Sir. Ubaka Nwafor & ORS -VS- Mr. Solomon Chukwuebuka Onwuemene & ORS- National Industrial Court of Nigeria

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE AWKA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT AWKA.

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE J. I. TARGEMA, PhD

DATE: 15 JULY, 2026

SUIT NO: NICN/AWK/15/2025

BETWEEN

Sir Ubaka Nwafor (Financial Secretary,

Motor Operators Union of Nigeria (MOUN),

Nnewi Branch)

Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria (MOUN) - Claimants/Applicants

AND

Mr. Solomon Chukwuebuka Onwuemene

(sued for himself and on behalf of the Special

Anit-Tout Squad (SASA), Anambra State

Mr. Jude Udegbe - Defendants/Respondents

REPRESENTATION

G.I. Egbere, Esq., for the claimants.

M.A. Ezeakor, Esq., for the 2^nd defendant.

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

The claimants filed the instant suit on 27^th March 2025 vide originating summons. The claimants posed four questions for determination, namely:
Whether having regards to the combined provisions of section 40 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) vis-à-vis Exhibit A in this suit, the 2^nd claimant is not entitled to operate and carry out its activities at Nnewi, Anambra State.
Whether having regards to the combined effects of the provisions of section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), sections 2(1) & (2), 4(1) and 15(1) as well as item 3 of the 1^st Schedule to the Trade Unions Act, 2005 (as amended) and Rules 5 & 20 of the Constitution of the Constitution of the Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria (MOUN) 2023, the 2^nd claimant is not entitled to operate and carry out the purposes for which it was formed including the enforcement of its objectives & purposes and in particular to collect subscriptions dues, ticketing or any other requisitions from her members as actions in furtherance of the purposes for which it was formed under its rules at Nnewi, Anambra State.
Whether having regards to the provisions of section 43 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and section 5(6) and 21 of the Trade Unions Act, 2005 as amended the claimants are not entitled to own, maintain and enjoy without intimidation/interference in any manner whatsoever from the defendants, the claimants’ office at No. 38 Ezeogidi Road, Akaboedoji Uruagu, Nnewi popularly known as and called “Okada White House” Nnewi, Nnewi North Local Government Area of Anambra State.
Upon the determination of the above issues or resolution of the above issues in favour of the claimants, whether it is not against the rule of law and unconstitutional for the defendants through the men of the 1^st defendant to be interfering with and frustrating the activities of the claimants at Nnewi, Anambra State.
Whereupon the claimants hereby claim jointly and severally against the defendants upon a favourable consideration of the issues as follows:
A declaration that the 2^nd claimant having been duly registered by the Registrar of Trade Unions and issued with Certificate of Registration pursuant to section 5(6) of the Trade Unions Act, 2005 (as amended) has the right to exist and operate as prescribed by its Constitution at its offices and units at Nnewi, Anambra State.
A declaration that the 2^nd claimant is entitled pursuant to section 2(1) & (2), 4(1), 15(1) and Item 3 of the 1^st Schedule to the Trade Unions Act, 2005 (as amended) to operate and carry out its activities and in particular collect subscriptions, dues, ticketing and any other sources of funds permitted by its rules from her members at designated collection point at Nnewi, Nnewi North Local Government Area in Anambra State without interference in any manner whatsoever from the defendants.
A declaration that the claimants are entitled to own, maintain and enjoy its office at No. 38 Ezeogidi Road, Akaboedoji Uruagu, Nnewi popularly known as and called “Okada White House” Nnewi, Nnewi North Local Government Area of Anambra State without interference in any manner whatsoever from the defendants.
An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, assigns, servants or otherwise howsoever described from arresting or in any other manner interfering with lawful activities of the members of the claimants at their designated points at Nnewi, Nnewi North Local Government Area of Anambra State.
An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, assigns, servants or otherwise howsoever described from sealing off, closing or in any manner whatsoever interfering with the claimants’ ownership, maintenance and enjoyment of their office at No. 38 Ezeogidi Road, Akaboedoji Uruagu, Nnewi popularly known as and called “Okada White House” Nnewi, Nnewi North Local Government Area of Anambra State.
?100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) damages against the defendants and in favour of the claimants for the excruciating pains suffered in the hands of the defendants.

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANTS IN SUPPORT OF THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS

The claimant submitted a lone issue for determination namely:
1. Whether having regard to the combined effect of the provisions of section 40 & 43 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), sections 5(6), 2(1) & (2), 4(1), 15(1), 21 and item 3 of the 1^st Schedule to the Trade Unions Act, as well as relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria (MOUN) is the 2^nd claimant entitled to exist and carry out actions in furtherance of the purposes for which it was formed at Nnewi in Anambra State.

The claimant submitted that it is apposite to begin a resolution of the above issue with the highlight of the provisions of sections 40 and 43 of the 1999 Constitution as amended, the relevant provisions of the Trade Unions Act and of the 2023 Constitution of the Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria (MOUN) thus: section 40 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) provides:

“Every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and in particular, he may form or belong to any political party, TRADE UNION or any other association for the protection of his interest: provided that the provisions of this section shall not derogate from the powers conferred on the Independent National Electoral Commission with respect to political parties to which the commission does not accord recognition.”

See also, Article 10 of the African Charter on Peoples and Political Rights. (Highlights, ours for emphasis). That section 43 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) states:

“Subject to the provisions of this constitution, every citizen of Nigeria shall have the right to acquire and own immoveable property anywhere in Nigeria”

Section 2(1) of the Trade Unions Act, 2005, provides thus:

“Union shall not perform any act in furtherance of the purpose for which it has been formed unless it has been registered under this Act; provided that nothing in this subsection shall prevent a trade union from taking any steps (including the collection of subscriptions or dues which may be necessary for the purpose of getting the union registered.”

Subsection (2) thereof provides:

“Where a trade union registered under this Act ceases to be registered, it shall not thereafter perfume any act in furtherance of its purposes; provided that nothing in this subsection shall prevent a trade union from taking any steps which may be necessary for the purpose of dissolving the union.”

Section 4(1) of the Trade Unions Act provides:

“Every trade union shall have registered rules, which shall contain provisions with respect to the various matters mentioned in the 1^st Schedule to this Act.”

Section 5(6) of the Trade Unions Act, is to the effect that

“on registering a trade union, the Registrar shall issue to the union a certificate of registration which is a conclusive proof that the requirements of the act and the regulations for the registration of trade unions have been complied with and that the trade union is a union for the purposes of the Act.” (Highlights, ours for emphasis).

Section 15(1) of the Act provides thus:

“Unless otherwise provide, in so far as the funds of a trade union represents payments which the members are required to make under the rules, whether by way of subscriptions, dues or otherwise, those funds shall not be app[lied (whether directly or indirectly or through any other union, association or body or in any other indirect manner) to the furtherance of any political objective.”

Finally, Item 3 of the 1^st Schedule to the Trade Unions Act, is to the effect that matters to be provided for in rules of trade unions includes the subscriptions and dues, if any, which members are required to pay.”

The claimant continued that it can be seen from the above provisions that the constitutional right to freedom of assembly and association guaranteed to every Nigeria like all the fundamental rights provisions is mandatorily required to be observed and complied with in relation to Nigerians by the use of the word “shall” by the constitution; that the fundamental right of freedom of assembly and association cannot be detracted or derogated from by mere wave of hand. It is very mandatory and fundamental. See Jim Jaja v. COP Rivers State (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 225. That it is in the exercise of that right that the claimants formed themselves into the trade union registered as the 2^nd claimant in this suit for the protection of their interests; that is instructive to note that section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) specifically isolated the right to membership of trade union and political party as crucial aspects of the provisions; that as a political association wishing to function as a political party can only function as such upon being recognized by the Independent National Electoral Commission as having satisfied the requirements of the law and once recognized as such is entitled to function. See Musa & ors v. INEC (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt. 806) 72. In the same vein, an association can only function as a trade union upon being recognized and registered as such by the Registrar of Trade Unions as having satisfied the legal pre-requisites for its registration; that once registered, a trade union enjoys similar rights and privileges to function as such and the performance of acts in furtherance of its objectives and purposes for which it was formed. See Erasmus Osawe & 2 ors v. Registrar of Trade Unions (2004) NLLR (Pt. 1) 34; (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 755, Registered Trustees of National Association of Community Health Practitioners of Nigeria & 2 ors v. Medical Health Workers Union of Nigeria (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1072) 575.

