KEGHTOR JESSE JIKA -VS- AZMAN AIR SERVICES LIMITED - National Industrial Court of Nigeria

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE KANO JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT KANO

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE M. A. NAMTARI

DATE: 10^TH MARCH, 2026 SUIT NO: NICN/KN/04/2021

BETWEEN:

KEGHTOR JESSE JIKA ..……………………….. CLAIMANT

AND

AZMAN AIR SERVICES LIMITED ………………………… DEFENDANT

REPRESENTATION:

MOHAMMAD HAMZA A.G FOR THE CLAIMANT

ADO MUHAMMAD MA’AJI WITH AHMAD MA’AJI AND SAGIR MUSTAPHA FOR THE DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT

The Claimant, who was employed as a Line Captain by the Defendant, filed a Complaint on the 5^th January, 2021 accompanied by Statement of Facts, Statement on Oath and List of documents as required by the rules of court praying for the following reliefs against the Defendant:

1. AN ORDER of Court mandating the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N9,000,000 (Nine Million Naira only) being unpaid salaries for the months of April, May and June 2020 at N3,000,000 (Three Million Naira only) per month.

2. The sum of N2,428,580 (Two Million Four Hundred and Twenty Eight Thousand, Five Hundred and Eighty Naira only) being balance of one month salary in lieu of termination as specified in the Claimant’s employment letter.

3. The sum of N3,000,000 (Three Million Naira only) as cost for 28/30 days annual leave for the year 2020.

4. The sum of N10,000,000 (Ten Million Naira only) as damages for unlawful termination.

5. The sum of N20,000,000 (Twenty Million Naira only) as damages for defamation of the Claimant’s character.

On the 26^th February, 2024, the Counsel for the Claimant informed the Court that the case was part-heard as the Claimant had testified and his cross examination commenced before the transfer of Isele, J. Claimant applied for the continuation of the case instead of starting the case de novo. Counsel for the Defendant having supported the application and given the nature of the case, the Court granted the application in accordance with Order 62 of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017. One Nuruddeen Aliyu, the Assistant General Manager of the Defendant, testified on behalf of the Defendant as DW and tendered five (5) Exhibits (DW1-DW5) on the 27^th January, 2025 and was cross-examined on 9^th July, 2025. Having filed and exchanged their Final Written Addresses, the parties adopted same on 23^rd February, 2026.

CASE OF THE CLAIMANT

The Claimant is a professional pilot who was employed by the Defendant, a private limited liability company registered in Nigeria to operate an airline business. He was offered employment as a line captain through a letter of appointment dated 27^th August, 2019, which he duly accepted and immediately resumed duty. In that capacity, he was assigned to fly the Defendant’s Boeing 737CL aircraft on a monthly salary of Three Million Naira. The Claimant maintains that throughout his service, he diligently and conscientiously discharged his responsibilities without any record of negligence, misconduct, or accident attributable to him.

Despite his dedication, the Defendant consistently failed to pay him and other staff their salaries and entitlements as and when due. Matters culminated on 6^th November, 2020 when his employment was abruptly terminated through a letter which vaguely stated “recent happenings and development in the company” as the reason for his disengagement. The Claimant contends that this explanation was not only insufficient but contrary to his terms of employment, which envisaged misconduct as a possible ground for termination. He stresses that he was never issued any query, interdicted or accused of wrongdoing, making his dismissal wrongful.

The true reason for his dismissal, according to the Claimant, came to light when Business Day Newspaper published on 9^th November 2020 that he and other pilots were sacked for indiscipline and promotion of anarchy, having allegedly complained about delayed and reduced salaries. The Claimant asserts that this publication was defamatory, malicious and injurious to his professional reputation, portraying him falsely as a violent and unruly person. He maintains that he is a man of peace and has never promoted violence, but the publication stigmatized him within the aviation industry, foreclosing further employment opportunities.

He further avers that the Defendant maliciously circulated communications within the airline industry discouraging other airlines from employing him, citing a supposed memorandum of understanding between airline operators. This act, he claims, was ultra vires since the Defendant is not a court of law and has no authority to blacklist him from future employment. To compound matters, the Defendant subsequently advertised in the Punch Newspaper of 30^th November, 2020 for new pilots to fly the very same Boeing 737CL, while requiring applicants to obtain clearance letters from previous employers, further reinforcing the Defendant’s vindictive motive.

The Claimant also contends that the Defendant failed to pay its contractual entitlement to one month’s salary in lieu of notice, paying him only a fraction of N571,420 after his solicitors demanded the full amount of three million naira, leaving a balance of over two million naira unpaid. He also notes that payment for flights he had operated prior to termination was only made belatedly after pressure from his solicitors. He accuses the Defendant of acting in bad faith, pointing out that despite receiving substantial bailout funds from the Federal Government to cushion the effects of the Vovid 19 pandemic it still owed him salaries for several months in 2020.

The Claimant avers that his wrongful termination, coupled with the defamatory publications and blacklisting, was a deliberate and malicious attempt by the Defendant to destroy his career and render him unemployable. He has since been unable to secure alternative employment, leaving his family’s livelihood endangered. His professional goodwill, reputation and years of hard work in the aviation sector have been eroded by the stigma created by the Defendant’s actions.

He recounts that the National Association of Aircraft Pilots and Engineers intervened on his behalf by appealing to the Defendant and the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority to reverse his termination and clear his name, but the Defendant ignored these entreaties. Left with no alternative, the Claimant briefed his solicitors, who demanded compensation, apology, and retraction of the defamatory statements, but the Defendant refused to comply.

