IN
THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN
THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN
AT LAGOS
BEFORE
HIS LORDSHIP, HON. JUSTICE IKECHI GERALD NWENEKA
Date: Tuesday, 3rd March
2026 SUIT NO. NICN/LA/601/2018
BETWEEN
OVERLAND AIRWAYS LIMITED …
CLAIMANT
AND
1. WASIU
DUROJAIYE HUSSAIN ] …
DEFENDANTS
2. DORNIER AVIATION (AIEP) LTD]
JUDGMENT
The claim
1. The Claimant initiated this lawsuit on 29th
November 2018, seeking the following reliefs:
a.
A declaration that the Defendant breached the employment
contract when he failed to give the agreed three months’ notice or fully pay
the three months’ salary in lieu as contained in the contract of employment.
b.
A declaration that the Defendant breached the Bond Agreements
dated the 31st day of December 2012, 8th May 2015, and 29th June 2015, by
failing to remain in the services of the Claimant for the minimum periods
agreed between the parties under the different Bond Agreements and as such is
liable to pay the full value of the trainings offered to him by the Claimant as
agreed.
c.
A declaration that the 2nd Defendant wrongfully induced the 1st
Defendant to breach his employment agreement and Training Bond Agreements by
failing to carry out the necessary due diligence before employing the 1st
Defendant, and encouraged the 1st Defendant to breach the said agreement, which
practice constitutes an unfair labour practice.
d.
An order of the Court directing the Defendants jointly and severally to
pay damages in the sum of N3,500,000 (three
million five hundred thousand naira) to the Claimant, being the expenses
incurred by the Claimant for the training of the 1st Defendant under the
Training Bond Agreement dated 31st December 2012.
e.
An order of the Court directing the Defendants to
pay the sum of N600,000 (six hundred thousand naira) to the Claimant, being the expenses incurred by the Claimant for
the training of the 1st Defendant under the Training Bond Agreement dated 8th
May 2015.
f.
An order of Court directing the Defendants to pay the sum of N2,000,000 (two million naira) to the
Claimant, being the expenses incurred by the Claimant for the training of the
1st Defendant under the Training Bond Agreement dated 29th June 2015.
g.
An order of the Court directing the 2nd Defendant to pay the sum of N50,000,000 (fifty million naira) as exemplary
and general damages for the inducement of the 1st Defendant to breach his
training bond with the Claimant.
h.
Interest
on the above sums at the rate of 21% per annum from the date of the judgment in
this suit until liquidation of the judgment debt.
i.
The
costs of this action.
History of the case
2. Upon receipt of the originating process, the
2nd Defendant filed a conditional memorandum of appearance on 4th January 2019,
along with a notice of preliminary objection dated 26th December 2018. The 2nd
Defendant subsequently filed its statement of defence on 18th March 2020, to
which the Claimant responded on 24th June 2020, and again on 13th July 2021. The
statement of defence was regularised on 10th February 2022, and the Claimant’s
reply dated 16th June 2020 was struck out. Although the 1st Defendant was
served with the originating process on 18th December 2018, he did not enter an
appearance or file a statement of defence. The trial commenced on 11th March
2020 and was concluded on 12th July 2023. The Claimant's witness and Manager of
Legal Services, Mrs. Cynthia Mohammed, testified in support of the Claimant's
claims, tendering 16 exhibits, and was cross-examined by the 2nd Defendant's
counsel. The suit was subsequently adjourned to 23rd March 2020, for the defence,
and then to 14th May 2020, at the request of the Defendants. The Court did not
sit on 14th May 2020, and the suit was adjourned administratively to 23rd
February 2021. After several adjournments and the hearing of pending
applications, the suit was rescheduled for trial and defence to 31st March
2022, and then to 31st May 2022. On 31st May 2022, the Claimant's witness
adopted her additional statement on oath and tendered two additional documents
marked as Exhibits 17 and 18. The suit was further adjourned to 28th November
2022, then to 11th May 2023, and subsequently to 12th July 2023, for defence.
At the resumed hearing on 12th July 2023, the learned counsel for the 1st
Defendant informed the Court that he was present solely to cross-examine, stating
that the 1st Defendant’s inability to pay the default penalty prevented him
from filing a statement of defence. Upon the application of the Claimant's
counsel, the 1st Defendant's right to defend the suit was foreclosed.
Subsequently, Mrs. Ngozi Ike Ebenezer, the Head of Legal Services for the 2nd
Defendant, testified in defence and was cross-examined by the 1st Defendant.
During the cross-examination by the 1st Defendant, letters dated 10th February
2016 and 3rd May 2016 were admitted into evidence and marked as Exhibits D1 and
D2 respectively, subject to the Claimant's right to object to admissibility in
the final written address. Following the cross-examination of the 2nd Defendant’s
witness by the Claimant and her re-examination, the suit was adjourned for the
adoption of final written addresses. However, the Defendants did not file any
written addresses. On 11th December 2025, upon the application of the
Claimant’s counsel, the Defendants’ right to file final written addresses was
foreclosed under Order 45 Rule 12 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria
(Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017. Thereafter, the Claimant's counsel proceeded to
adopt the Claimant’s final written address, which was dated and filed on 20th
March 2023, and the matter was set down for judgment.
Brief
facts of the case
3. The 1st Defendant was employed by the
Claimant as a trainee aircraft engineer, as per a letter dated 3rd July 2012.
Due to the 1st Defendant's insufficient professional qualifications,
experience, and technical expertise, the Claimant sponsored him for three training
programmes for aircraft type ratings. In return for this sponsorship, the 1st
Defendant signed three Training Bond Agreements. In the first Training Bond
Agreement, the 1st Defendant agreed to work for the Claimant for a minimum of
six months after completing the training or pay the Claimant the training cost
of N3,500,000.00. This agreement was
guaranteed by Alhaji Shamusideen A. Hussain. In the second Training Bond
Agreement, the 1st Defendant agreed to work for the Claimant for at least 24 months
after the training or pay the Claimant N600,000.00
as the training cost. In the third Training Bond Agreement, the 1st Defendant
agreed to serve the Claimant for a minimum of 32 months after the training or
pay the Claimant N2,000,000.00, which
was the agreed cost of training. The 1st Defendant attended and completed all
three training programmes, the last of which was completed on 8th July 2015.
However, he resigned from his position on 11th January 2016, thus breaching the
contract. The Claimant subsequently discovered that the 1st Defendant was
employed by the 2nd Defendant. The Claimant informed the 2nd Defendant about
the 1st Defendant’s subsisting contractual obligations, but the 2nd Defendant
took no action to ensure the 1st Defendant fulfilled these obligations. As a
result, this lawsuit was filed. The 1st Defendant did not file a defence, while
the 2nd Defendant denied liability and requested the Court to dismiss the case
against it.
Summary
of the Claimant’s final written address
4. Learned counsel for the Claimant nominated
three issues for determination in the final written address dated and filed on 20th
March 2024:
b. Having
regard to the evidence before this Honourable Court, whether the terms of the
Training Bond Agreements, Exhibits 2, 5, and 7, are not binding and enforceable
against the 1st Defendant as sought by the Claimant in this suit.
c. Whether
the 2nd Defendant is not liable to the Claimant for the inducement of the 1st
Defendant to breach his training bond with the Claimant.
5. Before
addressing the issues for determination, the learned counsel for the Claimant
raised a preliminary matter regarding whether the 1st Defendant's failure to
present evidence constitutes an admission. Counsel responded in the affirmative,
citing the case of Oduwole & Ors v. West [2010] LPELR-2263(SC) 27, and Jim
Jaja v. COP Rivers State & Ors [2012] LPELR-20621(SC), among others, in
support of this argument. Consequently, counsel submitted that the 1st
Defendant's failure to challenge the Claimant's evidence should be treated as
an admission, which the Court can rely upon. The Court was urged to uphold this
position.
6. In
addressing the first issue, and referring to Exhibits 1 and 5 as well as the
Claimant’s evidence regarding the exit procedure, counsel argued that the 1st
Defendant breached the employment contract by terminating it without providing
the required three months’ notice or making a full salary payment in lieu of
notice. The Claimant received only N244,000
(two hundred and forty-four thousand naira) in addition to the 1st Defendant’s
entitlements amounting to N262,952.96 (two
hundred and sixty-two thousand, nine hundred and fifty-two naira, ninety-six kobo),
which was intended to partially offset the 1st Defendant’s obligations under
the contract. The cases of Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum (Nig) Ltd [1993]
LPELR-864(SC) and Oforishe v. Nigerian Gas Co. Ltd [2017]
LPELR-42766(SC) were cited to support this argument. The Court was urged to conclude
that the 1st Defendant breached the employment contract.
7. The learned counsel argued the second issue
under five sub-issues: the enforceability of the training bonds; the offer and
consideration involved in the training bonds, specifically Exhibits 2, 5, and
7; the acceptance of the terms outlined in the training bonds; the nature and
benefits of the training attended by the 1st Defendant; and the breach of the
terms of the training bonds by the 1st Defendant. In addressing the first
sub-issue, the learned counsel argued that training bonds are not alien to our
employment and labour jurisprudence. He emphasised that the parties' right to
contract is an inalienable right enshrined in the 1999 Constitution. To support
his position, counsel referenced the unreported cases of Allied Air Limited
v. Kwabena Sarfo Ossei, Suit No. NICN/LA/464/2014, with judgment delivered
on 6th April 2017, by Hon. Justice Dele Peters, and Overland Airways Limited
v. Oladeji Afolayan & Anor, Suit No. NICN/LA/19/2011, with judgment
delivered on 2nd May 2014, by Hon. Justice B.A. Adejumo, OFR. Counsel argued
that as long as the essential elements of a valid contract are present, the
Court should readily affirm the validity and enforceability of training bonds.
