IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE R. B. HAASTRUP
6TH MAY 2026
SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/269/2025
BETWEEN:
BEN KALIO BRIGHT ………………………….………………………………………………. CLAIMANT
AND
LEGAL REPRESENTATION:
Pereboh Sanami Esq., for the Claimant.
Okoro Nnachi Ibiam Esq. with Aisha Hassan Abdulkadir Esq., for 1st Defendant.
Rimamsomte Ezekiel-ACP for 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants
JUDGMENT
[1] Introduction and Claims
This action was commenced at the instance of the Claimant vide an Originating Summons which is dated and filed on 8th September 2025 upon which five (5) issues for determination were submitted for the determination of the Court as follows;
[2] That in the event the Court finds the answers to the above issues to be in the negative, the Claimant hence sought the following reliefs to wit;
OR ALTERNATIVELY;
An Order directing the Defendants, either by themselves, their agents, servant, officers, privies or legal representatives to pay or cause to be paid forthwith, the salaries, allowances and entitlements of the Claimant or the balance of same as Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) with effect from June 2025;
[3] In support of the Originating Summons is an Affidavit of Thirty-Seven (37) paragraphs deposed to by the Claimant himself on same 8th September 2025 alongside some documents marked thus:
[4] In his written address in support of the Application, Claimant’s counsel distilled a sole issue thus;
“Whether considering the questions raised by the Claimant for determination vis-à-vis the affidavit evidence, together with the exhibits attached before this Honourable Court, the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought?”
Claimant’s Counsel Legal Argument on Sole Issue Raised.
[5] In response to the issue raised above, Claimant’s counsel answered in the affirmative and prayed to argue it jointly with issues 1, 2 and 3 raised in the Originating Summons.
Submitting on the said issues, counsel stated that by the authority of two signals annexed as exhibits A and B, Claimant resigned his initial appointment as rank and file vide exhibits C before he was eventually appointed as Cadet ASP, which facts he stated are contained at paragraph 11 of Claimant’s Affidavit in support. That Claimant’s fresh appointment was after he had successfully gone through the requisite training at the Nigerian Police Academy as evidenced in Exhibits E1 and E2 (i.e. Progress Report and Assessment Form of Claimant).
[6] Counsel pointed out further, that sequel to exhibit L which is an extract of meeting of 1st Defendant at its 24th Plenary session, it was decided that all officers who complied with the policy of Defendants as contained in Signal CE:2710/SKS/VOL.V/136 and resigned their appointments, the dates of their appointments as Cadet ASP’s or Inspectors are to be maintained as their date of first appointment.
That contrary to the above, vide a wireless message as seen in Exhibit I, a Signal was sent by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants directing Claimant to proceed on compulsory retirement before his statutory age of retirement. Counsel noted that the power of appointment, promotion and discipline in the Nigerian Police Force resides with the 1st Defendant by reason of section 6 (1) and (2) of the Police Service Commission (Establishment) Act, even though it sometimes seems helpless under the 2nd and 3rd Defendants as regards its statutory functions.
[7] Equally, that going by the provisions of Rule 020810 of the Public Service Rules 2008 (PSR), the compulsory age for retirement of all grades in the Federal service is 60 years of age or 35 years of service whichever comes first. On this footing, Claimant counsel argued that the two appointments as rank and file as well as Cadet ASP cannot run concurrently, forming the basis why he was expected and did resign the initial appointment to allow for the new one which was duly accepted by the Defendants, hence that Claimant’s date of retirement cannot be calculated from his initial non-existent date of appointment as rank and file.
Also, that Rule 020801 (b) of the PSR stipulates that by virtue of section 15 of the Pension Reform Act 2004, all previous pensionable service was forfeited on resignation and cannot be taken in account for pension purposes if the officer is subsequently re-employed, except where, under certain circumstances, the break in service is condoned by the office of Establishment or Pension.
