IN THE ******** INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

** THE AWKA ******** DIVISION

HOLDEN AT AWKA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE J.I. TARGEMA, PhD

 

DATE: JULY 7, 2026                                  

**** NO: NICN/AWK/22/2025

 

BETWEEN

Idika Uchenna                                  -                           Claimant 

 

AND

Coscharis ******** Limited (SIXT)           -                           Defendant

 

REPRESENTATION 

C.E.O. Nwonkwo, Esq., ******* the brief of I.E. Ofoluchi, Esq., *** the Claimant.

No legal representation for the Defendant.

 

RULING

INTRODUCTION

  1. The claimant ********* this ****** vide ** originating ******* filed on 21st *** 2025. The claimant originating summons was ******* pursuant to Order 3 ***** 3, 16, 17(1) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017.  *** claimant seeks *** determination of the ********* questions:
    1. Whether *** respondent is not ********** by ******* provision ** *** employment ****** dated 1st January, 2019 from terminating the claimant’s employment whilst the contract between the respondent and Enugu ************ Company exists without giving *** prior notice of termination to *** ******** or payment ** lieu?
    2. Whether by *** ******* provision of the ********** letter ******** by the parties, the ********** has the power to withhold the claimant’s ******** *** pensions?

Therefore, the claimant seeks the following:

  1. A declaration that the ********** has no power whatsoever to go outside the provisions of *** Employment letter ***** 1st January, 2019, to ********* his contract ****** of any prior notice or ******* in lieu. 
  2. A declaration **** the ********** has no power whatsoever to withhold *** salaries *** pensions due ** the claimant.
  3. A *********** that *** ********* *********** of the claimant’s ******** of employment devoid ** *** prior notice ** ******* in lieu is null, **** and of ** effect whatsoever.
  4. A declaration that the claimant is ******** to ** *** ******** and privilegeds contained ** the ********** letter ***** his employment is duly terminated.
  5. An order directing the ********** to *** the claimant ** the benefits *** privileges ******* until his ********** is ******** terminated.
  6. ** ***** directing *** respondent to issue a ****** a public apology to *** claimant ** *** National Dailies *** the trauma, stress, ********* hardship, ****** ******** *** embarrassment the respondent caused the claimant.
  7. The sum of *** ******* ***** (?1,000,000) ** ******* damages.
  8. The sum of *** ******* Naira (?2,000,000) only **** of this action.

 

  1. In ******* of the *********** summons, the claimant **** filed a 15-paragraphs affidavit attached and attached Exhibits A *** B.

 

  1. The ********** did not file a counter-********* in opposition ** the originating ******* dated 21st May 2025.

*** CASE ** THE CLAIMANT

  1. The **** of *** claimant/applicant ** **** the respondent employed *** claimant by a ****** of employment by Coscharis Mobility Limited dated 1st January, 2019 annexed as ******* A; that the said letter of employment specifically stipulated that either ***** can terminate this contract by giving two (2) weeks’ notice ** termination or payment in lieu; **** the respondent, however, terminated *** contract without regard ** the contents and the terms and conditions embedded in *** employment letter. The claimant submitted that *** fulcrum ** **** suit ** centered ** the interpretation of the employment letter annexed ** “Exhibit A.” That the ******** has **** approached this Honourable Court to ********* *** ******** provisions of the employment ****** particularly regarding the termination ** his ********** ****** of any ****** or ******* in lieu.

 

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT

  1. The claimant/applicant ********* two ****** *** determination:
    1.  ******* from *** clear, express *** *********** ********** of the employment letter (******* A) the respondents (sic) *** ********* the claimant’s employment ****** the ********* of *** respondent’s contract with Enugu *********** Distribution ******* without any formal ****** ** payment in lieu?
    2. ******* from the circumstances of this case, the claimant is ******** to damages?
  2. On issue (1), *** claimant submitted that it ** elementary *** and ******* principle ** interpretation **** where ***** **** in a document are clear, ******* and unambiguous, the Court must **** ****** ** ***** ordinary clear, ***** *** natural meaning. See Adeyemo v. Beyioku (1999) 1 NWLR (Pt. 635) ** 488. The Supreme Court ** A.G Cross River v. FRN (2019) ** **** (Pt. 1681) 401 @ 419 Paras 23-24 **** thus:

“When the provisions of *** Constitution and a ******* *** clear and free from ambiguity they ****** be given ***** plain meaning ******* *** embellishment. In **** case, *** ***** used in section 232 (1) ** *** 1999 Constitution are simple, clear and free from ambiguity.”

