IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM

 

DATE: 19TH MAY, 2026                            

SUIT NO: NICN /ABJ/09/2025

 

BETWEEN: 

 

MR. NGBEDE MOSES FREEMAN                                   - CLAIMANT

 

AND

 

BOYIDA SYNERGY LIMITED                               -                     DEFENDANT

       

REPRESENTATION:

G. I. Enenche Esq., for The Claimant

Daniel G. Odubitan Esq., with Ihite Emmanuel Esq.; and Olusola Oguntimehin Esq., for The Defendant

 

JUDGEMENT

 

  1. The Claimants via General Form of Complaint filed on the 17th day of January, 2025 commenced this suit against the Defendant seeking the following reliefs:

 

  1. A DECLARATION that the purported termination of the Claimant’s employment as Key Account Officer with the Defendant vide a letter from the Defendant dated 13th May. 2024 was unlawful and in gross violation of Section 11 of the Labour Act, Cap L1, LFN 2004. 

 

  1. AN ORDER directing the Defendant to compute and pay all his salaries and his allowances from date of termination of his contract of employment till the date the judgment of the court would be given.
  2. AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the sum of N780, 000.00 (Seven Hundred and Eighty Thousand Naira) which is the salary due to him for the month of May-July 2024.

 

  1. AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the sum of N699, 999.00 (Six Hundred and Ninety-Nine Thousand, Nine Hundred and Ninety-Nine Naira) which is the salary allowances due to him for the month of May-July 2024.

 

  1. AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the sum of N20, 000, 000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) for general damages and adequate compensation to the Claimant for traumatic experience.

 

  1. AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the sum of N5, 000, 000.00 (Five Million Naira) being cost of litigation of this suit.

 

CLAIMANT’S CASE

 

  1. The case of the Claimant is that he was employed by the Defendant vide a contract of employment dated 13th July 2023 with a monthly salary of N260,000.00 (two Hundred and Sixty Thousand Naira) and that he was the Key Account Officer of the Defendant until 13th May 2024, when the Defendant terminated his employment without prior notice, warning, or query which is in violation of Section 11 (1) and (2) of the Labour Act, Cap L1, LFN 2004 and his contract of employment.

 

DEFENDANT’S CASE

 

  1. The Defendant in opposition filed its statement of defence on the 13th day of May 2025 though belated but regularized and averred that Claimant’s employment was terminated in accordance with the clear provisions of the contract of employment and that it adopted best practice in Labour relation. It equally stated that the Claimant’s conduct showed gross misconduct, negligence, poor performance and inability to lead other staff under him resulted to substantial loss of the Defendant’s distributors stock and huge sum of money which amounted to breach of trust. The Defendant further stated that prior to termination of Claimant’s employment, verbal warnings had been issued to him on the 27th September 2023 and 5th November 2023 where he  was urged to tidy up his team’s laity. Also, that the Claimant was given an opportunity to explain his supervisory misconduct and his failure to maintain strict controls and negligence in oversight function as key account manager has caused the Defendant’s substantial loss to the sum of Eleven Million Nine Hundred and Ten Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty (N11, 910, 750. 00)  which amounted to breach of trust, an official query was sent to him via his email on the 25th of April 2024 and the Claimant failed to provide written explanation for this breach of duty as expected until after 3 weeks before he sent in his response dated 14th May 2024 which was not satisfactory to the Defendant leading to the issuance of a letter of termination dated 13th May 2024 him. Defendant continued and averred that if the Claimant has not breached the duty of trust, he would ordinarily have been entitled to a month’s notice or a month salary in lieu of notice. Defendant averred that it is not indebted to the Claimant for the months of May to July 2024 as Claimant has not earned those months and the salary could not have accrued to the Claimant, as the Defendant complied with the provisions of Labour Act and the Claimant’s employment was lawfully terminated in line with his contract of employment.

 

COMMENCEMENT OF HEARING

 

  1. The Claimant opened his case on the 9th of June 2025 and testified as CW1 by adopting his Witness Statement on Oath dated 17th of January 2025, as his oral evidence-in-chief at the trial. Claimant tendered Exhibits Freeman A-E and was cross-examined by the Defendant’s Counsel and Claimant’s response to his query was admitted and marked as Exhibit 1 and thereafter his case was closed. On the 11th November, 2025, Defendant opened its defence and called one Timilehin Odunwo who testified as DW1. He adopted his witness Statement on Oath dated 13th of May 2025 as his oral evidence. Exhibit Odunwo 1-5 was admitted through him and he was subsequently cross-examined by the Defendant’s Counsel and subsequently Defendant’s case was closed.  The case was adjourned for adoption of Final Written Addresses.