Furthermore, that the essence of directing qualified members of the Nigeria Police Force to resign their initial appointments before taking the fresh ones was to bring them at par with their civilian counterparts, thus that it will not be fair and just to make Claimant retire before his civilian counterparts.
[8] Concluding arguments on these issues, Claimant counsel submitted that in the circumstance, the date of retirement of Claimant ought to start running from 1st February 2005 when he was appointed as Cadet ASP and that 2nd and 3rd Defendants were wrong to direct him to proceed on retirement before the required statutory age.
Arguments on Question 4 in Originating Summons
[9] It is the contention of Claimant counsel that even though the Claimant is currently addressed as CSP, he ought to have been a rank higher than that but for the questionable acts of 2nd and 3rd Defendants who refused him the said promotion. He pointed out that 1st Defendant recommended Claimant among 58 others for special promotion in 2023 from the rank of CSP to that of Assistant Commissioner of Police, with his name being No. 4 on the list which decision was conveyed to 3rd Defendant by a letter with Ref No. PSC/PROM/1/1096/II dated 28th March, 2023, which was denied him by 2nd- 4th Defendants; another letter with same Ref No. but dated 15th June 2023 and 26th June 2023 re-iterating 1st Defendant’s earlier position was forwarded again, but till date the 3rd Defendant failed to implement the promotion. Evidence of Claimant’s promotion are said to be contained in exhibits G1 and G2, even as Claimant is said to have deposed that some of his mates have passed from the rank of ACP to Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP).
[10] Flowing from the above, Claimant counsel reiterated the source of establishment, powers and functions of the 1st Defendant to be drawn from section 153 (m) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and section 6 of the Police Service Commission (Establishment) Act. Thus, that promotion given by 1st Defendant takes immediate effect and does not require validation from 2nd and 3rd Defendant under the guise of implementation. He finally, urged the Court to hold that the Defendants are wrong for refusing to implement Claimant’s promotion from the rank of Chief Superintendent of Police (CSP) to the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), since 15th day of May 2023.
Arguments on Question 5 in Originating Summons
[11] In summation, Claimant counsel posited that having earlier shown that 2nd and 3rd Defendants were wrong in directing Claimant to proceed on compulsory retirement before his due date, and even as at the time of instituting this action, he then urged the Court to hold that Defendants are also wrong in withholding his salaries and allowances since June 2025. He prayed the Court to grant all the reliefs sought by the Claimant.
1st Defendant’s Counter/Affidavit and Counsel Legal Argument
[12] on behalf of the 1st Defendant, its memorandum of appearance was filed on 17th September 2025 alongside a Counter-Affidavit of Sixteen (16) paragraphs in opposition to the Originating Summons, deposed to by one Haruna Usman, a Senior Executive Officer in the employment of the 1st Defendant and a Written Address in compliance with the Rules of this Court. Counsel here submitted three issues for determination as follows;
Issue One
[13] Counsel to the 1st Defendant submitted that going by Constitutional and Statutory mandate, the 1st Defendant is saddled with the responsibility of appointments, promotions, discipline and dismissal over police Officers other than the Inspector General of Police and does not exercise operational control over the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants, which is under the control of 3rd Defendant (i.e. Inspector General of Police). Section 6 of the Police Service Commission (Establishment) Act was relied upon to further substantiate the above. It was also counsel’s submission that 3rd Defendant is constitutionally and statutorily responsible for carrying out instructions and directives issued by the 1st Defendant as it pertains to promotions as selected by the Commission based on annual and special promotions
Thus, that there is no cause of action against 1st Defendant, which by extension means it is not a necessary party to this suit. The 1st Defendant counsel relied on the cases of CHIEF ADENIBE AFOLAYAN V. OBA JOHNSON OGUNRINDE & ORS. (1990) 1NWLR (PT.129) 369 and OJULEWU V. YAR’ADUA (2009) 38 NSCQR (PT.147) @ 557 & 565, to define a cause of action as the factual situation which enables a person to obtain a remedy from another in Court with respect to an injury. He noted that in the instant case, none of the alleged acts of the 2nd- 4th Defendants respectively was and/or can be linked to the 1st Defendant. Rather, that 1st Defendant’s actions have been taken by it in favour of the Claimant and ought not to have been joined as a party to this suit.
