Victor Nnana -VS- Minister of the Federal Capital Territory & ORS

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

26^TH NOVEMBER 2025 NICN/ABJ/224/2023

BETWEEN

VICTOR NNANA .................................................................... CLAIMANT

AND

1. MINISTER OF THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY

2. FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY ADMINISTRATION............ DEFENDANTS

Representation:

Dr. Nnaemeka Otagburuagu Esq. with Emmanuel Enemor Esq. and A.G. Ajeka Esq. for Claimant

Y Abubakar Esq. with M.S. Ugwu Esq. for Defendants

JUDGMENT

[1] This suit was commenced by way of a general form of complaint filed on 10^th August 2023 wherein the Claimant is seeking the following reliefs:

i. A DECLARATION that the Claimant's employment is still valid and subsisting and that any purported termination of the Claimant's employment by the Defendants without notice and payment of salary arrears and other employment [sic] is in breach of his contract of employment, unconstitutional, null and void

ii. AN ORDER of this Court directing the Defendants to reinstate the Claimant as a staff of the Department of Land Administration under the Federal Capital Territory Administration

iii. AN ORDER of this Court directing the Defendants to promote the Claimant to the rank he ought to have been had the Defendant not orchestrated the trial against him since 2003.

iv. AN ORDER of this Court directing the Defendants to pay to the Claimant the outstanding salary arrears and other employment benefits due to him from September 2003 to date.

v. COMPENSATION for loss of income derivable from farming

vi. AN ORDER of Court directing the Defendants to pay the Claimant the sum of N300, 000, 000.00 (three hundred million naira) only as general damages for emotional, psychological, financial and physical trauma including the negative effect it had on his familial relationship.

vii. Cost of litigation in the sum of N5, 000,000.00 (five million naira) only.

CLAIMANT’S CASE

[2] It is the case of the Claimant, that he is a Federal civil servant with the Federal Capital Territory Administration (2^nd Defendant). He was employed on 1^st of August 1989, and held various positions, including Personal Assistant IV, Personal Assistant III, and Clerical Officer GD I. The Claimant completed a part-time training program in Land Administration (Dip) at Federal Polytechnic Nasarawa and was upgraded to Assistant Estate Officer on 2^nd July, 2001. However, his career was disrupted when he was charged with 10 counts of criminal conspiracy and forgery in 2003. The trial lasted 19 years, and he was eventually acquitted on May 5, 2022, by Hon. Justice Nnamdi O. Dimgba. The Claimant alleges that throughout the 19 years of prosecution, the Defendants withheld his salary which was last paid in September 2003.

[3] The Claimant asserts that the Defendants’ actions caused him significant financial losses, including loss of income from farming, which he estimates to be around N250, 000,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Million Naira). He is seeking reinstatement, payment of outstanding salaries and allowances, promotion to Grade Level 15 (Assistant Director) and award of damages. He also claims that he incurred solicitor’s fees amounting to N5, 000,000.00 (Five Million Naira).

DEFENCE

[4] The 1^st and 2^nd Defendants in reaction to the claims of the Claimant on 17^th January 2024 filed a robust joint defence denying most of the allegations. The Defendants claim that the Claimant was never an employee of either Defendant, and that the quoted file numbers do not exist in their records. They assert that the Claimant's employer was the defunct Ministry of Federal Capital Territory, which was dissolved in 2004. Following the dissolution, the Ministry's employees, including the Claimant, were redeployed to the Federal Civil Service Commission or other agencies. The Defendants emphasize that they have no records of the Claimant's employment, salary, or personnel files. They also deny initiating any criminal proceedings against the Claimant and argue that any such actions were taken by the Claimant's former employer, the Ministry of Federal Capital Territory.

[5] Furthermore, the Defendants claim that the Claimant's suit is statute-barred, as the alleged incidents occurred 15-22 years ago. They also question the 2^nd Defendant's Capacity to be sued, as it is an administrative body created by administrative arrangement, not a statutory body. The Defendants' defence centres on the argument that they are not liable to the Claimant for any alleged losses or damages.

[6] The Defendants intend to raise the following issues for determination by the Court: whether the Claimant's suit discloses a reasonable cause of action, whether the Claimant's suit is statute-barred and whether the 2^nd Defendant is Capable of being sued. The Defendants maintain that they are not liable to the Claimant and seek dismissal of the suit.

COMMENCEMENT OF HEARING

[7] This suit was initially heard by Hon. Justice O.O Oyewumi (now JCA); upon his lordship’s elevation to the Court of Appeal, this suit was transferred to my Court and hearing before me commenced on 18^th November 2024.

[8] Trial in this suit commenced on 11^th March 2025 wherein the Claimant opened his case and testified as CW. He adopted his witness statement on oath filed 10^th August 2023 and tendered 14 (fourteen) documents admitted and marked as exhibits A-G,G1,H-M of which the Defendant Counsel objected to the admissibility of exhibits G,K, L and J and reserved argument for stage of address.

