IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE YENAGOA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT YENAGOA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE P. I. HAMMAN ------- PRESIDING JUDGE

DATE: TUESDAY 16TH JUNE, 2026     SUIT NO: NICN/YEN/71/2017

BETWEEN:

BARR. PEREMOBOWEI MIRINN           -------------- CLAIMANT

AND

  1. SAGBAMA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL

  2. MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT                    DEFENDANTS

ADMINISTRATION

JUDGMENT


  1. The Claimant commenced this suit by way of Complaint and Statement of Facts filed on the 15th day of November, 2017. With the leave of Court, the Claimant filed an Amended Complaint and Amended Statement of Facts on the 6th of January, 2023, claiming the following reliefs against the Defendants.


  1. The sum of One Million, Four Hundred and Seventy Three Thousand, Four Hundred and Sixty Eight Naira (N1, 473, 468.00) only as specific damages being part of the outstanding sum of money accruable to the Claimant and to be paid by the Defendants as part of the Claimant’s benefit as a former Councilor.


  1. The sum of Six Hundred Thousand Naira (N600, 000.00) only covering the cost of litigation which includes the filing, professional and appearance fees.


  1. The sum of One Million Naira (N1, 000, 000.00) only as general damages for all the inconveniences suffered by the Claimant.


  1. The 1st Defendant who filed a Memorandum of Conditional Appearance and Statement of Defence on the 5th of March, 2018 relied on the Amended Statement of Defence filed on the 29th of April, 2024.


  1. Trial in this suit commenced de novo on the 27th of June, 2024 when the Claimant opened his case by testifying for himself as CW1. The witness identified and adopted his witness deposition made on the 6th of January, 2023, and then tendered the following documents which were admitted by the Court:

  1. The Certificate of Return of Election under the Local Government Law issued by the Bayelsa State Independent Electoral Commission dated 30th March, 2004 ----------  exhibit CW1A.

  2. The CTC of the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development, Yenagoa Report of Allowances owed Councilors between April 2004 and March 2007  ---------------- exhibit CW1B.

The witness was cross-examined by the Learned Counsel to the 1st Defendant Henry Ikenna Nnamuka on the 27th of June, 2024. The 2nd Defendant was foreclosed from cross-examining the witness on the 23rd of October, 2024, after which the witness was discharged.


  1. The Claimant’s 2nd witness Hon. Lucky Agbalaje testified as CW2 on the 23rd of October, 2024. The witness identified and adopted his witness statement on oath filed on the 6th of January, 2023. He then tendered the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission Circular on Explanatory Notes on Councillors Remuneration Package dated 7th November, 2001 which was admitted as exhibit CW2A.

The witness was cross-examined by the 1st Defendant’s Counsel Henry Ikenna Nnamuka on the 23rd of October, 2024. The 2nd Defendant was foreclosed from cross-examining the witness on the 26th of November, 2024, after which he was discharged.


  1. The Claimant’s 3rd witness Hon. Odu Forster gave evidence as CW3 on the 26th of November, 2024 by identifying and adopting his witness statement on oath filed on the 6th of January, 2023. The witness was cross-examined by the 1st Defendant’s Learned Counsel Henry Ikenna Nnamuka on the 29th of January, 2025. The 2nd Defendant was foreclosed from cross-examining the witness on the 29th of January, 2025, after which the witness was discharged. The Claimant closed his case on the same 29th of January, 2025.


  1. The 1st Defendant opened her defence on the 24th of February, 2025 by calling her lone witness Oyindinepreye Stephen Kpodoh who testified as DW1. The witness identified and adopted his witness statement on oath filed on the 29th of April, 2024. He was then cross-examined by the Claimant’s Learned Counsel P. P. P. Tamuno on the 24th of February, 2025. The 2nd Defendant was foreclosed from cross-examining the witness on the 1st of July, 2025, after which the witness was discharged.

  2. When the 2nd Defendant still failed to appear before the Court to defend the suit, the Court foreclosed the 2nd Defendant from defending the suit on the 21st of July, 2025.


  1. It is apposite to note that the 2nd Defendant did not file any defence to the suit, and did not also appear before the Court throughout the proceedings in the suit.