 

  1. In line with the provisions of Order 45 of the NICN (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, the Defendant also filed its Final Written Address on the 2nd of December 2025. The Claimant initially filed his Final Written Address out of time on the 12th of February 2026. However, by a motion for extension of time dated and filed 12th of February 2026, and moved on the 20th of April 2026, the Court granted an order deeming their Final Written Address as properly filed and served. The Defendant filed a Reply on Points of Law on the 23rd of February 2026.

 

 

 

DEFENDANT’S WRITTEN SUBMISSION

 

  1. On the 2nd day of December 2025, the Defendant filed its final written address franked by Learned Counsel Daniel G. Odubitan Esq, of The Advocates Law Firm wherein he formulated two issues for the Court’s determination viz;

 

  1. Whether ‘termination of the Claimant’s employment was in line with the provisions of the Labour Act and the employment letter dated 13th of July 2023? 
  2. Whether the Claimant has by documents tendered and admitted in evidence by this Court vis a vis the defence of the Defendant establish or prove his case in the Complaint to enable him be entitled to the relief sought therein?

 

  1. On issue one learned Counsel started by submitting that the relationship that exist between the Claimant and the Defendant is a master and servant relationship or employer and employee relationship which falls in the category of private employment thus either the employer or the employee has the absolute right of termination of the employment for any reason as long as same is in compliance with the Law of land and employment letter. Counsel relied on the cases of CBN v. Mrs Agnes M. Igwillo [2007] 14 NWLR (Part 1054) 393 @ 419 A to 420 A-C; U.T.C. (Nig) Ltd v. Peters [2009] LPELR-8426(CA) (PP. 18-19 Paras. F). It is the submission of Counsel that a Court of law typically will not declare a termination "null and void" just because no reason was given. He cited the case of Osisanya v. Afribank Nig. Plc and Obanye v. Union Bank where the Supreme Court reinforced the principle and held that an employer is entitled to terminate an employment for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all, provided the termination follows the contract. Counsel also submitted that a person who hires must ensure he afford the other he fires (where it is expressly stated in the employment letter) adequate notice and fair hearing before he fires him as provided by Section 11 of the Labour Act. Counsel placed reliance on the case of Angel Spinning & Dyeing Ltd v. Ajah [2000] LPELR-10724(CA) (Pp. 13-16 Paras. D).

 

  1. Counsel equally submitted that Section 11 (1) of the Labour Act, is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this suit or any Suit where the Claimant and the Defendant executes employment letter which spelt out the modus operandis of claimant’s works, the code of conduct binding on him, the need to act diligently, the immediate termination of his employment if committed breach of trust and in the interest to his job and are both therefore bonded by the terms therein. He cited in support of his position the case of The Market Research Consultancy Ltd v. Amuabunosi & Anor [2019] LPELR-47841(CA) (Pp. 22-24 Paras. A-A) and Section 11 subsection 1 and 5 of Labour Act and Exhibit freeman A & E.   Counsel further submitted that the above clause ‘of on month salary in lieu of termination’ will only be enforceable against the Defendant where the Claimant’s appointment or employment was not terminated as a result of committing ‘breach of trust’. The express terms of “Exhibit freeman-A” is clear and unambiguous hence be given its literary meaning and interpretation as the said document speaks for itself. He relied on the cases of Star Finance & Property Ltd. & Anor v. NDIC [2012] LPELR-8394(CA) (Pp. 22-23 Paras. E); Oguejiofor v. Access Bank [2020] LPELR-49583(CA) (Pp. 44-45 Paras. B). Counsel stated that the Defendant, in the interest of justice and fairness, gave the Claimant adequate time to ‘provide a written explanation of breach of duty and the measure he had put in place to right the wrong’, by serving him with ‘Formal Query’ on the 25th April 2024, to be respond to within 24 hours but the Claimant’s shallow ‘Response’ was on the 14th May 2024 (replied after 13 days) without any concrete, convincing and/or viable explanation to exonerate him of the breach. Counsel submitted that the documents speak for itself. He relied on the case of Amadi v. Owhonda [2021] LPELR-54590(CA) (P. 13, Paras. B-E), Debs v. Cenico Ltd. [1986] 3NWLR Pt.846 Pp.853-854; Angel Spinning & Dyeing Ltd v. Ajah [2000] LPELR-10724(CA) (Pp. 13-16 Paras. D).