[9] Under cross examination, the Claimant testified that the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory (Ministry) issued his letter of appointment and executed his confirmation, promotions and upgrading. That in 2004, when the Federal Government merged ministries, the ministry metamorphosed to Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) and absorbed all staff of the Ministry. He also testified that the last time he went to his office was on 24^th September 2003 when he was arrested.

[10] That Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) and Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB) were agencies of the Ministry with their own staff. That he was released on 24^th February 2008 and upon release, he was asked by the 2^nd Defendant to produce evidence of acquittal.

[11] Claimant testified that he owns farms and made about N50, 000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) per annum from his farm. However, he lost everything from 2003-2008 due to his incarceration.

Claimant closed case on 12^th March 2025.

[12] The Defendants opened case on 29^th May 2025 calling Shafiu Aliyu of Human Resource Department FCTA and adopted witness statement on oath filed 28^th April 2025.

[13] Under cross examination, he alluded that upon the effect of Order 1 Federal Capital Territory (Dissolution Order No. 1 2004), Claimant ought to have submitted himself to civil service commission as all staff of the Ministry were asked to report to office of Head of Service. Case closed same day and Court adjourned for adoption of final written address.

[14] On 25^th September 2025, date slated for adoption, the Claimant adopted final written address and reply on points of law filed 25^th August 2023 and 24^th September 2025 respectively. On their part, the Defendants adopted final written address filed 15^th September 2025.

CLAIMANT’S SUBMISSION

[15] Learned Counsel to the Claimant raised this sole issue for determination:

i. Whether, having regard to the statutory nature of the Claimant's employment, the continuity of the Federal Capital Territory Administration as successor to the defunct Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory, and the Claimant's eventual discharge and acquittal of all criminal allegations, the Claimant is entitled to reinstatement, arrears of salary, promotion, and other reliefs sought in this suit.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

[16] The Claimant's submission asserts that the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory is a statutory office with executive, administrative, and employment powers within the Federal Capital Territory, citing Section 302 of the Constitution and Section 18 of the Federal Capital Territory Act. The Claimant argues that the dissolution of the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory doesn't extinguish existing employment relationships, and the Defendants failed to provide evidence of lawful redeployment or termination, he placed reliance on OLANIYAN V. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 9) 599.

[17] The Claimant contends that Exhibit I, a letter from the Defendants, admits to the Claimant's employment and requests evidence of acquittal to facilitate reinstatement. Claimant’s Counsel therefore argued that this admission, combined with the acquittal (Exhibit H), entitles him to reinstatement and payment of outstanding salaries and allowances.

[18] Citing C.B.D.I V COBEC (NIG) LTD (2004) 13 NWLR (PT 890) 376, the Claimant submits that the Federal Capital Territory Administration is the successor to the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory, inheriting its responsibilities and obligations, including employment relationships.
[19] Regarding the Defendants' argument that the Claimant was redeployed to the Federal Civil Service Commission, the Claimant asserts that this claim is unsupported by evidence and contradicts administrative practice. The Claimant relies on Section 131 of the Evidence Act, 2011, and NOIBI V. FIKOLATI (1987) 1 NWLR (PT. 52) 619, arguing that the Defendants failed to prove redeployment.
[20] The Claimant’s Counsel argued that the termination of his employment was unlawful, as it didn't follow statutory procedures, he cited SHITTA-BEY V. FPSC (1981) 1 SC 40 and OLANIYAN V. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 9) 599. The Claimant seeks reinstatement, payment of salary arrears, and damages for hardship and reputational damage, relying on Section 254C (1)(f) of the Constitution and International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No. 158.
[21] In conclusion, the Claimant submits that he has established a valid cause of action, and the Defendants' arguments are misconceived. The Claimant urges the Court to grant the reliefs sought, citing equity, justice, and the Rule of law.

DEFENDANTS’ SUBMISSION

[22] The Defendants’ argument is two-pronged comprising a preliminary objection and a substantive written address.

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

[23] The learned Counsel to the Defendants raised the following objections:

i. The Originating Process is defective as the Complaint is at variance with the provisions of Order 3 Rules 9 and 10 and also Form 1 of the Rules of this Court.

ii. The suit is Statute barred by virtue of the Limitation Act applicable in the Federal Capital Territory.

iii. The suit is brought against a non-Juristic person.

[24] GROUNDS UPON WHICH THIS OBJECTIONS ARE PREMISED ARE AS FOLLOWS:

a. The Rules of this Court provided for the format of Complaint as set out in Order 3 Rule 10 and Form 1, of the Rules of this Court.

b. The Complaint upon which this suit is brought is contrary to the provisions of the Rules.

c. The Complaint is brought more than six years of the accrual of the purported contract of service.

d. The 2^nd Defendant is not a creation of statute nor an incorporated body Capable of being sued.

OBJECTION i

The Originating Process is defective as the Complaint is at variance with the provisions of Order 3 Rules 9 and 10 and also Form 1 of the Rules of this Court.

