IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT PORT-HARCOURT

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE F. I. KOLA–OLALERE (FCIArb) (UK)

 

Date: April 23, 2026                                                            Suit No: NICN/ PHC/31/2023

 

Between:

 

Service Medical International Ltd                  -------------------------                Claimant

                                               

And

 

Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff      -----------------------------       Defendant

Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN)                                                                    

 

Representations

K.E. Asuquo and Victor Kuforiji for the Claimant.

Abdullahi M. Aliyu (SAN) with Oru Oru Ebam for the Defendant.

 

COURT’S JUDGMENT

1.0.          On March 29, 2023; the Claimant sued the Defendant by way of Originating Summons, seeking for the determination of the following questions:

                                      i.          Whether having regard to the clear and unambiguous provision of the Claimant’s Memorandum and Articles of Association dated 28th March 1996, the employees of the Claimant are eligible for membership of the Defendant?

 

                                    ii.          Whether having regard to the clear and unambiguous provision of the Claimant’s Memorandum and Articles of Association dated 28th March 1996, the Defendant can unionize employees of the Claimant?

 

                                 iii.          Whether having regard to the clear and unambiguous provision of the Claimant’s Memorandum and Articles of Association dated 28th March 1996, the Claimant, being a duly registered company for provision of medical services is bound to recognize the Defendant as a union, make deductions from the salary of employees and remit same to the Defendant?

 

2.0.          If the answers to the Questions are in the negative, the Claimant seeks the following reliefs: 

                                  i.              A Declaration that all the employees of the Claimant, irrespective of their level are ineligible for membership of the Defendant.

 

                               ii.               A Declaration that the Defendant cannot unionize the employees of the Claimant irrespective of their level. 

 

                            iii.               A Declaration that the Claimant is not bound under any law, contract or enactment to recognize the Defendant as a trade union.

 

                             iv.               An Order of Perpetual Injunction restraining the Defendant from demanding or further making demand for monthly deductions of any percentage whatsoever from the salary of employees of the Claimant. 

 

                           v.                   An Order of Perpetual Injunction restraining the Defendant, its agents, servants, officers and/or privies, howsoever described from harassing, intimidating and pestering the Claimant or its employees.

 

                        vi.                   An Order of Perpetual Injunction restraining the Defendant, its agents, servants, officers and/or privies, howsoever described from disrupting, tempering with, picketing or shutting down the business operations of the Claimant or business relations maintained between the Claimant and other business entities whatsoever.

 

                      vii.                   The sum of N5,000,000.00 as cost of this action.

 

3.0.          Other initiating processes were filed along with the Originating Summons in line with the Rules of this Court. In response, the Defendant entered appearance through his Counsel and filed its Counter-Affidavit together with it’s address in compliance with the Rules of this Court.

 

4.0.         THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT AS PLEADED

It is the Claimant’s case that by virtue of its Memorandum and Articles of Association, it is a company that offers medical services to different sectors of the economy, which includes the Oil and Gas Sector. The Claimant stated that a letter dated December 22, 2022 was sent to it by the Defendant, which states that the employees of the Claimant have been organized into the Defendant and directed the Claimant to recognize the Defendant in its organization and to also commence “check off” deductions from the affected employees. The Claimant was also invited to a meeting with members of the Defendant and that at the meeting, the Defendant insisted that check-off dues must be deducted from their members’ January, February and March salaries and remitted to the defendant within seven days from that time.

 

4.1.          The Claimant continued that some members of the Defendant threatened that they would lock up the business premises of the Claimant if it fails to comply. The Claimant’s contention is that, by the nature of its business; it provides medical services to various sectors of the economy and so, its employees cannot be unionized by the Defendant who unionizes employees from Oil and Gas Sector. The Claimant maintained that its business does not fall within the trade union of the Defendant and urged the Court to so hold for the claimant.

