IN
THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN
THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN
AT LAGOS
BEFORE
HIS LORDSHIP, HON. JUSTICE IKECHI GERALD NWENEKA
Date: Monday, 9th March 2026 SUIT NO. NICN/LA/399/2022
BETWEEN
MRS. OLUYEMI OBADARE … CLAIMANT
AND
NIGERIAN EXCHANGE LIMITED … DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
The claim
1. The Claimant initiated this suit on 19th
October 2022, and in her third amended statement of facts dated 27th August
2025, but filed on 3rd September 2025, she sought the following reliefs:
a.
Bonus
payout in the sum of N7, 000, 000
(seven million naira) due to the Claimant as the Defendant’s Head, Information
Security and Business Continuity from March 2021 to September 2021.
b.
Bonus
payout in the sum of N3,000,000 due to the
Claimant as the Defendant’s acting Chief Risk Officer from September 2021 to April
2022.
c.
Six
months’ salary in lieu of notice in the sum of N6,645, 924.54 (six million, six hundred and forty-five thousand,
nine hundred and twenty-four naira, fifty-four kobo).
d.
Order
of specific performance directing the inclusion of a clause acknowledging the Claimant’s
contribution (N5,995,000) to the
purchase of the status car in the vehicle purchase agreement.
e.
Order
of specific performance arrogating the work of the Claimant to the Business
Continuity Management Team, not the Business Continuity Steering Committee
(BCSC), in line with the rulebook and responsibilities within Business
Continuity Management practice in the LBS Case Study – Nigerian Exchange Group;
Riding the Tides.
f.
Sum of N20,000,000 as damages for unlawful withholding of the
Claimant’s benefits since April 2022.
g.
Post-judgment
interest at the prevalent Central Bank of Nigeria’s rate.
h.
Consequential orders that this Honourable Court may
deem fit to grant in the circumstances.
Counterclaim
2. After
receiving the originating process, the Defendant submitted a conditional
memorandum of appearance, a statement of defence, and a counterclaim, along
with a motion on notice to regularise the processes on 11th January 2023. The
Defendant counterclaimed against the Claimant for:
a. A
declaration that the Counterclaimant has a right to immediately set off the sum
of ?12,914,334.34 (twelve million, nine hundred and fourteen thousand, three
hundred and thirty-four naira, thirty-four kobo), being the agreed purchase
price of the status vehicle from the exit benefits of the Defendant to counterclaim.
b.
A declaration that the exit
benefits of the Defendant to counterclaim be deemed paid by setting off the sum
of ?12,914,334.34 (twelve million, nine hundred and fourteen thousand, three
hundred and thirty-four naira, thirty-four kobo) being the Defendant to the counterclaim’s
outstanding debt to the Defendant less the sum of ?5,995,000.00 (five million
nine hundred and ninety five thousand naira) which the Counterclaimant (sic,
Claimant) contributed to the purchase of the status car and the 20% write-off
which the Defendant magnanimously approved of the Net Book Value) of the status
vehicle from her final entitlement in the sum of ?6,610,966.44 (six million, six hundred and
ten thousand, nine hundred and sixty- six naira, forty-four kobo).
c.
An order directing the Defendant to counterclaim to
pay the sum of ?6,303,367.90 (six million, three hundred and three thousand,
three hundred and sixty-seven naira, ninety kobo), being the outstanding sum on
the purchase of the status car after the application of the Claimant’s exit
benefits to set off part of the vehicle purchase price.
d.
An order directing the Defendant to counterclaim to
pay the sum of ?10,000,000.00 (ten million naira), being solicitors’
fees.
e.
Cost of this action.
f.
And for such further order or other orders as this Court
may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case.
Brief
history of the case
3. The memorandum of appearance, statement of defence, and
counterclaim were deemed properly filed and served on 9th March 2023. The
Claimant filed a reply to the statement of defence and a defence to the
counterclaim on 28th March 2023. By an order of the Court made on 9th March
2023, the Claimant was granted leave to amend her statement of facts and sworn statement,
which were filed on 28th March 2023. Subsequently, the Claimant filed a second
amended statement of facts, dated 29th November 2023, pursuant to a Court order
made on 12th October 2023. Additionally, in accordance with a Court order made
on 22nd October 2025, the Claimant’s third amended statement of facts, dated
27th August 2025 but filed on 3rd September 2025, was deemed properly filed and
served.
4. The trial commenced on
11th July 2023 and concluded on 12th October 2023. During this period, the
Claimant adopted her two sworn statements, both dated 28th March 2023, and
tendered 26 documents marked as Exhibits 1-26 before being cross-examined.
Exhibit D1 was tendered by the Defendant’s counsel through the Claimant during cross-examination.
Following this, the suit was adjourned to 12th October 2023 for the defence. At
the resumed hearing on 12th October 2023, Ademola Adebayo, the Defendant’s Chief
Human Resources Officer, testified and tendered 14 documents marked as Exhibits
D2-D14, subject to the Claimant’s right to object to admissibility in the final
written address. He was then cross-examined and re-examined. The suit was
subsequently adjourned to 4th December 2023 for the adoption of final written
addresses and then to 1st February 2024. After several adjournments, the
hearing resumed on 29th October 2024, during which the Claimant's evidence
continued. She adopted her sworn statement dated 10th January 2024 as further
evidence and tendered three additional documents marked as Exhibits 27, 28, and
29, subject to the Defendant's right to object to the admissibility of Exhibits
27 and 29 in the final written address. She was then cross-examined. The suit
was adjourned to 5th February 2025 to adopt final written addresses. However,
on 22nd January 2025, the Defendant was granted leave to recall its witness,
and the suit was adjourned to 11th March 2025 to continue the trial. At the
resumed hearing on 11th March 2025, the Defendant’s witness provided further
evidence but was not cross-examined. The suit was then adjourned to adopt final
written addresses. The parties exchanged their final written addresses, which
were adopted on 9th December 2025, and the matter was set down for judgment.
Brief facts of the
case
5. The Claimant was employed as a Business
Continuity Manager in the Defendant’s Information Security Department, as
outlined in her letter of employment dated 27th May 2014. During her tenure,
she advanced through the ranks. The Claimant asserts that she was solely
responsible for developing and establishing the Business Continuity procedural
plans for the Defendant and contributed to the formation of the Nigerian
Exchange Group. She claims that the BCSC team lacked the capacity to create
Business Continuity and IT disaster recovery plans that were in compliance with
the Rule Book. Upon her termination due to redundancy, the Defendant increased
her terminal benefits to six months’ salary in lieu of notice and wrote off 20%
of the net book value of the status car assigned to her. The Claimant states
that the Defendant paid her N17,000,000
(seventeen million naira) for the status car, and she added N5,995,000 from her own funds to purchase
a 2020 Honda CRV, which was valued at N22,000,000.
The Claimant valued the status car at N12,914,334.34,
after deducting the N5,995,000 and
accounting for the 20% write-off of its net book value. She contends that her entitlements
remain unpaid despite her involuntary exit. The Defendant has responded to the
Claimant’s assertions in its statement of defence and has counterclaimed
against her.
Summary of final
written addresses
6. The learned counsel for the Claimant nominated five issues for
determination in the final written address dated and filed on 30th October 2025:
a.
Whether
or not the Claimant is entitled to a bonus payout as the Defendant’s Head,
Information Security and Business Continuity, and as the Defendant’s acting Chief Risk Officer?
b.
Whether
or not the Claimant is entitled to an order of specific performance directing
the inclusion of a clause acknowledging her contribution of N5,995,000 to the purchase of the status
car in the vehicle purchase agreement?
c.
Whether
or not the Claimant is entitled to an order of specific performance assigning
her work to the Business Continuity Management Team, rather than the Business
Continuity Steering Committee (BCSC), in accordance with the rulebook and
responsibilities within Business Continuity Management practice?
d.
Whether
or not the Claimant is entitled to six months' salary in lieu of notice in the
sum of N6,645,924.54?
e.
Whether
or not the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N20,000,000
as damages for the unlawful withholding of her benefits since April 2022.
7. On
the first issue, the learned counsel argued that, based on the combination of
the employment contract and the performance incentive scheme policy of the
Defendant, the Claimant is entitled to a bonus payout. Counsel asserts that the
Claimant has successfully advanced through various ranks and has performed
exceptionally in her tasks. Referring to paragraphs 2.1, 7.8, and 7.3 of
Exhibit 28, counsel reviewed the Claimant’s evidence and asserts that the Claimant
has fulfilled the pre-conditions for eligibility for the bonus payout, as
demonstrated by Exhibit 27. As a result, she is entitled to receive the bonus.
In support of this argument, the case of Dangote Cement Plc v. Ager [2024]
10 NWLR (Pt 1945) was cited. Counsel further contends that the Defendant’s
refusal to pay the Claimant’s entitlements before her exit constitutes a
violation of principles of fairness and good faith, referencing Section 11[7]
of the Labour Act. Additionally, it was noted that the evidence provided by the
Defendant regarding the payment of the bonus is inconsistent, with the case of Robert
v. I.G.P [2021] 7 NWLR (Pt 1775) 268 cited in support. Counsel summarised
the Claimant’s evidence based on Exhibit 29, asserting its admissibility under
Sections 13 and 89(c) of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended) [“the Evidence
Act”]. It was argued that it is improper for the Defendant to withhold the
Claimant’s bonus, relying on Ulegede v. The Military Administrator of Benue
State [2001] 2 NWLR (Pt 696) 73 at 91. Lastly, counsel referred to
Exhibits 28 and 29, as well as the letter dated 1st August 2022, and argued
that the Defendant is estopped, per Section 169 of the Evidence Act, from
denying its obligation to pay the bonus. Therefore, counsel concludes that the
Claimant has demonstrated her entitlement to the bonus.
8. In
addressing the second issue, the learned counsel summarised the Claimant's
evidence regarding the purchase of the status car and argued that the Claimant
has established her entitlement to relief four. The counsel equated the
Defendant's refusal to acknowledge the Claimant's contribution to the car
purchase in the agreement to unjust enrichment, citing Uzoukwu v. Idika
[2022] 3 NWLR (Pt 1818) 403 and Anyaoha v. Obioha [2014] 6 NWLR (Pt
1404) 445. Therefore, the counsel submitted that the Claimant has proven
her entitlement to the claim by making financial contributions, citing the case
of Bioku Inv. Property Co. Ltd v. Light Machine Ind. [Nig.] Ltd [1986] 5
NWLR (Pt 39) 42, and urged the Court to grant the claim. In arguing the
third issue, the learned counsel summarised the Claimant's evidence regarding
her contributions and the role she played in establishing and developing the
Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plans for the Defendant prior to the
formation of the Business Continuity Steering Committee (BCSC). The counsel
asserted that, because documentary evidence is the most reliable form of proof,
the Defendant's acknowledgment in the crisis management manual constitutes
evidence of the Claimant's involvement in creating the BCSC. The counsel
further noted that while the Defendant credited different members of the BCSC
with creating the Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plans, this
attribution lacks supporting evidence. Therefore, the learned counsel contended
that the Claimant has demonstrated that she was solely responsible for the
development of the Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plans, urging the
Court to recognise this contribution.
9. In addressing the fourth issue, the learned counsel referenced the
case of Chukwuma v. Shell Petroleum [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt 289)
512, arguing that when an employment contract specifies a notice period or a
payment in lieu of notice, that term must be strictly followed. Counsel
asserted that the Claimant is entitled to either notice of termination or
payment of salary in lieu of notice. Furthermore, it was argued that the
Defendant violated the employment contract by failing to pay the Claimant’s six
months' basic salary as terminal benefits, citing Obanye v. Union Bank of Nigeria
Plc [2018] 17 NWLR (Pt 1648) 375 in support. As a result, the learned counsel
contended that, since this payment has become due, it is recoverable as a
liquidated money demand, which is subject to grant once proven, relying on Capital
Oil & Gas Ind. Ltd v. Oteri Holdings Ltd [2021] 1 NWLR (Pt 1758) 483, among other cases. The
Court was therefore urged to grant the claim. On issue five, counsel referenced
the case of British Airways v. Makanjuola [1993] 8 NWLR (Pt
311) 276, along with other precedents, to argue that the Claimant is entitled to
an award of general damages. Counsel stated that the Claimant has sufficiently
demonstrated the Defendant's breach of contract by failing to pay her benefits,
which have been overdue since April 2022. The Court was urged to grant the Claimant’s
claims and to dismiss the counterclaim.