  1. With the conclusion of evidence in the suit, the parties were ordered to file their final written addresses. While the 1st Defendant’s Final Written Address was filed on the 19th of November, 2025 but deemed as properly filed and served on the 8th of December, 2025, the final written address of the claimant was filed on the 18th of February, 2026 but deemed as properly filed and served on the 18th of February, 2026. The 2nd Defendant did not file any Final Written Address in the suit. These Court processes were adopted by Learned Counsel to the Claimant and the 1st Defendant on the 18th of March, 2026, with A. O. Aniso appearing for the Claimant, while Henry Ikenna Nnamuka appeared with V. T. Pinaowei for the 1st Defendant. There was no representation for the 2nd Defendant.


THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT:


  1. The Claimant pleaded that he was elected and served as the Councilor for Ward 1 in the Sagbama Local Government Council for three (3) years from 2004 – 2007. In the course of the service he was not paid some statutory allowances, and in March, 2017, the Councilors who had completed their three years term in office but were not paid their statutory allowances came together under the aegis of the Past Councilors Forum of Bayelsa State, and took steps to recover their outstanding allowances totaling the sum of Ten Million Naira only (N10, 000, 000.00) owed to each Councilor. They then contacted the Law Firm of Falana and Falana in 2009 to seek redress in Court, but the Bayelsa State Government pleaded for an out of Court resolution, and then directed the 2nd Defendant to investigate the matter. The 2nd Defendant then set up a Committee headed by the Permanent Secretary Mr. Durban Whyte who came up with the sum of N24, 548, 555.00 (Twenty Four Million, Five Hundred and Forty Eight Thousand, Five Hundred and Fifty Five Naira) to be shared evenly among the 14 Councilors, which they accepted.


  1. That the Bayelsa State Government then directed all Local Government Council Chairmen to commence the immediate payment of the amount, and the then Chairman of the 1st Defendant and the 14 Councilors agreed that the sum of One Million Naira only (N1, 000, 000.00) should be paid monthly and shared evenly among the 14 Councilors until the total sum of N24, 548, 555.00 is fully paid. That each Councilor was entitled to N70, 000.00. That the sum of N1, 000, 000.00 was paid through the cashier of the 1st Defendant who withdrew same from the account of the 1st Defendant and handed same to the then Special Adviser to the Chairman of the 1st Defendant on Legislative Matters Hon. Lucky Agbalaje who was also a Councilor between 2004 – 2007. That the 14 Councilors including the Claimant got the sum of N70, 000.00 each for four months totaling the sum of N280, 000.00 each. That the 1st Defendant stopped further payment to the Councilors and the balance of N1, 473, 468.00 (0ne Million, Four Hundred and Seventy Three Thousand, Four Hundred and Sixty Eight Naira) has remained unpaid till date. According to the Claimant, Ekeremor Local Government Council has completed the payment of the outstanding allowances they owed the past Councilors while the 1st Defendant still owes the 14 Councilors the sum of N1, 473, 468.00 each as balance of their statutory allowances.

1ST DEFENDANT’S CASE:

  1. According to the 1st Defendant, all the Councilors who represented the various wards in the Sagbama Local Government Area between 2004 –2007 including the Claimant were paid their entitlements and benefits. That the Claimant received his salaries and allowances during the period of service which was not predicated on the remuneration packages for Political and Judicial Officers by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission or by a Circular of the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (Explanatory Note on Councilors Revenue Package). That the Revenue Mobization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) cannot prescribe remuneration packages for holders of Councillorship office, hence the Circular issued by the said Commission is illegal and unenforceable.


  1. That the 1st Defendant is not indebted to the Claimant and was not in receipt of any demand from the Claimant for payment of lawful allowances that are outstanding. That there is no body known as Past Councillors Forum of Bayelsa State with the powers and insignia of a legal personality to make demands, and the 1st Defendant was neither privy to any alleged plea by the Bayelsa State Government nor appeared before any Committee allegedly set up by the 2nd Defendant. That it is not in receipt of any directive of the Bayelsa State Government to commence the implementation of any recommendation of the Durban Whyte Committee, and it never agreed with Councillors that the sum of N1, 000, 000.00 would be paid monthly and shared evenly among the Councillors. That it is untrue that the sum of N1, 000, 000.00 was at any time paid through the cashier of the 1st Defendant from its bank account domiciled at Zenith Bank and then given to Hon. Lucky Agbalaje to distribute to former Councillors including the Claimant. That the 1st Defendant is not owing the Claimant and 13 former Councillors the sum of N1, 473, 468.00, and that the funds allocated and generated by the 1st Defendant are deployed for the provisions of basic amenities to the people of the Local Government Area. That the instant suit is statute barred and caught by the Limitation Law of Bayelsa State. 