[25] The Defendants argued that the Claimant's Originating Process is defective and incompetent due to non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Order 3, Rules 9 and 10 of the Rules of this Honourable Court. According to the Defendants, the Claimant failed to comply with the requirements of Order 3, Rule 9, which stipulates that the Complaint shall be accompanied by a statement of facts establishing the cause of action, a list of witnesses, a written statement on oath of all witnesses, and a list and number of copies of documents and other exhibits to be tendered at the trial. The Defendants also argue that the Claimant failed to comply with Order 3, Rule 10, which requires the Complaint to be in the format set out in Form 1 and to contain a clear and concise statement of the material facts establishing the cause of action. The Defendants cite several cases, including D.E.N.R. LTD V. TRANS INTL. BANK LTD (2008) 18 NWLR (PT. 1119) 430, SAKAMORI CONSTR. (NIG.) LTD V. L.S.W.C (2022) 5 NWLR (PT. 1823) 339, AND OLOMO V. APE (2015) 14 NWLR (PT.1478) 46, to support their argument that Rules of Court must be obeyed and that non-compliance with mandatory provisions renders the Originating Process incompetent. The Defendants submit that the use of the word "shall" in Order 3, Rules 9 and 10, makes it mandatory for the Claimant to comply with the provisions, and that failure to do so render the Originating Process incurably defective. The Defendants urge the Court to dismiss the suit as the Originating Process is incompetent and incurably defective. In support of their argument, the Defendants also cite the case of NIGERIA LNG LTD V. A.D.I.C LTD (1995) 8 NWLR (PT 416), which held that the word "shall" imports a mandatory obligation.

OBJECTION ii

The suit is Statute barred by virtue of the Limitation Act applicable in the Federal Capital Territory.

?[26] The Defendants argue that the Claimant's suit is statute-barred, citing Section 7 of the Limitation Act Cap 522 LFN, which states that actions founded on simple contract or tort must be brought within six years from the date the cause of action accrued. To the Defendants, the Claimant's cause of action arose in 2009 when he wrote requesting payment of his salary, allowances, and posting, which was not acceded to. Counsel cited SAKI V. A.P.C (2020) 1 NWLR (PT.1706) 515 SC, OLADAPO V. KALEJAYE (2023) 14 NWLR (PT.1903) SC. Counsel argued that the suit was filed in 2023, 13 years after the cause of action arose, exceeding the six-year limitation period. Counsel further cited YAKUBU V. NITEL LTD (2006) 9 NWLR (PT.985) 367 CA, MOHAMMED V. LAWAL (2006) 9 NWLR (984) 400 CA, A.P.C V. UDUJI (2020) 2 NWLR (PT.1709) 541 SC predicated upon these, the Defendants urge the Court to dismiss the suit as it is statute-barred and incompetent.

OBJECTION iii

The suit is brought against a non-Juristic person.

[27] The Defendants argue that the suit is brought against a non-juristic person, specifically the 1^st Defendant, which is not a statutorily established organization Capable of employing staff or incurring liability. By the same token, the 2^nd Defendant, Federal Capital Territory Administration, is also not a creation of any statute and lacks the Capacity to sue or be sued. It was argued that the Federal Capital Territory Act doesn't mention or establish the Federal Capital Territory Administration as a body corporate. The Defendants cite cases like INTERNATIONAL NIGERBUILD CONST. CO. LTD V. GIWA (2003) NWLR (PT. 836) 69 AND FAWEHINMI V. NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION (2003) NWLR (PT. 558) @ 595, emphasizing that only natural persons and juristic artificial persons can sue or be sued, failure of which goes to the root of jurisdiction.

[28] Additionally, the Defendants claim there’s no record of the Claimant’s service in their records, and even if the Federal Capital Territory Administration had juristic personality, it wouldn’t be liable since the Claimant wasn’t an employee. The Defendants urge the Court to dismiss the suit, arguing that it is incurably defective and lacks jurisdiction.

SUBSTANTIVE WRITTEN ADDRESS

[29] The Counsel representing the Defendants raised the following issues

a. Whether the Claimant was prima facie the employee of the Ministry of Federal Capital Territory.

b. Whether the Defendants can be forced to accept an employee of another Employer.

c. Whether considering the circumstances of the suit, the Claimant has any cause of action against the Defendants.

ISSUE A

Whether the Claimant was prima facie the employee of the Ministry of Federal Capital Territory.

[30] The Defendants argue that the Claimant was an employee of the defunct Ministry of Federal Capital Territory, not the Defendants. They claim the 1^st Defendant, the Minister of Federal Capital Territory, is not an employer of labour and can't incur liability for the Claimant's employment. The Defendants present evidence, including Exhibits A-G, showing the Claimant's employment documents were issued by the Ministry of Federal Capital Territory, not the Defendants. They also point out the Claimant admitted during cross-examination that he was employed by the Ministry of Federal Capital Territory. Citing Section 136(1) of the Evidence Act, the Defendants argue the Claimant failed to prove the Defendants were his employers. They reference the Supreme Court case of NEWBRED ORGANISATION LTD V ERHOMOSELE 2006) LPELR-1984 (SC), emphasizing that the burden of proof lies with the Claimant. The Defendants also argue the Claimant's admission that he was employed by the Ministry of Federal Capital Territory is a crucial fact that supports their defence. Defendants’ Counsel cited SALAWU & ANOR V. YUSUF & ANOR (2007) LPELR – 2988 (SC), stating admissions are evidence of facts asserted against a party.