10. The
learned senior counsel for the Defendant raised two issues for determination in
the final written address dated 10th November 2025:
a.
On the state of pleadings
and evidence led in this case, whether the Claimant has successfully discharged
the burden of proof placed on her to be entitled to reliefs sought.
b. Whether
the Defendant is entitled to the reliefs sought in the counterclaim.
Before discussing the issues, the learned senior counsel submitted that
the burden of proof lies with the Claimant. An employee who asserts a breach of
contract must provide evidence to support the claim, citing Katto v. CBN
[1996] 6 NWLR (Pt 607) 390 and Morohunfola v. Kwara State College of
Technology [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt 145) 506 as references.
11. In
addressing the first issue, the learned senior counsel argued that the Claimant
has not demonstrated any entitlement to the reliefs sought. The counsel summarised
the Claimant’s case and asserted that, in accordance with the principle of
pleading, the Claimant has a duty to present evidence to support reliefs 1, 2,
5, and 6. Referring to the case of Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc v. LGC Ltd [2018] 10 NWLR
(Pt 1626) 96 at 140, 159-160 and other relevant cases, the learned senior
counsel contended that parties are bound by their pleadings and that if no
evidence is provided to support the pleaded facts, those averments are deemed
abandoned. In this case, the Claimant is required to present evidence to
support her pleadings in order to be entitled to the reliefs sought, a duty
that she did not fulfil, as established in Arambambi & Anor v. Advance
Beverages Industries Ltd [2005] 12 SCNJ 331 and other cases. The learned
senior counsel also pointed out that both parties agree that the Claimant’s
employment was terminated on the grounds of redundancy. Regarding the issue of
bonus payout, the counsel cited Order 3 Rule 12 of the National Industrial
Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, and the unreported case of Ineh
Monday Mgbeti v. Unity Bank Plc, Suit No. NICN/LA/98/2014, decided on 21st February
2017, and Skye Bank Plc v. Adegun Plc [2024] 15 NWLR (Pt
1960) 1, and submitted that the Claimant has not substantiated her claim for a
monetary award, which falls under the category of special damages and must be
specifically pleaded and proven. Furthermore, it was argued that the Claimant
failed to identify and prove the specific provisions in her employment contract
that entitle her to a bonus payout. In any case, it was noted that a bonus
payout was not specified in the Claimant’s employment contract. The learned
senior counsel referred to the unreported case of Ogbogbo Chiedu Patrick v. United
Bank for Africa Plc, Suit No. NICN/PHC/17/2024, judgment delivered on 13th
January 2025, and argued that the Claimant was unable to link Exhibits 27, 28,
and 29 to her claim for a bonus payout. Drawing on the Defendant’s witness
testimony under cross-examination, the learned senior counsel further argued
that the Claimant has not established her entitlement to a bonus payout,
thereby disqualifying her from reliefs 1 and 2. The Court was urged to rule in
favour of the Defendant.
12. Regarding the Claimant’s contribution to the
purchase of the status car, the learned senior counsel stated that both parties
agree on the Claimant’s contribution and the total amount contributed. This
contribution was factored into the 20% write-off applied to the net book value
of the status car, resulting in an agreed sum of N12,914,334.34. It was argued that if the parties did not agree on
the Claimant’s contributions, the Court would be unable to issue the requested
order, as doing so would interfere with the parties’ contractual rights. In
relation to the Claimant’s involvement with the Business Continuity Management
Team, the learned senior counsel argued that this claim contradicts the
provisions outlined in the employment contract, Exhibit D2, which states that
all work performed by the Claimant during employment is the property of the
Defendant. Consequently, it was argued that the Claimant is not entitled to the
fourth and fifth claims. The Court was urged to uphold this position.
13. Regarding the issue of six months' salary in
lieu of notice and exit benefits, the learned senior counsel argued that there
is unchallenged documentary evidence, specifically Exhibit D6, indicating that
the Claimant's final entitlement is N6,645,924.54
(six million, six hundred and forty-five thousand, nine hundred and twenty-four
naira and fifty-four kobo). Since documentary evidence is considered the most
reliable form of evidence, as it serves as a basis for assessing oral evidence,
relying on Udeorah v. Nwakonobi [2003] 4 NWLR (Pt 811) 643, Exhibit D6
speaks for itself and remains unchallenged. The Court was urged to accept this
argument. While agreeing with the decision in Chukwuma v. Shell B.P &
Co. Ltd [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt 289) 512, which states that when a contract of service gives a party the
right to terminate the contract by notice or payment of salary in lieu, and the
latter course is chosen, the salary in lieu of notice must be paid
contemporaneously with the termination of the contract; the learned
senior counsel contended that this principle has been modified in Ikemba v.
Pyrammidt Company Nig. Ltd [2021] LPELR-56145(CA) 26-27, where it was
established that salary in lieu of notice does not need to be paid immediately
upon termination of employment. Thus, while it was argued that salary in lieu
of notice should ideally be paid at the point of termination, the non-payment
in this case does not render the termination wrongful, especially as the
payment was withheld due to the Claimant's refusal to either return the status
car or pay the purchase price for it. The learned senior counsel referred to
the Claimant’s testimony during cross-examination, stating that the Claimant’s
exit benefits and the purchase of the status car were being considered
together, and the parties intended to resolve the purchase of the status car
before payment of the Claimant’s agreed benefits. Therefore, it was contended
that the Defendant is not unlawfully withholding the Claimant’s exit benefits,
referencing the unreported case of Haruna Ishola Salau v. Sterling Bank,
Suit No. NICN/ABJ/36/2022, decided on 4th October 2023, by Hon. Justice O. O.
Oyewumi (now JCA).
14. Regarding
the Claimant's claim for damages, it was argued that the Claimant failed to
establish her case on a preponderance of evidence, and the Court was urged to
rule accordingly. On the matter of post-judgment interest, it was submitted
that such relief is only available to successful litigants as stipulated by law
or the Rules of the Court. Citing Order 47 Rule 7 of the National Industrial
Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, the learned senior counsel
argued that the Court is authorised to grant a minimum post-judgment interest
of 10%. Consequently, for the Court to grant a higher interest percentage,
credible evidence must support it. The learned senior counsel referenced the
case of Samello Invt. Ltd v. Nig. Interbank Settlement Plc [2019]
LPELR-48852(CA) 21-22, urging the Court to deny the claim for 27%
post-judgment interest for lack of evidence.
15. In addressing the second issue, the learned
senior counsel referenced his earlier submissions from paragraphs 5.1 to 5.36
of the Defendant’s final written address. He further argued that the right to
set off and counterclaim is a legal remedy available to a Defendant, citing the
case of General Tyres W.A. Ltd v. Spring Bank Plc [2010] LPELR-9067(CA).
Additionally, the learned senior counsel pointed out that the Claimant admitted
to receiving a status car from the Defendant, which is still in her possession
and has not yet been paid for. According to the authority of Okereke v. The
State [2016] LPELR-26059(SC), facts that are admitted do not require
further proof and are considered established. Consequently, the learned senior
counsel concluded that the Defendant is entitled to judgment for ?12,914,334.34
and urged the Court to hold so. Regarding solicitors’ fees, the learned senior
counsel argued that because these fees fall under special damages, they must be
specifically pleaded and proven. He referenced the authority of Agbalugo
& Anor v. Izuakor [2017] LPELR-43289(CA) 55-56 and indicated that,
based on Exhibits D13 and D14, the Defendant has satisfied this requirement, as
the evidence remains unchallenged. Therefore, the Defendant is entitled to the
claim for solicitors’ fees. The Court was urged to rule in favour of the Defendant,
grant the counterclaim, and dismiss the claims made by the Claimant.
Preliminary
issue – admissibility of Exhibit 29
16. The learned senior counsel objected to Exhibit
29, specifically in paragraphs 4.0 to 4.12 of the Defendant’s final written
address. The objection is based on several grounds: the document is illegible,
it lacks a proper foundation explaining why the original document was not
submitted, the reasons for its redaction, and the absence of submission by the
document's maker. Additionally, concerns were raised regarding the denial of a fair
hearing and the lack of proper pleading. The Court was urged to reject this
document. The Claimant did not respond to this objection and is therefore
deemed to have conceded the issue. Relevant case references include Okongwu
v. NNPC [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt 115) 296 at 309, Maersk Line & Anor v.
Addide Investments Limited & Anor [2002] 11 NWLR (Pt 778) 317 at 362,
and African Democratic Congress v. Bello [2017] 1 NWLR (Pt 1545) 112 at 133.
17. The
established principle in the law of evidence is that the relevance of evidence
to the facts in issue determines its admissibility. For a document to be
admitted as evidence, it must meet three criteria: it must be pleaded, it must
be relevant to the issues before the Court, and it must be admissible in law. Please
refer to Okonji & Ors v. Njokanma & Ors [1999] 14 NWLR (Pt 638) 250
at 266 and Frederick v. Ibekwe [2019] 17 NWLR (Pt 1702) 467 at 480.
The first question, therefore, is whether Exhibit 29 is illegible, and its
admission as evidence will deny the Defendant its right to a fair hearing.
Illegibility of Exhibit 29 and
denial of a fair hearing?
18. The
learned senior counsel for the Defendant argued that Exhibit 29 is materially
illegible. Citing Jwan v. Ecobank (Nig) Plc [2021] 10 NWLR (Pt 1785) 449 at
481, he contended that a faded or illegible document lacks probative value.
The learned senior counsel further asserted that a party must present the
original document in its entirety unless a valid exception exists. Since a
document must speak for itself, any tampering diminishes its evidential weight.
Moreover, the counsel claimed that relying on a redacted and illegible
document, which cannot be properly examined through cross-examination or
independently verified, amounts to a denial of a fair hearing. I have reviewed
Exhibit 29, dated 1st August 2022, and signed by Temi Popoola, the Defendant's
Chief Executive Officer. The document is titled, "Appreciation for Your
Contributions to the Company in 2021." While the addressee’s name and
details were removed, presumably because the document is classified as DC3 and
intended for confidential use, the contents are still largely readable. The
document indicates that the Defendant approved a bonus pool and made bonus
payments for the year 2021. These facts can be verified and could have been
confirmed by the Defendant. In fact, the Claimant's witness was cross-examined
about this document on 29th October 2024. The Defendant's witness, in his
testimony on 11th March 2025, acknowledged that Exhibit 29 is a letter from the
Defendant to an individual whose name is not clearly written, expressing
appreciation for her contributions in 2020. The witness also stated that there
is no connection between this letter and the Claimant's claim for a bonus.
Therefore, Exhibit 29 is readable and can be evaluated by the Court. Given the
examination of both parties' witnesses regarding the document, the issue of
denial of a fair hearing does not arise. Additionally, I must clarify that the
Defendant's submission, in paragraph 4.8 of its final written address, that the
defence witness, during re-examination, stated that he was unaware of the
document's content and could not confirm whether it truly originated from the
Defendant or what it contained is incorrect; there is no record of such answers
given by any of the witnesses. Accordingly, this ground of the objection is
resolved against the Defendant.
Lack of pleading and proper
foundation
19. The learned senior counsel for the Defendant
argued that Exhibit 29 is inadmissible because no proper foundation was
established regarding the reason for redacting the document, the whereabouts of
the original, and the identity of the maker or recipient. These issues raise
serious concerns about the exhibit's veracity and admissibility. Additionally,
it was contended that Exhibit 29 is inadmissible because it was not pleaded,
and evidence of facts not pleaded is irrelevant, citing Adake v. Akun [2003]
14 NWLR (Pt 840) 418 at 427. I have reviewed the pleadings and the evidence
presented by the parties. It is trite law that only facts, not the evidence
intended to prove them, need to be pleaded. This principle is highlighted in Southbeach
Company Limited & Anor v. Williams [2022] 8 NWLR (Pt 1831) 147 at 186-187.
In paragraph 16 of the amended statement of facts dated 27th August 2025, it is
stated that despite the Claimant’s forced exit from the Defendant company, her
entitlements and other benefits have still not been paid up to the time of
filing the suit. Although the specifics of these benefits were not detailed in
the amended statement of facts, paragraph 17 mentions that the Claimant intends
to rely on certain documents, including Exhibit 29 (see paragraph 7(l)).
