IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF
NIGERIA
IN THE KANO JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT KANO
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE M. A.
NAMTARI
DATE: 10TH MARCH, 2026 SUIT NO: NICN/KN/74/2023
BETWEEN:
NIGERIA SOCIAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS ……………
CLAIMANT
MANAGEMENT BOARD
AND
MALLAM ABDULKADIR …………. DEFENDANT
(Trading under the name and style of
Abdulkadir Senior Special Bread)
REPRESENTATION
BINTA SHUAIBU WITH I. I. SANUSI AND ATINUKE
MOROUNRANTI ALIMI FOR THE CLAIMANT
I. G. INUWA FOR THE DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
On 25th
October, 2023, the Claimant filed an Originating Summons against the Defendant praying
for the determination of the following questions:
1)
Considering
the extant provision of Sections 32, 33 (1); 39 (1) (a) and (b) (i) (ii) (iii);
40 (1) (a) (b) and 73 of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010, whether the
Defendant is an Employer within the meaning of the Employees’ Compensation Act,
2010, and if the answer is in affirmative, whether he is duty bound to register
with the Claimant and under legal obligation to make a minimum monthly
contribution of 1:0 percent of its total monthly payroll into the Employees’
Compensation Fund established under the Act and managed by the Claimant.
2)
If
the Defendant is an employer within the meaning of the Employees’ Compensation
Act.2010 and considering the provision of Section 39 (4) of the Employees’
Compensation Act. 2010, where the Defendant does not furnish complete and
accurate of its payroll to the Claimant or if the particulars of the payroll is
false and inaccurate, the Defendant for every failure to comply and for every
such particulars of the payroll shall be liable to imprisonment or fine or
both.
3)
Having
regards to the combined provisions of
Sections 53 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) and (7), and 54 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) and
(g) of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010 whether an officer of the Claimant
or any person authorized thereby at any time or at all reasonable hours, can
enter the Defendant’s workplace with or without warrant or notice require the
production of the Defendant’s payroll and account record for inspection or
examination of same with a view to ascertaining the accuracy of the Defendant’s
payroll and assessing same.
4)
Whether
having regard to the combined provisions of Sections 33 (1) and 39 (1) of the
Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010 the Claimant is entitled to be furnished by
the Defendant the estimates of the probable amount of its payroll from July,
2011, when the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010 became operational or from to date.
In the
determination of these questions, the Claimant sought for the following Reliefs:
1)
A DECLARATION that the Defendant is an employer
within the meaning of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010 and it is under
legal obligation to make a minimum monthly contribution of 1:0 percent of the
Defendant’s total estimate of monthly payroll from July, 2011 to date and thereafter
into the Employees’ Compensation Fund managed by the Claimant.
2)
A DECLARATION that the Defendant being an employer within the meaning of the
Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010 is obligated to furnish the Claimant the
particulars of its total payroll from July, 2011 to date and thereafter.
3)
AN ORDER compelling the Defendant to
immediately register with the Claimant.
4)
AN ORDER compelling the Defendant to keep at all
time, with the Claimant complete and accurate particulars of its payroll from
July, 2011 or from the date of incorporation till Date and thereafter.
5)
AN ORDER compelling the Defendant to
compute/calculate and make minimum monthly contribution of 1:0 percent of its
total monthly payroll from July, 2011 to date and thereafter into the
Employees’ Compensation Fund managed by the Claimant.
6)
AN ORDER restraining the defendant from refusing
access to the officers of the Claimant to enter into the workplace of the
Defendant situated in Potiskum town, Misau Road, Yobe State for purposes of
inspecting and examining the Defendant‘s payroll and other documents necessary
for assessment of its minimum monthly contribution of 1:0 percent of the total
monthly payroll from July, 2011 to date and thereafter.
7)
AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay into the
Employees’ Compensation Fund 40% percent of the total monthly payroll from
July, 2011 to date as penalty for default in failing to furnish the Claimant
complete and accurate total monthly payroll from July, 2011 to date and for
failure to make minimum of 1:0 percent of the total monthly payroll from July,
2011 to date into Employees’ Compensation Fund managed by the Claimant.
8)
10% interest on the Defendant ‘s total
monthly payroll from July, 2011 up to date.
9)
The
sum of Five Million Naira (N5,000,000.00) only for cost of litigation.
10) And for such further order(s) as this
Honourable Court may deem fit and expedient to make in the circumstance of the
case.
