IN THE NAT10NAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT CALABAR

BEFORE: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANUSI KADO

 

21^ST DAY OF APRIL, 2026                                      

SUIT NO. NICN/CA/61/2025 

BETWEEN:

1. Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria (ASCSN)
2. Senior Staff Association of Universities Teaching 

Hospitals Research Institutes and Associated Institutions (SSAUTHRIAI)

Government Owned Companies (SSASCGOC)

4. Air Transport Service senior staff association of Nigeria 
5. Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria (RTEAN)
6. Nigeria union of Allied Health Professional (NUAHP)

AND

Trade union Congress of Nigeria (TUC) ………………………………… defendant 

JUDGMENT.

1. Vide originating summons 25^th day of November, 2025 and filed on the  same date, the claimants submitted twin questions for resolution. They are:-
   1. Whether considering the express provisions of articles (e) & (k) of the Procedure for State Council Delegate Conference 2025 and Rule 11 E(xi) of the Constitution of the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria, the Defendant has the authority and vires to unilaterally reject, vary and or modify the consensus list of candidates reached by the Claimants and submitted to it by(sic) to the State Electoral Committee charged with the responsibility of conducting the State Council Delegate Conference 2025.
   2. Whether considering the express provisions of Articles (j), (k) & (q) of the Procedure for State Council Delegate Conference, 2025, the Defendant can impose persons’ who did not obtain nomination forms within the time stipulated for the collection and return of such forms or send in the names of their candidates and delegates as mandatorily required under the Procedure for State Delegate Conference 2025.
2. In anticipation of favourable resolution of the twin questions submitted to the court, the claimants pray for grant of the following reliefs:-
   1. A DECLARATION that by the clear and unambiguous provisions of Articles (e) and (k) and the totality of the provisions of the Procedure for State Council Delegate Conference 2025 and Rule 11 E(xi) of the Constitution of Trade Union Congress of Nigeria. The Defendant has no right power, authority or vires to unilaterally impose candidates for the position of Chairperson and Secretary of the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria, Cross River State Council other than the persons contained in the Consensus list submitted to it.
   2. A DECLARATION that the purported imposition of candidates for the position of Chairperson and other positions of the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria, Cross River State Councils contrary to the procedure for State Council Delegate Conference 2025 and therefore Ultra vires, and ipso facto incompetent, illegal, null and void.
   3. A DECLARATION that the consensus list submitted by the Electoral Committee of Trade Union Congress of Nigeria, Cross River State Council in complete compliance with the procedure for State Council Delegate Conference, 2025 remains the only valid list for election into elective positions in the State Council delegate Conference 2025, remains the only valid list for election into elective positions in the state council delegate conference 2025.
   4. AN ORDER setting aside the unsigned and undated list produced by the Defendant or any other list which is produced contrary to the mandatory provisions of the Procedure for State Council Delegate Conference 2025, and Rule 11 E(xi).
   5. AN ORDER directing the Defendant to forthwith conduct the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria, Cross River State Council State Delegate Conference 2025 based on the Consensus Delegate list submitted to it by the Electoral Committee which is, in compliance with the Procedure for State Council Delegate Conference 2025.
3. The originating summons is supported by a 27 paragraphs affidavit sworn to by one Bassey Otop, the Vice chairman of the 1^st claimant, wherein he stated that the claimants are affiliates of the defendant having offices and operational presence in Cross River State. The supreme authority under which the defendant operates is the National Delegate Conference comprising of members of National Administrative Council, president and general secretaries of affiliates unions; secretary TUC women commission, and Accredited delegates of affiliate unions based on monthly aggregate payments. By the constitution of the defendant the delegate conference of the defendant and its affiliates is quadrennial, which shall be convene quadrennially for each of the state council of TUC.
4. The state delegate conference (SDC) consists of delegates from all affiliates constituting the council. For candidates to be eligible for nomination and election as a delegate to the conference at the state level must come from an affiliate union that is in good financial standing, owing not more than three months subscription prior to the conference. The power to nominate candidates for the conference is the sole prerogative of the affiliates of the various state councils. The role of the defendant is solely supervisory. Officers elected from among members of the state council during the quadrennial  delegate conference of the council from each state of the federation constitutes the state administrative committee (SAC).
5. Following the expiration of the tenure of state administrative committee of the Trade Union congress of Nigeria, Cross River State, the national leadership of trade union congress of Nigeria as provided for in the constitution directed the Cross River State Council to prepare and conduct its state council quadrennial delegate conference of the  (TUC), to be held on the 18/11/2025. As per exhibit 2.
6. Sequel to the directives of the defendant contained in exhibit 2, the Cross River State Council swung into action by notifying all its affiliates and constituting local electoral committee to oversee the conduct of its 1^st Quadrennial State Council Delegate Conference of Trade union Congress of Nigeria. The directive contained in exhibit 2, was accompanied by uniform guidelines to all its affiliates to regulate the conduct of the various states’ councils delegate conference of Trade Union Congress of Nigeria including the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The guideline is as contained in exhibit 3. The duly issued nomination forms to various interested members filed and returned, are exhibit 4A-H. Vide exhibit 5, forms are to be obtained and returned not later than 4/11/2025 and return of delegate list not later than 7/11/2025.
7. At the close of nomination and after consensus was reached by all the affiliates of the council in respect of all elective position, the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria Cross River State Council, through the electoral committee sent a preliminary report on the 1^st quadrennial state delegate conference to the defendant. The report which is dated 4/11/2025, is hereto attached as exhibit 6. The consensus list is exhibit 7.
8. One of the affiliates PENGASSAN allotted 90 delegates did not forward the name of any of its delegates including its candidates within the time provided for in the guidelines. Also contrary to the provision of the guidelines for the conduct of state delegate conference that on the date slated for the congress, the defendant sent a returning officer with a list contrary to the consensus reached by the various affiliates of the state council. Exhibit 8 is the undated and unsigned list. The defendant serreptiously and clandestinely introduced the names of Moses Ekpo as candidate for position of Chairperson, when his form was obtained on 15/11/2025 and returned on 17/11/2025, after consensus had been reached by the various affiliates of the state council and a consensus list submitted by the electoral committee to the defendant. The nomination form obtained and submitted contrary to the provisions of the guidelines is exhibit 9. The defendant equally allotted the position of ex-officio to the duly nominated representative of 6^th claimant Comrade (Dr.) Bassey Icha as against the position of Assistant Secretary for which he was duly nominated by the 6^th claimant within time provided in the guidelines. Also, comrade Monday Okoro, a representative of the 3^rd claimant was nominated for position of Auditor. While comrade Asuquo Henry Asuquo was nominated for the position of public Relation Officer by the Amalgamated Commercial Tricycle and Motor Cycle Owners, repairs and Riders Association of Nigeria, the defendant removed name of Comrade Monday Okoro from the list of contestants and brought in Comrade Asuquo Henry Asuquo who never indicated any interest in the position of Auditor. Exhibit 10 and 11, are evidence to that effect.
9. The action of the defendant to impose candidates on the state council through the national returning officer is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and electoral guidelines for the conduct of the congress. All affiliates of the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria Cross River State council desirous of holding a peaceful state delegate conference devoid of imposition from the defendant.  
10. E. l. Akpama, Esq; counsel for the claimants relied on the depositions contained in the affidavit in support and the further and better affidavit filed in response to counter affidavit of the defendant. counsel also adopted the twin questions submitted for resolution and the written address filed along with the originating summons and the reply on points of law. 
11. Counsel argued the two questions for resolution together by submitting that the claimants are not inviting this Honourable Court to resolve any issue of facts but to simply give an interpretation of the provisions of Articles (e), (k), (0) and (q) of the Procedure for State Councils Delegate Conference 2025 and Rule 11 E(XI) of the Constitution of the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria, exhibit 2. While the Procedure for State Council Delegate Conference 2025 is exhibit 3 attached to the Claimants affidavit in support of the Originating Summons.
12. Counsel submitted that by the procedure for the conduct of State Council’s Delegate Conference 2025, the power to nominate candidates for the conference rest squarely on the affiliates and this is to be done through an electoral process, without prejudice to a consensus arrangement. On this submission counsel relied on Article (e) of exhibit 3, the guidelines for delegate conference.
13. Counsel contended that exhibit 3, the Procedure for conduct of elections for State Council Delegate Conference 2025 is the instrument that regulates the conduct of the said elections and the provision are binding on the parties. It has provided a framework and the requirements and prerequisites for the conduct of the said elections which are binding on it’s members including the Defendant. The guideline has provided the requirements as well as a condition precedent to be fulfilled before a person can be so qualified. It has also made it mandatory in Article (h) that all candidates who intend to stand for elections during the State Council Delegate Conference will obtain nomination from their respective affiliates. Article (j) mandatorily requires that the completed forms must be returned to the Secretary General or any officer so designated, and the electoral committee, two weeks before the State Delegate Conference. The law is trite that where a statute provides for a particular method of doing something or performing a duty which is regulated by statute that method and no other, must be the one to be adopted. Thus, if a law requires the fulfillment of a condition before a particular act or action, substantive or procedural is to be done or taken, non-fulfilment of the pre-condition or compliance therewith will be prejudicial to the defaulting party. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the case of Crutech v, Obeten (2011) NWLR (Pt. 1171) 588 at 608 paras C-E.
14. Counsel went on to submit that in Abubakar v. Attorney General of the Federation (2008) All FWLR (Pt, 441) 870 at page 908 para B, the Court held thus:

“Where a statute provides for a particular method of performing a duty regulated by statute: that method and no other must be adopted. In the instant case, Section 306 of the constitution provides for the mode of resignation of the president. As such, no other procedure or method (constructive resignation inclusive) shall be employed, save that provided for in the constitution.”

“It is the onerous duty of the court to interpret the words used by the legislature in a statute (the Constitution inclusive). And, where the provision of the Constitution (or a statute) is clear and unambiguous, the court is devoid of discretionary power to read therein an implied term, This is absolutely so because by the clear and unambiguous provision, an implied term is impliedly forbidden to be part of the Constitution. This is more so as a constitution ‘is not a transient agreement like a contract where implied terms could be read into it in the interest of the commercial transactions of the parties. Thus, where a constitutional provision is clear and unambigous and the courts read in to them so-called implied terms the courts would be going outside their interpretative jurisdiction and will be branded as making the law in a bad way”

“In interpreting a provision of the Constitution, the primary function of the court is to search for the intention of the Where a constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, the court must give the words their ordinary meaning unless it will lead to absurdity and inconsistency with the provisions of the Constitution as a whole. The true meaning of the words used and the intention of the legislature in a Constitution is considered as a whole. It is single document and every part of it must be considered as far as relevant in order to get the true meaning and intent of any particular portion of the enactment. Also, a Constitution must be interpreted and applied liberally. It must always be construed in such a way that it protects what it sets out to protect or guides what it sets out to guide. By necessity, a constitutional provision must be interpreted broadly.”

17. It is submission of counsel that in interpreting the provisions of Article (J) and other provisions of the Procedure for State Council Delegate Conference 2025 and Rule 11 E(xi) made by the Defendant, the Court has the duty to search for the intention of the law makers. The intention of the law makers according to counsel is that only candidates who obtain and return their nomination forms two weeks prior to the Conference are eligible or qualified to contest for election during the Conference. Conversely, those who fail to obtain and return their nomination forms two weeks before the conference are not qualified to contest. In the same vein Rule 11 E(xi) makes the position of Ex—officio the exclusive preserve of the immediate past Chairman of the Union.
18. Counsel submitted that by Exhibit 3, the window for the collection and returned of duly nominated forms closed on the 4^th day of November, 2025. The electoral committee in compliance with regulation or article (k) duly collated and submitted all valid nomination forms together with the consensus list to the Defendant on the 11^th day of November, 2025. The law makers did not leave any loophole to be exploited by the Defendant by couching, the provisions of Articles (0), and (k) and Rule 11 E(xi) in mandatory terms. According to counsel the use of the word shall and must in Articles (o), & (k) and Rule 11 E(xi) connotes mandatoriness; obligation or a command and gives no room for discretion. To support his contention counsel relied on the caser of Emordi v. Igbeke (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1251) 24 at Pp 33 para G.

“The word shall denote an obligation or a command and give no room for discretion by its nature, it is mandatory and imposes a duty. Accordingly, where a statutory provision stipulates that a thing shall be done, it goes without equivocation that a pre-emptory mandate is enjoined.”

‘‘The word “shall” is used to expresses a command or exhortation of what is legally mandatory, The use of the word in a statute or Rules of Court, makes it mandatory that the rule or statute must be observed.”

20. Counsel submitted that, the duty of the Court in the interpretation Article (o) of the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria Procedure for State Council Delegate Conference 2025  is limited to two questions, whether a person who did not validly obtain, completed and return his nomination form before the 4^th day of November, 2025 can contest the election during the Conference or whether the Defendant can impose a candidate who did obtain, complete his nomination form before the 4^th November, 2025 or any candidate at all. Again, the Court is faced with the task of discerning the intentions of the drafters of the 1^st Defendant’s Constitution to determine whether the Defendant can allot the position of Ex-officio other than the immediate past chairman of the Council where as in this case it is shown that the immediate past chairman is still a member of the 1^st Claimant. According to counsel the purported imposition of candidates for the positions of Chairperson and other positions by the Defendant other the persons validly nominated by the Claimants as contained in Exhibit 7 is a clear breach of the guidelines.
21. The action of the Defendant in disrupting the Claimants scheduled for the 18^th day of November, 2025 by trying to impose candidates not qualified to contest the said election as shown in Exhibit 8 was done in violation of the guidelines made by the Defendant. The court has a duty to set aside the reckless actions of the Defendant by setting aside exhibit 8. Counsel urged the court to resolve issues one and two in favour of the Claimants.