Furthermore, in paragraph 21(x), the Claimant asserts that a letter dated 1st
August 2022, confirming payment of bonus pay-out, signed by Temi Popoola, the
Defendant’s Chief Executive Officer, was computer-generated, and that a
certificate of compliance with Section 84 of the Evidence Act has been duly
filed at the Registry of the Honourable Court. Upon examining the case file, I
found that the only certificate of compliance is dated 10th March 2023 and was
filed on 27th March 2023. No documents are listed on this certificate, and it
is unclear which documents it refers to. However, paragraph 23 of the amended
statement of facts seems to serve as a certificate of compliance with Section
84 of the Evidence Act.
20. As mentioned
earlier in this judgment, the primary consideration in the admissibility of
documentary evidence is whether the document is pleaded, relevant, and
admissible in law. Upon reviewing the pleadings in their entirety, along with
other documents in the case file, there is sufficient justification to conclude
that Exhibit 29 has been pleaded. The first two reliefs pertain to the bonus
payout, which constitutes part of the Claimant's “entitlements and other
benefits” that are still outstanding. Regarding proper foundation, the Claimant
stated that Exhibit 29 is a computer-generated document. It is a
well-established principle that an objection to electronically generated documents
cannot be sustained simply because the maker has not been called as a witness.
Section 84 of the Evidence Act addresses how documents are produced, rather
than focusing on their maker. Therefore, the objection that requires the
presence of the maker or recipient of an electronically-generated document for
it to be tendered is, respectfully, a misapplication of Section 83(1)(b) of the
Evidence Act. In the case of Brila Energy Ltd v. FRN [2018] LPELR-43926(CA),
the Court of Appeal ruled that Section 83 of the Evidence Act does not apply to
electronically generated documents. Likewise, in Atabo v. FRN [2023]
LPELR-61080(CA), the Court of Appeal further clarified the matter. The
Court held that "There is nothing in S.84
requiring that the computer-generated documents and the certificate of
compliance must be tendered in evidence through their maker or that their maker
must be called as witness to testify concerning their compliance with S.84 (2)
(a) to (d) and S.84 (4)(a) to (c) of the Evidence Act. The compliance
certificate must prima facie show compliance with S.84 (4) (a) to (c) and does
not require evidence outside itself to show so. Once the compliance certificate
is in keeping with S.84(4)(a) to (c), it is prima facie proof that the
computer-generated documents satisfied the conditions in S.84 (2)(a) to (d)…The
argument that the computer generated documents admitted as exhibits E, F, G,
and H and the certificate of their compliance with S.84 (2), exhibit I are
legally inadmissible evidence because PW3 through whom they were tendered is
not their maker and that their maker was not called as a witness to enable him
or her to be cross examined is wrong."
21. Moreover,
the Court has discretion under Section 83(2) of the Evidence Act to admit or
refuse to admit a document when the maker has not been called. In exercising
this discretion, the only requirement is whether the document is relevant to
the fact in issue, and if it is, it should be admitted, as held in Elias v. FRN [2021] 16 NWLR (Pt 1800) 495
at 551. Furthermore, justification for redacting Exhibit 29 was
provided in the motion on notice dated 16th October 2023 and filed on 19th
October 2023. The relief sought in that application was for an order “granting
leave to the Applicant to re-open her case by adducing a redacted document
(anonymising the bearer) establishing her entitlement to a bonus pay-out.” The
third and fourth grounds for the application state that the bearer of the
document is Nigerian and that the bearer's fundamental right to privacy
necessitates the granting of the application. The bearer would be prejudiced if
his identity were disclosed. These reasons are further elaborated in paragraphs
7 to 10 of the supporting affidavit signed by the Claimant. In paragraphs 9 and
10 of the affidavit, the Claimant explains that the bearer is in an employment
relationship with the Defendant and that disclosing his name could cause him
significant hardship. Notably, the Defendant did not oppose the application,
which the Court ultimately granted. Since the Court has ordered that the
Claimant be allowed to present evidence from the redacted document to support
her claims for a bonus payout, I believe this objection has not been adequately
substantiated. Furthermore, the Court is authorised by Section 12(2)(b) of the
National Industrial Court Act, 2006, to deviate from the provisions of the
Evidence Act in the interest of justice. After considering all the facts and
circumstances of this case, I have concluded that this is an appropriate case
to exercise that discretion. Therefore, I accordingly depart from the strict
application of the rules of evidence in the interest of justice. Consequently,
this objection is overruled.
Issues for determination
22. I have
reviewed the processes filed by the parties, including the final written
addresses, and in my view, the seven issues for determination raised by both
parties can be subsumed into two broad issues, which are: whether the Claimant
is entitled to judgment on her claims or any of them, and whether the Defendant
is entitled to the counterclaim.
Issue
one: Is the Claimant is entitled to judgment on her claims or any of them?
23. The law is trite that whoever desires the
Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the
existence of facts which she asserts must prove that those facts exist. By the combined force of Sections 131, 132, 133,
134, and 136[1] of the Evidence Act, the Claimant bears the initial burden of
proving the pleaded facts on the balance of probabilities. The Claimant must succeed on the strength of
her case, not on the weakness of the defence, absence of defence, or admission
by the Defendant. If the Claimant fails to discharge this burden
satisfactorily, her claims will be dismissed without considering the
Defendant's case, as the Defendant is not required to prove its defence under
these circumstances. In such a situation, there would be no evidence to rebut,
leading to a judgment against the Claimant for lack of evidence. Please refer
to Adama & Ors v. Kogi State House
of Assembly & Ors [2019] 16 NWLR (Pt 1699) 501 at 531,
Igwenagu v. Hon. Minister, Federal
Capital Territory & Ors [2025] 7 NWLR (Pt 1988) 145 at 173-174, Nsude & Ors v. Nichodemus & Ors
[2025] 4 NWLR (Pt 1982) 253 at 280,
and Nduul v. Wayo & Ors [2018] LPELR-45151(SC) 51-53.
24. The Claimant who seeks declaratory relief must
demonstrate her entitlement to the declaration by credible evidence and will
succeed on the strength of her case, not on the weakness of the defence or
admission by the Defendant. As granting declaratory relief involves the Court’s
discretion, the Claimant must place sufficient materials before the Court to
justify the declaration, as illustrated in the cases of Nduul v. Wayo & Ors [2018] 7 SC (Pt III) 164 at 213, U.T.C.
Nigeria Plc v. Peters [2022] 18 NWLR (Pt 1862) 297 at 312,
313, and Osho v. Adeleye
& Ors [2024] 8 NWLR (Pt 1941) 431 at 452.
25. In
resolving employment disputes, the Court will refer to the employment contract
and any other stipulations that are incorporated, or deemed to have been
incorporated, into the contract, as stated in the cases of Adekunle
v. United Bank for Africa Plc [2019] 17 ACELR 87 at 108 and Gbedu
& Ors v. Itie & Ors [2020] 3 NWLR (Pt 1710) 104 at 126. The employment
contract serves as the foundation for any action taken in the event of a
breach. The success of the case hinges entirely on the terms agreed upon, or deemed
to have been agreed upon, by the parties involved, as outlined in Umera
v. Nigerian Railway Corporation [2022] 10 NWLR (Pt 1838) 349 at 386 and Gyubok
v. The Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi & Anor [2024] 16 NWLR (Pt 1965) 515 at
549.
Summary
of evidence
26. The Claimant sought eight reliefs, testified on
her own behalf, and tendered 29 exhibits, which were marked as Exhibits 1 to
29. These are: employment letter dated 27th May 2014, addendum to employment
letter, promotion letter dated 1st April 2021, letter of acting appointment
dated 13th September 2021, termination letter dated 22nd April 2022, First Bank
of Nigeria payment receipt dated 24th May 2021, vehicle purchase agreement, a
case study titled "Riding the Tides" from the Nigerian Exchange Group,
letter from the Claimant’s solicitors to the Defendant dated 29th September
2022, job description for the Business Continuity Manager, the Defendant’s
organisational structure, Terms of reference for the Business Continuity
Steering Committee, Photographs, Business Continuity Master Plan, Disaster
Recovery Plan, Business Continuity Test Report, emails dated 22nd and 31st July
2021; 15th and 21st May 2021, Market-wide Disaster Recovery Failover Test
Report, Crisis Management Manual, Physical Resumption to Work Modalities, copies
of the Claimant’s certificates, email threads from 5th, 14th, 15th, 18th and
20th July 2022, email threads from 3rd, 7th, 10th and 11th August 2022, Employee
Performance Appraisals since 2014, Performance Incentive Scheme, Redacted letter
dated 1st August 2022.
27. Mrs. Obadare's evidence indicates that she was
employed as a Business Continuity Manager in the Defendant's Information
Security Department, beginning with a letter of employment dated 27th May 2014.
Following the departure of her head of department, an Assistant General
Manager, in March 2019, she assumed additional responsibilities in addition to
her existing role until her employment was terminated by the Defendant. She successfully
managed both duties for 2 years. According to a transfer addendum effective 1st
March 2021, she was officially assigned the role of Manager of Information
Security and Business Continuity and was subsequently promoted to Principal
Manager, Step 1, as stated in the Defendant’s letter dated 1st April 2021. In
September 2021, at the Defendant's request, as per a letter dated 13th
September 2021, she assumed the position of Chief Risk Officer following the
departure of her predecessor, a role she held until her employment was
terminated. Mrs. Obadare further testified that although she was initially
hired as the Business Continuity Manager when Business Continuity Management
did not exist in the Defendant's organization, she successfully established business
continuity procedures upon assuming her duties on 2nd July 2014. She developed
the Business Continuity Plan, IT Disaster Recovery Plan, Business Impact
Analysis, and the Business Unit Recovery Plans for the Nigerian Stock Exchange,
now known as the Nigerian Exchange Group and its entities. This included
identifying critical functions essential for delivering mission-critical
services during unforeseen business disruptions. Additionally, Mrs. Obadare
coordinated enterprise training and awareness sessions, guided the business
recovery and disaster recovery teams, built organisational resilience, and
initiated and coordinated scheduled enterprise Call-Tree Tests. Over the past
seven years, she organised periodic Capital Market-wide Business Continuity Failover
Simulation tests in collaboration with the Central Securities Clearing System
Plc, market data vendors, both local and international, issuing houses, and
over 200 trading licence holder firms.
28. Mrs.
Obadare attributed the successes and improvements in business continuity and
disaster recovery tests to her efforts, which facilitated the seamless
transition of the Defendant's patent company, the Nigerian Exchange
Group, and its entities, to remote work and remote trading for over 100 weeks.
The process efficiencies and maturity developed over the years resulted in
uninterrupted trading activities from March 2020, during the lockdown in
response to the COVID-19 global pandemic outbreak. These efforts earned the
Nigerian Exchange Group recognition as a finalist in the 2021 International
Organisational Resilience Awards and contributed to its nomination as the Best
Performing Exchange in 2020, among other accolades. According to her, the work
she performed over eight years aligned with industry standards and global best
practices. The NGX BCSC is a strategic team that lacks the necessary depth to
develop Business Continuity and IT Disaster Recovery plans, which contradicts
the established rulebook regarding roles and responsibilities within Business
Continuity Management. The BCSC is responsible for authoring and overseeing the
development and maintenance of the Crisis Management Plan and plays a
leadership role in coordinating and managing crisis events, as detailed in the
Functions of the BCSC – Roles and Responsibilities section found on page 13 of
the approved Business Continuity Plan. In February 2022, the Defendant invited
her to a meeting, during which she was informed of management's decision to
terminate her employment on the grounds of redundancy, in violation of
redundancy laws. Though her termination on these grounds was communicated to
her two months later via a letter dated 22nd April 2022, she acknowledged her
entitlement in that letter as six (6) months’ basic salary in lieu of notice
(net of any debts to the Defendant and applicable taxes) along with a 20%
write-off on the net book value of the status car issued to her by the
Defendant. While the Defendant paid her the sum of N17,000,000 to acquire the status car, she added N5,995,000 to purchase a 2020 model Honda
CRV, which cost N22,000,000. She
explained that after applying the 20% write-off and deducting the N5,995,000 she contributed to the car
purchase, the value of the status car is N12,914,334.34.
As of the commencement of this lawsuit, her entitlements and other benefits
have not yet been paid, despite her involuntary termination.
