UBAYO JUJI UMAR -VS- FEDERAL UNIVERSITY GASHUA & ORS- National Industrial Court of Nigeria

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE BAUCHI JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT BAUCHI

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE MUSTAPHA TIJJANI

MARCH 26, 2026 SUIT NO: NICN/BAU/06/2023

BETWEEN:

UBAYO JUJI - - - - - - - CLAIMANT

AND

1. FEDERAL UNIVERSITY GASHUA

2. THE GOVERNING COUNCIL DEFENDANTS

FEDERAL UNIVERSITY GASHUA

REPRESENTATION:

1. Dahiru Abdulhameed Esq. for the Claimant.

2. Dr. Aliyu Abdullahi Esq. for the Defendants.

JUDGMENT

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On January 30, 2023, the Claimant filed a Complaint, followed by an Amended Statement of Facts on January 30, 2024, thereby initiating this legal action to seek the following reliefs against the Defendants:

a) A DECLARATION that the defendants’ letter with reference no: FUGA/REG/PERS/SSP 1003 dated 20/12/2022 purportedly dismissing the claimant from service of the 1st defendant is unlawful, irregular, malicious and a flagrant violation of his right to employment, fair hearing and or due process.

b) A DECLARATION that the defendants’ letter with reference no: FUGA/REG/PERS/SSP 1003 purportedly dismissing the claimant from service on grounds of consideration of the report of their Appointments/Promotions and Disciplinary Committee alleging to have found the claimant guilty of concealment and suppression of records or on ground of his pending cases with the Federal Polytechnics Bauchi is unfounded, unlawful, null and void and of no any legal effect whatsoever.

c) AN ORDER of this honourable court setting aside the purported dismissal of the claimant from service by the defendants same being unlawful, irregular, malicious and a flagrant violation of the claimant’s right to employment, fair hearing and the due process.

d) AN ORDER of this honourable court directing the defendants to reinstate the claimant to his employment with the 1st defendant and to be paid all his lost benefits, allowances and other emoluments in consequence of the unlawful dismissal from service by the defendants.

e) AN ORDER awarding the sum of N5,000,000.00 general damages against the defendants.

f) Cost of filing and prosecuting this suit.

In response to the Complaint, the Defendants entered appearance on March 27, 2023 and filed a Joint Amended Statement of Defence on April 23, 2023. The Claimant thereafter responded and filed a reply to the Defendants’ Joint Statement of Defence on May 10, 2024.

2.0 BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Claimant contends that he was promised continued employment by the Defendants following the conclusion of his sabbatical with them in 2019. He states that the 1^stDefendant subsequently appointed him to lead various roles and participate in multiple committees. In acknowledgment of his commitment, he received a commendation letter from the Vice-Chancellor of the 1st Defendant. Prior to joining the 1^st Defendant, the Claimant had sought and obtained approval to withdraw from his previous employer, The Federal Polytechnic Bauchi. However, when the 1^st Defendant was informed by The Federal Polytechnic Bauchi that the Claimant's withdrawal approval had been rescinded, they requested an explanation from him regarding his withdrawal and allegations of forgery concerning his promotion and transfer letters. The Claimant responded by explaining that after receiving his release letters, his former employer wanted him to return, which he declined, resulting in a lawsuit to clarify his withdrawal status. He further clarified that he had been on secondment to Bauchi State University with his former employer's consent, later took a leave of absence, and eventually returned to his former employer's service, providing a three-month notice of withdrawal. Despite his explanations, the Claimant was suddenly dismissed by the Defendants for allegedly concealing and suppressing records. He argues that his dismissal breached his conditions of service, as he was not queried, warned, interdicted, or suspended beforehand. Aggrieved by his dismissal, the Claimant initiated this legal action.

In response to the Claimant’s case, the Defendants collectively denied the Claimant’s assertions, asserting that the dismissal was lawful. They further claimed that after the Claimant completed his sabbatical appointment with them, he applied for a permanent position, leading to a provisional offer. Subsequently, the Claimant’s appointment was elevated to the rank of deputy registrar. The Defendants discovered inconsistencies in the Claimant’s service record and his inability to transfer this record from previous employers, prompting the 1st Defendant to seek information from those employers. They further alleged that subsequent events revealed the Claimant had misled them by falsifying and concealing his record to gain an advantage. The Defendants contended that the Claimant would not have received a commendation letter had he not suppressed his records and that he consistently violated their conditions of service. Their request for the Claimant’s records from his previous employer and other institutions where he had been on secondment uncovered falsification of documents and suppression of facts. The Claimant had previously served the Defendant as Deputy Registrar on a sabbatical appointment from Bauchi State University (BSU) in 2018. During this period, he misrepresented himself as a BSU employee and claimed promotion to Deputy Registrar by BSU. He later presented himself as a staff member of Federal Polytechnic Bauchi, submitted a letter of withdrawal of service, and assumed employment with the 1st Defendant. In 2016, the Claimant stated that he was promoted to the rank of Deputy Registrar while on secondment with BSU. Contrary to Service Rules, his secondment lasted six years instead of the maximum four years, and he should not have been promoted by the institution where he was seconded. The Claimant's records also show he was promoted twice by BSU. The Defendants further claimed that a letter responding to their request for information revealed the Claimant had a pending disciplinary case of forgery with the Federal Polytechnic. The Claimant had been absent from the Federal Polytechnic since 2020. Although his secondment with BSU was terminated, he refused to return to the Federal Polytechnic. When queried about these issues, the Claimant chose to respond through his lawyers, stating he had sued his former employer. The Defendants asserted that a committee was formed to investigate the allegations against the Claimant, and he appeared before it. Upon concluding the investigation into the misconduct allegations, the committee recommended the Claimant's dismissal to the 1st Defendant’s Vice-Chancellor. At the 2nd Defendant’s regular meeting, the committee's report and recommendation for dismissal were approved. Consequently, the Claimant was dismissed in accordance with Chapter 2 (d) and Chapter 7 (C) (iv) & (xiv) of the 1st Defendant’s Regulations Governing the Conditions of Service of Senior Staff.

The Claimant in reply denied the Defendants’ averments and averred that contrary to the allegations of the Defendants, he had successfully completed his sabbatical with the 1^st Defendant and successfully withdrawn his services from his former employer before taking up appointment with the 1^st Defendant. The Claimant further averred that he was dismissed on basis of falsification of records but on the basis of unverified information reaching the Defendants from his former employer. The Claimant further averred that he was seconded by the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi to BSU on 6/3/2012 and upon expiration he sought and obtained leave of absence on 17/8/2018. That he was therefore not on secondment but on leave of absence at BSU. The Claimant further averred that he was promoted by BSU to the rank of Deputy Registrar in 2016 with effect from 2014. The Claimant further averred that it was during his leave of absence at BSU that he was released back to the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi. That even though the word de-secondment was used, it was merely a misnomer instead of the word release letter. The Claimant further averred that the allegation of absconding from the services of the Federal Polytechnic was only raised for the first time by the Defendants as even the Federal Polytechnic did not make such assertion.

Upon close of pleadings, the matter proceeded to trial and both parties presented their cases and led evidence. The Claimant testified for himself and tendered thirty-two (32) documents which were admitted and marked as Exhibits C1-C32 respectively. The Defendants’ learned counsel objected to the admissibility of all the documents and reserved his submissions for the Final Written Address.

Exhibit C1: Letter of Sabbatical Appointment as Deputy Registrar with 1^st Defendant dated May 23^rd 2018

Exhibit C2: Letter of Approval for the Sabbatical from Bauchi State University dated May 10 2028

Exhibit C3: Letter of Appointment as Principal Assistant Registrar dated October 18^th 2019

Exhibit C4: Notification for proper placement by the 1^st Defendant dated June 30 2021

Exhibit C5: Letter if Appointment as Assistant Registrar by the 1^st Defendant dated June 30 2021

Exhibit C6: Letter of Commendation dated January 27^TH 2021

Exhibit C7: Request for Explanation by the 1^st Defendant dated November 24 2022

Exhibit C8: Letter of Dismissal by the 1^st Defendant dated December 20 2022

Exhibit C9: Application for withdrawal of service from Federal Polytechnic Bauchi dated July 27 2019.

Exhibit C10: Provisional Approval from Federal Polytechnic Bauchi dated July 27 2019

Exhibit C11: Claimant’s letter choosing 3 months’ notice option dated July 16^th 2019

Exhibit C12: Releasing Letter dated November 27 2019

Exhibit C13: CTC of the Originating Summons filed by the Claimant

Exhibit C14: CTC of Criminal Summons

Exhibit C15: Request for explanation dated November 28 2022

Exhibit C16: Claimant’s Solicitor’s letter dated November 28 2022

Exhibit C17: Letter from G. Hassan & Co. dated December 16 2022

Exhibit C18: Notification for Promotion dated August 8 2016

Exhibit C19: CTC of the Claimant’s Payslip for 3 Months, April, May and June 2018

Exhibit C20: Internal Memo dated February 10 2017

Exhibit C21: Approval for Secondment dated March 3 2012

Exhibit C22: Approval for 2 year Leave of Absence dated July 26 2019

Exhibit C23: IPPS Bio data dated July 26 2019

Exhibit C24: Conditions of Service for the 1^st Defendant’s Staff

Exhibit C25: CTC of the Judgment of the Court dated September 29 2023

Exhibit C26: Offer of temporary appointment from the 1^st Defendant dated May 1 2019

Exhibit C27: Claimant’s application to the 1^st Defendant dated May 1^st 2019

Exhibit C28: Letter of Promotion from Federal Polytechnic Bauchi dated August 19 2024

Exhibit C29: Letter of invitation for promotion interview dated May 12 2014

Exhibit C30: Letter of promotion to the rank of Principal Assistant Registrar by the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi dated September 2014.