 

  1. Counsel posited that notwithstanding the express provisions of the Labour Act, parties are at liberty to enter into agreement and bound by the tenet of the agreement entered into between them, such terms may suspend the right to ‘one-month notice’ or ‘one-month salary in lieu of termination’ and/or state that no notice whatsoever in the event of commission of any infraction as in the instant case, shown in the employment letter. He relied on the case of The Governing Board of the Nigerian National Merit Award & Anor v. Ayoola & Ors [2022] LPELR-57173(CA) (PP. 38-41 Paras. B); UBN Plc v. Alhaji Ajabule & Anor [2011] 18 NWLR (Part. 1278). Finally, it is the learned Counsel’s submission of issue one that the burden of prove is on the Claimant who is alleging unlawful termination of his employment but failed with all unsubstantiated facts and evidence he supplied this Court to shift the burden on the defendant and make this Court hear in his favor. He referred the Court to Section 137 of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended).

 

  1. Respecting issue two, Counsel submitted that the totality of the Claimant’s pleading, documents tendered and admitted in evidence has not in any way proved his case to afford the Court the grant of any of the Reliefs sought on the face of his Complaint. Counsel argued that Section 11, which the Claimant predicated his reliefs upon, is clear and unambiguous as per whether it is in all cases that a notice must be served on employee before termination of his employment. He contended that the entire provisions of Section 11 must be read and interpreted conjunctively and not disjunctively as all sub-Sections in pari pasu, to enable appreciation of the intendment of the Legislation. That Section 11, allows Parties to Labour Law contract have and be bound by their own contractual terms. Counsel submitted that Court does not also possess the prerogative to interprets the provisions of this Law or any enactment whatsoever against its original meaning/intention of the Legislature as same is clear and unambiguous and that the Claimant purported during cross examination that he received allowances twice, since he joined the Defendant’s employment without tendering any document whatsoever to substantiate the claim neither did he lead any document in evidence during examination chief to that effect. He submitted that, that line of testimony and the Reliefs 1 & 2 sought by the Claimant are not substantiated therefore fell like pack of cards and should be thrown out without being accorded any probative value whatsoever. He cited in support of his assertion the cases of Nwaeke Solomon Okechukwu & Ors v. Chicason Group of Companies Ltd [2020]; UBA Plc v. Mage Ltd & Anor [2017]. Counsel again submitted that the termination of Claimant in the eye of the Law is lawful and in strict adherence with the terms of the employment letter and Section 11 of the Labour Act. Counsel relied on the case of Ifeta v. S.P.D.C. (Nig.) Ltd. [2006] LPELR 1436 (SC); [2006] 8 NWLR (Pt. 983) 585 Pp. 619-620, Paras. H-A; Maja v. Stocco [1968] 1 ALL WLR 141. Counsel added that the Court will not be move by sentiments because Courts does not act on sentiment or sympathy have no place where the law or facts is against a party. He placed reliance on the case of Barigha-Amange v. Adumein [2016] 13 NWLR [Pt. 1530] 349 CA. Counsel argued that the Reliefs 5 and 6 sought by the Claimant are not usually awarded as a matter of course but such must be substantiated with facts and evidence with justifiable reason in law. He submitted that the Claimant’s termination was justified and thus he was not entitled to Reliefs 5 and 6. He relied on the cases Balogun v. Union Bank [2016] LPELR-41442(CA) (PP. 18-19 Paras. E); 7up Bottling Company Plc v. Augustus [2012] LPELR-20873(CA) (Pp. 36-37 Paras. C).

 

  1. On the Defendant’s pleaded documents - (i.) Official Query and (ii.) Minute of Meeting which are admitted in evidence by this Court but challenged on ground that (a) proper foundation with respect to certificate of compliance in accordance with Section 84 of evidence Act was not tendered alongside the Document sought to be tendered and (b) the said Official Query was not listed on the List of Documents filed alongside the Statement defence. Counsel submitted that the bedrock of admissibility of any documents before the Court is whether that document is relevant or not, where the document is relevant it behooves on the trial Court to admit the documents in evidence. He placed reliance on Section 14 of the Evidence Act 2011 and the case of Olowolaramo v. Umechukwu [2003] 2 NWLR (Part 805) 537 and urged the Court to flash its microscopic search light and accord probative value on (i) official query and (ii.) Minute of Meeting juxtaposing same with Exhibits Odunwo1, Odunwo2 and Exhibit Odunwo3 respectively to evaluate and make inference on the Defendant’s Defence in the final judgment. He relied on the cases of Felix George & Company Ltd v. Afinotan & Ors [2014] LPELR-22982(CA) (P. 51, Paras. C-E); Usen v. State [2012] LPELR-20063(CA) (Pp. 35-36, Paras. E-A); Skye Bank & Anor v. Akinpelu [2010] LPELR-3073(SC) (Pp. 48-49, Paras. E-B). In conclusion Counsel posited that based on the facts and circumstances of this suit, the evidence and judicial authorities cited, he urges this Court to refuse all the claims of the Claimant and the reliefs sought for lacking in substance and dismiss this suit with cost in the interest of justice.