[31] Placing reliance on MOROHUNFOLA V. KWARA STATE COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY (1990) 4 NWLR [PT 145] 506, Defendants’ Counsel argued that the Claimant failed to establish the conditions in proof of wrongful termination.

ISSUE B

Whether the Defendants can be forced to accept an employee of another Employer.

?[32] The Defendants argue that the Claimant has no cause of action against them, citing the Claimant's admissions during cross-examination that he was employed, promoted, and paid by the Ministry of Federal Capital Territory. The Defendants reference the Supreme Court case of OSHOBOJA V AMUDA & ORS (1992) LPELR-2804 (SC) defining cause of action as facts that entitle a plaintiff to a remedy against a Defendant. They argue the Claimant's circumstances don't yield any remedy against the Defendants, as the act complained of wasn't born out of the Defendants' wrongful act. He cited AGBE ADEFARASIN (1985) 1 NWLR PT 3 PG 549. RELYING ON AG FEDERATION & ORS V ABUBAKAR & ORS (2007) LPELR-3(SC) Defendants’ Counsel submitted that a Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a matter without a live issue between parties. They argue the Claimant's suit is an example of forum shopping, as he claims to be a statutory employee of the Federal Capital Territory Administration while admitting employment by the Ministry of Federal Capital Territory.

ISSUE C

Whether considering the circumstances of the suit, the Claimant has any cause of action against the Defendants.

?[33] The Defendants’ Counsel argue that an employer of labor cannot be forced to accept an employee of another employer, citing the principle of privity of contract. Defendants’ Counsel submitted that the Claimant's employment relationship was with the Ministry of Federal Capital Territory, and the Defendants were not party to this contract. The Defendants reference the Court of Appeal case of B.B.A. PLC V. BTL IND. LTD (2004) 18 NWLR (PT.904) 180 CA, which held that a contract affects only the parties to it and cannot be enforced by or against a person who is not a party. Counsel also cited NWUBA V. OGBUCHI (2008) 2 NWLR (PT.1072) 471, - J.E. OSHEVIRE LTD V. TRIPOLI MOTORS (1997) 5 NWLR (PT.503) 1 SC which reiterated this principle. The Defendants argue that foisting the Claimant on them would go against established principles of law, as the relationship between the Claimant and his employer was regulated by statute and contract. They claim the Defendants cannot be made to inherit or accept the employee of another employer.

In conclusion, Defendants’ Counsel urged Court to dismiss this suit for lacking merit.

REPLY ON POINT OF LAW

[34] In reaction to the Defendants’ final written submission, the Claimant responds to the Defendants' preliminary objection, arguing that the suit is not incompetent due to non-compliance with Order 3 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017. The Claimant contends that the Rules of Court are meant to facilitate justice, not hinder it, and that substantial justice should prevail over technicalities. Counsel cited DANFULANI V. SHEKARI (1996) 2 NWLR (PT 433) 723, DADA V. OGUNSANYA (1992) 3 NWLR (PT 323) 754. He therefore placed reliance on Order 5 of the Rules of this Court which enjoins the Court to do substantial justice and treat certain noncompliance as mere irregularities.

[35] More so, it was submitted that compliance with the Rules of Court is procedural rather than substantive jurisdiction which is required to be raised timeously. Learned Counsel to the Claimant referred to Order 1 Rule 2(2) of the Rules of this Court which provides that a Defendant may file a motion on notice challenging the competence of an action filed. To the Claimant’s Counsel, failure to raise this objection timeously inputs that the Defendants’ have waived their right and are hereby estopped. He cited OSTANKINO SHOPPING CO. LTD V. THE OWNERS, THE MT BATA (2022) 3 NWLR (PT. 1817) 367.

[36] The Claimant also argues that the suit is not statute-barred, as the cause of action arose in 2022 when the Defendants failed to reinstate the Claimant despite receiving Exhibit J. The Claimant cites Section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution, which vests exclusive jurisdiction in the National Industrial Court over matters related to payment or non-payment of salaries, wages, pensions, gratuities, and benefits.

[37] Regarding the Defendants' argument that the 2^nd Defendant is not a juristic person, the Claimant submits that the Federal Capital Territory Administration is an administrative body established under the authority of the Federal Capital Territory Act, and is therefore liable for the Claimant's employment. EGBO V. AGBARA (1997) 1 NWLR (PT 481) 293 - - MOYOSORE V. GOV., KWARA STATE (2012) 5 NWLR (PT 1293) 242 - VICTOR V. FUTA (2015) 4 NWLR (PT 1448) 1 - CITEC INTL ESTATES LTD V. S.T and F LTD (2024) 1 NWLR (PT 1919) 231

REPLY ON POINT OF LAW TO DEFENDANTS’ FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS

?[38] The Claimant responds to the Defendants' arguments, asserting that the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory is a statutory office with executive, administrative, and employment powers within the Federal Capital Territory. The Claimant cites Section 302 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and Section 18 of the Federal Capital Territory Act, emphasizing the Minister's role in appointment, control, discipline, and administration of staff. Counsel also placed reliance on Section 147 of the Constitution.

