IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT LAGOS

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, HON. JUSTICE IKECHI GERALD NWENEKA

Date: Tuesday, 13th January 2025                     SUIT NO. NICN/LA/172/2023

BETWEEN

HASSAN AHMED                                   …              CLAIMANT

AND

FLYFORVALUE AVIATION LIMITED                       …                         DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT

1.       The Claimant initiated this suit on 14th June 2023, and seeks:

2.       Upon receiving the originating process, the Defendant entered an appearance and filed a statement of defence on 14th July 2023. The Claimant replied on 22nd September 2023. The defence processes were regularised on 9th November 2023. The trial commenced and concluded on 21st February 2024. During the trial, the Claimant testified in support of his claims and tendered three exhibits. He was then cross-examined and re-examined. The Defendant’s witness and Chief Security Officer, Mr. Adeniyi Taiwo Adekala, also testified in defence of the suit, tendered three exhibits, and was cross-examined. Following the testimonies, the suit was adjourned to adopt final written addresses. Both parties exchanged their final written addresses, which their counsel adopted on 27th November 2025, after which the matter was set down for judgment.

 Brief facts of the case

3.       The Claimant asserts that he was employed by the Defendant and began his employment with a six-month probationary period. After successfully completing this probation, his employment was deemed confirmed. However, on 14th April 2023, his employment was terminated based on a red alert that was never communicated to him, thereby violating his right to a fair hearing. As a result of the Defendant’s actions, the Claimant experienced economic loss, mental distress, and reputational damage and has been unable to find new employment, which has led to this lawsuit. The Defendant denies any wrongdoing, disclaims liability, and requests that the Court dismiss the suit for failure to disclose any reasonable cause of action.

 Summary of final written addresses

4.       The learned counsel for the Defendant raised two issues for determination in the final written address filed on 5th March 2024:

          a.        Whether the contract of employment between the Claimant and the Defendant was validly and lawfully terminated?

          b.        Whether the Claimant has made a case to be entitled to any of the reliefs sought from this Honourable Court?

5.       Before arguing the issues, the learned counsel raised an objection to paragraphs 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 of the Claimant’s further witness deposition. The objection was based on a breach of Section 115 of the Evidence Act, 2011, as amended (“the Evidence Act”). The counsel argued that these paragraphs contained arguments and conclusions that rendered them incompetent and subject to being struck out. The learned counsel referenced Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt 18) 621 at 641 in support, and urged the Court to uphold the objection.  

6.       Counsel submits that the relationship between the parties is regulated by Exhibit 1, and the duty of the Court is to give effect to the specified terms, citing Cannitec International Company Ltd v. Solel Boneh Nig. Ltd [2017] 10 NWLR (Pt 1572) 66 at 79. It was argued that generally an employer can terminate without reason, but where a reason is stated, that reason must be justified, relying on Ifeta v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. Nigeria Limited [2006] 8 NWLR (Pt 983) 588 at 606 and Shonaike v. Bras Ventures Limited [2015] 64 NLLR (Pt 225) 75-76. Counsel contends that the Defendant relied on Exhibit D2 to terminate the Claimant’s employment. It was further argued that, contrary to the Claimant’s allegation of victimisation, the background check on the Claimant was conducted alongside those of other staff members. Counsel submitted that the findings in Exhibit D2 were not challenged by the Claimant, and the Court is bound to accept the evidence, resting on Monkoma v. Odika [2010] 2 NWLR (Pt 1179) 419. The learned counsel contended that Exhibit 3 is not evidence of the Claimant’s identity and lacks evidential value. In response to the Claimant’s allegation of a breach of fair hearing, counsel relied on the case Nigerian Society of Engineers v. Mrs. Bimbo Ozah [2016] NLLR (Pt 225) 1 at 35-36, and submits that since the Claimant’s employment was terminated during the probationary period, the disciplinary procedure was not applicable. Counsel also noted that Exhibit 1 provides for summary dismissal without benefits. Referring to Section 167[d] of the Evidence Act, counsel submits that, based on the evidence before the Court, it is presumed that the Claimant was aware of the red alert against him and chose to withhold that information. Therefore, counsel concludes that the Claimant's employment was validly terminated in accordance with the employment contract and international best practices.

7.       In arguing the second issue, the learned counsel reiterated his arguments on issue one and stated that the Claimant has not sufficiently demonstrated wrongful termination of his employment. Counsel argued that the Claimant lacks credibility as a witness, citing the case of Oguntayo v. Adebutu [1997] 12 NWLR (Pt 531) 81 at 94 as support. He also contended that the Claimant has not established any entitlement to $40,000 in damages, explaining that in employment cases like this, an employee is only entitled to what he would have earned during the notice period, referencing Oforishe v. NGC Ltd [2018] 2 NWLR (Pt 1602) 35 at 61 and Garuba v. Kwara Investment Co. Ltd [2005] 5 NWLR (Pt 917) 160 at 179. Additionally, the learned counsel contended that the N5,000,000 requested for the cost of the action and solicitors’ fees is unproven, urging the Court to deny this claim. Regarding interest, counsel argued that a party seeking interest must both plead and prove its entitlement, referencing Sani Abacha Foundation for Peace & Unity v. United Bank for Africa Plc [2010] 17 NWLR (Pt 1221) 192 at 201. Counsel concluded that since the Claimant has failed to substantiate his case, it follows that the suit lacks merit and should be dismissed. The Court was urged to rule accordingly.

8.       Learned counsel for the Claimant nominated three issues for determination in the final written address filed on 18th April 2024:

a.       Whether the Claimant's probationary period was still in effect at the time of the termination of his employment? 

b.       Whether the Claimant’s employment was unjustly and unlawfully terminated on grounds of an unfounded and unsubstantiated allegation? 

c.       Whether the Claimant is entitled to the sum of four hundred thousand United States dollars [$400,000] or to any other sum that the Honourable Court may award as damages and all other consequential/incidental costs for the malicious, wrongful, and unlawful termination of the Claimant’s employment?