Issue Two
[14] Counsel answered this question in the negative by placing reliance on the decision of the Court of Appeal in IGP & ORS V. UMOLO & ANOR. (2022) LPELR-57715 (CA), to the effect that notwithstanding the statutory function of the PSC as regards the appointment, promotion and discipline of all police officers with the exception of the Inspector General of Police, that the Police Service Commission cannot be held vicariously liable for infractions committed by a police officer in the performance of his constitutional and statutory duties.
He further pointed out the basis upon which the principle of vicarious liability is built; as such where there exists a relationship of a master and servant as held in IFEANYI CHUKWU (OSONDU) CO. LTD V. SOLEH BONEH (NIG) LTD. (2000) LPELR-1432 (SC) (PGS. 12-13, PARAS. G-D).
[15] That to ascertain the existence of a master-servant relationship, it must be established as follows:
(i) the master’s power of selection over his servant
(ii) the payment of wages or other remunerations
(iii) the master’s right to control the method of the work
(iv) the master’s right of supervision or dismissal.
While noting that the above requirements were determined in the case of SHORT V. J & W HENDERSON LTD. (1945) LI.L.REP 271, counsel argued that conditions 2 and 3 from the above case are clearly absent in the present case as it has no power over the payment of salaries, allowances and other benefits of Nigerian Police Force, citing in support section 26 of the Police (Establishment) Act 2020.
[16] On the whole, 1st Defendant counsel contended that even though by law it is the employer of police officers in Nigeria, it lacks operational control of them nor does it pay their salaries and allowances as all these duties and powers lie with the IGP, hence in the circumstances, its name should be struck out from this suit.
Counsel concluded by asking for a dismissal of the suit against 1st Defendant for lacking basis with cost in the sum of Ten Million Naira (N10, 000, 000.00).
It is noteworthy that 1st Defendant counsel argued only two (2) issues (i.e. issues 1 and 3) even though he nominated three issues for determination.
2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants Counter/Affidavit and Legal Argument
[17] The 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants filed their Counter Affidavit and written address on 23rd January 2026 after same was deemed proper by order of Court made on 28th January 2026.The Counter Affidavit is of eleven (11) paragraphs and deposed to by one Inspector Ewa Anthony of the Nigerian Police Force Area 11, Abuja. Annexed thereto are four Aper Forms belonging to the Claimant and marked as Exhibits NPF 1A, NPF 1B, NPF 1C and NPF 1D. The counsel distilled a single issue for the resolution of the Court as follows;
“Whether the Claimant has placed anything cogent enough for this Honourable Court to grant?”
[18] It is 2nd- 4th Defendants’ counsel submission that Claimant has not placed anything before this Court to entitle him to the grant of the reliefs sought, emphasizing that the case is speculative with no weight and merely to harass the Nigerian Police Force.
That Exhibits A and B attached to Claimant’s Originating Summons are documents made in 1989 which does not apply to Claimant’s training in 2005. More so, that the Exhibits are not legible for the Court to rely on, citing the case of ASUERINME V. INEC (2025) 17 NWLR (PT.2015) 433 @ 481 RATIO 40.
[19] In addition, it was posited that Exhibit C presented by the Claimant is a fake and forged document seeing that it was not approved by the Nigeria Police Force Abuja or AIG of the Nigeria Police Force and urged the Court to dismiss it and the entire case for abuse of Court process.
Further to the above, counsel here argued that Exhibit D being the letter of appointment issued to Claimant in 2005, has since been retrieved from him when it was discovered he was already a serving member of the Nigerian Police Force (Force Entrant) and cannot be appointed twice. Also, that Exhibits NPF 1A, NPF 1B, NPF 1C and NPF 1D have facts which speak for themselves that Claimant was appointed on 1st August, 1989, emphasizing that there is nothing to show Claimant resigned his appointment in 2004 before the Cadet training in Wudil, Kano state.