[39] The Claimant argues that the dissolution of the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory doesn't extinguish existing employment relationships, and the Defendants failed to provide evidence of lawful redeployment or termination. The Claimant relies on OLANIYAN V. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 9) 599, stressing that statutory employment subsists until lawfully determined. The Claimant also asserts that a cause of action exists, citing uncontroverted evidence of employment, acquittal, and requests for reinstatement.

[40] Reacting to Defendants’ argument that an employee cannot be foisted on an employer, Claimants’ Counsel submitted that the principle only applies to master servant and would not avail in a statutory employment. He cited SHITTA-BEY V. FPSC (1981) 1 SC 40 - DEMATIC (NIG.) LTD. V. UTUK (2022) 8 NWLR (PT. 1831) 7, OLANIYAN V. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (SUPRA).

[41] Claimant’s Counsel urged Court to hold that Defendants’ argument is unsustainable and unsupported by credible evidence.

DECISION

[42] In determining this suit, I shall consider the preliminary objections of the Defendants, and where untenable, proceed to the substantive matter. I must, however, express my disapproval of the Defendants' decision to raise the issues contained in their preliminary objection at the stage of final address, seeing that the issues are challenging the jurisdiction of this Court; one which is Capable of depriving this Court of jurisdiction to entertain this suit in the first place. It is trite law that matters bordering on jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of trial, even at the Court of appeal or in the Supreme Court for the first time. See IBRAHIM V. SARHAM (2024) 4 NWLR (PT. 1927) 1 @ 50 PARAS E-F, AG. KWARA STATE V. ADEYEMO (2017) 1 NWLR (PT. 1546) 210 @ 239 PARAS E-F. However, it is not equitable that a party would remain silent as to these issues, literally saving the objection for the last minute. I must emphasize that while jurisdictional matters can be raised at any stage of a trial, the equitable thing to do is to raise it timeously so as to save time and resources from being expended in vain. See SALAMI V. MUSE (2019) 13 NWLR (PT. 1689) 301 @ 319 PARAS C-E SC, N.P.A. V. AMINU IBRAHIM & CO. (2018) 11 NWLR (PT. 1632) 62 @ 82 PARAS C-D SC. Thus, once it became apparent to the Defendants that this Court may not have jurisdiction to entertain this matter, the proper step would have been to raise the issue.

[43] As mentioned earlier, the preliminary objection of the Defendants are founded on three legs which are:

I. The Originating Process is defective as the Complaint is at variance with the provisions of Order 3 Rules 9 and 10 and also Form 1 of the Rules of this Court.

II. The suit is Statute barred by virtue of the Limitation Act applicable in the Federal Capital Territory.

III. The suit is brought against a non-Juristic person.

The grounds upon which they are predicated have been reproduced in the preceding part of this judgment.

[44] With regard to objection I, the Defendants have argued that the originating process does not comply with Order 3 Rules 9 and 10, as well as Form 1 of the Rules of this Court. I have carefully examined these provisions, which require a complaint to be accompanied by a statement of facts establishing the cause of action and other requisite documents, and specify the format for the statement of facts. Upon reviewing the originating process in this suit, I note that the complaint is accompanied by a ‘statement of claim’, written witness statement on oath, list, and frontloaded documents. I do not see any non-compliance with the Rules. The Defendants' objection appears to be based on a technicality, as they have not specifically identified the particulars of non-compliance. The only discrepancy I notice is that the Claimant has titled his pleadings as a "statement of claim" instead of a "statement of facts" as required by the Rules. In my view, this is a mere irregularity that does not occasion a miscarriage of justice. Pursuant to Order 5 of the Rules of this Court, I hereby exercise my discretion to overlook this technicality. It is well-established that Courts should not follow Rules of Court slavishly, and should instead strive to do substantial justice. See, IWUEKE V. ODIKANWA (2019) 16 NWLR (PT. 1749) 105 @ 126 PARAS A-C CA, NIKA FISHING CO. LTD. V. LAVINA CORP (2008) 16 NWLR (PT. 1114) 509 @ 542 PARAS B-D SC. In this instance, the mere mislabelling of the pleadings as a "statement of claim" rather than a "statement of facts" is not sufficient to render the originating process incompetent. This objection is hereby discountenanced.

[45] Addressing objection II which is to the effect that this suit is Statute barred by virtue of the Limitation Act applicable in the Federal Capital Territory, it has become pertinent to determine whether an employment contract is a simple contract. This is because the Limitation Act relied upon by the Defendants in the context which it was used applies to only simple contract. Thus, the question is whether an employment contract is a simple contract within the contemplation of the Limitation Act of the Federal Capital Territory.

