IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT UYO

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, HONOURABLE JUSTICE S. H. DANJIDDA

ON THE 16^TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026 SUIT NO: NICN/LA/209/2019

BETWEEN:-

1. KUJE ALANANA GODWIN
2. SADI LAWAN DANBAZAU
3. ABUBAKAR HARUNA  (1^ST, 2^ND AND 3^RD CLAIMANTS ARE SUING FOR THEMSELVES AND ON BEHALF OF THE UNDER LISTED 4^TH_19^TH PERSONS/CLAIMANTS-
4. SELVEN VOUGNIM
5. AMIDA SHANSIDEEN
6. SHUAIBU IBRAHIM
7. DABO OJU KEMUEL
8. NDIYO GEORGE
9. MUHAMMED ABDULLAHI                                  CLAIMANTS                 
10. UNDIE NEHEMIAH.A
11. DOGARA YAKUBU,
12. MUSA A.WADI
13. REUBEN AGBANATUS
14. PHILIP NDU DONGO
15. JOHN WASINDA
16. YAKUBU SIMEON
17. AMINU TUKUR
18. DAIRUS DEDAN
19. MARY BALA

AND

THE NIGERIAN PORTS AUTHORITY                           ---- DEFENDANT 

REPRESENTATION:

Claimants – Present

Defendant –Absent 

 

 

APPEARANCE:

C. R. Chinweze, Esq. with Destina Dalumo, Esq. for the Claimants

N. O. O. Oke (SAN) with M. I. Olotorunmo Waju, Esq. and A. A. Sanni, Esq. for the Defendant. 

JUDGMENT

The Claimant commenced this suit by way of complaint and  other accompanying processes filed on 2^nd May, 2019 and asked for the following reliefs as contained in their statement of facts against the Defendant:-

 

 

 

 

2007 entitlements and bonuses

@ ?423, 838.96 per Claimant – ?8,052,940.24

2. Leave Bonus for 2007 @?52, 979.87 per Claimant ?1,006,617.53
3. Christmas Bonus for 2007 @?52, 979.87 per Claimant ?1,006,617.53

Subtotal=?10,066,175.30

2008 entitlements and bonuses

@?264, 899.35 per Claimant – ?5,033,087.65

2. Arrears of Salary from June – December 2008 @ ?1,580,243.35 per Claimant  ?30,024,623.65
3. Leave Bonus 2008

@?225, 749.05 per Claimant – ?4,289,231.95

@?225, 749.05 per Claimant – ?4,289,231.95

Subtotal=?43,636,175.20

2009 – 2018 entitlements and bonuses

@ ?27,089,886 per Claimant ?514,707,834

@?2,257,490.50 per Claimant ?42,892,319.50

@ ?2, 257,490.50 per Claimant – ?42,892,319.50

Subtotal=?600,492,473.00

2019 entitlements and bonuses

@ ?677,247.15 per Claimant ?12,867,695.85

@? 225, 749.05 per Claimant – ?4,289,231.95

Subtotal=N17,156,927.80

Grand total as at March 2019 ?671,351,751.30 (Six Hundred and Seventy One Million, Three Hundred and Fifty One Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty One Naira Thirty Kobo). 

 

 

 

 

PARTICULARS OF AGGRAVATED DAMAGES

i.          The Defendant being a public corporation, is aware, or ought to be aware that the Claimants' employment with it is of the nature that has been described as being clothed with “statutory flavour” and is not such as can be terminated except through the due process of law, nor whimsically or arbitrarily; in spite of this knowledge, the Defendants(sic) therefore, have treated the Claimants;

1. with insufferable contempt, disdain and indignity, and with gross disregard and insensitivity for their rights under their contract of employment;
2. with gross disregard for the terrible suffering which its actions has caused the Claimants, and continues to cause them and;
3. with impunity, rebuffing several efforts by both the Claimants themselves as well as well-meaning third parties to draw its attention to the intolerable suffering their actions have caused the Claimants and reach a meaningful settlement with the Claimants;
4. oppressively, cruelly and inhumanely by its insistent and continued refusal to settle its legally binding obligations to the Claimants.
5. Callously, in gross abuse of power and a total disregard for the rule of law.

 

The Defendant in reaction to the Claimant’s suit entered appearance and filed its Statement of Defence on 10^th June, 2019 by leave of Court. Meanwhile, the Claimant also filed a reply to the statement of defence on 28^th October, 2019 which was deemed as properly filed and served via leave of court.

 

CASE OF THE CLAIMANTS.

From the pleadings filed by the Claimants and their testimony, the Claimants were offered admission/appointment as technical trainees in the Technical Training Centre of the Defendant Corporation. That the Defendant Corporation was established in 1935 for a number of purposes which include training and development of technical and engineering manpower. That on the 3^rd March, 2003, the Claimants were accordingly admitted as trainees/employees under the pensionable service of the Defendant on a JSS 3 salary grade in the Defendant’s salary structure and scheme.

That it is stipulated in the Defendant's letter of offer of admission/appointment to the Claimants, that the first year of the Claimants’ employment will be a period of probation and that Claimants were to spend a maximum of four years in the training centre and upon successful completion of their programme, the Claimants would be deployed to various departments of the Defendant’s workforce.

That the Claimants successfully completed the required mandatory training, but notwithstanding this, the Defendant reneged on the terms of employment contract by its continuous and deliberate refusal to deploy the Claimants and pay their outstanding salaries from April, 2007 to date, despite several entreaties, pleas, demands and representations by the Claimants. 

CASE OF THE DEFENDANT 

The Defendant’s case is however that the Claimants who are former Trainees of the Defendant were admitted into various departments in the Technical Training Centre of the Defendant in the year 2003 and that sometimes in April, 2006 they were informed of the closure of the School, but they were later recalled after series of Petitions to various governmental bodies and organisations in October, 2006. That after the completion of their programme in 2007, they were not absorbed as employees of the Defendant. Defendant contended that the Claimants are not permanent and pensionable employees of the Defendant, nor their employment confirmed. 