The Claimant therefore brings his grievances before the court, asserting that the Defendant’s actions were wrongful, malicious, defamatory and oppressive. He maintains that he has suffered severe anguish, economic hardship, reputational damage and stigmatization, and he accordingly seeks redress and the award of his reliefs as endorsed in his statement of claim.

CASE OF THE DEFENDANT

The Defendant, while expressly admitting only certain limited facts, denies generally and specifically the bulk of the allegations raised by the Claimant. It admits that the Claimant was indeed employed as a line captain pursuant to a letter of appointment dated 27^th August, 2019 and that his salary prior to the COVID-19 pandemic was three million naira monthly. However, the Defendant emphasizes that as a result of the economic hardship occasioned by the pandemic, it reviewed the salary structure of all staff through internal memoranda dated 16^th July, 2020 and 2^nd September, 2020, which were duly communicated to employees. According to the Defendant, the Claimant’s revised salary as a line captain was pegged at N571,420, and it is this sum that formed the basis of his one-month salary in lieu of notice upon termination.

The Defendant denies owing the Claimant or any staff arrears of salary or entitlements and asserts that the Claimant’s termination was strictly in line with the terms of his employment. It relies on the termination clause contained in the letter of appointment, which permits either party to terminate the contract by giving one month’s notice or payment of one month’s salary in lieu. The Defendant maintains that the termination letter issued on 6^th November, 2020 was fully compliant with this clause and denies that misconduct was the only basis for termination under the contract.

In response to the Claimant’s reliance on publications in Business Day Newspaper alleging that he and others were dismissed for indiscipline and promotion of anarchy, the Defendant categorically denies responsibility. It contends that the newspaper is not its subsidiary, that the publication was not authorized by it, and that it never issued or caused to be issued any defamatory or slanderous statements against the Claimant. It equally denies ever sending signals or instructions to other airlines not to employ the Claimant or any other dismissed employee, stressing that each airline is an independent entity, and the Defendant has neither the authority nor the power to dictate the employment decisions of others.

On the question of remuneration, the Defendant avers that it duly paid the Claimant what was owed to him. It asserts that upon the successful handover of company property, the Claimant received the sum of N1,399,979 on 11^th December, 2020, which comprised N571,420 as one month’s salary in lieu of notice and N714,275 as payment for 25 flight sectors completed. The Defendant insists that these payments were made in accordance with the terms of the termination letter and that the Claimant’s contrary calculations are misconceived and misleading.

While admitting that it advertised vacancies for pilots in the Punch Newspaper, the Defendant clarifies that recruitment of pilots and other staff is a periodic exercise driven by operational needs and not evidence of malice against the Claimant. It underscores that it has a fleet of aircraft of varying classes and retains the prerogative to decide when and whose services to engage. The Defendant further asserts that policies such as requesting clearance from previous employers fall within its managerial discretion, but denies ever imposing rules on other airlines or interfering in their operations.

The Defendant also acknowledges that the National Association of Aircraft Pilots and Engineers wrote letters and sought to intervene on behalf of the Claimant and others. It states that a meeting was held on 10^th November, 2020 in Kano where the possibility of re-engaging some former employees was discussed, but insists that the Claimant and some others gave conditions which were not acceptable to the company. With respect to the letter of demand written by the Claimant’s solicitors, the Defendant confirms that it instructed its legal representatives, A.M. Ma’aji & Partners, who duly responded on 8^th December, 2020 denying any defamatory publication and affirming the lawfulness of the termination.

The Defendant expressly denies the Claimant’s allegations that it collected bailout funds and still failed to meet its obligations, as well as his claims of wickedness, malice, or deliberate destruction of his career. It maintains that the termination was purely a business decision necessitated by prevailing economic realities and carried out strictly within the framework of the contractual agreement.

In conclusion, the Defendant urges the court to dismiss the Claimant’s case in its entirety. It contends that the suit is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of judicial process, designed not to seek justice but to engage in gold-digging and therefore prays that it be dismissed with substantial costs awarded against the Claimant.

SUBMISSION OF THE DEFENDANT

The Defendant’s submissions before this Court are anchored on a single issue for determination, namely whether, having regard to the circumstances of this case and the totality of the evidence adduced, the Claimant’s appointment was properly and lawfully terminated by the Defendant and whether, in consequence, the Claimant is entitled to any of the reliefs sought. The Defendant submits that this issue must be resolved in its favour, as the termination of the Claimant’s employment strictly complied with the governing contract and settled principles of Nigerian labour law.

The Defendant argues, as a foundational issue that under Nigerian labour jurisprudence there is no contractual relationship that is indissoluble. Even the most sacrosanct human relationship admits of lawful separation, and the law does not compel unwilling parties to remain bound in a contractual relationship once the agreed terms for disengagement are followed. In a master–servant relationship, such as the one between the Claimant and the Defendant, the parties are bound by the terms of their contract, and once the procedure stipulated for termination is complied with, the Court lacks the power to foist an unwilling master on a willing servant or vice versa. In the instant case, the Claimant himself acknowledged that the Defendant paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice, which was the fundamental condition agreed upon for termination. Having complied with this agreed procedure, the Defendant submits that the Claimant cannot, under any guise, describe the termination as unconstitutional, illegal or wrongful.