Exhibit C31: Response of Bauchi State University dated September 16 2014

Exhibit C32: List of the staff due for promotion at the Bauchi State University.

The Defendants presented two witnesses and submitted fourteen documents through DW1, which were accepted and marked as Exhibits D1 to D14. The Claimant’s counsel objected to the documents' admissibility and reserved his arguments for the Final Written Address.

Exhibit D1: Defendant’s Condition of Service 2017

Exhibit D2: Claimant’s undated appointment for Sabbatical appointment to the Defendant.

Exhibit D3: Offer of appointment as Principal Assistant Registrar dated October 18 2019

Exhibit D4: Notification for proper Placement by the 1^st Defendant dated June 30 2021

Exhibit D5: Request for Proper Placement to the rank of Deputy Registrar dated March 16 2021

Exhibit D6: Request for Information on Mr Ubayo Juji to Federal University Gashua dated October 12 2022

Exhibit D7: Reply to Request for information on Mr Ubayo Juji from Bauchi State University dated October 27 2022

Exhibit D8: Request for information in respect of Mr Ubayo Juju dated October 12 2022 to Federal Polytechnic Bauchi

Exhibit D9: Reply to Request for information on Mr Ubayo Juji from Federal Polytechnic Bauchi dated October 21 2022

Exhibit D10: Defendant’s Query to the Claimant dated November 24 2022

Exhibit D11: Letter of dismissal dated December 20 2021

Exhibit D12: Minutes of Inaugural meeting of investigation Committee against the Claimant held on December 1 2022 and their subsequent findings

Exhibit D13: Request of the Investigative Committee over the Claimant dated December 15 2022

Exhibit D14: Minutes of the 24^th Regular Meeting of the Defendant’s Governing Council (2^nd Defendant) held on December 20 2012.

3.0 DEFENDANTS’ FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS

The Defendants by a final written Address filed July 1 2025 formulated two issues for determination:

i. Whether from facts and evidence before this Honourable Court, the Defendants were right in dismissing the Claimant from service on the grounds of concealment and suppression of records of service?

ii. Whether before dismissing the Claimant from service of the 1st Defendant, the Defendants did not afford the Claimant fair hearing and follow the due process?

On issue One (1), learned counsel contended that the Claimant was rightly dismissed pursuant to the grounds contained in Exhibit C3 (the Claimant’s appointment letter) as well as Exhibit C24 (the Defendant’s condition of Service). Learned counsel added that these two exhibits bind the parties and equally define their relationship particularly as regards termination of appointment. Learned counsel relied on UMERA V. N.R.C. (2022) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1838) 349 and further cited Paragraph vi of the Claimant’s appointment letter, Chapter 2 (d) subparagraph (i) and (c) and Chapter 7, 7 (c) (iv) and (xiv) of the Defendants’ Condition of Service. Learned counsel argued that the Claimant’s appointment is pursuant to the conditions as stipulated in Exhibits (C3) and (C24).

Learned counsel added that the 1^st Defendant upon realising the Claimant’s questionable demeanour caused them to write to the Claimant’s former employers via Exhibits D6 and D8 seeking information on the Claimant. That the two former employers of the Claimant replied via Exhibits D7 and D9 revealing information on the Claimant which prompted the need for further information on the Claimant. Learned counsel further contended that the Claimant’s deposition in chief further corroborated under cross-examination has further confirmed details pointing the Claimant concealed and suppressed his record of service and held two full-time employments.

Learned counsel further added that the Claimant misled the 1^st Defendant to promoting him without the knowledge that the Claimant’s promotions prior to joining them was by BSU while he was on secondment with them. Learned counsel submitted that where the evidence of a witness is unchallenged and uncontroverted under cross-examination, the Court is bound to act on it. Learned counsel relied on NZE V. N.P.A. (1997) 11 NWLR (Pt. 528) 210 and Amadi v. Orlu (2023) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1904) 319.

Learned counsel further added that the 1^st Defendant upon concluding its findings wrote to the Claimant via Exhibit C7 requesting for information from the Claimant in respect of the discoveries made against the Claimant. That the Claimant thereafter replied through his counsel and the 1^st Defendant proceeded to constitute a committee against the Claimant. That the Committee invited the Claimant whereupon he appeared and made his case. Upon this, the committee made a finding that the Claimant concealed and suppressed his records of service in violation of the Claimant’s letter of Appointment as in Exhibit C3. That the Claimant was thereafter dismissed on grounds of serious misconduct liable for summary dismissal pursuant to the 1^st Defendant’s Condition of Service. On meaning and what amounts to serious misconduct, learned counsel relied ABOMELI VS. N.R.C. (1995) 1 NWLR (PT. 372) 451, N.N.B. LTD. V. OBEVUDIRI (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 29) 387 (P.25, Paras. F-G) and MUTUAL LIFEGEN. INS. LTD VS. IHEME (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt 1389) 670.

Learned counsel concluded that more specifically, the Claimant was dismissed on the following basis:

1. That the Claimant secured promotion while on secondment at Bauchi State University, such promotion which ought to have been made by his parent employer the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi.

2. That the Claimant misrepresented himself as a substantive staff of Bauchi State University; and

3. Failure to inform the Defendants of a pending legal action between the Claimant and his parent employer, Federal Polytechnic Bauchi.

Learned counsel thereafter submitted that these amounted to concealment and suppression as defined under Exhibits C24 and Exhibit C3. Learned counsel thereafter urged the Court to resolve this issue against the Claimant.

On issue two (2), learned counsel contended that while the Claimant challenges that the Disciplinary Committee whose report led to his dismissal did not afford him fair hearing was not according to due process, learned counsel argued that this contention is misconceived. Learned counsel argued that if a case of gross misconduct is made out, mere failure to accord a dismissed servant fair hearing is not enough to sustain an action for wrongful dismissal.

Learned counsel further argued that where an act of misconduct has been established against the Claimant, the Claimant’s wrongful dismissal action on grounds of denial of fair hearing therefore cannot succeed. That it is also not a requirement of the law that the particulars of the dismissal are disclosed to the employee at the time of dismissal. Learned counsel relied on C.C.B. (NIG) LTD VS. NWANKWO (SUPRA) Pp. 743-744, PARAS. H-A.

Learned counsel further argued that assuming the Claimant was entitled to fair hearing in the circumstances of his dismissal, learned counsel argued that the Claimant was duly accorded fair hearing. That the Claimant has admitted to same at Paragraph 11 of his deposition wherein the Claimant deposed to the fact that he was invited to make a presentation to the Disciplinary Committee. Learned counsel further relied on the unchallenged testimony of DW1. Learned counsel further submitted that the Defendants followed all the necessary procedures including affording the Claimant the opportunity of being heard. Learned counsel relied on U. B. A. PLC VS. ORANUBA (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt 1390) 1.

Learned counsel contended that the evidence of PW1, DW1 and DW2 all indicate that the due procedure on fair hearing was accorded to the Claimant but the Claimant willingly chose not to take advantage of same. Learned counsel further added that affording a party fair hearing does not entail forcing the party to appear, it merely entail providing an opportunity of being heard. Learned counsel relied on STABILINI VISINONI LTD. V. MALLINSON PARTNERS LTD (2014) 12 NWLR (PT. 1420) 134 P. 205, paras. B-E.

Learned counsel further argued that a party cannot sustain a claim for breach of fair hearing where he wilfully absented himself from hearing. Learned counsel added that equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent party who fails to pursue his right diligently. That the law regards this delay or indolence as fatal to their case. Learned counsel thereafter urged the Court to dismiss the Claimant’s case.

4.0 CLAIMANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS

The Claimant by a final written Address filed on November 3^rd 2025 formulated a sole issue for determination:

Whether the claimant has proved his case against the defendants on the preponderance of evidence to entitle him to the judgment of this honourable court in his favour as per the reliefs sought?

Learned counsel before arguing the sole issue first made submissions in respect of his objections earlier reserved during trial against the Defendants’ exhibits D6 and D8 tendered as photocopies. Learned counsel argued that the Defendants’ DW1 failed to lay any foundation prior to seeking to tender exhibits D6 and D8. Learned counsel argued that this offends the provisions of sections 89 and 91(10) of the Evidence Act. Learned counsel further relied on STATOIL (NIG) LTD -VS- INDUCON (NIG) LTD (2014) 9 NWLR (PT 1411) 43 at 55 – 56 r. 16.

Learned counsel further argued that the Defendants’ extract of minutes of meetings of the Investigative Committee did not meet the requirement of certification. Learned counsel argued that there must be evidence of payment for the said certification with the date and signature of the officer responsible along with his name and official title. Learned counsel relied on TABIK INVESTMENT LTD -VS- GUARANTY TRUST BANK PLC (2011) 17 NWLR (PT. 1276) P. 240.

Learned counsel urged the Court to discountenance all the documents.

On the Claimant’s sole issue, learned counsel contended that the standard of proof required in civil cases is proof on preponderance of evidence. Learned counsel argued that the Claimant has discharged this burden against the Defendants to entitle him to judgment. Learned counsel relied on EMEKA –VS- CHUBA IKPEAZU (2017) 15 NWLR (PT 1589) 345 AT 351 RR 2 & 3.

Learned counsel further argued that the Claimant has tendered exhibits and has further made testimony in line with his pleadings. Learned counsel argued that these evidences are credible and the Court is bound to act on them. Learned counsel relied on OKO VS STATE (2018) 1 NWLR (PT. 1600) 216 @ 226 – 228 R. 12, CITEC INTIL ESTATE LTD. VS E. INTIL INC. & ASSOCIATES (2018) 3 NWLR (PT. 1606) 332 @ 344 – 346 RR. 11, 12 & 13.