*** ******* Court went further at ***** 24 to **** as follows:

“The ****** rule ** interpretation is that the words **** ** a section of the Constitution must be given ***** natural *** ordinary ******* ****** doing so will result in ********* or inconsistency with the **** ** the Constitution. In this case, *** provision of section 232 of *** Constitution is ******* and unambiguous.”

See **** Al-Maseer *** **** v. FIRS (2019) 12 **** (Pt. 1687) 555. That ** the instant case, the document sought ** be interpreted or construed is “Exhibit A” ***** is the employment ****** executed between the claimant and *** respondent; **** the relevant ********* f *** employment letter provides as follows:

“Please be informed that either party *** ********* **** ******** by ****** two weeks’ notice or payment in lieu. Termination also ******* on the contract ******* Coscharis Mobility Limited and ***** *********** Distribution Company”.

It ** the claimant contention that the above provision of the employment letter ** clear, simple and ****** be ***** ***** ******** and natural meaning. See La Wari Furniture & ***** Ltd v. FRN (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1677) 262 and Delmas v. Sunny Ositez Int’l Ltd (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1677) 305.

     

  1. The ******** continued **** *** simple and natural interpretation of the ********** letter ** **** ***** the respondent intends to terminate the contract, ** **** give two weeks’ notice of termination ** the ******** or payment in lieu; that *** termination is therefore not automatic; that the ********** ** this **** automatically terminated the claimant’s employment devoid of any ***** notice or payment in lieu; that *** respondent **** ******* ****** him salaries and some other benefits. The claimant therefore, ********* that the ********** contravened the express provisions of Exhibit A; that the Exhibit “A” which is the employment ****** ** the contractual agreement entered **** ** both *** ******** *** the respondent in relation to *** ***** leave; **** the law is trite **** partiesare ***** by ***** agreement. See ****** v. *** & P Co Ltd (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 318. The Supreme Court in Mekwunye v. Imoukhuede (2019) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1690) 439 at page 459 paras 24, 25 & 27 **** as follows:

“Parties are ***** ** *** ***** of their contact. Consequently, they are **** bound by errors and mistakes ** *** contract, which **** **** condoned and waived. ** the case, the respondent signed the tenancy agreement, *** thereby ******** the error in *** arbitration clause.”

The **** Court went ******* at paras 25 and **** thus:

“The cardinal principle of ************** of documents ** that parties are presumed to have intended what is contained in a document to which they have subscribed. **** ** because it ** not the function of the ***** ** **** a ******** between the *** parties or ** rewrite *** one already **** by them, but ** is *** Court’s **** ** construe the surrounding circumstances including written *** oral statements to effectuate in *** tenancy agreement and ** their subsequent conduct to the appointment of a single ** sole arbitrator.”

The **** Court in paras 27 said ** follows:

“***** *** ********* of the parties ** a ******** *** clearly ****** in a document, the Court cannot go outside that document in search of other ********* not forming **** ** *** intention ** the parties”

*** claimant ********* ********* that Exhibit A binds **** the ******** and *** respondent and consequently, the respondent cannot go ******* the express ********** ** *** Exhibit A in an ******* to ********* their contract with claimant.

 

  1. On issue (2), the claimant submitted that Courts **** *** a long-time awarded ******* to assuage pains, suffering, trauma or hardship ****** by a party to a suit, for the wrongful, unlawful, arbitrary, oppressive conduct ** actions of the ********** party. See Kopek ************ Ltd v. Ekisola (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1182) 623, Mekwunye v. Emirates Airlines (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1677) 191 @ 201, ***** 14. The Supreme Court had **** to say:

“General damages *** damages that *** law presumes and they flow from *** type ** ***** complained about by the ****** **** are compensatory ******* for harm that results from the ***** *** which a party has sued; that *** **** is reasonably expected and need not ** alleged or proved. In **** case, the ********* led evidence to establish that she suffered economic loss, loss ** valuable time, ***** anxiety, ****** *** ********* stress between 17th December 2007 and 19th December, 2007. General damages are meant to ********** such class of ****** or losses the ********* suffered from the wrongful *** deliberate denial ** boarding. And ***** general damages ********* ****** from the act of the Respondent and ******* by law ** ****** of contract, there is no **** for it to be ************ proved.”