9.       In response to the Defendant's objection concerning specific paragraphs of the Claimant's additional evidence, the learned counsel argued that the rules governing affidavits under the Evidence Act do not apply to a witness statement on oath, referencing the case of Samuel Lambert & Anor v. Chief A.S.B.C. Okujaghu [2015] ALL FWLR (Pt 808) in support. The Court was urged to disregard the objection.

10.     In addressing the first issue, the learned counsel argued that when an employer fails to appraise an employee at the end of the probationary period and does not either confirm the employment in writing, terminate it, or communicate an extension of the probation, the employee's continued presence at work leads to the automatic confirmation of his employment, as illustrated in several cases, including University of Jos v. Ikegwuoha [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt 1360) 478, Iwuji v. Federal Commissioner for Establishments [1985] 1 NSCC 580, Raji v. Obafemi Awolowo University [2014] LPELR-22088[CA], and Reliance Communications Ltd v. Adegboyega [2017] 8 NWLR (Pt 1567). The counsel reviewed Exhibits 1 and 2, along with the evidence of the Defendant’s witness during cross-examination, and contended that the Claimant's employment was wrongfully terminated after the probationary period, at which point the employment should have been deemed confirmed. This situation constitutes an unfair labour practice, as established in Back Taylek Drugs Co. Ltd v. Onankpa [2018] LPELR-45882[CA]. The Court was urged to hold that the Claimant’s employment was confirmed at the time of termination.

11.   In addressing the second issue, and referencing Exhibits 1, 2, and D3, as well as the cases of International Drilling Co. v. Ajijola [1976] 2 SC 115 and Ajayi v. Texaco [Nig.] In Ltd [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt 62) 577, the learned counsel argued that when an employment contract includes a provision for termination, the parties cannot seek other applicable termination provisions. The counsel emphasised paragraph 1 of Exhibit 1 and paragraphs 15.5, 9.4.1-9.4.3 of Exhibit D3, arguing that the Claimant's employment was terminated in violation of the Defendant's disciplinary procedures. Furthermore, it was argued that when an employee is dismissed for gross misconduct, such dismissal cannot be justified without a fair hearing. Counsel indicated that if there are allegations of gross misconduct involving a crime, the employee must be granted a fair hearing, as established in Yusuf v. U.B.N. Ltd [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt 457) 632 and Olatunbosun v. NISER Council [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt 80) 25. The Court was urged to conclude that the Claimant's employment was unjustly and unlawfully terminated based on unfounded and unsubstantiated allegations, in direct contradiction to applicable laws in Nigeria and international best practices in labour and employment. Counsel argued under issue three that the Claimant is entitled to damages for the wrongful termination of his employment. Referencing Sections 14 and 19 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, as well as the case of Sahara Energy Resources Limited v. Oyebola [2020] LPELR-51806[CA], the Court was urged to award damages and costs, resolving the issues in favour of the Claimant. In conclusion, the learned counsel submitted that the Claimant's employment was effectively confirmed at the time of the wrongful termination, entitling him to damages and other related reliefs. The Court was also urged to disregard the Defendant's defence in the interest of justice.

          Preliminary issue

12.     The Defendant objected to paragraphs 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 of the Claimant’s additional sworn statement for breaching Section 115 of the Evidence Act, thereby rendering it incompetent. The Claimant responds that the provisions of Section 115 of the Evidence Act on affidavits do not apply to a witness statement on oath. 

13.   Since the introduction of the front-loading system, the relationship between a witness statement on oath and an affidavit has been a subject of controversy. Although an affidavit and a witness statement on oath are statements of facts which the deponent swears to be true, both forms of evidence are remarkably different. An affidavit is documentary evidence that the Court can admit in the absence of any contrary evidence. It is complete upon deposition and does not require cross-examination except in cases of conflict in affidavit evidence, where oral evidence will be required to resolve the conflict. A witness statement, on the other hand, is not evidence. It is merely a statement on oath that becomes evidence only after the witness is sworn in Court and adopts it as his evidence. At that point, it becomes his evidence in chief, which is then subjected to cross-examination. Please refer to Udeagha & Anor v. Omegara & Ors [2010] LPELR-3856[CA] 19, Okpa v. Irek & Anor [2012] LPELR-8033[CA] 9 and Onyenwe & Anor v. Anaejionu [2014] LPELR-22495[CA] 30-31. 

14. Additionally, the Evidence Act regulates affidavits, while the Rules of Court regulate statements on oath. Orders 3, Rule 9[c], and 15, Rule 1[1][d] of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria [Civil Procedure] Rules, 2017 [“the Rules”] merely state that the complaint or statement of defence and counterclaim [if any] shall be accompanied by a written statement on oath of all witnesses listed to be called by the party concerned. Order 41, Rule 11 of the Rules, dealing with affidavits, stipulates that the “Provisions of Sections 107 to 120 of the Evidence Act, which set out the provisions governing Affidavit, shall be applicable under these Rules.” Clearly, the Rules do not specify the content of a witness statement on oath, but Section 115 of the Evidence Act sets out the content of an affidavit.  It is an elementary rule of statutory interpretation that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of matters not mentioned. See Asikpo & Anor v. Etuk & Ors [2011] LPELR-4050[CA] 30. The case of Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu [supra] cited by the Defendant deals with affidavit evidence, not witness statements on oath, and is therefore inapplicable. 