 

5.0.         THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANT AS PLEADED

It is the Defendant’s pleadings that the Claimant is operating in the Oil and Gas Sector as the first nine objects in its Memorandum of Association deal with Oil and Gas; therefore, the defendant has right to unionize the Claimant’s employees. The Defendant continued that the employees of the Claimant have Constitutional rights to join any union of their choice.  According to the Defendant, the trade or industry where the Workers/Employees are engaged determines their choice of membership of the trade union they want to join.

 

6.0.          CLAIMANT’S WRITTEN ARGUMENTS

In the Claimant’s written address in support of the Originating Summons at page 48 of the records, Its Counsel raised the following issues for Court’s determination:

                                           i.         Whether having regard to the clear and unambiguous provision of the Claimant’s Memorandum and Articles of Association dated 28th March 1996, the employees of the Claimant are eligible for membership of the Defendant?

                                        ii.          Whether having regard to the clear and unambiguous provision of the Claimant’s Memorandum and Articles of Association dated 28th March 1996, the Defendant can unionize employees of the Claimant?

 

                                      iii.          Whether having regard to the clear and unambiguous provision of the Claimant’s Memorandum and Articles of Association dated 28th March 1996, the Claimant, being a duly registered company for provision of medical services is bound to recognize the Defendant as a union, make deductions from the salary of employees and remit same to the Defendant?

 

7.0.          Arguing the first issue, Counsel submitted that the National Industrial Court has power to hear and determine this suit by virtue of section 245 C of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 and that the suit by its very nature bothers on the fundamental right of employees to freely associate and belong to Trade Unions as guaranteed in section 40 of the Constitution. He further submitted that this suit was properly commenced by way of Originating Summons; referring to Order 3 Rules 2(a) & 3 of the Rules of this Court, 2017. He also cited the case of Hon. Michael Dapianlong & Ors v. Chief (Dr) Joshua Chibi Dariye & Anor [2007] 4 S. C.  (Pt. III) 18.

 

7.1.               It is the Counsel’s submission that the right to freely associate and belong to any trade union is guaranteed both in the Constitution and in the statute; citing section 40 of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (As Amended)  and Section 12(4) of the Trade Union Act (As Amended). He continued that the right to freely associate and belong to any trade union just like most other rights in the Constitution is a qualified right and not absolute, citing section 45 of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (As Amended).

 

7.2.               Counsel outlined the various restrictions to the Freedom of Association under section 45 of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (As Amended), laying special emphasis on  restriction 7  which states that ‘Membership of a Trade Union is only limited to Unions that are in the trade and industry of the employee’. He also referred to Exhibit One, which is the Memorandum of Association of the Claimant and outlined the business objects of the Claimant. He prays for an Order of Perpetual Injunction against the defendant. To the claimant’s counsel, from the business objectives of the claimant; the Claimant is solely established for the provision of medical services, medical research, operation of pharmacies, manufacture and supply of medicines/drugs; while the Defendant on the other hand, is set up to manage industrial relations in the petrochemical, natural gas and petroleum industry.

 

7.3.               Counsel cited the case of PERESSA v. SSACGOC [2009] 14 NLLR (Pt. 39) 306 at 340 B-D (NIC) where the Court was asked to determine the question as to whether Precision Electrical and Related Equipment Senior Staff Association (PERESSA) can unionize workers in the telecommunication and communications industry. The Court held that PERESSA falls within the Steel and Engineering Workers Union and not the provision of telecommunications services. He urged the Court to resolve this issue in the claimant’s favour.

 

8.0.               On Issue 2:

On whether having regard to the Claimant’s Memorandum and Articles of Association, the Defendant can unionize the employees of the Claimant; counsel submitted that the Defendant cannot unionize the employees of the Claimant who are ineligible for membership of the Defendant, since the business objects of the Claimant are primarily medical and health services, medical research and manufacture of drugs/medicine. Counsel argued that this is very clear and unambiguous as provided in Exhibit 1. He submitted that it is trite law that where words and phrases as contained in a law, enactment or document are clear and unambiguous; the Court will give literal interpretation to it in order to bring its intention into effect. He cited in support, the cases of Ikpeazu v. Ogah & Ors. [2016] LPELR-40845(CA); Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Chief Joshua C. Dariye [2011] LPELR-4151 and National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers v. Nigeria Union Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) [2008] 13 NLLR 365 and urged the Court to so hold.

