IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT PORT HARCOURT

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HONOURABLE JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR, PhD

 

DATED:  21ST DAY OF APRIL, 2026                 SUIT NO: NICN/PHC/121/2021

 

BETWEEN

1.     HON. PRINCE I. CHARITY-WILCOX

2.     HON. ADOLPHUS SETH LAZARUS

3.     HON. PEPPLE ESTHER MATHEW

4.     HON. IBINYE HENRIETTA IGONI-WILCOX----------- CLAIMANTS

 

AND

1.     BONNY LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL

2.     THE EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, BONNY

LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL---------------------DEFENDANTS

 

 

Representation

Dr. Innocent Ekwu for the Claimants.

D. M. Omereji for the 1st and 2nd Defendants.

 

JUDGEMENT

This suit was commenced by a General Form of Complaint filed on the 8th day of October, 2021. The Complaint was accompanied by a Verifying Affidavit, Statement of Facts, List of Witnesses, Witness Statement on Oath, List of Documents, and copies of the documents to be relied upon at trial.

 

Arising from the Complaint and the Statement of Facts, the Claimants claim against the Defendants as follows:

1.     The sum of ?8,365,279.9 as special damages for each of the Claimants, being outstanding entitlements and benefits due to them, particularized as follows:

                                i.            Furniture Allowance — ?2,427,900.00

                             ii.            Motor/Vehicle Loans — ?3,237,200.00

                           iii.            Service Gratuity — ?2,427,900.00

                           iv.            Salary Advance (Basic) — ?67,441.66

                              v.            Accommodation Allowance — ?30,248.75 × 36 months = ?1,889,028.00

                           vi.            Utility Allowance — ?20,232.50 × 36 months = ?728,370.00

                        vii.            Domestic Staff Allowance — ?50,581.25 × 36 months = ?1,820,925.00

                      viii.            Entertainment Allowance — ?20,232.50 × 36 months = ?728,370.00

                           ix.            Newspaper Allowance — ?10,116.25 × 36 months = ?364,185.00

                              x.            Personal Assistant Allowance — ?16,116.25 × 36 months = ?580,185.00

                           xi.            Leave Allowance — ?6,744.16 × 36 months = ?242,789.76

                         xii.            Vehicle Allowance — ?50,566.25 × 36 months = ?1,820,385.00

                      xiii.            Severance Package — ?2,500,000.00

 

Total: ?18,834,679.42 for each of the Claimants.

 

2.     The sum of ?5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) per year for Constituency Projects for the three-year tenure, amounting to ?15,000,000.00 for each of the Claimants.

3.     The sum of ?100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) as general damages for each of the Claimants for the hardship, suffering, humiliation, frustration, embarrassment, shame and mockery allegedly occasioned to them by the Defendants.

4.     The sum of ?10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) for each of the Claimants as severance package.

 

In response to the claims, the Defendants filed a Memorandum of Conditional Appearance on the 12th day of January, 2023, accompanied by a Statement of Defence, List of Witnesses, and Witness Statement on Oath.

 

Upon being served with the Defendants’ processes, the Claimants filed a Reply to the Statement of Defence on the 8th day of May, 2023. The Claimants also filed a Comprehensive List of Documents to be relied upon on the 1st day of November 2023, in addition to an Application for Leave to call an Additional Witness, namely Hon. Solomon Anari Pollyn, filed on the 6th day of May, 2024.

 

Trial commenced before this Court on the 1st day of November, 2023, with the Claimants opening their case.

 

The 1st Claimant, Hon. Prince I. Charity-Wilcox, testified as CW1. He adopted his Witness Statements on Oath made on the 8th day of October, 2021 and the 8th day of May, 2023, which were marked as C1(a) and C1(b) respectively.

 

During the course of his testimony, CW1 tendered sixteen (16) documents, which were admitted in evidence and marked as Exhibits C2 – C17, while Exhibits C9 – C17 were admitted under protest.

 

The documents admitted in evidence are as follows:

·        Exhibit C2 (a & b): Claimants’ Certificates of Return as Councillors

·        Exhibit C3: Claimants’ Letter to the Chairman, Bonny Local Government Council dated 19th March, 2021

·        Exhibit C4: Claimants’ Letter to the Commissioner for Local Government Affairs dated 22nd March, 2021

·        Exhibit C5: Claimants’ Official Complaint to the Chairman, PDP dated 21st April, 2021

·        Exhibit C6: Plea for Justice addressed to the Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice, Rivers State dated 21st April, 2021.

 

·        Exhibit C7: Claimants’ Letter to the Executive Governor of Rivers State dated 26th April, 2021.

·        Exhibit C8: Claimants’ Second Letter to the Executive Governor of Rivers State dated 2nd June, 2021.

·        Exhibit C9: Council Letter of Suspension issued to Hon. Prince I. Charity-Wilcox dated 20th May, 2021.

·        Exhibit C10: Council Letter of Suspension issued to Hon. (Sir) Adolphus Seth Lazarus dated 20th May, 2021.

·        Exhibit C11: Council Letter of Suspension issued to Hon. Pepple Esther Mathew dated 20th May, 2021.

·        Exhibit C12: Council Letter of Suspension issued to Hon. Ibinye Henrietta Igoni-Wilcox dated 20th May, 2021

·        Exhibit C13: Claimants’ Solicitors’ Letter to Bonny Local Government Council dated 25th May, 2021

·        Exhibit C14: Claimants’ Solicitors’ Letter of Demand and Pre-Action Notice to the Executive Chairman, Bonny Local Government Council dated 17th June, 2021

·        Exhibit C15: Claimants’ Solicitors’ Letter of Reminder to the Executive Chairman, Bonny Local Government Council dated 18th July, 2021

·        Exhibit C16: Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law No. 2 of 2007

·        Exhibit C17: Receipt of Payment to Courier Company, DHL.

 

Arising from the Statement of Facts and the 1st Claimant’s Witness Statement on Oath, the case of the Claimants is that they are politicians and indigenes of Bonny Local Government Area of Rivers State, who were duly elected as Councilors of the Bonny Local Government Council for a three-year tenure spanning June 2018 to June 2021.