It was also the Defendant's averment that it complied with the laid down rules and procedures before the Claimants' disengagement from service. 

That the Claimants were notified of the directive of the Federal Ministry of Transport to close the Training School as well as the determination of the Claimants' employment and that since April, 2007, no services were rendered by the Claimants to the Defendant to warrant their entitlement to salaries, leave bonus and emoluments.

 

 

TRIAL 

Trial commenced on 28^th June, 2021, where the 1st Claimant(CW1) testified by adopting his witness statement on oath dated 2^nd May, 2019 and tendered Exhibits KAG1 to Exhibits KAG17a & b. 

CW1 was thereafter cross examined, re-examined and discharged. 

Abubakar Haruna(CW2) testified by adopting his witness statement on oath dated 2^nd May,  2019 and tendered Exhibits KAG18a-f to Exhibits KAG23a & b. 

CW2 was cross-examined and discharged as there was no re-examination. The case of the Claimants was then closed and the matter was adjourned for defence. 

Defendant opened its case by calling Balogun Shafideen(DW1) who adopted his witness statement on oath dated 10^th June, 2019 and tendered Exhibits NPA1a & b, NPA2, NPA3 and NPA4. 

Following cross-examination and re-examination of DW1, the case of the Defendant was closed and the matter was adjourned for adoption of final written addresses. 

DEFENDANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS 

Defendant’s final written address is dated and filed on 1^st March, 2022, wherein one issue for determination was submitted by counsel to wit;

"WHETHER FROM THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE TRIAL, THE CLAIMANTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS SOUGHT." 

Learned Senior Advocate for the Defendant submitted that the 10^th to 19^th Claimants cannot maintain this action against the Defendant as their cause of action is statute barred under the law, having failed to file any action from 2007 to 2019, a period of 12 years. Citing the case of NIGERIAN PORTS AUTHORITY v. AJOBI (2006) LPELR-2029(SC),  where the Supreme Court pronounced on the period of limitation of action against Nigerian Ports Authority as provided under section 110 of the Nigerian Ports Authority Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. Learned counsel also cited the case of  Umukoro v NPA (1997) 4 NWLR Part 502 656 at 667. 

Learned senior counsel also submitted that the 10^th – 19^th Claimants’ offer of admission were respectively made on the 30^th day of January, 2003 and the 10^th- 19^th Claimants were enjoying all the benefits accruing from the offer of admission until sometime in April 2007. That the 10^th- 19^th Claimants failed to institute any action in court from 2007-2019 (the instant case) which is a period of 12 years from the year they alleged that the Defendant stopped paying their entitlements under their respective offers of admission and although the 1^st and 2^nd Claimants; suing for themselves and on behalf of other persons as well, instituted an action at Federal High Court in 2010 in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1412/2010, the 10^th – 19 Claimants were never parties either in their personal or representative capacities in the above mentioned suit, neither did they apply to be joined thereon.

It is the submission of counsel that, as for the other Claimants left in this suit i.e. the 1^st to 9^th  Claimants, by the combined effect of the authority of NIGERIAN PORTS AUTHORITY v. AJOBI (2006) LPELR-2029(SC) and the provisions of Section 110(1) of the Ports Act of 1954 establishing the Defendant, the suit filed in 2010 in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1412/2010 which gave rise to this suit is equally statute barred having not been filed within the time prescribed by the Act. The cause of action in this suit indubitably arose in 2007 and the Claimants filed the first action in 2010, a period of about 3 years. Citing PODO v. GOMBE STATE GOVT. & ORS (2016) LPELR-40815(CA). 

Counsel contended that the Claimants’ claims are essentially declaratory reliefs and orders for the payment of salaries and allowances to the Claimants and the onus of proving their case is on the basis of probabilities as provided in their case and not on the weakness of the defence and that failure to discharge the onus will be fatal to the Claimants' case. Counsel referred to the case of ADAMU v. NIGERIAN AIRFORCE & ANOR (2022) LPELR-56587(SC)

Learned counsel also contended on the issue of termination of employment that there are specific preconditions  which must be fulfilled before the claimants can succeed. That the said ingredients must be evidentially proved before the Claimants can sustain their claim. That from the Complaint and Statement of facts, the evidential required ingredients were not made out. Citing Morohunfola v. Kwara Tech. (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 145) 506 at 525 – 526 paras H -A. 

Counsel argued that at the trial of this case, the CW2 tendered ID cards issued to the Claimants bearing the term “Trainee” and the Certificates and Testimonials tendered also show that the Claimants were simply on training and had simply concluded their training with the Defendant. 

It is the further argument of counsel that the Claimants were never employees of the Defendant but only trainees who underwent training without being formally employed as staff. That the Claimants' terms of employment were regulated by the conditions of service as well as letters of offer of admission into the Technical Training Centre/School. Paragraph 5 of the said letter of offer dated 30^th January, 2003 and Section 11(2)(a) of the Nigerian Ports Authority Act CAP N126 LFN 2004 were referred to. 

That the engagement or otherwise of any employee or trainee is subject to the rules and regulations in force and made from time to time by the Nigerian Ports Authority. The proviso is very clear that the engagement of the Claimants is not automatic, rather it was subject to some other rules regulating the day to day running of the Defendant. In the instant case, the Conditions of Service do not apply to an employee whose employment has not been confirmed. Counsel referred to paragraph 4 of the Offer letter so relied upon by the Claimants which states that: "Upon successful completion of the probation period, your admission/appointment may be confirmed." 

It was submitted that subsequent confirmation is not a mandatory obligation on the Defendant. That CW1 said under cross-examination that they were not given confirmation letter as permanent staff. 