 

9.0.             Issue 3:

On whether having regard to the Memorandum and Articles of Association dated 28th March 1996; the Claimant, being a duly registered company for provision of medical services is bound to recognize the Defendant as a union, make deductions from the salaries of its employees and remit same to the Defendant; counsel contended that having already established that the employees of the Claimant are ineligible for membership of the Defendant and the fact that the Defendant cannot unionize the employees of the Claimant, it therefore follows that the Claimant cannot recognize the Defendant as a union and make deductions from the salaries of its employees to the defendant, relying on the case of Executive Chairman & Mgt of Benue SUBEB v. NASU [2021] LPELR-55724(CA). Counsel urged the Court to resolve all these issues in favour of the Claimant.

10.0.   DEFENDANT’S WRITTEN ARGUMENTS

In the Defendant’s written address at page 339 of the Records, its counsel adopted the same issues as raised by the Claimant and submitted that the Memorandum and Articles of Association (inclusive of the objects of Business) of a company are requirements for the incorporation or registration of a company under the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) and that it does not in any way have any bearing with a Trade Union or its membership. Thus, it cannot by any stretch of imagination be a determinant for the membership of a Trade Union.

 

10.1.         Counsel submitted further that Section 45 of the Trade Unions Act, Cap. T.114 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Trade Unions’ Act’) prohibits the application of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) to a Trade Union. In defining a Trade Union, he referred the Court to section 1(1) of the Trade Unions’ Act and cited the cases of Olaifa v. Adeniji & Ors. [2017] LPELR 42708 (CA) at page 10, paragraphs D – F; Oloruntoba-Oju & Ors. v. Dopamu & Ors. [2002] LPELR-12325 (CA) at page 28 paragraphs B – C.

 

10.2.              In addition, counsel argued that a Trade Union being a combination of workers/employees or Employers is open to all workers (irrespective of their

profession or discipline) who are normally engaged in a particular trade or

Industry. He referred to paragraph 8 to the schedule of the Trade Union Act, and continued that there is a great difference between a Trade Union and a professional Body and that the key consideration is not the profession or discipline of the prospective members of a Trade Union, but the trade and industry that they are engaged in.

 

10.3.         Counsel added that on the issue of check-off deductions from the Claimant’s employees’ salaries, he contented that a Lawyer, Doctor, Nurse or Engineer who is employed in the Oil and Gas Industry is eligible to be a member of a Trade Union that represents that Trade or Industry, while still maintaining membership in his Individual professional Association. This is because a Trade Union is a combination of workers/Employees in a particular Trade or industry. He contended that the employees of the Claimant are not being forced to join the Defendant, therefore the issue of protection of their rights does not apply here.

 

10.4.         Counsel submitted that the Defendant’s Trade Union registered under the

Trade Unions’ Act is the appropriate Trade Union to unionize the Claimant’s

Workers; being the Trade Union that covers the sphere of the Trade or Industry where the Claimant’s workers are engaged. He continued that the

payment of check-off dues or union dues is an integral part of Trade unionism in Nigeria and that the consent of the employer to the payment of the dues to the relevant Union is irrelevant once the workers are eligible to be members of the Trade Union concerned, citing the case of Udoh v. O.H.M.B. [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 142) 52 pages 72 - 73, paragraphs H - A; Section 17 of the Trade Unions Act and Section 5 (3) of the Labour Act.