 

CLAIMANT’S WRITTEN SUBMISSION

 

  1. On the 12th day of February 2025, the Claimant’s filed his final written address franked by Learned Counsel G. I. Enenche Esq, of Choicevine Legal & Consulting though belated but regularized wherein Counsel on his behalf raised three (3) issues for this Court’s determination to wit;

 

  1. Whether the Defendant lawfully terminated the Claimant’s employment in accordance with the contract of employment and Section 11 of the Labour Act.
  2. Whether the evidence of DW1 and the exhibits tendered and admitted through him are competent, credible, and have any probative value. 
  3. Whether the Claimant has proved his entitlement to the reliefs sought before this Honourable Court.

 

  1. On Issue one, Counsel submitted that Defendant’s contention that it had an unfettered right to terminate the Claimant’s employment at will is only sustainable where no reason is given. He equally submitted that in the instant case, he Defendant expressly gave reasons in Exhibit Freeman B, namely misconduct, loss, and low productivity. Once reasons are given, the employer bears the burden of justification. He relied on the cases of Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Ltd v. Olarewaju [2008] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 1 @ 19–20; Fakuade v. O.A.U.T.H. Complex Management Board [1993] LPELR-1233(SC). It is the argument of Counsel that the Defendant’s reliance on Section 11 of the Labour Act is misconceived noting that Section 11 regulates notice; it does not override express contractual provisions as Exhibit Freeman A provides for one month’s notice or salary in lieu after probation. He submitted that the Defendant neither issued notice nor paid salary in lieu. He relied on the case of Oforishe v. Nigerian Gas Co. Ltd [2018] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1602) 35 @ 56. 

 

  1. On issue two, Counsel stated that DW1 admitted under cross-examination that he is not an employee of the Defendant, but a legal practitioner acting under Exhibit Odunwo-1, executed after the cause of action arose. He also submitted that a witness must testify from personal knowledge. He cited in support of his assertion the case of Anyaebosi v. R.T. Briscoe (Nig.) Ltd [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) 84 @ 97, and Majekodunmi v. Primera Africa Finance Group Ltd [2018] LPELR-47020 (CA) and urged the Court to discountenance the averments contained in DW1’s Statement of Defense and his testimony before the Court, as they constitute hearsay evidence and are consequently unreliable and devoid of probative value. Counsel went further to state that assuming without conceding that DW1 was in the employment of the Defendant prior to the events giving rise to this suit, his testimony remains fundamentally incompetent reiterating that DW1 has not disclosed any official position within the Defendant’s company beyond his role as a legal practitioner and principal partner of Emporium Attorneys. Counsel also submitted that Exhibit Odunwo-3 is a photocopy tendered without laying foundation and it therefore has no probative value. He referred the Court to the case of Ecobank v. Grace [2025] LPELR-81253(CA). Counsel continued and submitted that Exhibit Odunwo-4 is an electronically generated document and no Certificate of Compliance was tendered pursuant to Section 84(2) of the Evidence Act. He placed reliance on the case of Kubor v. Dickson [2013] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1345) 534 @ 578.

 

  1. Regarding issue three, Counsel submitted that the Claimant’s monthly salary of ?260,000.00 (Two Hundred and Sixty Thousand Naira) was expressly admitted by the Defendant in Exhibit Odunwo-5. Although no formal letter was issued to the Claimant regarding the payment of ?233,333.00 (Two Hundred and Thirty-Three Thousand, Three Hundred and Thirty-Three Naira) as allowance, the said sum was consistently paid to the Claimant on a monthly basis, separate and distinct from his salary. DW1, not being the maker or custodian of the relevant records, is therefore not competent to deny this fact. Counsel relied on the case of Mobil Producing Nig. Unlt & Anor v. Udo [2008] LPELR-8440(CA). He urge the Court to enter judgment in favour of the Claimant and grant all the reliefs sought.