In support of the
Originating Summons, the Claimant filed 12 paragraphs affidavit deposed to by Musa
Hussaini Jajere, Officer 1 in Maiduguri Road, Damaturu, Yobe State and a
written address settled by Binta Shuaibu in accordance with the rules of this
court. The Defendant by leave of court on the 21st October, 2024
filed his Counter Affidavit out of time. On the 13th January, 2026,
a day slated for hearing, the Defendant applied for adjournment to file his
Counter Affidavit to reflect the amended name of the Claimant. By leave of
court on the xxx, 2026, his Counter Affidavit and written address in opposition
to the originating summons was filed and served out of time.
CASE OF THE CLAIMANT
The
case of the Claimant, as advanced in the affidavit in support of this action,
is that the Claimant is a statutory body charged with the administration and
management of the Employees’ Compensation Scheme under the Employees’
Compensation Act, 2010, and that the deponent, Musa Hussaini Jajere, is an
officer of the Claimant who is conversant with the facts and circumstances of
the case by virtue of his official duties. He states that the facts deposed to
are within his personal knowledge or derived from official records available to
him in the course of his duties, and that he has the authority and consent of
the Claimant to depose to the affidavit on its behalf.
The
Claimant’s case is that the Defendant is a business enterprise duly registered
under Part E of the Companies and Allied Matters Act and operates a bakery
business in Potiskum, Yobe State, where it employs workers who are on its
payroll. By reason of the nature of its business and its engagement of
employees, the Defendant is a stakeholder in the labour market and qualifies as
an employer within the meaning of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010. The
Claimant asserts that, as an employer, the Defendant is statutorily required to
participate in and comply with the Employees’ Compensation Scheme for the
benefit and protection of its employees in the event of death, injury, or
disability arising out of or in the course of employment.
The
Claimant avers that in furtherance of its statutory mandate, it formally wrote
to the Defendant by a letter dated 21 June 2022, introducing the Defendant to
the modalities for the implementation of the Employees’ Compensation Scheme and
enjoining it to key into the scheme as required by law. According to the
Claimant, despite this formal introduction and notification, the Defendant
failed, neglected, or refused to register with the Claimant and has not
furnished the Claimant with details of its total monthly payroll from July 2011
to date. The Claimant further maintains that the Defendant has not made any
remittance whatsoever to the Employees’ Compensation Fund during this period.
It
is the Claimant’s further case that it’s Enforcement and Inspection Officers
made several visits to the Defendant in an effort to secure compliance with the
provisions of the Employees’ Compensation Act. Notwithstanding these visits and
engagements, the Defendant allegedly continued to refuse or fail to register
with the Claimant and to make the mandatory minimum monthly contribution of one
percent of its total payroll to the Employees’ Compensation Fund. As a result
of the Defendant’s persistent non-compliance, the Claimant states that it
issued reminder letters dated 4th April, 2023 and 7th
May, 2023, which were duly served on the Defendant, yet the Defendant ignored
these reminders and still failed to comply with its statutory obligations.
The
Claimant also avers that, following the Defendant’s continued refusal to comply
despite repeated reminders and inspections, a pre-action notice dated 13th
July, 2023 was served on the Defendant as a final step before instituting legal
proceedings. However, even after the service of the pre-legal action notice,
the Defendant allegedly willfully neglected and refused to make the required
statutory contributions or to regularize its participation in the Employees’
Compensation Scheme.
According
to the Claimant, the Defendant’s persistent failure to remit the mandatory
contributions has greatly and negatively affected the Claimant’s ability to
effectively discharge its statutory mandate of providing a fair, adequate, and
guaranteed system of compensation for employees and their dependants in cases
of death, injury, or disability arising from employment. The Claimant contends
that such non-compliance undermines the objectives of the Employees’
Compensation Act and deprives the Defendant’s employees of the protection
guaranteed to them by law.
The
Claimant further relies on legal advice received from its counsel, which it
believes to be true, to the effect that the Defendant qualifies as an employer
under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010 and is consequently under a
statutory duty to make a minimum monthly contribution of one percent of its
total payroll into the Employees’ Compensation Fund pursuant to section 33 (1)
of the Act. In addition, the Claimant maintains that the Defendant is under a
further statutory obligation, pursuant to sections 39 (1) and 40 (a) and (b) of
the Act, to furnish the Claimant with an estimate of its probable payroll and
any other information required for the effective administration of the scheme.