15.     However, in my respectful view, since a witness statement on oath is an accompaniment to a pleading, the rules of pleadings must apply to it. Order 30, Rules 3[1] of the Rules, provides that “Every pleading shall contain a statement in summary form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for the party’s claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved and shall, when necessary be divided into paragraphs and numbered consecutively.” Order 30, Rule 11 of the Rules, provides that “Whenever the contents of any documents are material, it shall be sufficient in any pleading to state the effect of the document[s] as briefly as possible, without setting out the whole or any part [of] the document[s], unless the precise words of the document or any part of the same are material.” 

16.     It is trite law that pleadings must contain only facts, material facts, and not evidence, arguments, conclusions, inferences, and submissions, as established in precedent, including Attorney-General of Anambra State v. C. N. Onuselogu Enterprises Ltd [1987] LPELR-614[SC] 20, Usman v. Garke [1999] 1 NWLR (Pt 587) 466 at 481-482, Nwanji v. Coastal Services Nigeria Ltd [2004] LPELR-2106[SC] 22, Alibo & Ors v. Okusin & Ors [2010] 3-5 SC (Pt I) 41 at 62, Buhari v. INEC & Ors [2008] 4 NWLR (Pt 1078) 546 at 623 623, Takuma & Anor v. Liman & Ors [2009] LPELR-5000[CA] 18, Sanni-Omotosho v. Obidairo [2014] LPELR-23006[CA] 27-28 and Addison United Nigeria Limited v. Lion of Africa Insurance Limited [2010] LPELR-3596[CA] 29. In Usman v. Garke [supra], Edozie, JCA [as he then was], posited that “Every pleading must contain facts, not law. Although a party may raise a point of law in his pleading, he is not permitted to plead conclusions of law or of mixed fact and law…. Applying the above principles to the case in hand, it is plain to me that a great deal of the averments in the paragraphs of the statement of defence under consideration consist of legal conclusions and not facts, and to that extent the averments are violative of the rules of pleading.” 

17.     In my view, a witness statement on oath should focus on the facts presented in the statement of facts or defence rather than on legal arguments or conclusions. Those aspects are reserved for the final written address. Please refer to the unreported case of Continental Reinsurance Plc v. Mr. Kanma Maduka Okafor, Suit No. NICN/LA/647/2016, judgment delivered on 23rd January 2020, pages 22 and 23. After carefully reviewing the disputed paragraphs of the Claimant's additional sworn statement, I found that paragraphs 2, 3, and 8 contain legal arguments and are therefore not appropriate for a witness statement on oath. As a result, these paragraphs are struck out. However, I did not find any issues with paragraphs 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15. Consequently, I hold that those paragraphs of the Claimant's additional sworn statement are valid. The objection is partially upheld. 

          Issue for determination

18.     The sole issue for determination in this case is whether the Claimant is entitled to judgment as claimed. The law is trite that whoever desires the Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. By the combined force of Sections 131, 132, 133, 134, and 136[1] of the Evidence Act, the Claimant bears the initial burden of proving the pleaded facts on the balance of probabilities.  The Claimant must succeed on the strength of his case, not on the weakness of the defence, absence of defence, or admission by the Defendant. If the Claimant fails to discharge this burden satisfactorily, his claims will be dismissed without considering the Defendant's case, as the Defendant is not required to prove its defence under these circumstances. In such a situation, there would be no evidence to rebut, leading to a judgment against the Claimant for lack of evidence. Please refer to Adama & Ors v. Kogi State House of Assembly & Ors [2019] 16 NWLR (Pt 1699) 501 at 531, Igwenagu v. Hon. Minister, Federal Capital Territory & Ors [2025] 7 NWLR (Pt 1988) 145 at 173-174, Nsude & Ors v. Nichodemus & Ors [2025] 4 NWLR (Pt 1982) 253 at 280, and Nduul v. Wayo & Ors [2018] LPELR-45151[SC] 51-53.

19.     Additionally, the Claimant who seeks declaratory relief must demonstrate entitlement to the declaration by credible evidence and will succeed on the strength of his case, not on the weakness of the defence or admission by the Defendant. Since granting declaratory relief involves the exercise of the Court’s discretion, the Claimant must place sufficient materials before the Court to justify the declaration, as noted in U.T.C. Nigeria Plc v. Peters [2022] 18 NWLR (Pt 1862) 297 at 312, 313, and Osho v. Adeleye & Ors [2024] 8 NWLR (Pt 1941) 431 at 452. 

20.     Furthermore, in resolving employment disputes, the Court will refer to the employment contract and any other stipulations that are incorporated, or deemed to have been incorporated, into the contract, as stated in Gbedu & Ors v. Itie & Ors [2020] 3 NWLR (Pt 1710) 104 at 126. The employment contract serves as the foundation for any action taken in the event of a breach. The success of the case hinges entirely on the terms agreed upon, or deemed to have been agreed upon, by the parties involved, as illustrated in Gyubok v. The Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi & Anor [2024] 16 NWLR (Pt 1965) 515 at 549.

21.     Generally, an employer has the inherent right to terminate an employee's services, whether the employment is protected by law or governed by contract. However, when an employer chooses to disengage an employee, it is crucial that it complies with the terms and conditions outlined in the employee's contract of employment. Failing to adhere to these terms may result in wrongful termination, for which the employer could be held liable for damages. Please refer to Oforishe v. Nigerian Gas Company Ltd [2018] 2 NWLR (Pt 1602) 35 at 53-54, 61; Ovivie & Ors v. Delta Steel Company Limited [2023] 14 NWLR (Pt 1904) 203 at 229, 236; and Dangote Cement Plc v. Ager & Anor [2024] 10 NWLR (Pt 1945) 1 at 36. An employee who claims his employment was wrongfully terminated bears the responsibility of pleading the terms and conditions of his employment contract and demonstrating how the employer breached them, as noted in Sections 131[1] and 136[1] of the Evidence Act, and the cases of Onwusukwu v. Civil Service Commission [2020] 10 NWLR (Pt 1731) 179 at 200, 201, U.T.C Nigeria Plc v. Peters [2022] 18 NWLR (Pt 1862) 297 at 320, Ovivie & Ors v. Delta Steel Company Limited [2023] LPELR-60460[SC] 9-10, and Benue Brewery Limited v. Okonta [2024] LPELR-61878[CA] 8. 