The claimant submitted that a careful perusal of the above constitutional and statutory provisions, clearly demonstrates that once an association has satisfied the requirements of the law to be registered as a trade union, it is entitled to exist and perform acts in furtherance of its objectives/the purposes for which it was formed; that by section 5(6) of the Trade Unions Act, 2005 (as amended), the Act made it as clear as day light that once an association has been duly registered by the Registrar of Trade Unions and issued with a Certificate of Registration, the issuance of the certificate of registration conduces a conclusive proof of satisfaction of the requirements of the law to be so registered and entitled to exist as a trade union for the purposes of the Act. That the Act could have been more correct that the said provision in view of the usual disequilibrium of influence/power in the relationship of workers on the one hand and the employers or regulators on the other hand; that the very essence of trade unionism is to secure a platform for the promotion of the collective interest of the unionists that could not have been possible if the members were to be left individually on their own without such aggregation of their different voices into one louder voice. Thus, trade unions are interesting voices in a democracy who convey a united voice of the members in a louder pedestal capable of effervescing out of the gagging storms of oppression and suppression.

The claimants went on that in the instant, the certificate of registration of the 2^nd claimant is attached as Exhibit A to the affidavit in support of this originating summons; that Exhibit A is conclusive prove that the 2^nd claimant is a trade union within the meaning and for the purposes of the Trade Unions Act and therefore can exist to perform actions in furtherance of its objectives pursuant to section 5(6) of the Trade Unions Act, 2005 (as amended) and a right fundamentally guaranteed by section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 which vests every Nigeria with the right to join a trade union or any other association of his choice for the protection of his interest. The exercise of that right by the claimants cannot be faulted nor truncated by any degree of disgruntleness of the defendants; that the above conclusion is inevitable having regards to the fact that the Act also made registration of an association as a trade union a condition precedent to the performance of any act in furtherance of the purposes for which the association has been formed as a trade union pursuant to section 2(1) of the Trade Unions Act, 2005 which provides thus:

“A trade union shall not perform any act in furtherance of the purpose for which it has been formed unless it has been registered under this Act; provided that nothing in this subsection shall prevent a trade union from taking any steps (including the collection of subscriptions or due which may be necessary for the purpose of getting the union registered.”

That it is contended that the use of the word “shall” by section 2 of the Trade Union Act, above, equally implies in reverse order, that once an association has been registered as a trade union, it shall be entitled as of right, to perform any act in furtherance of the purposes for which it has been formed; that the 2^nd claimant having been duly registered is entitled to perform the functions prescribed by its rules in furtherance of the purposes for which it has been formed pursuant to section 4(1) of the Trade Union Act, which provides:

“Every trade union shall have registered rules, which shall contain provisions with respect to the various matters mentioned in the 1^st Schedule to this Act.”

That many things contained in the 1^st Schedule to the Trade Unions Act which a registered trade union is required to provide in its rules is the payment of subscriptions and dues by members as an act in furtherance of the objectives/purposes for which the union is formed. Thus, item 3 of the 1^st Schedule to the Trade Unions Act provides thus:

“Matters to be provided for in rules of trade unions includes the subscriptions and dues, if any, which members are required to pay”

The rule of law and due process in a democratic setting like Nigeria demands an inquiry into activities of the 2^nd claimant in any part of the country including Anambra State to find out whether its activities are in conformity to the relevant provisions of the Trade Unions Act and other relevant regulations in that behalf before any punitive measures or regulatory enforcement can be meted out to the 2^nd claimant and her members.

The claimants submitted that it is contended in the absence of running afoul of any law or regulation, the sledge hammer of extermination or actions targeted at extinction of the 2^nd claimant cannot fall on it or any of its members. Otherwise, it would amount to unleashing anarchy and lawlessness on a body that came into existence by due process of law. For a lawful body or union as the 2^nd claimant cannot be strangulated unlawfully by sheer dint of brute force guaranteed by privilege of office for then, it will amount to abuse of office and privilege for the 1^st defendant to take alibi under the veneer of the grandeur of its office as state homeland security to exterminate the claimants and/or shutdown their activities being carried out within the bounds of the law. See Governor of Lagos State v. Ojeukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621, Doherty v. Balewa (1963) SCNLR 155, Attorney General Abia State v. AG Federation (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 763) 264. In Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu, the Supreme Court stressing the utmost need for rule of law stated thus:

“The Nigerian Constitution is founded on the rule of law the primary meaning of which is that everything must be done according to law. It means also that government should be conducted within the framework of recognized rules and principles which restrict discretionary power which coke colorfully spoke of as ‘golden and straight metwand of law as opposed to the uncertain and crooked cord of discretion’ (see 4 Inst. 41). More relevant to the case in hand, the rule of law means that disputes as to the legality of acts of government are to be decided by judges who are wholly independent of the executive. See Wade on Administrative law 5^th Edition p. 22-27. That is the position in this country where the judiciary has been independent of the executive by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 as amended by Decree No. 1 of 1984 and No. 17 of 1985. The judiciary cannot shirk its sacred responsibility to the nation to maintain the rule of law. It is both in the interest of the Government and all persons in Nigeria. The law should be even handed between the government and citizens.”

That the claimants have come for justice from this Court to enjoy the rights and privileges which they are by law entitled to; that it is pursuant to the provisions of the Trade Unions Act and regulations connected thereto that the 2^nd claimant made its rules known as the Constitution of the Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria (MOUN).

The claimant continued that a trade union being the umbrella voice of its members has to be maintained by the members to retain a considerable influence of policies and programs in favour of its members. Thus, while an unregistered trade union cannot take any other step in furtherance of the purposes for which it is proposed to be formed, it could take steps to collect subscriptions and dues from its members for the purpose of getting such union registered. See section 2(1) supra. To that extent, item 3 of the 1^st Schedule to the Trade Unions Act provides thus:

“Matters to be provided for in rules of trade unions includes the subscriptions and dues, if any, which members are required to pay.”

That in that regard, provisions for compulsory automatic deduction from the wages of workers who are members of relevant trade unions as check-off dues in favour of the appropriate registered trade unions are part and parcel of trade unionism and labour regulations. See section 5(3) of the Labour Act. In the case of Corporate Affairs Commission v. Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations, Civil Service Technical and Recreational Services Employees (2004) NLLR (Pt. 1) 1, the National Industrial Court upheld the said provisions as constitutional and rightfully made.

The claimant further submitted that the 2^nd claimant in its Constitution made provisions in Rules 5 and 20 of the Constitution of the Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria (MOUN) (the constitution is Exhibit C) in this suit for the payment subscriptions and dues by the members. Rule 5 provides:

“All members of the union shall pay a prescribed daily subscription fee and any other level to the union to deal with any emergency as may come up, such levy to be determined by INEC.”