Counsel also submitted that by Section 1.07 of the Conditions of Service, Permanent post is defined as; "A permanent post is a position occupied by an employee on the completion of a probationary period and confirmation into that of permanent appointment." While Section 1.09 further provides that "Pensionable appointment is an appointment so designated by the Company in accordance with the existing pension rules.”

It is the submission of counsel that there is no where in the Conditions of Service where it was stated that an employee who was not confirmed and whose appointment was determined on the ground that his service are no longer required is entitled to pension and counsel urged the Court to hold that the Claimants are not entitled to any damages and emoluments.

Counsel further submitted that the appropriate authority that can approve the termination of employment of the Claimants is the Honourable Minister of Transport, and that by virtue of the document dated 21^st June, 2006 marked Exhibit NPA 1A, the Defendant had the directives and instruction of the Minister to close the Technical Training School and the phasing out of the Training Centre with the last batch of students graduating in 2007 and this fact was to the knowledge of the Claimants. Counsel referred to paragraphs (i) and (ii) of the letter of recall (Exhibit NPA 1b).

That in the instant case, Claimants did not prove and show in their pleaded processes how the terms of their contract were breached. Counsel cited L.C.R.I. Vs. MOHAMMED (2005) 11 NWLR (pt. 935) 1 at 26 – 27 paras H – A, where the Court of Appeal held as follows:

“Where an employee is on probation, as a temporary staff by virtue of his terms of employment which also states that the appointment will be confirmed subject to his being found suitable, the employer reserves the right and discretion to determine if the employee is found unsuitable”.

It is the submission of counsel that the Claimants’ case is not materially supportable as they failed to establish by credible evidence their perceived rights to be reinstated and deployed by the Defendant especially since CW1 stated at trial that he had not rendered any services to the Defendant since 2007, although he was living rent free in the quarters of the Defendant in flagrant violation of Section 8.07 of the Conditions of Service. 

Counsel submitted that from the totality of the evidence adduced at the trial, the Claimants have failed to prove their entitlements to the declaratory and other ancilliary reliefs. 

It is submission of counsel that the Claimants are not entitled to any salary, emoluments, allowances and promotion commencing from 1^st   April, 2007 since their employments were lawfully terminated in accordance with their condition of service and other extant rules of the Defendant.

Counsel urged this Honourable Court to discountenance the Claimants' Reply to the Defendant’s Statement of defence, same not being supported by an accompanying Statement on Oath of a Witness for the purpose of cross-examination as all the evidence adduced therein is incompetent.

CLAIMANTS’ FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS 

Claimants’ final written address which is dated and filed on 14^th April, 2022 was deemed as properly filed and served via leave of court, wherein Counsel for the Claimants adopted the sole issue for determination as submitted by the Defendant. 

Counsel argued that from the totality of both the documentary and oral evidence presented before this court, the Claimants are entitled to the reliefs sought. Counsel  canvassed his argument according to the following subheads:

1. Facts not in dispute
2. Employment Status of the Claimants
3. Statutory Flavour of the Claimants’ Employment
4. Claimants’ Entitlement to Reliefs sought.
5. Non- applicability of the Statute of Limitation. 

FACTS NOT IN DISPUTE

According to counsel, the Claimants (trainees) were appointed by the Defendant in 2003 under a "Technical Trainee" contract (Exhibit KAG1). That for four years, they received salaries, allowances, bonuses, corporate IDs, and pension contributions, indicating a formal employment relationship.

That their probation was one year, and they successfully completed their training in 2007, receiving certificates (Exhibit KAG4). However, since April 2007, the Defendant stopped all payments and, despite the training being concluded, never deployed them to permanent roles as promised.

It also argued that the Defendant never formally terminated their appointments, while the Claimants further participated in company-wide staff verification exercises in 2006 and 2014, which the Defendant admits, it verified them as "Trainees."

Counsel submitted that in view of the above undisputed facts, and following a thoughtful review of the pleadings and oral testimonies of the parties before the court, these undisputed and uncontroverted facts accepted by both parties are deemed established and need not, again, be further proved based on the principle of law that admitted facts require no further proof, but the same can be relied upon by the court to ground its decision one way or the other. Citing Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011 and the following cases: Habib Nig. Bank Ltd v. Gift Unique Nig. Ltd (2005) ALL FWLR (Pt 241) 234@261,paras C-D, Wema Bank v. Osilaru (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt 1094)150 @ 179 paras A-B, Oyekanmi v. Nepa (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt 690) 414 and Maersk Line & Anor v. Addide Investments Ltd & Anor (2002) 11 NWLR (PT 778), 317 @ 362 B-E RATIO 9 SCT.

It was also submitted by counsel that the above constitutes admission  of the facts that the Claimants are subsisting employees of the Defendant, who underwent the Defendant’s compulsory workforce. The Claimants are thus entitled to regard themselves as employees of the Defendant unless and until their various appointments are properly terminated by either party. 

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CLAIMANTS

Counsel submitted that the issue here is whether there exists a contractual employment relationship between the Claimants and the Defendant by virtue of the appointment letters (Exhibit KAG1) issued to the Claimants by the Defendant and whether by the terms of the letters, the Defendant is still obligated to the Claimants.

It is the submission of counsel that it is a settled principle of law that parties are bound by the terms of their agreement or contract freely entered into and that contract of employment is circumscribed by the terms in the employment letter and worker’s handbook if incorporated by reference into the contract of employment. Citing Amodu v. Amode & Anor (1990) LPELR-466(SC) and Mr. Daniel Pat – Ogheonemu v. Oceanic Insurance Company Limited & Anor (2017) Legalpedia (CA) 11361.

Counsel also submitted that in construing the terms of a contract, it is the duty of the Court to ascertain  the intention of parties based on terms agreed by them and enforce the said terms. In other words, the court cannot make contract for the parties neither can it vary the terms contained in a contract agreed to by the parties; rather the court is bound to give effect to the legitimate contract entered into by the parties. Citing the case of Nika Fishing Co. Ltd v. Lavina Corporation (2008) LPELR-2035(SC). 