On the legality of the termination, the Defendant contends that the Claimant’s employment was governed by Exhibit DW3, the Letter of Appointment dated 27^th October, 2019, particularly paragraph 7 thereof, which expressly provided that either party could terminate the contract within its subsistence by giving one month’s notice or payment of one month’s salary in lieu. Exhibit DW4, the Termination of Appointment Letter dated 6^th November 2020, clearly communicated the Defendant’s decision that the Claimant’s services were no longer required due to developments within the company and that the termination took immediate effect. The Defendant submits that the immediate termination, coupled with payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice, was squarely within the contemplation of the contract. The combined effect of Exhibits DW3 and DW4, it is argued, leaves no doubt that the Defendant acted strictly in accordance with the contractual terms agreed by the parties.

The Defendant further submits that the relationship between the parties was purely one of master and servant, devoid of statutory flavour. It is trite law that in such relationships, the terms and conditions freely agreed upon by the parties are paramount, especially where they are clear and unambiguous. Reliance is placed on Layade v. Panalpina (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 456) 544 at 555, where the Supreme Court held that, save for contracts governed by statute, a master is entitled to terminate employment in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Applying this settled principle, the Defendant maintains that since it terminated the Claimant’s appointment in strict compliance with paragraph 7 of Exhibit DW3, the termination was proper and lawful.

It is also the Defendant’s contention that in a simple master–servant relationship, the employer’s right to hire inherently carries the right to fire. Once the employer complies with the contractual requirement as to notice or payment in lieu thereof, the termination is valid, irrespective of whether the reason given is arbitrary or even unstated. The Defendant argues that the Claimant’s attempt to link the one-month salary in lieu of notice to sector payments is unsupported by Exhibit DW4, which clearly identifies the payment as salary in lieu of notice.

With respect to the Claimant’s salary structure, the Defendant explains that at the time of the Claimant’s employment, his cumulative salary stood at ?3,000,000.00. However, due to the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic and its devastating impact on the aviation industry, the Defendant was compelled, upon resumption of operations on 16^th July, 2020, to review its salary structure. This review was communicated through internal memos tendered as Exhibits DW1 and DW2, which revised the pilot salary structure first in July, 2020 and again in August, 2020, several months before the Claimant’s termination. The Defendant submits that the Claimant resumed work on 16^th July, 2020 and was paid his salaries for July, August, September, October and part of November, 2020 strictly in line with the revised structure, without protest. By accepting these payments, the Claimant is deemed to have accepted the revised terms.

The Defendant relies on the principle that an employee who accepts and receives payment under altered terms without objection is estopped from later challenging those terms. Authorities are cited, including Chukwu v. Bukar (2020) LPELR-51265 (CA) and Bureau of Public Enterprises v. Reinsurance Acquisition Group Ltd (2022) LPELR-57962 (CA), where the Court of Appeal affirmed that acceptance of altered terms by conduct gives rise to estoppel and that acceptance of terminal benefits constitutes acquiescence and mutual determination of the contract. It is further argued that under paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Defendant’s witness statement on oath, the Claimant’s basic salary at the time of termination was ?571,420.00, which was duly paid to him on 11^th December, 2020 as one month’s salary in lieu of notice, a fact corroborated by Exhibit DW5 and even admitted by the Claimant in paragraph 20 of his witness statement.

The Defendant emphasizes that the law is settled that an employee who receives terminal benefits without protest cannot later complain that his employment was improperly terminated. In Berger Nig. Ltd v. Nwagwu (2006) LPELR-8223 (CA) and Bankole v. NBC Plc (2022) LPELR-57826 (CA), the Court of Appeal held that acceptance of terminal benefits renders the termination mutual and forecloses subsequent complaints. On this basis, the Defendant urges the Court to hold that the Claimant’s employment was lawfully terminated and that all due entitlements, including one month’s salary in lieu of notice and salary for the days worked in November, were duly paid.

Turning to the reliefs sought, the Defendant challenges the Claimant’s claim for unpaid salaries for April, May and June, 2020. It is submitted that the Court is entitled to take judicial notice of the COVID-19 pandemic and the nationwide lockdown declared by the Federal Government with effect from 1^st April, 2020, which led to the complete shutdown of the Defendant’s operations from 27^th March, 2020 until 16^th July, 2020. During this period, there was a mutual understanding between the Defendant and its staff, including the Claimant, that they would proceed on leave without pay, with the option of voluntary resignation for anyone unwilling to accept the arrangement. The Claimant accepted this arrangement and did not work during the period in question. The Defendant submits that the Claimant has failed to establish that he worked or earned salaries for those months as of right.

The Defendant further submits that the Claimant’s claim for these salaries is predicated on newspaper publications alleging that the Federal Government granted bailout funds to airline operators. These publications, tendered as Exhibits CW1 and CW3, are, in law, hearsay and lack probative value, as the makers were not called to testify. Reliance is placed on Bajowa v. FRN (2016) LPELR-40229 (CA) and Ojukwu v. Yar’Adua (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 482) 1065, where the courts held that newspaper reports have no evidential value regarding the truth of their contents. By virtue of sections 37 and 83 of the Evidence Act 2011, the Defendant submits that these exhibits cannot ground the Claimant’s claim for unpaid salaries.

On the claim for the balance of one month’s salary in lieu of notice, the Defendant reiterates that the applicable salary at the time of termination was ?571,420.00, as revised by Exhibits DW1 and DW2, and that this sum was fully paid. Having accepted the revised salary for several months and collected sector payments without objection, the Claimant is estopped by conduct under section 169 of the Evidence Act, 2011 from asserting otherwise. The Defendant relies on Attorney-General of Rivers State v. Attorney-General of Akwa Ibom State (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 579) 1023 to reinforce this submission.

