’s further complaint that his removal was precipitous and capricious must be dismissed. Relief number 3 sought is thus denied, and I so hold.

ISSUE FOUR:

142) The fourth and final issue concerns appropriate reliefs to be granted. Having answered the preceding questions, the Court must now decide which remedies the Claimant is entitled to, including declarations of nullity, mandatory orders for reinstatement, awards of back pay and allowances, exemplary or aggravated damages, and the assessment of costs and interest.

143) The reliefs available in this case will turn entirely on the court’s ultimate conclusions about the validity of the Claimant’s appointment as Registrar (Issues 1 and 2). It is a settled rule in Nigerian law that a court may not award any remedy that a party has not expressly sought. This principle has been repeatedly affirmed—see UNIJOS v. IKEGWUOHA (2013) LPELR-20233(SC) 22–23, Paras. E–F; KWANGILA v. DANKOLI (2022) LPELR-59605(CA); and MUSTAPHA v. ABUBAKAR & ORS (2022) LPELR-57124(CA) 23, Paras. C–E. In the present proceedings, the Claimant’s applications are confined to declarations, reinstatement, injunctions, and monetary damages.

144) A close review shows that the requirements of Section 14(3) of the College Law were never met. The Provost and EMAC alone effected the appointment without any approval or lawful delegation from the Governing Council. As a result, the Claimant’s appointment is void ab initio. Because there was no valid employment contract in place, there was nothing that could lawfully be terminated and no rights ever vested. Accordingly, the Claimant cannot seek reinstatement as Registrar or any related relief—whether declarations of valid tenure, injunctions, or damages—because one cannot enforce rights that never existed. As the Court of Appeal held in JIBIA & ORS v. SULE & ORS (2022) LPELR-58293(CA) p. 30, paras. A–E, any order beyond the scope of a properly founded claim is null and void. By the same logic, if the underlying appointment is invalid, no ancillary relief can stand.

145) Because the Claimant’s appointment was void from the start, there is no remedy available and the suit must be dismissed for lack of merit. In other words, the Claimant had no legal right on which to base this action, since the right he sought to enforce never existed. And as a matter of principle, when the main claim fails, all dependent or ancillary claims must also fall.

146) Accordingly, the claimant’s case is dismissed in its entirety, and judgment is entered in favor of the defendants.

DELIVERED IN JOS THIS 23^RD DAY OF JANUARY 2026.

HON. JUSTICE I.S. GALADIMA

Judge.

Public access to NICN decisions:

Judgments and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://nicnadr.gov.ng. NICN decisions are available to the general public shortly after a copy each has been sent to the claimant(s) and defendant(s) in a case.