 

DEFENDANT’S REPLY ON POINT OF LAW

 

  1. Responding to the Claimant’s final written submissions, Counsel on behalf of the Defendant filed reply on point of law dated 27th February 2025 and submitted that the Claimant has not proved his case by the totality of the issues raised or by preponderance of evidence. Counsel equally submitted that the primary purpose of a written address is to summarize the entire case from a party’s perspective as the written address allows counsel to tie together all the disparate pieces of evidence, highlight the most salient points, and demonstrate how they support their client’s claims or defence. Counsel relied on the case of Omisore & Anor v. Aregbesola & Ors [2015] LPELR-24803 (SC). Counsel argued that the Claimant misinterprets the law when he submitted that the unfettered power of the Defendant to terminate the Claimant from its employment need not come with any reason but once reason is proffered the onus to prove these reasons lies on the Defendant. Counsel submitted that assuming without conceding the Claimant’s argument was right, Defendant during the examination of its sole witness proved the reason of termination of the Claimant’s employment. Counsel relied on the case of 7up Bottling Co. Plc v. Augustus [2012] LPELR-20873 (CA) and argued that the Claimant’s employment was not terminated but dismissed for the commission of a gross misconduct. He submitted that dismissal is often summary meaning it takes effect immediately without prior notice or payment in lieu of notice and that a dismissed employee typically forfeits certain benefits. He placed reliance on the cases of Olasunkanmi v. UBN Plc [2022] LPELR-59296; Unity Bank Plc v. Chori [2021] LPELR-55270 (CA); Olaniyan & Ors v. Unilag & Anor [1985] LPELR-2565 (SC). Counsel contended that on the one hand Claimant relies on the testimony of DW1 while urging the Court to discountenance the entire evidence of DW1 without proving the strength of his weakness on the preponderance of evidence. Counsel submitted that the law is clear that a plaintiff is expected to rely on the strength of his case and not the weakness of the case of the Defense. He relied on the case of Ibrahim v. Kolo [2025] LPELR-80840(CA) and urged the Court to discountenance Claimant’s Counsel argument on the issues together with the cases cited. In furtherance to the above Counsel submitted that when an employee is dismissed on the ground of committing an infraction, he is not entitled to any a month salary and/or one month in lieu of salary. He cited the case of Keystone Bank v. Afolabi [2017] LPELR-47390 (CA). Regarding Claimant’s submission that the Court should not accord any probative value to the testimonies of DW1 as it amounts to hearsay because he is not in the employ of the Defendant. Defendant’s Counsel submitted that Claimant failed to understand the concept of corporate operations which is to the fact that the Defendant is an artificial corporate legal entity that cannot appear in Court physically being an abstract legal personality but can only be represented in circumstance by its staff, directors, legal representatives and shareholders. He posited that a corporation can give evidence through its officers/agents who are conversant with the fact. He cited in support of his assertion the cases of Anyaebosi v. R.T Briscoe (Nig) Ltd [1987] LPELR-506 (SC); Ishola v. Societe Generale Bank (Nig) [1997] LPELR-1547 (SC). It is the submission of Counsel that testimonies given on behalf of the Defendant by its representative or agent (including the power of attorney tendered and admitted) are tenable and ought to be accorded probative value. He cited in support of his assertion Section 175 of the Evidence Act 2011, and Odogwu v. The State [2009] LPELR-8506. With respect to the sum of N233, 333.00 being the money distinct and separate from his salary which he received every month, Counsel submitted that the burden of proof lies on the Claimant to prove his assertion. He cited Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 and the case of Dasuki v. FRN & Ors [2018] LPELR-43897(SC). Counsel argued that the case of Mobil Producing Nig. Ltd has nothing to do with the argument and submissions of the Counsel and again that in the Majekodummi case relied on by Claimant, the Court of Appeal held that the donee of the Power of Attorney cannot competently depose to facts not within his personal knowledge, particularly where such facts were merely narrated to him by the donor as the Court emphasized that a Power of Attorney does not convert hearsay into admissible evidence. Counsel submitted that this the Majekodumi does not apply to the instant case as the Defendant is a juristic person and it cannot speak, act or testify except through its officers, agents/donee. Thus, the DW1 evidence is not hearsay. However, learned Counsel posited that assuming without conceding that DW1 was not aware when the Plaintiff was employed or that led to the suit, the law is settled that whether or not transactions or supervised the process or testifies from company records kept in the ordinary course of business, his evidence is admissible. Counsel relied on the case of Chemiron Intl Ltd v. Stabilini Visinoni Ltd [2015] LPELR-45741 (CA). Counsel finally submitted that evidence of DW1 is credible and ought to be accorded probative value as a Court accords probative value to a piece of evidence when it finds that the evidence is relevant, reliable, credible and capable of assisting the Court in reaching a just determination.  He relied on the case of Maurice & Anor v. Ogbaga & Ors [2019] LPELR-4886 (CA). On the whole counsel urge the Court to hold that the submission of learned Counsel to the Claimant lacks merit, same should be discountenance and ultimately hold that the Claimant I not entitled to iota of the reliefs sought as his claims falls like packs of cards and therefore dismiss the case in favour of the Defendant and award cost against the Claimant.