 

The Claimants state that the 1st Defendant is a constitutionally recognized Local Government Council in Rivers State, while the 2nd Defendant is the Executive Chairman of the Bonny Local Government Council.

The Claimants assert that they were properly sworn in and inaugurated in June 2018 as Councilors and members of the Bonny Legislative Assembly, and that they faithfully discharged their duties throughout their tenure until June 2021. They contend, however, that they were not paid their statutory salaries, allowances and fringe benefits as provided under the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007.

 

According to the Claimants, the 1st Defendant, acting through the 2nd Defendant, discriminated against them by withholding their entitlements while allegedly paying similar benefits to other Councilors. They further aver that they were also denied their severance allowances upon the expiration of their tenure. The Claimants maintain that the failure to pay their entitlements subjected them to hardship, shame and embarrassment.

 

Under cross-examination, CW1 admitted that the alleged withholding of their entitlements was carried out by the 2nd Defendant, whom he identified as the late Hon. David Rogers, and stated that his allegations were directed entirely against the said late Executive Chairman. He further stated that one of the Councilors who allegedly received payment of his entitlements was unwilling to testify before the Court.

 

CW1 confirmed that during the subsistence of their tenure, they received certain payments, and that his salary formed part of his overall entitlements. He maintained, however, that the present claim relates specifically to the benefits provided under the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007.

 

He also stated that he was not aware that payments under the said Law are made by the Rivers State Government through the Office of the Accountant-General. According to him, the allowances being claimed were captured in the Local Government budget, which is presented annually to the Council.

 

CW1 further affirmed that the sums claimed in this suit reflect complaints previously made to the government and that each of the Claimants is entitled to the sum of ?18,000,000. He equally acknowledged that he was suspended before the expiration of his tenure and that he did not challenge the suspension before any court of law.

 

Upon the discharge of CW1, the Claimants presented their second witness, Hon. Solomon Anari Pollyn, who testified as CW2. He adopted his Witness Statement on Oath made on the 6th day of May, 2024, which was marked as C1(c).

 

During the course of his testimony, CW2 tendered three (3) documents, which were admitted in evidence and marked as Exhibits C18 to C20, namely:

 

·        Exhibit C18: Certificate of Return issued to Hon. Solomon Anari Pollyn as a Councilor.

·        Exhibit C19: Access Bank Account Statement showing proof of payment to Hon. Solomon Anari Pollyn for his vehicle grant.

·        Exhibit C20: Access Bank Account Statement showing proof of payment to Hon. Solomon Anari Pollyn for his wardrobe allowance.

 

The case of the Claimants, as disclosed in the Statement of Facts and the 1st Claimant’s Witness Statement on Oath, is that they are politicians and indigenes of Bonny Local Government Area of Rivers State who were duly elected as Councilors of the Bonny Local Government Council for a three-year tenure spanning June 2018 to June 2021.

 

The Claimants state that the 1st Defendant is a constitutionally recognized Local Government Council in Rivers State, while the 2nd Defendant was at the material time the Executive Chairman of the Bonny Local Government Council.

 

According to the Claimants, they were sworn in and inaugurated in June 2018 as Councilors and members of the Bonny Legislative Assembly, and they served throughout their tenure until June 2021. They contend, however, that despite performing their legislative duties, they were not paid their statutory salaries, allowances and fringe benefits as prescribed under the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007.

 

The Claimants further allege that the 1st Defendant, acting through the 2nd Defendant, discriminated against them by withholding their entitlements while allegedly paying similar benefits to other Councilors. They also contend that they were denied their severance allowances upon the expiration of their tenure, and that the failure to pay their entitlements subjected them to hardship, humiliation, and embarrassment.

 

Under cross-examination, CW1 admitted that the alleged withholding of their entitlements was carried out by the 2nd Defendant, whom he identified as the late Hon. David Rogers, and that his allegations were directed against the said Executive Chairman. CW1 further stated that one of the Councilors who allegedly received payment of his entitlements was unwilling to testify before the Court.

 

CW1 also confirmed that during the subsistence of their tenure, they received certain payments, and that his salary formed part of his entitlements. He maintained, however, that the present claim relates specifically to the benefits provided under the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007.

 

He further stated that he was not aware that payments under the said Law are made by the Rivers State Government through the Office of the Accountant-General, but maintained that the allowances being claimed were captured in the Local Government budget presented annually to the Council.

 

CW1 equally testified that the sums claimed in this suit reflect complaints previously made to the government and that each of the Claimants is entitled to the sum of ?18,000,000.00. He further acknowledged that he was suspended before the expiration of his tenure, and that he did not challenge the suspension in any court of law.

 

Upon the discharge of CW1, the Claimants presented Hon. Solomon Anari Pollyn, who testified as CW2. CW2 adopted his Witness Statement on Oath made on the 6th day of May 2024, which was admitted in evidence and marked as C1(c).

 

In the course of his testimony, CW2 tendered three documents, which were admitted in evidence as Exhibits C18 – C20, namely:

  • Exhibit C18: Certificate of Return issued to Hon. Solomon Anari Pollyn as a Councilor.
  • Exhibit C19: Access Bank Account Statement showing proof of payment to Hon. Solomon Anari Pollyn for his vehicle grant.
  • Exhibit C20: Access Bank Account Statement showing proof of payment to Hon. Solomon Anari Pollyn for his wardrobe allowance.

 

CW2 testified that he was a former member of the Bonny Local Government Legislative Assembly who served during the same tenure as the Claimants. According to him, he was sworn in and inaugurated on the same day as the Claimants and completed his tenure on the same date as them.

 

CW2 further testified that members of the Bonny Local Government Legislative Assembly are statutorily entitled to various benefits, including Furniture Allowance, Motor/Vehicle Loan, Service Gratuity, Accommodation Allowance, Utility Allowance, Domestic Staff Allowance, Entertainment Allowance, Newspaper Allowance, Personal Assistant Allowance, Leave Allowance, Vehicle Allowance, and Severance Package.