Learned counsel further contended that the Claimant’s dismissal was not done in line with the Defendants’ condition of Service. Learned counsel contended that the Claimant’s employment is one with statutory flavour and the procedure laid down for the said dismissal must be strictly followed otherwise the purported dismissal will be null and void. Learned counsel relied on RECTOR POLY KWARA STATE VS ADEFILA (2024) 9 NWLR (PT. 1944) 529 @ (P. 552 PARAS. A-E). See also the case of D, - G., N.I.A VS DAUDA (2024) 7 NWLR (PT. 1936) 1 @ (PP. 59-66, PARAS. D-B).

Learned counsel further argued that the Defendant’s condition of service does not permit the Defendants to act in the manner they did in dismissing the Claimant. Learned counsel cited Chapter 7 (Discipline) Paragraph; 7.0 (a), (b), (c), (d) (xiv), (e) (vii), (e) (ix) and (e) (xi) at pages 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46 of the Defendants’ condition of service.

Learned counsel argued that mere invitation for explanation alone without issuing a formal query, suspension to enable investigation and interdiction prior to the Claimant’s dismissal is a breach of his right to fair hearing. Learned counsel further relied on Chapter 7.0 of the Defendants’ condition of service. Learned counsel further added that the Claimant was never served with reasons for his purported dismissal as required by the condition of service. Learned counsel submitted that this is a clear violation of the Claimant’s right to fair hearing and right to employment and the Defendants’ evidence against the Claimant is unfounded.

Learned counsel further contended that Defendants’ DW1 only gave contradictory and hearsay evidence. Learned counsel further argued that DW1 had testified that the Claimant was dismissed on the basis that the Claimant forged his sabbatical appointment letter and CV, learned counsel argued that this is an allegation of crime which the law requires must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Learned counsel relied on Section 133 of the Evidence Act and the decisions in P.D.P VS INEC (2014) NWLR (PT. 1437) 525 @ 538-539 R. 11; KAKIH VS P.D.P (2014) 15 NWLR (PT. 1430) 374 R. 12; ABDUULRAHMAN VS ODUNEYE (2009) 1 WLR (PT. 1170) 222 @ 224-225 RR. 5 & 6.

Learned counsel submitted that the Defendants have failed to lead any evidence in support of their allegations of forgery. Learned counsel argued that it is not enough for DW1 to merely testify that the documents were forged, that it behoves on the witness to produce the purported original along with the forged ones before the Court for comparison. Learned counsel relied on APC VS OBASEKI (2022) 2 NWLR (PT. 1814) 273 @ (PP. 308-309 PARAS. B-A; 342-343 PARAS. F-A; 305-306 PARAS E-C; 318 PARAS D-F).

Learned counsel further contended that the Defendants had listed and intended to rely on three subpoenaed witnesses from the Claimant’s former employers but failed to call any of them in evidence. Learned counsel submitted that this renders the evidence of the Defendants as mere hearsay. Learned counsel further added that there is also a reasonable presumption of withholding of evidence having failed to call these vital witnesses to testify. Learned counsel relied on MOHAMMED VS WAMAKO (2017) LPELR -42667 @ (P. 26 PARA. F & P. 27 PARA. A).

Learned counsel argued further that the Defendants’ DW1 had testified that he was told that the Claimant was facing disciplinary action as well as a pending action in court. That DW1 testified that he was told that the outcome of the disciplinary action against the Claimant was that the Claimant had absconded from his former employer, the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi. Learned counsel submitted that the Court cannot ascribe any probative value to DW1’s testimony in that he did not witness anything on his own. Learned counsel relied on KAKIH VS P.D.P supra @ 390 R. 18. See also GUNDIRI VS NYAKO (2014) 2 NWLR (PT. 1391) 211 R. 6.

Learned counsel further submitted that the Claimant did not abscond from his former employer prior to taking up new appointment with the 1^st Defendant. Learned counsel argued that the Claimant had obtained release letters from his former employer even prior to taking his new appointment and had tendered Exhibit C12 in that respect. Learned counsel argued that even though his former employer introverted his release from their service, the Claimant instituted an action against the status of his said release from his former employers and had succeed in the suit and relied on Exhibit C25 being the certified copies of the judgment.

Learned counsel further argued that DW1 testified that the Claimant was dismissed on the basis that he failed to provide his true employment record to the Defendants. Learned counsel argued that this testimony goes contrary the Defendant’s pleadings. Learned counsel contended that the law is that evidence at variance with pleadings goes to no issue. Learned counsel relied on EWEJE VS O.M OIL IND. LTD (2021) 4 NWLR (PT. 1765) 117 @ (P. 140 PARAS A-C).

Learned counsel further submitted that the mere oral testimony of DW1 without any document in support does not carry any evidentiary weight. Learned counsel relied on OLOWU VS BUILDING STOCK LTD (2018) 1 NWLR (PT. 1601) 343 @ 363 R. 24; ZAKIRAI VS MUHAMMAD (2017) 17 NWLR (PT. 1594) 181 @ 197-198 R. 16.

Learned counsel further argued that contrary to the testimony of DW1 that the Claimant was served with a query but failed to respond, learned counsel submitted that the Claimant was not served with any query save for a request for explanation which the Claimant had duly responded via letters from his solicitors.

Learned counsel further argued that Defendants’ DW1 admitted that the Claimant was neither queried, suspended nor placed on half salary prior to his dismissal. Learned counsel added that while DW1 testified that the Conditions of service does not require all of these in the case of the Claimant, learned counsel submitted that this is also an erroneous conclusion and against the Defendants’ condition of service.

Learned counsel further added that the Defendants’ DW1 had further admitted under cross-examination that no other committee was constituted against the Claimant and that the recommendation of the sole committee was not to dismiss the Claimant but to terminate his appointment.

Learned counsel thereafter submitted that from the totality of the Defendants’ evidence adduced against the Claimants’ case, the Defendants have failed to prove their assertions that the Claimant falsified his documents or in any way justified the Claimant’s dismissal. Learned counsel submitted that the law is that he who asserts must prove and relied on DASUKI VS THE F.R.N (2018) 10 NWLR (PT. 1627) 320 @ 330 R. 5; MAIHAJA VS GAIDAM (2018) 4 NWLR (PT. 1610) 454 @ 466 RR. 25 & 26.

Learned counsel further argued that while the law is that the Claimant cannot rely on the weakness of the Defence, that however where the evidence of the Defence supports his case, he can make use of same. Learned counsel relied on OLUSULE VS MAIDUGURI METRO COUNCIL (2004) 4 NWLR (PT. 863) 290 @ 292-293 R. 2.

Learned counsel further contended that while they are not unmindful of the Defendants’ submission that the Claimant’s dismissal is on grounds as contained in the dismissal letter, learned counsel submitted that the only legal document that binds the parties is the condition of service as in Exhibit C24 and not the Claimant’s appointment letter as in Exhibit C3. Learned counsel relied on RECTOR POLY KWARA STATE VS ADEFILA supra, at page 151 Paragraph G-H.

Learned counsel further added that there is no evidence to support the allegation that the Claimant has held double appointment as there is equally no evidence to show that the Claimant enjoyed double salary.

Learned counsel further argued that the submission of the Defendants on the purported demeanour and secondment of the Claimant is based on mere speculation and conjecture. Learned counsel submitted that the Court has a duty to accept real evidence as opposed to mere conjecture and speculation. Learned counsel relied on EGOM -VS- ENO (2008) 11 NWLR (PT. 1098) 320 at 322 – 323 rs. 1 & 2.

Learned counsel further submitted that the Defendants’ reliance on the case of C.C.B Nig. Ltd. vs. Nwankwo (1993); Sale vs. Nigerian Cotton Board (1985); Ajayi vs. Texaco Nig. Ltd. (1987); and Olaniyan University of Lagos (1985) in support of their contention that where an employee’s conduct is of a grave and weighty character would warrant a summary dismissal. Learned counsel submitted that this is a misapplication of those principles to the Claimant’s case. Learned counsel further added that the cases cited above as sought to be relied by the Defendants is distinguishable to this case as unlike the Claimant’s case, the contract of employment in those cases are not ones with statutory flavour thus inapplicable to the Claimant’s case.

Learned counsel further submitted that while he concedes that an employer is not required to disclose any reason in dismissing their employee, learned counsel argued that the law is that where the employer so discloses such reason, the employer is bound to justify the reason otherwise the dismissal cannot stand. Learned counsel relied on OKUSAMI VS. A.G LAGOS STATE (2015) 4 NWLR (PT. 1449) 220 @ (PP. 254-255 PARAS. C-F).

Learned counsel further contended that the argument of the Defendant is not required to accord fair hearing to the Claimant as misplaced. Learned counsel contended that where a contract of employment is clothed with statutory flavour unlike a private employment, the employer is bound to strictly follow the statutory procedure and accord the employee fair hearing. That an employee must be given fair hearing before he/she can be dismissed.

On the whole, learned counsel submitted that the evidence adduced by the Claimant is manifestly stronger than that of the Defendants and as such is entitled to judgment.

Learned counsel further submitted that the Claimant was dismissed on the basis of allegation of fraud and forgery, learned counsel contended that only the courts have the jurisdiction to determine the truth of these allegations and not the Defendants. Learned counsel submitted that such power cannot be usurped by any administrative tribunal and as such the Defendants lack the authority to dismiss the Claimant. Learned counsel relied on UCHENNNA VS DINNEH (2021) 15 NWLR (PT. 1798) 91 @ (P. 118 PARAS. B-E).

Learned counsel thereafter urged the Court to resolve the sole issue and enter judgment in favour of the Claimant.

5.0 DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW

By a reply on point of law filed on December 17 2025, the Defendants’ learned counsel argued as follows:

In response to the Claimant’s learned counsel submission that exhibits D6 and D8 are inadmissible being photocopies and for failure to lay foundation prior to tendering the documents, the Defendants’ learned counsel submitted that the proper time for laying foundation of photocopy of a document is at the point of tendering same during proceedings. Learned counsel relied on OSAGHAE VS. AMADASUN (2014) 16 NWLR (PT 1433) 346.