That similarly, Rule 20(1) of the Constitution of the MOUN provides thus:

“The sources of revenue for the union shall be the following (a) Registration fees, daily/monthly dues, tonnage levies, penalties, fines donations, contribution to special funds, returns on investment, sales of membership cards and publications including constitution, proceeds from economic and social activities, loading and offloading permits, ticketing and any other sources of funds approved by the National Executive and Council and National Delegate Conference of the union…”

That the various sources of funds for the union, the one now approved by the National Executive Council and the National Delegate Conference of the union and which is being carried out in Anambra State and at Nnewi is the payment of subscription fees, registration fees, dues and ticketing as well as sale of membership identity cards; that the 2^nd claimant by Exhibit B demonstrated willingness to collaborate and partner with appropriate agencies or departments of the state government in the implementation of the approved programs.

The claimant went on that the defendants have been hell bent on strangulating the activities of the 2^nd claimant in the state; that until the registration of the 2^nd claimant is canceled by the Registrar of Trade Union; that the 2^nd claimant is entitled to exist and carry out lawful acts in furtherance of the purposes for which it was formed. That it is not open for the defendants to root out the claimants for no just cause when the claimants do not pose any security threat as they organize and carry out their activities professionally as provided in their rules and as per the terms of reference of their registration as a trade union; that the very essence of the formation of the 2^nd claimant as a trade union is in the interest of public order, security and peace. It is therefore contended that the claimants under the extant law are entitled to exist and perform actions in furtherance of the purposes for which the 2^nd claimant was formed anywhere in Anambra State including Nnewi. Section 43 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) provides thus:

“Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, every citizen of Nigeria shall have the right to acquire and own immovable property anywhere in Nigeria”

While section 21(1) of the Trade Unions Act, 2005 says: “Every trade union shall have a registered office to which all communications and notices may be addressed.” And section 21(4) of the Trade Unions Act, 2005 provides “if any trade union continues for more than thirty days without a registered office, the trade union and every official thereof shall be liable to a fine of ?10 for every day during which, after the end of the thirty days, it continued as aforesaid.”

The claimant submitted that it is not only a constitutional and statutory right of the claimants to own and main an office but also a criminal offence for the claimants to operate without an office; that the defendants are not in the circumstance entitled to interfere in any manner whatsoever with the claimants’ ownership, enjoyment and maintenance of their office at “Okada White House, Nnewi” which the 2^nd defendant has been going about inciting to be sealed off. That it is a grave and blatant contravention of the constitutional and statutory rights of the claimants for the defendants to be strangulating the activities of the claimants at Nnewi, Anambra State; that it is against the constitutional and statutory rights of the claimants as well as every tenets and fundamentals of rule of law for the defendants to seek to seal off or interfere with the claimants’ ownership, enjoyment and maintenance of their office at Nnewi. The claimants urged the Court to find in favour of the claimants and save them from the suppressive and oppressive wickedness of the defendants on the claimants.

In conclusion, the claimants pray the Court to grant their prayers as per the reliefs sought by resolving all the issues in favour of the claimants.

THE SUBMISSION’S OF THE 2^ND DEFENDANT IN RESPONSE TO THE CLAIMANTS’ ORIGINATING SUMMONS

The 2^nd defendant raises four (4) issues for determination, namely:
1. Considering the reliefs as contained in the originating summons of the claimants whether the 1^st claimant has the locus standi and or ought to be a party in this case.
2. Whether the 2^nd claimant is a body/person capable of suing or being sued considering the affidavit in the originating summons, Exhibit A attached thereto and counter affidavit if (sic) the 2^nd defendant and where the Court finds in affirmation, whether, in law, the 2^nd claimant is properly a party before this Court.
3. Whether considering the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), particularly section 254(C) and in consideration of facts as deposed in the affidavit evidence before the Court, the Court has substantive/subject matter jurisdiction to try this matter.
4. Whether the claimants proved against and entitled to their reliefs against the 2^nd defendant on the evidence before the Court.

On issue (1), considering the reliefs as contained in the originating summons of the claimants whether the 1^st claimant has the locus standi and or ought to be a party in this case. The 2^nd defendant submitted that the law is trite that for a party to approach a Court for any redress, the party must be a person with legal capacity of instituting or commencing an action in a competent Court of law or tribunal without any inhibition, obstruction or hinderance from any person of body whatsoever. See Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423. In Makinde v. Okon Engr. Services (UK) Ltd (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt.1471) P. 1. It was held that the term locus standi denotes legal capacity to institute legal proceedings in a Court of law. It is the right of a party to appear and be heard on a question before a Court, that in order to have locus standi to commence an action a party must have sufficient interest in the action as well show that his legal right or obligation have been or are in danger of being infringed. (underlining mine for emphasis). See also Para v. Mohammed (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1112) 1. That from the above position of the law, it is the duty of the 1^st claimant before instituting any action before this Court to show his sufficient interest in the action and as well show that his legal rights or obligations have been or are in danger of being infringed. But looking at the originating summons before this Court and reliefs thereof, there is nowhere the question of whether the rights of the 1^st claimant have been breached, infringed or likely to be breached, no reliefs sought was in favour of the 1^st claimant rather all the reliefs are reliefs sought for the 2^nd claimant; that there is no legal interest of the 1^st claimant in issue and by same the 1^st claimant lacks the locus standi to be a party in this suit, having no triable or real interest in it.

The 2^nd defendant continued that the reliefs as contained in the originating summons are as follows:
1. A declaration that the 2^nd claimant having been duly registered by the Registrar of Trade Unions and issued with Certificate of Registration pursuant to section 5(6) of the Trade Unions Act, 2005 (as amended) has the right to exist and operate as prescribed by its Constitution at its offices and units at Nnewi, Anambra State.
2. A declaration that the 2^nd claimant is entitled pursuant to section 2(1), (2), 4(1), 15(1) and Item 3 of the 1^st Schedule to the Trade Unions Act, 2005 (as amended) to operate and carry out its activities and in particular collect subscriptions, dues, ticketing and any other sources of funds permitted by its rules from her members at designated collection point at Nnewi, Nnewi North Local Government Area in Anambra State without interference in any manner whatsoever from the defendants.
3. A declaration that the claimants are entitled to own, maintain and enjoy its office at No. 38 Ezeogidi Road, Akaboedoji Uruagu, Nnewi popularly known as and called “Okada White House” Nnewi, Nnewi North Local Government Area of Anambra State without interference in any manner whatsoever from the defendants.
4. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, assigns, servants or otherwise howsoever described from arresting or in any other manner interfering with lawful activities of the members of the claimants at their designated points at Nnewi, Nnewi North Local Government Area of Anambra State.
5. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, assigns, servants or otherwise howsoever described from sealing off, closing or in any manner whatsoever interfering with the claimants’ ownership, maintenance and enjoyment of their office at No. 38 Ezeogidi Road, Akaboedoji Uruagu, Nnewi popularly known as and called “Okada White House” Nnewi, Nnewi North Local Government Area of Anambra State.
6. ?100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) damages against the defendants and in favour of the claimants for the excruciating pains suffered in the hands of the defendants.

That by section 2(1) of the Trade Union Act 2005, it is provided that a trade union shall not perform any act in furtherance of the purpose for which it has been formed unless it has been registered under that Act. In other words, the Act only recognize that it is only a registered Trade Union that can function as such with its right, obligation and liabilities thereto provided; that by section 5 of the Trade Union Act (ibid) issuance to a Union a certificate of registration is a conclusive proof that requirements of the Act and the regulations for the registration of Trade Union have been complied with, and the registered trade union is a union for the purposes and on that stands to function as such.

The 2^nd defendant submitted that Trade Union under section 1 of the Act defined to mean thus:

“Any combination of workers or employers, whether temporary or permanent, the purpose of which is to regulate the terms, and conditions of employment or workers, whether the combination in question would or would not, apart from this Act, be an unlawful combination by reason of any its purposes being in restraint of trade and whether its purpose do or do not include of benefits for its members.”