[46] The Supreme Court in a plethora of cases has provided insight into what constitutes a simple contract. For instance, in TSKJ (NIG) LTD V. OTOCHEM (NIG) LTD (2018) LPELR-44294 (SC), a houseboat hire transaction was deemed a simple contract. Similarly, in RAHMAN BROTH LTD V. NPA (2019) LPELR-46415 (SC), an arrangement to indemnify against losses from a fire incident was considered a simple contract. On the other hand, employment contract in Nigeria is governed by specific regulations, including: the letter of employment, employee handbook, Civil or Public Service Rules, collective agreement, the Labour Act 2004, likewise international instruments which have been ratified. Thus, employment contracts, goes beyond the basic elements of offer, acceptance and consideration; these characteristics distinguish employment contracts from simple contracts, making it clear that they are separate entities. In essence, an employment contract is not a simple contract; consequently, the Limitation Act of the FCT is not applicable. I so hold.

[47] Given that the Defendants herein are public officers, it is my firm view that the appropriate limitation law in this instance is the Public Officers Protection Act of which section 2a provides a limitation period of 3 months within which to commence an action against a public officer. To determine whether an action is caught up by statute of limitation, the Court will make recourse to the complaint and statement of facts alleging the date the cause of action accrued, compare with the date on which the complaint was filed and the time stipulated by the relevant law to bring such action. See GBADEHAN V. HILADEJO (2012) 16 NWLR (PT. 1326) 392, INEC V. OGBADIBO (2015) LPELR – 24839 (SC).

[48] It is the case of the Claimant herein that whilst in the employ of the now defunct ministry of Federal Capital Territory (subsequently referred to as the Ministry), he was charged and prosecuted for a criminal offence. During the pendency of this criminal action against the Claimant, the ministry was dissolved. In 2009, he wrote to the FCTA to pay his salary arrears, allowances and to reinstate him. The FCTA responded by requesting for proof of acquittal a condition upon which he would be reinstated. Thus, upon Claimant’s discharge and acquittal sometime in 2022, he wrote the 1^st Defendant once again seeking for payment of arrears of salary, allowances, promotion and reinstatement (exhibit J). A demand which was never met by the Defendants. It is thus my view that contrary to the claim of the Defendants, the cause of action of the Claimant accrued on 14^th June 2022 when the Claimant issued a letter seeking for reinstatement to the Defendants, who on their part failed to meet demand. It is noteworthy that this suit was commenced on 10^th August 2023 and it is lucent that this is beyond the stipulated period of three months by section 2a POPA.

[49] Notwithstanding, the POPA is not bereft of exceptions one of which is continuing injury. For this exception to apply, periodic payments must exist as held in AG RIVERS STATE V. AG BAYELSA STATE (2013) 3 NWLR (PT 1340) 123 SC. After a careful appraisal of the totality of evidence before me, it is my finding that the employment of the Claimant was not terminated, hence for every month that the Defendant failed to pay to the Claimant his salary and allowances, fresh cause of action arose. I so hold.

[50] To this end, I acknowledge that the issue of limitation is one which must be carefully considered due to its jurisdictional implications. This is the reason why I have painstakingly determined whether the Claimant’s action is caught up by Section 2a POPA despite the Defendants’ failure to raise it and conclude that this suit is not statute barred for the reasons given above.

[51] With regards to objection 3 which challenges the juristic personality of Defendants. The law is trite that a non-juristic person cannot sue or be sued. It follows therefore that no action can be brought by or against any party other than a natural person and juristic or artificial persons. The law however recognises that apart from natural and juristic persons, some non-legal entities can sue and be sued eo nomine. Thus, it has been held that no action can be brought by or against any party other than a natural person (s) unless such a party has been given by statute expressly or impliedly either:

a. A legal persona under the name by which it sues or is sued e.g. corporation sole and aggregate, bodies incorporated by foreign law and quasi-corporations constituted by Act of parliament; or

b. A right to sue or be sued by that name e.g. partnerships, trade unions etc. authorised by their own law to sue and be sued but not incorporated.

See FAWEHINMI V. N.B.A. (NO. 2) (1989) 2 NWLR (PT. 105) 558, CARLEN NIG. LTD. V. UNIVERSITY OF JOS (1994) 1 NWLR (PT. 323) 631.

[52] In other words, no action can be brought by or against any party other than a natural person except where such party has been conferred by a statute expressly or impliedly with legal Capacity see also LION OF AFRICA INSURANCE COMPANY LTD V. ESAN (1999) 8 NWLR (PT. 614) 197.

[53] In this instance the Defendants argue that the 2^nd Defendant lacks juristic personality as it was not created by Statute or incorporated as a body corporate. They claim the Federal Capital Territory Act Cap F6 LFN 2004 did not mention or establish the 2^nd defendant, and that the FCTA is merely an administrative conglomerate of agencies, departments, and secretariats without statutory backing. He placed reliance on NKPORNWI V. EJIRE (2009) 9 NWLR (PT. 1145)143 RATIO 14 asserting the 2^nd defendant cannot sue or be sued due to lack of juristic personality.

[54] Accordingly, I have reviewed the Federal Capital Territory Act Cap F6 LFN 2004 alongside Federal Capital Territory (Establishment of Functionaries and Departments) and Ministry of Federal Capital Territory (Dissolution Order No. 1 2004) and find that the FCTA has not been conferred legal Capacity. It follows therefore that the 2^nd Defendant is not a juristic person and therefore cannot sue or be sued. The 2^nd Defendant is consequently struck out from this suit. I so hold.