Learned counsel argued that DW1 was properly led to lay foundation of the whereabouts of the originals of exhibits D6 and D8 before tendering them in evidence. Learned counsel urged the court to discountenance the Claimant learned counsel’s objection.

In response to the Claimant’s objection against the Defendant’s Exhibit D12 tendered without proper certification, learned counsel argued that the submissions and reliance on Tabik Investment LTD vs. Guaranty Trust Bank Plc made are misconceived. Learned counsel argued that there is no need for the requirement of payment of fees for certification since the officer tendering the document is the maker and custodian of same. Learned counsel argued that even the authority relied upon by learned counsel does not support the Claimant’s contention, that in Tabik Investment LTD vs. Guaranty Trust Bank Plc, the document sought to be tendered was in the custody of EFCC and that since the witness through which the document sought to be tendered is an officer of same, payment of certification fees was not necessary.

Learned counsel submitted that the two reasons that would necessitate certification does not arise in this case since the documents were made by the Defendants’ and were subsequently tendered through the custodian of the said document. Learned counsel relied on ONOCHIE vs. ODOGWU (2006) 6 NWLR (PT 975) 65.

In response to the submission that the Claimant’s dismissal is wrongful and not in compliance with Chapter 7 Paragraph 7.0 (a), (b), (d), (xiv), (e), (vii), (e), (ix), and (e), (xi) of the Defendants’ condition of service, learned counsel argued that this is misplaced. Learned counsel submitted that the case of the defence is that the Claimant was dismissed for breaching Chapter 2 Paragraph (d), (i c) and sub-paragraph (ii) of Exhibit C24 and thus liable for summary dismissal. Learned counsel added that the lengthy procedure in Paragraph 7 (a), (d), and (e) do not therefore apply to the Claimant’s case.

Learned counsel submitted that summary dismissal is available in both private and statutory employment. learned counsel relied on AHMED VS. ABU (2016) LPELR-40261 (CA).

Learned counsel further added that the Defendants’ right to summary dismissal is provided for under Chapter 2 of Exhibit C24. Learned counsel contended that in the Claimant’s case, specific disciplinary procedure under chapter 2 of Exhibit C24 takes precedence over the ones under Chapter 7 of Exhibit C24. Learned counsel further added that where there is a conflict between specific and general procedure, the specific procedure prevails. Learned counsel relied on LOKPOBIR VS. A. P. C. (2021) 3 NWLR (PT 1964) 538 at pp.545 paras D-G, 549, paras B-C, paras D-E.

In response to the Claimant’s contention that where an allegation of crime is made in a civil suit the standard of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, learned counsel contended that this submission is misplaced. Learned counsel argued that the Claimant was dismissed on grounds of concealment and suppression of records thereby breaching the conditions of service under Exhibits C24 and C3. Learned counsel further submitted that concealment and suppression of record are not criminal offences and as such the argument on proof beyond reasonable doubt does not arise.

Learned counsel further argued that even where the allegations against the Claimant bothers on crime, proof beyond reasonable doubt would only arise when the Claimant denies these allegations. Learned counsel argued that the Claimant has in this case admitted to falsifying and supressing facts which gained him appointments from the Defendants during cross-examination. Learned counsel cited ORI VS. STATE (2022) 5 NWLR (PT 1824) 441.

In response to the Claimant’s submission that the Defendants having listed three (3) subpoenaed witnesses from the Claimant’s former employers but failed or neglected to call them in evidence, that the information on falsification therefore amounts to hearsay. In further response to the Claimant’s submission that on this basis there is also a presumption of withholding of evidence, learned counsel argued that it is not the law that a party must call all the witnesses if he can establish his case through other means. Learned counsel argued that the Claimant’s PWI had made admissions during cross-examination which are sufficient for the Defendants’ defence. learned counsel relied on MUSA VS. YERIMA (1997) 7 NWLR (PT 511) 27.

Learned counsel added that section 167 (d) of the Evidence Act, as cited by the Claimant and the case of MOHAMMED VS. WAMAKO (2017) LPELR – 42667 @ P.26 PARA F & P, 27 PARA A, KAKIH vs. P.DP., GUNDIRI vs. NYAKO (2014) 2 NWLR (PT1391) 211 R. 6 cannot aid the Claimant.

In response to the Claimant’s submission that the evidence of DW1 is at variance with the Defendants’ pleading at Paragraph 7 (d), learned counsel argued that this is an attempt to mislead the court. learned counsel added that Paragraph 7 of the Defendants’ Statement of Defence has a collection of sub-paragraphs. Learned counsel submitted that the Claimant’s cannot cherry-pick certain paragraphs and make submissions. That the law is that to make meaning out of pleadings, community reading of all the sub-paragraphs is necessary. Learned counsel relied on AGI VS. P.D.P. (2017) 7 NWLR (PT 1595) p. 386 at p422 PARA H.

In further response to the Claimant’s contention that the only document that binds the Claimant and the Defendant is the condition of service only without the appointment letter, learned counsel argued that this submission is wrongly made and that both documents are relevant. Learned counsel argued that the Claimant’s appointment letter is highly relevant which even the Claimant did not fail to tender. Learned counsel relied on U.B.N VS. CHINYERE (2010) 10 NWLR (PT 1203) 453 at 471 paras C-F and 473 paras F-G.

In further response to the Claimant’s contention that decisions in C.C.B. NIG. LTD VS. NWANKWO (1993); SALE VS. NIGERIAN COTTON BOARD (1985); AJAYI VS. TEXACO NIG LTD (1987); and OLANIYAN VS. UNIBVERSITY OF LAGOS (1985) and also the case of U.B.A PLC VS. ORANUBA (2014) are in relation to master-servant relationship and not statutory employment, learned counsel argued that SALE VS. NIGERIAN COTTON BOARD (1985) and OLANIYAN VS. UNIBVERSITY OF LAGOS (1985) are cases where the Defendants are statutorily established agencies while the other cases bothered on summary dismissal.

Learned counsel submitted that summary dismissal applies in both private and state owned agencies and chapter 2 of the condition of service provides for such procedure. Learned counsel relied on Ahmed vs. ABU (Supra).

Learned counsel urged the Court to dismiss the Claimant’s case and uphold the dismissal.

6.0 COURT’S DECISION

After thoroughly considering all the facts and evidence presented in this case, along with the submissions made by counsel from both sides, I have identified two issues that I believe will effectively resolve this matter. They are:

Whether or not having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Claimant has suppressed his employment record with the 1^st Defendant?

Was the Claimant’s summary dismissal lawful?

Before addressing these issues, I must first note that during the trial, both counsel objected to the exhibits intended for submission and reserved their arguments for their final written addresses. However, only the Claimant’s learned counsel proceeded to present submissions, which I will now address.

The Claimant's learned counsel objected to the admissibility of Exhibits D6 and D8, arguing that they are photocopies and that the witness did not establish the whereabouts of the originals. The counsel referenced sections 89 and 91(10) of the Evidence Act. Additionally, the Claimant's learned counsel objected to the admissibility of Exhibit D12, citing its failure to meet certification requirements. The counsel contended that Exhibit D12 should have been submitted with evidence of payment for certification fees and a certificate confirming it as a true copy.

The Defendants’learned counsel responded by asserting that, although the law mandates objections to Exhibits D6 and D8 be raised at the time of their presentation, the Defendants’ witness was appropriately guided during the examination-in-chief and established the foundation regarding the location of their originals. Additionally, the learned counsel contended, in response to the objections against Exhibit D12, that the certification requirement was satisfied since the document was submitted through the custodian of the entity that created and issued it.

With respect to Exhibits D6 and D8, the law is indeed trite that the essence of laying foundation is to assure the Court that the originals exist but beyond the reach of the party seeking to tender same. On this the Penultimate Court Per OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A (now JSC) in Osaghae v. Amadasun (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1433) 346 @ P. 360, paras. F-G, thus:

“There is no doubt that even though P.W.1 and P.W.4 did not specifically talk about a search of the documents being mad before or during the trial, the fact that a top government official came to confirm that the documents were last reposed in government custody which he could not apparently produce, is enough foundation to satisfy the trial court. The essence of laying foundation is to assure the court that indeed the original documents exists somewhere but out of the reach of the party who tendered the photocopies as secondary evidence. The interesting point in this case is that the documents were rejected not because they were thought to be intrinsically inadmissible by the learned trial Judge but because the appellant did not lay sufficient foundation for its admissibility. There has been no argument that the documents are inadmissible in any event. It is trite that where documents are inadmissible by law in any event, consent of the advert party to its admissibility confers no probative value to it. See Alao v. Akano (2005) 4 SCNJ 65, (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 935) 160; Omega Bank v. O.B.C. Ltd. (2005) 1 SCNJ 150, (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 547.

In the circumstances of this case, it is my humble view that the appellant satisfied the provisions of S. 89(c) of the Evidence Act 2011 and in good faith laid proper foundation for the admissibility of exhibit C, D, E and F. Thus issues one and two are resolved in favour of the appellant.” (Underlined for emphasis)

It is on record that DW1 while being led in chief and upon seeking to tender Exhibits D6 and D8 had testified that the originals are with the agencies to whom the letters were addressed. Exhibits D6 and D8 are acknowledgment copies of the original letters requesting information from the former employers of the Claimant. DW1 thus explained why the Defendants could not have been in custody of the originals. This in my view has satisfied the requirements for admissibility of Exhibits D6 and D8 as secondary documents tendered as photocopies. Accordingly, the Claimant’s learned counsel objection against Exhibits D6 and D8 is discountenance. I so hold.