That the 1^st claimant is only a person and the definition of a trade union did not include him too; that from the originating process the complaint of the 1^st claimant has never been that he is a registered Union and as such cannot and or pretend to seek for himself before the Court protections, rights or whatsoever exclusively reserved for a trade union in the Trade Union Act (supra); that the reliefs on the originating summons are clearly not for the 1^st claimant, by so the 1^st claimant cannot be a party to this suit that did not seek a relief in his favour. The 2^nd defendant urged the Court to so find and strike out the name of the 1^st claimant in the suit.

On issue (2), is whether the 2^nd claimant is a body/person capable of suing or being sued considering the affidavit in the originating summons, Exhibit A attached thereto and counter affidavit if (sic) the 2^nd defendant and where the Court finds in affirmation, whether, in law, the 2^nd claimant is properly a party before this Court. The 2^nd defendant submitted that the parties to action must be persons or bodies recognized by law to sue and be sued either as a legal person or a corporate body created and empowered under an Act or a Law to sue or be sue in its name. See Knight and Seale v. Dove (1964) 2 ACT CR 307 at 309 the Court held thus:

“No action can be brought by or against any party other a natural personal or persons unless such party has been given by statute, expressly or impliedly or by common law, either (a) legal personality under the name which is sued or to sued or (b) a right to sue or be sued by that name.”

That in the case of Shitte v. Ligali (2001) FWLR (Pt. 71) 1717, the Court held that the plaintiffs who described themselves as the Executive Committee of Central Mosque, Lagos had no capacity to sue because Central Mosque, Lagoe was not a legal person or a body empowered by any statuate (sic) to sue or be sued in that name.

The 2^nd defendant went on that the counsel to the claimants seems to know the position of this principle of law and that is why he argued their right to approach this Court and seek any redress by relying on the Trade Unions Act, 2005 and cited many sections in support of his submissions but looking into the evidence before the Court, particular (sic) their affidavit, 2^nd defendant’s counter-affidavit and Exhibit A in support of the affidavit of the claimants, 2^nd claimant neither a legal person or person expressly or implied recognized by the statute i.e. Trade Union Act (ibid) or granted the capacity to sue or be sued in that name. That section 2 of the Act provided thus:

“A trade Union shall not perform any act in furtherance of the purpose for which has been formed unless it has been registered under this Act”

While section 5 of the Act provided thus:

“The Registrar on registering a trade union shall issue a certificate of registration which unless is proved that the registration of the union has been canceled shall (except in any proceeding for the cancellation of the registration of the union on the ground that its registration was obtained by fraud or as the result of a mistake) be conclusive evidence that the requirements of this Act and Regulations with respect to the registration of trade union, have been complied with, and that the trade union for the purpose of this Act”

That the ordination of the above sections shows that a trade union is born on its registration which the certificate of registration bearing its registered name shall be given by the registrar to it. It is upon satisfying the said sections that the union can enjoy the provisions of the Trade Union Act, which right to sue and be sued in its name is part of; that in the present case, the claimants, through the deposition of the 1^st claimant claimed that the 2^nd claimant is a trade union that have the right to sue and sued while the 2^nd defendant in his counter-affidavit challenged the status of the 2^nd claimant as a trade union, therefore, it is incumbent on the claimants to prove that the 2^nd claimant is a registered trade union capable of suing and be sued.

The 2^nd defendant further submitted that in demonstration that 2^nd claimant is a trade union, the claimants attached in their evidence (affidavit) a certificate of registration as Exhibit “A”. In the Exhibit “A” what is shown to be the registered union is “Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria (MOUN) while the 2^nd claimant in this suit is “Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria (MOUN) Nnewi Branch, Anambra State.” That Certificate of registration is a conclusive evidence that the union is a recognized trade union under the Trade Unions Act but looking at the certificate and other evidence before the Court, it is evidently shown that the claimants have failed to prove that the 2^nd claimant “Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria (MOUN), Nnewi Branch, Anambra State “ is a registered union, corollary, the 2^nd claimant is neither a legal person nor a person by creation of statute (Trade Union Act) who can sue or be sued in its name. The 2^nd defendant urged the Court to so find and strike out the name of the 2^nd claimant.

The 2^nd defendant continued that assuming without conceding that the 2^nd claimant is a person capable of suing and to be sued; that from the facts and circumstances of this case, the 2^nd claimant proper or in law the person before this Court; that on registration of a trade union, the union an artificial person capable of suing and being sued, and just like companies, trade union being not a natural person cannot act on its own, as it has no minds and hands of the own, but through human beings who are the members, executives and organs of the union. See Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 KB 461; 67 ER 189, the principle of how a body like the 2^nd claimant is run was stated to be by the decision of the majority members of the body; that in this present case, the 2^nd defendant, relying on the Exhibit “A” attached in his counter-affidavit Exhibit “R1” a composite of the officers of the union, in this Exhibit “R1” the name of the 2^nd defendant appeared in number 6 as the vice chairman (South East) and the 2^nd defendant also challenged the position of the 1^st claimant in the said union; that the 1^st claimant has the burden of proving that the decision to institute this action is the majority decision of the members of the union or at least that the decision is one taken by the majority of the officers of the union; that the 1^st claimant did not show this, through his evidence, he didn’t even show that he is a member of the union neither did he show any evidence that he is a financial secretary of the union, purported 2^nd claimant but only stated that he has the consent of it to depose on his behalf the affidavit in support of their originating summons. In view of the 2^nd defendant submission, the 2^nd defendant urged the Court this (sic) Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit.

For issue (3), is whether considering the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), particularly section 254(C) and in consideration of facts as deposed in the affidavit evidence before the Court, the Court has substantive/subject matter jurisdiction to try this matter. The 2^nd defendant submitted that it is a trite law that a Court must have jurisdiction to try a matter before it can go on with the case and when a Court of law tries a matter without jurisdiction, the proceedings remain a nullity ab initio no matter how well the matter was conducted or brilliantly the decision was. See Goldmark (Nig) Ltd v. Ibefon Co. Ltd (2012) 10 NWLR P. 291, Adeyemi v. Odili (2006) 6 NWLR (977) 587 and Onuorah v. K.R.P.C Ltd (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 393. In PDP v. Okorocha (2012) 15 NWLR P. 205 and African Newspaper of Nigeria Ltd v. FRN (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 6) p. 137, the Court held that jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law and that no litigant can confer jurisdiction on a Court where the Constitution statutes say that the Court does not have jurisdiction. That in the present case, what guides the Court, being a Court established by the Constitution, on whether or not it has jurisdiction is the Constitution of the Federal Republic of NIGERIA (1999); that section 254(A) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended 2023 established this Court as the National Industrial Court of Nigeria and the Constitution went further in section 254(C) and itemized matters the Court should exercise jurisdiction.