          Summary of evidence

22. The Claimant sought six reliefs, testified, and tendered three documents, which were marked as Exhibits 1 to 3. These are: the Claimant’s employment letter dated 28th September 2022, a termination letter dated 14th April 2023, and a DBS report. The Claimant's evidence is that he is a British citizen who was employed by the Defendant as a Senior First Officer in the Defendant’s Flight Operations Department under a contract of employment dated 28th September 2022, effective from 4th October 2022. He worked as an aircraft Captain, reporting to the Defendant's Fleet Manager and/or Chief Pilot. His annual remuneration was $48,000 (forty-eight thousand United States dollars), excluding other fringe benefits such as per diem allowance, accommodation, and medical coverage. According to the contract of employment, he was placed on a six-month probationary period, which could be extended at the Defendant's discretion for up to three additional months upon written notice to him. Upon completing the six-month probationary period on 5th April 2023, his employment with the Defendant was deemed confirmed since no written notice was issued to him extending the probationary period for reasons related to his performance or any other matters. Throughout his employment, he diligently carried out his duties as a Captain and received commendations for his outstanding contributions to the Defendant.

23.     Despite his excellent performance and record, his employment was terminated by a letter dated 14th April 2023, which he alleged was based on a “red alert” connected to his name. The Claimant insists that the red alert, stemming from an alleged statutory background check, was a ruse and an act of victimisation by the Defendant. Before receiving the termination letter, he was not informed of any due diligence or background checks conducted on him, and was never notified of any purported red alert. Furthermore, he was not confronted with any report against his personal or professional integrity, nor was he invited to any disciplinary panel before the termination letter was issued. The Claimant asserts that he has no criminal record and has never travelled to the United States. He also states that no country, security agency, employer, or individual has placed a red alert on his name. To substantiate his claims, he wrote to the National Central Bureau (Interpol) at the Nigeria Police Force's headquarters in Abuja, FCT, and found no record of any red alert issued against him by the United States or any other country.

24.     Following the termination letter, he was promptly logged off the Defendant’s network system and directed to return all company properties in his possession, exiting effective 14th April 2023. To avoid embarrassment and harm to himself, he complied with this directive. As a result of the unjust and abrupt termination of his employment, he has suffered significant economic loss, hardship, mental distress, and reputational damage. The allegations made against him have made it challenging for him to secure another job as a pilot. Consequently, he has been forced to withdraw from his retirement savings to support himself and his family and meet basic needs. The Claimant stated that under international employment and labour law, an employee’s contract should not be terminated without a valid reason related to his capacity, conduct, or operational requirements of the establishment. None of these critical elements is present in his termination, which he claims amounts to an unfair labour practice. He has filed this suit before this Honourable Court, believing that the judiciary is the last hope for the common man, and seeks the reliefs outlined in the statement of facts.

25.     In the additional sworn statement, the Claimant reiterated his evidence that his employment was for a six-month probationary period, which could be extended at the Defendant's discretion by up to three months, provided that written notice was issued to him. He stated that upon completing the six-month probationary period, his employment was confirmed on 5th April 2023, since no written notice had been issued to extend the probation period for any reason related to his performance or conduct as a Senior First Officer. The Claimant maintained that the effective date of his employment commencement was 4th October 2022, as stated in his contract. He claimed to have performed his duties as a Senior First Officer diligently, with no complaints regarding his character, competence, or integrity. Furthermore, he stated that the red notice issued against him by the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) was a deceptive tactic and an act of victimisation by the Defendant. The Claimant claimed that he was never made aware of the red notice, thereby denying him the opportunity to defend himself and to uphold his constitutional right to a fair hearing. He expressed concern that the name "Ahmed Hassan" is both generic and widely used, increasing the risk of reputational harm if the alleged red alert stems from mistaken identity or fabrication. The Claimant denied being a security threat to the Defendant, its customers, or anyone else, noting that he has no criminal record and has never been questioned or arrested during his global travels. He provided all necessary background information, including integrity and credibility, to the Defendant during the recruitment process. He also noted that his right to a fair hearing would not have been denied if the Defendant had complied with regulatory frameworks and international best practices in the aviation sector. He asserted that he had not misrepresented or withheld any information from the Defendant, affirming that the red alert was an allegation he was denied the chance to contest before his unlawful summary dismissal. Therefore, he is entitled to the relief sought, and he requests that the Court grant his claims while rejecting the Defendant's defence.

26.     During cross-examination, the Claimant confirmed that he is a citizen of the United Kingdom and was born in Sudan. He holds both Sudanese and UK passports. When shown Exhibit 3, he read the last sentence of the second paragraph under "Use of Certificate Information." He stated that his employment was not terminated for the reasons listed in the DBS report. When asked if the DBS report pertains only to the UK and does not relate to any other country, he replied that the report can only be obtained in the UK. He confirmed that it is a UK document and explained that it is the only form of verification available in the UK. While reviewing Exhibit 1, the letter of employment on page 3, he acknowledged that he signed below the first paragraph. During re-examination, the Claimant reiterated that the DBS check is conducted only in the UK, but since it is part of the police system, it can be accessed internationally.