Issue 3:

“Whether the Claimants are entitled to the reliefs sought”

23. In arguing the additional issue, counsel submitted that by the provision of Order 3 Rule 3 & 16 (1) & (2) of the Rules, any person claiming to be interested under a deed, will or other written instrument may apply by Originating Summons for the determination of any question of construction arising thereunder and for a declaration of the rights of the person interested.
24. The Claimants have shown by affidavit evidence, their interest in the subject matter of this suit. The right of their members duly nominated by them to represent them during the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria 1^st Quadrennial State Delegate Conference. The Claimants have graphically demonstrated through affidavit evidence that they had complied with the guidelines made by the Defendant, the same guidelines the Defendant wants to circumvent.
25. The Claimants have also demonstrated through affidavit evidence that they are the only persons entitled to contest the elections during the conference having obtained, completed and returned their nomination forms within the time provided in the guidelines. The Claimants in this regard have tendered Exhibit 4A-H.
26. The law is trite that once the court accepts the affidavit evidence of the claimants, it will enter judgment in favour of the claimants, having been adjudged to have proved their case, the grants of the reliefs flow naturally thereon. To support this submission counsel relied on the cases of ELF Petroleum Nig. Ltd v. Umah (2006) All FWLR (Pt, 343) 1761 at1765; Zobams Company Nigeria Ltd. V. Tota General Enterprises Ltd (2006) AII FWLR (Pt. 317) 515 at 512 H.
27. In concluding his submission counsel urged the court to uphold the overwhelming affidavit evidence of the Claimants, and enter judgment for Claimants.
28. In reaction to the originating summons the defendant filed a 22 paragraphs counter affidavit sworn to by one Tolulope Akinmayowa, legal officer of the defendant. In the counter affidavit the deponent stated that the 27 paragraphs affidavit in support of the originating summons is false and misleading. The deponent of the defendant’s counter affidavit denied the claim of Mr. Bassey Otop of being vice chairman of the 1^st claimant, the Association of Senior Civil Servant of Nigeria (ASCSN). As there is no vice chairman in the organisational structure and the deponent of affidavit in support does not occupy any such position. It was further stated that the deponent of the affidavit in support of the originating summons has not been  authorized to depose the affidavit of the 1^st claimant or the 2^nd to 6^th claimants. It was also stated that the claimants in commencing this suit did not join the trustees of the affiliate un ions as parties to the present suit. There is no document showing claimants have been authorized to sue on behalf of affiliate unions they purport to represent. The 1^st to 6^th claimants have issued disclaimers, categorically stating that they are not aware of this suit and did not sanction its commencement and the persons prosecuting same do not represent their interest at either the state or national level. See exhibits TUS 1A-1C. and for the version of 2^nd, 4^th and 5^th claimants have stated their disclaimer through whatsapp. See exhibits TUC 2C.
29. The secretariat of the trade union congress of Nigeria does not merely supervises state councils. The national secretariat directs, authorizes, controls and regulate the activities of state councils, including the conduct of state delegate conferences. The state councils derive their authority entirely from the national secretariat in accordance with the constitution of the trade union congress of Nigeria. The power to nominate candidates for the state delegate conference is the exclusive prerogative of affiliate unions at the national level and not at state level. In fact state councils do not have the constitutional authority to unilaterally nominate candidates or validate nominations not duly authorized by affiliate unions. There is no state administrate committee, as an organ within the trade union congress of Nigeria. The officers elected at a valid state delegate conference constitute the state administrative council and not a committee. It was stated repeated reference to non-existing organ exposes the claimants lack of understanding of the internal structure of the defendant. it was stated any purported consensus arrangement cannot lawfully replace an election where any interested affiliate dissents or where any interested major stakeholder union opts out of the consensus arrangement. The PENGASSAN which has over 90 delegates, the highest representation in Cross River State, was never part of any purported consensus arrangement. PENGASSAN was not bound by the outcome of any purported consensus reached in its absence. It was also stated that the purported consensus list relied by the claimants was unilaterally altered by the chairman of the electoral committee and his team.
30. It was stated PENGASSAN has held position of vice chairman of state council for 6 years. The alleged failure to submit names was a consequence of internal manipulation by persons with intent to  impose candidates as PENGASSAN was deliberately excluded from critical engagements by the outgoing chairman in furtherance of his personal agenda. The claimants have not disclosed any right capable of being protected.
31. Chief Anthony Eyo, Esq; counsel for defendant in arguing in opposition to the originating summons informed the court that he is relying on the depositions contained in the 22 paragraphs counter affidavit of the defendant.  Counsel also adopted  the final written address filed along with the counter affidavit as his argument.
32. In the written address three issues were submitted for determination: They are:-
    1. Whether the Claimants possess the requisite locus standi and authority to institute this suit and maintain the present action, particularly, having regard to the false representation of office and authority.
    2. Whether this Honourable Court ought to interfere with the internal democratic processes of a labour Union having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case.
    3. Whether the Claimants have exhausted the internal dispute-resolution mechanisms available within their affiliate Unions and the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria before approaching this Honourable Court.

ARGUMENT:

33. Issue 1: Whether the Claimants possess the requisite locus standi and authority to institute this suit and maintain the present application, particularly, having regard to the false representation of office and authority,
34. In arguing issue 1, counsel submitted that the law  is trite, elementary and no longer open to argument that locus standi is the fulcrum upon which the jurisdiction of a court pivots. Where a plaintiff lacks locus standi, the action is incompetent ab initio and must be struck out, irrespective of the merit or demerit of the claims presented. The concept of locus standi is designed to prevent busybodies from litigating matters in which they have no legally recognizable interest and protect the judicial process from being converted into a forum for political or factional battles. In Abraham Adesanya v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1981) 5 SC 112, the Supreme. Court, per Bello JSC (as he then was), held emphatically thus:

“The term locus standi denotes the legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court of law. A person must show that his civil rights and obligation have been or are in danger of being infringed”

“Where a plaintiff has no locus standi, the court is without jurisdiction to entertain the action’’.