The **** Court further held in Mekwunye (supra) as follows:

“General damages *** monetary recovery ** a *** **** for ******** ******** **** as pain, suffering, *********** cost, economic loss *** inability to perform certain functions, or breach of ******** for which here is ** extract ******** value which can be calculated.”

**** from *** above judicial pronouncement, it is clear **** damages is grantable in view of the fact **** the respondent has ************ subjected *** ******** to trauma, anxiety, hardship, opportunity loss, pain and as well ** ********* ** perform *** ********* when *** respondent deliberately **** *** the provisions of the Bond Form and initiated a ***** *** demanded *** appearance ** the claimant before *** ************ committee ** contravention to *** ******* provision of the Bond Form.

 

  1. In conclusion, the claimant submitted that *** respondent has no power whatsoever to go outside *** provision of *** **** Form in a bide to enforce the provision of Article 3(vii) of the Bond Form; that *** claimant has ******** damages as a result ** *** actions of the respondent. *** claimant ***** *** ***** to grant *** the ******* of the claimant.

 

COURT’S DECISION

  1. I have examined the *********** summons ***** by the claimant, *** questions *** ************* and the reliefs ****** therein. The crux of the applicant’s claims ** reliefs sought centres on *** termination and *********** ** salaries *** pensions due to the ******** as provided in ****** ** offer of *********** issued ** the claimant (Exhibit A).

 

  1. By ***** 3 Rule 3 of **** (***** Procedure) Rules, 2017 provides that:

Civil *********** **** *** be commenced by way ** originating ******* include matters ******** principally to the ************** of *** constitution, enactment, agreements or any other instrument ******** to employment, ****** and ********** relations in respect of which *** Court *** jurisdiction ** ****** of *** ********** of ******* 254C of *** Constitution ** the ******* ******** of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) ** by any Act or law in force in Nigeria.

Originating summons **** be ideal where there is a ******* instrument or document, *** *** question *** the determination of the Court is what construction *** ** placed on the ****** ********** or document, or *** part ** it.  In 1907, Neville, J., clearly stated the principle in the English case of Re King, ****** v. South Australia Land Mortgage and Agency (1907) 1 Ch.72 thus:

“In ***** words, ** ** our ********** **** that *********** summons ****** only be ********** in such circumstances as where there ** no ******* ** ********* ** fact or the ********** ** such dispute.  Where, *** instance, *** issue ** ** determine short ********* of construction, and not matters ** such controversy that the justice ** the **** ***** demand the settling of pleadings, originating ******* could be applicable for, it is to be noted **** originating summons ** ****** a method of procedure and *** one that is meant to enlarge the jurisdiction of Court.”

 

  1. Where *** Court finds **** the ****** ** *** *** which ***** to be determined ** originating summons, the Court is empowered ** “make *** **** ****** as he deems fit.” This ***** ** admittedly wide, and would naturally include the ***** to strike out *** suit, *** in want ** jurisdiction, *** for ****** that a hostile action has been erroneously brought ** *** of originating summons. See ******** v. Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) 76 SC, 271; Obasanjo v. Yusuf (2004) *** FWLR (Pt. 213) 1884, (2004) 9 NWLR (Pt. 877) 144; ****** v. Oladokun (2003) 2 NWLR (Pt. 804); ****** v. Agu (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 229) 350; ***** v. Nwuche (2013) 3 **** (Pt. 1341) 337 ** per Galadima, JSC.

 

  1. It is my considered view **** the ********* ** originating summons ** meant ** be invoked in a friendly ****** between parties who *** substantially ** idem ** the facts and who, ******* the **** for pleadings, merely want, for example, a ********* ** the ***** ** *** ***** of law.  Where, for instance, issues ** mitigation of damages/injuries, rules regulating establishments, ******* ** salaries and how arrived at, limitation laws, nature of reliefs sought *** such ********** narratives are vagaries **** challenged *** sustainability ** the process, ** ******* a contentious issue/topic/subject.   ** *** circumstance, I **** that this action ** not one ***** ***** to be commenced ** originating summons as ***** *** facts within the ********* of the parties **** are not covered by the law they want this ***** ** interpret.  I so hold. ** *** circumstance, ** is ****** ******* that ******* **** and exchange pleadings on the issues for ************* by *** Court. I ** order.

 

  1. Judgment ** ******* accordingly. I make ** ***** as ** costs.

 

                                      

                             Hon. Justice J.I. Targema, PhD

 

 

 

 

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