 

He stated that while other members of the Legislative Assembly received these allowances and benefits, the Claimants were not paid same and were only paid their basic salaries.

 

CW2 further testified that the Claimants were statutorily entitled to these benefits both during the subsistence of their tenure and upon its expiration, pursuant to the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007.

 

He stated that he personally received the sum of ?3,000,000.00 on 16th March 2021 as a Motor/Vehicle Loan, and had earlier received ?2,000,000.00 on 23rd September 2019 as Wardrobe Allowance. According to him, the Claimants did not receive similar payments. He further testified that several members of the Bonny Local Government Legislative Assembly had also been paid their severance benefits as provided under the said Law.

 

During cross-examination, CW2 testified that the Claimants were not paid their entitlements, which he put at ?18,000,000.00 each. He confirmed that he had seen the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007, and stated that the Rivers State Government was not responsible for the payment of the said entitlements.

 

He also confirmed that he personally received payment of his own entitlements, as reflected in his bank statement of account, and that he received a total sum of ?5,200,000.00, though he maintained that further payments were still outstanding. He further stated that the entitlements being claimed by the Claimants were captured in the Council’s budget.

 

Upon the discharge of CW2, the Claimants closed their case.

 

The Defendants, on the 28th day of November 2025, elected to adopt trial by record pursuant to Order 38 Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. Consequently, the Defendants adopted their Statement of Defence and Witness Statement on Oath filed on the 12th day of January 2023.

 

Arising from the Statement of Defence and Witness Statement on Oath, the case of the Defendants is that the 1st Defendant constitutes the executive arm of the Bonny Local Government Area, while the 2nd Defendant is the Head of the Local Government Council, and that the Claimants were Councilors and members of the Bonny Legislative Assembly.

 

The Defendants deny that the Claimants were at any time discriminated against or deliberately victimized. They equally deny withholding the Claimants’ entitlements while paying same to other Councilors.

 

According to the Defendants, the Claimants were paid all their statutory entitlements, including sitting allowances, as and when due, alongside other Councilors, until a leadership crisis arose within the Bonny 8th Legislative Assembly, which culminated in the suspension of the Claimants by the Legislative Assembly.

 

The Defendants maintain that during the period of suspension, the Claimants did not attend House sittings and consequently did not perform legislative functions.

They further deny withholding any entitlements due to the Claimants under the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007. The Defendants also contend that payments under the said Law apply to all twenty-three (23) Local Government Areas in Rivers State and are made by the Rivers State Government.

 

Finally, the Defendants contend that this suit is incompetent and discloses no reasonable cause of action against them.

 

Upon the close of trial, the matter was adjourned for adoption of Final Written Addresses. Arising from the Defendants’ Final Written Address filed on the 3rd day of December 2025, learned counsel for the Defendants, D. M. Omereji, Esq., formulated a lone issue for determination as follows:

 

Whether in view of the facts, evidence elicited under cross examination and circumstances of this case, the Claimants have made out a case according to law as to be entitled to the reliefs sought?

 

In arguing the sole issue, learned counsel submitted that the burden of proof rests on the party who seeks judgment in his favour. Consequently, the burden lies on the Claimants to establish to the satisfaction of the Court each of the claims made in this suit. Counsel contended that it is the Claimants who would fail if no evidence were adduced by either party. Counsel cited Section 131 (1) and (2), 132 and 133 of the Evidence Act 2011, Busari & Anor Vs. Adepoju & ORS (2015) LPELR- 41704 (CA). Counsel submitted that by the reliefs sought, the Claimants have asserted that they are entitled to the various sums itemized in their writ as allowances and benefits allegedly due to them for the duration of their tenure under the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders' Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007, and that the Defendants are responsible for making such payments.

 

Counsel further contended that the Claimants are required to plead sufficient and material facts to ground the reliefs sought and must adduce cogent, credible, and convincing evidence in support thereof. He added that the Claimants must succeed on the strength of their own case and cannot rely on any perceived weakness in the Defendants’ case. Counsel cited Akaninwo & Ors. Vs. Nsirim & 7 Ors (2008) 2 SCNJ 100 at 113.

 

Counsel argued that by the provision of Section 1 of the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders' Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits Law, 2002 (amended in 2007), payments in respect of the claims made by the Claimants against the Defendants in this case are to be paid by the Accountant General of Rivers State when authorized by the Governor, and such funds are paid  out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Hence the law never impose the payment of the said entitlements on the Local Government such as the Defendants in this case. Counsel contended that in view that the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders'Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007 is the basis or foundation for the Claimants' suit and no part of the said law puts the responsibility of paying the entitlements claimed by the Claimants on the Defendants, there is clearly no cause of action established by the Claimants against the Defendants.

 

Counsel further contended that the Claimants failed to demonstrate how they arrived at the sums claimed as their alleged statutory entitlements. He argued that the figures claimed are not reflected in Exhibit C16, and that Councilors are not listed in the schedules contained in the said exhibit. According to counsel, Exhibit C16 specifically identifies Chairman, Vice Chairman, Supervisors, and Special Advisers as the beneficiaries of the statutory entitlements provided under the Law. Consequently, he submitted that, by the contents of Exhibit C16, the Claimants, being Councilors, do not fall within the categories of Public or Political Office Holders entitled to benefit under the said Law.

 

To further emphasize the argument that Councilors are not Public or Political Office Holders within the contemplation of the Law, counsel relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Nwokedi Vs. Anambra State Government & Anor (2022) LPELR-57033 (SC), wherein it was held that Councilors do not fall within the category of officers whose salaries are to be determined and charged upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund of a State by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission.

 

Counsel submitted that the principle established in the above decision is applicable to the present case. He argued that the effect of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement is to render inoperative any provision, if such exists, in the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders' Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007 purporting to include Councilors as beneficiaries under the Law. Consequently, counsel contended that the Claimants lack the legal basis to invoke or enforce the provisions of the said Law in their favour.