The 2^nd defendant submitted that section 254C of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended provide thus:

“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters-

relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith;
relating to, connected with or arising from Factories Act, Trade Disputes Act, Trade Unions Act, Labour Act, Employees’ Compensation Act or any other Act or Law relating to labour, employment, industrial relations, workplace or any other enactment replacing the Acts or Laws;
relating to or connected with the grant of any order restraining any person or body from taking part in any strike, lock-out or any industrial action, or any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a strike, lock-out or any industrial action and matters Connected therewith or related thereto;
relating to or connected with any dispute over the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter IV of this Constitution as it relates to any employment, labour, industrial relations, trade unionism, employer’s association or any other matter which the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine;
relating to or connected with any dispute arising from national minimum wage for the Federation or any part thereof and matters connected therewith or arising therefrom;
relating to or connected with unfair labour practice or international best practices in labour, employment and industrial relation matters;
relating to or connected with any dispute arising from discrimination or sexual harassment at workplace;
relating to, connected with or pertaining to the application or interpretation of international labour standards;
connected with or related to child labour, child abuse, human trafficking or any matter connected therewith or related thereto;
relating to the determination of any question as to the interpretation and application of any-
1. collective agreement,
2. award or order made by an arbitral tribunal in respect of a trade dispute or a trade union dispute,
3. award or judgment of the Court,
4. term of settlement of any trade dispute,
5. trade union dispute or employment dispute as may be recorded in a memorandum of settlement,
6. trade union constitution, the constitution of an association of employers or any association relating to employment, labour, industrial relations or work place,
7. dispute relating to or connected with any personnel matter arising from any free trade zone in the Federation or any part thereof;

relating to or connected with disputes arising from payment or nonpayment of salaries, wages, pensions, gratuities, allowances, benefits and any other entitlement of any employee, worker, political or public office holder, judicial officer or any civil or public servant in any part of the Federation and matters incidental thereto;
relating to
1. appeals from the decisions of the Registrar of Trade Unions, or matters relating thereto or connected therewith,
2. appeals from the decisions or recommendations of any administrative body or commission of enquiry, arising from or connected with employment, labour, trade unions or industrial relations, and
3. such other jurisdiction, civil or criminal and whether to the exclusion of any other court or not, as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly;
4. relating to or connected with the registration of collective agreements.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, the National Industrial Court shall have the jurisdiction and power to deal with any matter connected with or pertaining to the application of any international convention, treaty or protocol of which Nigeria has ratified relating to labour, employment, workplace, industrial relations or matters connected therewith.
The National Industrial Court may establish an Alternative Dispute Resolutions Centre within the Court premises on matters which jurisdiction is conferred on the court by this Constitution or any Act or Law:

Provided that nothing in this subsection shall preclude the National Industrial Court from entertaining and exercising appellate and supervisory jurisdiction over an arbitral tribunal or commission, administrative body, or board of inquiry in respect of any matter that the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction to entertain or any other matter as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly or any Law in force in any part of the Federation.

The National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction and powers to entertain any application for the enforcement of the award, decision, ruling or order made by any arbitral tribunal or commission, administrative body, or board of inquiry relating to, connected with, arising from or pertaining to any matter of which the National Industrial Court has the jurisdiction to entertain.
The National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction and powers in criminal causes and matters arising from any cause or matter of which jurisdiction is conferred on the National Industrial Court by this section or any other Act of the National Assembly or by any other law.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, appeal shall lie from the decision of the National Industrial Court from matters in sub-section 5 of this section to the Court of Appeal as of right.”

The 2^nd defendant continued that though the claimants on the face of the originating summons maybe, deceitful and presented their matter to say that their case falls under section 254C above; that critical examination of their case reveals that their case is not one under the jurisdiction of this Court; that it is the law that the Court is empowered to examine the evidence of the parties where evidence has been led evidence (sic) in determination of its jurisdiction. See Goldmark Nig Ltd v. Ibefon Co. Ltd (supra), the Court enlisted basis for reviewing of issues of jurisdiction and (sic) follows:
On the basis of the statement of claim;
On the basis of evidence received;
On the face of writ of summons;
By motion supported by affidavit setting out facts relied on and;
Where appropriate as to the capacity brought or against whom the action was brought.

That in NLC v. Amimu (2012) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1302) P. 330, the Court held that in cases fought on affidavit, the evidence is what is averred in an affidavit; that the evidence before this Court is the 34 paragraph depositions of the 1^st claimant and the 2^nd defendant on examination of the 1^st claimant deposition (the evidence), the Court will out that the facts of the case are nowhere collected to the reliefs sought and do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Court as listed in section 254C of the Constitution; that the summary of the facts as deposed in the affidavit of the claimants, the claimants are not claiming that there is leadership dispute within the 2^nd claimant, neither did they claim that the defendants are challenging its existence and functions as a trade union rather their claims are on their alleged facts that the 1^st defendant on the instigation of the 2^nd defendant harassed and detained the 1^st claimant and other persons and collected money from them regardless of the fact that the members of the 2^nd claimant pay subscriptions, dues, ticketing and other sources of funds to the 2^nd claimant.

The 2^nd defendant submitted that in the other words, the complaint of the claimants is on whether the 1^st defendant an employee in department of Anambra State, could still collect any fund, (as taxes) from the members of the 2^nd claimants (sic) and the legality of the 1^st defendant collecting same on their alleged instigation by the of the (sic) 2^nd defendant, which, with the greatest respect, falls under the jurisdiction of a state High Court and other courts in this state (Anambra State); that going further per their reliefs, the claimants are also asking this Court to declare them as the owners of the building know as and called “Okada White House” a landed property that by virtue of the Land Use Act, 1978 is exclusively reserved to the jurisdiction of State High Court. The 2^nd defendant therefore, submitted that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to try this motion.

On issue (4), is whether the claimants proved against and entitled to their reliefs against the 2^nd defendant on the evidence before the Court. The 2^nd defendant submitted that whoever wants a Court to give judgment to his on his (sic) affirmative assertion has the onus, duty/burden to prove such assertions. Counsel to 2^nd defendant cited Famurati v. Agbeke (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 189) p. 1 and Akunde v. Adisa (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1324). That the claimants in this Court want the Court to give judgment in their favour and against the defendants as contained per their originating summons thus have the burden to prove how the defendants would be liable to them but the claimants failed woefully in discharging this burden; that the 2^nd defendant is more concern on his case; that the evidence of the claimants is the affidavit, the claimants, in the affidavit never alleged that the 2^nd defendant directly or physically engaged with them neither did they allege that 2^nd defendant was the person who harassed, detained and collected money from them, rather the reason they sued the 2^nd defendant is on their allegation that the 1^st defendant did the alleged acts on the instigation of the 2^nd defendant, therefore for the claimants to be entitled to their reliefs sought against the 2^nd defendant, thence the claimants to be entitled their reliefs, in law, sought against the 2^nd defendant, the claimants have to those (sic) acts were really done on the instigation of 2^nd defendant and those acts entitle the reliefs in their claim; that even if the affidavit of the claimant is taken as it is, the reliefs sought ore (sic) so strange to the facts as deposed to the affidavit. In the affidavit, there is no dispute whether the 2^nd claimant can be or was registered as a Trade Union, its rights to exit as such, its rights to collect subscription, dues, ticketing and any other sources of funds from its members and or its rights to operate in address as contained in the claim rather the complaint of the claimants are on whether the 1^st defendant as the Chairman of Anambra State Special Anti-Tout Squard can collect further sums from the members of the 2^nd claimant and on examination the processes of the claimants; that the claimants neither argued this nor claim a declaration or any other relief on it. It is trite law that a Court of law is not a father Christmas and grant a party what he/she did not pray for. See Nwosu v. Nwosu (2012) 8 March (Pt. 1301) P.1.

The 2^nd defendant submitted that there is no evidence before this Court that established that the 1^st defendant did al acts as the claimants claimed but even if the claimants established their allegation, assuming that the facts in their affidavit are capable of granting the nature of their claims, they still have the task of proving that the 1^st defendant did so on the instigation of the 2^nd defendant to entitle judgment against the 2^nd defendants (sic) but the claimants failed in doing so; that the claimants in their affidavit only stated that the 2^nd defendant instigated the 1^st defendant against them without letting the Court know those facts, in their evidence, that will help the Court to decide whether the 1^st defendant was acting under the direction and influence the 2^nd defendant; that instigation in its ordinary meaning is the state of being instigated; incitement; especially to evil or wickedness while instigate itself means (i) to incite, to bring about by urging or encouraging (ii) to goad or urge (a person) forward, especially to wicked actions; to provoke. That from the above meanings, the Court can only decide whether or not the 2^nd defendant instigate the 1^st defendant from combination of facts placed before the Court but the claimants failed in feeding the Court the actual acts of the 2^nd defendant that Court can be seen or interpreted as acts that instigated the 1^st defendant.