[55] I have observed that the Defendants’ Counsel in his words argued that the 1^st Defendant is not a statutorily established organisation Capable of employing staff thus cannot incur or inherit the liability of the Claimant’s employer, i.e. the Ministry. At this juncture, I am minded to state that I agree with the submission of the learned Counsel to the Claimant that the 1^st Defendant (Minister of the Federal Capital Territory) is a creation of statute by virtue of section 147 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and therefore a juristic person. See ATALOYE & ANOR V. THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR OF ONDO STATE & ORS (2013) LPELR 21962 (CA) where the Court of Appeal held that the commissioner for land being a creation of statute is a juristic person whose office can sue and be sued. It is therefore my finding that the 1^st Defendant is juristic and therefore can sue and be sued. I so hold.

[56] The question as to whether the 1^st Defendant can inherit the liabilities of the Ministry, shall be determined alongside the substantive matter.

[57] With respect to the substantive matter, I have carefully gone through the Claimant’s Claim, Defendant’s Defence, exhibits tendered before this Honourable Court and final written submissions of both Counsel and thus distilled a sole issue for the just determination of this suit, to wit:

“Whether the Claimant has proved his case to be entitled to the reliefs sought.”

[58] The law requires civil cases to be decided on a balance of probabilities with the Court weighing the totality of evidence to determine which side’s evidence preponderates. The party with the heavier evidence succeeds. See ODOFIN V. MOGAJI (1978) 4 SC P. 91. More so, it is a settled position of law that cases are won and lost on the evidence presented by parties before the Court, therefore, the success or failure of the case of the Claimant is predicated first on the nature of his pleadings and secondly the evidence led in support of his averment. Likewise, the success or failure of the defence of the Defendant is based on the averment in his Statement of defence and the evidence led in support thereof. See RAMONU RUFAI APENA & ANOR V. OBA FATAIAILERU & ANOR (2014) 6 – 7 MJSC (PT.11)184 @ 188.

[59] The instant case revolves around the Claimant’s assertion that he was an employee of the erstwhile ministry of Federal Capital Territory, which was dissolved during the pendency of a criminal proceeding against him. Following his acquittal, the Claimant petitioned the Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) seeking reinstatement, promotion and payment of accrued salaries and allowances. This is predicated on the premise that the FCTA succeeded the interests and liabilities of the defunct ministry.

[60] The Claimant’s claim is anchored on the existence of an employment relationship with the FCTA which the Defendant contested, averring that the Claimant was not employed by it, neither is there any contractual nexus with them. The Defendants contend that upon the dissolution of the ministry, its employees, including the Claimant were redeployed to the Federal Civil Service Commission, as provided for in the FCT (Establishment of Functionaries and Departments) and Ministry of the Federal Capital (Dissolution) Order No. 1 of 2004 (Exhibit D1).

[61] It follows that the crux of the dispute centres on whether an employment relationship subsists between the Claimant and the FCTA, and whether the Claimant is entitled to reliefs sought.

Accordingly, I have carefully reviewed Exhibit D1, deeming it pivotal to the resolution of this case. Relevant excerpt are hereby reproduced below:

3. The administrative and bureaucratic structure established and referred to as Dissolution of the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory is hereby abolished with effect from 31st the Ministry. December, 2004.
4. Consequently, and subject to paragraph 5 below, with effect from the commencement of this Order :
(a) Steps shall immediately be taken to wind up and cease altogether the activities carried on by the various Departments and sub-units of the Ministry (howsoever called) ;
(b) All officers of the Civil Service of the Federation posted or seconded to the Ministry or to the FCDA shall, on a date to be determined by the Minister, be posted to the Office of the Head of Service of the Federation or de-seconded to their previous postings without further assurance or Order; and
(c) The duties, functions, responsibilities, powers, rights, privileges, assets and liabilities previously conferred on the Ministry are hereby transferred to the FCDA and other agencies created under these Regulations without further assurance or Order.

(Emphasis mine)

[62] Upon meticulous examination of the evidence, I find that the determinative issue is whether an employment relationship exists between the Claimant and the Defendants. The relevant provision, Section 4(b) of Exhibit DI, stipulates that officers seconded or posted to the ministry or Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) shall be returned to the Office of the Head of Civil Service or their previous postings upon dissolution. I find this provision to be without ambiguity and therefore to be given its literal interpretation. See UWAZURIKE V. AGF (2007) 2 SCNJ 369 @ 378, ISHOLA-WILLIAMS V. T.A. HAMMOND PROJECT LTD (1988) 2 SCNJ 318, JUKOK INTERNATIONAL LTD V. DIAMOND BANK PLC (2016) 6 NWLR (PT. 1507) 55 CA. Accordingly, I construe this provision to mean that it applies only to employees who were seconded to the ministry, and not to those directly employed by it. The Claimant, having been directly employed by the ministry (Exhibit A), does not fall within the ambit of Section 4(b). Consequently, the Defendant's contention that the Claimant's records were transferred to the Federal Civil Service Commission is untenable.
[63] Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Defendant complied with Section 4(b), and even if there was, such action would be ultra vires and void. I hold that the Claimant's employment with the ministry subsisted, and by operation of Section 4(c) of Exhibit D1, the FCDA succeeded to the ministry's liabilities, including the employment contract with the Claimant. Therefore, I find that the Claimant's employment was transferred to the FCDA, which now bears the responsibility as his employer, with the power to post him to any of its agencies or departments.