 

Counsel further submitted that there is no credible evidence before this Honourable Court to substantiate the Claimants’ assertion that they were entitled to statutory benefits which were denied to them while others were paid. He contended that the allegation of selective payment was not supported by cogent and convincing evidence. In support of this position, counsel relied on Nwavu & Ors vs. Okoye & Ors (2008) LPELR-2116(SC). Counsel also argued that Exhibits C19 and

C20, tendered through CW2, expose material inconsistencies in CW2’s testimony and, by extension, undermine the Claimants’ case. He pointed out that CW2 stated in paragraph 9 of his deposition that on 16th March 2021, he received a non-refundable sum of ?3,000,000.00 from the Defendants as a Motor/Vehicle Loan and tendered Exhibit C19 as evidence of that payment. However, counsel noted that Exhibit C19 reflects a transfer of ?3,000,000.00 from one Allaputa Stella Christopher to CW2 on the said date, and not from the Defendants. He argued that this contradicts CW2’s testimony, as the Defendants and the said individual are clearly not the same.

 

Counsel further submitted that Exhibit C20 shows the only payment made to CW2 by the Defendants to be the sum of ?2,000,000.00, transferred from Bonny Local Government to CW2. Although the exhibit does not state the purpose of the payment, CW2 claimed it was for Wardrobe Allowance. Counsel contended that Exhibit C20 does not establish payment of any of the statutory entitlements claimed in this suit. He added that even if, without conceding, the sum was paid as Wardrobe Allowance, such allowance is not among the reliefs sought by the Claimants in this action.

 

Counsel therefore submitted that the Claimants cannot depart from the specific reliefs sought in order to rely on payments unrelated to their claims. In support of this argument, he cited Counsel cited Abdul V. Shekwolo & Ors (2022) LPELR-56682(CA).

 

In conclusion counsel stated that the claimants failed to prove their case and urged the court to dismiss this suit.

 

Responding to the foregoing, the Claimant filed their final written address on the 14th day of January, 2026 and arising therefrom, counsel to the Claimant, Dr. Innocent U. Ekwu Esq. formulated three issues for determination wit:

 

1.     1.?Whether by the evidence before this Court the claimants have proved their case and have shown that the defendants owed them their salaries, statutory allowances and other fringe benefits following the claimant's successful completion of their tenure asElected Counselors in Bonny Local Government Council.

2.     ?Whether by the acts and omissions of the defendants, the claimants have suffered hardship, sufferings, pains, frustrations and embarrassments to warrant the grant of general damages by this court in favour of the claimants.

3.     3.?Whether the claimants are entitled to judgment where their evidence is not denied and not controverted by defendants who did not call any witness?

 

In arguing issue one, counsel stated that where an employment has a statuary flavor, the employer and employee are bound to recognize and conform with the dictates of that statute. He cited Ujam v. Institute of Management and Technology & 3 ors. (2007) 2 NWLR (P. 1019) p.470@476 ratio 3.

 

Counsel submitted that the Claimants are public servants, elected Councilors of Bonny Local Government Council, whose employment is provided in a statute and they have completed their 3 years tenure in that capacity as Legislatures. He added that the relevant statute governing their employment is the Rivers State Local Government Administration Law in force and their Remunerations, Salaries, Statutory Allowances and fringe benefits are provided by the Rivers State Political Office Holders and Appointees regulations Law. Counsel referred the court part 4 of the schedule of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) which provides a list of all the public officers and that No. 13 of the list referred to Chairman, members and staff of Local Government Councils, and that the claimants are members of the Bonny Local Government Legislative Council and hence qualifies as a public officer under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999(as amended).

 

Counsel added that the claimants’ Salaries and other monetary benefits as members of the Bonny Local Government Legislative Council are clearly spelt out by the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders' Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law 2007.Counsel referred the court to part 4 where the claimant’s basic salary and allowances and fringe benefits for Local Government Executive office Holders and Councilors were clearly provided for by the said Law.

 

Counsel further submitted that the Defendants failed to pay the Claimants their salaries, allowances, entitlements, and fringe benefits throughout the period they served as Councilors under the Defendants, and that the said sums remain outstanding to date. He therefore argued that the non-payment constitutes a continuing injury. Counsel also contended that the Defendants did not effectively challenge or controvert the evidence and exhibits tendered by the Claimants in support of their case.

 

In arguing issue two counsel posited that the claimants have suffered hardship, pains, frustrations and embarrassments to justify the grant of both the special and general damages. Counsel state that the fundamental purpose of damages is to place the plaintiff in a good position, so far damages has been suffered by the claimant due to the long period of his suffering. Counsel cited Edwin Uzor & 6 ors Vs.Peter Abara & Anor. (2006) 2 FWLR (Pt.314) p.2793 @2796 ratio 1.

 

Counsel submitted that the special damages claimed represent the specific allowances and entitlements expressly provided by law and allegedly due to the Claimants by virtue of their positions as Councilors, amounting to the total sum of ?18,834,679.42 (Eighteen Million Eight Hundred and Thirty-Four Thousand Six Hundred and Seventy-Nine Naira Forty-Two Kobo) for each Claimant. He further stated that general damages are those which the law presumes to flow naturally from a breach or violation of a legal right.

 

Counsel cited Acme Bullders Ltd v. Kaduna Water Board (1999) 2 NWLR (pt 59D) and Consolidated Breweries Pic V. Supr. Apostle Olusegun Adeolu (2006) 2 FWLR (pt.316) p.3105 @3111 ratio 6. Counsel submitted that the Claimants, who were in office from October 2008 to May 2011, have not been paid the allowances and entitlements due to them since October 2008, despite repeated demands for payment which were allegedly ignored by the Defendants. He further stated that the Defendants failed to pay six months’ salaries covering the period from December 2010 to May 2011. Counsel contended that as a result of the non-payment, the Claimants and their families have endured significant hardship, bothphysically and psychologically, thereby justifying an award of general damages.