The 2^nd defendant continued that the claimants instead of establishing their case, due to lack of evidence, in attempt to buy sympathy, went and attached as exhibit (Exhibit F) a voice note purported to be call log between the 2^nd defendant and AMCON, which is in this case very irrelevant in the sense that AMCON is not accused of any wrong doing on the instigation of the 2^nd defendant against the claimants and it is not a party to this case, hence it is a document irrelevant in deciding whether the 2^nd defendant instigated the 1^st defendant as alleged by the claimants in this suit; that assuming that the Exhibit F is relevant in this case, the claimants did not prove that the 2^nd defendant was really the person that made the alleged contract; that the claimants did not even tell the Court on the source of the Exhibit , i.e. how they managed to get the Exhibit.

The 2^nd defendant went on that it was the acknowledgement of the claimant that the said Exhibit was not made in the language of the Court, it is on this that they exhibited Exhibit F1, purported translation of the document, but in that F1 there is no known person that translated it, no name and no signature; that unsigned document is a worthless piece of paper. See Omega Bank (Nig) Plc v. O.B.C Ltd (2005) (Pt. 928) 547. That on the document, also there is nowhere the alleged maker even identified himself as a person understands the language it was made and the language of the Court, English and all the affidavit there is also no place where the maker of exhibit was introduced and the deponent himself did not also identify whether he understands the language and English; that the Court give any effect to the document as a Court cannot speculate; that Exhibit F1 is just a part of the lies of the claimants which the Court can see from other facts in their affidavit and exhibits thereto. For instance, Exhibits A & B, Certificate and Constitution of Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria but the claimant claims to belong the (sic) 2^nd claimant and Exhibit G, Deed of Lease that belongs to Nigeria Motorcycle Transport Association Nnewi North Local Government. That the 1^st claimant even went and deposed the (sic) 2^nd claimant purchased the building known as Okada White House in the 1996 but the certificate, Exhibit A, they relied on as a source of its registration shows that Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria was registered in the year 2023. That the law is that a Court cannot give relevance to an affidavit that is full of false. See Duruaku v. Nwoke (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1483) P 417. The 2^nd defendant urged the Court to desist from giving any effect to the claimants’ affidavit on the fact that is an embodiment of false and lies.

In conclusion, the 2^nd defendant pray the Court to dismiss the claim of the claimants and award a heavy cost against the 1^st claimant who is the known legal person but where the Court finds that the 2^nd claimant is also a legal person to award cost against both claimants in favour of 1^st defendant.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THIS SUIT.

The claimants submitted that the 2^nd defendant made heavy weather (sic) of lack of jurisdiction of the Honourable Court to entertain this action and he urged the Court to strike out the case in that (a) the 1^st claimant has no locus standi (b) the 2^nd claimant has no capacity to sue and (c) that the Court lacks the subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the claimants’ action.

The claimants further submitted that it is the law that once the jurisdiction of the Court is challenged, the issue of jurisdiction will have to be determined one way or the other before proceeding to the substantive case. The claimants refer to Asogwa v. Chukwu (2003) 4 NWLR (Pt. 811) 540.

On the issue of the locus standi of the 1^st claimant to maintain the action, the claimants submitted that the 2^nd defendant who is not even a member of the 2^nd claimant, parades a paper he attached as Exhibit R1 to place reliance thereon to pry into the affairs of the claimants by challenging the locus standi of the 1^st claimant; that this issue honestly should not have been dignified with a response since the 2^nd defendant who is a non-member of the 2^nd claimant has no right to question the internal affairs of the claimant; that it is the law that what determines whether or not a Court has jurisdiction is only the originating process such as the statement of claim but which in this case, is the totality of the affidavit in support of the originating summons. See Omnia Nig. Ltd v. Dyktrade Ltd (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1058) 576; (2007) LPELR-2641 (SC).

The claimants continued that very unfortunate for the 2^nd defendant, who did not by his counter affidavit disprove the grievances suffered by the claimants as copiously stated in the affidavit in support of the originating summons; that he particularly admitted paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the affidavit wherein it was narrated how the 1^st claimant himself was arrested, detained and forced to sign Exhibit E attached thereto, yet the 2^nd defendant says that the 1^st claimant has no locus standi to maintain the action. That with respect betrays a misconception of locus standi. Locus standi simply means the legal interest or right to be heard in a case before the Court; that a person is said to have an interest in a thing when his rights, duties, liabilities or the likes are connected therewith, whether present or future, ascertained or potential rights and duties, the possibilities is not too remote. See Imade v. Administrator of Edo State (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 709) 478; Adetona v. Zenith International Bank Ltd (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 440) 796 at 806.

The claimant went on that the point has already been made that it is the affidavit in support that the Court will considered to determine the locus standi of the claimants; that in the instant case, the 2^nd defendant in his counter affidavit misguidedly with respect, set up an extraneous issue of the principle of majority rule in the common law case of Foss v. Habbotle which has no nexus to the claimants’ case to challenge the locus standi of the 1^st claimant; that the Court has no business with such extraneous escapade that the 2^nd defendant seeks to plunge the Court into. See Ugwunze v. Adeleke (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 408) 327 at 346 paras C-E, Governor of Ekiti State v. Fakiyesi (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 501) 828 at 870 Paras F-G, Aniownu v. Anionwu (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 881) 224 at 225 Paras F-H. It is contended that from the facts deposed to by the 1^st claimant in the affidavit in support, the 1^st claimant has the locus standi to maintain this action and urged the Court to dismiss the objection of the 2^nd defendant on that score.

CAPACITY OF THE 2^ND CLAIMANT TO MAINTAIN THE ACTION

The claimants submitted that the 2^nd defendant also claimed that the 2^nd claimant has no capacity to maintain this action and accordingly contended that the action is incompetent; that it is gravely misconceived. The law is that where an identifiable juristic person is the intended claimant or intended defendant but the person is wrongly described, such is treated as a mere misnomer as it is a just a slip of description of the person and not that the person is unknown or that a wrongful party is before the Court. See Onwuka Kalu v. Chief Victor Odili (1992) 6 SCNJ 76. In the instant case, the claimants in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons clearly identified the 2^nd claimant both by the affidavit evidence and by Exhibits A & B. In that manner, the identity of 2^nd defendant is not misled as to whom the 2^nd claimant is. That the 2^nd claimant is a registered trade union capable of suing and being sued in its name. See Taff Vale Railway Company v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (1901) A.C 426. That the mere addition of Nnewi Branch is at best a mere miss-description and cannot vitiate the competence of the 2^nd claimant to maintain this action. See ACB v. Eurostrade Ltd (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt. 536) 19, Onwuka Kalu v. Chief Victor Odili (1992) 6 SCNJ 76. That all the authorities cited by the 2^nd defendant were cited out of context and are inapplicable to the instant case as they relate to cases of non-juristic persons. The facts and circumstances of the authority of Shitta v. Ligali cited by the 2^nd defendant is most divorced from the facts of the instant case and inapplicable thereto as the 2^nd claimant is a juristic person. The claimants therefore, urged the Honourable Court to discountenance all the argument of the 2^nd defendant counsel on the issue and grant the reliefs sought by the claimants.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The claimants submitted that the 2^nd defendant in his written address in support of his counter affidavit contended that the claimants’ actions does not fall within the constitutional jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. That nothing can be further from the reality even when the 2^nd defendant’s counsel acknowledged at paragraph 4.29 of the written address in company of the 2^nd defendant counter affidavit that the action falls within the jurisdiction of the Honourable Court; that 2^nd defendant’s counsel abusively described it as a “deceitful presentation” and had to plunge this Honourable Court and the claimant into a needless shadowboxing and wild goose chase in the name of argument on jurisdiction.