29. In Mrs. Obadare’s additional sworn statement
dated 28th March 2023 in response to the statement of defence, she indicated
that when she began her employment with the Defendant, the role of Information
Security was not included in her employment letter dated 27th May 2014. She
expressed her commitment to the organisation's core values, operational
efficiency, customer-centricity, innovation, and partnerships, which she
believed in as a loyal employee, as outlined in the 2018 Corporate Strategy
Document. This commitment motivated her drive for process enhancements,
innovation, efficiency, and excellent performance, as well as a can-do spirit
she demonstrated throughout her career at the Defendant, helping her meet and
exceed expectations. Mrs. Obadare stated that two years after she filled the
vacant post, in March 2021, she signed the transfer agreement. During this
time, she effectively managed her responsibilities as the Business Continuity
Manager, working as a one-person team for over five years. She clarified that
the Business Continuity Department was established in 2014 when she started,
while the Business Continuity Steering Committee was created as the Crisis
Management Committee in 2016 and was officially transformed into the Business
Continuity Steering Committee in 2018. According to her job description as
Business Continuity Manager, she was responsible for coordinating Disaster
Recovery Failover and Business Continuity Tests and conducting Business
Continuity awareness exercises. Mrs. Obadare documented the Business Continuity
Plan and Disaster Recovery Plan starting in 2014 and submitted the first review
in 2015 to the Executive Director of her division, who was then the Executive
Director of Market Operations and Technology. She also drafted the business
impact analysis and business recovery templates in 2014 to gather information
needed to develop a sustainable Business Continuity Plan.
30. Mrs.
Obadare clarified that the objective of the Business Continuity Steering
Committee/Crisis Management Committee is to assess, investigate, recommend, and
implement approved solutions and processes for foreseeable and unforeseen
emergencies affecting the organisation's operations. However, this committee
does not have the responsibility or capacity to develop the Business Continuity
Plan and Disaster Recovery Plan, which she had created. When approached to
review the Crisis Management Manual 1: Pre-Crisis Preparation in the Nigerian
Stock Exchange Crisis Management Plan in 2016, she noted that there were
already documented Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery plans that she had
developed during her tenure as the Business Continuity Manager. She explained
that the documents assembled by the Business Continuity Steering Committee team
were specific to crisis recovery, including the Covid-19 Response Plan and the
Resumption to Physical Work Protocol, both developed by the Business Continuity
Steering Committee and documented by her. She maintained that, in accordance
with the Defendant’s directives, she officially served as the Chief Risk
Officer in an acting capacity from October 2021 until her exit from the
Defendant in February 2022. During this time, she saved the Defendant a total
of N11,407,159.15 (eleven million, four
hundred and seven thousand, one hundred and fifty-nine naira, fifteen kobo),
which represented five months' salary for the Chief Risk Officer position.
Furthermore, she testified that while serving as the Head of Information
Security (AGM Step 2) for two years, she saved the Defendant N54,754,363.90 (fifty-four million, seven
hundred and fifty-four thousand, three hundred and sixty-three naira, ninety kobo),
which amounted to two years' gross pay (excluding the 13th month and leave
allowances). Despite the two years of additional duties she undertook for the
Defendant, she was only entitled to an annual gross pay increase of N3,278,095.73 (three million, two hundred
and seventy-eight thousand and ninety-five naira, seventy-three kobo),
reflecting the difference in her salary prior to her promotion.
31. Mrs.
Obadare also stated that the decision to request the Defendant to sell the
company cars to the staff declared redundant, a group primarily comprised of
senior employees, was a joint decision. These staff members had been entrusted
with strategic functions essential to ensuring the Defendant’s mission of
providing a reliable, efficient, and adaptable exchange hub in Africa for
investors and businesses seeking to save and access capital. This group
included Heads of Market Operations, Technology Services, Enterprise Risk Management,
the Enterprise Innovation Hub, and the Network and Branch Coordination Manager.
These individuals had dedicated between 5 and 20 years of service, working
tirelessly to achieve the organisation’s goals, as evidenced by their performance
records. These staff felt it would be proper for the Defendant to allow them to
purchase the status vehicle they possess, as the termination was unprepared and
unplanned. She stated that the vehicle purchase agreement, prepared more than
90 days later and with revised termination terms for employees with 7 years or
more of service who held managerial roles, contained errors and showed a lack
of empathy toward the disengaged staff.
She stated that the frequent corrections were merely a reflection of the
Defendant's lack of regard for the former staff's well-being. The Defendant
appeared more interested in what the employees could offer and treated them as
disposable, which contradicted the organisation's core values. She pointed out
that the Defendant did not consider her claim for the 2021 bonus payout.
32. Mrs. Obadare further testified that upon
the termination of her employment on 25th February 2022, at approximately 7 p.m.
via Zoom, the Defendant deactivated her account and terminated her access to
emails, effectively denying her access to the termination letter. As a result,
she had to forward her personal email address to the Chief Human Resource
Officer, who then sent her the termination letter. In an effort to deprive her
of her share of the 2021 bonus, despite having worked a full year, the
Defendant had deactivated her account from the system by 1st March 2022. Despite
her strong performance in 2021, during which she fulfilled three different
roles as Business Continuity Manager, Head of Information Security, and through
her promotions in April and October 2021, she was denied her profit share. This
treatment constituted injustice and unfairness on the part of the Defendant. Mrs.
Obadare emphasised that the Defendant, who had benefited financially from her
contributions during her employment, had no right to label this lawsuit as
gold-digging, vexatious, or exploitative, especially after she expressed her
grievances. In her pursuit of excellence and to ensure that her assigned tasks
were delivered in line with global standards and industry best practices, she
consistently worked on her professional development. She improved and sustained
the culture of business continuity and cyber resilience across the Defendant's
operations. Furthermore, she personally covered all expenses for her training
in Business Continuity, Disaster Recovery, Crisis Management, and other
managerial courses.
33. In 2016, she attended a course on Business
Continuity and Crisis Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
in Boston, USA, at an estimated cost of N3,000,000
(three million naira), which covered training costs, airfares, and hotel
accommodations. Additionally, she attended the annual Disaster Recovery Institute
International Conference in Las Vegas, USA, in 2019, at an estimated cost of
over N2,500,000 (two million, five
hundred thousand naira). She also enrolled in a two-year Executive Master of
Business Administration program at the prestigious Lagos Business School (LBS),
Pan Atlantic University, Nigeria, in 2017, at an estimated cost of over N7,000,000 (seven million naira). According to her, she
attended IESE Business School at Navarra University in Barcelona for a course
on Managing Business Across Cultures as part of an exchange program with
Strathmore Business School in Kenya and Lagos Business School. She incurred an
estimated cost of N2,500,000.00 (two
million, five hundred thousand naira) for training expenses, air tickets, and
hotel logistics. These international and local trainings, workshops, and
professional certifications contributed to her personal development and
enhanced her knowledge, which she applied to the Defendant's business
operations. This experience enabled her to effectively multitask in her job
roles. She stated that her position as Head of Information Security and
Business Continuity, which was declared redundant, is not truly redundant. The
Defendant has continued to seek qualified personnel to fill the role.
Immediately after her departure from the Defendant, the role was outsourced to
PWC for six months at an exorbitant fee that exceeded the total salaries of the
entire team for the same period, and the position remains vacant.
34. Regarding the counterclaim, Mrs. Obadare reiterated her earlier
evidence in support of her reply to the statement of defence. Additionally, she
noted that the Defendant produced only the last of nearly a dozen email
correspondences exchanged between them as exhibits. Mrs. Obadare maintained
that the Defendant insisted that her contribution of N5,995,000.00 (five million, nine hundred and ninety-five thousand
naira) toward the car would not be reflected in the vehicle purchase agreement,
which stated that a 2022 CRV SUV was given to her. Given that the N17,000,000 (seventeen million naira) to
which she was entitled did not cover the purchase price of the luxury car, she
urged the Defendant to ensure that the contributions from each party were included
in the vehicle purchase agreement, but to no avail. Mrs. Obadare insists that
her exit was involuntary and requests her share of the 2021 profits. Mrs. Obadare’s
additional sworn statement, dated 10th January 2024, repeats her earlier evidence
and need not be reproduced here.
35. During cross-examination, Mrs. Obadare reviewed Exhibits 1 and 5, specifically reading
the last page of Exhibit 1 regarding her cessation of employment. She confirmed
that it is her employment letter. The employee handbook was subsequently
presented through her, admitted as evidence, and marked Exhibit D1. Mrs. Obadare was shown page 77 of Exhibit D1 and acknowledged
that the heading is "Termination of Employment," but emphasised that
the crux of her claim is not about the termination itself. She stated that
based on the information on page 77, she was at a senior management level and
was entitled to two months' basic salary upon exiting the Defendant. When asked
to refer to paragraph 17.2 on page 78, she confirmed that it pertains to
redundancy. She was shown paragraph 17.2.2, which discusses termination due to
redundancy, and was asked if payment is in accordance with paragraph 17.1.1;
she read paragraph 17.2.2. Mrs. Obadare
was then shown Exhibit 5, where she confirmed that her termination was indeed
based on redundancy. Reading the second paragraph, Mrs. Obadare acknowledged receiving six months' salary, but
clarified that her employment was terminated under certain conditions. She
admitted to receiving payment in advance in January 2022 and acknowledged a 20%
write-off of the status car's net book value. She confirmed her appointment as
Acting Chief Risk Officer through a letter dated 13th September 2021. She
stated that setting up the business continuity recovery plan and business
impact plan were part of her duties. The status car cost approximately N23 million, but the Defendant paid N17 million, which she was entitled to.
She was given the option to purchase the car and, despite not returning it upon
her exit from the Defendant, she admitted that she requested to buy the status
car when her employment was terminated, and the Defendant agreed to her
request. A draft agreement was provided; however, issues arose regarding the
terms. The Defendant was willing to sell the status car for about N13 million. She initiated this lawsuit
because the Defendant was not ready to agree on the terms of the agreement,
reiterating that she is still in possession of the status car.
36. During her further testimony under
cross-examination on 29th October 2024, Mrs. Obadare presented Exhibit 27 as the complete document.
When asked about its source, she explained that it originated from a Microsoft
Dynamics application used by Defendant's employees for performance appraisals.
Each employee has access to a personal portal. She noted that the document's
appearance is different because the company migrated to a newer version of the
software. When asked when she generated the document, she stated that she
produces it annually. She extracted it from the system before leaving the
Defendant, and Exhibit 27 contains the full 2021 appraisal. She mentioned that
her last Employee Performance Evaluation (EPE) took place in 2021, so she did
not extract the 2022 appraisal. Mrs. Obadare
affirmed that she had made no changes to Exhibit 27. When shown page 15, she
confirmed that it contains her 2019 comments. Although she stated that Exhibit
27 is formatted to allow comments to be easily added, she expressed uncertainty
about the number of employees declared redundant, admitting she was not the
only one affected. Mrs. Obadare acknowledged
knowing one or two individuals who were declared redundant but had completed
appraisals the previous year. Regarding Exhibit 29, she stated that it was
addressed to a Defendant staff member. When shown Exhibit D1 and asked to
compare paragraphs 7.7.2.2 and 7.7.2.3 with Exhibit 28, Mrs. Obadare explained that, although it states they do not
have the right to receive incentives, they have been receiving them. The
requirement to qualify for these incentives is a score of 3-5. She clarified
that paragraph 7.7.2.3 refers to the Performance Incentive Scheme (PIS)
arrangement and not to individual employees. She confirmed that the incentive
was paid in 2021. When asked whether she had any evidence of this payment, she
stated that it is documented in a redacted document signed by the CEO.