With respect to the Exhibit D12 being the extract of the minutes of meeting of the investigative committee against the Claimant, Exhibit D12 undoubtedly qualifies as a public document within the meaning of section 102 of the Evidence Act 2011, as such, the Evidence Act ordinarily requires that such a document be certified as a true copy with evidence of payment of the application fees for the said certification before it becomes admissible. See Section 104 of the Act. The Defendants’learned counsel argued that the Claimant seeking to rely on Tabik Investment LTD vs. Guaranty Trust Bank Plc is misconceived. The Defendants’ learned counsel argued that in Tabik Investment LTD vs. Guaranty Trust Bank Plc the Supreme Court held that since the documents sought to be tendered by the EFCC originated from them, there was no need for them to pay any certification fees. Learned counsel’s submission here entails a form of exemption granted to the body seeking to tender a public document that originated from them. Thus, learned counsel submitted that since Exhibit D12 was tendered through the registrar of the 1^st Defendant who serves as the custodian of all the records of the Defendants, they are thus exempted from paying for certification fees on the basis of the decision in Tabik Investment LTD vs. Guaranty Trust Bank Plc.

After thoroughly reviewing the Supreme Court's decision in Tabik Investment LTD vs. Guaranty Trust Bank Plc, I find myself in disagreement with the Defendants' learned counsel regarding the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in this case. It appears that the learned counsel either referred to a different decision or misunderstood the Supreme Court's ruling in Tabik Investment LTD vs. Guaranty Trust Bank Plc. To clarify, I will reproduce the apex court's holding on whether Section 104 includes any exemption. The Supreme Court, through MUKHTAR, J.S.C. (CJN as he then was), in examining section 111(1) of the Evidence Act 1990 (now Section 104 of the Evidence Act 2011), held as follows:

“As 1 have said earlier, the provision of section 111(1) of the Evidence Act is clear and unambiguous, and so should be subjected to simple interpretation. The fact that it sets out conditions that must be satisfied before a public document is admitted in evidence, requires that such conditions must be met. The argument that the payment of legal fees required in section 111(1) of the Evidence Act supra would be by private or members of the public who are applying for such certified true copies of the public document, and not payable by government department as in this case, holds no water. None of the appellants belongs to any government department, so such concession cannot be arrogated to them. The tendering of the documents (exhibits A, B1, B2 and B3) was at the instance of the appellants, as litigants seeking reliefs in the learned trial court. They are neither government officials, government agencies nor government department, so they cannot be perceived as falling within any exemption, if at all there is any such. That is to say that the provision of section 111(1) of the Evidence Act has left no room for any exemption, for if the legislature intended or contemplated that there would be any such exemption it would have been specifically stated. In this respect the court below was on firm ground when it observed and found as follows:

“It is clear that the section has not made any exemption from the payment of legal fees by any person who requires to secure a certified true copy of any public document in custody of a public officer including members of the police force. If there are exemptions, the section or any section related thereto should have specifically provided for such exemptions.”

In the light of the above treatment of this issue, the answer to issue supra is in the affirmative. The grounds of appeal to which the issue is married fail and they are hereby dismissed. The end result is that the appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed. This court however directs that the appellants should pay the required fees as provided in section 111(1) of the Evidence Act, to meet and satisfy the said provision. It is in the interest of justice that this be done as quickly as possible so that the hearing continues immediately. This order is to meet the end of justice. I assess costs at N50,000.00 in favour of the respondent.”

I must further clarify that the facts in Tabik Investment LTD vs. Guaranty Trust Bank Plc did not involve any EFCC officer. Instead, copies of certain witness statements were obtained from the custody of the Police, leading to objections due to the lack of evidence of payment of certification fees.

The prevailing law concerning certification requirements stipulates that legal fees are not obligatory unless explicitly outlined by the issuing body. Typically, the non-payment of certification fees does not lead to the inadmissibility of a public document. As articulated by the Apex Court, per Jummai Hannatu Sankey, J.S.C., in the case of Audu v. F.R.N. (2025) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1984) 681 @ Pp. 713-715, paras. F-D:

“On the contention however, that no legal fees were paid for the certification, it was not shown that legal fees were prescribed for the certification of documents from the office of the Accountant General. The precursor to section 104 of the Evidence Act, 2011, was section 111(1) of the Evidence Act, Cap. E14, Laws of the Federation, 1990 interpreted by this court in the case of Tabik Investment Ltd. v. GTB Plc (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1276) 240. An examination of the two provisions reveals that, whereas they are similar, the requirement for the payment of legal fees for certification in section 104 of the Evidence Act, 2011 is qualified by “prescribed in that respect”. This qualification is not contained in section111 of the Evidence Act, 1990. Certainly, the inclusion of these words, “prescribed in that respect” was intended to have a meaning and effect. The dictionary meaning of the word “prescribe” is: “to lay down, in writing or otherwise, as a rule or a course of action to be followed.” What this invariably means is that the words in Section104 (supra) “the legal fees prescribed in that respect...” must refer to the legal fees laid down by the body, organization or person in the custody of a public document and on whom a demand is made for a certified true copy of that document. Thus, the corollary to this is necessarily that where the body, organization or person in the custody of a public document and on whom a demand is made for a certified true copy does not have a prescribed legal fee for the issuance of a certified true copy of the document, then the payment of legal fees cannot be a mandatory requirement for the certification of a document. To interpret the words otherwise would have the effect of disabling such an organization, body or person having custody of public document from issuing acceptable certified true copies in their custody. This would be an absurd interpretation and could not have been the intention of the Law makers. There is a presumption against the Legislature intending what is unreasonable and inconvenient. Thus, it is the law that common sense must be applied in construing statutes and, a construction that is agreeable to justice and reason must be adopted - Sobamowo v. Elemuren (2008)11 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 12, Elebanjo v. Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR(Pt. 1001) 76. See also Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes,12 Edition by Langan, 1976, at page 199.”

The necessary implication of this is that the decision in Tabik Investment Ltd v. GTB Plc (supra) on the requirements of certification of public documents can only be applicable to a public document certified under the provision of section 104 of the Evidence Act,2011 with a qualification that, the payment of legal fees is only mandatory in respect of an issuing body, organization or person in the custody of a public document that has prescribed fees for certified true copies, and that it is not obligatory or compulsory otherwise. In the instant case, there was nothing before the trial court showing that the office of the Accountant General of the Federation which issued the certified true copies through the 2ndaccused person, and which were admitted as exhibits D and E, had any laid down or prescribed legal fees for issuing certified true copies of documents in its custody. Thus, the payment of legal fees cannot be a mandatory requirement for the certification of exhibits D and E.

However, assuming that such fees were prescribed by the Accountant General’s Office, (which is not the case), the failure of the 2nd accused to pay such fee, (which in itself sounds incongruous, being the officer in custody of the said documents in the Accountant General’s Office), then the appellant cannot be allowed to benefit from a deliberate wrong of his co-director and co-owner of the companies, who was also tried along with him. It would be unconscionable. See Tonimas (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chigbu (2020) LPELR-50633(SC) 18-19, C, (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt.1720) 237 per Abba-Aji,JSC, Saleh v. Adabah (2017) LPELR-41914(SC); (2017 12 NWLR(Pt. 1578) 100 per Bage, JSC, Yusuf v. Adegoke (2007) LPELR-3534(SC); (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1045) 332 per Tobi, JSC.”

Refer also to the penultimate Court's decision in DG DIFN & ANOR v DINWABOR & ORS (2016) LPELR – 41316 (CA), which provided an interpretation of Section 104 of the Evidence Act 2011. This section distinguishes the requirement for the payment of "prescribed fees" from Section 111(1) of the Evidence Act 1990. In the present case, there is no evidence indicating that the 1st Defendant prescribed any fees to be paid for the certification of Exhibit D12. Consequently, the objection raised by the Claimant's learned counsel against Exhibit D12 is dismissed. I so hold.

Regarding the merits of this case, I will now address the issues outlined above in sequence.

Issue 1

Whether or not having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Claimant has suppressed his employment record with the 1st Defendant?

The Claimant initiated this lawsuit against the Defendants on the grounds of unlawful dismissal. He asserts that he was not granted a fair hearing before his dismissal and further contends that his alleged dismissal did not adhere to the Defendants' disciplinary procedures outlined in Chapter 7 of the Conditions of Service. In their joint defence, the Defendants argued that the Claimant had engaged in serious misconduct by suppressing and concealing his employment record prior to joining them. Consequently, the Defendants summarily dismissed the Claimant in accordance with Chapter 2, paragraph d (ii) of the Conditions of Service.

It is well established law that the onus is on the Claimant who initiated the action to prove his entitlement to the reliefs he seeks against his opponent. See Owoniboys Tech. Serv. Ltd. v. U.B.N. Ltd. (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 844) 545 @ P. 584, paras. E-H, Gundiri v. Nyako (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1391) 211 @ P. 252, paras. C-E, Edebiri v. Daniel (2009) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1142) 15 @ P. 31, para. H, Flash Fixed Odds Ltd, v. Akatugba (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 717) 46 @ P.61, paras. B-C. However, in labour relations while generally an employer is not required to state the reasons for dismissing his employee, where a reason is stated, the law requires the employer to establish and prove that those reasons exist. On this, the apex Court Per Francis Fedode Tabai, J.S.C (as he then was) in S.P.D.C. Ltd. v. Olarewaju (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 1 @ p. 19-20, paras. G-A held as follows:

“The question is whether the defendant/appellant failed to established the respondent’s gross misconduct as to render his dismissal wrongful, null and void and thus entitling him to the reliefs granted and affirmed by the courts below. The guiding principle which has been articulated and applied in many cases including Olatunbosun v. N.I.S.E.R. Council (1988) 1N.S.C.C. 1025; (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 25 is that an employer is not bound to give reasons for terminating the appointment of his employee. But where, as in this case, he gives a reason or cause for terminating the appointment, the law imposes on him a duty to establish the reason to the satisfaction of the court. In this case, the appellant, having given gross misconduct as it reasons for the respondent’s dismissal, has the onus to establish that the respondent was indeed guilty of the alleged misconduct to warrant his dismissal. And in a case such as this, the court must be watchful to ensure that in the investigations or proceedings of the domestic panel culminating in the employee’s dismissal, the rules of natural justice were not breached.” (Underlined for emphasis)

In their joint defense, the Defendants assert that before the Claimant's employment was terminated, he was on sabbatical with them while still holding his primary position at the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi. Upon completing his sabbatical with the 1st Defendant, the Claimant sought a permanent role, resulting in an offer from the 1st Defendant for the position of Principal Assistant Registrar, with a salary of CONTISS 13, STEP 9, on October 18, 2019. Subsequently, the Claimant requested and was granted a provisional withdrawal of service from his original employer, the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi, on November 27, 2019.