With respect to the claim for annual leave allowance, the Defendant submits that Exhibit DW3 only provides for annual leave, not leave allowance, and that the Claimant’s salary was expressly stated to be cumulative. Furthermore, the Defendant argues that the Claimant, as a professional employee, does not fall within the definition of a “worker” under section 91 of the Labour Act and is therefore not entitled to rely on section 18 of the Act. Even if section 18 were applicable, entitlement would only arise after twelve months of continuous service, and the Claimant’s cumulative salary already subsumed any such entitlement.

On the claim for damages for unlawful termination, the Defendant submits that since the termination was carried out in strict compliance with the contract, the Claimant is not entitled to damages. The law, as stated in Garba v. Kwara Investment Co. Ltd (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 917) 160, is that where termination accords with the contract, the employee’s entitlement is limited to what he would have earned during the notice period, which has already been paid. The Defendant explains that the slight delay in paying the salary in lieu was due to the Claimant’s failure to promptly hand over company property, a fact that was neither challenged in pleadings nor under cross-examination. Unchallenged evidence, the Defendant submits, is deemed admitted, as held in Umoh v. Tita (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 631) 427.

Finally, on the claim for damages for defamation, the Defendant submits that the Claimant has failed to establish the essential elements of defamation, particularly that the alleged defamatory publications were made by the Defendant. The publications relied upon were made by independent media organizations, not by the Defendant or its agents. In Din v. African Newspapers of Nigeria Ltd (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 139) 392, the Supreme Court held that liability for defamation attaches only to the publisher of the defamatory material. The Defendant reiterates that newspaper reports, without the testimony of their makers, cannot prove the truth of their contents, relying again on Lawal v. Governor of Kwara State (Supra) and Lekwot v. Judicial Tribunal (Supra).

In conclusion, the Defendant submits that the Claimant’s employment was lawfully terminated in accordance with the contract, that all his entitlements were duly paid, and that none of the reliefs sought has been established by credible evidence. The Defendant therefore urges the Court to dismiss the Claimant’s case in its entirety with substantial costs for being vexatious, speculative and lacking in merit.

SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT

The Claimant submits that upon a careful consideration of the pleadings, evidence adduced and the applicable principles of law, he has successfully discharged the burden placed upon him to entitle him to judgment in this suit. At the outset, it is pertinent to draw the attention of this Court to the material facts which are no longer in controversy between the parties, having been expressly admitted in the respective pleadings and supported by evidence. Both parties are ad idem that the Claimant was employed by the Defendant as a Line Captain on 24^th June, 2017 and that his agreed monthly salary under the contract of employment was the sum of ?3,000,000.00. It is also common ground that the Defendant terminated the Claimant’s appointment on 6^th November, 2020. Further still, both parties acknowledge that notwithstanding the Defendant’s assertion that the termination was occasioned by operational and financial challenges, the Defendant proceeded to advertise for the recruitment of new pilots in the Punch Newspaper of 30^th November, 2020 to fly the same Boeing 737CL aircraft, with a requirement that applicants provide clearance or letters of no objection from previous employers. The Defendant equally admitted the substance of the averments that this publication revealed that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was actuated by malice and was not founded on any genuine operational necessity.

From these settled facts, only one principle of law clearly emerges, namely that what is admitted needs no further proof. The Supreme Court has firmly settled this position in Mr. Sunday Adegbite Taiwo v. Serah Adegboro & Anor (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1259) 562 at 584 paragraphs B–C, where it was held that once a party admits a fact in issue, no further evidence is required to establish that fact and the court should not entertain any further dispute on it. This principle was reiterated in Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation v. Klifco Nigeria Limited (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1255) 209 at 237 paragraphs F–H. In the present case, the admissions made by the Defendant are neither implied nor ambiguous; they are express, direct and clearly discernible from a comparison of the relevant paragraphs of the Statement of Facts and the Statement of Defence. This Court is therefore entitled to act on those admissions without more.

Turning to the sole issue for determination, the Claimant respectfully submits that he has proved his case on the balance of probabilities. For clarity, the Claimant’s case may be conveniently considered under three broad aspects, namely the wrongful or unlawful termination of his employment, the defamation of his character, and his entitlement to special damages arising from unpaid salaries and leave allowance. The law is trite that he who asserts must prove, and failure to adduce evidence in support of an assertion is fatal to the case of the party making it. This position finds statutory expression in sections 131, 132 and 133 of the Evidence Act, 2011 and has been judicially affirmed in Onuh & Ors v. Idu & Ors (2002) RVLR (Pt. 94) 66 at 79–80. In compliance with this burden, the Claimant called one witness whose evidence was cogent, consistent and supported by documentary exhibits.