 

11.0.         Claimant’s Reply on Points of Law

In the Claimant’s reply on points of law to the Defendant’s counter Affidavit and written address at page 385 of the records, its counsel pointed out that counsel to the Defendant argued in paragraphs 4.02 to 4.04 of his Written Address on section 45 of the Trade Unions Act, Cap T114, LFN, 2004 (Trade Unions Act) that the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Claimant as well as the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2020 (CAMA) are inapplicable in Trade Union Disputes; he submitted that this argument is an attempt to mislead this Court.

 

11.1.       Counsel contended that the provision of Section 45 of the Trade Unions Act only relates to issue of registration of trade unions or federation of trade unions in Nigeria. To counsel, the effect of the section is that, trade unions are not required to be registered as legal entities under the provision of CAMA. He continued that where questions arises as to the business objectives of a company, the only point of reference is the company’s Memorandum and Articles of Association; referring to Inter-Continental Chemists Ltd. v. Ifeakandu [1966] LPELR-25293(SC), where the Supreme Court held per Bairamian, JSC (P. 6, paras, A-D) that: “after a company is incorporated, the memorandum becomes the charter of its activities and at the same time defines its field of operation.”

 

11.2.         Counsel submitted that Section 45 of the Trade Unions Act does not preclude this Court from relying on the Memorandum of Association of the Claimant for the purposes of determining its sphere of operations, trade and industry. He cited the case of National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers v. National Union of Air Transport Employees, [2008]13 NLLR 365 where the National Union of Air Transport Employees (NUATE) sought to unionize employees of Newrest ASL Nigeria Plc, a company primarily engaged in providing in-flight catering services, airline ticketing, and travel agency operations. In that case, counsel for NUATE advanced arguments similar to those canvassed by PENGASSAN in the present case, asserting that NUATE was established to represent all aviation workers which according to them, includes all holders of licenses issued by the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) as well as individuals involved in Aviation-related services. In rejecting that argument, the Court held that a key principle in the restructuring of trade unions is the requirement for compatibility based on product, skills, services, and conditions of employment. Accordingly, unionization must be industry-based and determined by the sector in which the employees are trained.

 

11.3.         Counsel continued that in the present case, the Claimant’s employees are trained in the medical field, not in the Oil and Gas Sector. It is therefore, evident that the Defendant is not the appropriate union to represent the Claimant’s employees. He urged the Court to reject the submissions of the Defendant’s counsel that the mere possession of a license from the NUPRC places the Claimant within the Oil and Gas industry and find that the Claimant operates within the medical services industry. He referred to the case of NUPENG v Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria (MWUN) [2015] 61 NLR (Pt. 214) 403.

 

11.4.         Counsel also referred to the case of National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers v. Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) [2008] 13 NLLR 365; another case that is on all fours as the present case, in which NUPENG sought to unionize the employees of Sodexho Ltd, a company that engages in providing catering services within the Oil and Gas Industry. The Court rejected NUPENG’s argument, similar to that being canvassed by the Defendants in the present suit—that the mere fact that services were rendered in the Oil and Gas sector conferred jurisdiction to NUPENG. The Court held that the primary object and nature of Sodexho Ltd.’s business fell within the hospitality sector. Consequently, it ruled that the appropriate union for its employees was the National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers.

 

11.5.         On the issue raised by the Defendant that the employees of the Claimant are free to join whatever union they want, counsel submitted that the right to join a trade union is also subject to the internal rules of and policies of the organization concerned, citing the case of AUPCTRE v. SSASCGOC & Anor. [2023] LPELR-60813(CA) where James Gambo Abundaga JCA held in pages 33-36 paras F-C that the right of employees/workers to join  associations and trade unions of their choosing without previous authorization is absolute only where the organization concerned has no Rules. But where they have Rules, employees/workers must operate subject to those Rules. He urged the Court to discountenance the submissions of the Defendant on this point.