 

In arguing the third issue, counsel stated that where the claimants adduce evidence which establishes their claim against the defendant, which was unchallenged or unrebutted by the defendant, the claimants will be entitled to judgement. Counsel cited Federal University of Technology, Yola & Anor V. Samuel A. Daramola (2006) 1 FWLR (pt.302) 1027@1030 ratio 1. Counsel added that the defendants never called any witness in prove of their case. He cited among other authorities Iwunze v. F.R.N. (2013) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1334) 119, Okoye v. Iriso (2023) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1914) 581 etc.

 

In conclusion counsel stated that the claimants are entitled to judgment of the court as they have proved their case successfully, counsel urged the court to grant all the reliefs of the claimants.

 

In response to the submission of the claimant’s counsel, counsel for the defendant on the 26th day of January filed a reply on points of law, he contended that address or argument of Counsel cannot take the place of evidence.  He cited Anyawele V. Odusami (2011) LPELR 8143(SC). 

 

Counsel contended that learned counsel for the Claimants, in his final address, sought to introduce evidence relating to the hardship allegedly suffered by the Claimants, despite the fact that such facts were not pleaded at any stage of the proceedings. He argued that parties are bound by their pleadings and cannot raise new facts in their address. Counsel further submitted that the Claimants bore the responsibility of pleading material facts and adducing credible evidence in support of their claims for both special and general damages, which they failed to do. He therefore urged the Court to discountenance the said submissions made by Claimants’ counsel in that regard.

 

Counsel submitted that learned counsel for the Claimants had made an issue of the Defendants’ decision not to call any witness, contending that such failure amounts to an admission of the Claimants’ claims and that the Claimants’ evidence stands unchallenged and uncontroverted.Counsel argued that this submission is misconceived and not supported by the record of proceedings. He stated that upon the close of the Claimants’ case, the Defendants duly notified the Court of their decision to dispense with calling a witness and elected to rely on their pleadings in accordance with Order 33 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2017, which permits parties to adopt trial on record and dispense with oral testimony. He therefore maintained that it is erroneous to suggest that the Defendants abandoned their pleadings.

 

Counsel further submitted that, having regard to the nature of the claims before the Court, the mere failure of a defendant to call a witness does not automatically entitle the Claimants to judgment. Counsel relied on Akinbisehin V.Olajide (2018) LPELR-511 72 (CA),Counsel argued that the Claimants’ case before this Honourable Court is fundamentally flawed, riddled with contradictions, and was materially discredited under cross-examination, as well as by inconsistencies in their own evidence before the Court.

 

Counsel submitted that the Claimants failed to discharge the burden of proof before this Honourable Court. He contended that although the Claimants relied on certain statutes in instituting the action, they failed to cite any specific provisions conferring enforceable rights or benefits capable of grounding their claims.

In the light of the foregoing, I have carefully evaluated and considered all the processes filed by the parties in this suit. I have reviewed the testimonies of the witnesses called by the Claimants, observed their demeanour, and painstakingly examined all the exhibits tendered and admitted in evidence.

I have also taken into account the reliefs sought by the Claimants vis-à-vis the submissions of learned counsel to both parties in their respective Final Written Addresses. Arising from the totality of the issues raised and argued by learned counsel, the issue for determination in this suit is as follows:

 

Whether, having regard to the evidence before this Court, the Claimants have proved their case and are entitled to the reliefs sought.

 

Before proceeding to determine the issue formulated above, it is necessary to address a preliminary matter relating to the admissibility of certain documents tendered during trial.

 

During the course of the evidence of CW1, learned counsel for the Claimants tendered several documents which were admitted and marked Exhibits C2 – C17. Learned counsel for the Defendants objected to the admissibility of Exhibits C9 – C17, which were nevertheless admitted under protest, and both counsel were directed to address the Court on their admissibility in their respective Final Written Addresses.

 

However, a careful perusal of the record shows that neither counsel made any submissions regarding the admissibility of the said documents in their final addresses. In law, where an objection is raised but not pursued or canvassed in final address, the objection is deemed abandoned.

 

In the circumstance, the objection earlier raised to the admissibility of Exhibits C9 – C17 is hereby deemed abandoned, and the said documents remain properly admitted in evidence.

 

Before proceeding further to determine the substantive issue in this suit, it is also necessary to address the contention of the Claimants that their evidence stands unchallenged and unrebutted, on the ground that the Defendants did not call any witness.

 

Without be labouring the point, it must be stated that the Rules of this Court are clear and unequivocal. From the proceedings of 28th November 2025, the Defendants expressly elected to adopt trial on record. The Rules of this Court expressly permit such procedure in the prosecution or defence of a suit, and it is recognized as a proper mode of trial.

 

Order 38 Rule 33(1) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 provides that:

 

“In any proceeding before the Court, parties may by consent at the close of pleadings agree to a trial on record where they rely only on the documents and exhibits frontloaded and thereby dispense with the need for oral testimony and/or cross-examination.”

 

In the instant case, the Defendants adopted their frontloaded processes and elected to rely on the documentary evidence before the Court. That procedure is expressly permitted by the Rules of this Court and is legally sufficient.

 

In the circumstance, it is misconceived for the Claimants to argue that their evidence stands unchallenged or unrebutted merely because no witness was called by the Defendants. The adoption of trial on record does not amount to an admission of the Claimants’ case, nor does it relieve the Claimants of the burden of proof imposed by law.

 

Accordingly, the Claimants’ argument in this regard is hereby discountenanced.

 

I now turn to the determination of the sole issue formulated above, which is whether, having regard to the evidence before this Court, the Claimants have proven their case and are entitled to the reliefs sought.

 

In addressing this issue, it is necessary to restate the settled principle of law that a party who asserts a claim bears the burden of establishing same by credible and admissible evidence. In other words, the Claimants bear the legal burden of proving the claims placed before this Court.

In Ayeni v. Adesina (2007) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1033) 233 at 264 paras. A–B (CA), the Court held as follows:

 

“It is trite law that he who asserts or claims a relief must prove it by credible and admissible evidence, and judgment granting such claims must be based on legal evidence of the highest probative value.”

See also A.G., Oyo State v. Fairlakes Hotels Ltd. (No. 2) (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 121) 255.