[20] To buttress the issue of Claimant’s retirement via Exhibit I, reference was made to Rule 020908 (i) & (ii) of the PSR and section 18 (8) of the Nigerian Police Act, 2020 to the effect that every Police officer on either recruitment or appointment is expected to serve for a period of 35 years or until the attainment of 60 years, whichever is earlier.
On a note of finality, counsel to 2nd- 4th Defendants submitted that it acted within the ambit of the law in retiring the Claimant whom in his opinion had served for 35 years in the Nigerian Police Force, hence that this case lacks merit and should be dismissed.
Claimants Further and Better Affidavit in Support of Originating Summons
[21] On 3rd February 2026, the Claimant filed a Further and Better Affidavit of Seventeen paragraphs deposed to by the Claimant and a letter of resignation by the Claimant annexed as Exhibit A and no written address.
Decision
[22] The Claimant’s case is hinged on two main claims; the first challenging his untimely compulsory retirement from the service of the 1st Defendant and the second being a claim for his unimplemented promotion from the rank of Chief Superintendent of Police (CSP) to Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) among other ancillary reliefs.
Having considered the facts of this case, the pieces of evidence and submissions of learned counsel, I find the following issues as apt for the determination of this case:
Resolution of Issues Distilled
Issue One
[23] 1st Defendant’s counsel has argued vide his issue one that no cause of action was disclosed by the Claimant against it, as the focus of the infractions complained of lie at the door steps of 2nd- 4th Defendants. Hence, that where no cause of action is disclosed against a Defendant, the proper step to take is one of striking out the name of the party or dismissing the action against such a party which he prayed on behalf of the 1st Defendant.
The Claimant on his part did not react to the issue of want of reasonable cause of action raised by 1st Defendant. Be that as it may, I shall resolve same with regard to the position of the law.
[24] A reasonable cause of action has been interpreted by our Courts to mean a combination of facts and circumstances giving rise to the right to file a claim in Court for a remedy. See OKAFOR V. BENDE DIVISIONAL UNION, JOS BRANCH (2017) 5 NWLR (PT. 1559) 385 @ 417, PARA. E-G and MULIMA V. USMAN (2014) 16 NWLR (PT.1432) 160 @ 198, PARA. F-H. Furthermore, to determine whether a Claimant has established or disclosed a reasonable cause of action, the Court will make recourse to the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim (in this case the Originating Summons and Affidavit in support). See the case of AJUWON V. GOV. OYO STATE (2021) 16 NWLR (PT.1803) 485 @ 540, PARAS. A-H; 541, PARAS. C-D.
It is clear by the provisions of section 6 (1) of the Police Service Commission Establishment) Act 2001, that it is the body saddled with the responsibilities of appointment, promotion, discipline and dismissal of all police officers of the Federation, with the exception of the Inspector General of Police.
[25] Having considered the Originating Summons and Affidavit in support of this case, it is my observation that Claimant’s questions 1 and 2 for determination in the Originating Summons, and reliefs 1 and 2 are intricately tied to the statutory functions of the 1st Defendant. They relate to issues and claims pertaining to his retirement from the service of the Nigerian Police Force and as such are matters best dealt with having the presence of the 1st Defendant, I so hold. Thus, this makes it a proper party in this suit as one who even though not directly interested in the Claimant’s claims, is made a party for some good reason. See APUGO V. UGOJI (2022) 16 NWLR (PT. 1857) 669 @ 693, PARA. F.
Issue Two
[26] The Crux of Claimant’s case regarding his claim against his untimely compulsory retirement is that having resigned his appointment as a rank and file vide a letter dated 7th October 2004 (i.e. Exhibit C) and as contained in paragraphs 14 and 29 of the Affidavit in support, his new appointment as a Cadet ASP vides Exhibit D dated 11th January 2005 gave rise to a fresh service term which he asserted is supported by the Defendant’s Signals founded in Exhibits A and B.