He concluded that Exhibits 2, 5, and 7 are valid, reasonable, and enforceable
against the 1st Defendant, given that the necessary elements of a valid
contract are met. Furthermore, he urged the Court to hold that the Claimant has
provided credible evidence regarding the reasonableness of the training bonds
and the basis for the monetary claim in this case.
8. In addressing the second sub-issue,
counsel referred to paragraphs 4, 5, 7, and 18 of the statement of facts, as
well as Exhibits 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8, along with the testimony of the
Claimant’s witness. Counsel argued that the essential elements of a contract
are present, as the Claimant offered to sponsor the 1st Defendant. In return,
the 1st Defendant agreed to continue his service with the Claimant for
specified consecutive periods in exchange for the training fees. Counsel
supported this argument by citing the unreported case of Overland
Airways Limited v. Engr. Shehu Sekula & Ors, in which judgment was
delivered on 12th April 2021, by Hon. Justice Nweneka. Regarding the third
sub-issue, counsel contended that there is uncontested evidence indicating that
the 1st Defendant unequivocally accepted the terms of the training bonds. He
noted that the signing of the bond agreements by the 1st Defendant serves as a clear
indication of acceptance. Counsel emphasised that, in addition to executing
Exhibits 2, 5, and 7, the 1st Defendant also participated in the training
sessions.
9. In
discussing the fourth sub-issue, counsel referenced paragraphs 8-10 of the
statement of facts and argued that type rating training is crucial for an
aircraft engineer and provides lifelong benefits. Counsel emphasised that type
rating training is a prerequisite for an aircraft engineer to serve as an
airman and to obtain a licence as aircraft maintenance personnel. Additionally,
it was argued that type rating training is linked to an aircraft engineer's
employability, an important factor in determining the reasonableness of the
training bond. The
learned counsel argued that the Claimant incurred total expenses of N16,000,000.00 (sixteen million naira) for
training the 1st Defendant. This amount is an important factor in assessing the
reasonableness of the training bond. Citing the unreported case of Overland
Airways Limited v. Engr. Shehu Sekula & Ors, and Exhibits
15-18, the counsel submitted that when the Court evaluates the value of the
training provided to the 1st Defendant, as well as the significant expenses the
Claimant invested in sponsoring these training sessions, it will become clear
that both the duration of the bond and the amounts stated in the bond
agreements are reasonable and justifiable. Furthermore, it was argued that even
if the Court determines that the bond period is unreasonable, the Claimant is
still entitled to a refund of the costs incurred for the 1st Defendant's
training.
10. On sub-issue five, counsel argued that parties
are bound by the agreements they voluntarily enter into, and the Court should
respect the sanctity of such agreements and ensure their enforcement. He
referenced cases such as Akams v. Ali-Bro International Services Ltd [2022]
LPELR-57996(CA) and BFI Group Corporation v. B.P.E. [2012] 18 NWLR (Pt
1322) 209 to support this position. Counsel referred to Exhibits 2, 5, and
7, asserting that the 1st Defendant breached the training bond agreements by
resigning from his position before the bond period expired, without refunding
the costs incurred by the Claimant as stipulated. Consequently, counsel argued
that the Claimant is entitled to damages for the breach of contract and
reimbursement for the training costs associated with the 1st Defendant’s
training. Citing Ogundalu v. Macjob [2015] LPELR-24458(SC) 46, counsel
maintained that since the Claimant has fulfilled its obligations under the bond
agreements, it is entitled to a refund of the training costs. Counsel also
referenced the case of Akinade v. Nigerian Law School Lagos Campus Staff
Co-Operative Thrift & Credit Society Ltd [2015] LPELR-41705(CA) 16,
urging the Court to uphold this view.
11. In
addressing issue three, counsel explained the concept of inducement of breach
of contract. It was submitted that when one party causes another to breach his
contractual obligations, as seen in the present case, where the 2nd Defendant
knowingly induced the 1st Defendant to violate his employment contract with the
Claimant, it constitutes a wrongful act. This wrongdoing allows the aggrieved
party to pursue a legal action for inducement to breach of contract. The case
of Nissan Nigeria Ltd v. Yoganathan [2010] 4 NWLR (Pt
1183) 135 at 153-154 was cited in support of this argument. Counsel submitted
that to be liable for inducing a breach of contract, the person must know that
he is inducing such a breach. On what counts as knowledge for the purpose of
liability for inducing a breach of contract, counsel referred to Emerald
Construction Co Ltd v. Lowthian [1966] 1 WLR 691 at 700-701, and submitted that
even if the person did not know the actual terms of the contract but had the
means of knowing, which he deliberately disregarded, that would be enough to
make him liable. Counsel argued that since the 2nd Defendant was aware of the
existing contract between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant, as demonstrated
by the evidence from the 2nd Defendant’s witness statement and testimony during
cross-examination, the 2nd Defendant is liable for inducement, irrespective of
the evidence presented by the 2nd Defendant’s witness in paragraph 6 of the
sworn statement, which lacked substantiation.
12. Moreover, counsel stated that the 2nd
Defendant ignored a letter dated 18th April 2016, as well as letters of
complaint to the NCAA that informed him of the contractual terms concerning the
1st Defendant, yet it proceeded to employ the 1st Defendant. Regarding intent,
counsel referenced Nissan Nigeria Ltd v. Yoganathan (supra) and contended
that the 2nd Defendant’s retention of the 1st Defendant, despite receiving
notice of the latter's obligations to the Claimant, demonstrates an intention
to induce a breach of contract. It was further submitted that the 2nd Defendant
profited from the training and qualifications that the 1st Defendant acquired
during his employment with the Claimant. As such, the 2nd Defendant is liable
for damages, having deprived the Claimant of the benefits of its investment.
The case of Fidelity Bank Plc v. Trimidan Ltd & Anor
[2020] LPELR-50146(CA) was cited in support. The Court was urged to grant
the reliefs sought by the Claimant.
Issue
for determination
13. I have considered the issues for determination
nominated by the Claimant, which can be combined into one overarching question:
is the Claimant entitled to a judgment on its claims, either in full or in
part? It is
a fundamental principle of law that
whoever desires the Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent
on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove those facts. By
the combined force of Sections 131, 132, 133, 134, and 136[1] of the Evidence
Act, the Claimant bears the initial burden of proving the pleaded facts on a
balance of probabilities. If the
Claimant fails to discharge this burden satisfactorily, its claims will be
dismissed without considering the Defendants’ case, as the Defendants are not
required to prove their defence under these circumstances. In that case, there
would be no evidence to rebut, resulting in a judgment against the Claimant for
insufficient evidence. Please refer to the cases of Igwenagu v. Hon.
Minister, Federal Capital Territory & Ors [2025] 7 NWLR (Pt 1988) 145 at
173 – 174, Nsude & Ors v.
Nichodemus & Ors [2025] 4 NWLR (Pt 1982) 253 at 280, and Nduul v. Wayo & Ors
[2018] LPELR-45151(SC) 51 – 53.
14. The Claimant who seeks declaratory relief must
demonstrate its entitlement to the declaration by credible evidence and will
succeed on the strength of its case, not on the weakness of the defence or
admission by the Defendants. As granting declaratory relief involves the
Court’s discretion, the Claimant must place sufficient materials before the
Court to justify the declaration, as illustrated in the cases of Nduul v. Wayo & Ors [2018] 7 SC (Pt
III) 164 at 213, U.T.C. Nigeria Plc v. Peters [2022] 18 NWLR
(Pt 1862) 297 at 312, 313, and Osho v. Adeleye & Ors [2024] 8
NWLR (Pt 1941) 431 at 452.
Summary of Evidence
15. The Claimant sought nine reliefs, called one
witness, and tendered 18 documents, which were marked as Exhibits 1 to 18.
These are: employment letter dated 3rd July 2012 with the attachment, training
programme bond agreement dated 31st December 2012, certificate of course completion
issued to the 1st Defendant and dated 26th March 2013, aircraft type
maintenance training course & examination certificate dated 22nd March 2013,
guarantor’s form dated 31st January 2013, training programme bond agreement
dated 8th May 2015, IATA Safety Management Systems for Airlines certificate, IATA
Root Cause Analysis certificate, training programme bond agreement dated 29th
June 2015, 1st Defendant’s resignation letter with the Claimant’s official
receipt for N244,000.00, copy of a
manager’s cheque for N244,000.00 dated 11th
January 2016, 1st Defendant’s training bond agreement repayment plan dated 11th
January 2016, the Claimant’s letter to the 1st Defendant’s dated 24th February
2016, the Claimant’s letter to the 1st Defendant dated 18th April 2016, the Claimant’s
letter dated 10th May 2016 to the DG, NCAA against the 2nd Defendant, the
Claimant’s letter dated 1st June 2016 to the DG, NCAA against the 2nd
Defendant, confirmation of payment of ATR invoices dated 14th June 2021, along
with the attachments, and quotation and statement of work by AMETA with the
attachment.