 

The gravamen of the Claimants’ case is that their offices enjoy statutory flavour under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007. The Claimants contend that having duly served their three-year tenure as Councilors, they are entitled to the salaries, allowances, and severance benefits provided under the said Law. They further allege that the Defendants discriminated against them by withholding their entitlements while allegedly paying similar benefits to other Councilors. According to the Claimants, the failure to pay their entitlements constitutes a continuing injury.

 

The Defendants, on their part, deny liability and contend that the Claimants were paid all lawful entitlements due to them during the subsistence of their tenure. The Defendants further assert that the Claimants were suspended during a leadership crisis within the Legislative Assembly and did not perform legislative duties during the period of suspension. The Defendants also contend that payments under the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007 are made by the Accountant-General of Rivers State upon the authorization of the Governor, and not by the Local Government Council. It is their further contention that Councilors are not beneficiaries under the relevant schedules of the said Law, and that the Claimants failed to strictly prove the special damages claimed.

 

In considering the reliefs sought by the Claimants, it is necessary to reiterate the settled principle of law that he who asserts must prove. A party who seeks to succeed in obtaining judgment in his favour must adduce credible and admissible evidence in support of his claims.

 

In Engr. Mustapha Yunusa Maihaja v. Alhaji Ibrahim Gaidam & Ors (2017) LPELR-42474 (SC), the Supreme Court held as follows:

 

“Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 provides that whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts shall prove that those facts exist. Put streetwise, he who asserts must prove his assertion. It therefore logically follows that what is alleged without proof can be denied without proof. When a fact is asserted without proof then the existence of the alleged fact is not established. That is why Section 132 of the Evidence Act provides further that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.”

 

See also Section 131 and 132 of the Evidence Act, 2011.

 

Based on the foregoing, this Court shall now proceed to consider each of the reliefs sought by the Claimants with a view to determining whether they have been established on the strength of credible and admissible evidence.

 

Relief One seeks “The sum of ?18,834,679.42 as special damages for each of the Claimants, being outstanding salaries, allowances and benefits particularised as follows:

a.      Furniture Allowance — ?2,427,900.00

b.     Motor/Vehicle Loan — ?3,237,200.00

c.      Service Gratuity — ?2,427,900.00

d.     Salary Advance (Basic) — ?67,441.66

e.      Accommodation Allowance — ?30,248.75 × 36 months = ?1,889,028.00

f.        Utility Allowance — ?20,232.50 × 36 months = ?728,370.00

g.      Domestic Staff Allowance — ?50,581.25 × 36 months = ?1,820,925.00

h.     Entertainment Allowance — ?20,232.50 × 36 months = ?728,370.00

i.        Newspaper Allowance — ?10,116.25 × 36 months = ?364,185.00

j.        Personal Assistant Allowance — ?16,116.25 × 36 months = ?580,185.00

k.     Leave Allowance — ?6,744.16 × 36 months = ?242,789.76

l.        Vehicle Allowance — ?50,566.25 × 36 months = ?1,820,385.00

m.   Severance Package — ?2,500,000.00

 

Total: ?18,834,679.42 for each of the Claimants.

 

It is settled law that special damages must not only be specifically pleaded but must also be strictly proved. The Court will therefore examine whether the Claimants have placed before the Court credible evidence establishing their entitlement to each of the sums claimed under this relief.

 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is necessary to state that the Claimants contend that their claim is founded on statutory entitlement, by virtue of the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits Law, 2007 (as amended). Being a claim founded on statutory entitlement, it raises a question of law, which must be determined by reference to the relevant statutory provisions.

 

In an attempt to establish their entitlement under the said Law, the Claimants tendered Exhibit C16, which is a highlighted extract of the provisions amended in the principal legislation, namely the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits Law, 2002.

The factual issue which therefore calls for determination is whether the Defendants are legally responsible for the payment of the specific sums claimed by each of the Claimants.

 

In establishing their status as former political office holders, the Claimants tendered Exhibit C2 (a & b), being copies of the Certificates of Return issued to the 1st and 2nd Claimants as Councilors representing Ward 09 and Ward 10 of Bonny Local Government Area. The Claimants also tendered Exhibits C9 – C12, being the letters of suspension issued to each of them on 20th May 2021, suspending them as members of the Bonny Local Government Legislative Assembly.

With respect to the said exhibits, there is no dispute as to the fact that the Claimants once served as Councilors of Bonny Local Government Council. Indeed, the Defendants have admitted this fact in their pleadings.

 

The foundation of the Claimants’ case, however, rests squarely on the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007. The Defendants contend that the Claimants are not entitled to the benefits claimed under the said Law.

 

In support of this contention, the Defendants placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Nwokedi v. Anambra State Government & Anor (2022) LPELR-57033 (SC), wherein the apex Court held that Councilors do not fall within the category of officers whose salaries are to be determined and charged upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund of a State by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC).

 

The Defendants therefore argued that, by virtue of the said decision, Councilors are excluded from the class of public office holders contemplated under the constitutional provisions relating to remuneration determined by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission, and cannot therefore claim entitlement under the Rivers State Law in the manner asserted by the Claimants.

 

The Claimants, on their part, contend that they are duly elected Councilors of the Bonny Local Government Council, whose offices are statutory in nature pursuant to the Rivers State Local Government Administration Law. They argue that their remunerations, salaries, statutory allowances and fringe benefits are governed by the Rivers State Political Office Holders and Appointees Regulations Law, as well as the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007.

 

The Claimants further relied on Part I of the Third Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), particularly paragraph 13, which recognizes “Chairman, members and staff of Local Government Councils” as public officers. It is their contention that as members of the Bonny Local Government Legislative Council, they qualify as public officers under the Constitution and are therefore entitled to the salaries and monetary benefits stipulated under the Rivers State Law.

 

It must be reiterated that there is no dispute that the Claimants were duly elected Councilors of the Bonny Local Government Council. Their offices are creations of statute under the Rivers State Local Government Administration Law. The real issue for determination is whether they fall within the category of persons entitled to remuneration as provided under the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007.