1st Defendant by their Counter-Affidavit have not challenged the claims made herein, however, the 2nd- 4th Defendants have vehemently contended against Claimant’s assertions stressing on the fact that Claimant’s enlistment date of 1989 as a rank and file is the date to be reckoned with in calculating his years of service which he opined elapsed since 2024; reliance was placed on their Exhibits NPF 1A, NPF 1B, NPF 1C and NPF 1D to substantiate their position.
Equally, that the claim of a fresh appointment as Cadet ASP is not tenable because Claimant’s purported resignation letter (Exhibit C) is a forged document and was never processed, in addition to the claim that the said appointment letter (Exhibit D) was withdrawn when it was discovered Claimant was a serving police officer before proceeding to the Police Academy. (See paragraphs 4 l - q & 5 e-g of their Counter Affidavit). The foregoing was further denied by Claimant at paragraph 9 of his further Affidavit of 23rd January 2026.
[27] A clear-cut fact is that Claimant was first enlisted into the Nigerian Police Force on 1st August 1989 as rank and file. However, sequel to two Signals CE:2710/SKS/VOL.V/136-DTO:261340/06/89 and signal DTO: 221535/05/89 (Exhibits A & B) issued by the Defendants in 1989, Claimant by evidence on record and contrary to 2nd- 4th Defendants’ contention, submitted a handwritten resignation letter dated 7th October 2004 through the Deputy Commissioner of Police, CID Department, Zone Six, Calabar to the Assistant Inspector General of Police, Zone Six, Calabar which was endorsed as received on same 7th October 2004.
[28] At this stage, before proceeding to the substance of the value of Exhibit C above, I shall be addressing the allegation of forgery raised by 2nd- 4th Defendants. For a start, forgery is a criminal offence which even if raised in civil proceedings must be proved beyond reasonable doubt as held in the case of ATUCHUKWU V. ADINDU (2012) 6 NWLR (PT. 1297) 534 @ P. 565, PARA. E., where the Court highlighted that to prove forgery, the following must be shown: -
In the present case, only the alleged forged Exhibit C is before the Court, while the purported original was never produced, hence I find that the allegation of forgery stands unproved and arguments canvassed thereon fail. I so hold.
[29] Closely tied to the above, 2nd - 4th Defendants’ counsel also argued that said Exhibit C was never processed and approved by the Defendants. I have carefully perused the said Exhibit C and it is glaring on the face that it was received on 7th October 2004 with the official stamp of the office of the Assistant Inspector General of Police Zone Six, Calabar. That the first minutes thereon was addressed to the Deputy Commissioner with the writing ‘Approved’. The second minute was addressed to a CSP who was directed to ‘deal pls’. Third minute was to a designation SOJ instructing same to ‘convey’ and lastly, is the minute to an O/R who was directed to ‘inform Applicant Accordingly’.
The above explicit facts speak for themselves, that Claimant wrote through the appropriate authority under whom he was serving at the time and that he was granted approval to proceed on the said resignation from that end. Hence, the 2nd-4th Defendants cannot at a later stage of more than 20 years claim that the said document was never processed. I so hold.
[30] Another leg of contention raised by the 2nd- 4th Defendants in their written address is that exhibits A & B are not legible for the Court to decipher and as such the Court should not ascribe any probative value to them. I have perused the said Exhibits in question and observe that they are not one for an easy read, however, they are legible enough for one to read and get the full information contained therein. No alphabet or word is missing or as it were illegible. Thus, this Court finds this line of submission to be without merit and same is accordingly discountenanced. I so hold.
[31] Next is the contention raised at paragraph 4 (g, h & i) of 2nd- 4th Defendants’ Counter Affidavit that the Signals in Exhibits A and B issued in 1989, were not meant for the Claimant who went on the Cadet ASP/Inspectorate Direct Entrance training in 2005. This is in response to Claimant’s depositions at paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 of his Affidavit in support where he asserted that the training program sequel to those Signals is an ongoing thing as many others asides the year 1989 have benefited from such like the Force Entrants Course, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 etc.