36. Counsel also argued that, in representative or collective actions, Nigerian courts have insisted on strict proof of authority. In Melwani v. Five Star Industries Ltd (2002) 3 NWLR (Pt.753) 217, the Supreme Court held that, “where a party claims to sue in a representative capacity, the authority to do so must be clearly established.”
37. According to counsel in the present case, upon a careful examination of the facts of this case, this Honourable Court will discover that, the Claimants purport to act for and on behalf of affiliate Unions of the Defendant but have completely failed to place any materials such as a Resolution of the Unions, written authority and any form of document mandating or authorizing them to institute this suit. Worse still and fatally so – the 1^st to 6^th Claimants have expressly disclaimed the suit, categorically stating that they neither authorized nor are they aware of the action.
38. Counsel submitted that an Affidavit deposed to before a court of law constitutes a body of evidence. However, the law is settled that, where a deponent makes a false statement on a material fact, the court is entitled and indeed bound to treat such affidavit as unreliable. Counsel refers to the case of Bamaiyi v State (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt. 715) 270 where the Supreme Court held that, “An affidavit which contains falsehood in respect of a material fact is liable to be discountenanced.” Counsel further refers to the case of Eze v Okolonju (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt.1180) 183, where it was held that, “Once an affidavit is shown to be false in any material particular, it loses its probative ‘value”.
39. According to counsel in the instant case, the deponent deposed that, he is the Vice Chairman of the 1^st Claimant. The Defendant has shown clearly and unequivocally that, no such office exists in the 1^st Claimant Union and the 1^st Claimant has equally disowned the deponent’s claim. counsel submitted that, this false statement goes to the root of competence and authority. Consequently, paragraph 1 of the Claimants’ Affidavit in Support of the Motion collapses and with it goes the entire affidavit structure. It is the submission of counsel that, once the supposed principal deny authority, the agents’ standing evaporates instantly. This suit is therefore bereft of locus standi and liable to be dismissed in limine.
40. Issue 2; Whether this Honourable Court ought to interfere with the internal democratic processes of a labour Union having regard to the circumstances of this case. 
41. Counsel begun argument on this issue by submitting that, Nigerian courts have historically exercised studied restraint in interfering with the internal affairs of voluntary Associations and Trade Unions, particularly in matters relating to Elections; Delegate Conferences; Leadership Contests etc. This restraint is rooted in Freedom of Association and Union autonomy; the recognition that internal democracy is best regulated internally, not judicially. In Onuoha v. Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244, the Supreme Court warned against judicial intrusion into internal political arrangements,  holding that:   “The court is not the proper forum for deciding issues which are essentially political and internal.” Although, that case concerned party politics, the principle has been consistently applied to trade unions.
42. At the National Industrial Court, this position has been reinforced repeatedly to the effect that, courts should not become referees of union factionalism except where there is a clear breach of statute or constitution.
43. For counsel, in the instant case, the Claimants are not alleging a breach of the Trade Unions Act or a denial of fair hearing or exclusion contrary to constitutional provisions. Rather, they are attempting to freeze an election they are not positioned to win. This Honourable Court is urged not to dignify such political stratagems with judicial endorsement.
44. Issue 3; Whether the Claimants have exhausted the internal dispute-resolution mechanisms available within their affiliate Unions and the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria before approaching this Honourable Court.
45. Counsel argued that it is settled principle that where any statute, constitution,  or regulatory framework provides internal remedies, those remedies must be exhausted before recourse to the court of law and failure to do so renders the action premature and incompetent. In AP.C. v. Karfi (2017) 9 NWLR (Pt.1571) 414, the Supreme Court held thus:

“Where a party fails to exhaust internal remedies provided by the Constitution of an Organisation the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the matter.”

46. Counsel also refers to Eguamwense v. Amaghizemwen (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt. 315) 1, where the Apex  court held that: ‘’courts will not intervene until internal remedies have been exhausted’’.
47. It is the submission of counsel that upon a careful examination of the facts of this case, it will be evidently clear that, the Claimants did not exhaust internal remedies within their own Unions and did not invoke dispute mechanisms within the TUC before rushing to the court at the first hint of political disadvantage. This singular failure is sufficient to terminate the suit and we urge this Court to dismiss this Motion against the Claimants.
48. In concluding his submission counsel urged the court to refuse the invitation to destabilize union democracy and refuse this application by dismissing same with punitive cost in order to protect the integrity of internal labour governance.
49. In response to the counter affidavit of the defendant, the claimants filed further and better affidavit with a reply on points of law.
50. In the further affidavit it was stated that by its organizational structure, the 1^st claimant has branches in all the states of the federation with branch executive committees. The members of a branch executive committee of the 1^st claimant consist of the Chairman, two Vice chairman, treasurer, Internal Auditor, five other members elected at the branch delegates conference from the units that are not represented in (a) to (d) above, the appointed state secretary, and the appointed organizing secretary.
51. The deponent of the affidavit in support, Mr. Bassey Otop, stated that he was elected as a Vice Chairman of the 1^st claimant during the delegate conference of the Cross River State branch of the Association held on Monday, the 9^th day of December, 2024. The letter of introduction of elected executive of the 1^st claimant to the executive governor of Cross River state is attached as exhibit 13. He insisted that he had authority of the 1^st claimant and indeed other claimants to depose to the affidavit in support of the originating summons. He stated that they need not join trustees of affiliate unions  as parties in this suit, as the matter is purely a matter between the state branches and the trade union congress of Nigeria (TUC), and has nothing to do with the national executive council of affiliate unions. The decision to commence this action was a collective decision of all the affiliate unions in the state. The 1^st claimant does not need consent of its national office to commence legal action in Cross River State. The claimants stated that the defendant had no intention of conducting a credible congress/election in Cross River State. While this case was in court pending the defendant wrote to one contestant Asikong Nchewi to organize, supervise or otherwise assist in the conduct of the said conference contrary to the conference guidelines. The letter is exhibit 14. Exhibit 15 is duly completed form of Asikong Nchewi, who is a candidate at the election.
52. The further and better affidavit was accompanied by reply on points law.
53. On locus standi, counsel submitted that the submission that claimants lacked locus standi to institute this suit is misconceived. As locus standi denote the legal capacity to institute proceedings in court, usually where a party does not possess the legal capacity to institute a proceeding, it robs the court of jurisdiction to entertain such proceedings. In support of this contention counsel relied on the case of Daniel v INEC (2015) 9 NWLR (Pt.1463) 113 @ 152, Citec Int’l Estate ltd v francis (2021) 5 NWLR (Pt.1768) 150.
54. Counsel also submitted that in considering issue of locus standi, it is the claimants’ pleadings that the court will consider. The totality of the averments in the statement of claim will be scrutinized with a view to ascertaining whether or not the claimants’ interest has been disclosed. This does not depend on merit or success of the case.  to support this contention counsel relied on the case of Cited Int’l Estate Ltd v Francis (supra).
55. Counsel submitted that in an action commenced by originating summons it is the affidavit in support of the originating summons which is equivalent to pleading that will be considered. AMCON v Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) ltd (2024) 10 NWLR (Pt.1970) 255. Counsel further submitted that, it is claimants’ affidavit in support that will be considered in deciding whether or not claimants have shown sufficient interest in the subject matter of the suit to be properly clothe with the locus standi to institute this action. To support this submission counsel relied on the cases of Abubakar v Buhari (2023) 12 NWLR (Pt.1897) 61, Inter Ocean Dec Co (Nig.) Ltd v Fadeyi (2024) 14 NWLR (Pr.1958) 239.
56. Counsel also argued that a careful perusal of the claimants’ affidavit in support of the originating summons, the exhibits attached therein and the twin questions submitted for resolution, will clearly show that claimants’ interest has arisen in the subject matter of this action. As the claimants have clearly demonstrated in paragraphs 15, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26 and 27 of the supporting affidavits how their interest will be adversely affected by this suit. See also exhibits 4a, -4h, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. Adesanya v President FRN (1981) 2 NWLR (Pt.
57. Counsel submitted that the claimants have demonstrated that the conduct of the defendant has affected them or likely to affect them. The claimants are persons likely to be  aggrieved by the conduct of the defendant. it is that conduct of the defendant that has necessitated the filing of this action. Counsel again relied on the case of Cited Int’l Este ltd v Francis (supra).
58. The defendant has lost sight of the fact that rule 5 (vi) of the Constitution of the defendant exhibit 1, has confers on the affiliate branches the right to sue and be sued in that capacity.
59. Counsel submitted the defendant lack vires to question the capacity of claimants to institute this action against the defendant. in support of this contention reliance was placed on the case of SPDC  Nig. Ltd v Edamakue (2009) All FWLR (Pt.489) 408.
60. On exhaustion of internal mechanism for settlement of dispute counsel relied on section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended which vest judicial power on court and submitted this court has requisite power to deal with this action. The judicial power extend to determination of civil rights and obligations. To support this contention counsel relied on the case of Council of Legal Education v Dange (2024) 13 NWLR (Pt.1295) 307.
61. Counsel also submitted that, notwithstanding exhibits TUC-1A - TUC-1C, this case was not instituted by national secretariat of the claimants but by the state executive committee. There is no law in force which mandates the claimants to seek the authority of national secretariat to commence any action against the defendant in Cross River State.
62. Counsel submitted that exhibits TUC-2A-2C are of doubtful origin. They are inadmissible in law as they are print out of whatsapp from GSM telephote which messages have been clearly edited. It is submission of counsel that by combine section 84(1), (5)(a) and 258 of the evidence Act, these exhibits  being electronic documents needs certification. To support his contention counsel relied on the case of IGP v Bellow (2023) 4 NWLR (Pt.1865) 265. It is the contention of counsel that the absence of certificate has rendered the documents inadmissible for failure to comply with section 84(2) of the evidence Act, as amended.
63. Counsel also submitted that the defendant’s constitution does not contain any internal dispute resolution mechanism before resorting to court of law.
64. Counsel submitted that the defendant’s counter affidavit did not controvert the depositions contained in the affidavit in support. The implication is that the averments are deemed admitted by the defendant. in support of the argument reliance was placed on the cases of Noble Drilling Nig. Ltd v NPA (2021) ALL FWLR (Pt.1697) 762, Malari v leiogh (20190 ALL FWLR (Pt.980) 604.
65. It is submission of counsel that the defendant has failed to join issues on the substantive claim, other than challenged claimants; locus standi.