On the issue of wrongful termination, the Claimant submits that this aspect of his claim is no longer in doubt, given the express admissions by the Defendant in paragraph 12 of the Statement of Defence, where the Defendant admitted the substance of paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Claimant’s Statement of Facts. By settled law, such admissions dispense with the need for further proof, as restated in Mr. Sunday Adegbite Taiwo v. Serah Adegboro & Anor (supra). Nevertheless, and in an abundance of caution, the Claimant led uncontroverted evidence by tendering his letter of appointment, the letter of termination and the Punch Newspaper publication of 30^th November 2020. The letter of appointment clearly stipulates that either party may terminate the contract upon giving one month’s notice or one month’s salary in lieu thereof, and it unequivocally fixes the Claimant’s salary at ?3,000,000.00 per month. The Defendant terminated the Claimant’s appointment without giving the requisite notice or paying the stipulated salary in lieu contemporaneously with the termination, thereby acting in flagrant breach of the contract. Although the Defendant alleged that it paid the sum of ?571,420.00 as salary in lieu, such payment was made over a month after the termination and only after the Claimant’s solicitor had issued a demand. More importantly, the sum paid does not reflect the contractual salary agreed by the parties, and there is no evidence of any variation or review of the salary clause in the contract. The Defendant’s conduct therefore constitutes a clear violation of the terms of employment, rendering the termination wrongful and unlawful. The Punch Newspaper publication further demonstrates that the purported reliance on financial difficulties occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic was merely a pretext, as the Defendant was actively recruiting new pilots shortly after terminating the Claimant’s employment.

With respect to defamation, the Claimant submits that he adduced credible evidence establishing that the Defendant published libellous statements against him through widely circulated print and online media. The Business Day Newspaper and the Nigerian Flight Deck publication of 9^th November, 2020 contained statements attributed to the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Defendant, which portrayed the Claimant in a damaging light. These publications were not challenged, denied or corrected by the Defendant at any time. On the contrary, the Defendant sought to rely on portions of the same publications during cross-examination, thereby acknowledging their existence and relevance. By this conduct, the Defendant is estopped from denying responsibility for the publications. The law on defamation is well settled, as articulated in Okolie v. Marinho (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1002) 316 at 335–337, where the court defined a defamatory publication as one calculated to lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society or injure him in his profession or calling. The Court of Appeal further clarified the concept of publication in Zabuski v. Israeli Aircraft Industries (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1070) 109 at 136 and 144, holding that the essence of libel lies not merely in the writing but in the communication of the offending material to third parties. The Claimant submits that the unchallenged exhibits tendered satisfy all the elements of libel and establish that the Defendant’s actions caused him serious reputational injury.

On the claim for special damages, the Claimant led direct evidence that the Defendant withheld his salaries for the months of April, May and June 2020, as well as his annual leave allowance for the year 2020. The Claimant’s witness testified that despite the Defendant receiving substantial bailout funds, his outstanding entitlements were not paid. Crucially, the Defendant failed to cross-examine the Claimant on this material evidence and did not adduce any documentary proof to rebut it. By virtue of sections 133 and 136 of the Evidence Act, 2011, once the Claimant adduced evidence sufficient to establish these facts, the evidential burden shifted to the Defendant to disprove them. The Supreme Court in APC v. Obaseki (2022) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1814) 273 at 302–303 affirmed that the burden of proof in civil cases is dynamic and shifts as evidence is led. The Defendant’s failure to challenge or contradict the Claimant’s evidence entitles this Court to act upon it, as restated by the Supreme Court in CBN v. Okojie (2015) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1449) 231 at 258.

Similarly, the evidence that the Defendant refused to pay the Claimant’s leave allowance for 2020 was not challenged under cross-examination. The attempt by the Defendant’s witness to suggest that leave allowance was cumulative and included in salary was not supported by any pleading. It is trite law that evidence on facts not pleaded goes to no issue and must be discountenanced. This principle has been consistently upheld in Ladipo v. Ajani (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 517) 356, Lana v. University of Ibadan (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 64) 245 and George v. Dominion Flour Mills Ltd. (1963) 1 All NLR 71.

Finally, the Claimant submits that civil cases are decided on the preponderance of evidence. In Onowhosa v. Odiuzou (1999) 1 NWLR (Pt. 586) 173 at 183, the Supreme Court held that the court must weigh the totality of the evidence on an imaginary scale to determine which side carries greater weight. When the evidence led by both parties in this case is so weighed, it is clear that the Claimant’s evidence is more credible, cogent and compelling.

In conclusion, the Claimant respectfully urges the Court to resolve the issue for determination in his favour and grant all the reliefs sought, having regard to the admissions of the Defendant, the unchallenged and uncontroverted evidence led by the Claimant, and the settled principles of law governing wrongful termination, defamation and special damages.

CLAIMANT’S REPLY TO THE DEFENDANT’S FINAL ADDRESS

On the 5^th November, 2025, the Claimant filed what he called “The Claimant’s Reply to the Defendant’s Final Address.” This process will be considered in due course.

DECISION OF THE COURT

I have carefully considered the pleadings, the evidence adduced, the submissions of learned counsel and the authorities cited and I think the issue which calls for determination in this case is: Whether the Claimant has placed sufficient evidence to prove his case against the Defendant to be entitled to the reliefs sought.

The Claimant seeks reliefs relating to alleged unpaid salaries, balance of salary in lieu of notice, annual leave entitlement, damages for unlawful termination of employment, and damages for defamation of character. The principal question arising from the evidence is whether the termination of the Claimant’s employment was wrongful or unlawful and, if not, whether the Claimant nonetheless proved entitlement to the monetary and ancillary reliefs claimed, including damages for defamation.