27.     The Defendant's witness and Chief Security Officer, Mr. Adeniyi Taiwo Adekala, testified that the Claimant's employment was never deemed confirmed on 5th April 2022, given that it became effective on 9th October 2022. The employment relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant is that of master and servant. According to him, the Defendant is obligated to comply with the established regulations governing its operations in the aviation industry, as it is a commercial flight operator regulated by relevant agencies and international best practices. After the selection process was completed, the Claimant was placed on probation to allow the Defendant to assess his competence and suitability, and to verify the authenticity of certain representations made by the Claimant during the selection process. As a condition for confirming the Claimant's employment, a request was made to the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) to conduct background checks on all its Flight Operators. On 28th March 2023, the report on these background checks was provided to the Defendant; however, only the Claimant's name appeared negatively among all others checked. The red-flag report from INTERPOL regarding the Claimant constitutes a significant security risk to both the Defendant and its numerous customers, locally and globally. Mr. Adekala stated that the Claimant's failure to disclose information during the selection process is grounds for summary dismissal, as explicitly stated in the employment letter. He denied that the termination of the Claimant's employment was driven by any vendetta, clarifying that it was carried out in accordance with regulatory frameworks and international best practices in the aviation sector. Mr. Adekala emphasised that the Claimant was aware of the provisions in his contract, which state: “Under this Agreement, any fraudulent act by the employee, including misrepresentation or withholding of information during the recruitment process, constitutes grounds for summary dismissal without benefits.” Consequently, the Claimant's employment was terminated in accordance with the terms of the contract. The Defendant asserts that the Claimant is not entitled to any of the reliefs sought and maintains that the Claimant’s claims do not present a reasonable cause of action. The Defendant therefore requests that the Court dismiss the Claimant’s claims with substantial costs for being provocative, baseless, malicious, unfounded, frivolous, and brought in bad faith.

28.     During cross-examination, Mr. Adekala confirmed that he is the Defendant’s Chief Security Officer (CSO) and has been with the company since 1st June 2022. He explained that his responsibilities include conducting background checks on staff the company intends to hire, ensuring that hired personnel are safe and secure, and preventing tampering with company property. He also organises staff training, collaborates with other security agencies on security-related matters, formulates policies and procedures for flight operations, and performs any other tasks assigned by the CEO. Mr. Adekala stated that he does not personally know the Claimant. When shown Exhibit D2, he read paragraphs 2 and 3. When asked whether there was anything in those paragraphs suggesting criminal action, Mr. Adekala explained that if someone has a red notice, the company cannot employ that individual. Being on a red notice necessitates caution. According to the national security policy, the Defendant is prohibited from hiring that person. Upon reviewing paragraph 3 of Exhibit D2, Mr. Adekala indicated that he does not possess copies of any further inquiry but is aware of the generic name. He mentioned that the letter from Interpol was communicated to the Claimant through HR; however, there is no evidence of this communication in the Court record. When asked whether there was any evidence that the Claimant faced a disciplinary panel, Mr. Adekala replied that the staff member was not in Nigeria and that communication was directed to HR, which then sent him an email. He was shown Exhibit 1, read paragraph 4 regarding probation, observed the commencement date of employment, reviewed Exhibit 2 on termination of employment, and confirmed that the employment lasted for more than six months. When asked whether there was evidence that the probationary period was extended, Mr. Adekala stated that the contract was not extended and that there was no basis for any extension. He was then shown Exhibit 2 and compared it with the employment letter, specifically the first paragraph on page 3. He noted that both Exhibit 2 and paragraph 1 on page 3 of Exhibit 1 were referred to, and he read paragraph 3 of Exhibit 2.

          Evaluation of evidence

29.     I have thoroughly reviewed and assessed the evidence presented by both parties, both oral and documentary. The Claimant seeks several declarations and damages for the wrongful termination of his employment. He tendered three exhibits, which have been outlined in this judgment. The Defendant also tendered three exhibits. The documents that regulate the employment relationship are the employment letter and employee handbook, Exhibits 1 and D3. It is accepted by both parties that the Claimant was employed by the Defendant by letter dated 28th September 2022, and assumed duty on 4th October 2022. They also agree that the Claimant's employment was summarily terminated on 14th April 2023 based on the Nigerian Interpol report of a red alert on his name by the United States of America, without prior notice or any payment in lieu of notice. The dispute centres on whether the Claimant’s employment was wrongfully terminated, and whether the Claimant’s employment was impliedly confirmed.

          Was the Claimant’s employment deemed confirmed?

30.     This is the fulcrum around which the Claimant’s case revolves. The supporting evidence is found in paragraph 8 of the Claimant’s sworn statement and paragraph 5 of his additional sworn statement to the effect that upon completing the probationary period, his employment was deemed confirmed on 5th April 2023, as there was no written notice whatsoever extending the probationary period. The Defendant denied this, and stated in paragraph 8 of its witness’s sworn statement, that the Claimant’s employment was not deemed confirmed on 5th April 2023, as the effective date of the Claimant’s resumption of duties was 9th October 2022. The Defendant argued in the final written address that the Claimant’s employment was terminated during the probationary period. As a result, the grievance procedure does not apply. Additionally, the Defendant argued that nothing in the employment letter mandates it to first notify the Claimant of the allegation against him and hear his defence before taking a decision. In contrast, the Claimant contended that his employment was deemed confirmed when it was terminated, given that there was no notice of an extension of the probationary period. 