37. The Defendant’s Chief Human Resource Officer,
Mr. Ademola Adebayo, confirmed the Claimant’s employment history and stated
that the Claimant was appointed as Chief Risk Officer effective 14th October
2021. Mr. Adebayo explained that the Claimant’s employment was terminated due
to redundancy, which resulted from structural changes within the Defendant's
organisation that rendered certain roles unnecessary and reduced the number of
departments. The Defendant followed due process during this exercise, in
accordance with the employment contract between the Defendant and the affected
employees, including the Claimant. Paragraph 17.2 of the Defendant's Employee
Handbook was adhered to in order to address business exigencies. Mr. Adebayo
clarified that the Business Continuity Steering Committee (BCSC) of the
Nigerian Stock Exchange Ltd, now known as Nigerian Exchange Group Plc,
comprised personnel from various teams within the organisation. This
collaborative effort contributed to achieving the overall objectives of the
BCSC and was not solely accomplished by the Claimant, as was incorrectly
asserted. The Claimant cannot claim sole ownership of the BCSC and its
achievements. Mr. Adebayo stated that the BCSC was made up of staff from
different departments who collectively developed the Business Continuity and IT
Disaster Recovery plans. Following the demutualization of NSE, the NGX Group
BCSC includes representatives from the NGX Group and its subsidiaries, all of
whom possess the necessary expertise to contribute effectively to the
committee. He admitted that the Claimant was invited to a meeting in February
2022, during which she was informed of management's decision to terminate her
employment on the grounds of redundancy. Mr. Adebayo denied any non-compliance
with applicable redundancy laws during the termination process, asserting that
the Defendant's structural changes rendered certain roles redundant and led to
a reduction in the number of departments. Additionally, he maintained that the
termination was in accordance with redundancy law, the contract with the
Claimant, and the relevant provisions of the Defendant's employee handbook.
Furthermore, Mr. Adebayo denied that the Defendant's decision to terminate the
Claimant's employment was formally communicated via a letter dated 22nd April
2022, which was two months after the meeting with the Claimant. Mr. Adebayo clarified that the management's
decision to terminate the Claimant’s employment on the grounds of redundancy
and to pay her three months' salary as terminal benefits was communicated to
her on 25th February 2022, via a letter sent to her official email, and on 26th
February 2022, through her personal email.
38. Mr.
Adebayo also testified that upon the request of employees terminated due to
redundancy, including the Claimant, the Defendant agreed to pay her six months'
basic salary as terminal benefits, net of any outstanding debts owed to the
Defendant and applicable taxes, on compassionate grounds. To alleviate the
impact of the redundancy exercise on the Claimant, the Defendant generously
agreed to write off 20% of the book value of the status car attached to the
Claimant’s office, which she had expressed interest in purchasing. The letter
dated 22nd April 2022, primarily communicated the upward revision of the
Claimant's terminal payment and the 20% write-off on the net value of the
status car. This letter was not the first correspondence officially notifying
the Claimant of her termination on the grounds of redundancy, as the Claimant
had mistakenly asserted. Despite the fact that the Claimant was only entitled
to two months’ basic salary as redundancy pay in line with her contract, unless
the board of the Defendant approved a higher exit benefit package, the 22nd
April 2022 letter indicated the Defendant's readiness to pay the Claimant six
months' salary as terminal payment (net of all debts owed to the Defendant and
applicable taxes), as well as to write off 20% of the net book value of the
status car assigned to her office. Mr. Adebayo stated that while the Defendant
allocated N17,000,000 for the purchase
of the status vehicle, the Claimant opted for a more expensive vehicle costing N22,995,000 (twenty-two million, nine
hundred and ninety-five thousand naira). She requested to cover the difference
of N5,995,000 (five million, nine
hundred and ninety-five thousand naira), which the Defendant accepted. On 24th
May 2021, the Claimant paid N5,995,000
into the Defendant's bank account to cover the cost difference, and on 29th
July 2021, she purchased the status vehicle of her choice, a 2020-model Honda
CRV SUV. It was assigned to her specifically on 2nd August 2021.
39. Mr.
Adebayo explained that according to the employee handbook and the agreement
between the parties, the status car remains the property of the Defendant. He
further explained that according to paragraph 16.1 of the Employee Handbook and
the Fixed Asset Policy and Procedure, which form part of the contract between
the parties, status cars are to be purchased for employees at the Principal
Manager (PM) grade level and above every five (5) years, subject to the
financial position of the Defendant. The vehicle is to be amortized over 5
years from the date of purchase. After this period, the vehicle should be
replaced, and the employee assigned the vehicle will have the option to
purchase it for 1% of the original purchase price, plus VAT. If the employment
relationship is terminated before the stated five-year period expires and
before the vehicle is fully depreciated, the current Net Book Value will be
used as the sale price. According to the policy, if the current user declines
the purchase option, the vehicle should then be auctioned off through an open
tender process that all confirmed staff members can participate in. He stated
that a 2020 Honda CR-V was purchased for the Claimant as a status vehicle on
2nd August 2021, shortly after the Claimant was promoted to the grade level of
Principal Manager (PM). The vehicle is to be amortized over five years, and the
Claimant would have the option to purchase it for 1% of the purchase price by
August 2026, provided she is still employed by the Defendant. However, in
February 2022, seven months after the status vehicle was purchased, the
Claimant's employment was terminated on the grounds of redundancy, as noted in
a termination letter dated 25th February 2022. Following her termination, she
approached the Defendant to request the purchase of the status car that had
recently been assigned to her office. The Defendant agreed and instructed its
solicitor to draft a vehicle purchase agreement. A draft was shared with the Claimant
for her review on 5th July 2022. On 5th and 20th July 2022, the Claimant
returned with some reviews and comments, which the Defendant addressed,
resulting in a revised Vehicle Purchase Agreement shared with the Claimant on
22nd August 2022. However, in response to the Defendant's email, the Claimant
indicated via email on 22nd August 2022, her decision not to sign the Vehicle
Purchase Agreement, which delayed the finalisation of the exit processes.
40. In a
letter dated 22nd April 2022, Mr. Adebayo outlined the Claimant's total exit
benefit as ?6,610,966.44 (six million, six hundred and ten thousand, nine
hundred and sixty-six naira, forty-four kobo). He also stated her indebtedness
as ?12,914,334.34 (twelve million, nine hundred and fourteen thousand, three
hundred and thirty-four naira, thirty-four kobo), representing the outstanding
value of the status car, which the Claimant intends to purchase. This amount is
less the sum of ?5,995,000.00 (five million, nine hundred and ninety-five
thousand naira) contributed by the Claimant to the purchase of the status car,
as well as the 20% write-off approved by the Defendant. Mr. Adebayo asserted
that the Claimant's employment was terminated due to redundancy and was not a
forced exit. According to paragraph 17.2.2 of the Employee Handbook, any
termination on the grounds of redundancy must be pre-approved by the board. The
board may also provide guidance on the notice period or the payment to be made
to an employee terminated due to redundancy. This notice or payment should be
in accordance with paragraph 17.1.1 of the Employee Handbook. The Defendant
expressed a willingness to immediately pay the sum of ?6,610,966.44 (six
million, six hundred and ten thousand, nine hundred and sixty-six naira, forty-four
kobo) less the Claimant’s outstanding debt, as the Claimant's final exit
package. However, when the Claimant requested to purchase the status vehicle,
the Defendant agreed to sell it for ?12,914,334.34 (twelve million, nine
hundred and fourteen thousand, three hundred and thirty-four naira, thirty-four
kobo), as mutually agreed upon by both parties. The Claimant retained
possession of the vehicle even while negotiations for the vehicle purchase
agreement were ongoing. Mr. Adebayo stated that the Defendant has the right to
offset the debt of ?12,914,334.34 against the Claimant’s exit benefits of
?6,610,966.44. This means that the Claimant would still owe the Defendant
?6,303,367.90 (six million, three hundred and three thousand, three hundred and
sixty-seven naira, ninety kobo) after the debt is deducted from her exit
benefits. He further indicated that the fifth relief sought by the Claimant
lacks merit, as all the work done by her during her employment belongs to the
Defendant, which must handle its affairs. This lawsuit is frivolous,
speculative, and a calculated attempt by the Claimant to exploit the Defendant.
Therefore, it should be dismissed with costs, as the Claimant is not entitled
to any of the reliefs sought. In relation to the counterclaim, Mr. Adebayo
reiterated his earlier evidence and added that while waiting for the parties to
continue negotiations on the vehicle purchase agreement, the Claimant initiated
this legal action. After receiving the originating documents, the Defendant
engaged the services of its solicitors, Messrs. Perchstone & Graeys.
According to the letter of engagement, the Defendant is responsible for paying
the solicitors' professional fees to defend this case. He seeks the reliefs
outlined in the counterclaim.
41. During
his testimony on 11th March 2025, Mr. Adebayo was shown Exhibits 27, 28, and
29. He explained that Exhibit 27 is a compendium of appraisals for the years
2020 and 2021. Exhibit 28 is the performance incentive scheme policy of the
legacy institution, the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Exhibit 29 is a letter from
the Defendant to an individual whose name is not clearly written, expressing
appreciation for her contribution in 2020. There is no connection between this
letter and the Claimant's claim for a bonus. The Defendant tendered 14
documents marked as Exhibits D1 to D14. Notably, Exhibit D1 was tendered
through the Claimant during cross-examination by the Defendant's counsel. These
documents include the Defendant's employee handbook, a letter of employment, an
addendum to the employment contract, a letter of acting appointment, an email
dated 25th February 2022, a termination letter with attachments, THP Ltd
invoice with attachments, a draft vehicle purchase agreement, an email dated
5th July 2022, an email dated 22nd August 2022, another email from Mr. Oladipo
to Mr. Peter Fajimi dated 22nd August 2022, the Claimant’s email dated 20th
July 2022, a solicitors' engagement letter, and a receipt dated 16th November
2022.
42. During cross-examination, Mr. Adebayo, the
Chief Human Resource Officer, confirmed his identity and stated that he is
familiar with the facts of the case. He affirmed the contents of paragraphs 10
and 11 of his sworn statement. When asked about the establishment of the
Steering Committee of the Business Continuity Committee, he indicated that he
was not with the Defendant at that time. Upon reviewing Exhibits 14 and 15, he
noted that Exhibit 14 was created in 2015, while Exhibit 15 lacked an issue date.
When shown Exhibit 8, he read aloud the section regarding crisis preparation.
Confronted with the assertion that the committee was formed in 2019, he
clarified that Exhibit 8 is a document from the Lagos Business School rather
than an official document of the Defendant. Further pressed, he reiterated that
Exhibit 8 is from the Lagos Business School and does not represent official
documentation from the Defendant. Referring to paragraph 7 of his sworn
statement, he confirmed that the Claimant had been promoted to a principal officer.
When asked whether the Claimant was entitled to a bonus based on her position,
he stated that there is no existing bonus policy within the organisation that
would entitle the Claimant to one. In response to whether the Defendant pays
bonuses to senior staff, Mr. Adebayo maintained that there is no active bonus
policy. Mr. Adebayo was also asked whether any bonuses were paid to staff in
2022, and he insisted that no bonuses were paid. Mr. Adebayo admitted that the Claimant's
employment was terminated on 25th February 2022, just a few days before March
2022. He confirmed paragraph 24 of his sworn statement, and when asked about
the reason for the termination, Mr. Adebayo said there had been a
back-and-forth exchange of emails. When pressed for details, he indicated that
he needed to review the email correspondence. He confirmed that the issue was
that the funds spent on purchasing the car were not reflected in the agreement.
During re-examination, Mr. Adebayo stated that the Claimant made an initial contribution
toward the purchase of the car. However, the amount specified in the agreement
pertains to the Defendant’s contribution, and the remaining balance for the car
is still outstanding.
Evaluation of evidence
43. I have reviewed the evidence presented by both
parties, which includes both oral and documentary evidence. The Claimant is
seeking a bonus payout of N10,000,000
for the period from March 2021 to April 2022, as well as N6,645,924.54, which represents six months’ basic salary in lieu of
notice, specific performance, damages, and interest. The facts of this case are
largely undisputed. Both parties agree that the Claimant was employed as a
Business Continuity Manager and served as the Chief Risk Officer until her
disengagement in February 2022. It is also undisputed that the Defendant
purchased a 2020 Honda CRV for the Claimant in August 2021, with the Claimant
contributing ?5,995,000.00 toward the purchase of the car. Following the
termination of the Claimant’s employment, the Defendant, in a letter dated 22nd
April 2022, offered to pay the Claimant six months' basic salary as terminal
benefits and to write off 20% of the net book value of the status car, which
the Claimant expressed interest in purchasing. However, evidence indicates that
the Claimant’s terminal benefits have not been paid. Both parties have also
agreed on the sale of the status car to the Claimant for ?12,914,334.34. The
main dispute arises over whether the Defendant should reflect the Claimant’s
contribution of ?5,995,000.00 in the vehicle purchase agreement, the
non-payment of the Claimant’s terminal benefits (six months’ salary in lieu of
notice, the alleged accrued bonus payout from March 2021 to April 2022, and whether
the Claimant’s work should be arrogated to the Business Continuity Management
Team.