16. The Claimant’s
witness and legal manager, Cynthia Mohammed, testified that as of when the 1st
Defendant applied for the position of Trainee Aircraft Engineer with the
Claimant in 2012, he had no aircraft type rating, professional and technical
expertise to carry out maintenance on the Claimant's aircraft type as an
Aircraft Engineer. As a result of the lack of qualification by the 1st
Defendant, the Claimant and the 1st Defendant agreed that the Claimant, at its
expense, sponsor the 1st Defendant to the ATR 42/72 Aircraft Type Rating
Maintenance Course and the ATR 72 Avionics Differences Course in consideration
that the 1st Defendant will remain in the Claimant's employment for five years.
The terms and conditions were reduced to writing in an offer of employment dated
3rd July 2012 between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant. Additionally, the employment
contract stipulated that a period of three months' notice in writing or payment
of three months' salary in lieu of notice would be required to terminate the contract.
The offer of employment also required the 1st Defendant to keep his Nigerian
Engineer's Licence and certificates current and to maintain the licence in
accordance with the Civil Aviation Act 2006 and the Nigerian Civil Aviation
Regulations. Given the deficiency in the professional qualification, experience
and technical expertise of the 1st Defendant when he was employed, the 1st Defendant
was required to undergo Aircraft Type Rating qualification training programme
which conferred on him the authority, dual knowledge, professional and
technical skills to specialise as Aircraft Engineer (Avionics) on the following
aircraft types/series: ATR 42-400/500/ATR 72-212A (PWC PW 12) - 500 Variant to
ATR 42-200/300 series (PWC PW 120) including ATR 72-100/200 series (PWC PW
120). Given the high cost of type-rating training, which runs into thousands of
dollars, most airlines assume responsibility for sponsoring the engineer for
the training on pre-agreed terms. Mrs. Mohammed explained that the type rating
license the engineer holds is beneficial because it allows the engineer to work
on and maintain that specific type of aircraft anywhere in the world for life.
She noted that type rating training centres are primarily located in Europe,
America, and South Africa, regions where the aircraft are manufactured, and
training is conducted by the aircraft manufacturers. As a result, the cost of
training is very high. Additionally, she mentioned that the airline often
incurs additional training-related costs, including airfare to the training
location, hotel accommodations, and other miscellaneous expenses.
17. Mrs.
Mohammed highlighted a troubling trend in the Nigerian aviation industry, in
which engineers, after receiving expensive training and type ratings from
airlines, breach their agreements to accept slightly higher pay at other
airlines. This has resulted in a significant influx of foreign engineers, as
many airlines prefer to hire foreigners who are more honest and committed. She
noted that the practice of blacklisting staff who breach training agreements is
common in Europe and America, but not enforced in Nigeria, leading many
airlines to avoid training Nigerian engineers due to past breaches. However,
the Claimant and a few others continue to train engineers, implementing
training bonds that require these engineers to commit to a specific period of
service. If they leave before this period ends, they must repay the training
costs. This ensures that airlines can benefit from their investment in
training, as departing engineers take their skills to competitors without having
to bear the costs of training. Mrs. Mohammed emphasised that training bonds are
supported by the National Industrial Court in Nigeria and are a standard
practice in many other countries. Mrs. Mohammed further testified that the
Claimant sponsored the 1st Defendant for three training courses during his
employment. The first training was the ATR 42/72 T2 Initial Type Rating Course
(Delta T2 Maintenance Training Course) held at the ATR Training Centre in
Toulouse, France. Upon completion of this training on 26th March 2013, the 1st
Defendant obtained professional qualifications and became licensed as an
Avionics technician to maintain the ATR 42, the 400/500/ATR 72-212A (PWC PW
12), and the 500 Variant to ATR 42-200/300 Series (PWC PW 120), including the
ATR 72-100/200 series (PWC PW 120). To cover the costs of this training, a
Training Programme Bond Agreement was executed between the Claimant and the 1st
Defendant on 31st December 2012. Based on this agreement, the 1st Defendant was
required to remain in the Claimant’s service for a period of sixty months after
the training. If the 1st Defendant breached this Bond Agreement, he would be
liable to pay a sum of N3,500,000
(three million five hundred thousand naira). For his second training, the 1st
Defendant attended a Safety Management Systems Course and a Root Cause Analysis
course facilitated by the International Air Transport Association at the
Landover Aviation Business School, an IATA Authorized Training Centre and NCAA
Approved Training Centre in Lagos, Nigeria. Upon completion of these courses on
14th May 2015, he received professional certification in Safety Management
Systems and Root Cause Analysis. A Training Bond Agreement was executed for
this training as well, which required the 1st Defendant to remain in the
Claimant’s service for an additional twenty-four months, running concurrently
with the first bond. If he breached this second Bond Agreement, he would be
liable to repay the sum of N600,000
(six hundred thousand naira), separate from the value of the first bond. The
1st Defendant also completed the B1900 & Pratt & Whitney PT6 Series
Type Rating Course, the third training in this series, facilitated by AME
Training Academy in South Africa at the Landover Aviation Business School. He
completed this training on 8th July 2015, and obtained additional type rating
qualifications and technical competence recognised globally to maintain Pratt
& Whitney PT6A Series (Cat C) aircraft engines. A third Bond Agreement was
executed for this training, which required the 1st Defendant to remain in the
Claimant’s service for a period of thirty-two months after completion. This
agreement ran concurrently with his other existing bonds. In the event of a
breach of this training bond, he would be liable to pay the sum of N2,000,000 (two million naira),
independent of the values of his other bonds with the Claimant.
18. After completing the three trainings, the
1st Defendant received a certificate of completion for each of them. On 11th
January 2016, the Claimant received a letter of resignation from the 1st
Defendant, which was submitted without the required three months' written
notice or payment of three months’ gross salary in lieu of notice. Mrs.
Mohammed stated that the 1st Defendant was obligated to pay three months' gross
salary for failing to provide the required notice, which she calculated to be N734,056.89 (seven hundred and thirty-four
thousand, fifty-six naira, eighty-nine kobo). Additionally, Mrs. Mohammed stated
that the 1st Defendant's outstanding debt under the training bond was N6,100,000.00 (six million one hundred
thousand naira), and calculated the 1st Defendant’s entitlement following his
exit to be N262,952.96 (two hundred and
sixty-two thousand, nine hundred and fifty-two naira, ninety-six kobo). This
amount included prorated salary for January 2016 of N86,823.93, Local Duty Allowance for December 2015 of N130,000.00, and Local Duty Allowance for
January 2016 of N46,129.03. Mrs.
Mohammed explained that, from the total entitlement of N262,952.96, the 1st Defendant had liabilities of a development fee
of N100.00 (one hundred naira) and
surcharges of N9,500.00 (nine thousand
five hundred naira). Furthermore, Mrs. Mohammed testified that in a separate
letter, also dated 11th January 2016, the 1st Defendant acknowledged his
indebtedness to the Claimant regarding the training bond agreements and
proposed a repayment plan. In that letter, the 1st Defendant committed to
paying N100,000.00 (one hundred
thousand naira) per month for the first six months following the date of the
letter and then N150,000.00 (one
hundred and fifty thousand naira) per month for the next four years. The
Claimant noted that the 1st Defendant, aware of his debt to the Claimant, made
cumulative payments of N244,000.00 (two
hundred and forty-four thousand naira) towards settling his termination notice
payment. He also paid N300,000.00 (three
hundred thousand naira) towards his debt repayment under the three bond
agreements. Mrs. Mohammed summarised the 1st Defendant’s total indebtedness as N6,843,656.89 (six million eight hundred and
forty-three thousand six hundred and fifty-six naira eighty-nine kobo). This
amount includes the agreed three months' salary in lieu of notice (N734,056.89), the training bond debt (N6,100,000.00), surcharges (N9,500.00), and the development levy (N100.00). The 1st Defendant paid a total
of N544,000.00, including his
entitlement of N262,952.96, resulting
in a total of N806,952.96 (eight
hundred and six thousand, nine hundred and fifty-two naira ninety-six kobo). As
a result, the 1st Defendant still owed an outstanding sum of N6,036,703.93 (six million thirty-six
thousand, seven hundred and three naira ninety-three kobo) after deducting the
sum of N806,952.96 from the total debt
of N6,843,656.89.
19. On 24th February 2016, in response to the
1st Defendant’s letter, the Claimant confirmed receipt of the 1st Defendant’s
resignation and payment plans. The Claimant informed the 1st Defendant of his
failure to provide three months’ notice or payment of salary in lieu, as
stipulated in the employment contract. The Claimant also stated that the
outstanding debt owed by the 1st Defendant is N6,036,703.98
(six million, thirty-six thousand, seven hundred and three naira, ninety-three
kobo only). The 1st Defendant did not respond to the Claimant's letter dated
24th February 2016. After the 1st Defendant’s resignation, the Claimant learned
that the 2nd Defendant, which operates aircraft of a similar series, had
employed the 1st Defendant despite his failure to meet the exit obligations
with the Claimant. The 2nd Defendant, located near the Claimant’s airport
office in Lagos, required an aircraft engineer with the specific type rating that
the 1st Defendant possessed, gained through the B1900 & PT6D Type Rating
Course sponsored by the Claimant. Upon learning of this development, the
Claimant notified the 2nd Defendant of the 1st Defendant's obligations in a
letter dated 18th April 2016, requesting that the 2nd Defendant take
appropriate action to ensure the 1st Defendant honoured his obligations.