31. The concept of deemed or implied confirmation of appointment is entrenched in our jurisprudence. It is based on the principle that delay defeats equity. In Obafemi Awolowo University v. Onabanjo [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt 193) 549 at 570, Akpabio, JCA [as he then was], expressed the principle in these words, “By keeping him in his employment and continuing to pay him for four months after the probationary period of three years had expired, they would be deemed by operation of law to have confirmed his appointment, and the doctrine of "estoppel by conduct" would operate to prevent the appellant from alleging and treating him as if he was still on probation. ‘Delay defeats Equity’.” This decision was applied in Raji v. Obafemi Awolowo University [2018] 12 ACELR 158 at 163-164. However, this does not mean that if employment is not confirmed after the probationary period ends, a presumption of 'deemed confirmation' will automatically apply. Each case must be decided based on its specific facts. The settled principle of law is that a case serves as authority for another case only based on what it decided regarding the facts and circumstances in issue. Please refer to Bababe v. Federal Republic of Nigeria [2018] 7-10 SC 1 at 29 and Brittania-U Nigeria Limited v. Seplat Petroleum Development Company Limited & Ors [2016] 4 NWLR (Pt 1503) 541 at 598-599. Additionally, a case can be a binding precedent only if the facts in the case are on all fours with those of the case under consideration, as noted in Ekwunife v. Ngene [2000] 2 NWLR (Pt 646) 650 at 667 and Aduku v. Federal Republic of Nigeria & Ors [2009] 9 NWLR (Pt 1146) 370 at 387. 

32.     The employment letter, Exhibit 1, states: “The first six (6) months of your employment shall be a probationary period in which either party may terminate your employment by one (1-week notice in writing). The Company may at its discretion extend the probationary period by up to [three] months (e.g. if references remain outstanding) by informing you in writing.” The evidence shows that the Claimant assumed duty on 4th October 2022. The six-month probationary period ended on 4th April 2023. The Claimant’s employment was neither terminated nor confirmed, and there was no written notice from the Defendant extending the probationary period. However, the Claimant's employment was ultimately terminated on 14th April 2023, approximately ten days after the probationary period had expired. The key question is whether the Claimant's employment can be considered 'deemed confirmed' under these circumstances. I believe it cannot. While it is true that the Claimant continued to work until his employment was terminated, there is no evidence to suggest that the Claimant believed his employment was confirmed. Furthermore, the Defendant did not pay the Claimant any salary, which would typically raise the equitable presumption of estoppel by conduct. Whether the failure to formally confirm employment creates a presumption of 'deemed confirmation' is a question of fact. Each case must be considered based on its specific facts to determine if such a presumption is warranted. After thoroughly examining the evidence, I arrive at the undeniable conclusion that the Claimant's employment was not confirmed, either implicitly or explicitly.

           Is the termination of the Claimant’s employment wrongful?

33.     As noted in this judgment, an employer can terminate an employee's services, whether the employment is protected by law or governed by contract. However, when an employer chooses to disengage an employee, it is crucial that it complies with the terms and conditions outlined in the employee's contract of employment. Failing to adhere to these terms may result in wrongful termination, for which the employer could be held liable for damages, as illustrated in several cases, including Oforishe v. Nigerian Gas Company Ltd [supra] and Dangote Cement Plc v. Ager & Anor [supra]. Additionally, an employee who claims his employment was wrongfully terminated bears the burden of pleading the terms and conditions of his employment contract and demonstrating how the employer breached them, as stipulated in Sections 131[1] and 136[1] of the Evidence Act, and precedents such as U.T.C Nigeria Plc v. Peters [supra] and Benue Brewery Limited v. Okonta [supra].

34. The supporting facts are contained in paragraphs 10 to 13 of the Claimant’s sworn statement, and paragraph 14 of his additional evidence. The Claimant’s case is that, despite his excellent performance and record, his employment was terminated by a letter dated 14th April 2023, which he alleged was based on a “red alert” connected to his name. The Claimant insists that the red alert, stemming from an alleged statutory background check, was a ruse and an act of victimisation by the Defendant. Before receiving the termination letter, he was not informed of any due diligence or background checks conducted on him, and was never notified of any purported red alert. Furthermore, he was not confronted with any report against his personal or professional integrity, nor was he invited to any disciplinary panel before the termination letter was issued. He stated that his employment was summarily terminated without affording him a fair hearing. Clearly, the Claimant did not plead the terms of his employment or demonstrate how the Defendant breached them. However, he alleged that the Defendant denied him a fair hearing before the summary termination of his employment based on a red alert by the United States of America.

35. The rebuttal evidence is in paragraphs 11 to 21 of the Defendant’s witness’s sworn statement. The Defendant’s evidence is that it is obligated to comply with the established regulations governing its operations in the aviation industry, as it is a commercial flight operator regulated by relevant agencies and international best practices. After the selection process was completed, the Claimant was placed on probation to allow the Defendant to assess his competence and suitability, and to verify the authenticity of certain representations made by the Claimant during the selection process. As a condition for confirming the Claimant's employment, a request was made to the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) to conduct background checks on all its Flight Operators. On 28th March 2023, the report on these background checks was provided to the Defendant; however, only the Claimant's name appeared negatively among all others checked. The red-flag report from INTERPOL regarding the Claimant constitutes a significant security risk to both the Defendant and its numerous customers, locally and globally. The Defendant asserted that the Claimant's failure to disclose information during the selection process is grounds for summary dismissal, as explicitly stated in the employment letter. The Defendant denied that the termination of the Claimant's employment was driven by any vendetta, clarifying that it was carried out in accordance with regulatory frameworks and international best practices in the aviation sector. The Defendant emphasised that the Claimant was aware of the provisions in his contract, which state: “Under this Agreement, any fraudulent act by the employee, including misrepresentation or withholding of information during the recruitment process, constitutes grounds for summary dismissal without benefits.” Consequently, the Claimant's employment was terminated in accordance with the terms of the contract.  

36.     The arguments presented by both parties are detailed in this judgment. It is sufficient to state that the main point of the Defendant’s argument is that compliance with the grievance procedure outlined in Exhibit D3 was unnecessary, as the Claimant was still under probation when his employment was terminated. However, the Claimant disagrees and contends that he is entitled to a fair hearing before any termination of employment for cause. I agree with the Claimant's position. The termination of an employee’s appointment is a serious matter that demands careful consideration from those who manage personnel within an organisation. In the case of Olatunbosun v. Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research Council [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt 80) 25 at 52, Justice Oputa (of blessed memory) held that, “The right to a fair hearing will only arise where there is an allegation of misconduct which may result and in fact did result in some form of punishment, deprivation of some right or loss of means of livelihood to the Appellant. In every case of dismissal or termination of appointment which may vitally affect a man's career or his pension, in such a case, it is equally vitally important that the Appellant be given ample opportunity to defend his conduct.” 