Is the Claimant
entitled to any bonus payout?
44. As
stated in this judgment, when resolving employment disputes, the Court will
refer to the employment contract and any other stipulations that are
incorporated, or deemed to have been incorporated, into the contract, as noted
in the cases of Adekunle v. United Bank for Africa Plc (supra) and Gbedu
& Ors v. Itie & Ors (supra). The employment contract serves as the
foundation for any actions taken in the event of a breach. The success of the
case depends entirely on the terms agreed upon, or deemed to have been agreed
upon, by the parties involved, as outlined in Umera v. Nigerian Railway
Corporation (supra) and Gyubok v. The Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi &
Anor (supra). Interestingly, although the Claimant’s principal claims
relate to the bonus payout, there is no pleading or evidence regarding the
bonus payout in the originating process or in the Claimant’s amended statement
of facts. In the amended statement of facts dated 29th November 2023, but filed
on 10th January 2024, the Claimant referenced the employee performance
evaluations, the performance incentive scheme, and a letter dated 1st August
2022, confirming the payment of a bonus. These were reiterated in the further
amended statement of facts dated 27th August 2025, and admitted as Exhibits 27,
28, and 29, respectively. The only pleadings can be found in paragraphs 16 to
19 of the reply to the statement of defence, which are also reiterated in
paragraphs 16 to 19 of the Claimant’s sworn statement dated 28th March 2023. A
summary of the Claimant’s evidence indicates that her employment was terminated
on the last Friday of February 2022, and by 1st March 2022, she was no longer
in the Defendant’s system, thereby making her ineligible for the 2021 profit
share, despite having worked for the entire year. The Claimant detailed her job
functions in 2021 and how she saved the Defendant over N62 million in salaries and allowances. However, there is no
reference to any provision in her employment contract that grants her the right
to a bonus payout or defines the basis for calculating the amount claimed.
45. It
is a legal principle that a relief claimed in the statement of facts does not
constitute facts averred in the pleadings. The reliefs sought in a lawsuit must
be based on substantive averments of facts stated in the body of the pleadings.
If the reliefs claimed are not grounded in pleaded facts, they are deemed
baseless and do not give rise to any issue. This is supported by the case of Trade
Bank Plc & Ors v. Pharmatek Industrial Projects Ltd [2020] 8 NWLR (Pt 1725)
124 at 169-170. Furthermore, claims for specific amounts, which are akin to
special damages, must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. Relevant
cases include Stirling Civil Engineering Nigeria Limited v. Yahaya [2002] 2
NWLR (Pt 750) 1 at 19-20, U.T.C. Nigeria Plc v. Peters [2022] 18 NWLR
(Pt 1862) 297 at 317, and Fidelity Bank Plc v. Sagecom Concepts Limited
[2025] 9 NWLR (Pt 1994) 435 at 486-487. In this instance, the required
pleading is lacking. Although the Claimant presented the employee performance
evaluation, the performance incentive scheme, and a letter dated 1st August
2022, confirming the payment of a bonus (referred to as Exhibits 27, 28, and
29), there is no oral evidence linking these documents to her claim for a bonus
payout. The law is settled that when documents are tendered in evidence,
their purport must be demonstrated in open Court by the party tendering them.
It is not sufficient to merely tender documents without linking them to
specific aspects of the party’s case, as noted in Bababe v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria [2019] 1 NWLR (Pt 1652) 100 at 130.
46. During
cross-examination, the Claimant acknowledged that Exhibit 27, the employee
performance evaluation, is a system-generated document that she created each
year and printed before the termination of her employment. The connection
between this appraisal and her entitlement to a bonus payout remains unclear.
The same uncertainty applies to Exhibit 28, the performance incentive scheme
policy, about which no information was provided. As for Exhibit 29, which is a
letter from the Defendant to the Claimant's colleague notifying him of his
qualification for the 2021 bonus payout, the Claimant asserted that this
document indicates a bonus was paid for 2021. However, when asked to compare
the provisions of the Employee Handbook (Exhibit D1) with the performance
incentive scheme policy (Exhibit 28), the Claimant admitted that the Defendant
may contend the employee does not have a right to receive the incentive, but
acknowledged that they have been receiving it. The Claimant stated that
qualification is contingent upon the employee meeting a performance rating of between
3-5. No further details have been
provided regarding the Claimant's qualifications for the performance incentive.
However, paragraph 7.7.2 of the employee handbook (Exhibit D1) states,
“Performance Incentive Scheme (PIS) – refer to the PIS policy in the staff
folder for further information.” Additionally, paragraph 7.7.2.1 indicates that
the organisation shall establish and maintain a Performance Incentive Scheme
(PIS). Paragraph 7.7.2.2 clarifies that “The PIS shall be discretionary and ex
gratia, i.e., the fact that an employee meets the criteria for the PIS does not
automatically entitle the employee to receive the cash incentive.” Furthermore,
paragraph 7.7.2.3 further states that “The organisation reserves the absolute
discretion to terminate the PIS arrangements without notice at any time.”
47. Contrary to the Defendant's witness’s
testimony during cross-examination, claiming there is no existing bonus policy,
the evidence shows that there is indeed a performance incentive policy outlined
in both the employee handbook and the performance incentive scheme policy
document. Please refer to paragraph 7.7.2.2 of the employee handbook and paragraph
1.1 of the performance incentive scheme policy document. Notably, payment of a
performance incentive is not automatic. Employees must achieve a performance
rating of 3-5 on a full-year performance evaluation. They must also have been
employed with the Defendant in the preceding year, participated in the
full-year evaluation process for the current year, and remained employed until
April of the current year, as specified in paragraphs 7.1 and 7.7 of the performance
incentive scheme policy.
48. Based on the evidence presented, the
Claimant did not remain in the Defendant’s employment until April 2022. Exhibit
27, the employee performance evaluation document, indicates that while the
Claimant began her self-evaluation, the process was not completed before her
employment was terminated. As a result, there is no evidence showing that the
Claimant qualified for the 2021 bonus payout. Even if she had qualified, the
payment of the performance bonus would still be subject to the Defendant's
discretion. Therefore, although Exhibit 29 demonstrates that the Defendant paid
the 2021 bonus to a designated employee, this does not support the Claimant’s
claim for a bonus payout. The Claimant's argument in paragraph 22 of her final
written address, that Exhibit 28 (the Defendant’s policy on bonuses) and the
letter dated 1st August 2022 (Exhibit 29), create an estoppel against the
Defendant under Section 169 of the Evidence Act, misinterprets the facts. Such
an argument would be valid only if the Claimant had established her entitlement
to the bonus and had been denied it. As mentioned earlier in this judgment,
relevant pleadings and evidence are lacking, rendering the claim unproven.
Therefore, I find that the Claimant has not established her claim to the 2021 bonus
payout and is accordingly not entitled to reliefs one and two.
Should the Claimant’s work be arrogated to the
Business Continuity Management Team?
49. The supporting evidence is contained in
paragraphs 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the Claimant’s sworn statement, and paragraphs 3
to 10 of her further sworn statement, which are detailed in this judgment. The
Claimant also relied on several exhibits, including Exhibits 8, 12, 14 to 23,
which support her oral testimony. A summary of the Claimant’s evidence is that
she was hired as the Business Continuity Manager when Business Continuity
Management did not exist in the Defendant's organisation. On 2nd July 2014, she
established business continuity procedures, including the Business Continuity
Plan, the IT Disaster Recovery Plan, the Business Impact Analysis, and the
Business Unit Recovery Plans for the Nigerian Stock Exchange, now the Nigerian
Exchange Group. She identified the critical functions necessary to deliver essential
services during disruptions and coordinated training, awareness sessions, and
disaster recovery tests. Over seven years, she organised Capital Market-wide
Business Continuity Failover Simulation tests with the Central Securities
Clearing System Plc, market data vendors, and over 200 trading firms, enabling
the successful transition to remote work and trading for over 100 weeks. The
Claimant noted that the Nigerian Exchange Group's Business Continuity Steering
Committee (BCSC) lacks the depth to develop effective Business Continuity and
IT Disaster Recovery plans, which contradicts established responsibilities. The
BCSC oversees the Crisis Management Plan and coordinates crisis events, but
does not develop the Business Continuity Plan. During her tenure, she managed
her role as a one-person team for over five years. The Business Continuity
Department was established in 2014, and the BCSC was formed as the Crisis
Management Committee in 2016, officially becoming the BCSC in 2018. She
documented the Business Continuity Plan and Disaster Recovery Plan starting in
2014 and drafted the business impact analysis to develop a sustainable plan.
The BCSC aims to assess, investigate, recommend, and implement solutions for
emergencies, but does not have the capacity to create the Business Continuity
Plan, Continuity Plan, and Disaster Recovery Plan, which she had created.
50. The
rebuttal evidence is found in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Defendant's witness's
sworn statement, which indicates that the overall objectives of the BCSC were
not solely achieved by the Claimant. Notably, in paragraph 4 of her further
sworn statement, the Claimant testified that she served as the Business
Continuity Manager as a one-person team for over five years. The Defendant argued
in paragraph 6.25 of its final written address that since the Claimant
performed her functions during her employment with the Defendant, she is
estopped by the intellectual property clause in her employment contract from
claiming the work as her own. This clause states: “All information, including,
without limitation, any documents, specifications, schematics, concepts,
illustrations, samples, and other materials, whether confidential or
non-confidential, created or developed by you in the course of your employment
with the Exchange shall be solely the property of the Exchange. No license or
other proprietary interest whatsoever vests in you by reason of your creation
or development of such information. You shall not engage in any act, including,
without limitation, unauthorized copying or distribution to the public, that is
inconsistent with the Exchange’s ownership of such information.”
51. This
provision is clear and binding on the parties. Nonetheless, I respectfully
believe that the Claimant’s fifth claim does not conflict with her obligations
under this clause. The Claimant is requesting an acknowledgment of her
contributions by attributing the work she did to the Business Continuity
Management Team, which she led, rather than the Business Continuity Steering
Committee, which did not contribute to the development of the work. Given the
committee’s terms of reference, which include assessing, investigating,
recommending, and implementing approved solutions and processes, I find the
Claimant’s request reasonable. However, since the Claimant seeks specific
performance, it is important to note that specific performance cannot be
invoked without the existence of a contract or agreement. Specific performance
cannot be applied abstractly in various situations, as established in Ports
& Cargo Handling Services Company Limited & Ors v. Migfo Nigeria
Limited & Anor [2012] 18 NWLR (Pt 1333) 555 at 584. “Specific
performance,” as the term implies, refers to the fulfilment of a promised
performance through a judgment or decree. It is a Court-ordered remedy that
requires precise fulfilment of a legal or contractual obligation when monetary
damages are inadequate. Please also refer to Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund
v. Fidelity Bank Plc & Ors [2022] 9 NWLR (Pt 1836) 475 at 518. Specific
performance is an equitable remedy. Equity does not act in vain or in
isolation. Equity must act for a purpose, as stated in Okpala & Ors v.
Okpu & Ors [2003] 5 NWLR (Pt 812) 183 at 215. The purpose of this claim
is unclear. The Claimant has not demonstrated any agreement or contract with
the Defendant that would entitle her to claim the works as personal to her or
her team. According to the parties' contract, the intellectual property rights
to the Claimant’s works during her employment belong to the Defendant.
Furthermore, since the Claimant's relationship with the Defendant has been
severed, it is not up to her to decide which team should be credited with the
business continuity programme. She has nothing to gain or lose from this
attribution. Therefore, I find as a fact that the Claimant has not established
her right to relief in her fifth claim.
Is the Claimant entitled to payment of the six
months’ salary in lieu of notice?