In
sum, the Claimant’s case is that the Defendant, despite due notice, repeated
engagements, reminder letters, and a pre-action notice, has deliberately and
persistently failed to comply with its statutory obligations under the
Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010, thereby necessitating the institution of
this action to compel compliance and protect the integrity of the Employees’
Compensation Scheme.
CASE OF THE DEFENDANT
The
defence put forward by the Defendant in the counter affidavit is essentially a
denial of liability under the Employees’ Compensation Act as alleged by the
Claimant, coupled with a challenge to the factual foundation of the Claimant’s
case. The Defendant’s case, as deposed to by Idris Muhammad Alkali, a
litigation clerk in the firm of F. A. Akinola & Co, is that the deponent is
competent and duly authorised to depose to the affidavit on behalf of the
Defendant, having acquired knowledge of the facts in the course of his
employment and upon information received from learned counsel to the Defendant,
which information he believes to be true.
The
Defendant contends that the description of the Defendant by the Claimant as a
business enterprise or private company registered under the Companies and
Allied Matters Act is incorrect and misleading. According to the Defendant, he
is not a private company as alleged, but rather a registered small-scale
businessman. The Defendant asserts that the nature of his business operations
does not fall within the characterization advanced by the Claimant and that
this distinction is material to the issues in controversy. In support of this
assertion, the Defendant relies on a certificate of registration, which is
exhibited to the counter affidavit, as evidence of his status as a small-scale
business operator.
Flowing
from this position, the Defendant further maintains that he does not operate a
formal employment structure with salaried staff on a monthly payroll. The
defence asserts that the Defendant engages workers on a daily basis and
remunerates them on a daily, task-based arrangement, rather than through a
structured monthly payroll system. On this basis, the Defendant denies the
allegation that he has a monthly payroll capable of registration with the
Claimant or upon which the computation of a statutory contribution could be
made. The Defendant therefore disputes the Claimant’s assertion that he failed
to register a payroll or remit contributions derived from a monthly payroll,
contending that no such payroll exists in the first place.
The
Defendant also challenges the factual accuracy of the Claimant’s assertion
regarding service of statutory notices and correspondence. He maintains that he
was never personally served with the letters allegedly issued by the Claimant,
including the introductory letter, reminder letters, and other
enforcement-related correspondence. According to the Defendant, the letters
referred to by the Claimant were addressed and delivered to a person described
as the Manager of “Senior Special Bread,” rather than to the Defendant in his
personal capacity. The Defendant contends that such service, even if it
occurred, cannot be construed as proper or effective service on him as the
Defendant in this suit.
In
the same vein, the Defendant denies being personally served with the alleged
pre-legal action notice relied upon by the Claimant. He asserts that the said
pre-action notice was similarly served, if at all, on the Manager of Senior
Bread and not on him as the Defendant. The Defendant therefore argues that the
procedural foundation of the Claimant’s action is defective, as the alleged
pre-legal notice was not properly served on the party sought to be bound by it.
Overall,
the Defendant’s defence is that the Claimant’s case is built on incorrect
assumptions about his legal status, the nature of his business operations, and
the existence of an employer–employee relationship structured around a monthly
payroll. He maintains that the factual allegations relating to registration,
payroll, statutory contributions, and service of notices are untrue or misconceived.
On the strength of these denials and explanations, the Defendant urges the
court to hold that the Claimant has failed to establish a credible basis for
the reliefs sought and contends that it would be in the interest of justice for
the court to dismiss the application in its entirety.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT IN SUPPORT
OF THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS
The
Claimant formulated four (4) issues for determination, to wit:
1) Considering
the extant provision of Sections 32, 33 (1); 39 (1) (a) and (b) (i) (ii) (iii);
40 (1) (a) (b) and 73 of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010, whether the
Defendant is an Employer within the meaning of the Employees’ Compensation Act
2010, and if the answer is in affirmative, whether he is duty bound to register
with the Claimant and under legal obligation to make a minimum monthly
contribution of 1:0 percent of its total monthly payroll into the Employees’
Compensation Fund established under the Act and managed by the Claimant.
2) If
the Defendant is an employer within the meaning of the Employees’ Compensation
Act.2010 and considering the provision of Section 39 (4) of the Employees’
Compensation Act. 2010, where the Defendant does not furnish complete and
accurate of its payroll to the Claimant or if the particulars of the payroll is
false and inaccurate, the Defendant for every failure to comply and for every
such particulars of the payroll shall be liable to imprisonment or fine or
both.