Learned counsel maitained that in this case, the terms of contract between the Claimants and the Defendant are well contained in Exhibit KAG 1 – which is the letter of offer of Admission/Appointment and Exhibit KAG 2 – which is the Defendant’s handbook titled “Conditions of Service” as revised on the 1^st  of January, 1994 as well as the provisions of the Nigerian Ports Authority Act Cap N126 LFN 2004, Vol. 12 (NPA ACT) – which is incorporated by reference in Exhibit KAG 1

Counsel also maintained that the Claimants’ employment relationship with the Defendant is governed by the above 3 documents(the letters of offer of admission/appointment issued to the Claimants, the conditions of service applicable to the Claimants’ employment and the NPA Act) and the parties are bound by the terms contained therein. That this position is not refuted by the Defendant. Counsel submitted that  oral evidence cannot be admitted to controvert the content of these documents. Citing the Supreme Court cases of Lewis v. UBA (Supra) and Dalek Nig. Ltd v. OMPADEC (2007) 7 NWLR (pt. 1033) 402, at pages 49-50. 

Counsel contended that by virtue of the content of the afore-mentioned documents, particularly Exhibit KAG 1, the Claimants were employed as technical trainees in the Defendant’s pensionable service on the 30^th of January, 2003 on a salary grade JSS 3 in the Defendant’s salary structure.

It is the further contention of counsel that on the basis of these appointment letters, the Claimants became employees of the Defendant on entry job description/ranks labelled “Technical Trainees”. This is buttressed by the fact that the Claimants were all issued staff identity cards by the Defendant (evidenced by Exhibit KAG 6), where the word  “STAFF” is boldly imprinted on the card. That the name of the holder of the card is also imprinted on the card, followed by their rank which was indicated as Trainees. That it also contains Claimants' Personnel Numbers which is unique to each staff. That the claimants were also, on the basis of this employment, paid monthly salaries and leave allowances. More so, the Claimants opened pension accounts with pension Administrators.  

It is the submission of counsel that contrary to the argument of the defence, it is clear from the Appointment letters and actions of parties, including the issuance of staff identity cards, that the Claimants were not interns or students but employees of the Defendant who were sent for technical trainsing, which is akin to professional training/education which many organizations or businesses still do for their staff. It is clear from Exhibit KAG 1 that the purpose of the Defendant’s training of the Claimants is to enable the Claimants acquire the requisite skills and knowledge that would enable them render technical and professional services to the Defendant Corporation at the required standards. 

It was submitted that a contract is said to be consummated where there is offer, acceptance and consideration. Citing Royal Exchange Assurance (Nig.) Plc v. Onibgogi & Ors.(2014) LPELR-22645(CA) and S.B.N. PLC v. Opanubi (2004) 15 NWLR (Pt. 896) 437. 

Counsel stated that in        the instant case, the Defendant offered each of the Claimants admission/appointment vide a letter dated the 30^th of January, 2003 which stipulated clear terms and conditions and these were duly accepted and performed by the Claimants. Counsel submitted that the Claimants having performed their own part of the contract of undergoing and successfully completing the four years of training, the Defendant is bound by the said terms of the contract to deploy the Claimants to respective areas or departments of its operations. That if, for any reason the Defendant did not need the services of the Claimants anymore, there are well-established procedures that should be followed to terminate the employments of the Claimants. But the Defendant has not done so. The employment of the Claimants is therefore not called to question and the Claimants are still in the employment of the Defendant, the Defendant cannot therefore, unilaterally and arbitrarily act in contravention of the well established procedures. 

Counsel posited that the Defendant is bound by the terms of the employment contract (Exhibits KAG 1 and KAG 2) made with the Claimants.

Counsel contended that the Defendant’s claim that the Claimants were disengaged from their employment at some point during their employment was not established by any material evidence whether documentary or oral testimony. 

Counsel submitted that the Defendant never tendered any evidence to show when or how the purported termination of the Claimants was made.

It is the submission of counsel  that the oral evidence given by the Defendant’s witness to the effect that the Claimants were notified of the termination of their appointment, without providing any proof of such notification, is clearly ineffective for the purpose of vitiating the contract of employment entered into by both parties. Counsel urged the court to hold that paragraphs 17, 18, 20, 47 and 48 of the Claimants’ witnesses’ depositions on oath have not been controverted.

Counsel reiterated that the Claimants’ appointments have not in any way been terminated and are still subsisting and that the Defendant is bound to fulfill their part of the terms of the agreement. 

The question of confirmation of Claimants’ appointment 

Claimants argued that the Defendant's failure to terminate the Claimants' appointments after their one-year probationary period in 2004 implies automatic confirmation. That their continued employment and training for four years without any issue supports this. It was submitted that there is no evidence to the contrary. That there is no record of any performance issues, queries, or disciplinary actions against any Claimant during their entire four-year training, suggesting their service was satisfactory.

Claimants maintained that Exhibit KAG 4 (Certificates and Testimonials) officially attests to the satisfactory conduct of each Claimant. That Probation is a trial period where an employee must prove capability before being considered permanent. Citing Wayo v. J.S.C, Benue State, (2006) ALL FWLR (pt. 302) 66 @ 78, paras A-B. 

That if an employer fails to either confirm or terminate an employee after the probationary period expires, and continues to employ and pay them, the law will deem the appointment confirmed. The employer is estopped from treating the employee as still on probation. Citing Raji v. OAU (2014) LPELR-22088(CA); Council of Federal Polytechnic, Ede v. Olowookere (2012) LPELR-7935(CA)

 

STATUTORY FLAVOUR OF THE CLAIMANTS' EMPLOYMENT

It is the submission of counsel that the employment of the Claimants enjoys “statutory flavour” and any supposed termination as alleged by the Defendant ought to strictly follow the laid down procedures. It is the law that where a contract of service is governed by the provisions of a Statute or where the conditions of service are contained in Regulations derived from statutory provisions, any person holding that office or in that employment enjoys a special status over and above the ordinary master and servant relationship. They accordingly enjoy “statutory flavour”. Citing the cases of Osisanya v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc (2007) LPELR-2809(SC) and Comptroller General of Customs & Ors v. Gusau (2017) LPELR-42081(SC) (Pp. 31 paras. B). 