37.     I have thoroughly reviewed the evidence presented by both parties, both oral and documentary. There is nothing in the employee handbook (Exhibit D3) that makes it inapplicable to an employee on probation. Clause 9.4.1 of the employee handbook states that the Defendant cannot exercise its disciplinary powers without providing the employee with a fair hearing. The Defendant claims to have received the Interpol report regarding the Claimant on 28th March 2023, but did not terminate the Claimant’s employment until 14th April 2023. Thus, the Defendant was not under any pressure to dismiss the Claimant. It had ample time to confront the Claimant with the Interpol findings and to allow him to respond before making a decision. Instead, the Defendant purportedly relied on a clause in the employment letter which states, “Under this agreement, any determined fraudulent act by the employee, including the misrepresentation or withholding of information through the recruitment process, amounts to summary dismissal without benefits.” First, there is nothing in the termination letter (Exhibit 2), indicating that the Defendant acted under that provision. Second, that provision does not justify the termination of the Claimant’s employment for cause without a fair hearing. It is crucial to note that evidence suggests the name Ahmed Hassan is common and generic in nature. Additionally, paragraph three of the Interpol report (Exhibit D2) indicates that further confirmation was ongoing and the process was not concluded before the termination of the Claimant’s employment. In light of these circumstances, I find that the Claimant’s employment was wrongfully terminated.

As a result, the sole issue for determination is resolved, in part, affirmatively and in part negatively.

Consideration of the reliefs 

38.     Relief one is for a declaration that the action of the Defendant in terminating the Claimant’s employment by a letter dated 14th April 2023 on grounds of a fabricated allegation relating to an unsubstantiated red alert against the Claimant was wrongful and unlawful. I found in this judgment that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was wrongful. I adopt my reasoning and conclusion in paragraphs 33 to 37 above, and hold that this claim has been established, and it is granted. 

39.     Relief two is for a declaration that the action of the Defendant in terminating the Claimant’s employment by a letter dated 14th April 2023 without first confronting or presenting the purported red alert to the Claimant for his defence amounts to denial of fair hearing and unfair labour practice which offends the principles of employment law and practice in Nigeria, as well as international best labour and employment practices as enforceable in Nigeria. This claim is connected to the first claim, which has been granted and should be successful as well. I found in this judgment that the Defendant did not accord the Claimant a fair hearing before terminating his employment. Therefore, I hold that this claim has been established, and it is granted.

40.   Relief three is for a declaration that the Claimant is entitled to adequate compensation for the wrongful and unlawful termination of his employment for no justifiable/valid cause. Although I found in this judgment that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was wrongful, it was with cause. Nonetheless, I am of the view that the Claimant is entitled to damages for the wrongful termination of his employment. By the agreement of the parties, the employment of a probationer may be terminated by notice or payment of salary in lieu of notice. The notice period is as specified in the employment letter. See clause 4.1 of the employee handbook. The employment letter specifies one week's written notice. It is well established that in resolving employment disputes, the Court will refer to the employment contract and any other stipulations that may have been incorporated into it. The employment contract serves as the foundation for any actions taken in the event of a breach. The success of this case is entirely dependent on the terms agreed upon, or those deemed to have been agreed upon, by both parties involved, as noted in Adekunle v. United Bank for Africa Plc [supra] and Umera v. Nigerian Railway Corporation [supra]. Thus, I find the Claimant is entitled to one week's salary as damages. Consequently, this claim is granted.

41.   Relief four is the sum of $400,000 (four hundred thousand United States dollars) as general damages and compensation for the malicious, wrongful, and unlawful termination of the Claimant’s employment. Damages are granted at the Court's discretion and are intended to compensate for losses caused by an adversary's actions, as seen in Nigerian Railway Corporation v. Ojo [2021] LPELR-55971[CA] 40-41 and Ecobank Nigeria Limited v. Saleh [2020] LPELR-52024[CA] 83-85. This Court has general powers under Section 19[d] of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, to award compensation or damages in any circumstance contemplated by the Act or any Act of the National Assembly dealing with any matter that the Court has jurisdiction to hear. However, granting damages is not automatic or routine. As an exercise of discretion, it must be supported by the facts and circumstances of the case. In Umera v. Nigerian Railway Corporation [2022] 10 NWLR (Pt 1838) 349 at 394, the Supreme Court, per Garba, JSC, restated the principle for award of damages in breach of contract of employment, thus: “This position, as it is, the lower court is also correct that in claims for breach of contract, either ordinary or for employment, award of damages depends on the terms and conditions of such a contract and the quantum assessed on the basis of the evidence of the facts and circumstances given rise to the breach of the agreement between the contracting parties. Where, for instance, the contract provides that the parties may determine it by way of notice of a specified nature and length or payment of money in lieu thereof, then in a claim for alleged wrongful termination of the employment, the law is now firmly established and settled that the quantum of damages a claimant would be entitled to is the sum or amount of money to be in lieu of the requisite notice for the proper determination of the employment.” 