1ST DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS.


  1. The learned counsel to the 1st Defendant submitted these two (2) Issues for determination:


  1. Whether, from the circumstances of the case, the Claimant’s suit is not barred by the statute of limitation to institute this action?


  1. Whether the Claimant has proven his case to entitle him to the reliefs sought in the circumstance.


  1. It was submitted on Issue one that, the instant suit is statute barred by virtue of section 16 of the Limitation Law, Cap. L8 Laws of Bayelsa State 2006 which provides for a period of five years from the accrual of cause of action to institute a suit. That from 2005 when the cause of action accrued to 2017 when the suit was instituted is a period of twelve years, and the suit was not commenced within the period of five years. The Court was urged to decline jurisdiction in the suit. References were made to the cases of Ajayi V. Adebiyi and Ors (2012) LPELR-7811(SC), Pp 32 paras A – B, Aremo II V. Adekanye and Ors (2004) LPELR-544(SC), Pp 17 – 18, paras F – B, Useni V. Atta and Ors (2023) LPELR-59880(SC), Pp 28 – 30 paras D – B, Power Products Int’l Ltd V. WEMA Bank (2012) LPELR-7952(CA) and Omnia V. Dyktrade (2007) 7 SCNJ 228.


  1. With respect to Issue two (2), it was argued that the claimant has failed to prove his case in line with section 135 of the Evidence Act and the cases of A. G. Rivers State V. A. G. Bayelsa State (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 161 and Aminu V. Hassan (2014) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1400) 287 at 316 paras B-C.


  1. Learned Counsel referred to Section 153 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and Section 6 of the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission Act, 2025, reproduced the provisions of Section 32, item N, Part 1, Third Schedule to the Constitution and Sections 84 and 124 of the Constitution and submitted that the appropriate political office holders referred to in the Constitution in respect of the determination of any remuneration by the Commission include the President, Vice-President, Governors, Deputy Governors, Ministers, Commissioners, Special Advisers, Legislators and the holders of the offices mentioned in sections 84 and 124 of the Constitution. That Local Government Councilors are not among the list of persons envisaged. That the Claimant is not a legislator as defined by the Constitution, relying on the case of Nwokedi V. Anambra State Government (2022) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1828) 29 which has interpreted the provisions of Section 32, item N, Part 1, Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution.


  1. That exhibit CW1B which is a mere Circular is incongruous with the provisions of Section 32, item N, Part 1, Third Schedule 1999 Constitution. That any allegation of the breach or infraction of the Constitution is of immense magnitude with far-reaching implications and therefore should not be handled with levity. See Knight Frankrutley (Nig) V. A. G. Kano State (1998) 7 NWLR (Pt. 556) 1, Jegede V. INEC (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1797) 409, Nganjiwa V. F.R.N. (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1609) 301, Onyedebulu V. Nwaneri (2008) LPELR-4793, GTB Plc V. Tank Investment Ltd (2005) 13 WRN 25, Aina V. Jinadu (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 233) 91 and Ahmed V. Crown Merchant Bank Ltd (2005) 41 WRN 117. The Court was urged to dismiss the suit with cost of N5, 000, 000.00 (Five Million Naira) only.


CLAIMANT’S SUBMISSIONS


  1. The Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted the following three Issues for the court’s determination: 


  1. Whether from the circumstances of the case, the Claimant is entitled to the sum claimed and demanded.


  1. Whether from the circumstances of the case Claimant has proved its (sic) case in the balance of probabilities.


  1. Whether from the circumstances of the case this case is statute barred.


  1. Learned Counsel to the claimant submitted on Issue one (1) that the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs in the suit. That by exhibit CW1A the Claimant is seeking to enforce the recommendations of the Committee set up to look into the delayed payment of the former Local Government Councilors of the 1st Defendant. That having been elected and served as a Councilor for three years from 2004 – 2007, the Claimant is entitled to the claims in the suit. By section 7 of the Labour Act, an employer is expected to give the employee a written statement not later than 3 months after assumption of duty specifying the core terms of the contract such as the obligation to pay wages and salaries, the duty to provide appropriate work, the duty to maintain employee welfare and safety, the right to discipline or take action in cases of misconduct and entitlements to rest periods, holidays and break periods.