 

12.0.        ON THE ISSUE OF LOCUS STANDI OF THE CLAIMANT TO INSTITUTE THIS ACTION RAISED SUO MOTU BY THE COURT:

 

13.0.        Written Arguments of Defendant’s Counsel on Claimant’s Locus Standi

Counsel to the defendant submitted that Claimant lacks locus standi to institute this suit against the Defendant because there is no dispute whatsoever between the Claimant and the Defendant in this case. To counsel, instituting an action against a person where there is no dispute is not justiciable in law, citing the case of Barbus & Co. Nig. Ltd v. Okafor-Udeji [2018] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1630) 278 at 311. He argued that a party must show a “sufficient interest” and a “civil right or obligation” that has been or is about to be breached; relying on Senator Abraham Adesanya v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria [1981] 5 SC 112. He continued that in determining whether a Claimant has locus standi, reference should be made to the originating process, citing  Emechebe v. Ceto Int'l (Nig) Ltd. [2018] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1631) 520 at 538 A-G. He maintained that the Claimant's originating summons does not reveal its title to sue the Defendant as there is no dispute between the parties and urged the court to look into its records in resolving this issue, citing the case of. Agbare v. Mimra [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) 378.

 

13.1.         Counsel contended further that the right to join a Trade Union is a personal and fundamental right of the worker under Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).  He went on that the court has held in plethora of cases that an Employer is a “stranger” to the relationship between workers and their union, citing the case of Panya Anigboro v. Sea Trucks Nigeria Ltd. [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 399) 35 where the Court emphasized that the choice of a trade union is the prerogative of the employee. He continued his argument that to be clothed with locus, the Claimant must show how the Defendant’s activities cause it a legal injury and that if there is a dispute regarding whether the Defendant can unionize Medical Service Staff in the Oil and Gas Sector; to him, that is a jurisdictional scope dispute, which ought to be between unions (inter-union) or between the Union and the Registrar of Trade Unions and not between the parties in this case. He urged the Court to dismiss the Claimant’s claims.

 

14.0.        Written Arguments of Claimant’s counsel on Claimant’s Locus Standi

Counsel submitted that the term "locus standi" or "standing" denotes legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court of law or tribunal or the right of a party to appear and be heard on the question before a court or tribunal, citing the case of Adesanya v. Shagari [1981] 5 S.C. 112: [1981] 2 NCLR 358 and GOMBE v. P.W. (Nig.) Ltd. & Ors. [1995] LPELR-1330(SC). He contended that what the claimant needs to show in order to establish its locus standi in a case is its sufficient interest in the matter in controversy; citing the case of Jitte & Anor v. Okpulor [2015] LPELR-25983 (SC). To counsel, the question in the instant case is whether the Claimant, a medical services company, can lawfully be compelled to recognize and register with the Defendant; a trade union registered for workers in the petroleum and natural gas sector.

 

14.1.         Counsel continued that based on that question he raised, particularly question 3 in its originating summons; this instant action has nothing to do with the right of the Claimant’s employees to belong to or join a trade union of their choice. To him, this suit is concerned solely with the legality or otherwise of the Defendant’s right to organize the Claimant’s employees and to compel the Claimant to recognise it, make deductions and remit union dues to the defendant. He maintained that based on this, the Claimant has locus standi to institute this action, citing the case of NESTOIL v. NUPENG [2018] LPELR-50094 (CA).

 

14.2.         Counsel submitted that section 17 of the Trade Union Act Cap T14 LFN, 2004 provides for the registration and recognition of a trade union by an employer before deductions can be mandated on the salaries of the employees. He continued that by the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, the responsibility for trade union registration, recognition, deductions and remittance is placed on the employer (where applicable). He contended that the general requirement of the law where there exists a service relationship between employer and employee is that the former is under a duty to take reasonable care for the actions and safety of the latter in all circumstances of the case, so as not to cause harm to others or to expose him (employee) to unnecessary risk; citing the case of Bello v. Dadah & Anor [2016] LPELR-40337(CA). To Counsel, the position of the Claimant, which gives it the legal right to institute this action is based on the following:

 

                                           i.         Firstly, that the operations of the Claimant do not fall within the sphere of operation or jurisdiction of the Defendant. He referred to the Claimant’s Memorandum and Articles of Association of March 28, 1996; it’s Exhibit 1.