Before a consideration of these questions/issues, it is pertinent to look at the Claimant’s Reply to the Defendant’s Final Address. It is on the record that at the close of defence on the 9^th July, 2025, the case was adjourned to 7^th October, 2025 for adoption of final written addresses. As a result of the failure of the Defendant to file its final address within time, the Claimant went ahead to file his final written address on the 2^nd October, 2025 and a motion on notice to foreclose the Defendant from filing same on the 20^th October, 2025. With the leave of court on the 23^rd February, 2026, the motion to foreclose was struck out and the motion for extension of time for the Defendant to the final address out of time was granted. It was under this circumstance that the Claimant filed the so-called Claimant’s Reply to the Defendant’s Final Address on the 5^th of November, 2025. Having not deemed it fit to withdraw and re-file his Final Written Address after the Final Address by the Defendant, the said reply is of no moment. It is unnecessary, surplus to requirement, procedurally unknown and therefore discountenanced. I so hold.

To determine whether the termination of the Claimant’s employment was wrongful or unlawful, I will be most guided at all times by the dictates of the Supreme Court in a long line of cases such as Kato v. CBN (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 390, Ibama v. S.P.D.C. (Nigeria) Limited (2005) 17 NWLR (Pt. 954) 364 and Ziideel v. R.S.C.S.C (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 554. The underlining principles in all these cases and many more, is to the effect that an employee seeking the declaration that the termination of his appointment is a nullity must plead and prove the following material facts:

a) The nature of the employment.

b) The condition of service.

c) The circumstances under which the appointment can be terminated.

I intend to analyse the pleadings and evidence in this case in the light of material facts (a-c) above and will only refer to the arguments of the parties where necessary. From the facts of this case, there is no dispute between the parties that the Claimant was employed by the Defendant as a Line Captain by a letter of appointment dated 27^th August, 2019, that his employment was terminated by a letter dated 6^th November, 2020, and that the employment relationship was one of private employment not clothed with statutory flavour. These facts were clearly admitted by both parties and therefore require no further proof. The law is settled that facts admitted need no further proof. See NNPC v. Klifco Nig. Ltd (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1255) 209. In any event, whether an employment is with statutory flavour or under the common law principles of master and servant, the fact of the employment and the terms and conditions of same must not only be pleaded but must be proved by evidence before a determination of the wrongful nature of the termination can be considered by the court. See Aji v. Chad Basin (2015) 3 S.C.N.J. 407-408, per Walter S. N. Onnoghen, J.S.C (as he then was).

As for the Condition of Service, what governs the relationship between the parties is Exhibit A, the Claimant’s Letter of Appointment. Paragraph 7 thereof expressly provides that either party may terminate the employment by giving one month’s notice or payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice. It is trite law that in a simple master–servant relationship, the rights and obligations of the parties are governed strictly by the terms of their contract, and where the contract is clear and unambiguous, the Court is bound to give effect to it.

Next is the circumstance under which the appointment can be terminated. Generally, the onus is on the Claimant to prove that the determination of his employment is wrongful and unlawful. However, where as in this case, the employer gives a reason or cause for the determination of the appointment, the law imposes on the employer the duty to establish the reason to the satisfaction of the court. See the cases of Shell v. Olarewaju (2008) 12 S.C.N.J. (Pt. 11) 696-697, Nipost v. Musa (2013) LPELR-20780 (C), Olatunbosun v. N.I.S.E.R Council (1988) 1 NCC (1025) 188 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 25 and more particularly Institute of Health v. Anyip (2011) 5 S.C.N.J. 262, where C. M. Chukwuma-Eneh, J.S.C. put it succinctly thus:

“Although it is trite that an employer is not obliged to give any reason for firing his servant all the same it is settled law that where he has proffered any reason at all it is obliged to satisfactorily prove the same as the onus is on him in that regard, otherwise the termination/dismissal may constitute a wrongful dismissal without more.”

This is also the purport and tenor of Articles 4 and Article 9 (2) (a) of the Termination of Employment Convention No. 158 of 1982 which stipulates that an employer can terminate an employee’s employment only on valid reasons and which also shifts the traditional paradigm by placing the burden of proof on the employer respectively. This is further reinforced by the Supreme Court case of Skye Bank Plc v. Adegun (2024) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1960) SC.

The reason for the termination of the Claimant’s employment can be found in the underlined sentence of the first paragraph of Exhibit DW 4, thus:

6^th November, 2020

TERMINATION OF APPOINTMENT

Management of Azman Air Services Ltd wishes to communicate its profound gratitude for the services rendered to it, from your employment to date, however, due to the recent happenings and developments in the Company, Management directed to convey its decision that your services is no longer required, therefore, same terminated with immediate effect.

Kindly, arrange to handover all company’s property in your possession, including ID/ODC Cards to the Chief Security Officer, who is to certify collection, by completing and signing of the attached disengagement/clearance form and return to Admin and HR Department for record. After successful handing over of the Company property, your one month in lieu of notice will be paid to you, as appropriate.

Management wishes you best of luck in your future endeavors.