3) Having
regards to the combined provisions of
Sections 53 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) and (7), and 54 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) and
(g) of the Employees’ Compensation Act.2010 whether an officer of the Claimant
or any person authorized thereby at any time or at all reasonable hours, can
enter the Defendant’s workplace with or without warrant or notice require the
production of the Defendant’s payroll and account record for inspection or
examination of same with a view to ascertaining the accuracy of the Defendant’s
payroll and assessing same.
4) Whether
having regard to the combined provisions of Sections 33 (1) and 39 (1) of the
Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010 the Claimant is entitled to be furnished by
the Defendant the estimates of the probable amount of its payroll from July,
2011, when the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010 became operational to date.
The
submissions of the Claimant on the issues for determination are firmly anchored
on the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010,
which the Claimant contends govern the rights, duties, and obligations of the
parties in this suit. The Claimant submits that all the issues raised for
determination are interrelated and ought to be resolved together, as they
revolve around the status of the Defendant as an employer, the statutory
obligations arising therefrom, and the powers of the Claimant to enforce
compliance with the Act.
In
advancing its submissions, the Claimant places considerable reliance on the
combined effect of sections 32, 33 (1), 39 (1) (a) and (b) (i), (ii) and (iii),
40 (1) (a) and (b), 53, 54, and 73 of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010.
The Claimant submits that by virtue of section 73 of the Act, the definition of
an “employer” is broad and inclusive, encompassing any individual, body
corporate, or government entity that has entered into a contract of employment
to engage another person as a worker or apprentice. The Claimant argues that
the Defendant, having admitted to engaging workers for the purpose of carrying
on his business, squarely falls within the statutory definition of an employer
under the Act, regardless of whether such workers are engaged on a daily or
monthly basis. The Claimant therefore urges the Court to hold that the
Defendant is an employer within the meaning and intendment of the Employees’
Compensation Act, 2010.
Having
established the Defendant’s status as an employer, the Claimant submits that
section 33 (1) of the Act imposes a mandatory statutory obligation on every
employer to make a minimum monthly contribution of one percent of its total
monthly payroll into the Employees’ Compensation Fund established under the Act
and managed by the Claimant. The Claimant contends that the language of section
33 (1) is couched in mandatory terms, using the word “shall,” which leaves no
discretion to an employer to opt out of compliance. The Claimant further
submits that the Defendant’s failure or refusal to register with the Claimant
and remit the prescribed contributions since the Act became operational in July
2011 constitutes a continuous breach of statutory duty. The Claimant urges the
Court to so hold.
The
Claimant further relies on sections 39 (1) and 40 (1) of the Act to submit that
every employer is under a further statutory obligation to keep complete and
accurate particulars of its payroll and to furnish the Claimant with estimates
of the probable amount of its payroll when the employer comes within the scope
of the Act and at such other times as may be required by the Claimant.
According to the Claimant, these provisions empower the Claimant to demand
payroll information from employers for the purpose of assessment, regulation,
and enforcement of contributions under the scheme. The Claimant submits that
the Defendant’s contention that he has no payroll cannot avail him, as section
39 (2) of the Act expressly empowers the Claimant, where an employer fails to
furnish accurate payroll information, to make its own estimate of the payroll,
assess contributions based on that estimate, and bind the employer by such
assessment. The Claimant argues that the Defendant’s persistent refusal to
furnish payroll information amounts to a violation of sections 39 and 40 of the
Act.
On
the issue of liability for non-compliance, the Claimant places reliance on
section 39 (4) of the Act, which provides that where an employer fails to
comply with the requirement to furnish payroll particulars, or where such
particulars are false or inaccurate, the employer commits an offence and is
liable, upon conviction, to imprisonment, fine, or both, depending on whether
the employer is an individual or a body corporate. The Claimant submits that
this provision underscores the seriousness with which the law treats compliance
with payroll disclosure and contribution obligations under the Employees’
Compensation Scheme.
The
Claimant also submits that sections 53 and 54 of the Act confer wide
investigative, inspection, and enforcement powers on the Claimant and its
officers. It is argued that by virtue of section 53 (1) and (2), any person
authorised by the Board of the Claimant may, at all reasonable hours, examine
the books and accounts of any employer and enter the employer’s establishment for
the purpose of administering the Act. Section 54 further empowers an officer of
the Board to enter any workplace at any time, with or without a warrant or
notice, require the production of payroll records and other documents, inspect
and examine such records, and make necessary inquiries to ascertain compliance.