  1. That parties to a contract are bound by the obligations therein, relying on the cases of Ashibuogwu V. Attorney General Bendel State (no citation), Ishola Olateju V. Lufthansa German Airlines (no citation) and Obedian Ashaye V. Akereke (no citation). The Court was urged to resolve Issue one in favour of the Claimant.


  1. On Issue two (2), Learned Counsel posited that, exhibit CW1B is the report on the allowances owed to Councilors in Bayelsa State including the Claimant. That out of the agreed sum, the Claimant was only paid N280, 000.00 before the payment was stopped. That where a claim is not denied it is deemed to have been admitted, and what is admitted needs no further proof, relying on the cases of Adesanoye V. Adewole (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt. 671) 145, Orianzi V. A. G. Rivers State and Ors (2017) LPELR-41737(SC), Owosho and Ors V. Dada (1984) NSCC 568, Ndukwe V. LPDC and Anor (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1026) 1, Ehinlanwo V. Oke and Ors (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1113) 357, Skye Bank Plc and Anor V. Akinpelu (2010) 3 SC (Pt. II) 29, UBA Plc V. BTL Industries Ltd (2005) 10 NWLR (Pt. 933) 356 and also Section 123 of the Evidence Act. The Court was urged to resolve Issue two in favour of the Claimant.


  1. With respect to Issue three (3), the Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the instant suit is not statute barred being suit seeking to enforce the breach of exhibit CW1B. That the Court should not allow technicality to override substantial justice. That the suit was first filed at the Bayelsa State High Court Ekeremor/Sagbama Judicial Division as Suit No. YHC/224/2009. That the defendants should not be allowed to benefit from their own wrongdoing of deliberately delaying the payment of the Claimant’s entitlement. That since the suit seeks to enforce the resolutions and recommendations of the Committee and not to enforce the initial contract of employment, the suit is not statute barred. The Court was urged to resolve Issue three (3) in favour of the Claimant.


  1. The Court was urged to enter judgment in favour of the Claimant with cost of Ten Million Naira Only.

COURT’S DECISION


  1. I have carefully considered the pleadings, evidence and submissions of  the Learned Counsel to the Claimant and the 1st Defendant, and seen that the 1st Defendant’s Issue one (1) challenges the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to entertain the suit. The Court shall therefore determine the suit on the basis of the two (2) Issues submitted by the 1st Defendant, which are:


  1. Whether from the circumstances of the case, the Claimant’s suit is not barred by the statute of limitation to institute this action. (This is the same as the Claimant’s Issue three).


  1. Whether the Claimant has proved his case to entitle him to the reliefs sought in the circumstance. (This is the same as the Claimant’s Issues one and two).


  1. On the Contention of the 1st Defendant on Issue one that the suit is statute barred by reason of the provisions of the Limitation Law of Bayelsa State, the law is trite that in determining whether or not an action is statute barred, the Court should look at the Statement of Claim (in this instance the Statement of Facts) to ascertain when the cause of action occurred, and compare that date with the date the suit was commenced to see whether or not it was commenced within the limitation period provided by the Limitation Law in question. In the case of Chief Ikie Aghwarianovwe V. Peoples Democratic Party and Others (2024) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1918) 45 at page 83 paras. C-G, the Supreme Court held as follows:


“When a suit is statute barred, it is barred by the provisions of a statute, or in this case, the Constitution. In simple terms, a suit is statute barred if it is brought outside the time limited for the institution of that type of action by the constitution or a statute. Any action brought outside the prescribed time is futile, fruitless and incompetent and the court would consequently lack the jurisdiction to entertain same. See Wali v. A.P.C. (2020) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1749) 82; Garba v. A.P.C. (2020) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1708) 345; A.C.N. & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2013) LPELR-20300(SC); (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1370) 161; Sulgrave Holdings Inc. v. F.G.N. (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 309; Nasir v. C.S.C. Kano State (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1190) 253.

In determining whether an action is statute barred, judicial precedents have laid down three yardsticks to assist the court. They are:

  1. The date when the cause of action accrued;

  2. The date of commencement of the suit as indicated in the writ of summons; and

  3. Period of time prescribed to bringing an action to be ascertained from the statute in question.

See Useni v. Atta (2023) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1887) 519; Besong v. Ochinke (2023) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1844) 545; Idachaba & Ors v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi & Ors (2021) LPELR-53081(SC); (2021) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1787) 209; Ajayi v. Adebiyi (2012) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1310) 137.”