However, the 2nd Defendant failed to respond to this letter. In letters dated
10th May 2016 and 1st June 2016, the Claimant informed the NCAA of the 2nd
Defendant's unethical practice of soliciting employees it had trained. The
Claimant requested the NCAA’s intervention to establish a policy preventing
personnel trained under bond obligations from seeking employment in the
industry until they fulfil their contractual obligations. Nevertheless, the 2nd
Defendant retained the 1st Defendant, benefiting from the expertise and
qualifications he acquired through the Claimant’s training, without adequately
verifying the 1st Defendant's status with the Claimant. This situation
indicates that the 2nd Defendant induced the 1st Defendant to breach his
contract with the Claimant. In her further testimony, Mrs. Mohammed outlined
the particulars of the 2nd Defendant’s inducement. As a result of these
actions, the Claimant lost the benefits of its investment in the 1st Defendant
and experienced business disruptions due to the time it would ordinarily take
to find a replacement engineer with the requisite experience. Mrs. Mohammed
confirmed that the 1st Defendant was indebted to the Claimant at the start of
this lawsuit, resulting in financial hardship for the Claimant. This was due to
the loss of funds that could have been utilised for business operations and
training other technical staff.
20. In
her subsequent sworn statement, Mrs. Mohammed asserted that the 1st Defendant
is still employed by the 2nd Defendant and was not employed for just three
months as previously claimed. She noted that it is customary for job seekers to
include their addresses and work experiences in their resumes. The dual
aircraft type ratings training, which was bonded by the Claimant, served as the
basis for the 1st Defendant’s aircraft engineering experience, making him
attractive to the 2nd Defendant. The 2nd Defendant benefited from the training
and skills that the 1st Defendant possessed, which were acquired at the
Claimant's expense. Mrs. Mohammed maintained that the breach of the bond
agreements by the 1st Defendant primarily benefited the 2nd Defendant, which
had prior knowledge and constructive notice of the bond, a standard practice in
the aviation industry. She stated that the 1st Defendant had no prior aviation
work experience other than that gained from the Claimant, a fact known to the
2nd Defendant. To successfully induce the breach of the 1st Defendant’s
contract, the 2nd Defendant failed to conduct a previous employer reference
check on him. The actions of the 2nd Defendant were prompted by a contract
secured with the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Company Limited, Bonny, to
operate its B1900D aircraft. Consequently, the 2nd Defendant was in need of
pilots and engineers who were type-rated on the B1900D aircraft. Having met
these qualifications, the 1st Defendant was employed immediately after being
induced to resign from his contract with the Claimant. She pointed out that
letters dated 10th May 2016 and 1st June 2016 were sent by the Claimant to the
NCAA to protest the 2nd Defendant's unethical actions. As an aircraft operator
and employer of aircraft crew, the 2nd Defendant has a duty to inquire about
how the 1st Defendant acquired his dual aircraft type rating qualifications,
including the source of his expertise, skills, and general experience, as well
as who financed his training, especially since it is customary in the aviation
industry to bond pilots and engineers for such training to develop their skills
and experience.
21. During
cross-examination by the 2nd Defendant, Mrs. Mohammed stated that she joined
the Claimant in 2007. She is the Head of Legal for the Claimant, and all
documentation passes through her desk. On 18th April 2016, she wrote a letter
to the 1st Defendant, which is now before the Court. Two letters were written
on that date: one to the 1st Defendant and another to the 2nd Defendant. A
notice was served to the 2nd Defendant requesting the production of that
letter. Additionally, she notified the 2nd Defendant about the existence of a
contract between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant. Although the 2nd Defendant
is not a party to the bond agreement, it has interfered with the relationship
between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant. The 2nd Defendant is also not a
party to Exhibits 2 and 3, yet it has disrupted the Claimant’s contract with
the 1st Defendant. Mrs. Mohammed acknowledged having seen Exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, and 9. Despite not being a party to these agreements, the 2nd Defendant,
being a neighbour of the Claimant, has interfered with the contract between the
Claimant and the 1st Defendant. The name on Exhibit 5 is Alhaji Shemusideen
Abiodun Hussain. The 1st Defendant resigned from the Claimant’s employment and
subsequently took a job with the 2nd Defendant, its neighbour, where they share
a common boundary. There is no restrictive clause preventing the 1st Defendant
from securing employment with another company after leaving the Claimant. The
guarantor’s form serves as additional security and does not absolve the 2nd
Defendant from interfering with the contract between the Claimant and the 1st
Defendant. Mrs. Mohammed stated that her testimony in chief indicates that the
2nd Defendant did indeed interfere with the Claimant’s contract with the 1st
Defendant.
22. The witness for the 2nd Defendant, Mrs. Ngozi
Ike, who is the Head of Legal, testified that the 1st Defendant, an Aircraft
Engineer, was employed by the 2nd Defendant for only three months, starting on
11th February 2016, and has since ceased to be their employee. Mrs. Eke stated
that the 2nd Defendant is not privy to the series of training bonds entered
into between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant, and that the training bond was
not established for the benefit of the 2nd Defendant. The 1st Defendant was
employed after leaving the Claimant, for a period of three months beginning on
11th February 2016. Mrs. Ike explained that during the interview and screening
process conducted by the Human Resources Department of the 2nd Defendant, the
1st Defendant withheld information about his ongoing employment relationship
and training bond with the Claimant, which the 2nd Defendant was unaware of.
She also stated that the 2nd Defendant did not act as a guarantor for the 1st
Defendant in the training bond agreement; that role was filled by Alhaji
Shamusideen Abiodun Hussain. While there was communication between the Claimant
and the 1st Defendant regarding the admission of liability, agreement to refund
the training bond, proposals for settlement, and payment of outstanding
liabilities, the 2nd Defendant was not involved in these discussions. Mrs. Ike
noted that by the time the letters dated 10th May 2016 and 1st June 2016 were
sent to the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority, the 1st Defendant had been
employed for over two months, with only a day remaining before the expiration
of his contract, which was not renewed. Regarding the letter dated 1st June
2016, the 1st Defendant had already left the 2nd Defendant's employment, as the
contract was not renewed. She clarified that the 2nd Defendant did not benefit
from the 1st Defendant’s skills and qualifications. Additionally, Mrs. Ike
stated that the 2nd Defendant complied with the Nigerian Civil Aviation
Authority's requirements for employing an aircraft engineer, but the
certificate did not indicate that the 1st Defendant was under a training bond
agreement with the Claimant. She denied that the 2nd Defendant induced the 1st
Defendant, who is an adult with full legal capacity, to voluntarily enter into
a contract upon his employment. Furthermore, she denied any prior communication
between the 1st Defendant and the 2nd Defendant during or after the 1st
Defendant's employment with the Claimant.
25. During
Mrs. Ike’s cross-examination by the 1st Defendant, she indicated that when they
received the originating process, the 1st Defendant had already left the
services of the 2nd Defendant. The originating process was served at her office
by the receptionist. The 1st Defendant worked for the 2nd Defendant for only
three months, from 10th February 2016 to 3rd May 2016. After his disengagement,
the 1st Defendant did not reapply for employment with the 2nd Defendant.
Instead, he was employed by Personnel Management Aviation Services and was
deployed to the 2nd Defendant. The 1st Defendant's employment letter, dated
10th February 2016, and termination letter, dated 3rd May 2016, were submitted
as evidence and marked as Exhibits D1 and D2, subject to the Claimant's right
to contest their admissibility in the final written address. Mrs. Ike stated
that Personnel Management Aviation Services was the employer that seconded the
1st Defendant to the 2nd Defendant, and they lost contact with him after he
left the 2nd Defendant. During Mrs. Ike’s cross-examination by the Claimant,
she confirmed that she is the Head of Legal Services for the 2nd Defendant. She
joined the organisation in 2013, and she is familiar with aviation practices.
The 2nd Defendant does not bond its staff. The 1st Defendant had applied for
the position of aircraft engineer. To maintain a particular aircraft, an
aircraft engineer must have type-rated experience for that aircraft. The 2nd
Defendant employed the 1st Defendant because he possessed the required experience
for its aircraft. Mrs. Ike stated that the 2nd Defendant inquired from the 1st
Defendant how he gained this relevant experience, but asserted that the 1st
Defendant was only employed by the 2nd Defendant for three months. This
information is evident in the employment and termination documents. She is not
aware of any notification from the Claimant to the 2nd Defendant regarding the
1st Defendant's obligations to them. When shown Exhibit 14, she confirmed that
the 2nd Defendant was copied on the letter. She conducted the interview for the
1st Defendant and affirmed that bonded employees have specific obligations. In
her re-examination, she clarified that Exhibit 14 had not been served on Dornier
Aviation.
Evaluation of evidence
26. According to the Court records, the 1st
Defendant was served with the originating process and hearing notices for this
case. He was represented by legal counsel and filed an application to set aside
the service of the originating process, which was heard and subsequently
dismissed. Although the 1st Defendant cross-examined the 2nd Defendant’s
witness and tendered two documents marked as Exhibits D1 and D2, he did not
file any defence processes or final written addresses. In light of this, the
learned counsel for the Claimant argued in paragraphs 5.1 to 5.6 of the
Claimant’s final written address that the 1st Defendant's failure to defend the
suit means that the Claimant's evidence remains unchallenged and is deemed
admitted. The counsel cited the cases of Oduwole & Ors v. West [2010]
LPELR-2263(SC) and Jim Jaja v. COP, Rivers State & Ors [2012]
LPELR-20621(SC) to support this argument. The Court was urged to uphold
this position, and I fully agree. In University of Abuja v. Asset Management
Corporation of Nigeria & Ors [2025] 2 NWLR (Pt 1975) 179 at 199, Okoro,
JSC, held that “where a Defendant fails to file a defence, he will be deemed to
have admitted the averments in the statement of claim, leaving the trial Court
with the authority to peremptorily enter judgment for the Plaintiff without
taking evidence.”