Counsel stated that the Claimants' employment is governed by the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) Act, specifically Section 8(p) which empowers the NPA to train employees, which it did for the Claimants and Section 11 which  governs the appointment and conditions of service for NPA employees.

That by section 11(2) of the NPA Act, the Defendant requires the approval of the Minister of Transport for any regulations or actions relating to employees' conditions of service, including termination.

That even if a termination occurred, it was irregular, wrongful, and a nullity because the mandatory statutory procedure (Ministerial approval) was not followed. It was also contended that even if approval was granted, it would only authorize the Defendant to act, but would not alter the fundamental statutory nature of the employment contracts, which remain protected.

CLAIMANTS’ ENTITLEMENT TO CLAIMS

It is the submission of counsel that going by the evidence before the court establishing that the claimants are subsisting staff of the Defendant as well as considering the fact that there exists no controversy as to the amount being earned by the Claimants as monthly salaries, allowances, and benefits as well as no controversy as to the period of outstanding arrears of salaries, allowances and benefits,  the Claimants are entitled to all their unpaid salaries, benefits, allowances and bonuses calculated from when their salaries were wrongfully and unlawfully stopped in April, 2007 until judgment is delivered. Counsel also submitted that the Claimants are entitled to be deployed immediately.

Furthermore, it is the submission of counsel that the Claimants are entitled to all the rights and benefits that could have accrued to them in the course of their employment if they had been deployed by the Defendant in April 2007 according to the terms of their contract. These rights and benefits include their rights to promotion and their entitlement to increased salaries, as there is no way they could have within all these years remained on the same grade level or salary scale. Counsel cited the cases of Balogun vs. University of Abuja, (2003) 13 NWLR Part 783 p.42, pp 49 para A-A, ALHASSAN v. ABU, ZARIA & ORS (2009) LPELR-8138(CA), Olaniyan & Ors. V. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR 599, Dauda v. Lagos Building Investment Company Ltd & Ors. (2010) LPELR-4024 (CA). 

WHETHER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION IS APPLICABLE TO THIS SUIT

Counsel submitted that the Port Acts relied upon by the Defendant is no longer part of our laws in Nigeria. That the Act was repealed by Section 3 of the Revised Edition (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) Act, 2007 which provides inter alia that the Revised Edition (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) Act, 1990 (which is the enabling Act of the Ports Act laws of the Federation 1990) is repealed. That following the repeal of the Ports Act, laws of the Federation 1990, the instant enabling law for the Nigerian Ports Authority is the Nigerian Ports Authority Act, Cap N126 LFN 2004. More so, the provisions of section 110 (1) of Ports Act, as referred to by the Defendant, is not retained or reproduced as a provision governing legal proceedings under section 92 of the Nigerian Ports Authority Act, 2004.

Learned counsel also submitted that the import of the repeal of the Ports Act is that it ceases to exist and it no longer has the force of law and therefore the court cannot rely on its provisions to oust itself of jurisdiction to entertain this suit. Citing the Supreme Court of Ezeokafor V. Ezeilo (1999) LPELR-1209(SC). 

It is the submission of counsel that assuming the said Section 110(1) of the Port Act exists in our laws, the Claimants’ suit as constituted before this court is NOT Statute-Barred. 

Counsel submitted that the latter part of section 110(1) makes continuing injury an exception to  the application of the limitation clause. By the Act, when such act, neglect or default complained of is continuous in nature, time will not run until 12 months after it ceases.

It is the submission of counsel that, based on the Claimants’ pleadings, it is abundantly clear that the legal wrong complained of by the Claimants is of a continuous nature and is not related to the effect of the injury but rather to the legal wrong itself which persists up till now. That the Claimants did not stop at pleading continuation of wrong, but also went on to present evidence in proof of same, as required by law. Citing Abdulrahman v. NNPC (2020) LPELR-55519(SC); Mobil Producing (Nig) UNLTD v. Davidson & Anor (2019) LPELR-48683(CA); Kwuhodu & Ors v. INEC (2021) LPELR-55214(CA).

DEFENDANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW 

The defendant filed its reply on points of law on 24/5/2022 where it argued that this action does not fall into the category of a continuous injury. That Continuance of injury or damage means continuance of the legal injury, and not merely continuance of the injurious effects of a legal injury. Counsel cited OBIEFUNA v. OKOYE (1961) ALL NLR 357, 360; KWUHODU & ORS v. INEC (2021) LPELR-55214(CA). 

COURT’S   DECISION

Having carefully perused the pleadings of the parties and the evidence presented as well as the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, I have decided to focus on two issues for determination as follows;

1. Whether the claimants' action is statute barred?
2. Whether the Claimants have proved their claims to be entitled to the reliefs sought?

In determining issue one, this Court is tasked to consider whether it has jurisdiction to entertain this suit, following the Defendant's averment at paragraph 43 of its Statement of Defence that the case of the 10^th to 19^th Claimants is statute barred. 

The Defendant again in its final written address contended that both the case of the 1st to 9th and that of the 10th to 19th Claimants is statute-barred, citing section 110 of the Nigerian Ports Authority Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 which prescribes a 12 month- limitation period for actions to be instituted against the Defendant. 

However, the Claimants argue that the Defendant is relying on an inapplicable law (the Ports Act) to challenge the court's jurisdiction. 

It is settled law that a court can only assume jurisdiction if the subject matter is within its jurisdiction, the case has been initiated by due process of law, and any condition precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction has been fulfilled. See Madukolu V. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341).