 

The reliance placed by learned counsel for the Defendants on Nwokedi v. Anambra State Government & Anor (supra) is, with respect, misconceived. In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the narrow question of whether Councilors fall within the category of public officers whose remuneration is to be determined by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission and charged upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund of a State pursuant to constitutional provisions.

The apex Court held that Councilors do not fall within that specific constitutional category.

 

However, the decision in Nwokedi v. Anambra State Government & Anor (supra) did not hold that Councilors are not public officers at all, nor did it preclude a State House of Assembly from legislating on the remuneration, salaries, and allowances of Local Government political office holders within its legislative competence.

It is beyond dispute that Local Government Councils are creatures of the Constitution, and their structure and administration are subject to State legislation. The Constitution recognizes the existence of Local Government Councils and their functionaries. Indeed, paragraph 13 of Part II of the Third Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) refers to the Chairman, members, and staff of Local Government Councils in relation to public officers for certain constitutional purposes.

 

The key distinction is this: the fact that the salaries of Councilors are not to be determined by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) or charged upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund of a State does not ipso facto mean that Councilors are disentitled to remuneration fixed by a valid State law.

 

The Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007 is a subsisting law enacted by the Rivers State House of Assembly. There is no evidence before this Court that the said Law has been repealed or declared unconstitutional. The decision in Nwokedi v. Anambra State Government & Anor (supra) does not invalidate State legislation fixing remuneration for Councilors; it merely clarifies that such remuneration does not fall within the constitutional purview of the RMAFC, nor is it chargeable upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State as of right.

 

Consequently, the Claimants, being elected Councilors of the Bonny Local Government Council, are statutory political office holders under the laws of Rivers State, and their remuneration, salaries, allowances, and fringe benefits are governed by the relevant Rivers State legislation. To that extent, the contention of the Defendants that the Claimants are not entitled to any statutory remuneration under State law is hereby discountenanced.

 

In the light of the foregoing, the question that naturally arises is whether the Claimants, as former political office holders, have established their entitlement under the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007 to the sums claimed, and whether the Defendants are liable for the payment of such sums.

 

This question becomes particularly necessary in view of the contention of the Defendants that they are not the authority responsible for the payment of the benefits claimed, and further that the Claimants failed to justify how they arrived at the figures claimed as statutory entitlements.

 

More specifically, learned counsel for the Defendants contended that by virtue of Section 1 of the principal law, the Rivers State Government is the body responsible for the payment of the benefits in question, and that the said payments apply across the twenty-three (23) Local Government Areas of Rivers State.

 

Although the Defendants did not present evidence in support of their defence and did not state the exact sums, if any, payable to the Claimants by the State Government, it must nevertheless be emphasized that the weakness of a defence does not relieve a claimant of the burden of proof. A claimant must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence.

 

Consequently, this Court shall carefully examine the evidence presented by the Claimants in support of their claims.

 

In this regard, I find that apart from the fact that the Claimants failed to refer this Court to any specific provision of the Law upon which their claim against the Defendants is predicated, the document tendered as Exhibit C16 is merely a skeletal extract highlighting sections amended in the principal legislation.

 

In other words, the Claimants did not place before this Court the relevant substantive provisions of the Law under which they claim entitlement to the sums claimed. This omission makes it difficult for the Court to ascertain with certainty whether the Defendants bear legal responsibility for the payment of the benefits claimed.

Furthermore, a closer examination of Exhibit C16 reveals that it contains several disjointed documents outlining various sums payable to different categories of political office holders, including Councilors.

 

Two of such documents are titled:

·        “Interpretation of Circular No. 2 of 2007 and the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders Salary/Allowances and Fringe Benefits Law of 2007 for the Legislative Arm of Local Government,” and

·        “Interpretation of Circular No. 2 of 2007 and the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders Salary/Allowances and Fringe Benefits Law of 2007 for the Executive Arm of Local Government.”

 

These documents appear to be administrative interpretations or explanatory circulars, rather than the substantive statutory provisions of the Law itself.

Both documents contain, on their reverse side, references to Vehicle Loan, Furniture Allowance and Severance Gratuity. There is also an attached page headed “Schedule – Part IV (A) Annual Basic Salary for Executive”, and another headed “Part IV Continued – (B) Allowances and Fringe Benefits for Executive Officers (LGC).”

 

Having painstakingly evaluated Exhibit C16 Juxtaposed with the other exhibits before the Court, I must state that the Claimants, upon whom the burden of proof rests, have failed to adduce sufficient evidence in support of their claims. The said Exhibit C16 is not linked in any discernible manner to the specific sums claimed by each of the Claimants so as to arrive at the total sum of ?18,834,679.42 claimed for each of them.

 

In exercising abundant caution, this Court examined the column dealing with Vehicle Loan, Furniture Allowance and Severance Allowance contained in the attached documents forming part of Exhibit C16. The entries relating to Councilors read as follows:

 

·        Vehicle Loan: Councilors – ?3,040,304.00 ÷ 3 = ?1,013,434.66 × 15 = ?15,201,519.90

·        Furniture Allowance: Councilors – ?2,280,228.00 ÷ 3 = ?760,076.00 × 15 = ?11,401,140.00

·        Severance Allowance: Councilors – ?2,280,228.00 ÷ 3 = ?760,076.00 × 15 = ?11,401,140.00

·         

Upon a careful consideration of the foregoing, I find that the evidence still does not support the case of the Claimants. This is underscored by the fact that none of the sums claimed by each of the Claimants corresponds with the figures stated in respect of Vehicle Loan, Furniture Allowance, or Severance Allowance. This inconsistency introduces further uncertainty into the claims presented by the Claimants.

 

In addition, CW1 testified that during the subsistence of their tenure, the Claimants received certain payments and that his salary formed part of his overall entitlements. He further stated that the present claim relates specifically to benefits provided under the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007.