The Claimant submits that these provisions entitle its officers to access the
Defendant’s workplace and records for inspection and verification of payroll
information, and that any obstruction or refusal by the Defendant constitutes
an offence under section 53 (6) of the Act.
The
Claimant contends that the affidavit evidence before the Court clearly shows
that despite repeated visits, demands, and notices, the Defendant has
consistently refused to grant the Claimant’s officers access to his workplace
and records and has failed to furnish any payroll information or make the
required statutory contributions. The Claimant submits that this conduct
amounts to a flagrant and willful breach of sections 33, 39, 40, 53, and 54 of
the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010, and has negatively impacted the
Claimant’s ability to discharge its statutory mandate of providing a fair and
guaranteed system of compensation for employees in the event of work-related
injury, disability, or death.
In
conclusion, the Claimant urges the Court to resolve all the issues for
determination in its favour by holding that the Defendant is an employer within
the meaning of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010, that he is under a statutory
obligation to register with the Claimant, furnish payroll information from July
2011 to date, and remit the minimum monthly contribution of one percent of his
total payroll into the Employees’ Compensation Fund. The Claimant further urges
the Court to affirm its statutory powers of inspection and enforcement under
sections 53 and 54 of the Act and to grant all the reliefs sought in the
interest of justice.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE
DEFENDANT IN OPPOSITION TO THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS
In opposition, the Defendant formulated
three (3) issues for determination, to wit:
1.
Whether the claimants have sufficiently
proved that the defendant is an Employer within the meaning of Employers
Compensation Act, 2010?
2.
Whether the Manager Senior Bread whom
EXHIBITS NSITF 1, NSITF 2 & 3 and NSITF 4 were allegedly served on is a
juristic person or juristic personality that be sued?
3.
Whether paragraphs 11 (a), (b) and (c),
of the claimant’s affidavit in support contradicted the rules of affidavit
under the Evidence Act 2011?
On the first issue, the Defendant
submitted that the Claimants failed woefully to discharge the evidential burden
placed on them by law to establish that the Defendant is an employer within the
meaning and contemplation of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010. It was
argued that the Claimants did not tender any credible documentary or oral
evidence before the Court to demonstrate that the Defendant employed any staff
or operated as an employer of labour as envisaged under the Act. The Defendant
maintained that mere assertions without supporting evidence cannot ground
liability under the Employees’ Compensation Act. Counsel emphasized that where
a claimant fails to supply adequate facts and evidence to prove that a
defendant qualifies as an employer, such a claim must necessarily fail. In
support of this position, reliance was placed on the decision of the National
Industrial Court in Nigeria Social
Insurance Trust Fund Management Board v. Manuchismo Weli (Doing Business Under
the Name and Style of Bluebells School), Suit No. NICN/CA/02/2021, where
the Court held that due to the absence of evidence establishing the existence
of employees, the quantum of claim, and any assessment thereof, the claimant’s
case collapsed for lack of proof and was accordingly dismissed. The Defendant
urged the Court to apply the same reasoning to the present case, contending
that the Claimants’ failure to establish the Defendant’s status as an employer
is fatal to their claim.
On the second issue, the Defendant
contended that the person on whom Exhibits NSITF 1, NSITF 2 and 3, and NSITF 4
were allegedly served, namely “Manager Senior Special Bread,” is not a juristic
person known to law and therefore cannot be sued or validly served. It was
argued that all the correspondence and demand notices relied upon by the Claimants
were addressed to “Manager Senior Special Bread” rather than to the Defendant,
described in this suit as “Mallam Abdulkadir (trading under the name and style
of Senior Special Bread).” The Defendant submitted that service on a
non-juristic entity is incompetent and of no legal effect. While conceding that
there exists a registered business name known as “Abdulkadir Senior Special
Bread,” as evidenced by Exhibit A attached to the Defendant’s counter
affidavit, counsel argued that the Claimants failed to direct their letters and
processes to this registered business name or to the Defendant personally.
Consequently, the Defendant maintained that all the letters relied upon by the
Claimants were addressed to a non-existent juristic personality and cannot ground
any valid cause of action against the Defendant in this suit.