 

 COURT’S DECISION

 

  1. I have reviewed the facts, evidence, and the comprehensive final written addresses submitted by learned Counsels for both parties. My examination has included a thorough study of all relevant court processes and the authorities cited therein. Furthermore, I have carefully listened to the testimonies of all witnesses presented by both sides. Before delving into the substantive merits of the case, it is imperative to first address a threshold legal question: 

Whether the Power of Attorney granted by the Defendant to DW1 confers upon him the right to testify on behalf of the Defendant, and consequently, the evidentiary value to be accorded to any documents tendered by DW1. 

 

  1. This preliminary determination is critical to the proper adjudication of the dispute between the parties. Counsel for the Claimant contended by submitting that a witness must testify from personal knowledge, relying significantly on the Court of Appeal's decision in Majekodunmi v. Primera Africa Finance Group Ltd [2018] LPELR-47020 (CA). In that case, while acknowledging the competence of a Power of Attorney donee to give evidence, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial Court's decision that the admissibility of such depositions must strictly comply with Sections 38, 39, and particularly Section 115 of the Evidence Act, 2011. The Court emphasized that Section 115(1) mandates affidavits to contain statements of fact and circumstances either from personal knowledge or from information believed to be true. Crucially, Section 115(3) and (4) of the Evidence Act require that when a deponent's belief is derived from sources other than personal knowledge, they must explicitly set forth the facts and circumstances forming the ground of their belief, including the name of the informant, and reasonable particulars regarding the informant, time, place, and circumstances of the information. The Court in Majekodunmi found that the Appellant's Attorney failed to provide such particulars, deposing to facts as if they were within his personal knowledge, which was deemed insufficient compliance with Section 115 Evidence Act. The Court further referenced Nwachukwu v. Awka Micro-Finance Bank Ltd [2016] LPELR- 41055 (CA) and Ude v. Nwara [1993] 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) 638, affirming that a Power of Attorney is merely a warrant to exercise powers on behalf of the donor, but the exercise of such powers, including giving evidence, must be within the limits of the law, especially the Evidence Act. Consequently, Claimant's Counsel submitted that DW1's testimony and evidence should be discountenanced as amounting to hearsay and non-compliant with the Evidence Act.

 

  1. In response, Counsel for the Defendant argued that the Claimant's position failed to appreciate the fundamental concept of corporate operations. The Defendant, being an artificial corporate legal entity, cannot appear physically in court. It can only be represented by its duly authorized staff, directors, legal representatives, or shareholders. Counsel submitted that a corporation is legally entitled to present evidence through its officers or agents who are conversant with the facts, or who are specifically empowered to act and testify on its behalf in litigation. A Power of Attorney is a formal legal instrument by which one person or entity empowers another to represent or act in their stead for specified purposes. This principle is well-established in law, as affirmed in cases such as Ibrahim v. Obaje [2019] 3 NWLR (Pt.1660) 389 and Abubakar v. Waziri [2008] 14 NWLR (Pt.1108) 507. Power of attorney can be granted by both individuals and corporations to an agent to perform various functions, including initiating legal actions, managing property, signing documents, or receiving rents. It serves as a practical mechanism for principals to delegate legal or financial matters when they are unable to handle them personally. The specific powers conferred upon the attorney are invariably delineated within the document itself. This Court, by virtue of Order 13 Rules 32 and 33 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, expressly permits an attorney or agent to sue or be sued in a representative capacity on behalf of a principal, provided a Power of Attorney has been duly executed granting such authority. For clarity, these Rules state:

“32. Where by these Rules, any act may be done by any party in any proceedings, such act, may be done either by the party in person, or by the party’s counsel, or by the party’s agent (unless an agent is expressly barred under these Rules).