Signed

Magaji Mohammed Misau

ADMIN & HR MANAGER

The onus or burden is therefore on the Defendant to prove or justify to the satisfaction of the court that due to the recent happenings and developments in the Company, the Claimant’s services are no longer required. To prove that, the Defendant testified through Nuruddeen Aliyu, its Assistant General Manager, who testified as DW and tendered five (5) Exhibits (DW1 to DW5). Exhibit DW1 is the Reviewed Pilots Salary Structure dated 16^th July, 2020. Exhibit DW2 is the Re: Request for Temporary Pre-Covid Pilots Salary Review sent to the Chief Accountant for implementation effective from 26^th August, 2020. Exhibit DW3 is Claimant’s Letter of Appointment dated 27^th August, 2019. Exhibit DW4 is the Termination Letter dated 6^th November, 2020 while Exhibit DW5 is the Statement of Account of the Defendant for the period of 11^th December, 2020 to 17^th December, 2020. It should be noted that apart from Exhibits DW1 and DW2, which are the same in content and a feeble reference to the effects of the Covid 19 on business, there was nothing to show the recent happenings and developments in the Company which necessitated the decision that the services of the Claimant is no longer required. In other words, the decision to terminate the Claimant’s appointment was not purely a business decision necessitated by prevailing economic realities and carried out strictly within the framework of the contractual agreement. There is equally nothing in both the pleadings of the Defendant and evidence of the DW in that regard. I have therefore no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the Defendant did not discharge burden to prove or justify that the termination of Claimant was as a result of the recent happenings and developments in the Company to my satisfaction. I so find and hold.

In spite of the above finding and holding, I am duty bound to consider the evidence put forward by the Claimant as regards the unlawfulness or otherwise of his termination for evaluation. Out of the ten (10) Exhibits tendered by the Claimant, I find only Exhibits A (Letter of Appointment dated 27/08/2019), Exhibit B1 (Termination Letter dated 6^th November, 2020) and Exhibit C (Defendant’s advert for Pilot in the Punch Newspaper of Monday, 30^th November, 2020) germane in proving that the termination is wrongful. A combine reading of Exhibits A and B satisfied the requirements as to the nature and terms of employment and how they are breached. While Exhibit A stipulates that his employment can be terminated by either party with one month written notice or payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice, Exhibit B1 terminated the Claimant’s employment with immediate effect. The Defendant’s evidence shows that the Claimant was paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice, though after the termination had taken effect. The Claimant himself admitted receipt of this payment but contended that it was both belated and inadequate.

From the foregoing, it is easy to conclude that the Claimant’s termination is wrongful for failure of the Defendant to establish or justify the reason for the termination as valid, in accordance with settled judicial authorities and Termination of Employment Convention No. 158 of 1982. Coupled with this is the Defendant’s failure to adhere to the agreed termination clause. This is particularly so as the Defendant who ended the employment contract on the 6^th November, 2020 paid the in lieu of notice on 11^th December, 2020. In other words, the salary in lieu must be offered with the termination letter contemporaneously. See NEPA v. Isiereore (1997) 7 NWLR (Pt. 511) 135 CA and NNPC v. Idoniboye-Oba (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt. 427) 655 CA.

Since the Defendant is liable for the wrongful termination of the Claimant and on the authority of Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Soares (2012) 29 NLLR (Pt. 84) 329 at 377 and Aremu v. Anusionwa (2018) ALL FWLR Pt. 962 1668 at 1688 paras E-H, damages of whatever kind are a function of liability, it goes without saying that the Claimant is entitled to damages. See the case of Dudusola v. Nigeria Gas (2013) 3 S.C.N.J. 35-36. The question is what manner of damages? Can it be damages for breach of the terms of contract in the sum of N10,000,000.00 in relief 4?

The nature of damages recoverable in employment is always a knotty one. The damages recoverable in employment cases have well been pronounced upon by our courts in several decided cases. Where there is a written provision for terminating the contract of employment, and there is a breach, the employee would only be entitled to the salary for the period of the notice; Gateway Bank of Nig Plc v. Abosede (2001) FWLR (Pt. 79) at 1337. Such damages are said to be the losses reasonably foreseeable by the parties; Shena v. Afropak (2008) 5 S.C.N.J. 92. The damages claimed needed not to be specifically pleaded but arises from inference of the law and provable by evidence; Union Bank v. Chimaeze (2014) 4 S.C.N.J. 59. The fact that the damages are difficult to assess does not disentitle a party to compensation from a breach of contract or the fact that the amount of such loss cannot be precisely ascertained, does not deprive the party either; Marine Management v. N.M.A (2012) 12 S.C.N.J. 169, per Mahmud Mohammed, J.S.C (as he then was now retired CJN). There is also the new vista enunciated in the case of Sahara Energy Resources Limited v. Mrs Olawunmi Oyebola, Appeal No.CA/L/1091/2016, delivered on the 3^rdNovember, 2020 for the application of international best practices in view of the provisions of Section 254C (1) (f) of the 1999 Constitution in the Third Alteration and Section 7 (6) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006. On the authority of the above case and having wrongly terminated the Claimant’s employment, I am inclined to award the Claimant damages in the sum of N5,000,000.00 only.

What is then the fate of the other reliefs by the Claimant in this case? Reliefs 1, 2, 3 and 5 are monetary in nature. The law is that in a labour case such as this one, it is the Claimant who has the burden of proving his entitlement to the claim and the quantum of his claim in terms of how he came by the said claim. To prove an entitlement, the employee must refer the Court to the exact provisions of the law, instrument or document that conferred the entitlement. See Oyo State v. Alhaji Apapa & Ors (2008) 11 NLLR (Pt. 29) 284 and Mr. Mohammed Dungus & ors v. ENL Consortium Ltd (2015) 60 NLLR (Pt. 208) 39. In other words, it is the duty of the Claimant to plead only such facts and materials as are necessary to sustain the reliefs sought and adduce evidence to prove same. See Gabriel Ativie v. Kabelmetal (Nig.) Ltd (2008) LPELR-591 (SC); (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 399; (2008) 5-6 SC (Pt. II) 47.