See also  the cases of Mrs. Comfort Olufunmilayo Asaboro and 1 Other V. Pan Ocean Oil Corporation (Nigeria) Limited and 1 Other (2017) 7 N. W. L. R. (Part 1563) 42 AT 67 – 68, Paragraphs H – C, and CIL Risk & Asset Management Limited V. Ekiti State Government & Others (2020) LPELR-49565(SC).


  1. It may be apposite to reproduce the provision section 16 of the limitation law being relied upon by the 1st Defendant in this suit for the purpose of clarity.

Section 16 of the   Limitation Law Cap. L8 Laws of Bayelsa State. 2006 provides as follows:


“No action founded on contract, tort or any other action not specifically provided for in Parts I and II of this Law shall be brought after the expiration of five years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.”


  1. There is no doubt that Section 16 of the Limitation Law of Bayelsa State provides for a period of five years from the occurrence of the cause of action to institute any suit in Court. The law is that any suit filed or instituted after the limitation period will be statute barred and incompetent, thereby depriving the Court of the jurisdiction to entertain same. This is the position of the law as stated by the Apex Court in the more recent cases of Chukwuka Okoronko v. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) (2025) LPELR-80425(SC) and Dr. Moses U. Anolam v. The Federal University of Technology Owerri (FUTO) and Ors. (2025) LPELR-80027(SC) both referenced in the case of The Incorporated Trustees of National Association of Plants Operators (NAPO) and Ors. V. Minister of Labour and Employment and Ors (Suit No: NICN/ABJ/165/2024) delivered by His Lordship, the Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PHD, OFR, the Hon. President of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria on the 18th of March, 2026.


  1. While I have seen that by paragraph 4 of the Amended Statement of Facts and exhibit CW1A the Claimant was elected as the Councillor for Ward 1 in Sagbama Local Government Council and served for three years from 2004 – 2007, and the cause of action should ordinarily have arisen in 2007 when he concluded his term of office and was not paid his entitlements, I however agree with the Claimant’s Counsel that the instant suit seeks to enforce the resolutions/agreements in exhibit CW1B. While by paragraph 7 of the Amended Statement of Facts, the Claimant’s initial claim was for the sum of N10, 000, 000.00 (Ten Million Naira only), by exhibit CW1B the sum of N24, 548, 555.00 was resolved to be paid to all the 14 Councillors who served in the 1st Defendant from 2004 – 2007. The Claimant has only been paid the sum of N280, 000.00, hence the instant suit seeking to recover the outstanding sum of N1, 473, 468.00. While exhibit CW1B was made on the 14th of July, 2015, the instant suit was instituted on the 15th November, 2017. I therefore hold that the suit is not statute barred as same was filed within the limitation period of five years as provided in Section 16 of the Limitation Law of Bayelsa State. Issue one (1) is therefore resolved against the 1st Defendant, and the Court hereby assumes jurisdiction in the suit.


  1. With respect to Issue two (2), I have seen that the Claimant is asserting that the defendants owe him arrears of allowances for the period he served as a Councilor for Ward 1 in the 1st Defendant from 2004 – 2007 totaling the sum of N1, 473, 468.00. The onus or burden of proof in this suit is on the claimant to prove his case on the preponderance of evidence. See sections 131, 132, 133 and 134 of the Evidence Act, and the case of International Messengers (Nig) Ltd V. Pegofor Industries Limited (2005) LPELR-1525(SC) at page 20, paras. A – F. And in the circumstance of the case where the claim is in the nature of special damages, the law enjoins the Claimant to not only specially plead the claims with particulars but also prove same strictly. See the cases of Casmir Obok and Ors V. Chief Christopher Agbor and Ors (2016) LPELR-41219(CA) and Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation V. Clifco Nigeria Limited (2011) LPELR-2022(SC), at page 30, paras B – E, where the Supreme Court held as follows:


“Evidence ought to be led before an award for special damages is granted. To succeed in a claim for special damages it must be claimed specially and proved strictly. The fact that it appears to be admitted does not relieve the party claiming it of the requirement of proof with compelling evidence. Special damages are exceptional in character and so there is no room for inference by the Court. It is unreasonable to consider a claim for special damages reasonable in the absence of proof. A claim for special damages succeeds on compelling evidence to justify it and not on the sums claimed appearing reasonable to the Court.”