The claimant further submitted that the 2^nd defendant just wakes up and framed up a different case in the realm of his imagination and devoted almost 5 pages on fruitless venture as far as his argument on the subject matter jurisdiction is concerned. It is submitted that by virtue of section 254C (a) and (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the issue submitted for determination by the claimants to this Court as well as the reliefs claimed therefrom by the is firmly within the constitutional subject matter jurisdiction of the Court. That the issue raised and reliefs claimed by the claimants pertains to the rights and liabilities of the claimants as a trade union and the judicial determination of those rights and liabilities under the Trade Union Act. Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) provides thus:

relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith;
relating to, connected with or arising from Factories Act, Trade Disputes Act, Trade Unions Act, Labour Act, Employees’ Compensation Act or any other Act or Law relating to labour, employment, industrial relations, workplace or any other enactment replacing the Acts or Laws” (Highlighting and underlining ours for emphasis).

That the claimants’ action is related to or connected with trade unions and arising from the Trade Union Act. The 2^nd claimant is a registered trade union and the 1^st claimant is a trade unionist; that all the authorities including Nkuma v. Odili (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 977) 587 wrongly cited as Adeyemi v. Odili (2006) by the 2^nd defendant is not applicable to this case and the claimants urged the Court to discountenance the 2^nd defendant’s argument.

The claimant continued that the facts of Nkuma v. Odili is that the parties claimed entitlement to compensation by AGIP for oil exploration on the land in dispute. The jurisdiction of the High Court was challenged on the ground that it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court but the objection was dismissed as it was held a land dispute or dispute over ownership of the land for which compensation was paid and not compensation for pollution and damages from mining operations in which case, the Federal High Court would have had exclusive jurisdiction. It is therefore as clear as daylight that that (sic) authority has no nexus with the facts and principles of the instant case but was cited out of context. That the claimant urged the Court to dismiss the 2^nd defendant’s preliminary objection and grant the claimants’ reliefs. The Court has warned that “every Court of law should guard its jurisdiction jealously and not to play Pontius Pilate by washing its hands off any matter upon its jurisdiction being challenged”. See Dosumu v. NNPC (2014) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1403) 282.

ON WHETHER THE CLAIMANTS PROVED THEIR CASE

The claimants submitted that they have proved their case before the Honourable Court against the defendants; that the genre of the claimants’ suit is one usually supported by affidavit evidence; that it is contended that affidavit evidence in itself without more constitutes evidence upon which the Court can rely and grant judgment as it is different from a witness statement on oath which is bare ipse dixit in that the absence of supporting evidence to proof the facts in a written deposition, could make the Court not to act on the bare ipse dixit of the witness. However, affidavit evidence is different. See Magnusson v. Koiki & ors (1993) 12 SCNJ 114 at 124-125, 132-133, Buhari v. INEC (2008) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1078) 546, Agbakoba v. INEC & 2 ors (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 462) 1037. That in the instant case, the averments in the claimants’ affidavit constitutes evidence and mere denial by the defendants does not render it unproved; that reliefs claimed by the claimants are anchored on the interpretation/construction of the provisions of relevant provisions of the 1999 Constitution, the Trade Union Act and the MOUN Constitution. It does not ordinarily require a host of witnesses or avalanche of documents to prove. See Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 432, Doherty v. Doherty (1969) NMLR 24.

The claimants went on that it is the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions that the Honourable Court will have to construe to determine whether or not the claimants are entitled to the grant of the reliefs claimed. Nevertheless, the claimants attached supporting evidence to their affidavit including the conversations of the 2^nd defendant in Exhibit F which the 2^nd defendant is denying in his counter affidavit; that the Court is entitled to consider the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case to find out that the 2^nd defendant indeed made Exhibit F now translated to Exhibit F1. That the claimants are constrained to Approach the Honourable Court when they could no longer bear the overbearing/choking interferences of the defendants with the affairs of the claimants; that it has become an existential threat to the claimants the activities of the defendants in his characteristics of seeking to divert attention, set up a very strange and laughable point and argued; that the 2^nd defendant said at paragraph 4.39 of his written address that the issue complained of by the claimants is “whether the 1^st defendant could collect further sums from the 2^nd claimant.”

The claimants further submitted that it is very unfortunate that of all the averments of the claimants with documentary evidence in support of how the claimants in the normal and usual course of their affairs have been subjected to undue harassments and intimidation by the defendants; that the 2^nd defendant said that the only issue is whether the 1^st defendant could collect further sums from the 2^nd claimant.” That it is therefore safe to conclude that the misconception of the claimants’ case by the 2^nd defendant informed the 2^nd defendant’s view that there is no wrongs against the claimants. No wonder the 2^nd defendant also contended that reliefs over the claimants’ office at “Okada White House” is “landed property that by virtue of the land use act is exclusively reserved to the State High Court”, quoting the 2^nd defendant’s counsel at paragraph 4.35 of his written address. The claimants contended that the 2^nd defendant is either been pettily mischievous or that he argued from a grave misconception of the claimants’ case; that the claimants satisfactorily established their case before the Court having regards to the relevant statutory provisions submitted for construction by the Honourable Court as well as the copious evidence presented to the Honourable Court.

The claimants contended further that the mere denial of Exhibit F by the 2^nd defendant does not absolve the 2^nd defendant of liability as the Court is bound to considered the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case in arriving at its decision; that the energy spent on attacking Exhibit F1 is just a jiggery-pokery to divert the Court’s attention away from the evidence; that the 2^nd defendant is obviously oblivious of the law that documents attached to an affidavit forms part of the affidavit and is not subjected to the rigours of formalities as the documents are already before the Court and which the Court is entitled to consider and accord due probative value. See British American Tobacco Nig Ltd v. Int’l Tobacco Co. Plc (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1339) 493 at 520-521, Governor of Lagos State v. Adjumo (sic) (1970) All NLR 187, Nwosu v. Imo State Environmental Sanitation Authority (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 135) 606 at 735, Ezechukwu v. Onwuka (2016) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1506) 529 at 562 Boko v. Nungwa & ors (2018) LPELR-45890 CA. In the instant case, the Exhibit F contains the conversations of the 2^nd defendant inciting the termination of the claimants’ activities by seeking to seal up the claimants’ office at Okada White House Nnewi; that the said conversation is critically relevant to the claimants’ case and it is the law that relevance is the fundamental determinant of the significance of a piece of evidence in a case and the key to admissibility. See Torti v. Ukpabi (1984) 1 SCNLR 214.

The claimants continued that the relevance of Exhibits F and F1 which are attached to the affidavit evidence which is already before the Court cannot grant the opportunity of a consideration of the technical jargons of who translated or did not translate Exhibit F into Exhibit F1 propounded against Exhibits F and F1 by the 2^nd defendant’s counsel. That the inference will therefore be drawn of the fact that it is in that manner that the 2^nd defendant now resort instigating members of the 1^st defendant to descend on the claimants by arrest, harassments, extortions and intimidation of all kinds; that the 2^nd defendant spoke in Igbo Language as per Exhibit F and it was translated into the language of the Court in Exhibit F1; that what the law requires is that a document made in a language other than English Language must be translated into English Language, which is the language of the Court. Once the document is translated, the credibility of the translated version can only come into question where it is shown not to represent what was said. See Kankai v. Maigamu (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 206) 460, Dantata v. Dantata (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 756) 144.