In March 2021, records indicate that the Claimant submitted an application to the 1st Defendant, seeking a formal reclassification of his position from Principal Assistant Registrar to Deputy Registrar (refer to Exhibit D5). The Claimant’s appeal for this reclassification, as outlined in Exhibit D5, is presented as follows:

“Ma

REQUEST FOR PROPER PLACEMENT TO THE RANK OF A DEPUTY REGISTRAR

You may wish to be informed that in the first instance, my appointment as a Principal Assistant Registrar was on the strength that whenever the Governing Council is on Board the anomaly will be corrected (since position of Deputy Registrar us interactive). Apart from that the Scheme of the Service of the University from all intent and proposes has favoured my claim on the basis of the following reasons: -

I. I was appointed as Principal Assistant Registrar by the Bauchi State University 9 years ago, see attached appendix (A)

II. Promoted to the rank of Deputy Registrar by the same University since 2014 see attached appendix (b)

III. Registry overseer of Bauchi State University for one year see attached appendix (c)

IV. Acting Registrar Bauchi State University see appendix (D)

V. Sabbatical appointment with Federal University, Gashua as Deputy Registrar in 2018 see appendix (E)

VI. Approval for my appointment by Federal Character Commission see appendix (F)

In view of the reasons I – VI coupled with my experience of 23 years in tertiary institution (out of which 9 years is for University), I earnestly request for my proper placement to my deserved rank Deputy Registrar with effect from the date I assumed the duty (i.e 3 February 2020)

Ubayo Juji ”

In June 2021, the Claimant was notified of their approval for the appropriate placement to the rank of Deputy Registrar on CONTISS 14 STEP 9. (See Exhibit C4)

The Defendants claimed that the Claimant's request for appropriate placement led them to investigate further and gather more information regarding the Claimant's service record. Subsequently, the 1st Defendant contacted the Claimant's previous employers, namely Bauchi State University and Federal Polytechnic Bauchi. (See Exhibits D6 and D8).

The 1^st Defendant's requests for information about the Claimant, as shown in Exhibits D6 and D8, are identical. Therefore, I will reproduce the contents of Exhibit D6 below:

“ Date: October 12, 2022

The Registrar,

Bauchi State University, Gadau,

Bauchi State.

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON MR. UBAYO JUJI

Mr. Ubayu Juji is a staff of Federal University Gashua, he was employed as Principal Assistant Registrar in the Registry Department on October 18, 2019, and he assumed duty on February 3, 2020.

He presented documents indicating he was in the service of Bauchi State University from 2012 to 2016 where he became a Deputy Registrar. He also applied for proper placement as Deputy Registrar on March 16, 2021, claiming that his previous employer had promoted him to the rank of Deputy Registrar in 2014.

Consequently, the Governing Council of Federal University Gashua at its 23rd Regular Meeting directed the University Management to request for information on the officer from you to enable the Council to take decision on the matter.

The purpose of this letter therefore, is to request the Registrar to kindly provide information on Mr. Ubayo Juji.

Best regards,

Dr. Abubakar Mamuda

Registrar”

For ease of reference, the Bauchi State University’s response to the request for information on the Claimant is reproduced hereunder (Exhibit D7):

“ Date: 27^th October, 2022

The Registrar

Federal University Gashua

Nguru Road P.M.B 1005 Gashua

Yobe State

Dear Sir,

RE-REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON MR. UBAYO JUJI

Your letter with reference number FUGA/REG/COU/033/I/56 on the above subject matter dated 12th October, 2022 refers.

1. I write to inform you that Mr. Ubayo Juji was offered an appointment on secondment as Principal Assistant Registrar from the Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi dated 1^st January, 2012 but assumed on 1^st February, 2012.

2. Mr. Ubayo Juji did not renew his secondment after its expiration in 2014 instead, he cunningly provided letter of approval of his service transfer from the Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi dated 4^th July, 2012 to Bauchi State University, Gadau.

3. Based on the purported letter of transfer Mr. Ubayo Juji was promoted from the rank of Principal Assistant Registrar to the rank of Deputy Registrar with effect from 1st October, 2015.

4. An official fact finding from the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi visited our University on 9^th January, 2019 under the leadership of the Registrar. After due deliberation, the meeting confirmed that the approval of the transfer of service of Ubayo Juji to the University was fake.

5. The meeting equally understood that Ubayo Juji presented a letter of appointment as General Manager of Bauchi State University Global Consultants to the Polytechnic to facilitate his renewal of the secondment which was also fake.

6. Mr. Ubayo Juji applied for one year sabbatical leave to the Federal University Gashua which was approved with effect from 1st July, 2018 to 30th June, 2019.

7. The Bauchi State University Governing Council at its 16th regular meeting held on 8th May, 2019 reviewed the status of Ubayo Juji's secondment and therefore approved his De-secondment from Bauchi State University, Gadau to the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi with effect from 8th May, 2019.

Hope the information provided will serve your aspiration, please.

Aminu Yakubu Gambo

(Registrar)”

Based on the aforementioned letter, it is evident that after the expiration of the Claimant's secondment in 2014, the Claimant submitted what was later discovered to be a fraudulent letter of service transfer. Subsequently, relying on this alleged letter of transfer, Bauchi State University promoted the Claimant to the position of Deputy Registrar. Upon verifying that the Claimant's letter of service transfer was indeed fake, Bauchi State University returned the Claimant to the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi.

According to Exhibit D9, the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi, in response to the 1st Defendant's request for information about the Claimant, stated that while employed by them, the Claimant had secured a secondment to Bauchi State University in 2012. The Claimant was later returned from secondment after his request for another secondment was denied. Subsequently, they received a report of misconduct from Bauchi State University, which included allegations of forgery against the Claimant. Attempts were made to investigate these allegations, but the Claimant did not respond to the invitations. The Claimant submitted a letter of withdrawal from service, which was provisionally approved; however, this approval was later reconsidered due to a pending action between the Claimant and the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi. The institution also stated that the Claimant remains a bona fide staff member while the status of his withdrawal from service is still pending in court. For ease of reference, I shall reproduce Exhibit D9 hereunder:

“ 21^st October, 2022

The Registrar

Federal University, Gashua

Nguru Road, P.M.B. 1005

Gashua, Yobe State – Nigeria

RE: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON MR. UBAYO JUJI

Please refer to your’s reference FUGA/REG/COU/033/1/55 of 12th October, 2022 on the above subject matter.

Mr. Ubayo Juji joined the services of the Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi on 2nd October, 2003 as Administrative Officer I and rose to the rank of Principal Assistant Registrar on 1st January, 2014.

On the request of Mr. Ubayo to the Management of Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi dated 27th February, 2012 the Polytechnic granted him approval for secondment to Bauchi State University Gadau with effect from 1st March, 2012. At the expiration of the secondment period, Mr. Ubayo Juji neither assumed back to duties with the Polytechnic nor apply for renewal of the secondment period.

However, on 5th September, 2017, the Polytechnic received a special request from Bauchi State University, Gadau on behalf of Mr. Ubayo for another secondment. The matter was then referred to the Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee (SSAP&DC) and subsequently to the Council. The request was rejected and the decision conveyed to the Bauchi State University, Gadau with advice that Mr. Ubayo should be de-seconded back to the Polytechnic. The decision was also copied to Mr. Ubayo. Therefore, Mr. Ubayo eventually reported back to Polytechnic and assumed duties on 16th April, 2018.

Surprisingly however, Mr. Ubayo on the same day submitted an application for two (2) years Leave of Absence. The request was provisionally granted on 30th April, 2018. However, the Bauchi State University de-seconded Mr. Ubayo back to the Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi with immediate effect on 8th May, 2019. Mr. Ubayo refused to report back and assumed duty with the Polytechnic; instead, he submitted an application for withdrawal of his service from the Polytechnic with effect from 5th July, 2012 to enable him take up an appointment with the Federal University, Gashua. The said application was however withdrawn by Mr. Ubayo on 5th July, 2019 and replaced it with assumption of duty in the Polytechnic with effect from the same date (5th July, 2019).

Thereafter, on 30th October, 2019 Mr. Ubayo re-submitted another letter for withdrawal of his service by giving 3 months’ notice with effect from 1st November, 2019 – 31st January, 2020. The Polytechnic Management graciously granted provisional approval to his request with effect from 1st February, 2020 subject to ratification by the Governing Council.

However, before the expiration of the three (3) months’ notice given by Mr. Ubayo, the Polytechnic Management received a report of misconduct connected with forgery of official documents from the Bauchi State University. The matter was immediately referred to the Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee (SSAP&DC). The Committee in the course of investigation invited Mr. Ubayo to appear before it to defend himself of the allegation but he failed to honour the invitation. Therefore, the SSAP&DC in its report recommended that the earlier provisional approval for withdrawal of service granted to Mr. Ubayo be withdrawn pending determination of the matter.