27. While it is true that the 1st Defendant's failure
to present evidence makes the Claimant's evidence uncontested and likely to be
accepted by the Court, this does not guarantee the Claimant an automatic
judgment. Please refer to Elewa & Ors v. Guffanti Nigeria Plc [2017] 2
NWLR (Pt 1549) 233 at 248. The evidence provided by the Claimant must
adequately support the claims made. If the evidence does not support the
claims, the Claimant has not discharged the burden of proof, and the claim will
fail, even in the absence of a defence, as illustrated in the case of Erinfolami
v. Oso [2011] LPELR-15357(CA) 18.
28. The Claimant's
claims are for breach of contract and inducement of breach of contract. The
Claimant called one witness and tendered 18 exhibits. As stated earlier, the
1st Defendant did not file defence processes, and did not present a witness,
although he tendered two exhibits through the 2nd Defendant’s witness. The 2nd
Defendant called one witness, but did not file a final written address. There
is undisputed evidence that the 1st Defendant was the Claimant’s employee, and
executed three training programme bond agreements (Exhibits 1, 2, 6, and 9). While
the first training programme bond agreement was guaranteed by Alhaji Shamusideen
Abiodun Hussain, the second and third were not. There is also unchallenged
evidence that the 1st Defendant could only terminate his employment by giving
three months’ notice or by paying three months’ gross salary in lieu of notice.
Moreover, it is clear that the 1st Defendant committed to remaining in the
Claimant's employment for at least 5 years after his training. It is not
disputed that the 1st Defendant participated in all three training programmes,
one of which took place in France, and that these were fully paid for by the
Claimant (Exhibits 17 and 18). He was duly certified and qualified to work as
an Aircraft Engineer (Exhibits 3, 4, 7, and 8). It is acknowledged that the 1st
Defendant resigned from his position with the Claimant through a letter dated 11th
January 2016, offering N244,000.00 as
payment in lieu of notice (Exhibits 10 and 11). The 1st Defendant also admitted
liability to the Claimant for the costs of his training, amounting to N6,100,000, which he agreed to repay over
a four-year period (Exhibit 12). The core issues in this dispute are: whether
the 1st Defendant breached his employment contract by failing to give the
required notice or pay the agreed salary in lieu of notice; whether he breached
the bond agreements by not fulfilling the bond term or paying the stipulated
bond amount; whether the 2nd Defendant induced the 1st Defendant to breach his
employment contract and training bond agreement with the Claimant; and whether
the Claimant is entitled to the sums claimed.
Did the 1st Defendant breach his contract of
employment?
29. The supporting evidence can be found in
paragraphs 28 and 29 of the sworn statement from the Claimant's witness, as
well as in Exhibits 1, 10, and 11. As previously mentioned in this judgment,
the Claimant's evidence remains unchallenged. To summarise, the Claimant's
witness states that the 1st Defendant resigned from his job on 11th January
2016, without providing the required three months’ notice or paying the
equivalent of three months’ gross salary in lieu of notice. In Exhibit 1, the
employment contract, the parties agreed that the 1st Defendant could terminate
his employment by giving three months’ written notice or by paying three
months’ gross salary in lieu of notice. Exhibit 10, which is the resignation
letter, indicates that the 1st Defendant submitted his resignation on 11th
January 2016, with notice. Exhibit 11 shows that he offered N244,000, representing one month’s salary
in lieu of notice. Although the resignation letter referenced accrued leave for
2013 and 2014, there is no evidence that the 1st Defendant had any accrued
leave for those years. Furthermore, in Exhibit 13, a letter from the Claimant
to the 1st Defendant dated 24th February 2016, the Claimant emphasised that the
1st Defendant’s notice of resignation did not comply with the contractual
agreement. The Claimant asserts that the gross salary for three months amounts
to N734,056.89, which the 1st Defendant
was obligated to pay. It is a legal principle that parties are bound by the
terms of the contracts they voluntarily enter into. In the case of African International Bank Ltd v. Integrated Dimensional
System Ltd & Ors [2012] 17 NWLR (Pt 1328) 1 at 50, Ariwoola,
JSC (as he was then), held
that “Parties are bound by
the contract they voluntarily entered into and cannot act outside the terms and
conditions contained in the said contract. In the same vein, neither of the
parties to a contract can alter or read into a written agreement a term that is
not embodied in it.” After reviewing the evidence, I
find, as a fact, that the 1st Defendant breached his contract with the Claimant
by failing to provide the required notice or to pay salary in lieu of notice.
Did the 1st Defendant breach the training
programme bond agreements?
30. The Claimant's evidence is detailed in
paragraphs 28 to 38 of the sworn statement of the Claimant's witness, as well
as in Exhibits 1 through 14. This evidence indicates that the Claimant
sponsored the 1st Defendant for three training courses during his employment.
The first was the ATR 42/72 T2 Initial Type Rating Course in Toulouse, France,
which the 1st Defendant completed on 26th March 2013, obtaining a licence as an
Avionics Technician. A bond agreement executed on 31st December 2012, required
him to remain with the Claimant for sixty months, or repay N3,500,000 if breached. His second training involved a Safety
Management Systems Course and a Root Cause Analysis Course at the Landover
Aviation Business School, completed on 14th May 2015. This required an
additional twenty-four months of service, with a penalty of N600,000 for breach. Finally, he completed
the B1900 & Pratt & Whitney PT6 Series Type Rating Course at AME
Training Academy in South Africa, obtaining type rating qualifications on 8th
July 2015. A third bond required him to stay for thirty-two months, with a
penalty of N2,000,000 for any breach.
This bond ran concurrently with the previous ones. After completing the three
training programmes, the 1st Defendant received a certificate for each. On 11th
January 2016, the Claimant received the 1st Defendant's resignation letter,
submitted without the required three months' notice or payment in lieu, which
amounted to N734,056.89. The 1st
Defendant's outstanding debt from the training bond was N6,100,000.00. Following his exit, his total entitlements were
calculated at N262,952.96, which
included prorated salary and allowances for January 2016 and December 2015.
From this, he had liabilities totalling N9,600.00,
consisting of a development fee and surcharges. In a separate letter dated 11th
January 2016, the 1st Defendant acknowledged his debt and proposed a repayment
plan: N100,000.00 per month for six
months, then N150,000.00 per month for
four years. He made payments of N544,000.00
towards his termination notice and bond agreements, leaving an outstanding debt
of N6,036,703.93. On 24th February
2016, the Claimant confirmed receipt of the 1st Defendant's resignation and
payment plan, noting the 1st Defendant's failure to meet the notice
requirement. The outstanding debt was reiterated as N6,036,703.98, but the 1st Defendant did not respond to this
letter.
31. Exhibits
1 through 14 support the Claimant’s evidence. The parties agreed in Exhibit 1,
the employment contract, that due to the 1st Defendant’s inadequate
qualifications to perform his duties as an Aircraft Engineer, the Claimant
would sponsor him for necessary training programmes. In return, the 1st
Defendant was required to execute a training programme bond agreement and
remain in the Claimant’s service for five years. The bonds are outlined in
Exhibits 2, 6, and 9, which detail the 1st Defendant’s obligations. Exhibits 3,
4, 7, and 8 are the qualifying certificates that demonstrate the 1st Defendant
participated in the training programmes and earned the requisite competencies
to work as an Aircraft Engineer. Exhibit 5 is a guarantor’s form for the first
bond, while Exhibits 10, 11, and 12 are the 1st Defendant’s resignation notice,
a cheque for part payment of his salary in lieu of notice, and the repayment
plan for the training bond agreement. Exhibits 13 and 14 are the Claimant’s
letters to the 1st Defendant in response to Exhibits 10, 11, and 12. It is
established law that when documentary evidence supports oral evidence, the oral
testimony becomes more credible. This is based on the principle that
documentary evidence provides a basis for assessing oral testimony, as seen in BAC
Electrical Co. Ltd v. Adesina & Anor [2020] 14 NWLR (Pt 1745) 548 at 566.
There is unchallenged evidence indicating that the 1st Defendant completed all
the training programmes but resigned from the Claimant's employment on 11th
January 2016, without fulfilling the required duration of service or refunding
the full training fees, thereby breaching his agreement as stated in Exhibits
1, 2, 6, and 9. In my view, Exhibit 12, the 1st Defendant’s repayment plan,
does not validate the breach. Clauses 4(b) of Exhibits 2 and 9, along with
clause 4 of Exhibit 6, the first, third, and second bond agreements
respectively, stipulate that if the employee resigns or terminates his
employment with the company before completing the specified period, he must pay
the full cost of the training on or before the effective date of his exit from
the company. The parties are bound by the terms of their contract. Therefore, Exhibit
12 represents a unilateral variation of the training bond agreements, which the
Claimant rightly rejected. Based on the evidence before me, I find that the 1st
Defendant breached the training bond agreements.
Did the 2nd Defendant induce the
1st Defendant to breach his contract with the Claimant?