                 COURT’S DECISION:

66. I have considered the originating summons, the affidavit in support with its attachment, the counter affidavit filed by the defendant in opposition to the originating summons, the further and better affidavit and the written and oral submission of counsel for the parties in adumbration of the position of their respective clients.
67. By order 3 rule 3 of the rules of this court originating summons is one of the modes for commencement of an action before this court. Order 3 of the rules of this court is very clear and unambiguous to the effect that Originating Summons can be resorted to where the party is seeking for interpretation of the constitutional provisions or any statute law or document. It can also be employed by a litigant for purposes of ventilating his grievances before the court based on facts that are not notoriously contentious or disputed. See Order 3 Rules 16 and 17 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017. It is apparent from the provisions of Order 3 of the rules of this court that, originating summons is best suited for cases where there are no substantial disputes of facts. Originating summons should only be applicable in circumstances where there is no dispute on the question of facts or even the likelihood of such dispute or for situations requiring interpretation.
68. Where it is obvious from the state of the affidavit that there would be an air of friction in the proceedings, then an originating summons is not appropriate. Originating summons should be used only where the proceeding involves question of law, rather than disputed facts, even where the facts are not in dispute, the originating summons should not be used, if the proceedings are hostile. See S.C.S. Co. v. Council, O.A.U., Ile-Ife (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1269) 193, Sani V Kogi State HA (2019) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1661) 172, S.C, Olley v. Tunji (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1362) 275, S.C.
69. The court in determining whether or not a suit was rightly commenced by originating summons, the court is not called upon to resolve disputes of facts but to apply the law (as to when a suit can be commenced by originating summons) to the facts in the affidavit in support of the originating process and, in some instances, the facts in the counter-affidavit opposing the process to see if they are potentially hostile or indeed hostile. The court of appeal has in the case of Owuama v Obasi (2011) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1228) 431, held that; Once a court is called upon to determine facts which parties must prove by oral evidence, even though documentary evidence would also be put in issue, such proceedings are hostile proceedings and the use of originating summons is totally unsuitable. This is not the position in this case as the facts deposed to in the affidavit in support are straight forward and the deposition in the counter affidavit were geared to raising objection to the claimants originating summons.
70. In the instant case, the reliefs sought by the claimants and the facts deposed to by the defendants do not show or revealed facts that are riotously contentious. I should stress here that the defendant in an action commenced by originating summons by filing of a counter affidavit does not tantamount to the matter being contentious and hostile. The dispute on facts, which will necessitate finding that a suit was not properly commenced by use of originating summons, must be substantial, material and affecting the live issues in the matter. Where the disputes are peripheral and not material to the live issues, an action can be sustained by originating summons.
71. A careful perusal of the entire content of the provisions of Order 3 and in particular Rule 16(1) & (2), 17(1)(a), (b) and (C) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules (2017) it will revealed that Originating Summons is one of the processes meant for commencement of action before the court for any person claiming to be interested under an enactment, constitution, agreement or any other written instrument, may by originating summons apply to the Court for the determination of any question of construction arising from the instrument and for a declaration of the rights of the person(s) interested, in so far as such question of construction arises from a subject matter over which the Court has jurisdiction. A party activating the interpretative jurisdiction of the Court shall indicate with sufficient particularity the provisions or part of the document sought to be interpreted. In activating the interpretative jurisdiction of the court. The rules of court clearly envisaged that the originating summons must contain question or questions of construction arising under the instrument involved and a declaration of rights of a person's interest. The declaration of rights depends on the answers to the questions formulated for determination in the application by way of originating summons. A claimant intending to benefit from the time and effort saving procedure of originating summons in Order 3 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 must raise the question or questions for determination on which he seeks the determination of the court. This means the real issues placed before the court for adjudication were those raised in the originating summons and those are the issues this court will have to address. 
72. In the case at hand, the defendant chose to formulate three distinct questions which were argued in the address filed along with counter affidavit. Going by the rules of this court, it is the questions submitted by the claimant that are to be argued and considered in determining the Originating summons. The counsel for the defendant is equally bound by the questions submitted by the claimant, the defendant is not permitted to deviate from the case put forward by the claimant for resolution by the court.
73. However, the  defendant decided and chose to formulate three issues for determination, the first issue questioned the locus standi and authority of the claimants to institute this suit. The second issue is alleging that this suit  is in respect of internal democratic processes of a labour union and this court ought not to interfere or delve into. The third issue is whether claimants have exhausted the internal dispute resolution mechanism available within their affiliate unions and the trade unions congress of Nigeria before approaching the court.
74. It is clear from the counter affidavit of the defendant and the written address filed along with it that the defendant is raising objection to the suit of the claimants. Though the appropriate thing to do is to file a separate motion on notice or a notice of preliminary objection after filing of the counter affidavit for the objection to be determined in limine. But the path taken by the defendant is to argue the objection as its defence.
75. In view of the nature of the three issues raised by the defendant, I shall first and foremost determine the three issues which if decided in favour of the defendant are capable of terminating the existence of this suit.
76. On locus standi, the defendant’s position is that the claimants lacked locus standi to institute this suit, the action is incompetent and should be struck out irrespective of the merit or demerit of the claim. Counsel argued that  the concept of locus standi is designed to prevent busybodies from litigating matters in which they have no legally recognizable interest and protect judicial process from being converted into a forum for political or factional battles. 
77. Counsel further argued that since claimants purport to institute this suit for and on behalf of the affiliate unions in representative or collective actions, courts have insisted on strict proof of authority. But they failed to place before the court any materials such as resolution of the unions or written authority and any form of document mandating or authorizing them to institute this suit. The claimants have expressly disclaimed the suit, categorically stating that they neither authorized nor are they aware of the action. 
78. The defendant has also argued that the deposition in the affidavit in support claiming that the deponent is the vice chairman of the 1^st claimant was false statement on a material fact, when no such post or position exists in the structure within the  1^st claimant. It was also argued that the denial of giving authority by the claimant for institution of this case has made locus standi to evaporates instantly.
79. The response of counsel for the claimants was that the submission of defendant on locus stadi was misconceived. As by the affidavit in support, the claimants have shown sufficient interest in the subject matter of this suit to properly clothed them with locus standi to institute this suit. 
80. Locus standi is the legal right of a party to an action to be heard in litigation before a court of law or tribunal. The term entails the legal capacity of instituting or commencing an action in a competent court of law or tribunal without any inhibition, obstruction or hindrance from any person or body whatsoever. See Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025)423; Thomas v. Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 669; Momoh v. Olotu (1979) All NLR 117; A.-G., Anambra State v. Eboh (1992) 1 NWLR (Pt. 218) 491. The issue of locus standi is a condition precedent to the determination of a case on merit. Where a claimant has no locus standi to bring a suit, the suit becomes incompetent and the court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain it, the only order the court can make in the circumstance is that of dismissal. See Ajayi v. Adebiyi (2012) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1310) 137; Nworka v. Ononeze-Madu(2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1672) 422.
81. The defendant based its objection on locus standi, on lack of proof of authority to sue in representative capacity. And the alleged disclaimer of this suit as contained in exhibits TUC 1C – TUC 1C, and TUC 2C., wherein the 1^st to 6^th claimants stated that they neither authorized nor aware of the present action in court. The defendant also impugns the affidavit in support due to an alleged materially false statement by the deponent that he is vice chairman of the 1^st claimant when no such position exists within the structure of the 1^st claimant.
82. In determining locus standi of a claimant the court is enjoined to look at the pleading of the claimant to ascertain whether the depositions contained in the affidavit have disclosed sufficient interest of the claimant which need to be protected by the court.
83. In abiding by the dictate of the law, I have carefully perused the affidavit in support which is the pleading in this case, since the matter is being fought on affidavits evidence. It is glaringly clear to every discerning eye that the case of the claimants is predicated on alleged substitution of candidates by the defendant for the 1^st quadrennial state delegate conference of the Cross River State Branch of the defendant to be convene due to expiration of tenure of the executive of Cross River State branch. The claimants have clearly and unequivocally stated in the affidavit in support of the originating summons that they are affiliates unions of the Cross River State Branch of the defendant. With the lucid clear depositions in the affidavit in support that the claimants are affiliates unions of the 1^st defendant. It will be full hardy to phantom the insistence of the defendant in relying on exhibits TUC 1A – 1C and TUC – 2C, to impugn the locus standi of the claimants to institute or maintain this suit.
84. The claimants having clearly in the affidavit in support of the originating summons stated their status, it is not for the defendant to assigned them status which they did not claimed to have. Likewise, the issue of the alleged false statement on a material fact, respecting the assertion of the deponent of the affidavit in support that he is vice chairman of the 1^st claimant was not false, since the deponent did not claim to be deposing the said affidavit for and on behalf of the national affiliate unions, the affidavit in support is categorical that the deponent is vice chairman of 1^st claimant Cross River State Branch and not national chapter. The defendant seems to have confused parties in a case and averments of a witness made in an affidavit. The deponent as per as this case is concerned is a witness not one of the parties, the claimants are branches of the of various unions in Cross River State and not National unions.
85. On absence of authority, the provisions of Order 13 rules 1, 2(1) and 11(1) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, becomes apposite, the provisions read as follows:-