                                        ii.          By the Claimant’s letter of March 15, 2023 its Exhibit 4; the Claimant stated that while it recognizes the constitutional right of its employees to belong to any trade union of their choice, the trade and business of the Claimant do not fall within the industry for which the Defendant is registered.

                                      iii.          The Defendant’s threat to “take action” against the Claimant by locking up the Claimant’s business premises if it fails to recognise the Defendant and deduct and remit union dues on behalf of its employees is a direct attack on the legal right of the Claimant, which entitles it to judicial remedy.

 

14.3.         Counsel then argued that all these facts are stated in its Originating Summons and Affidavit in Support, upon which the Court will determine the claimant’s cause of action and locus standi. He continued that the Claimant has disclosed its cause of action and that the rights and obligations or interest of the Claimant have been violated by the continuous threats of the defendant on its business. As such, it has locus standi to sue by virtue of Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as Amended) as the Claimant too has right to fair hearing. He urged the Court to so hold in its favour.

 

15.0.        COURT’S DECISION

I have gone through the facts of this case as presented by the parties. I have also read the written arguments of counsel to the parties including their cited authorities, both case and statute laws. After counsel’s addresses were adopted and the matter was adjourned for judgment, the court again invited counsel to parties to Court before the date slated for the judgment and directed them to further address it on the locus standi of the claimant to file this action against the defendant in this case, and both counsel complied with this further direction of the Court. From all of these facts and addresses of counsel, I am of the considered view that the following issues need to be resolved between the parties by this Court:

 

                                                   i.      Does the claimant have locus standi to initiate this action against the defendant?

 

                                                 ii.      Can the defendant unionize the employees of the claimant? Is the claimant bound to recognize the defendant, make deductions from the salaries of its relevant employees and remit same to the Defendant?

 

iii.   Is the Claimant entitled to the sum of N5,000,000.00 as cost of filing this suit?

 

16.0.   RESSOLUTION OF ISSUES

 

17.0.     ISSUES ONE: Does the claimant have locus standi to initiate this action

     against the defendant?

Locus standi connotes the legal capacity, legal standing or lawful authority of the claimant in this instance to institute this action against the defendant in this court. It is a threshold issue that affects jurisdiction of this Court to look into the claimant’s case. Therefore, where the Claimant lacks the Legal capacity to institute the action, the Court will in turn lack the capacity to adjudicate on the suit. See the case of Citec Intl. Estates Ltd& Ors. v. Francis & Ors [2021] LPELR-5308(S.C). Furthermore, in the case of OKWU & Anor. v. Umeh & Ors. [2015] LPELR -26042 (SC) the Court held that the correct position of the law is that where a plaintiff (claimant in this case) is held to lack locus standi to maintain his action, the finding goes to the jurisdiction of the Court; thus, denies the Court of jurisdiction to determine the action.

 

17.1.         It is the claimant’s contention on this issue that it has locus standi to institute this action because, firstly, by the provisions of section 17 of the Trade Unions Act, 2004; the defendant was required to take permission from it before unionizing its employees, which the defendant failed to do. It also contended that the Claimant is directly and unequivocally affected by the acts of the Defendant in unionizing its employees without its permission and recognition, the demand of the defendant from the claimant to make deductions from its employees’ salaries and remitting same to the defendant, failure of which the defendant threatened to disrupt its business etc.; which to its counsel, led to this suit and that these facts gave rise to its civil rights and obligations. It again contended that it is the duty of the claimant to ensure that its employees are unionized by the right trade union under its duty of care towards its employees. On the other hand, the defendant contended that Claimant lacks locus standi to institute this suit against it because there is no dispute at all between the parties in this case. Therefore, this action with no dispute is not justiciable in law.