Before I take the reliefs in turns, it imperative to determine the applicable salary for the purpose of calculating the claims for unpaid salaries and the salary in lieu of notice as claimed in reliefs 1 and 2 respectively. The Defendant tendered Exhibits DW1 and DW2, which show a downward review of pilots’ salaries occasioned by the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The evidence before the Court establishes that the Claimant resumed work after the lockdown and received his salaries under the reviewed structure for several months. To the Defendant, the Claimant have been collecting the reviewed salaries without protest and that it is settled law that where an employee accepts altered terms of employment and continues to work and receive payment thereunder without objection, he is deemed to have accepted the new terms and is estopped from resiling therefrom. This principle was restated by the Court of Appeal in FBN Ltd v. Owie (2024) LPELR-61789 (CA). By way of adumbration on the day of adoption of final written addresses, the Defendant in reply to the Claimant’s submission on the issue of estoppel advanced that paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Statement of Defence are adequate indications of estoppel. Relying on the case of CBN v. Aribo (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 162 para D-E, per Kekere-Ekun, JSC, the Defendant further argued that the plea of estoppel does not have to be specifically pleaded or take any particular form as long as it can be inferred from the facts of the case. On his part, the Claimant asserted that the reason for his termination vide the Business Day Newspaper published on 9^th November 2020 is that he and other pilots were sacked for indiscipline and promotion of anarchy, having allegedly complained about delayed and reduced salaries. The fixing of salaries in employment is a mutual action involving the employer and the employee as reflected in the Letter of Appointment (Exhibit A). I have taken a hard look at the Reviewed Pilots Salary Structure and the Re: Request for Temporary Pre-Covid 19 Pilots Salary Review (Exhibits DW1 and DW2) respectively, I cannot find any input by the Claimant to indicate the acceptance of the reviewed salary. So the testimony of the Claimant that he did not sign or agree to the salary review which was not refuted by the Defendant during cross examination is imperative. There is therefore force in the Court of Appeal case of Stabilini v. Obasi (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 520) 293 at 301 para. E, per Salami, JCA, cited by the Claimant to the effect that an internal memo or requisition cannot constitute or create a contractual obligation. It is therefore my finding and holding that the applicable salary at the time of termination of the Claimant was ?3,000,000.00.

The law is now settled that failure to pay salary in lieu of notice contemporaneously with termination does not render the termination unlawful or void; it only gives rise to a claim for the amount due. The Court of Appeal recently reaffirmed this position in U.B.N. Plc v. Soares (2023) LPELR-60276 (CA). The claim for balance of salary in lieu of notice in the sum of N2,438,580 (Two Million Four Hundred and Twenty Eight Thousand, Five Hundred and Eighty Naira only) therefore hereby succeeds.

Next is relief 1 for the payment to the Claimant of the sum of N9,000,000 (Nine Million Naira only) being unpaid salaries for the months of April, May and June 2020 at N3,000,000 (Three Million Naira only) per month. The Defendant’s evidence is that its operations were completely shut down during the COVID-19 lockdown and that staff, including the Claimant, were placed on leave without pay by mutual understanding. The Defendant however failed to place before the Court any documentary evidence to that effect and without any such agreement or prove the Claimant is entitled to his salary notwithstanding total operational shutdown. I therefore find that the Claimant is entitled to the claimed unpaid salaries.

Not so with respect to the claim for annual leave allowance. Exhibit A provides for annual leave but does not provide for payment of leave allowance or cash in lieu thereof. The Claimant’s salary was expressly stated to be cumulative. Furthermore, the Claimant, being a professional pilot in private employment, does not fall within the definition of a “worker” under Section 91 of the Labour Act and cannot rely on Section 18 thereof. This position has been consistently maintained by this Court, including in Sule v. Nigerian Bottling Company Ltd (2022) 59 NLLR (Pt. 207) 404. There is therefore no contractual or statutory basis for the claim for annual leave allowance, and it accordingly fails.

The same goes for the claim of defamation Relief 5. The Claimant relied on publications in newspapers and online platforms alleging that he was dismissed for indiscipline and promotion of anarchy. To succeed in an action for defamation, the Claimant must establish that the defamatory words were published by or at the instance of the Defendant. The Defendant denied authoring or authorizing the publications, and the publishers were neither joined nor called as witnesses. The law is settled that failure to link a defendant directly to the publication complained of is fatal to a claim for defamation. See Arulogun v. Abdul-Rahman (2024) LPELR-61802 (CA), Din v. African Newspaper of Nig. Ltd. (1990) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 139) 192, Iioabachie v. Iioabachie (2005) 5 S.C.N.J. 314, to mention but a few. I find that the Claimant failed to establish this essential element, and the claim for defamation must therefore fail.

On the totality of the evidence and on the balance of probabilities, the Claimant is entitled to the following reliefs:

1. An Order for the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N9,000,000 (Nine Million Naira only) being unpaid salaries for the months of April, May and June 2020 at N3,000,000 (Three Million Naira only) per month.

2. An order for the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N2,438,580 (Two Million Four Hundred and Twenty Eight Thousand, Five Hundred and Eighty Naira only) being balance of one month salary in lieu of termination as specified in the Claimant’s employment letter.

3. An order for the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N5,000,000 (Five Million Naira only) as damages for unlawful termination.

4. All payments to be effected 30 days from today.

Judgment is entered accordingly.

………………………….

JUSTICE MAHMOOD ABBA NAMTARI