On the third issue, the Defendant
submitted that paragraphs 11 (a), (b) and (c) of the Claimants’ affidavit in
support are fundamentally defective as they violate the settled rules governing
affidavits under the Evidence Act, 2011. It was argued that the said paragraphs
contain legal arguments, conclusions, and opinions, which are expressly
prohibited in affidavit evidence. The Defendant relied on Section 115 (2) of
the Evidence Act, 2011, which provides that an affidavit shall not contain
extraneous matter by way of objection, prayer, legal argument, or conclusion.
Counsel explained that extraneous matters include any deposition that is
improper in an affidavit, such as conclusions of law or argumentative
statements. In buttressing this submission, reliance was placed on the
decisions of the Supreme Court in Odey
v. Alaga (2021) 13 NWLR (Part 1792) 1 at 62, per Oseji, JSC, and Emeka v.
Chuba Ikpeazu (2017) LPELR-41920 (SC), per Peter-Odili, JSC, where the apex court reiterated that affidavits
must be confined strictly to facts within the personal knowledge of the
deponent and must not stray into the realm of legal argument or conclusions.
The Defendant therefore urged the Court to discountenance paragraphs 11 (a),
(b) and (c) of the Claimants’ affidavit for being incompetent and in breach of
Section 115 (2) of the Evidence Act.
In conclusion, the Defendant submitted
that the Claimants have failed to prove their case by credible evidence, having
not established that the Defendant is an employer within the meaning of the
Employees’ Compensation Act, having directed their processes to a non-juristic
personality, and having relied on a defective affidavit containing prohibited
extraneous matters. The Defendant therefore urged this Court to dismiss the
Claimants’ case in its entirety for lack of merit.
RELY ON
POINTS OF LAW
In the Claimant’s Reply on Points of
Law, the Claimant responds to the Defendant’s counter affidavit and written
address wherein the Defendant contends that he has no permanent staff, that
correspondences were not properly addressed or served on him, and consequently
urges the Court to dismiss the suit. The Claimant joins issues with the
Defendant and formulates three central questions for determination: whether the
Defendant qualifies as an employer under the Employees’ Compensation Act;
whether the issuance of demand notices or correspondences constitutes a
condition precedent to instituting an action under the Act; and whether the
alleged mistake in the Defendant’s name amounts to a mere misnomer capable of
being cured.
On the first issue, the Claimant
anchors his argument on Section 73 of the Employees’ Compensation Act, which
defines an employer to include any individual, body corporate, or government
entity that has entered into a contract of employment to engage another person
as an employee or apprentice. The same section defines an employee broadly to
cover persons engaged under oral or written contracts of employment, whether on
continuous, part-time, temporary, apprenticeship, or casual basis, including
domestic servants not being members of the employer’s family. The Claimant
further relies on Section 2 of the Act, which makes the scheme applicable to
all employers and employees in both the public and private sectors throughout
the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Applying these provisions to the facts,
the Claimant argues that by the Defendant’s own admission in his counter
affidavit, he engages workers on a daily basis and pays them daily wages. The
Defendant’s attempt to describe his operation as a small business rather than a
private company does not, in the Claimant’s view, remove him from the ambit of
the Act. The Claimant contends that the existence of a payroll system in the
strict sense of monthly salary documentation is not a legal prerequisite for an
employer–employee relationship under the Act. Payroll, it is argued, simply
refers to a system or record of remuneration, whether payment is made daily,
weekly, or monthly. What is decisive is the existence of a contract of service
and remuneration for labour. Even assuming, without conceding, the correctness
of the Defendant’s averments in certain paragraphs of the counter affidavit,
the Claimant maintains that the Defendant remains an employer within the
meaning of Section 73 and is therefore bound by the Employees’ Compensation
Scheme. The Court is accordingly urged to so hold.
On the second issue, the Claimant
addresses whether the issuance of demand notices or prior correspondence
constitutes a condition precedent to the institution of an action to enforce
compliance with the Act. Reliance is placed on Section 33 (1) of the Employees’
Compensation Act, which mandates every employer to make a minimum monthly
contribution of one percent of the total monthly payroll into the Fund within
the stipulated period. The Claimant also cites Section 36 (2), which provides
that where an employer liable to assessment is not assessed by the Board for
any reason, the employer remains liable for the amount that ought to have been
assessed, and such payment may be enforced as though the employer had been duly
assessed.