Order 13 rule 1. Provides:-

All persons may be joined in one action as claimants in whom any right to relief is alleged to exist whether jointly or severally and judgment may be given for such claimant(s) as may be found to be entitled to relief and for such relief as the claimant may be entitled to without any amendment.

2.—(1) When an action commenced in the name of a wrong person as Claimant, or where it is doubtful that it commenced in the name of the right Claimant, the Court, if satisfied that it commenced through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, may order any other person to be tituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as may be just.

11—(1) Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, one or more of such persons may sue or be sued on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested.

86. It is clear from the above provisions of the rules of this court that persons having common interest, common grievances and the outcome of the suit beneficial to all of them may approach the court in a single case for redress. The provisions also clearly established that the persons suing in a representative capacity must have the same interest in the proceeding. Thus, the subject matter must evince a common interest as opposed to diverse interest, common grievance and reliefs sought must in their nature be beneficial to all the representatives and those represented. See  Ayinde & Ors –V- Akanji & Ors (1988) LPELR – 676 (SC) per CRAIG JSC (pp 26 – 27 paras F. Also, in Ezendu –V- Ekwoaba (1998) 9 – 10 SC 143 at 152.1; Idise v Williams Int’l ltd (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt.370) 142, SC.
87. Looking at the originating summons, the questions posed for resolution, the reliefs being sought as well as the affidavit in support of the origination summons, I have no doubt in my mind that the claimants in this suit have common interest, common grievances and the outcome will be beneficial to them. The reason being that the questions and reliefs sought are all in respect of convening of 1^st Quadrennial state Delegate Conference for election of new executive officers of the Cross River state branch of the defendant to which the claimants are affiliates and entitled to participate through their members.
88. Also, the affidavit in support alleges that the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUC) violated its own constitution and electoral guidelines by imposing candidates on the Cross River State Council. There is also the assertion that the consensus list, submitted on November 4, 2025, was undermined by the national body's introduction of an unauthorized list of candidates and unauthorized alterations to nominee positions for the upcoming state delegate conference.
89. One vital question that need answer at this moment is are the claimants suing in representative capacity for them to be require to adduce evidence in that respect. The originating summons is clear on its face that the claimants sued in their own respective capacities as claimants and not suing in representative capacity. This means the objection based on non-production of authority to sue was based on misconception. The defendant seems to have confused deponent of affidavit with parties in this suit.
90. Assuming but without conceding that this action was commenced in representative capacity. It will be futile for a defendant who is not one of those the claimants purport to be represented to challenge the authority of the claimants. This is because if the claimants wins defendant cannot share in the victory and if they lose or the case dismissed, such dismissal can never affect the defendant adversely. In the instant case, none of the claimants said to have been represented was opposed to the claimants’ capacity or authority to represent them. The challenge of the claimants’ capacity to sue in a representative capacity did not lie in the mouth of the defendant who had nothing to share in the claimants’ victory. See Nduka v. Ezenwaku (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 709) 494; S.P.D.C. v. Edamkue (2009) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1160) 1; Elf Pet. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Umah (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1628) 428.
91. In law it is only the claimants or any one of them that can contest validity of authority and not  the defendant. i.e. a member of the group/class that can dispute the representative capacity of the claimants. See Nta v. Anigbo (1972) 5 SC 156; S.P.D.C.N. Ltd. v. Edamkue (2009) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1160) 1; (2009) All FWLR (Pt.489) 408; ELF Petroleum (Nig.) Ltd. v. Umah (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1628) 428; A.-G., Kwara State v. Lawal (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 266; Alikor v. Ogwo (2019) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1695) 331; C.B.N. v. Adedeji (2022) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1847) 361; C.B.N. v. Adedeji (2022) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1847) 361; Alikor v. Mainstreet Bank Reg. Ltd. v. Oshinuga (2025) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1984) 727.
92. A person suing or claiming to maintain an action on behalf of other party or parties in a representative, must disclose same in the statement of claim. BAMISILE v OSASUYI & ORS (2007) 10 NWLR (PT.1042) P.225; ABUBAKAR v USMAN (2018) LPELR-44089 (CA). However, on the face of the originating summons, there is nothing to suggest that this action was brought in a representative capacity. Although it is recognized that the Claimants have the same interest and obviously common grievance, yet it does give the present case the toga or coating of a representative action. In fact, in their affidavit in support the claimants stated that they were affiliates of Cross River State Branch union of the defendant. In the circumstance, I do not hesitate to hold that the present action as constituted is not one brought in a representative capacity hence, I resolve issue one in favour of the Claimants.
93. Let me make it clear that, the present case does not concern the national chapters of the claimants, it concerns the branches in Cross River State. It is to be noted that the Trade Unions Act, governed registration of Trade unions and once registered they become legal entity with power to sue of be sued. Trade unions occupy a special statutory position in our labour jurisprudence. By virtue of their registration under the Trade Unions Act, they acquire legal personality. More importantly, the practice and jurisprudence of the National Industrial Court have long recognized the peculiar operational structure of trade unions, which function through branches, state councils, and units that prosecute disputes arising from local industrial relations realities.
94. The decisions of this Court in Senior Staff Association of Nigerian Universities v. Federal Government of Nigeria (2008) 33 NLLR (Pt. 33) 407 and subsequent cases have acknowledged that branches and units of registered trade unions may properly approach the Court to ventilate grievances peculiar to them. In Dr. O. Odusote v. Lagos State Government (Suit No. NICN/LA/158/2012, delivered 24 May 2012), this Court expressly affirmed this practice, recognizing that to insist on the joinder of the national body in every dispute would unduly hamper access to justice and frustrate the effective resolution of labour disputes. Similarly, in Union of Tipper & Quarry Employers of Nigeria v. National Union of Road Transport Workers, Ogun State Chapter (Suit No. NICN/LA/265/2017, judgment delivered 5^th May, 2022, this Court reiterated that branch unions have the right of audience before it.