As a general rule, once an action is caught by a limitation law, it cannot be sustained and a Court is divested of the jurisdiction to entertain it. It is the position of the law that there is a time limit for instituting civil actions and any action caught by the Statute of Limitation is dead for all ages. Thus, where a statute of limitation prescribed a period within which an action should be brought, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. See Ogunko V. Shelle (2004) 6 NWLR(Pt. 868) page 17, and Osun State Government V. Dalami  Nig. Ltd (2007) All FWLR (Pt.365) page 438.

Section 110(1) of the Ports Act Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 states thus:- "When any suit is commenced against the Authority or any servant of the Authority for any act done in pursuance or execution, or intended execution of any Act or Law, or of any public duties or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of such Act, law, duty or authority, such suit shall not lie or be instituted in any court unless it is commenced within 12 months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or, in the case of a continuance of injury or damage, within twelve months next after ceasing thereof." 

I have looked at the Ports Act, Laws of Federation of Nigeria 1990 and Nigerian Ports Authority Act, 2004. I observe that the Ports Act is repealed by Section 125 of the Nigerian Ports Authority Act, 2004 and that suggests the Ports Act cited by the Defendant is no longer part of our law. 

The current law governing the Nigerian Ports Authority is now the Nigerian Ports Authority Act, Cap N126 LFN 2004 and section 110 of the old law which the Defendant relies on to oust the court's jurisdiction was not reproduced in the current Nigerian Ports Authority Act specifically under Section 92, which deals with legal proceedings. Suffice it to say that all the cases cited by the Learned Senior Advocate for the Defendant to support his argument in this respect are inapplicable too as they were decided under the repealled law. 

Since the Ports Act has been repealed, it has ceased to exist and has no force of law. Therefore, the court cannot use a provision from a defunct law to declare that it has no jurisdiction to hear the case See Olafisoye V, FRN (2004) LPELR – 2553 (SC).

In light of the above therefore, I hold that section 110 of the Ports Act cited by the Defendant is inapplicable in this case as rightly argued by the learned Counsel for the Claimants. Consequently, the Defendant's Objection has no merit and is hereby dismissed.

I therefore simply hold that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit, entitling the claimant to be heard on merit.

Turning to issue No. two, the crux of this case lies in determining the status of the claimants' employment, payment of their entitlements and the Defendant's refusal to deploy the Claimants to their respective departments. 

But the Defendant's contention is that Exh KAG 2 which is the Condition of Service of the Defendant, did not apply to an employee whose employment has not been confirmed and that the Defendant reserved the right to terminate the appointment of the Claimants.

The law is clear that in civil cases, the burden of proof lies with the Claimants to prove their assertions on the balance of probability. This principle is supported by sections 131 and 132 of the Evidence Act 2011 and the cases of Mrs. Betty Darego V. A.G Leventis (Nigeria) Ltd. & 3 Ors. LER (2015) (CA), Alh. Kabiru Abubakar & Anor V. John Joseph & Anor (2008) LPELR-48 (SC), Adighije V. Nwaogu (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1209) 419 and Chibuko V. Chibuko & Anor (2018) LPELR- 44345 (CA).

The above principle of law means that the Claimants must provide sufficient evidence to prove their case on the balance of probability. 

The Claimants in a bid to satisfy the above requirement of the law have heavily relied on Exhibits KAG1A-J, KAG2, KAG3A-C, KAG4A-L, KAG5A-K, KAG6A-I, KAG7, KAG8A-E and KAG9A-G among others to support their claim. 

Exhibits KAG1A-J are copies of the Claimants' appointment letters, Exhibit KAG2 is the Defendant's condition of service, Exhibits KAG3A-C and KAG4A-L are Claimants' certificates and testimonials of completion of training, Exhibits KAG5A-K are verification forms, Exhibits KAG6A-I, are Staff Identify Cards of the Claimants, Exhibits KAG7A-F are monthly pay slips, Exhibits KAG8A-E are vacation leave and Exhibits KAG9A-G are copies of accounts with pension managers. 

In law, when parties voluntarily enter into a written agreement, they are legally obligated to uphold its terms. Any disputes arising from their relationship must be resolved based on the agreed terms, and courts cannot deviate from what the parties originally intended. The Supreme Court in Ahmed V. CBN (2012) LPELR-9341 (SC) affirmed that parties must adhere to their contractual terms, and courts cannot introduce extraneous provisions unless fraud, duress, or misrepresentation is proven.  

Additionally, contractual terms are treated with a high level of respect, and any disputes must be interpreted strictly based on the written agreement. Courts do not have the authority to modify or rewrite contracts for the parties, as emphasized in Minaj Holdings Ltd V. AMCON (2015) LPELR-24650 (CA). 

Similarly, a court when determining a breach of contract, must strictly rely on the explicit language and meaning of the agreement, as stated in Oyamenda V. Abdulrahman (2013) LPELR-22744 (CA).

The duty of the Court in determining the rights and obligations of the parties is to ensure compliance with the terms and conditions of employment. The court in determining the 2^nd issue framed in the instant suit, is equally to ensure that the terms stated in the Condition of Service and the letter of admission/appointment are complied with. See the case of CBN v Archibong (2001) 10 NWLR Pt. 721. page 492 at 507. 

Let me refer to Exhibits KAG1A-J which state as follows:-

"OFFER OF ADMISSION/APPOINTMENT AS A TECHNICAL TRAINEE IN THE TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTRE

I am pleased to inform you that as a result of your performance in the just concluded examination/interview of the above named centre, you have been offered an admission as a Technical Trainee in the Authority's pensionable service on a commencing salary grade JSS 3 in the Authority's salary structure. 