52. It
is undisputed that the Defendant approved the payment of six months' salary in
lieu of notice to the Claimant as terminal benefits in its letter dated 22nd
April 2022 (Exhibit 5). Paragraph 2(a) of the letter clearly states, “With
respect to the 'three months’ basic salary in lieu of notice,' this has been
revised upwards to 'six (6) months’ basic salary in lieu of notice (net of all
indebtedness to the NGX and applicable taxes).” Attached to Exhibit 5 is a statement
of the Claimant’s final entitlements, showing a total entitlement of N6,645,924.54 and total indebtedness of N12,914,334.34, resulting in a negative
balance of N6,303,367.90. The Claimant
did not challenge these figures. Despite acknowledging these facts in
paragraphs 12 to 16 of her amended statement on oath dated 10th January 2024,
the Claimant claimed in paragraph 17 of her sworn statement that, despite her
forced exit, her entitlements and other benefits have yet to be paid. Under
cross-examination, the Claimant admitted that the parties had agreed on the
purchase price of the status car but stated that she is in Court because the
Defendant was unwilling to reach an agreement. Therefore, I conclude that while
the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N6,645,924.54
as terminal benefits, this benefit is subject to the payment of her debts to
the Defendant. Having acknowledged that the parties agreed on a selling price of
N12,914,334.34 for the status car and
that she still possesses the car, indicating her willingness to buy it, I find
that the Claimant is not entitled to her N6,645,924.54
terminal benefits. These benefits have been appropriately used to settle part
of her indebtedness to the Defendant.
Should the Defendant reflect the Claimant’s
contribution of ?5,995,000.00 in the vehicle purchase agreement?
53. The supporting evidence is contained in paragraphs
14, 15, and 16 of the Claimant’s additional sworn statement dated 10th January
2024, and paragraphs 25 and 26 of her evidence to the counterclaim dated 28th
March 2023. The Claimant also relies on Exhibits 6, 7, 9, 25, and 26. The
Claimant asserts that the Defendant paid her N17,000,000
to acquire a status car. However, this amount was insufficient to purchase a
2020 Honda CR-V, prompting her to contribute an additional N5,995,000. This brought the total cost of the car to about N22,000,000. After her employment was
terminated and while negotiating the car purchase, the Defendant insisted that
the Claimant's contribution of N5,995,000
would not be included in the vehicle purchase agreement, which indicated that a
2022 Honda CR-V SUV was provided to her. Since the N17,000,000 provided did not cover the full price of the luxury
car, the Claimant requested that both parties' contributions be documented in
the purchase agreement. However, her requests were ignored. Documentary evidence
supports the Claimant's claims, demonstrating that she indeed contributed N5,995,000 towards the purchase of the
status car, and that the Defendant disregarded her request to include her
contribution in the agreement. During cross-examination, the Claimant
acknowledged that her reason for being in Court was her observation that the
Defendant was unwilling to come to an agreement with her.
54. The
Defendant’s evidence is found in paragraphs 17 to 34 of the Defendant’s
witness’s sworn statement, and Exhibits D9 to D12. It is to the effect that the
Defendant allocated N17,000,000 for a
status vehicle, but the Claimant chose a more expensive option costing N22,995,000. She agreed to cover the N5,995,000 difference and paid this amount
on 24th May 2021. The Claimant received her 2020 Honda CR-V SUV on 2nd August
2021, after her promotion to Principal Manager. According to the agreement, the
vehicle remains the property of the Defendant and can be purchased by the
Claimant for 1% of the purchase price by August 2026 if she is still employed.
However, the Claimant's employment was terminated due to redundancy on 25th
February 2022, just seven months after receiving the vehicle. After her
termination, she requested to purchase the vehicle, and the Defendant instructed
its solicitor to draft a purchase agreement. A draft was shared with the
Claimant on 5th July 2022, and after her feedback, a revised agreement was sent
on 22nd August 2022. On the same day, the Claimant decided not to sign the
agreement, thereby delaying the finalisation of the exit processes. Exhibits D9
to D11 are similar to Exhibits 25 and 26. Exhibit D12 is the Claimant’s email
declining her signature because the Defendant did not buy her 2020 Honda CR-V
SUV. During cross-examination, the Defendant’s witness admitted that there was
a back and forth and that the issue was that the Claimant requested that her
contribution towards the purchase of the status car be reflected in the vehicle
purchase agreement.
55. Both
parties are in agreement on this issue. They acknowledge that the Defendant
allocated N17,000,000 for a status
vehicle, while the Claimant opted for a 2020 Honda CR-V SUV, which cost N22,995,000. The Claimant paid the
difference of N5,995,000 to complete
the purchase. The parties also agree on the purchase itself. The dispute arises
from the Defendant’s reluctance to reflect the Claimant’s contribution in the
vehicle purchase agreement. Notably, the Defendant has not provided any
convincing reason for insisting that this clause be excluded. In her final
written address, the Claimant argued that the Defendant’s refusal to recognise
her contribution constitutes unjust enrichment and urged the Court to include
the clause in the agreement. Conversely, the Defendant stated that it does not
dispute the Claimant’s contribution to the purchase of the car and has
acknowledged this in its pleadings. However, the Defendant requested that the
Court refrain from granting the relief, arguing that doing so would be equivalent
to imposing contractual provisions on the parties.
56. I
have carefully reviewed the evidence and the addresses of both parties and
noted that the facts are undisputed. It is clear that the Defendant did not
purchase a 2020 Honda CR-V SUV for the Claimant. The allocated amount of N17,000,000 was insufficient to buy the
car. The Claimant paid an additional N5,995,000
to complete the purchase. As mentioned earlier, the Defendant has not justified
its refusal to include a clause recognising the Claimant’s N5,995,000 contribution towards the purchase of the car. This
refusal has resulted in over 3 years of litigation and associated costs. Courts
are established to serve justice, guided by the principles of law and the rules
of the Court. Please refer to Broad Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Alhaji S.
Olayiwola & Sons Ltd & Anor [2005] 3 NWLR (Pt 912) 434 at 450.
Furthermore, Section 14 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, states that
the Court shall, in exercising the jurisdiction vested in it under this Act in
every cause or matter, have the power to grant, either absolutely or on such
terms and conditions as the Court deems just, all such remedies as any of the
parties may appear to be entitled to, regarding any legal or equitable claim
properly presented to the Court, so that, as far as possible, all matters in
dispute between the parties may be completely and finally determined, and any
multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning those matters may be avoided.
Given the totality of the evidence before me, I find that the justice of this
case demands that the Defendant be directed to include a clause acknowledging
the Claimant’s N5,995,000 contribution
to the purchase of the 2020 Honda CR-V SUV in the vehicle purchase agreement.
Therefore, this issue is resolved in favour of the Claimant.
In
the premises, the first issue for determination is resolved partially in favour
of the Claimant.
Consideration of the reliefs
57. The first claim is for a bonus payout in the
sum of N7,000,000 (seven million naira)
due to the Claimant as the Defendant’s Head, Information Security and Business
Continuity from March 2021 to September 2021. I have determined that the
Claimant has not proven her entitlement to the 2021 bonus payout and, as a
result, is not eligible for this claim. I adopt my reasoning and conclusions in
paragraphs 44 to 48 above, and hold that this claim has not been substantiated
and is hereby denied.
58. The
second claim seeks a bonus payout in the sum of N3,000,000 due to the Claimant as the Defendant’s acting Chief Risk
Officer from September 2021 to April 2022. This claim is related to the first
claim, which has been denied and is therefore refused due to insufficient
pleading and evidence.
59. The third
claim seeks an award of six months’ salary in lieu of notice in the sum of N6,645,924.54 (six million, six hundred
and forty-five thousand, nine hundred and twenty-four naira, fifty-four kobo). In
this judgment, I have determined that the Claimant is entitled to terminal
benefits amounting to N6,645,924.54.
However, this benefit is subject to the settlement of her indebtedness to the
Defendant. The parties had previously agreed on a selling price of N12,949,292.44 for the status car, which
the Claimant still possesses, indicating her intention to purchase it.
Therefore, I find that the Claimant is not entitled to receive the sum of N6,645,924.54 from the Defendant, as this
amount has been appropriately applied to settle part of her outstanding debt to
the Defendant. Thus, this claim is denied.
60. The fourth claim is for order of specific
performance directing the inclusion of a clause acknowledging the Claimant’s
contribution (N5,995,000) to the
purchase of the status car in the vehicle purchase agreement. In this judgment,
I determined that the justice of this case demands that the Defendant be
directed to include a clause acknowledging the Claimant’s N5,995,000 contribution to the purchase of the 2020 Honda CR-V SUV
in the vehicle purchase agreement. I adopt my reasoning and conclusions in
paragraphs 53 to 56 above, and hold that this claim has been substantiated and
is hereby granted.
61. The
fifth claim seeks an order of specific performance arrogating the work of the
Claimant to the Business Continuity Management Team, not the Business
Continuity Steering Committee (BCSC), in line with the rulebook and
responsibilities within Business Continuity Management practice in the LBS Case
Study – Nigerian Exchange Group: Riding the Tides. Specific
performance is an equitable remedy. Equity does not act in vain or in
isolation. Equity must act for a purpose, as stated in Okpala & Ors v.
Okpu & Ors (supra). The purpose of this claim is unclear. The Claimant
has not demonstrated any agreement or contract with the Defendant that would
entitle her to claim the works as personal to her or her team. According to the
parties' contract, the intellectual property rights to the Claimant’s works
during her employment belong to the Defendant. Furthermore, since the
Claimant's relationship with the Defendant has been severed, it is not up to
her to decide which team should be credited with the business continuity
programme. She has nothing to gain or lose from this attribution. Therefore, I hold
that the Claimant has not established her right to this claim, which is
accordingly denied.
62. The
sixth claim is for the sum of N20,000,000
as damages for unlawful withholding of the Claimant’s benefits since April
2022. General damages are
those that the law presumes to be the direct, natural, or probable consequence
of the act in question. They are a type of monetary compensation awarded at the
Court’s discretion to alleviate losses caused by the actions of the opposing party,
as established in Nigerian Railway Corporation v. Ojo [2021] LPELR-55971(CA)
40-41. General damages are intended to compensate for actual injuries. To
qualify for an award of general damages, the Claimant must demonstrate that she
has suffered a legally recognisable loss due to the actions or omissions of the
Defendant, as illustrated in Ecobank Nigeria Limited v. Saleh [2020]
LPELR-52024(CA) 83-85. In this case, I have determined that the Claimant is
entitled to terminal benefits amounting to N6,645,924.54.
However, this benefit is contingent upon the Claimant's payment of her debts to
the Defendant. The parties had previously agreed on a selling price of N12,914,334.34 for the status car, which
the Claimant still possesses, indicating her intention to purchase it. There is
evidence that the Defendant was prepared to pay the Claimant’s terminal benefit
immediately, but the Claimant requested to purchase the status car, and the
parties agreed on the purchase price as stated in paragraph 32 of the
Defendant’s witness’s sworn statement. Therefore, I determined that the
Claimant is not entitled to receive the sum of N6,645,924.54 from the Defendant, as this amount had been appropriately
applied to settle part of her outstanding debt to the Defendant. In this
circumstance, the Defendant did not wrongfully withhold the Claimant’s
benefits. Thus, the Claimant has not suffered any injury, and consequently,
damages are not awardable. This claim is therefore denied.
63. The
seventh claim is for post-judgment interest at the prevailing Central Bank of
Nigeria’s rate. This Court, under Order 47, Rule 7 of the National Industrial
Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, has the authority to award
post-judgment interest at a minimum rate of 10% per annum. However, since no
monetary amount has been granted to the Claimant, there is no basis for
awarding post-judgment interest. Therefore, this claim is denied.
64. The
eighth claim is for consequential orders that this Honourable Court may deem
fit to grant in the circumstances. A Court has the authority to issue an order that may
seem incidental yet is necessary for a proper and final resolution of a case
before it. Such an order can be made even if it was not specifically claimed to
prevent further disputes between the parties. Please refer to Kayili v.
Yilbuk & Ors [2015] 7 NWLR (Pt 1457) 26 at 80. However, in this
instance, there is no issue addressed that is not included in the Claimant’s
claims. Therefore, this claim is unnecessary and accordingly denied.
Issue two: Whether the Defendant
is entitled to judgment on the counterclaim?
65. The counterclaim is summarised in paragraph 2
above. A counterclaim is an independent action, and the burden of proof lies
with the Defendant to convince the Court that it is entitled to judgment on its
claims. Please refer to Sections 131 and 136 of the Evidence Act, as well as the
cases of Faloyo v. Faloyo & Anor [2021] 3 NWLR (Pt 1762) 114 at 135
and Tyonex Nigeria Limited & Anor v. Pfizer Limited [2020] 1 NWLR (Pt
1704) 125 at 161.