32. The
supporting evidence is found in paragraphs 40 to 45 of the Claimant’s witness's
sworn statement, paragraphs 5 to 13 of the Claimant’s witness's additional
sworn statement, and Exhibits 14, 15, and 16. The Claimant's evidence shows
that following the resignation of the 1st Defendant, the Claimant discovered
that the 2nd Defendant employed him despite his failure to fulfil exit
obligations to the Claimant. The 2nd Defendant, located near the Claimant’s
office in Lagos, needed an aircraft engineer with the specific type rating that
the 1st Defendant held, obtained through a training course sponsored by the
Claimant. Upon learning of this, the Claimant wrote to the 2nd Defendant on
18th April 2016, informing them of the 1st Defendant's obligations and
requesting that they take action to ensure compliance. However, the 2nd
Defendant did not respond. The Claimant also informed the NCAA in letters dated
10th May 2016 and 1st June 2016, about the 2nd Defendant's unethical practice
of soliciting trained employees. Despite this, the 1st Defendant was retained,
which benefited the 2nd Defendant without verifying the 1st Defendant's status
with the Claimant. The Claimant noted that the 1st Defendant is still employed
by the 2nd Defendant and has been employed longer than previously claimed by
the 2nd Defendant. The dual aircraft type ratings training that the 1st
Defendant acquired made him appealing to the 2nd Defendant, who benefited from
his skills at the Claimant's expense. The Claimant emphasised that the 2nd
Defendant had prior knowledge of the bond agreement, which is customary in the
aviation industry. The 2nd Defendant failed to conduct a reference check with
the 1st Defendant’s previous employer, which contributed to the breach of
contract. The 2nd Defendant’s actions were motivated by a contract with the
Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Company Limited to operate B1900D aircraft,
necessitating type-rated pilots and engineers. As a result, the Claimant
suffered losses from its investment in the 1st Defendant and experienced
business disruptions due to the time required to find a suitable replacement
engineer. During cross-examination, the Claimant’s witness confirmed that two
letters were written on 18th April 2016: one addressed to the 1st Defendant and
the other to the 2nd Defendant. The witness also stated that she notified the
2nd Defendant about the contract between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant.
She emphasised that although the 2nd Defendant is not a party to the bond
agreements, it has interfered with the relationship between the Claimant and
the 1st Defendant. Notably, even though the 2nd Defendant was in copy of Exhibit
14, dated 18th April 2018, and addressed to the 1st Defendant, there is no
evidence that the 2nd Defendant actually received it. The Claimant did not
produce a copy of the letter to the 2nd Defendant. Exhibits 15 and 16 consist
of complaints submitted to the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority regarding the
2nd Defendant.
33. The 2nd Defendant's evidence is that the 1st
Defendant was employed for only three months starting 11th February 2016, and
has since left. The 2nd Defendant indicated that it was unaware of the training
bonds between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant and clarified that these bonds
were not for its benefit. The 2nd Defendant noted that the 1st Defendant was
employed after leaving the Claimant and failed to disclose his prior employment
and training bond during the hiring process. It emphasised that it did not act
as a guarantor for the training bond. Communication regarding the admission of
liability and settlement between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant occurred
without the 2nd Defendant's involvement. By the time letters dated 10th May
2016 and 1st June 2016 were sent to the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority, the
1st Defendant had been with the company for just over two months, and his
contract was not renewed. The 2nd Defendant stated it did not benefit from the
1st Defendant's skills and complied with aviation employment requirements,
noting that the relevant certificate did not mention a training bond. During
cross-examination, the 2nd Defendant’s witness confirmed that an aircraft
engineer requires type-rated experience, which is why the 1st Defendant was
hired. The witness denied any notifications from the Claimant about the 1st
Defendant's obligations and acknowledged being copied on Exhibit 14, although
it was not officially served.
34. Even
though Exhibits D1 and D2 were presented by the 1st Defendant through the 2nd
Defendant’s witness, they contradict the evidence provided by the 2nd
Defendant. Exhibit D1, dated 10th February 2016, indicates that the 1st
Defendant’s employment with the 2nd Defendant began on 11th January 2016, which
is the effective date of the 1st Defendant’s resignation from the Claimant.
This contradicts the 2nd Defendant’s testimony (specifically paragraphs 4, 6,
8, and 11 of the 2nd Defendant’s witness’s sworn statement), which asserts that
the 1st Defendant’s employment commenced on 11th February 2016. Furthermore,
contrary to the 2nd Defendant’s assertion that its contract with the 1st
Defendant was not renewed after its termination on 11th May 2016, Exhibit D2
suggests otherwise, stating that the 1st Defendant’s employment was terminated
on 3rd May 2016. Notably, during cross-examination by the 1st Defendant, the
2nd Defendant’s witness admitted that Personnel Management Aviation Services
(PMAS) Ltd employed the 1st Defendant and assigned him to the 2nd Defendant.
The witness acknowledged the employment and termination letters, which were tendered
as Exhibits D1 and D2. The first paragraph of Exhibit D1 states, “We are
pleased to offer you a contract of employment as an Aircraft Engineer with
effect from 11th January 2016 and on deployment to our parent company, DANA
Limited, Kaduna.” The discrepancies between Exhibits D1, D2, and the 2nd
Defendant’s witness testimony raise questions about the reliability of the 2nd
Defendant's evidence. As documentary evidence serves as a basis for evaluating
oral testimony (refer to BAC Electrical Co. Ltd v. Adesina & Anor [2020]
14 NWLR (Pt 1745) 548 at 566), it implies that where, as in this case,
Exhibits D1 and D2 contradict the 2nd Defendant’s witness testimony on a
significant point, they undermine the credibility of the 2nd Defendant’s evidence.
As a result, I hold that the 2nd Defendant’s evidence is unreliable.
35. The
Supreme Court in Brittania-U
Nigeria Limited v. Chevron Nigeria Limited & Ors [2025] 3 NWLR (Pt 1979) 197 at 268, held that an
allegation of inducing a breach of contract is classified as an economic tort, and it is also a recognised cause of action.
The Court of Appeal in Trans Atlantic Shipping
Agency Limited v. I.A.S. Cargo Airlines Nigeria Limited [1991] 7 NWLR (Pt 202) 156 at 172-173, per Ogundere, JCA (as he was then), held
that the tort of procuring a breach of contract by third persons is not confined to direct intervention, the
intervener who knows of a contract between A & B and wishes to procure its
breach by A to the damage of B will be liable not only if he directly
intervenes by persuading A to break it, but also if he intervenes by the
commission of some wrongful act in itself so as to prevent A from performing
his contract, or renders impossible A's performance of his contract with B. The elements of the claim
of inducing breach of contract elicited from this case are: the Claimant must show that he was able and willing to
perform the contract; the Claimant must also show that there was an intentional
invasion of his contractual rights, and not merely that breach of contract was
the natural consequence of the Defendant's conduct; the breach must go to the
root of the contract; the Claimant must prove that he has been damaged by the
breach of contract, unless it is such as must, in the ordinary course
of business, inflict damage upon the Claimant when it is
unnecessary to prove particular damage. The Court referred to the English case
of Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd v. Cousins (1969) 2 Ch 106,137-138,
where Lord Denning posited that once a breach of contract has been induced, the
Claimant need not prove actual breach of it. In Nissan (Nig.) Limited v. Yoganathan &
Anor [2010] 4 NWLR (Pt 1183) 135 at 153-154 (cited by the Claimant’s
counsel), Rhodes-Vivour, JCA (as he was then), held that “Where the 3rd party
knowingly and without justification facilitated or intentionally induced the
breach of the contract between the contracting parties, he is liable of
inducing or procuring breach of contract. An action would lie, and quite
rightly too, against the 2nd respondent for continuing to employ the 1st
respondent when he had good notice that the said 1st respondent had a prior
contract of service with the appellant, which was still enforceable.” In his
contributing judgment, at page 158 of the report, Mukhtar, JCA (as he was
then), posited that “It is
an actionable wrong to flagrantly facilitate the breach of contractual
obligation to the detriment of the appellant simply because the 2nd respondent
was not privy to it. It is pertinent that the alleged deliberate violation of
the contractual term by the two respondents occasioned an actionable wrong,
whether proved or unproven, and the liability for the consequential damages
suffered thereby is, of course, joint. The basis for liability lies in the
imputation made in the statement of claim about the knowledge of the
appellant’s contractual right and the flagrant violation thereof by both
respondents.”
36. It is evident from legal precedents that when one
party's intentional or reckless actions cause another party to breach an
existing contract with a third party, the tort of inducing breach of contract
is established. The evidence presented indicates that the 1st Defendant
received a job offer from the 2nd Defendant before resigning on 11th January
2016. Exhibit D1 shows that the 1st Defendant's new employment began on the
same date he resigned from the Claimant. Moreover, the 2nd Defendant
significantly raised the 1st Defendant’s salary from approximately N244,000 to N750,000, making the job change highly attractive. Additionally,
the statement in paragraph 13 of the sworn testimony from the 2nd Defendant’s
witness suggests that the 2nd Defendant continued to employ the 1st Defendant
despite knowing about his breach of contract. As held by the Court of Appeal in
the case of Nissan (Nig.) Limited v. Yoganathan & Anor (supra), an
action can be taken against the 2nd Defendant for employing the 1st Defendant
after being properly informed that the latter had a prior and enforceable
contract with the Claimant. Furthermore, the 2nd Defendant was aware of the aviation
industry's bonding practices. Its failure to conduct previous employer checks
demonstrated extreme recklessness and a desperate desire to employ the 1st
Defendant. Based on these facts, I find as a fact that the Claimant has
successfully demonstrated that the 2nd Defendant induced the 1st Defendant to
breach his employment contract and the training bond agreements. Poaching an
employee from another company is generally not regarded as an unfair labour
practice in itself (google.com/search, accessed on 1st March 2026). However, in
this case, I found that the 2nd Defendant induced the 1st Defendant to violate
his employment contract and training bond agreements with the Claimant.