42.     I am aware that in Skye Bank Plc v. Adegun [2024] 15 NWLR (Pt 1960) 1 at 29-30, the Supreme Court, per Agim, JSC, expanded this principle and held that, “Where a contract of employment is brought to an end by the employer contrary to the terms agreed therein, the quantum of damages awardable therefore cannot be based on the remuneration of the employee during the period of notice prescribed in the agreement for either party to terminate the agreement. The employer cannot enjoy the benefit he would have enjoyed if the contract had been brought to an end in accordance with the contract. Having brought the contract to an end in breach of the contract, the damages payable by it cannot be restricted to only one month's salary in lieu of notice, which is what it would have been liable to pay if it had terminated the employment as prescribed in the contract. To limit the damages payable by the employer to one month's salary in lieu of notice in this case would amount to enabling it to benefit from its wrongful act in breach of the contract. It is an inveterate rule of equity of great antiquity that equity will operate to prevent a party from benefiting from his or her wrongful act. It would be oppressive and unjust to the employee to award him or her damages on a basis prescribed in the contract of employment for termination of his employment in breach of that contract. Having brought his employment to an end outside the terms of the contract, the employer cannot restrict the quantum of damages awardable to the employee to the terms prescribed in the contract. The quantum of damages awardable to the employee in such a situation should be in accordance with the general law on contract on award of damages for breach of contract, which would involve a consideration of the consequential loss that has arisen or would arise from the breach of the contract of employment having regard to the monthly wage, current age of the employee and the due date of retirement.” 

43. Clearly, an award of damages beyond what is stipulated in the contract is not automatic. The party claiming a specific amount as damages must justify it. Where it is not justified, the Court will not grant it. General principles of law are guides, and what the Court does in each case is determined by the facts and circumstances. I found in this judgment that by the agreement of the parties, the employment of a probationer may be terminated by notice or payment of salary in lieu of notice. The notice period is as specified in the employment letter. This is as stated in clause 4.1 of the employee handbook, Exhibit D3. The employment letter, Exhibit 1, specifies one week's written notice. As a result, I determined that the Claimant is entitled to one week's salary in lieu of notice as damages. Although the Claimant claimed that he wrote to the National Central Bureau [Interpol] of the Nigeria Police Force in Abuja, and there is no record of any red alert issued by the United States of America, his letter to the Police and the Police report clearing him were not produced at the trial. Additionally, the Claimant’s salary was $48,000 per annum (paragraph 6 of the Claimant’s sworn statement and Exhibit 1). Given the evidence before me, I hold that the Claimant is entitled to $1,000, being one week’s salary in lieu of notice as damages. 

44.   The fifth claim is for ten percent [10%] interest [or as may be determined by this Honourable Court] per annum, on the above sum from the date of judgment until the judgment debt is fully liquidated. With due respect, I believe the Defendant is mistaken when it argued, in the final written address, that the Claimant must plead and prove his claim for interest. In Berliet Nigeria Ltd v. Kachalla [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt 420) 478 at 500, the Supreme Court, per Ogundare, JSC [as he then was], held that “there clearly is a difference between award of interest pre-judgment where plaintiff must specifically claim such and prove it and the award of interest on a judgment-debt which is purely statutory and can only be awarded if there are provisions to that effect in the law or rules of the court.” The Court of Appeal, per Omokri, JCA [as he then was], restated the principle governing award of post-judgment interest in M & B Electrical Company Ltd v. The Government of Cross River State & Ors [2005] 6 NWLR (Pt 922) 471 at 493, thus, “A post-judgment interest as its name implies is usually awarded by the court at the end of the trial after the amount of the judgment debt would have been determined. And because there is usually no agreement about this between the parties in advance, the matter is usually left to the court's discretion at the end.” Order 47, Rule 7 of the Rules, empowers the Court to award post-judgment interest at a rate of not less than 10% per annum. I hold that the Claimant is entitled to 10% post-judgment interest per annum with effect from today until the judgment sum is liquidated.

45.   The sixth claim is for the cost of this action and counsel fees at N5,000,000 [five million naira]. A claim for solicitor’s fees is similar to a claim for special damages and must be specifically pleaded and proved. Unfortunately, the requisite pleading and evidence are lacking. Therefore, I hold that this claim has not been proved, and it is denied. However, the law is that costs follow the event in litigation, meaning that a successful party is entitled to recover costs regardless of whether they have been specifically claimed, unless there are exceptional reasons to deny them. Litigation costs are compensatory, not punitive. The Court has the discretion to award costs, and this discretion must be exercised both judicially and judiciously. Please refer to DHL International Nigeria Limited v. Eze-Uzoamaka & Anor [2020] 16 NWLR (Pt 1751) 445 at 500, and Order 55, Rules 1 and 5 of the Rules.

46.     In determining the costs, the principle to follow is that the successful party should be indemnified for the expenses he has unnecessarily incurred during the proceedings, as stated in Order 55 Rule 5 of the Rules. The Court considers several factors, including: the filing fees paid, the duration of the case, the number of witnesses called by the victorious party, the vexatious nature of the unsuccessful party's actions or defence, the cost of legal representation, the monetary value at the time the expenses were incurred, and the value and purchasing power of the currency at the time of the award. Relevant cases include Chijioke v. Soetan [2006] 11 NWLR (Pt 990) 179 at 217-218 and Adelakun v. Oruku [2006] 11 NWLR (Pt 992) 625 at 650. In this case, evidence of the cost of legal representation is not available in the Court's records. The documented expenses amount to N69,550. The Claimant participated in these proceedings virtually once and was represented by counsel five times. The case lasted approximately two years and five months. After thoroughly considering all the facts and circumstances, I hold that the Claimant is entitled to the costs of this action, and I award him N750,000 (seven hundred and fifty thousand naira) in costs.

Judgment is entered accordingly.

……………………………………….….

IKECHI GERALD NWENEKA

JUDGE

8/1/2026

Attendance: Parties absent

   Appearances:

   Chukwunonso Azih Esq. with Esther I. Jimoh Esq. and I. N. Brown Esq. for the Claimant

           Nicholas Olaoye Esq. for the Defendant