 

17.2.         What exactly is the claimant’s cause of action in the instant case or what is the claimant’s grouse against the defendant? From the Originating summons, affidavit in support and written address of counsel, the claimant’s protest or its main complaint is that the defendant did not take prior permission from the company before unionizing its employees in line with the provision of section 17 of the Trade Unions Act, 2004. The second reason is that its employees cannot belong to the defendant; a union for those in the Oil and Gas sector, since the business of the claimant is giving of medical services. To the claimant therefore, it is not bound to deduct check-off dues from its employees who wrongly joined the defendant and remit same to the defendant.

17.3.         Section 17 of the Trade Unions Act Cap T14 LFN, 2004 states:

Upon the registration and recognition of any of the trade unions specified in the Third Schedule to this Act, the employer shall-

a)    Make deductions from the wages of every worker who is a member of any of the trade unions for the purpose of paying contributions to the trade union so registered; and

b)    Remit such deductions to the registered office of the trade union within a reasonable period or such period as may be described from time to time by the Registrar.

 

17.4.     The claimant erroneously interpreted section 17 of the Trade Unions Act by stating that the “registration and recognition” of a trade union in its Establishment was to be done by the claimant (the employer); but this is very wrong. The actual interpretation of this provision in my considered view is that “the registration and recognition of any of the trade unions” in this section is to be done by Registrar Trade Union, see sections 2 and 54 of the TUA. That is, the Union in question must be registered in compliance with the provisions of the Trade Unions Act; thereafter, that trade Union should be specified or listed in the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions’ Act. Once all these are done properly, the employer shall (is bound to) recognise the trade union, make deductions from salaries of its members in the employer’s Establishment and remit same to it. The employer does not have to give prior approval to the union before it unionizes the employees of the employer. Once a registered union unionizes or seeks to unionize eligible workers, the employer is obliged to recognize it and must not pose obstacles.    

 

17.5.         This position of the Trade Unions Act is supported by the provisions of ILO Convention No. 87 (1948) on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Trade Unions. By this Convention, employees have Right to form and join any union of their choice and their Employers must not obstruct the unionization, interfere in the union affairs, or manipulate union processes. This convention was ratified in 1960 and with or without the ratification; section 254C (1)(f)(h) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (As Amended) allow this Court to apply the Convention to Labour and Trade Union related issues being resolved before it. See also the provision of section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (As Amended), which again allows Freedom of Association. Employers must remain neutral and passive in trade union matters. This is because, issues on union recognition and check-off dues can only be initiated by either rival unions or by employees, and not by employers. Any attempt by employers to control or pre-empt union activities is regarded in law as unlawful interference.

 

17.6.         In a recent case of Raw Materials Research and Development Council v Nigeria Service Union (unreported) Suit No: NICN/ABJ/152/2025; Ruling of which was delivered on February 19, 2026 by the Hon. President of this Court, his Lordship, Hon .Justice B. Kanyip Phd (OFR). The Court held on similar issue that “it is not opened to the Claimant (an employer) to ask, as it did in this case whether the Defendants are in breach of sections 25 and 17 of the Trade Union Act. --- the choice must be that of the Trade Unions or Members.” The Court continued that the Claimant is not competently before it as a Claimant and referred to the case of Nestoil Plc. v. NUPENG [2012] 29 NLLR (Pt. 82) 90 NIC where it was held that an employer is a busybody and has no locus to ask whether a union is the appropriate union to unionize its staff, the locus being with either the staff themselves or some rival unions that lay claim to jurisdictional mandate. 