[64] Stemming from the foregoing, I have also concluded that the Claimant's employment, being one governed by the Civil Service Rules, is imbued with statutory flavour, thereby enjoying a special status beyond the ordinary master-servant relationship. The employment relationship between the Claimant and the Ministry (now FCDA) which is regulated by statute requires strict adherence to laid-down procedures. See OLORUTOBA-OJU V. ABDUL-RAHEEM (2009) ALL FWLR (PT. 497) 1 @ 46-47. In the absence of any evidence to prove that the purported transfer of the defunct ministry’s employees to the Federal Civil Service Commission or Head of Service as claimed by the Defendants is in compliance with any Rule or Regulation, I find that the employment of the Claimant is still subsisting with the current employer being the FCDA. In addition, I am minded to emphasise that the parties herein have not alluded or led evidence to the effect that the employment of the Claimant was terminated thereby laying credence to the holding of this Court that the employment of the Claimant with the FCDA subsists.

[65] Incidentally, in the course of evaluation of the evidence, I noted that the Claimant's employment commenced in August 1989 (Exhibit A). In Nigeria’s Public Service, compulsory retirement age is 60 (sixty) years or 35 (Thirty-Five) years of pensionable service, whichever comes first (see PSR 020908). Assuming without holding that the Claimant has not attained the compulsory retirement age of 60, it would then be correct to hold that his employment elapsed due to mandatory retirement provisions of the PSR as he would then have obtained 35 years in service on 1^st August 2024 (exhibit A). In this circumstance, I find that an order of reinstatement is not tenable. I hold that the Claimant's employment subsisted, up until the date of his mandatory retirement whichever came first. Consequently, I declare that the Claimant is entitled to arrears of salaries, allowances, and benefits from the date of stoppage of his salary to the date of mandatory retirement. I so hold.

[66] In addition to the foregoing, I acknowledge and reiterate that pursuant to Section 4c of the Order, the Claimant’s employment has been transferred to the FCDA, a non-party to these proceedings. Notwithstanding this, I take cognizance of the fact that the Minister of FCT, as the apex administrator of the FCDA’s affairs, bears the responsibility of ensuring that the directives and orders emanating from this judgment are duly complied with and implemented.

[67] On issue of promotion, it is trite that promotion is not automatic but must be earned; it is a privilege and not a right. More so, the criteria for promotion varies from one organisation to another, consequently, the Court cannot interfere in the internal administration of an organisation. See MAMMAN V. ICPC (2021) LPELR-56683 (CA) P. 36-37, PARAS F-C, ABENGA V. BENUE STATE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION (2006) 14 NWLR (PT. 1000) 610 @ 622, PARAS F-A, SPDC V. NWAKA (2001) 10 NWLR (PT. 720) 64 @ 84 PARAS D-E. The claim for promotion therefore fails. I so hold

[68] The Claimant as can be seen in relief v is seeking for damages for loss of income from his farm. This is a fact and claim that is not supported by any iota of evidence. It is the law that facts asserted but not proved are deemed abandoned. See MOHAMMED V. KLARGESTER (NIG.) LTD (2002) 14 NWLR (PT. 787) 335 SC, B.S. (NIG) LTD V. OMETRACO LTD (2011) 10 NWLR (PT. 1255) 290 @ 303 PARA E. Thus, the claim, fails.

[69] With regard to relief vi, it is pertinent to state that the origin of this case is that by a complaint of the Minister of FCT, the Claimant among others was arrested for alleged criminal offence and faced criminal proceedings from 2003 -2022. He was eventually discharged and acquitted in 2022; a span of 19 years. As unfortunate as the ordeal of the Claimant is, I cannot place the Defendant in the position to make up for the lost years as there are no facts to indict the Defendant either for malicious prosecution or action in bad faith or even occasioning the delay as criminal proceedings are not within the purview of the power and control of the Defendants. I so hold.

[70] For all that have been said above, this suit succeeds partially and is hereby determined as follows:

Reliefs iv and vii succeed

Relief i succeeds in part

Reliefs ii, iii, v, and vi fail

It is hereby declared and/or ordered as follows:

i. Claimant’s employment subsisted from September 2003 when his salary was stopped till when he would have ordinarily been due for retirement.

ii. The prayer for reinstatement is not granted because claimant’s employment was never terminated and has now elapsed by way of mandatory retirement.

iii. It is hereby ordered that the 1^st Defendant shall pay to the Claimant accrued salaries, allowances and benefits from September 2003 (date of stoppage of salary) to date of mandatory retirement.

iv. The sum of N500, 000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) is hereby awarded in favour of the Claimant as cost of litigation in favour of the Claimant; the 1^st Defendant is hereby ordered to pay same.

Judgment is hereby entered.

________________________

Hon. Justice R.B. Haastrup

Judge