You will be expected to spend a maximum of four years in the Training Centre. On successful completion, you will be deployed appropriately. This admission is subject to the following conditions.-

1. Submission of letter of acceptance
2. Certificate of fitness from the Authority's medical Doctor
3. Reference letter/Certificate of conduct from a senior public Servant, Clergyman, Principal of a School or Secretary of A local Government Council.
4. Willingness to accept the trade allocated to you.

Your first year of admission will be a period of probation and subject to termination by either side on one month notice or salary in lieu.

Upon successful completion of the probation period, your admission/appointment may be confirmed.

The engagement is otherwise subject to the rules and regulations in force and made from time to time by the Authority. 

Your training commences on the 3rd of March, 2003 at the Technical Training Centre, Dockyard Apapa-Lagos................. "

Looking at Exhibits KAG1A-J, the Claimants’ appointment was subject to a one-year probationary period, at the end of which their employment was to be either confirmed or terminated. However, after the Claimants had served for one year, the Defendant took neither of these actions. Instead, the Defendant continued to utilize the Claimants’ services. Notably, although the Claimants were informed of the closure of the Training Institute in April 2006, they were recalled in October 2006—three years after their initial appointment. This naturally raises the question: why would the Defendant recall the Claimants in 2006 if their appointments had never been confirmed?

Even if it is assumed, without conceding that the Defendant never confirmed the Claimants’ appointments prior to 2007, the Defendant was obligated to notify them of this fact immediately after the probationary period ended. Yet, the Defendant continued to pay the Claimants’ salaries beyond the one-year probationary term.

The Defendant has not provided any evidence to show that the Claimants were ever informed of an extension of their probationary period. In fact, it appears that no such extension occurred. The responsibility to confirm or terminate the appointment rested solely with the Defendant. Having failed to terminate the Claimants’ employment either during or immediately after the probationary period, the Defendant cannot now, years later, rely on the argument that their appointments were never confirmed.

The Defendant’s failure to terminate the Claimants’ employment implies that, under the terms of Exhibits KAG1A-J, their appointments became confirmed by operation of law once the Defendant continued their employment without any indication of unsatisfactory performance. See the case of Obafemi Awolowo University  v Onabanjo (1991) 5 NWLR Pt. 193) 549 CA; In the unreported case of Adedeji Oladele Julius v Lagos State Universal Basic Education Board &3 Ors Suit No: NICN/LA/397/2017, judgment delivered on 18th May 2021, it was held on this issue of confirmation that: - “In the case of Iwuji v Federal Commissioner for Establishment 1985 1 NSCC 580, it was held that, ”where an employee on probation has spent the required probationary period without termination or confirmation, confirmation of the employee is implied.”

Similarly, the court of Appeal in Raji v Obafemi Awolowo University (2014) LPELR-22088 CA at pages 50-51 per Owoade JCA cited with approval the dictum of Akpabio JCA in Obafemi Awolowo University v Dr Onabanjo (supra) thus;- “ by keeping him in his employment and continuing to pay him for four months after the probationary period of three years had expired, they would be deemed by operation of law to have confirmed his appointment, and the doctrine of “estoppel by conduct “would operate to prevent the appellant, from alleging and treating him as if he was still on probation.”

I wish to observe that upholding the Defendant's argument would permit them to terminate the Claimants' employment even after decades of service, simply on the basis that the appointment was never formally confirmed in writing. The law cannot reasonably expect an employee to remain on probation in perpetuity. 

I therefore find that the Claimants’ appointments were automatically confirmed under Exhibits KAG1A–J, entitling them to the corresponding rights and benefits. The Defendant’s failure to confirm their appointments, and continued refusal to do so over several years, constitutes a clear breach of the employment terms. Accordingly, the court must not permit the Defendant to benefit from a wrongdoing it knowingly failed to remedy.

The Defendant contended that only the Honourable Minister of Transport has the authority to determine the termination of the Claimants’ employment. It further claimed to have acted on the Minister’s directives and instructions to close the Technical Training Centre, with the final batch of students graduating in 2007.

This position appeared to offer the Defendant a convenient means of terminating the Claimants’ employment under any pretext, in an attempt to avoid liability for its wrongful conduct. In the absence of any valid ground for dismissal, and operating under the belief that it could determine the Claimants’ fate at will, the Defendant proceeded to terminate their employment on that basis.

Several factors show that the Defendant treated the Claimants as employees through various actions. It is evident as presented by the Claimants that the Defendant issued them staff identification cards, paid their monthly salaries and allowances, and contributed to pension scheme accounts opened in their names. Furthermore, the Defendant provided them with certificates and testimonials acknowledging their satisfactory performance. The Claimants' inclusion in the Defendant's staff verification exercises in 2006 and 2014 further supports this. These actions collectively indicate that the Defendant accepted the Claimants as full staff members by conduct. However, the Defendant  alleged that the Claimants are trainees and were lawfully terminated by the closure of the Training institute. 

It is the law that in the interpretation of statutes or documents which restrict the citizen's rights, any doubt, gap, duplicity or ambiguity as to the meaning of words used in the enactment should be resolved in favour of the person who would be liable to the penalty or a deprivation of his right. See Nigerian Navy & Ors V. Lambert (2007) LPELR-2026(SC). Nwonsu V. Imo State Environmental Sanitation Authority & Ors (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 135) 688.

I need to point out that eventhough the claimants were offered admission/appointment as Technical Trainees by virtue of Exhibits KAG1A-J and the institute closed in 2006, but the Defendant had recalled them and continued to pay the Claimants their salaries and condoned the purported termination up to the time of their completion of the training which was acknowledged by the Defendant's issuance of certificates and testimonials. See Section 169 of the Evidence Act, 2011 which provides as follows:-

“When a person either by virtue of an existing court judgment, deed, or agreement, or by his declaration, act or omission intentionally caused or permitted another to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative in interest shall be allowed in any proceeding between himself and such person or such person’s representative in interest to deny the truth of that thing.” See Mohammed V. Jama'are Emirate Council (2024) LPELR 61660 (CA), Ironbar V. Federal Mortgage Finance Ltd (2024) LPEL-62186(SC) and Skyebank plc V Adegun(2024) LPELR - 62219(SC).