  1. While I have seen from the pleadings and evidence on record, particularly exhibits CW1A and CW1B that the Claimant was elected and served as the Councillor for Ward 1 in the 1st Defendant from 2004 – 2007 and is alleged to be entitled to the claims before the Court, this Court will however not lose sight of the contention of the 1st Defendant that the claims based on exhibit CW2A issued by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission is unconstitutional. The Learned Counsel to the 1st Defendant cited and relied on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Charles Nwokedi V. Anambra State Government and Onitsha North Local Government (2022) 7 NWLR (Part 1828) 29, and urged the Court to refuse the claims because the said Commission has no powers to fix salaries and allowances of Councillors at the Local Government Councils in the country. The Claimant’s Counsel has however asked the Court to discountenance the contention of the 1st Defendant because the Claimant is covered by the definition of a legislator, and is therefore a legislator to benefit from exhibit CW2A.


  1. I have pored over the provisions of Sections 153, 84, 124 and Section 32, item N, Part 1, Third Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), and also section 6(1)(d) of the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission Act, 2025 and seen that while the Act empowers the Commission to determine the remuneration appropriate to the holders of the offices as specified in Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Act, the Constitution however lists the holders of the following offices as the offices the Commission is empowered to determine their remuneration, and these are the President, Vice-President, Governors, Deputy Governors, Ministers, Commissioners, Special Advisers, Legislators and the holders of the offices mentioned in sections 84 and 124 of the Constitution. The issue of whether a Councillor of a Local Government Council is a legislator within the contemplation of the Constitution was resolved in the case of Charles Nwokedi V. Anambra State Government and Anor (supra). The Apex Court made it clear that Councillors are not legislators within the contemplation of the Constitution. The Court held as follows at page 58, paras. D-F of the report:


“Learned counsel for the appellant had contended that as a Councillor of the Onitsha Local Government, the appellant is a Legislator as envisaged by the section 32(d). item N, Part 1 of Schedule of the Constitution. As rightly held by the Court below, it would appear there was a legislative device to deliberately exclude political office holders like Councillors who are Legislators as of right on their Local Government tier of Government. However, if they are not legislators properly so called as envisaged by the Constitution in section 318(1) thereof, which states that: “In this Constitution, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, or the context otherwise requires, Legislative house means that Senate, House of Representatives or a House of Assembly.” The Legislative council of a Local Government is not mentioned by the Constitution so by extension a Councillor is not recognized by the Constitution as a member of a Legislative House properly so-called. Again, section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) defined the “Public Service of a State” to mean the service of the State in any capacity in respect of the Government of the State and includes service as mentioned in sub-paragraphs (a) to thereunder.”


  1. The Apex Court having held that the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission who issued exhibit CW2A has no powers to determine the remuneration of Councillors at the Local Government level, the Claimant cannot claim under exhibit CW2A. While exhibit CW2A was issued by the Commission on the 7th of November, 2001, the Apex Court however delivered the judgment in the case of Charles Nwokedi V. Anambra State Government and Anor (supra) on Friday 4th February, 2022.


  1. Let me make the point that, as persuaded as the Court is with respect to the claims of the Claimant, I have however seen that the claims, particularly the principal claim in relief 1 is intrinsically tied to the Circular of the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (exhibit CW2A) as pleaded in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Amended Statement of Facts, paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Claimant’s witness statement on oath and paragraph 6 of both the depositions of CW2 and CW3. A claim by a Local Government Councillor that is principally hinged on exhibit CW2A issued by the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission alone without supporting same with any other Law, Circular or Regulation of the Bayelsa State Government cannot be competent in the circumstance. This Court is bound to follow the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Charles Nwokedi V. Anambra State Government and Anor (supra) referenced above.   The principal claim in relief one (1) is therefore bound to fail, and same is hereby refused. Having refused the principal relief, it follows that the ancillary reliefs two (2) and (3) for N600, 000.00 as cost of litigation and the sum of N1,000,000.00 as general damages are also bound to fail, and they are also refused.


  1. In the final result, Issue two (2) is resolved against the Claimant, and the suit is hereby dismissed for want of proof. Judgment is entered accordingly. The parties are to bear their respective costs.


Hon. Justice P. I. Hamman

Presiding Judge


APPEARANCES:


A. O. Aniso holding the brief of P. P. P. Tamuno for the Claimant.

Henry Ikenna Nnamuka with V. T. Penaowei for the 1st Defendant.

No Counsel for the 2nd Defendant.