[32] A cursory look at the said Signals and particularly Exhibit A reads thus:
“….X CE 2710/ES/VOL.3/205 DTO: 011345/6/89 X CADET ASP/INSPECTORATE DIRECT ENTRANCE X GRATEFUL INFORM ALL SERVING MEMBERS OF RANK AND FILE AND INSPECTORATE CADRE X THAT FORTHWITH ALL SERVING MEMBERS WHO QUALIFIED FOR APPOINTMENT AS CADET ASPS OR INSPECTORS ON THE BASIS OF ACQUISITION OF HIGHER QUALIFICATION WILL NOW BE INTERVIEWED ALONG WITH THEIR CIVILIAN CONUTERPARTS X WHERE FOUND SUITABLE AND OFFERED APPOINTMENT X SUCH SERVING MEMBER WOULD THEN RESIGN THEIR APPOINTMENTS AS MEMBERS OF THE RANK AND FILE OR INSPECTORS AND JOIN AS FRESH CADETS X …” (Underlining for emphasis)
It is glaring and contrary to the arguments made by 2nd– 4th Defendants’ counsel that by the use of the word ‘forthwith’ in the Signal, it was not meant to be restricted only to serving members of rank and file and inspectors for the year 1989 only. Also, I am mindful of the reference made by Claimant at paragraph 33 of his affidavit in support to the decision of this Court by Hon. Justice O. O. Oyewunmi (now JCA) in NICN/ABJ/353/2019- CSP SUNDAY OKUGUNI & ORS V. POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION & 2ORS, delivered on 13th January 2021 from which I have had the privilege of delivering a judgment on 25th September 2025, in SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/28/2025 (ACP CHINEDU & ORS V. POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION & ORS), which was sequel to that decision and of which same was recently upheld into to by the Court of Appeal on 14th April 2026 in APPEAL NO: CA/ABJ/PRE/ROA/CV/1829MI/2025 between POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION V. ACP CHINEDU AMBROSE EMENGAHA & ORS, which all dealt with the issue pertaining to these very Signals issued in 1989.
[33] Consequent upon my reasoning supra and the recent judgment of the Court of Appeal referred to among others, I am fortified and do hold that the said signals in Exhibits A and B were not strictly confined to police men who were in service as at 1989 only and as such Claimant rightly benefitted from same.
[34] What then is the import of the above? Simply put, that Claimant is found by this Court to have duly resigned his appointment as a rank and file before he was offered appointment as a Cadet ASP (Exhibit D) and upon which he successfully completed the said training vide Exhibits F1 and F2 of the Claimant. Thus, the date of 1st February 2005 contained in Exhibit D stands as Claimant’s commencement date of service, I so hold. This I should point out negates the claim by 2nd- 4th Defendants that the date 1st of August 1989 written by Claimant is his date of appointment as contained in his Aper Forms (Exhibits NPF 1A, NPF 1B, NPF 1C and NPF 1D); and my reason for stating so is that such cannot override the document (Exhibit D) issued by the Defendants and which obviously informed the Claimant’s pleas for rectification of his date of Appointment as seen in Exhibit H.
[35] It is pertinent to resolve the contention at paragraph 4 (p & q)) of the Counter-Affidavit of same 2nd- 4th Defendants that upon discovery of the anomaly in allowing Claimant to go for the said training whilst being a serving police officer, the appointment letter of Claimant among others were withdrawn from them. I am to say the least disappointed that 2nd- 4th Defendants will make such strong assertions of that withdrawal without any documentary evidence to buttress their position. Can a letter of appointment be withdrawn by word of mouth? That can never be accepted by a Court of law as being proper especially coming from an organization like the Nigerian Police. That being the case, I find that leg of contention to equally be misplaced as it stands on nothing. I so hold.