The Council at its meeting held on 12th December, 2020 directed the withdrawal of the earlier Provisional approval for withdrawal of service granted and further directed that an investigation Committee be constituted to investigate the matter and also accord Mr. Ubayo with the opportunity to defend himself on the allegation. The investigation Committee was therefore constituted on 17th December, 2020 and it swung into action immediately. While the Committee was investigating the matter, Mr. Ubayo absconded from duty in the month of February, 2020. He was invited to appear before the Committee four (4) times but he refused to honour all the invitations and failed to disclose his whereabouts. Instead of him to appear before the Investigation Committee, the Polytechnic Management received a letter from a Law Firm claiming that they were solicitors to Mr. Ubayo and that their client was in receipt of invitation letters from the Investigation Committee but informed the Polytechnic that their client would not honour the invitation as he had already instituted an action against the Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi before the National Industrial Court of Nigeria and the matter was yet to be determined.

Consequently, the Governing Council at its 100th Regular Meeting directed that legal action be taken against Mr. Ubayo. Therefore, presently there is a court action between Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi and Mr. Ubayo Juji. As such, pending the determination of the case, Mr. Ubayo is still a bonafide staff of the Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi.

It is hoped that the above information meets your requirement, please.

Thank you,

Sgd.

Haj. Rakiya U. Maleka

REGISTRAR”

The information detailed in Exhibits D7 and D9 led the 1st Defendant to query the Claimant through Exhibit D10. In this exhibit, the 1st Defendant asked the Claimant to clarify how he achieved a promotion to Deputy Registrar while on secondment at Bauchi State University, and to address allegations of forging a letter of transfer of service, which was the basis for his promotion. The Claimant subsequently provided his own explanation via Exhibit C15 and also through his solicitors in Exhibits C16 and C17. Both the Claimant's response and his solicitors' letters indicated that the Claimant could not provide an explanation and advised that any actions related to complaints from the Claimant’s former employers be suspended due to two pending cases between the Claimant and his former employer. For reference, I reproduce Exhibits D10, C15, C16, and C17 respectively:

Exhibit D10 reads thus:

“From: Registrar To: Ubayo Juji

FUGA/REG/PER/SSP 1009 Date: November 24, 2022

REQUEST FOR EXPLANATION

On assumption of duty, you submitted a Provisional Approval of withdrawal of Service from Federal Polytechnic Bauchi dated November 27 2019. The Polytechnic, however, has notified the University that the Provisional approval of withdrawal of Service was introverted by the Polytechnic’s Governing Council on December 12, 2020 and you were duly informed.

Federal Polytechnic Bauchi also informed the University that you are still a binafide staff of the polytechnic based in an ongoing case in a competent Court of jurisdiction in Nigeria, until the determination of the matter by the Court.

Furthermore, the University was educated by the Bauchi State University, Dadau that the letter of promotion you tendered to the Federal University Gashua which was dated August 8, 2016, showing your promotion to the rank of Deputy Registrar with effect from October 1, 2014, was a product of forgery and was based on a purported letter of transfer of transfer from Federal Polytechnic Bauchi, which turned out to be fake.

As you are aware, the forgoing issues are all matter of misconduct, vacillating from Holding two full-time appointments, Concealment of information, Suppression of Records to Falsification of Records.

Consequently, you are required to explain in writing why disciplinary action should not be taken against you. Your reply should reach my desk before end of business on Monday November 28, 2022.

Dr Abubakar Mamuda

Registrar”

Exhibit C15 reads thus:

Federal University Gashua

Establishment Division

28^th November, 2022

The Registrar

Federal University Gashua

Yobe State

Sir,

RE: REQUEST FOR EXPLATION

Refer to yours on the above subject matter dated 24^th November 2022.

I write to respond to you as follows

i. That the matter between Federal Polytechnic Bauchi and Bauchi State University is in pendency before the National Industrial Court Bauchi.

ii. Therefore, it will be a contempt of Court to attempt to any of the false allegations concocted and dished out to you, and it was on that strength of that I summoned the two parties for deformation of character.

Consequently, my council have advised me not to engage in any ultra-vires since the issues sine qua non for suit of the two parties.

In conclusion, all the two parties Federal Polytechnic Bauchi and Bauchi State University were refrained from any action and directed to commit to the final determination of the two courts what more of the onlooker. Had there any issues, you would have been communicated since 2018 without been sought for (that us court compliance from their end).

Finally, my counsel will equally intimate you soonest. Therefore, all allegation is false until proven by the Courts.

Thank you

Ubayo Juji ”

Exhibit C16 reads thus:

“ 28/11/2022

The Registrar

Federal University Gashua

Yobe State

Sir,

RE: REQUEST FOR EXPLANATION

We are counsel representing Ubayo Juji your staff for the purpose of this correspondence who shall hereinafter be referred to as “our client” and on whose instruction we address this letter to you.

Our client handed over to us your letter dated and served on the 24/11/2022 requesting for some explanation as captured above in respect of some allegations by his former employers who have written to your school alleging falsification and forgery of documents.

Although our client has every reason to rebuff such spurious allegations against him by his former employers he however finds it pertinent in the circumstances to reserve any explanation at the moment the matter being ‘subjudice’ i.e pending in court.

We therefore contend on behalf of our client that considering the two pending court cases in respect of the same issue any explanation herein will only pre-empt the possible decision of the court and it is common principle of law and justice that whenever a court of and it is a common principle of law and justice that whenever a court of law is seized of a matter any other person or body of persons are expected to stay action pending the decision of the court.

Our client further says the same set of stories was concocted without success against our client by the same former employers when he was with the Bauchi State University before finally switching to this situation.

We hope our advice will be given due consideration in the interest of justice and fair play.

Find enclosed herewith copies of the courts’ processes being litigated upon for your perusal.

Thanks.

Sgd.

Yours faithfully,

Dahiru Abdhulhameed, Esq.

M.M. Ahmad, Esq.”

Subsequently, the Defendants formed an investigative committee to examine the suspicions regarding the Claimant’s employment records, and they invited the Claimant for a discussion. The Claimant attended the committee's third inaugural meeting, where he stated that he has a pending action against his former employer and, therefore, could not comment. Additionally, in paragraph 2 (x) of his Reply to the Statement of Defence, the Claimant admitted to appearing before the investigative committee and informed them of the pending action.

It is important to emphasize that the mention of a pending suit before this court in Exhibits C15, C16, and C17 is not connected to the employment record or the alleged infraction attributed to the Claimant in the query. The primary purpose of the case was to ascertain whether the Claimant could withdraw his services from Federal Polytechnic Bauchi. In this regard, the Court determined that the Claimant possesses an absolute right to resign, even amidst an investigation into an alleged infraction, and the Defendant in that case has no authority to reject the resignation.

During cross-examination, the Claimant himself acknowledged further details regarding the circumstances of his service record, secondment, and alleged transfer of service. I present these details below:

“I left Federal Polytechnic Bauchi on the Rank of Senior Assistant Registrar 1 In 2012. There is one rank between the rank and that of Deputy Registrar.

While secondment I was promoted at the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi to the rank of Principal Assistant Registrar.

After the secondment has expired I applied for leave of absence from the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi to Bauchi State University and 4 years was approved I served.

After the leave of absence, I proceeded to the 1^st Defendant on sabbatical leave as Deputy Registrar.

The 1^st Defendant appointed me as Deputy Registrar as Deputy Registrar on sabbatical. I was not appointed as Deputy Registrar by the Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi.

Before the sabbatical leave I was already promoted by Bauchi State University as Deputy Registrar which informed the decision of the 1^st Defendant to appoint as such.

As at the time I was still under the employment of the Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi.

The Responsibility of promoting a staff on secondment is on the employer.

At all material time the 1^st Defendant believe that I was due for employment to the rank of deputy Registrar based on the letter of promotion I presented to her.

My appointment does not require confirmation.

My request for withdrawal of service was rejected by the Federal Polytechnic in 2019 and sued them in the year 2020 before the Court.

I did not inform the 1^st Defendant of the legal tussle between me and the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi. The 1^st Defendant got the information of the tussle from the Federal Polytechnic Bauchi.”

Based on the aforementioned reasons, the Claimant was found to have breached the 1^st Defendant’s conditions of service, leading to his summary dismissal on December 20, 2022.

Considering the aforementioned points, a comprehensive examination of the facts and evidence presented thus far indicates that, although the Claimant has had several opportunities to present his case to his employers, he has been notably evasive. On multiple occasions before his testimony, the Claimant failed to clarify how he managed to secure a promotion while on secondment. The evidence before this Court regarding his alleged promotion during secondment includes a letter from Bauchi State University, marked as Exhibit D7. This document suggests that the Claimant allegedly submitted a fraudulent letter of transfer of service to the 1st Defendant, thereby positioning himself as a permanent staff member, which seemingly facilitated his promotion. Based on Exhibits D7 and D9, as previously outlined, no rational employer would reasonably choose to retain such an employee. Consequently, the Claimant’s counsel’s argument regarding hearsay in relation to the contents of Exhibits D7 and D9 is irrelevant. Nonetheless, this court remains aware of the legal principles concerning the probative value of a document submitted as evidence by someone other than its creator, which typically holds little evidentiary weight. Refer to the Court’s prior decision in Adewale v. Olaifa (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1330) 478 @ Pp. 511-512, paras. H-C.

The central issue, however, is whether the Claimant concealed and suppressed his service record. It is documented that the Claimant has had opportunities to present his case through requests for explanations or queries, as well as during the subsequent investigations, which he himself acknowledged attending. Therefore, the following points remain undisputed:

a) The Claimant was asked to provide an explanation regarding a series of misconduct allegations made against him by his former employers. (See Exhibit C7)

b) The investigative committee, before recommending dismissal, also invited the Claimant to present his case, and the Claimant complied. Refer to Exhibit D12 and Paragraph 2 (x) of the Claimant’s Reply to the Defendants’ Joint Statement of Defence.