66. The
evidence presented by the parties has been summarised in this judgment. As
mentioned earlier, the facts of this case are mostly undisputed. Both parties
agree that the Claimant was employed by the Defendant, and her employment was
terminated by a letter dated 25th February 2022. In a letter dated 22nd April
2022 (Exhibit D6), the Defendant calculated the Claimant’s terminal benefits to
be N6,645,924.54, conditional upon the
Claimant's settlement of any debts owed to the Defendant. The Defendant also
states that it was ready to pay this amount to the Claimant when she offered to
buy the status car. Therefore, the parties agreed on a selling price of N12,914,334.34 for a status car that the
Claimant still possesses, indicating her intention to purchase it. The essence
of the counterclaim is that the Defendant has the right to deduct the sum of N12,914,334.34 from the Claimant’s exit
benefits, along with the payment of any outstanding balance owed by the
Claimant to the Defendant, as well as the Defendant’s solicitors’ fees and
costs. The supporting evidence can be found in paragraphs 31 to 35 and 40 to 48
of the sworn statement from the Defendant's witness, as well as in Exhibits D1
to D14.
67. During
cross-examination, the Claimant acknowledged that she had not returned the car
because she had the right to purchase it and had formally requested to do so
upon her termination of employment. In this instance, the Defendant, acting as
a creditor, has the right to set off the Claimant’s terminal benefits against
the Claimant’s debts. However, the Defendant is required to specifically plead
the right of set-off, as stated in Order 30 Rule 2(2) of the National
Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, and the cases of Barbedos
Ventures Limited v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc [2018] 4 NWLR (Pt 1609) 241 at
274 and Benin Rubber Producers Co-operative Marketing Union Limited v.
Ojo & Anor [1997] 9 NWLR (Pt 521) 388 at 406. The Defendant complied
with this provision, and has specifically pleaded the set off in paragraphs 31,
32, 33, 34, and 35 of the statement of defence, which are reiterated in the
corresponding paragraphs of the Defendant’s witness's sworn statement. After a
thorough review of the totality of the evidence presented, I find that the
Defendant has successfully established its entitlement to a set-off of N12,912,334.34, which is the agreed value
of the status car, against the Claimant’s terminal benefits. Therefore, the
second issue for determination is resolved in favour of the Defendant.
Consideration of the counterclaims
68. Relief one is for a declaration that the
counterclaimant has a right to immediately set off the sum of ?12,914,334.34 (twelve
million, nine hundred and fourteen thousand, three hundred and thirty-four
naira, thirty-four kobo), being the agreed purchase price of the status vehicle from
the exit benefits of the Defendant-to-counterclaim. In this judgment, I
concluded that the Defendant is entitled to set off the value of the status
vehicle against the Claimant's terminal benefits. Therefore, this claim is
granted.
69. Relief two is for a declaration that the exit
benefits of the Defendant-to-counterclaim be deemed paid by setting off the sum
of ?12,914,334.34 (twelve million, nine hundred and fourteen thousand, three
hundred and thirty-four naira, thirty-four kobo), being the Defendant to the
counter claim’s outstanding debt to the Defendant less the sum of ?5,995,000.00
(five million nine hundred and ninety five thousand naira) which the Counterclaimant
contributed to the purchase of the status car and the 20% write-off which the Defendant
magnanimously approved of the Net Book Value) of the status vehicle from her
final entitlement in the sum of ?6,610,966.44 (six million, six hundred and ten
thousand, nine hundred and sixty- six naira, forty-four kobo). This claim is
similar to the previous one, which has been granted. Accordingly, I hold that
this claim has been established, and it is granted.
70. Relief
three is for an order directing the Defendant-to-counterclaim to pay the sum of
?6,303,367.90 (six million, three hundred and three thousand, three hundred and
sixty-seven naira, ninety kobo), being the outstanding sum on the purchase of
the status car after the application of the Claimant’s exit benefits to set off part of the
vehicle purchase price. There is clear evidence that, in a letter dated 22nd
April 2022 (Exhibit D6), the Defendant calculated the Claimant's terminal
benefits to be ?6,645,924.54, contingent upon the Claimant settling any debts
owed to the Defendant. After deducting the Claimant’s debts, a remaining
balance of ?6,303,367.90 exists. The Claimant did not dispute this amount. It
is settled law that facts that are not denied are considered admitted, and admitted
facts do not require further proof. This is supported by Section 123 of the
Evidence Act and the case of Balogun v. Egba Onikolobo Community Bank
(Nigeria) Limited [2007] 5 NWLR (Pt 1028) 584 at 600. Therefore, I conclude
that this claim has been established, and it is granted.
71. Relief four is for an order directing the Defendant-to-counterclaim
to pay the sum of ?10,000,000.00 (ten million naira) being solicitors’ fees. The
supporting facts are outlined in paragraph 48 of the counterclaim and
reiterated in paragraph 48 of the sworn statement of the Defendant's witness.
The Claimant did not deny this assertion in her defence to the counterclaim,
and facts that are not denied are considered admitted. However, a claim for
solicitors' fees falls under the category of special damages, which must be
specifically pleaded and substantiated. Although it is true that the Claimant's
failure to counter the Defendant's evidence makes it uncontested and more
likely to be accepted by the Court, this does not guarantee the Defendant an
automatic judgment. Please refer to Elewa & Ors v.
Guffanti Nigeria Plc [2017] 2 NWLR (Pt 1549) 233 at 248.
The evidence provided by the Defendant must adequately support the claims made.
If the evidence fails to substantiate the claims, the Defendant will not have discharged
the burden of proof, and the claim may fail, even in the absence of a defence.
This principle is illustrated in Erinfolami v. Oso [2011]
LPELR-15357(CA) 18.
72. Generally, a claim for the
recovery of solicitor’s fees paid by a party to its counsel to defend a case is
considered ungrantable. Relevant cases are The Shell Petroleum Development
Company of Nigeria Limited v. Okeh & Ors [2018] 17 NWLR (Pt 1649) 420 at
439-440, Suffolk Petroleum Services Limited v. Adnan Mansoor Nigeria
Limited & Anor [2019] 2 NWLR (Pt 1655) 1 at 33, and Keystone Bank
Ltd v. Abdulgafaru Yusuf [2021] LPELR-55646(CA). These cases were decided
after the case of Agbalugo & Anor v. Izuakor [2017] LPELR-43289(CA),
cited by the Defendant, where the Court of Appeal determined that solicitors’
fees are claimable as special damages. I share the view that they are indeed
claimable, but it is important for the party claiming the solicitors’ fees to
not only provide evidence of the amount claimed with relevant particulars but
also demonstrate that the fees are reasonable and justifiable in the given
circumstances.
73. Upon reviewing the pleadings and evidence supporting the claim
for solicitors’ fees, I note that, although the Defendant stated that it was
sued and engaged solicitors, there are no sufficient particulars provided. It
is unclear from the pleading and the Defendant’s witness’s testimony how much
was charged and agreed upon, as well as how much had been paid, and the method
of that payment. The Defendant seeks N10,000,000
as solicitors' fees, but the basis for this amount remains unclear. The
Defendant submitted Exhibits D13 and D14, which are a letter from the
Defendant’s solicitors dated 8th November 2022 indicating professional fees of N10,000,000, and a receipt dated 16th
November 2022 for N5,000,000. However,
there is no evidence of any agreement between the Defendant and its solicitors
regarding the payment of this fee. Typically, a solicitor’s invoice is viewed
as a proposal that requires agreement, and there is no evidence of such an
agreement in this case. Exhibit D14 appears to be a receipt for N5,000,000, allegedly paid by the
Defendant to the solicitors via bank transfer. However, the bank transfer
receipt was not provided, nor were the approval vouchers for the payment. There
is a lack of justification from the Defendant concerning the claimed or
allegedly paid amounts. Since this is a claim for a specific sum, it must be
justified under Sections 131(1) and 136(1) of the Evidence Act. Producing just
an invoice and a receipt is insufficient; the claimed amount must be reasonable
and must be shown to be either paid or payable by the Defendant. This evidence
is lacking.
74. Furthermore, the fact that the Claimant did not cross-examine
the Defendant’s witness on this issue or challenge it is of no moment. A claim
for solicitors’ fees belongs to a special class of special damages, as it is
typically against public policy to transfer the litigation costs of one party
to another. Therefore, any such claim must be strictly proven. Additionally, it
is a settled principle of equity that a party should not be allowed to benefit
from its wrongs. In this judgment, I determined that the Defendant did not
purchase a 2020 Honda CR-V SUV for the Claimant. The allocated sum of N17,000,000 was insufficient to purchase
the car, and the Claimant contributed an additional N5,995,000 to complete the transaction. I also found that the
Defendant had not justified its refusal to include a clause recognising the
Claimant’s contribution of N5,995,000
towards the car’s purchase. This refusal has led to over three years of
litigation and related costs. In these circumstances, the Defendant must bear
the cost of its solicitors’ fees. Therefore, I conclude that the Defendant has
not adequately established this claim, and it is accordingly denied.
75. Relief
five is for the cost of this action. Litigation costs follow the outcome of the case, and the
successful party is entitled to recover its costs. This principle is
illustrated in cases such as Ezennaka v. C.O.P., Cross River State [2022] 18
NWLR (Pt 1862) 369 at 420, Yakubu v. Min. Housing & Environment,
Bauchi State [2021] 12 NWLR (Pt 1791) 465 at 485, and Ubani-Ukoma &
Anor v. Seven-Up Bottling Company Plc & Anor [2023] 2 NWLR (Pt 1867) 117 at
184. Costs are awarded to partially compensate the successful party for the
losses it incurred during the litigation process. The Court has the discretion
under Order 55 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil
Procedure) Rules, 2017, to award costs, and this discretion must be exercised
both judicially and judiciously. Furthermore, under Order 55 Rule 2 of the
National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, the Court
is empowered to order the successful party to pay the costs of any specific
proceedings in the suit, regardless of its overall success in the case.
Having found that the
Defendant had not justified its refusal to include a clause recognising the
Claimant’s contribution of N5,995,000
towards the car’s purchase, and that this refusal led to over three years of
litigation and related costs, I hold
that the Defendant is not entitled to the cost of this action. Thus, this claim
is denied.
76. The next claim is for such further order or
other orders as this Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this
case. This relief is imprecise. As stated in this judgment, while the Court has the authority to make
consequential orders that are necessary for a proper and final resolution of a
case before it, there is no issue addressed that is not included in the Defendant’s
counterclaim. Therefore, this claim is unnecessary and accordingly denied.
77. Overall, the claim and counterclaim are partially
successful. Reliefs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Claimant’s claims are
dismissed. Relief 4 is granted. Additionally, Reliefs 1, 2, and 3 of the counterclaims
are granted, while reliefs 4, 5, and 6 are dismissed. For the avoidance of doubt,
judgment is entered as follows:
a.
The
Defendant is hereby directed to include a clause acknowledging the Claimant’s N5,995,000 contribution to the purchase of
the 2020 Honda CR-V SUV in the vehicle purchase agreement.
b.
It is declared that the Defendant has a right to
immediately set off the sum of ?12,914,334.34 (twelve million, nine hundred and
fourteen thousand, three hundred and thirty-four naira, thirty-four kobo),
being the agreed purchase
price of the status car from the Claimant’s exit benefits.
c.
It is
declared that the Claimant’s exit
benefits of N6,645,924.54 have been
paid by using them to liquidate part of the Claimant’s liability to the
Defendant.
d.
The
Claimant is hereby directed to pay the
Defendant the sum of ?6,303,367.90 (six million, three hundred and three
thousand, three hundred and sixty-seven naira, ninety kobo), being the
outstanding sum on the purchase of the status car after the application of the
Claimant’s exit benefits to set off part of the vehicle purchase price.
Judgment is entered accordingly.
…………………………………..
IKECHI GERALD NWENEKA
JUDGE
9/3/2026
Attendance: Parties absent.
Appearances
Dr. Olumide Babalola
with Etisang Solomon Esq. for the Claimant
Folabi Kuti, SAN, with Adejumoke Ademola Esq., Chidiebere
Nneji Esq., Toluwalase Dele-Peters Esq., and Chinasa Obiorah Esq. for the
Defendant