 

Similarly, CW2 testified that members of the Bonny Local Government Legislative Assembly are statutorily entitled to several benefits during their tenure, including Furniture Allowance, Motor/Vehicle Loan, Service Gratuity, Accommodation Allowance, Utility Allowance, Domestic Staff Allowance, Entertainment Allowance, Newspaper Allowance, Personal Assistant Allowance, Leave Allowance, Vehicle Allowance, and Severance Package. According to him, the Claimants were paid only their basic salaries and did not receive these other entitlements.

 

Notwithstanding this testimony, the record before the Court does not contain any credible evidence indicating what sums the Claimants were actually paid as salary and allowances, nor does it show what they ought to have received under the applicable law.

Furthermore, the evidence led by the Claimants does not in any way establish how the figures claimed under the various heads of Accommodation Allowance, Utility Allowance, Domestic Staff Allowance, Entertainment Allowance, Newspaper Allowance, Personal Assistant Allowance, Leave Allowance, and Vehicle Allowance were derived from the provisions of the Rivers State Public and Political Office Holders’ Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits (Amendment) Law, 2007.

 

In the absence of any credible evidence linking the sums claimed to the relevant statutory provisions, and given the inconsistencies identified in the figures relied upon by the Claimants, this Court finds that the Claimants have failed to strictly prove the special damages claimed under this relief.

 

I must state at this juncture that notwithstanding the fact that the Claimants’ claim is predicated on a statutory entitlement, the sum sought to be ordered for payment is a specific monetary claim, which in law constitutes special damages. Such claims must not only be specifically pleaded but must also be strictly proved by credible evidence.

 

The Court of Appeal, in Mr. Lawrence Agugu v. Ramatu Buhari & Anor (2016) LPELR-41617 (CA), held thus:

 

“Special damages are such which the law will not presume to flow from the nature of the act complained of or breach of duty of the other party, as a matter of course. Special damages are exceptional in nature and connote specific items of loss which a plaintiff alleges are the result or consequence of the defendant’s act or breach of duty.”

 

Similarly, in OGFS Ltd v. Ogunleye (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 437) 48 at 64, special damages were defined as:

 

“Such damages as the law will not infer from the nature of the act complained of. They are exceptional in character and therefore must be claimed specifically and proved strictly; all the losses claimed on every item must have crystallized in terms and value before trial.”

 

The necessity of specifying the items constituting special damages before same can be proved was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Nwanji v. Coastal Services (Nig.) Ltd (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt. 885) 552, where the Court held that:

 

“Special damages consist of all items of loss which must be specified by the plaintiff before they may be proved and recovery granted.”

Per Uwaifo, JSC.

 

In the instant case, I am not unmindful of the fact that the total sum payable to each Claimant was stated in the Statement of Facts as ?18,834,679.42. However, the critical question before this Court is how each of the Claimants arrived at the specific figures claimed.

 

It is important to emphasize that the itemized particulars pleaded must clearly linked to the evidence adduced at trial. The Court of Appeal in CELESTINE UGWU & ORS v. NIGERIA BREWERIES PLC (2020) LPELR-50858(CA) posited that:

 

"The law is trite that special damages must be specifically pleaded, particularized by the claimant making a specific and distinct plea with respect to his claim for special damages. This is because, special damages is different from general and exemplary damages. Thus, whereas general damages is usually at large, special damages is pinpointed and targeted at a specific loss sustained by the plaintiff/claimant as a result of the action or inaction of the defendant. The Supreme Court in the case of NEKA B. B. B. MANUFACTURING CO. LTD. V. AFRICAN CONTINENTAL BANK LTD. (2004) LPELR-1982 (SC), per Iguh, JSC at pages 38-39 held as follows: "It must be stressed that the law is firmly established that special damages must be pleaded with distinct particularity and strictly proved and a Court is not entitled to make an award of special damages based on conjecture or some fluid and speculative estimate of alleged loss sustained by a plaintiff”. Per UMAR, JCA.

See also Neka B.B.B. Manufacturing Co. Ltd v. African Continental Bank Ltd (2004) LPELR-1982 (SC).

 

Applying the foregoing principles to the present case, it is evident that the Claimants failed to present credible particulars showing how the figures claimed were derived. The sums claimed were not sufficiently linked to the statutory provisions relied upon, nor were they supported by documentary evidence establishing the specific entitlement of each Claimant.

 

In addition, the Claimants failed to present the substantive provisions of the law under which their alleged statutory entitlements arise. The document tendered as Exhibit C16 merely contains skeletal extracts and administrative interpretations, and does not sufficiently establish the legal basis of the sums claimed.

 

Furthermore, the Claimants failed to establish that the Defendants are the statutory authority responsible for the payment of the sums claimed.

 

In the circumstance, this Court finds that the Claimants have failed to discharge the burden of proof placed upon them, whether on the basis of preponderance of evidence or on the balance of probabilities.

 

Accordingly, upon a careful examination of the facts and the evidence presented before this Court, the Claimants have failed to establish their claim in respect of Relief One.

 

Since Reliefs Three and Four are consequential upon Relief One, the failure of Relief One inevitably renders those reliefs unsustainable, and they accordingly fail.

Relief Two seeks: “The sum of Five Million Naira (?5,000,000.00) per year for constituency projects multiplied by the three-year tenure, amounting to Fifteen Million Naira (?15,000,000.00) for each of the Claimants.

 

The claim for ?15,000,000.00 per Claimant for constituency projects is not supported by any statutory provision placed before this Court mandating the direct payment of such sums to Councilors personally.

 

Constituency project allocations, where they exist, are ordinarily budgetary provisions meant for developmental projects within constituencies and not personal monetary entitlements payable directly to elected officials.

 

The Claimants failed to produce any statutory or documentary evidence establishing that such sums are payable to them personally.

 

This relief therefore lacks evidential and legal foundation and accordingly fails.

In the final analysis, the Claimants have failed to present cogent, credible and convincing evidence in support of their claims.

 

Consequently, I have no hesitation in resolving the sole issue for determination in favour of the Defendants.

 

This suit is lacking in merit and is hereby dismissed in its entirety.

 

Judgment is accordingly entered.

 

I make no order as to cost.

 

 

………………………………………………………….

HON. JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR, PhD

JUDGE