Therefore, I conclude that the actions of the 2nd Defendant constitute an
unfair labour practice.
Are the training programme bond
agreements enforceable against the 1st Defendant?
37. To ensure clarity, it is essential to discuss
the enforceability of the training programme bond agreements between the
Claimant and the 1st Defendant, even though the 1st Defendant did not defend
this lawsuit or submit a final written address. This issue was addressed in the
second issue of the Claimant’s final written address. The Claimant provided
evidence to support the reasonableness of the bond, which can be found in
paragraphs 10 to 18, 20 to 27, and 30 of the sworn statement from the
Claimant’s witness. This evidence highlights that, due to the high cost of
type-rating training, most airlines assume responsibility for sponsoring engineers'
training under pre-agreed terms. The type rating licence that the engineer
obtains is beneficial to them as it allows them to work on and maintain that
specific type of aircraft anywhere in the world for their lifetime. Given the
high mobility of engineers, who often move to other airlines offering slightly
better pay after being trained and type-rated at considerable expense by their
current employers, airlines have implemented bonding agreements. These
agreements require engineers to serve the airline for a specified period. This
measure is intended to enable the airline to recoup its investment by
benefiting from the training provided. If an engineer leaves before the bond
period expires, he must refund the full cost of the training, as training a
replacement would incur the same expenses and entail a long adjustment period
for the new engineer. The rationale behind training bonds is to ensure that
airlines derive maximum benefit from the training investment. To support this
assertion, the Claimant submitted several exhibits: Exhibits 2, 6, and 9, which
are the training bonds; Exhibits 3, 4, 7, and 8, which include the relevant
certificates; and Exhibits 17 and 18, comprising invoices and receipts for
payments made on behalf of the 1st Defendant.
38. It is
important to note that the 1st Defendant’s inexperience, training, and the
training bond agreement were integral parts of the employment contract, labelled
as Exhibit 1. Paragraph 8 on page 2 of the employment contract states:
“Considering that your qualification at the point of your employment is not adequate
for the performance of the duties of an Aircraft Engineer, you hereby agree
that the company shall sponsor you for the following training and any other
required training.” Furthermore, paragraph 9 on page 2 states: “In
consideration of the company sponsoring you for the above-mentioned training
programmes and any other training programme relevant to your duties, you will
be required to sign a Training Bond Agreement, which will bind you to the
company for the period of the validity of the bond. For the avoidance of doubt,
the duration of the initial training bond is five (5) years.” Unchallenged
evidence shows that the 1st Defendant attended three training programmes sponsored
by the Claimant, and obtained the necessary certificates that qualified him as
an Aircraft Engineer, which ultimately helped him secure a job with the 2nd
Defendant.
39. In Overland
Airways Limited v. Ademola Edward Opaleye & Ors, Suit No.
NICN/LA/602/2018, judgment delivered on 30th January 2023, paragraph 39, page
29, I stated this: “The next question
is whether the restriction on the 1st Defendant is reasonable and enforceable
in the circumstances of this case? Generally, a covenant in restraint of trade
is unenforceable being against public policy. See Section 34[1][b] and [c] of
the 1999 Constitution as amended and Koumoulis v. Leventis Motors Limited [1973] LPELR-1710[SC] 13.
A training bond, in so far as it
restricts the employee’s mobility, is prima facie not enforceable. See Overland Airways Limited v. Jam [2015] 62
NLLR [Pt 219] 525 at 605. For it to be enforceable it must be reasonable with reference to the
interest of the parties and the public. Reasonability is determined by taking
into account the bonding period, the restrictiveness of the covenant, and the
amount required to be paid in the event of breach. See Koumoulis v. Leventis Motors Limited [supra] at pages 11-12 and Overland Airways Limited v. Jam [supra]. It has been suggested that a bonding
period of between one year to three years is reasonable, while a bonding period
of five years is ‘outrightly unreasonable’. See Overland Airways Limited v. Jam [supra] at 606. As observed in Balogun & Ors v. Federal University of Technology, Akure &
Anor, Suit no. NICN/AK/49/2015, which judgment was delivered on 15th November 2018, the
reasonability or otherwise of a training bond is relative, and dependent on the
primacy of facts of each case. A bonding period of five years may be justified
by the investment made by the employer in developing the employee. The burden of proof in each case is on the
employer who seeks to enforce the bond. See Section 133[1] of the Evidence Act,
2011, and Koumoulis v. Leventis
Motors Limited [supra].” The
airline industry is capital-intensive, and the costs associated with training
and retraining personnel are significant. The reasonableness of a training bond
varies depending on the specific circumstances of each case. A five-year
bonding period can be justified by the employer's investment in employee
development. After carefully considering the evidence presented, I conclude
that the training bond agreements in this case, set for a term of five years,
are reasonable and enforceable.
Is
the 1st Defendant liable for the N6,036,703.93
claimed by the Claimant?
40. The question then arises: should the 1st Defendant
pay the sum of N6,036,703.93 claimed by
the Claimant? I believe the answer is yes. Exhibits 10 and 12 are letters from
the 1st Defendant dated 11th January 2016. Exhibit 10 is the resignation
letter, while Exhibit 12 outlines the 1st Defendant's repayment plan for the
training bond. Both letters were written in the 1st Defendant's handwriting. In
Exhibit 12, the 1st Defendant acknowledged liability for N6,100,000.00 and proposed a repayment plan, which the Claimant
rejected (as shown in Exhibits 13 and 14). It is a well-established legal
principle that admitted facts do not require further proof and are considered
the strongest evidence. This is supported by Section 123 of the Evidence Act
and the case of Federal University of Technology, Minna & Ors v. Olutayo
[2018] 7 NWLR (Pt 1617) 176 at 189. Notably, in rejecting the repayment
plan proposed by the 1st Defendant, the Claimant clearly stated that the 1st Defendant
owed N6,036,703.93 and attached a
statement of his final entitlements (Exhibit 13). This assertion was reiterated
in a letter to the 1st Defendant dated 18th April 2016 (Exhibit 14). The 1st Defendant
received these letters and did not dispute the figures, so he is deemed to have
accepted them as accurate. The law is settled that when a party fails to
respond to a business letter requiring a reply, that failure constitutes an
admission of its contents. This principle was illustrated in the case of Thompecotan
& Sons Nigeria Limited v. Jos South Local Government Council [2021] 4 NWLR
(Pt 1766) 277 at 289. While this is not an inflexible rule, the facts of
this case suggest that the 1st Defendant's silence indicates acceptance of the
amount claimed by the Claimant. Therefore, I find as a fact that the Claimant
has successfully established its entitlement to the sum of N6,036,703.93.
In the
premises, the sole issue for determination is resolved in favour of the
Claimant.
Consideration of the reliefs
41. The first claim seeks a declaration that the Defendant breached the employment
contract when he failed to give the agreed three months’ notice or fully pay
the three months’ salary in lieu as contained in the contract of employment. Although
a claim for a declaration is not automatically granted, I found in this
judgment that the 1st Defendant breached his contract with the Claimant by not
providing the required notice or paying salary in lieu of notice. I reaffirm my
reasoning and conclusion in paragraph 29 above and hold that this claim has
been established. Consequently, it is granted.
42. The
second claim seeks a declaration that the Defendant breached the Bond Agreements
dated 31st day of December 2012, 8th May 2015, and 29th June 2015 by failing to
remain in the services of the Claimant for the minimum periods agreed between
the parties under the different Bond Agreements and as such is liable to repay
the full value of the trainings offered to him by the Claimant as agreed. I have
determined that the 1st Defendant breached the training bond agreements. I
adopt my reasoning and conclusion in paragraphs 30 and 31 above and hold that
this claim has been established. Therefore, it is granted.
43. The third claim is for a declaration that the 2nd Defendant wrongfully induced the 1st
Defendant to breach his employment agreement and Training Bond Agreements by
failing to carry out the necessary due diligence before employing the 1st
Defendant, and encouraged the 1st Defendant to breach the said agreement, which
practice constitutes an unfair labour practice. In this judgment, I have found
that the Claimant successfully proved that the 2nd Defendant induced the 1st
Defendant to breach his employment contract and the training bond agreements. I
also concluded that, while poaching an employee from another company is
typically not considered an unfair labour practice in itself, the 2nd
Defendant's actions in inducing the 1st Defendant to violate his employment
contract and training bond agreements with the Claimant constitute unfair
labour practices. I reiterate my reasoning and conclusions from paragraphs 32
to 36 above, and I hold that this claim has been established. Therefore, it is
granted.
44. The fourth claim seeks an order of the Court
directing the Defendants jointly and severally to pay damages in the sum of N3,500,000 (three million five hundred
thousand naira only) to the Claimant,
being the expenses incurred by the Claimant for the training of the 1st
Defendant under the Training Bond Agreement dated 31st December 2012.