 

33. If a power of attorney is executed by a principal and the agent is authorized to sue in a representative capacity on behalf of the principal, such an action must be brought in the name of the principal, that is, the donor of the power of attorney, indicating that the donor is suing through the named agent.” A careful examination of Exhibit Odunwo 1 reveals that a Power of Attorney was indeed duly executed by the Defendant in favour of DW1, appointing Timilehin Odunwo as the Donee. The relevant clauses of the Power of Attorney explicitly state:

 

"Hereby appoint Timilehin Odunwo to act AS MY TRUE AND LAWFUL ATTORNEY in my name and on my behalf, to do all as my personal assistant/witness related to complaint and/or issues related to Suit No: NICN /ABJ/09/2025 between Mr. Ngbede Moses Freeman v. Boyida Synergy Limited relating to the termination of the employment of the Claimant pending at the National Industrial Court FCT Abuja.

To act as witness during the hearing of the above suit.

To attend periodic Court session and give evidence based on the facts and documentary evidence released to him in furtherance to just determination and dispensation of this suit in the interest of justice."

 

  1. By virtue of Order 13 Rules 32 and 33 of the NICN (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, and considering the explicit terms of Exhibit Odunwo 1, I find and hold that the Defendant validly issued a Power of Attorney in favour of DW1. Consequently, DW1, as the duly appointed attorney, possesses the competence to give evidence in the course of this suit on behalf of the Defendant. This aligns with the principle enunciated in Majekodunmi (supra) that the competence of a donee of a Power of Attorney to testify is not generally in question. However, the more critical question before this Court, as rightly raised by the Claimant, pertains to the admissibility of the content of DW1's testimony under the strictures of the Evidence Act, particularly Sections 37, 38, and 115. Section 115 of the Evidence Act, 2011, as highlighted in Majekodunmi, imposes specific requirements for evidence not based on a witness's personal knowledge. While DW1 is authorized to "give evidence based on the facts and documentary evidence released to him," this phrase necessitates careful scrutiny. For any part of DW1's testimony that is not derived from his personal knowledge but from information "released to him" by the Defendant or other sources, Section 115(3) and (4) of the Evidence Act mandates that DW1 must explicitly set forth the facts and circumstances forming the ground of his belief, including the name of the informant, and reasonable particulars respecting the informant, the time, place, and circumstances of the information. Failure to comply with these provisions renders such portions of the testimony inadmissible as hearsay or otherwise non-compliant with the Evidence Act. The Court in Okeremute v. State [2021] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1803) 587 clarified that evidence is hearsay and inadmissible when its object is to establish the truth of what is contained in a statement made by a person not called as a witness. It is admissible only when it establishes the fact that the statement was made, not its truth, or when it is based on direct personal knowledge. In the present case, to the extent that DW1's testimony merely reiterates information "released to him" without fulfilling the specific disclosure requirements of Section 115(3) and (4) of the Evidence Act, such portions would indeed constitute hearsay or be otherwise inadmissible. Therefore, having carefully reviewed DW1's testimony, this Court finds that while DW1 was competent to testify, any part of his evidence that purports to establish the truth of facts not within his personal knowledge, and for which the specific sources and circumstances were not explicitly disclosed in compliance with Section 115 of the Evidence Act, is hereby discountenanced as inadmissible. However, documents properly tendered through DW1, which are inherently admissible and do not rely solely on his personal knowledge for their truth, remain admitted in evidence.

 

  1. Notwithstanding the foregoing determination regarding the admissibility of certain aspects of DW1's testimony, it is a fundamental principle of law that where a party seeks declaratory reliefs, as in the present case, the Claimant bears the burden of proving his case on the strength of his own evidence, and not merely on any perceived weakness in the defence. A declaratory relief must be established to the satisfaction of the Court, irrespective of any default of defence or admissions in the Defendant’s pleadings. The onus therefore rests squarely on the Claimant to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. This principle has been consistently upheld by appellate Courts, as seen in Olayiwola v. Minister, Fct & Ors [2021] LPELR – 53044 (CA) and Glo v. Fatmax Global Ventures Ltd [2020] LPELR – 50500 (CA). Furthermore, in the determination of employment rights, the employee who alleges a breach of contract bears the burden of placing before the Court the specific terms and conditions of his employment that define his rights and obligations. This position is well-settled in numerous authorities, including Oforishe v. Nigerian Gas Co Ltd [2017] LPELR-42766 (SC), Ibama v. SPDC (Nig) Ltd [2005] 17 NWLR (Pt. 954) 364, WAEC v. Oshionebo [2006] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1994) 258, Okoebor v. Police Council [2003] 12 NWLR (Pt. 834) 444, Kablemetal Nig Ltd v. Ativie [2002] 10 NWLR (Pt. 775) 250, Idoniboye-Obe v. NNPC [2003] 2 NWLR (Pt. 805) 589 @ 630, Okomu Oil Palm Co v. Iserhienrhien [2001] 6 NWLR (Pt. 710) 660 @ 673, and Afribank (Nig ) Plc v. Osisanya (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 642) 592.