The Claimant argues that these
provisions impose a statutory obligation on employers and do not make the
issuance of demand notices, meetings, or other correspondence a condition
precedent to enforcement. The Defendant’s objection that correspondence was
wrongly addressed is characterized as a purely technical argument designed to
evade substantive liability. The Claimant points out that the Defendant trades
and is widely known as “Senior Special Bread,” and that photographs of the
bakery premises and product packaging bearing that name were exhibited,
together with evidence of the address where the letters were served. In the Claimant’s
submission, the statutory duty to contribute arises directly from the Act, and
non-compliance cannot be excused on the ground that demand notices were
allegedly misdirected. The Court is therefore urged to hold that prior demand
is not a prerequisite to the enforcement of statutory contributions under the
Act.
On the third issue, concerning the
alleged mistake in the name of the Defendant, the Claimant submits that the
error constitutes a mere misnomer and is curable. Heavy reliance is placed on judicial
authorities, particularly the decision of the Court of Appeal in Guaranty Trust Bank Plc v. Pico Projects
Services Ltd (2023) LPELR-60886 (CA),
where the Court, drawing from the Supreme Court’s pronouncements, clarified
that a misnomer occurs where the correct party is before the Court but is
described by an incorrect name. The Court in that case referred to the Supreme
Court’s exposition in Calabar Municipal
Govt & Ors v. Honesty & Ors (2021) LPELR-58391 (SC) and Registered Trustees of Airline Operators
of Nigeria v. NAMA (2014)
LPELR-22372 (SC), emphasizing that a misnomer does not vitiate proceedings
where there is no real doubt as to the identity of the party intended to be
sued.
The Claimant further draws support from
authorities such as Emespo J.
Continental Ltd v. Corona S. & Co. (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 991) 365, Njoku v. U.A.C. Foods (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt.
632) p.557 at 564, paras B-C and Keystone
Bank Ltd v. Okefe (2014) LPELR-22633 (CA), all of which reiterate that
where the correct person is brought before the Court under a wrong name, and
there is no confusion as to identity, the defect is a mere misnomer and is
curable. The Claimant submits that paragraphs of the Defendant’s counter affidavit
acknowledge that the Manager of Senior Special Bread was served, though the
Defendant disputes the correctness of the name used. In the Claimant’s view,
this confirms that there was no misapprehension as to the identity of the party
sued. The error in name, if any, was occasioned by the Defendant’s own manner
of holding out his business to the public, as evidenced by the exhibits showing
the business name on the premises and product packaging. The Claimant further
invokes the principle that a party cannot benefit from his own wrong, relying
on Sale Ado Abdullahi v. Yusha’u Ibrahim
& Ors (2023) LPELR-59984) (CA).
In conclusion, the Claimant urges the
Court to discountenance the Defendant’s technical objections regarding
employment status, prior demand, and alleged misnomer, and to hold that the
Defendant is an employer within the meaning of the Employees’ Compensation Act,
that no prior demand notice is required before enforcement, and that any defect
in the name of the Defendant is a curable misnomer. The Court is accordingly
urged to grant the reliefs sought by the Claimant.
DECISION
OF THE COURT
Having regard to the questions posed in
the originating summons and the submissions of the parties, the following
issues can sufficiently determine this case:
Issue
One: Whether the Claimant has established that the Defendant is an employer
within the meaning of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010
The foundation of the Claimant’s case
is that the Defendant is an employer and therefore subject to the provisions of
the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010. The Defendant, on the other hand,
contends that the Claimant failed to prove this essential fact and argues that
he is merely a small-scale businessman who engages workers on a daily basis and
does not operate a monthly payroll.
By section 73 of the Employees’
Compensation Act, 2010, an “employer” is defined to include any individual,
body corporate or government agency that has entered into a contract of
employment to employ another person as a worker or apprentice. The definition
is deliberately broad and inclusive. Nothing in the Act limits the status of an
employer to those who operate formal corporate structures or monthly payroll
systems.
The Defendant admits, in his counter
affidavit, that he engages workers in the course of his bakery business. His
contention is merely that such workers are paid daily and not monthly. In my
considered view, this distinction does not avail the Defendant. The Act does
not predicate the status of an employer on the mode or frequency of payment of
wages. What is material is the existence of an employment relationship, whether
permanent, temporary, casual or otherwise.
The National Industrial Court has
consistently held that once a person engages workers in the course of a
business, he qualifies as an employer for the purposes of labour and employment
legislation. See Adewunmi v. Nigerian Eagle Flour Mills Ltd (2014) 42 NLLR (Pt.
133) 1. The Employees’ Compensation Act is a social legislation enacted to
provide protection for workers, and its provisions must be given a liberal and
purposive interpretation to advance its objectives. See Skye Bank Plc v. Iwu
(2017) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1590) 24.