45. The fifth claim is for an order of the Court
directing the
Defendants to pay the sum of N600,000 (six
hundred thousand naira) to the Claimant, being the expenses incurred by the
Claimant for the training of the 1st Defendant under the Training Bond
Agreement dated 8th May 2015.
46. The
sixth claim is for an order of the Court directing the Defendants to pay the sum of N2,000,000 (two million naira) to the
Claimant, being the expenses incurred by the Claimant for the training of the
1st Defendant under the Training Bond Agreement dated 29th June 2015. The
fourth, fifth, and sixth claims are interconnected and seek compensation for
the expenses incurred by the Claimant in training the 1st Defendant. In this
judgment, I have determined that the 1st Defendant breached his employment
contract and the training bond agreements. I also found that the Claimant has
successfully established its entitlement to N6,036,703.93.
The 2nd Defendant was not privy to the training programme bond agreements, did
not guarantee these agreements, and therefore cannot be held liable to the
Claimant for the repayment of the agreed bond sum. Generally, only parties to a
contract can enforce it; a person who is not a party to the contract cannot do
so, even if the contract was made for his benefit and appears to grant him the
right to sue. This principle is supported by case law, including Union
Beverages Ltd v. Pepsicola International Ltd & Ors [1994] 3 NWLR (Pt 330) 1
at 16, and First Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Standard Polyplastic Industries
Ltd [2022] 15 NWLR (Pt 1854) 517 at 547. While the total bond amount was N6,100,000, evidence shows that the
Claimant aggregated the 1st Defendant’s indebtedness, subtracted payments
already made, and presented a total claim of N6,036,703.93,
which this Court has determined is justified. The combined amounts of reliefs
four, five, and six total N6,100,000,
which is not due or owed to the Claimant. Therefore, I hold that the Claimant
is entitled to N6,036,703.93 from the
1st Defendant. Additionally, I declare that the 2nd Defendant is not liable to
the Claimant for the repayment of this amount. As a result, the fourth, fifth,
and sixth claims are partially successful.
47. The seventh claim is for an
order of the Court directing
the 2nd Defendant to pay the sum of N50,000,000
(fifty million naira) as exemplary and general damages for the inducement of
the 1st Defendant to breach his training bond with the Claimant. The Claimant
has combined two unrelated claims. General damages, also known as compensatory damages,
are different from exemplary damages. General damages aim to compensate a Claimant
for losses that naturally result from the wrongful act or omission of the Defendant.
These damages are awarded to address harm that is not easily quantified in
monetary terms. By law, general damages are presumed to arise from the wrongful
act, meaning they do not need to be specifically pleaded or proved. The purpose
of these damages is to alleviate the loss caused by the Defendant and restore
the Claimant, as much as possible, to the position it would have been in if the
harm had not occurred.
48. The key distinction between general damages
and exemplary damages lies in their purpose. While general damages seek to
restore the Claimant to its original position, exemplary damages are intended
to punish the wrongdoer and deter similar behaviour in the future. Exemplary
damages are awarded when the Defendant's conduct is particularly outrageous,
such as in cases involving malice, fraud, cruelty, insolence, or a blatant
disregard for the law. To justify an award of exemplary damages, it is not
enough to simply show that the Defendant committed a wrongful act; the Defendant's
behaviour must also be proven to be intentionally high-handed, insolent,
vindictive, and in total disregard for the Claimant’s rights. The Court
considers the Defendant’s motives, conduct, demeanour, and overall attitude. In
contrast, once a legally recognisable wrong is established, damages will
follow. Relevant cases include Anibaba v. Dana Airlines Limited & Anor
[2025] 9 NWLR (Pt 1994) 377 at 415-416, Nigerian Railway Corporation v.
Ojo [2021] LPELR-55971(CA) 40-41, Ecobank Nigeria Limited v. Saleh
[2020] LPELR-52024(CA) 83-85, and Aice Investment Company Limited &
Anor v. Fidelity Bank Plc [2025] 3 NWLR (Pt 1979) 279 at 297-298.
49. This
Court has broad powers under Section 19(d) of the National Industrial Court
Act, 2006, to award damages in any circumstance outlined by the Act or any Act
of the National Assembly that pertains to matters within the Court's
jurisdiction. The granting of damages is not automatic; it is a discretionary
exercise that must be substantiated by the facts and circumstances of each
case. I believe that the claim's inelegant wording should not invalidate it. It
is a settled principle of law that where there is a wrong, there must be a
remedy, as established in cases such as Falobi v. Falobi [1976] 9-10 SC 1 at
9, Mbilitem v. Unity Kapital Assurance Plc [2013] 32 NLLR (Pt 92) 196 at
237, Bello & Ors v. A.G. Oyo State [1986] 5 NWLR (Pt 45) 828 at
870-871, and Mekwunye v. West African Examination Council [2020] 6 NWLR
(Pt 1719) 1 at 22. Having determined that the 2nd Defendant induced the 1st
Defendant to breach his employment contract and the training bond agreements, I
conclude that the Claimant is entitled to damages in this case. In the case of Odogu
v. A.G. Federation & Ors [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt 456) 508 at 519, it was
established that when there is substantial interference with a right and damage
has been demonstrated, it is wrong to award, under the guise of compensation,
an amount that is almost contemptuous and trivial. In Mr. Kehinde Adeniyi
Johnson v. Lafarge Africa Plc, Suit No. NICN/LA/60/2022, a judgment
delivered on 17th February 2026, which involved a breach of personal data and
privacy rights, I awarded the Claimant N2,000,000
in damages under the provisions of the Nigeria Data Protection Act, 2023.
Similarly, in Ginikachukwu Loyce Nze v. Opitva Capital Partners Ltd,
Suit No. NICN/LA/221/2023, judgment delivered on 26th February 2026, a case
involving the violation of the Claimant's rights to privacy and dignity, I
awarded N1,000,000 (one million naira)
in damages. As previously mentioned, the airline business is capital-intensive.
In paragraph 45 of the sworn statement from the Claimant’s witness, it was noted
that the Claimant lost the benefit of its investment in the 1st Defendant and
suffered business disruptions due to the time required to procure the services
of a substitute engineer with the requisite experience, which the 1st Defendant
had acquired through the Claimant to maintain its aircraft. Clearly, the
associated loss from the Claimant’s business disruption is unquantifiable.
Given that the Claimant has been awarded the actual cost of the 1st Defendant’s
training, and considering the business disruptions caused by this breach, I
award the Claimant N5,000,000 (five
million naira) in damages. Therefore, this claim is partially successful.
50. The eighth claim seeks interest on the above
sums at the rate of 21% per annum from the date of the judgment in this suit
until liquidation of the judgment debt. There is no pleading or evidence to
support the claim for 21% interest. Generally, interest is not payable on
ordinary debts in commercial transactions unless there is a specific term in
the contract, express or implied, or if there is a customary practice between
the parties, a relevant statute, or a fiduciary relationship. This principle is
supported by the case of African International Bank Ltd v. Integrated
Dimensional System Ltd & Ors [2012] 17 NWLR (Pt 1328) 1 at 49. However,
under Order 47 Rule 7 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria [Civil
Procedure] Rules, 2017, this Court has the authority to award post-judgment interest
at a rate of no less than 10% per annum. Therefore, the Claimant is entitled to
this amount and will receive it. Consequently, this claim succeeds partially.
51. The ninth claim seeks the costs of this action.
In litigation, the general rule is that costs follow the event, meaning the
successful party is entitled to recover their costs, regardless of whether they
were explicitly claimed, unless there are exceptional reasons to deny recovery.
This principle is supported by several cases, including NNPC v. Klifco
Nigeria Limited [2011] 10 NWLR (Pt 1255) 209 at 234-235, Chijioke v.
Soetan [2006] 11 NWLR (Pt 990) 179 at 217-218, Onesi & Anor v. Keri
& Anor [2024] 14 NWLR (Pt 1957) 1 at 39, and Egypt Air Limited v. Ibrahim
& Anor [2021] LPELR-55882(CA) 35-36. The Court has broad discretion in
determining the award of costs, which must be exercised judiciously and with
careful consideration of the circumstances, as outlined in Order 55, Rules 1
and 5 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria [Civil Procedure] Rules,
2017. When assessing costs, the Court considers various factors, such as the
filing fees paid, the duration of the case, expenses related to legal
representation, and the value of the naira at both the time the expenses were
incurred and at its current value. This is illustrated by cases such as Adelakun
v. Oruku [2006] LPELR-7681(CA) 26-28 and Chijioke v. Soetan (supra).
The documented expenses in this case amount to N75,100.00, but there is no record of the legal fees charged by the
Claimant's solicitors. The Claimant attended Court proceedings nine times and
had legal representation on fourteen occasions over the span of approximately
six years and six months. After carefully considering all the relevant facts
and circumstances, I conclude that the Claimant is entitled to recover costs
associated with this action. Therefore, I award the Claimant N1,000,000 (one million naira) in costs
against the Defendants.
52. Overall,
the Claimant's lawsuit is partially successful.
Judgment is entered accordingly.
…………………………………..
IKECHI GERALD NWENEKA
JUDGE
3/3/2026
Attendance:
The Claimant is present, while the Defendants are absent.
Appearances
Adetoyese Latilo Esq. with
Michael Akinleye Esq. and Joy Ebong Esq. for the Claimant
Yemi
Okewoye Esq. with Oladapo Ebiesuwa Esq. for the 1st Defendant
F.
Ikuru Esq. with Yetunde Azeez Esq. for the 2nd Defendant