95. From what I observed what brought about the defendant assuming that the claimants as shown on the face of the summons are the national unions and not branches, is absence of stating on the face of the summons that the claimants are branches. In the circumstance, I am persuaded that the description of the Claimant as depicted on the face of the summons without adding branch to the names does not derogate the capacity of claimants as branches and not national chapters. Therefore, to accede to the request of the defendant to hold that claimants on the face of the summons are national chapters and not Cross River branches will amount to giving prominence to technicality thereby jettisoning substance. In labour adjudication, substance must prevail over technicality. I therefore hold that the Claimants, as a branches of a duly registered trade unions, are competent to institute this action before this Court as they have the requisite locus standi to prosecute this matter.
96. Once the correct legal person is before the Court but is described in an inaccurate or incomplete manner, the error is one of misnomer rather than a fundamental defect. The Supreme Court has consistently held that a misnomer, as opposed to suing a non-existent or wrong party, is curable by amendment. The underlying rationale is that the Court is concerned with substance and not mere technical description.
97. In my considered view, the absence of putting branch in the name of the claimant is at worst an irregularity in description, which does not go to the root of jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would elevate form above substance and defeat the overriding objective of this Court to dispense substantial justice in labour matters. Furthermore, the defendants are not in any way misled as to the status of the claimants was clearly stated in the affidavit before the court.
98. Following the above analysis, I find that the Claimants, as branches of the national unions, possesses the requisite capacity to institute this action before this Court. I further hold that the manner in which the claimants sued does not render the suit incompetent, the defect in not stating branches in the names of the claimants is not a fundamental vice to nullify the action of the claimants. The objection of the defendant lacks merit and is hereby accordingly dismissed. 
99. The second limb of the defendant’s objection i.e. issue two whether this court ought to interfere with internal democratic processes of a labour union having regard to the circumstances of this case. According to counsel courts in Nigeria exercise studied restraint in interfering with the internal affairs of voluntary association and trade unions, particularly on issues relating to election; delegate conference, leadership contests etc.
100. Although, trade unions are considered voluntary organisations and possess internal democratic processes, disputes arising from these processes, particularly concerning elections and nominations, are not automatically excluded from judicial review. The Trade Unions Act and related legislation provide frameworks for the regulation of trade unions, including their electoral processes. The Trade Unions Act governs the formation, registration, and operation of trade unions in Nigeria. While it emphasizes internal democracy, it does not explicitly oust the jurisdiction of courts regarding disputes arising from union elections or nominations.
101. General electoral laws, such as the Electoral Act, while focused on political elections, establish principles of fairness and due process that may inform judicial approaches to disputes in other electoral contexts, including trade unions, where applicable.
102. The courts generally retain jurisdiction to ensure that the internal rules and governing laws of organisations, including trade unions, are followed, and that democratic processes are conducted fairly and in accordance with the law. Disputes concerning nominations, if they allege violations of the union's constitution or relevant statutes, as in this case are subject to judicial examination. It is to be noted that this court by virtue of section 254C(1) of the Constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended) has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine cases bordering n trade unionism, the present suit was as a result of dispute emanating from unionism. See Standard Chartered Bank v. Adegbite (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1653) 348; SCC (Nig.) Ltd. v. George (2024) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1971) 421; SCC (Nig.) Ltd. v. Joseph (2026) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2025) 227; Skye Bank Plc v. Iwu (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1590) 24.
103. On the third issue on whether claimants have exhausted the internal dispute resolution mechanism available within their affiliate unions and trade unions congress of Nigeria before approaching this court. However, counsel has not referred this court to the provisions of the claimants’ constitutions that made provision for internal dispute resolution which the claimants failed to honour. 
104. From all I have been saying above all the three issues canvassed by the defendants have failed woefully, same are hereby rejected.
105. Coming to the substantive matter as per the originating summons, the claimants submitted twin questions for resolution, I have earlier in this judgment reproduced the said questions and reliefs being sought, in the circumstance, there will be no need to reproduce them here again.
106. I have also extensively captured argument of counsel on the questions submitted for resolution.
107. I have thoroughly examined the provisions of the constitution of the defendant and the guidelines for conduct of the state delegate conference which the claimant submitted in the originating summons for interpretation.
108. Let it be made clear that the claimants’ case is for interpretation of certain provisions of the defendant’s constitution and guidelines for state delegate elections. The constitution is attached to the affidavit in support as exhibit 2, while the guidelines was attached as exhibit 3.
109. In law the cardinal principle for the interpretation of contents of documents and statutes are the same. Like statutes which are interpreted in the circumstances in which they were enacted, documents are to be construed in the light of the circumstances on which they are drawn up. When the language used is not only plain but also admits of only one meaning, the rules of construction require giving the words their ordinary natural meaning and adherence to same where such meaning is sensible. 
110. In construing a document, the court is enjoined to apply the literal rule as a canon of interpretation, that is, to give the words employed in the document their ordinary grammatical meaning without any embellishment. See UBN Ltd. v. Ozigi (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 333) 385; UBN Ltd. v. Sax (Nig.) Ltd. (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 361) 150; 
111. The courts have power to read a document holistically so as to reach harmonious construction of its contents. See Ojokolobo v. Aremu (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 377; Unilife Dev. Co. Ltd. v. Adeshigbin (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt. 704) 609; ACB v. Apugo (2001) 5 NWLR (Pt. 707) 483; Mbani v. Bosi (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 991) 400; Bunge v. Gov., Rivers State (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 995) 573; Agbareh v. Mimra(2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) 378; Nigerian Army v. Aminu-Kano (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1188) 429; BFI Group v. BPE (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1332) 209; Julius Berger (Nig.) Plc. v T.R.C.B. Ltd. (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1665) 219; Inntraco Universal Services Ltd. v. U.B.N. Plc (2020) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1728) 48.