 

17.7.         Flowing from all these findings from the provisions of the TUA, ILO Convention No. 87 and the case laws; it is my holding that the claimant in the instant case has no civil right that was violated when the defendant unionized some of its employees. And so, it has no legal right that confers any standing on it to initiate the suit. I further hold that recognition of eligible trade unions in its company is automatic and not discretionary as, the employer (claimant) cannot insist on prior approval before unionization. I again hold that the employees of the claimant have exclusive right to join any trade union of their choice under section 40 of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (As Amended), which they had rightly exercised in the instant case. In addition, I hold that the claimant is only entitled to be informed of the Unionization and not to be consulted or asked for permission before they are unionized. It should be noted that union activities do not require employer’s approval unless the activities were conducted during working hours. Consequently, I hold that the claimant in this instance lacks locus standi to institute this action.

 

18.0.        ISSUE TWO: Can the defendant unionize the employees of the claimant? Is

the Claimant bound to recognize the defendant, make deductions from the salary of its employees and remit same to the Defendant?

 

18.1.        Can The Defendant Unionize The Employees of the Claimant?

I have held above that once a union is registered and recognized under the Trade Unions’ Act and its name is so listed in the 3rd Schedule of the Act (the TUA), it is allowed to unionize employees of its eligible company. I have also held in this judgment that it is not within the authority of the claimant in this instant case to challenge the right of the defendant to unionize its employees; as that power lies with either a rival trade union or the employees themselves. Since the claimant is neither the rival trade union nor its own employees who is asking the Court to resolve whether or not the defendant can unionize the employees of the claimant in this case, I hold that until a proper party raises that issue, the defendant has prima facie right to unionize the employees of the claimant in the instant case. See the provision of section 17 of the TUA and the ILO Convention 87 (1948).    

 

18.2.   Is the Claimant bound to recognize the defendant, make deductions from the salaries of its relevant employees and remit same to the Defendant?

It is the defendant’s case before the Court that it had already unionized some employees of the claimant, formed a branch of the Union in the Claimant, chosen some of its branch leaders, intimated the claimant with these information and requested the claimant to make necessary deductions and remittances to the Union as a result of which the claimant instituted this action inter alia; contended that it is not bound to make deductions for or make remittances to the defendant as requested. I have also held in this judgment that once the law is complied with in the registration and recognition of a trade union and the union’s name is listed in the 3rd schedule of TUA as the defendant has done in this case, the employer (claimant) is bound to make the necessary deductions and remittances to the union. See section 17 of the TUA, 2004. There is no evidence before the Court that the defendant was not properly registered under the TUA. Because the word ‘shall’ is used in section 17 of TUA, I hold that the claimant is absolutely bound to recognize the defendant, make deductions from the salaries of its employees (who are members of the defendant) and remit same to the Defendant as so requested.

19.0.         ISSUE THREE: Is the Claimant entitled to the sum of N5,000,000.00 as cost

                                of filing this suit?

 

Relief seven of the claimant is for the sum of N5,000,000.00 as cost of filing this suit. I have held in this judgment that the claimant has no locus standi to file this suit. In actual fact, if the issue of the claimant’s locus standi had been raised and trashed inimine, the matter would have been struck out. However, because it was raised suo motu after parties have copiously argued and traversed their cases, the court is required to make pronouncements on all the issues contended in this matter. Since the claimant has no locus standi to institute this action, it is not entitled to any of its reliefs including this one for cost of N5,000,000.00 for filing this suit before the Court and I so hold. 

 

20.0.       On the whole, I hold and declare as follows:  

                                           i.              I hold and declare that the claimant has no locus standi to initiate this action against the defendant.

 

                                        ii.               I hold and declare that the defendant can prima facie unionize the employees of the claimant until the contrary is proved by a rival Union or the employees of the claimant.

 

                                      iii.               I hold and declare that the claimant is bound to recognize the defendant, make deductions from the salaries of its employees who are members of the defendant and remit the deductions to the Defendant.

      

                                      iv.               I hold that the Claimant is not entitled to the sum of N5,000,000.00 as cost of filing this suit.

 

21.0.   Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

 

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Hon. Justice F. I. Kola-Olalere

Presiding Judge