The Defendant’s reliance on the
decision in Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board v. Manuchismo Weli
(Bluebells School) NICN/CA/02/2021 is misplaced. In that case, the
claimant failed to place any material before the court to establish the
existence of employees or any factual basis for assessment. In the present
case, the Defendant himself admits engaging workers, even though he describes
them as daily-paid workers. That admission is sufficient to bring him within
the statutory definition of an employer.
I therefore find and hold that the
Defendant is an employer within the meaning of the Employees’ Compensation Act,
2010.
Issue
Two: Whether the Defendant is under
statutory obligations under the Act and whether the Claimant is entitled to the
reliefs sought.
Having held that the Defendant is an
employer, the next question is whether the Act imposes obligations on him and
whether the Claimant has established entitlement to the reliefs sought.
Section 33 (1) of the Act provides that
every employer shall make a minimum monthly contribution of one percent of the
total monthly payroll into the Employees’ Compensation Fund. The use of the
word “shall” denotes a mandatory obligation. The Act does not confer any
discretion on an employer to opt out of compliance.
Sections 39 and 40 further impose
obligations on employers to keep accurate payroll records and to furnish the
Claimant with estimates of their payroll. Where an employer fails or refuses to
furnish such information, section 39 (2) empowers the Claimant to make its own
assessment and bind the employer thereby.
The Defendant’s argument that he has no
monthly payroll does not absolve him from compliance. An employer cannot evade
statutory obligations by merely refusing to keep records or by adopting an
informal payment structure. To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of
the Act.
The Claimant also relied on sections 53
and 54 of the Act, which confer wide powers of inspection, entry and examination
on the Claimant and its officers. These provisions are clear and unambiguous.
Once a person qualifies as an employer, the Claimant is statutorily empowered
to enter the workplace, inspect records and enforce compliance, subject to the
limits provided by law.
However, while the Court finds that the
Defendant is under statutory obligations to register, furnish payroll
information and make contributions, the reliefs sought by the Claimant must
still be scrutinised to determine whether they are grantable on the evidence
before the Court.
The Claimant seeks orders compelling
payment of contributions from July 2011 to date, penalties amounting to 40% of
payroll, interest at 10%, and a substantial cost of litigation. These monetary
reliefs are premised on the existence of a determinable payroll and an assessed
quantum. The Claimant did not place before the Court any concrete assessment,
computation or basis upon which the Court can ascertain the Defendant’s payroll
or the exact sums claimed.
It is settled law that courts do not
grant speculative or indeterminate monetary claims. See Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v.
Astra Builders (W.A.) Ltd (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 1. While the Act
empowers the Claimant to assess payroll where an employer defaults, such
assessment must be pleaded and placed before the Court.
Accordingly, while the declaratory and
coercive reliefs relating to registration, furnishing of records, and access
for inspection are grantable, the monetary claims for penalties, interest and
retrospective contributions cannot be granted in the absence of a concrete
assessment.
Issue
Three: Whether the Defendant’s objections
on service and affidavit defects defeat the Claimant’s case
The Defendant argued that the notices
and letters relied upon by the Claimant were served on the “Manager, Senior
Special Bread” and not on him personally, and that such service is ineffective.
He also challenged paragraphs 11 (a), (b) and (c) of the Claimant’s affidavit
as containing extraneous matters contrary to section 115 (2) of the Evidence
Act, 2011.
On service, the substance of the Act
does not make service of demand letters a condition precedent to the Court’s
jurisdiction. This action is founded on statute, not on pre-action
correspondence. Even if there were irregularities in service of letters, same
would not defeat a statutory claim where the Defendant is already before the
Court and has fully joined issues. So all the cases cited by the Claimant on
this point are apposite.
On the objection to the affidavit, it
is trite that where an affidavit contains both competent facts and extraneous
matters, the proper order is to discountenance only the offending portions, not
to strike out the entire affidavit. See Odey v. Alaga (2021) 13 NWLR (Pt.
1792) 1. The Defendant did not demonstrate that the alleged offending
paragraphs are the sole foundation of the Claimant’s case. I accordingly
discountenance any argumentative portions but hold that the affidavit remains
substantially valid.
In the final analysis, I find that the
Claimant has partially succeeded in this action. Accordingly, it is hereby
declared and ordered as follows:
Judgment entered accordingly
……………………………………...
HON. JUSTICE M. A. NAMTARI