 

  1. To ascertain whether the Claimant has discharged this burden and is entitled to the reliefs sought, it is essential to determine the precise nature of the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant. Employment relationships generally fall into three distinct categories: (a) Master and Servant; (b) Servant holding office at the pleasure of the employer; and (c) Employment governed by statute. See Adedeji v. CBN [2023] 5 NWLR (Pt.1878) 531. From Exhibit Freeman A, it is unequivocally established that the Claimant was employed by the Defendant on July 13, 2023. It is not disputed by either party that the Claimant's employment falls under the category of a Master and Servant relationship. The Claimant asserted that his employment with the Defendant spanned from July 13, 2023, to May 13, 2024, when it was terminated without any prior notice, warning, or query, which he contends constitutes a violation of Section 11 of the Labour Act. The law is well-settled that in an ordinary contract of master and servant, which is not protected by statute (i.e., not one of "statutory flavour"), the employer retains the prerogative to terminate the contract with the employee at any time and for any reason, or even for no reason at all. Where such termination is effected in a manner contrary to the agreed terms of employment, the employee's remedy lies in an action for damages for breach of contract. The quantum of damages an employee is typically entitled to is what he would have earned over the period required to lawfully terminate his appointment. The courts will not compel a master to retain a servant whom he no longer desires to employ. This principle was affirmed in Oforishe v NGC Ltd [2018] 2 NWLR Part 1602 Page 35 @ 61 Para A-C per Galinje JSC and Garuba v. Kwara Investment Co. Ltd [2005] 5 NWLR Part 917 Page 160 @ 179 Para D-F per Oguntade JSC. Furthermore, where there has been a purported termination of a contract of service, a declaration to the effect that the contract of service still subsists will rarely be granted by the Courts. See Joseph Ifeta v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. Of Nigeria Ltd [2006] 8 NWLR Part 983 Page 585 @ 606.

 

  1. The Supreme Court, in Shena Security Company Ltd v. Afropak Nigeria Ltd & Ors [2008] LPELR-3052(SC), held that where a contract of service stipulates a specified and pre-agreed period of notice for termination by either party, this provision governs the cessation of the contractual relationship. This aligns with Section 11(1) of the Labour Act, Cap. 198 LFN, 1990 (now Cap. L1 LFN 2004), which provides for notice periods based on the duration of employment. However, it is crucial to note that this statutory provision is "without prejudice to the common law right of an employer to dismiss without notice for certain gross misconduct of the employee." In the present case, a careful review of Exhibit Freeman A, the Contract of Employment, reveals that the terms and conditions governing the Claimant's employment explicitly include the clause: "Any Breach of Trust is liable to immediate termination of your appointment." This contractual provision unequivocally establishes that, notwithstanding the general notice requirements of Section 11 of the Labour Act, the Defendant reserved the right to summarily terminate the Claimant’s employment without notice in instances of gross misconduct, specifically a breach of trust. The Claimant alleged that his employment was dismissed without prior notice, warning, or query. However, a thorough examination of the documents tendered in this case, particularly Exhibit Odunwo 3, clearly demonstrates that the Claimant was issued a formal query, thereby affording him an opportunity to respond to the allegations levelled against him. The law is well-established that accusing an employee of misconduct by way of a query, allowing the employee to answer the query, and considering that answer before a decision is taken, fully satisfies the requirements of fair hearing and natural justice. This principle was emphatically stated by His Lordship Per Rhodes-Vivour JSC in Imonikhe v. Unity Bank Plc [2011] LPELR-1503(SC); [2011] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1262) 624 SC. In the instant case, the Claimant was indeed given an opportunity to respond to the query, which he did, as evidenced by Exhibit 1. Therefore, the assertion that he was not given any notice, query, or warning is unfounded. Based on the totality of the evidence presented, I find that the Claimant has failed to prove his case on his own strength and has not discharged the burden of proof required for the reliefs sought. I so hold.

 

  1. On the whole for the reasons pronounced above, this court is left with no option than to dismiss this suit. Accordingly, this suit is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. 

 

  1. Judgment is hereby entered. There shall be no order as to cost.

 

                    …………………………………

                   Hon. Justice E. D. Subilim

                JUDGE