And again, let's hear what DW1 said under cross-examination;

"By virtue of Exhibit KAG1A-J, the Claimants were offered admission/appointment as Tecnical Trainees at the Technical Training Center of the Defendant. 

The Management of the Defendant issued the Claimants Exhibit KAG1. 

There was a letter issued to the Defendant closing the School. The letter of closure of the School is the samething with a termination letter. After the closure of the School, the Defendant issued recall letters to all the Claimants. There is nothing contained in the recall letter(Exhibit KAG22/NPA2) that the Claimants were terminated. The period the School was closed was regarded as leave period with pay. 

Apart from the letter of closure of the training School, there is no document terminating the Claimants' offer. 

There is no document removing the Claimants from the Defendant's pensionable service on Grade JSS 3 in its salary structure because they were not deployed. 

Yes the Claimants were issued I. D. Cards as Technical Trainees. Yes, the Claimants' pictures are attached to the I. D. Cards. 

The word "Staff" is written on Exhibit KAG6. 

The word "Rank" is also written on Exhibit KAG6, but as "Technical Trainees".

Staff personnel number is also written on Exhibit KAG6. 

It is the Defendant's duty to deploy the Claimants after completion of their training. The Claimants spent four years for the training and they completed the training. 

The Claimants were issued Testimonials and Certificates.

.….…...................."

It can be observed that the Defendant's decision to place the Claimants on its pensionable payroll at Grade JSS 3, their formal designation as staff members in Exhibit KAG6, and the assignment of individual staff personnel numbers to them are further evidence of employment relationship with the Defendant. 

In B. Stabilini & Co. Ltd V.Obasa (1997) NWLR (Pt.520), 293, the Court of Appeal held that contracts need not necessarily be in writing as the conduct of the parties may also create contractual obligations. A contract may be express or implied from the conduct of the parties.

Also in Buhari V. Takuma (1994) NWLR (Pt.325), 183, it was held that where there is no written document evidencing contractual relations between the parties and there is no third party to prove the contractual relationship, the court will fall back on the circumstances surrounding the relationship between the parties as narrated by both of them to determine whether there was such a contract.

In Nigerian Airways V. Gbajumo (1992) NWLR (Pt.244) 735, the Court of appeal held that where one party employs another, appoints him to various positions in its establishment, pays him salary and allowances, these acts constitute sufficient fact from which a contract of employment can be inferred. See also the unreported Court of Appeal case of Ismalia Oluwatosin Gizali & 19 Ors V. National Pension Commission & Anor Appeal No. CA/ABJ/CV/830/2024, the judgment of which was delivererd by Hon. Justice Oyewumi JCA on 6/3/2026. 

Given that the Claimants have presented a well-substantiated case demonstrating they are, for all intents and purposes, employees of the Defendant, and in light of the Defendant’s failure to provide a credible or reasonable defence, I find their assertion that the Claimants were terminated merely as trainees to be entirely unsubstantiated and without merit. 

Taking cognizance of the fact that the Defendant is a product of statute established under Section 1 of the Nigeria Ports Authority Act, 2004, as correctly argued by the Claimants' counsel. I must consider whether the Claimant’s employment is clothed with statutory flavor. The legal position, as established in CBN v. Mrs. Agnes N. Igwillo (2007) LPELR 835 SC, is that an employment is imbued with statutory flavor when it is safeguarded by statute or by regulations that govern the procedures for employment and discipline.

Section 11(2) of the Nigerian Ports Authority Act says that; "The Authority may, with the approval of the Minister, make regulations generally relating to the CONDITION OF SERVICE of the employees of the Authority...." 

It can be seen that by virtue of Exhibits KAG1A-J(Claimants' Appointment letters) which made reference to Exhibit KAG2(Defendant's Conditions of Service) as well as the Nigerian Ports Authority Act, the Defendant is a creation of statute and its operations are regulated by the Act that establishes it. It is therefore beyond doubt that the employment of the Claimants is one that is statutorily flavored. I so find and hold.

And when an employment contract is regulated by statute or when conditions of service are derived from statutory regulations as in the instant case, the employee holds a legal status beyond that of a typical master-servant relationship. As established in Musibau Olatidoye Adeniyi V. Ejigbo Local Government (2013) LEPLR-22017 (CA), the only valid way to terminate Claimants' employment is by strictly following the statutory procedure. Any termination that deviates from the prescribed legal process is null, void, and ineffective. 

Having the Defendant not followed the statutory procedure in terminating the Claimants, the purported termination is accordingly null, void and ineffective. 

For the Claimants' reliefs 4, 6, and 7. It is well established through long line of case law that promotion is a privilege, not a right. For an employee to qualify for promotion, they must demonstrate that they have met all the prerequisite conditions outlined in their contract of employment. The Supreme Court has clearly held that moving from one rank or position to another within an organization is a privilege that must be earned, not a guaranteed entitlement. An employer cannot be compelled to promote an employee, regardless of how highly the employee regards their own performance. This principle is supported by the cases of Nwoye v. FAAN (2019) 5 NWLR Pt 1665) 193 and Abenga v. Benue Judicial Service Commission 2006) 14 NWLR PT. 1000)610. Furthermore, because the criteria for promotion differ across organizations, the courts will not intervene in matters of internal administrative policy, as affirmed in Mamma v. ICPC (2021) LPELR-56683(CA) p.36-37 paras F-C.T. Accordingly, these claims cannot succeed.

From all that has been said, Iam satisfied that the Claimants have proved their case and are entitled to some of their reliefs sought. For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared and ordered as follows:-

 

 

 

 

 

 

Judgment is delivered accordingly. 

 

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HON. JUSTICE S.H. DANJIDDA

(JUDGE)