112. A document must be read in its true meaning. In this case, the wordings of Articles 11 of exhibit 2 and items e, h, k, o, p of exhibit 3, are the focus for consideration and interpretation. I have calmly perused the relevant provisions to be interpreted as well as having a holistic view of the entire contents of exhibits 2 and 3. The provisions to submitted for interpretation are clear and unambiguous   The words are clear, ordinary and in plain language and they should be given their ordinary and natural meaning. See Ogbonna v. A.-G., Imo State (1992) 1 NWLR (Pt. 220) 647; Ejuetami v. Olaiya (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 746) 572; Ahmadu Bello University v. VTLS Inc. (2021) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1783) 33.
113. It is clear the content of the provisions Articles, (e), (k), (j)  and (q), of the procedure for state council delegate conference, 2025, guidelines exhibit 3  read in conjunction with Article 11 E(xi) of the constitution of the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria, exhibit 2, which laid down conditions for nomination of candidates for state delegate conference of the Cross River State branch/chapter of the defendant, cannot be construed to cloth the defendant with unilateral power to reject, vary or modify the consensus list of candidates reached by the claimants and submitted to it by the state electoral committee charged with the responsibility of conducting the state delegate conference, 2025, to hold otherwise will amount to allowing the defendant desecrate the rules which were set by it for the conduct of the state delegate conference and the constitution which are binding on both the claimants and the defendant. The nomination of candidates for state delegate conference is exclusive prerogative of affiliate unions (the claimants) in this case and not that of the defendant.
114. The defendant cannot as well be allowed to impose persons who did not obtain nomination forms within the time frame stipulated for the collection and return of the said forms or send names of their candidates mandatorily required under the procedure for the state delegate conference.
115. The defendant has in its counter affidavit stated that the National secretariat  of the defendant does not merely supervised states council but directs, controls and regulates the activities of state councils including the conduct of state delegate conferences. The state councils derive their authority entirely from national secretariat in accordance with the constitution of the defendant. This means the defendant will not be allowed to deviate from the set rules governing the conduct of the state delegate as contained in exhibits 2 and 3.
116. The defendant was wrong in stating that the power to nominate candidates for state delegate conference was within the exclusive prerogative of affiliate unions at the national level and not at state council level. As per exhibit 2 and 3, the affiliate unions made nomination submitted to state branch who in turn forward to the national union. There is no power conferred on defendant to nominate or include in the list of delegate conference candidates that did not comply with time frame for collection and return of forms for nomination in line with the guidelines for the conduct of the delegate conference. Those who refused to comply with the guidelines do so at their own peril and would not be allowed to circumvent the guidelines by refusing to abide by the time limited for collection and return of forms to qualify for nomination.
117. I must state compliance with guidelines and constitution are mandatory as the defendants and members of the affiliate unions are bound by the constitution and guidelines made in line with the constitution.
118. On the averment contained in paragraph 12 of the counter affidavit alleging that consensus arrangement cannot lawfully replace an election where any interested affiliate dissent or where any interested major stakeholder union opts out of the consensus arrangement. There is no evidence adduced before the court to establish dissent or opting out of consensus by any of the affiliate’s unions. The said assertion of the defendant is bare without proof. 
119. The defendant also claimed that PENGASSAN, was not part of consensus. Even if they are not part of consensus for them to field candidate, they can only do so in line with exhibits 2 and 3, by fielding candidate that comply with the time lines contained in the guidelines, their refusal to collect forms filed and returned within time frame means they have forfeited their right to nominate and participate in the conduct of the delegate conference.
120. There is also no iota of evidence adduced by the defendant to establish that the consensus list submitted to it by the electoral committee was unilaterally altered by the chairman of the electoral committee and his team. Also, the list which the defendant wanted to use was unsigned. This means it has no any legal potency to prove anything.
121. In view of the foregoing analysis, I answer the twin questions posed for resolutions as follows:-
     1. Question One:- the defendant has no vires or authority to unilaterally reject, vary and or modify the consensus list of candidates reached by the Claimants and submitted to it by(sic) to the State Electoral Committee charged with the responsibility of conducting the State Council Delegate Conference 2025.
     2. Question Two: The Defendant cannot impose persons’ who did not obtained nomination forms within the time stipulated for the collection and return of such forms or send in the names of their candidates and delegates as mandatorily required under the Procedure for State Delegate Conference 2025.
122. In view of the answers to the questions I hereby grants the following reliefs:-
     1. A DECLARATION is hereby granted that by the clear and unambiguous provisions of Articles (e) and (k) and the totality of the provisions of the Procedure for State Council Delegate Conference 2025 and Rule 11 E(xi) of the Constitution of Trade Union Congress of Nigeria. The Defendant has no right power, authority or vires to unilaterally impose candidates for the position of Chairperson and Secretary of the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria, Cross River State Council other than the persons contained in the Consensus list submitted to it.
     2. A DECLARATION is hereby granted that the purported imposition of candidates for the position of Chairperson and other positions of the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria, Cross River State Council is contrary to the procedure for State Council Delegate Conference 2025 and therefore Ultra vires, and ipso facto incompetent, illegal, null and void.
     3. A DECLARATION is hereby granted that the consensus list submitted by the Electoral Committee of Trade Union Congress of Nigeria, Cross River State Council in complete compliance with the procedure for State Council Delegate Conference, 2025 remains the only valid list for election into elective positions in the State Council delegate Conference 2025, remains the only valid list for election into elective positions in the state council delegate conference 2025.
     4. AN ORDER is hereby granted setting aside the unsigned and undated list produced by the Defendant or any other list which is produced contrary to the mandatory provisions of the Procedure for State Council Delegate Conference 2025, and Rule 11 E(xi).
     5. AN ORDER is hereby granted directing the Defendant to forthwith conduct the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria, Cross River State Council State Delegate Conference 2025 based on the Consensus Delegate list submitted to it by the Electoral Committee which is, in compliance with the Procedure for State Council Delegate Conference 2025.
123. I make no order as to cost. Parties to bear their respective costs.
124. Judgment is hereby entered accordingly.

 

 

 

Sanusi Kado,

Judge

REPRESENTATION:

E. L. Akpama, Esq; for the claimants

Chief Anthony Eyo, Esq; for the defendant with Emmanuel Eyong, Esq; and Peace Nseimo, Esq;