[36] Flowing from the above, what then is the proper date for Claimant to retire from the service of the 2nd Defendant? I have taken cognizance of the facts put forward by the parties that both Rule 020810 of the Public Service Rules 2008 (PSR) and section 18 (8) of the Police Act provide that the compulsory age for retirement of all grades in the Federal service is 60 years of age or 35 years of service whichever comes first or is earlier.
Since the evidence on record shows that Claimant was born on 4th May 1971, it means that even as at today, he is 55 years of age. Now, having found that the date to be reckoned with as the commencement of his service with the 2nd Defendant is 1st February 2005 when he was appointed as a Cadet ASP, it will mean that Claimant as at today has spent over 21 years in service. The foregoing by extension implies that Claimant’s retirement vides the signal of the 2nd- 4th Defendants issued in May 2025 (Exhibit I) is of no moment and it is hereby set aside. I so hold.
Issue Three
[37] This issue borders on the claim for promotion by the Claimant from the rank of CSP to ACP with effect from May 2023. In this regard, Claimant deposed to facts at paragraph 20 which reveal that the 1st Defendant had recommended him among 58 other persons for special promotions vide a letter dated 26th June 2023 (Exhibit G1) which reads:
“Please refer to the Commission’s earlier letter of conveyance with Ref. No. PSC/PROM/1/1096/II dated 28th March, 2023 and the second letter of Conveyance Ref. No. PSC/PROM/1/1096/II dated 15th June 2023, both in respect on the above subject matter.
2. The management of the Commission wishes to draw the attention of the Inspector General of Police to its decision at its 19th Plenary Meeting, in respect of Police Promotion (i.e. Special Promotions) as conveyed in the aforementioned letters, which are yet to be implemented.
3…………………………………………………………………………………………………………...
Further to the above, Exhibit G2 being the list attached to Exhibit G1 is captioned “CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (CSP) TO ASSIST. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (ACP)” had Claimant’s name conspicuously as No. 4 on the list.
[38] I have observed also that the 1st Defendant had deposed at paragraph 11 of its Counter-Affidavit maintaining that its decision held at its 19th Plenary Meeting on 28th March 2023 was still subsisting.
[39] The 2nd- 4th Defendants have argued to the contrary that Claimant is not entitled to any such promotions having retired since 1st August 2024. There is nothing more beyond the oral evidence here to substantiate these assertions. The law is trite that oral evidence cannot be used to contradict documentary evidence. See Section 128 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011 and the case of UNION BANK V. ONWUKWE (2017) LPELR-43279(CA). More so, in the case of STABILINI & CO. LTD. V. NWABUEZE OBASI (1997) 9 NWLR (PT.520) 293 @ 305 CA, the Court held to the effect that where there is oral and documentary evidence on an issue or fact, the latter should be used as a hanger from which to assess the oral evidence.
[40] Having earlier found that Claimant’s employment is still subsisting and that he was not due for retirement by reason of the wireless message in Exhibit I, I find that the documentary evidence before me as per Exhibits G1 and G2 are overwhelmingly in support of his claim for promotion from the rank of CSP to ACP and with effect from May 2023 when he became due for same. I so hold.
[41] The above is further fortified by the fact that the statutory power of promotion of the Claimant lies within the purview of the powers of the 1st Defendant, thus the refusal or neglect by the 2nd- 4th Defendants to comply with same necessitating 2 more letters of follow up is not only an affront on the constitutional and statutory powers of the 1st Defendant, but also creates a negative impression as done in the mind of the Claimant and on the larger scale the general public, that there is no proper synergy among them which ought not to be so, considering their strategic position in the Federation. I therefore call on the 2nd – 4th Defendants to see to it that beyond this judgment they play and carry out their functions and duties in a manner that is not just supportive of the 1st Defendant, but also speaks well of the Nigerian Police Force as a whole.
[42] In totality, I find the case of the Claimant to be meritorious, the questions raised are all resolved in his favour and his reliefs granted as follows:
[43] This judgment shall take effect immediately. I so hold.
Judgment is hereby entered.
__________________
Justice R. B. Haastrup
JUDGE