The Claimant therefore cannot claim denial of fair hearing even after admitting he was accorded all the opportunity to be heard. I agree with the Defendants’ learned counsel submission that fair hearing only entails according all the opportunity to be heard. See also the Apex Court’s decision in Olayioye v. Oyelaran (2019) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1662) 351 @ P. 373, paras. C-H.

Based on the facts and evidence presented, the Claimant, through his own statements, not only misrepresented himself to the Defendants as a full-time employee of Bauchi State University, but also acknowledged being promoted to the position of Deputy Registrar at Bauchi State University while on secondment, implying he held two full-time positions. Consequently, I firmly believe that these circumstances provide sufficient grounds for the Defendants to dismiss the Claimant on the basis of concealing and suppressing records. Therefore, I affirmatively answer issue one (1) and resolve it against the Claimant. I so hold.

Issue 2

Was the Claimant's summary dismissal lawful?

This issue primarily revolves around the legality of the Claimant’s summary dismissal. It is undisputed that the Claimant was engaged in a statutory employment relationship with the 1st Defendant before his dismissal. It is a well-established legal principle that the termination of employment with statutory flavor must adhere to the procedures prescribed by the statute. The Supreme Court, per Amina Adamu Augie, J.S.C. (as he then was), held in Umera v. N.R.C. (2022) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1838) 349 at Pp.395-396, paras. E-E as follows:

“Employment with statutory backing must be terminated in the way and manner prescribed by that statute. Any other manner of termination of employment that is inconsistent with the relevant statute is null and void and of no effect. U.B.N. Ltd. v. Ogboh (supra).”

The Claimant’s learned counsel argued that the Claimant’s dismissal breached the 1st Defendant’s conditions of service. Furthermore, the counsel contended that the dismissal contravened Chapter 7 (Discipline) Paragraphs 7.0 (a), (b), (c), (d) (xiv), (e) (vii), (e) (ix), and (e) (xi) on pages 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46 of the Defendants’ conditions of service regarding staff discipline procedures. In response, the Defendants’ learned counsel asserted that the Claimant’s dismissal was a summary dismissal due to suppression and concealment of records. The Defendant’s counsel referred to Chapter 2 Paragraph (d), (i c), and sub-paragraph (ii) of Exhibit C24. Additionally, the counsel noted that given the circumstances of the Claimant’s dismissal, the extensive procedure outlined in Chapter 2 was not required to be followed.

It is instructive to note that parties are bound by the terms of their employment contract. Thus, where it is shown that termination of the employment was done in accordance with those terms, the contract is said to have ended even in the case of statutory employment. The law further recognises the sanctity of terms of contract of employment. See LAKE CHAD RESEARCH INSTITUTE & Anor v. FRANCIS NDEFOH (1997) 3 NWLR (Pt. 491) 72 @ P. 79, para. E.

In this case, the Claimant was summarily dismissed for supressing and concealing facts in relation to his service record which he used to gain appointment and promotion with the 1^st Defendant. The letter of dismissal (Exhibit D11) reads thus:

“ December 20, 2022

Mr Ubayo Juji (SSP 1003)

Deputy Registrar

School of Postgraduate Studies

Federal University Gashau

Yobe State

LETTER OF DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE

I write to inform you that the Governing Council at its 24^th Regular meeting held on Tuesday, December 20, 2022 considered the report of the Appointments, Promotion and Disciplinary Committee in which you were found to have violated Chapter 2(d) and Chapter 7 (c) (iv & xiv) of the Regulations governing the conditions of service of senior staff of Federal University Gashua and for that reason approved the recommendation for your dismissal from the service of the University. Please note that the sections indicated above bothers on concealment and suppression of records respectively.

Accordingly, you are hereby dismissed from service of Federal University Gashua with effect from December 20, 2022.

You are therefore, requested to handover all University property in your custody to the Registrar, inclusive of your ID card.

Dr. Abubakar Mamuda

Registrar”

Chapter 2 Paragraphs (d) of Exhibit C24 reads thus:

“Chapter 2 (d) Ineligibility for Appointment

(i) No person shall be eligible for appointment to a post in the University, whether as an established or temporary employee if he/she has:

a. Within the last five years completed a term of imprisonment for a criminal offence.

b. Been dismissed or terminated on grounds of misconduct or inefficiency from any post in any university or organization

c. Knowingly made a false statement in a material particularly when applying for a post.

(ii) any person who has obtained employment by concealing information as in (d) (i) above shall be liable to summary dismissal and /or prosecution”

In addition, the Claimant’s appointment letter (Exhibit C3) further contains a condition to this effect. Particularly at clause vi. It provides as follows:

“ Date: 18th October, 2019

Ubayu Juji,

Federal Polytechnic Bauchi,

Bauchi State.

OFFER OF APPOINTMENT

With reference to your application for employment in the Federal University, Gashua. I am pleased to convey to you the Vice-Chancellor’s approval of your appointment as Principal Assistant Registrar in the Registry Department on salary CONTISS 13, STEP 9, with effect from the day you assume duty, and the appointment is subject to the following conditions:

i. That you will be governed by the Conditions of Service as well as the laws, rules and regulations of the University as approved by Governing Council or the Vice-Chancellor on its behalf;

ii. That the appointment shall be on probation for two (2) years after which it may be confirmed if your service and conduct are adjudged to be satisfactory, or the probation extended;

iii. That you will submit evidence of official release from your employer, if you are currently employed;

iv. That your duties and responsibilities will be assigned to you by your Head of Department;

v. Please note that the University cannot provide accommodation to you and thus you will be required to make your private arrangement;

vi. That the University reserves the right to terminate your appointment if at any time it is discovered that the information given by you is false or any of the credentials presented by you is fake;

vii. That your assumption of duty is conditional upon the presentation of a medical report/certificate of fitness from a recognized Government Hospital which is subject to verification by the University Medical Officer or a Hospital/Clinic designated by the University for this purpose;

viii. That either you or the University reserve the right to terminate the appointment by giving three (3) months’ notice or payment of three (3) months’ salary in lieu of notice.

2. Please respond in writing within three weeks if this offer is acceptable to you indicating therein the date you intend to assume duty.

3. Please accept my congratulations.

A. B. Shehu, PhD

Ag. Registrar” (underlined for emphasis)

There is no doubt that the Claimant in this case misrepresented or concealed his employment record from the 1st Defendant, which led to his employment. It is evident that the foundation of the Claimant’s employment was invalid from the start. Therefore, it is unreasonable for the Claimant or his counsel to argue a denial of fair hearing, given the overwhelming evidence leading to the undeniable conclusion that the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant was void from the outset.

In paragraph 5.08 of the final written address, the Claimant’s learned counsel argued that the Claimant was deprived of a fair hearing and was not given adequate opportunities to defend himself. The counsel also pointed out that the Claimant did not receive any query before his dismissal, as stipulated by Chapter 7.0 (d) of the Regulations and Conditions of Service. Nevertheless, it has been established that the Claimant’s summary dismissal was due to the concealment and suppression of records, as outlined in Chapter 2(d) and Chapter 7 (c) (iv & xiv) of the Regulations governing the conditions of service for senior staff at Federal University Gashua. Therefore, the application of Chapter 7.0 (d) of the Regulations is not applicable in this context. I so hold.

The most recent decision by the apex Court in Daramola v. F.U.T., Yola (2026) 4 NWLR 189 (P. 202-203, paras. C-G) provides valuable insights into the grounds and procedures for the dismissal of senior staff from employment at the Federal University of Technology. It held as follows:

In the instant case, the reason for the dismissal of the appellant was his absence from duty as shown in exhibit B. Exhibits G and K, which set the tone for the appellant’s dismissal also accused him of absenting himself from duty. By the provisions of section 14(1) of the 1 st respondent’s establishment Act, a member of the academic staff of the 1 st respondent may be removed or dismissed from his employment on the ground of misconduct. The Regulations Governing the Conditions of Service of Senior Staff of the Federal University of Technology, Yola, defines “misconduct” to include “absence from duty without permission”. Although, section 14(1) of the Federal Universities of Technology Act does not specify how notice is to be given to a member of staff who the Council has seen reason to dismiss, neither does the Regulations (exhibit H) contain such a provision, it is enough if a member of staff under investigation receives some sort of notification or communication of the allegations leveled against him or if the University Council has conveyed to him the nature of the accusation against him. The appellant was given notification of the allegation against him by exhibit F. He gave his reply and told his side of the story by Exhibit G. Due to the unsatisfactory nature of his response; his case was taken up by the Appointments and Promotions Committee of the University Council. After duly looking into his case, the Committee considered a dismissal as the appropriate punishment and recommended same to the Council, which in turn approved the decision. Thus, notifying the appellant of the allegations against him, requesting him to respond to the query issued to him and considering his response, satisfied the fair hearing requirement. (Underlined for emphasis)

The Claimant's argument and submission regarding the alleged denial of a fair hearing are equally misplaced. It is important to note that before the Claimant's dismissal, he was served with a query and a request for explanation via Exhibit C7. Additionally, the Claimant was invited to appear before the investigating Committee, which he did (see Exhibit D12). This Committee recommended the Claimant's dismissal to the 2nd Defendant, who acted upon the recommendation. See Exhibit D14. In my humble yet firm view, this satisfies the requirements of a fair hearing in this case. I so hold.

In conclusion, the Claimant's summary dismissal is upheld, and his case is entirely dismissed due to its lack of merit. Judgment is entered accordingly.

I make no order for costs.

…………………………………………

HON. JUSTICE MUSTAPHA TIJJANI