The claimants submitted that it is not the contention of the 2^nd defendant that Exhibit F1 is not an accurate representation of the content of Exhibit F; that even if he had done so, the document s are still subject to evaluate by the Court; that it certainly is not for the Court to overlook the Exhibits on mere technicality when it is acutely relevant to the case at hand. That Exhibits F and F1 are proper already before the Court and the Court is bound to consider them especially in this case where they are attached to affidavit evidence which as has (sic) been noted earlier is already evidence before the Court; that it is the law that each case is treated according to its peculiar facts and circumstances. That is why not every authority will be applicable to every case but the ones with the same facts and principles. See Okafor v. Nnaife (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 64) 129. The authority of Omega Bank Plc v. O.B.C Ltd (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 547 cited by the 2^nd defendant is a world apart from Exhibits F and F1. The document in Omega Bank is the document in question was the contractual terms that was to be between Omega Bank v. OBC for a NEXIM Bank Revolving Loan Facility which was not executed by the parties to the contract as it was an internal memo by the bank headquarters to its branch office; that in the instant case, Exhibit F1 is a simple translation of Exhibit F which can be done by anybody who understands the language and the translation was not made between two parties but simply made to represent what is contained in Exhibit F; that the Court can order a translation of the Exhibit F to ascertain the veracity of Exhibit F1 since Exhibit F has been translated to Exhibit F1 to the language of the Court. The claimants therefore urged the Court to discountenance the contention of the 2^nd defendant and accord due probative value to Exhibit F and F1

The claimants continued that whether the 2^nd defendant is actually liable to the claimants in their claims, the Court is urged to consider all the materials put before the Court including Exhibit FA1, FA2, FA3, FA4, FA5 and FA6 and the Court will find that they all together corroborate the unmerited bad blood of the 2^nd defendant against the claimants. The claimants submitted as per the dictum of the legendary Lord Denin that even the devil does not know the intentions of man but only inferred from his overt actions/conducts.

In conclusion, the claimants urged the Honourable Court to save the claimants from the unlawful siege of the defendants so as to enable the claimants carry out their statutory obligation.

COURT’S DECISION

I have carefully considered all the processes filed and the submissions of the parties. Before considering the merit of the case, I need to resolve a preliminary issue. Exhibit F1 tendered by the claimant said to be leaked communication between Jude Udegbe and AMCON Senior Staff is not signed, and it is not dated. Jude Udegbe is the 2^nd defendant in this suit. The law is that any document which ought to be signed and is not signed renders its authorship and authenticity doubtful; and an unsigned and undated document has no evidential valve. See Nwaubo v. Elem (2004) All FWLR (pt 225) 107, Aiki v. Haowu (2006) All FWLR (pt 293) 361, 2006) 9 NWLR (pt 984) 47, Sarai v. Haruma (2008) 23 WRN 130, Global Soap & Detergent Ind. Ltd v. NAFDAC (2011) All FWLR (pt 599) 1025 at 1047 and Udo & ors v. Essien & ors (2014) LPELR – 22684 (CA). Exhibits F and F1 have no evidential valve and others not attached to the further affidavit have no evidential valve, and I so find and hold. They are discountenanced for purposes of this judgment.

The case of the claimants is that faced with the ugly and frustrating acts of the defendants against the claimants spaning grand agenda of strangulating the activities of the claimants at Nnewi and breaches of the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and other legal and statutory rights provisions as it relates to the members of the claimants, the claimants do not have any better option than to approach this Court for intervention nay protection.

To the claimants, the point has been made in the affidavit in support of this Originating summons that the defendants have been heavily at the neck of the claimants; that the 2^nd claimant as has been demonstrated is a duly registered trade union in Nigeria. That through the 2^nd claimant has a new beginning, in that it was registered in September 2023 and therefore still trying to firmly establish its governance structers permitted by its rules across the Federation including Anambra State, but the defendants have been suffocating the claimants.

To the claimants, having regards to the extant laws and the Constitutional provisions regarding the inalienable right (sic) of the claimants to exist and operate as a trade union in Nigeria for the protection of the interest of the unionists, the claimants have approached this Court for redress as to freely operate in the State for the prosecution of the objectives and purposes, including carrying out actions in furtherance of the purposes for which the 2^nd claimant was formed.

The claimants continued that notwithstanding the explicit provisions of the Constitution and the Trade Unions Act, the defendants have been strangulating the activities of the claimants at Nnewi in Anambra State through unbrialed intimidation, arrest, detention, extortion and all manner of inhuman and degrading treatment targeted principally at extinguishing the activities of the claimants at Nnewi and unless the Court intervenes, the defendants will not let the claimants rest.

In the written address of defendant’s Counsel to the defendants in paragraph 2.02 of his written address in support of the 2^nd defendants’/Respondents counter affidavit in opposition of (sic) motion of the claimants/Applicants stated in paragraph 2.02 thus:

2.02 in the processes of the 2^nd defendant/respondent, he challenged jurisdiction of the Court to hear the matter, inter alia, on the following grounds-

a. The locus standi of the 1^st claimant/applicant to be a party in the suit based on the facts contained in the affidavit and reliefs sought in the originating summons.

b. The status of the 2^nd claimant/applicant as person who can sue and be sued.

The claimants/applicants supported their application with 11 paragraphs affidavit deposed to by the 1^st claimant/Applicant.

The 2^nd defendant/respondent in opposition to this application deposed to 11 paragraph Counter affidavit.

The National Industrial Court Act 2006, Part II section 12 (2) (a) and (b) state thus:

(2) Subject to this Act and any rules made there under, the Court

(a) May regulate its procedure and proceedings as it thinks fit, and

(b) Shall be bound by the Evidence Act but may depart from it in the interest of justice.

On whether the present application of the claimant ought to be granted, it is submitted by M.A. Eze-Akor, Esquire of Counsel to the 2^nd defendant stated that the 2^nd defendant/Applicant is a non-existent body in law and the affidavit of the 2^nd claimant/Applicant and other processes show the fact that the deposition or name of the 2^nd claimant was not a mistake; that the same claimants who want the Court to believe that the name of 2^nd claimant as appeared in their processes was a mistake are the same people who seek to represent the 2^nd claimant case, where a non-juristic person is a party, the only option the Court has is to strike out the suit of the non-juristic person; citing Emecheta v. Ogueri (1996) 5 NWLR (pt 447, 227.

On parties, Order 13 Rules 11 (1) and 14 (1) and (3) of NICN Rules 2017 state thus:

11 (1) Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, one or more of such persons may sue or be sued on behalf or for the benefit of all persons so interested.

14 (1) No proceedings shall be defeated by reason of joinder or on joinder of parties, and a Judge may deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interest of the parties before the Court.

14 (3) A Judge may order that the name of any party who ought to have been joined or whose presence before the Court is necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle the questions; involved in the proceedings be added.

The 2^nd defendant’s Counsel continued that assuming without conceding that the Court can grant the order, it is submitted that the application is also incompetent; that from the affidavit of the 1^st claimant/Applicant, he claimant to be the financial Secretary, Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria (MOUN) Nnewi Branch still a non-registered Union and not the Financial Secretary of MOUN Nnewi Branch still a non-registered Union, and that he brought the application on behalf of 2^nd claimant/Applicant but Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria (MOUN) who is not natural person, just like every other non-natural person, acts through the recognized natural persons and it is through recognized natural persons that institute an action.

The 2^nd defendant’s Counsel continued that it is only the executives of the Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria (MOUN) at the National level that can bring an action or asked to be joined to its name and not the 1^st claimant/Applicant who expressly stated that he is a branch financial Secretary, he can only stand for his branch, where it is recognized as a registered Trade Union. The 2^nd defendant’s Counsel then urged the Court to dismiss the application of the claimants/Applicants for lacking in merit.

It is submitted by 2^nd defendant that its members are in the very grassroots of the society and could serve as useful source of intelligence in crime prevention in the society; that even the Constitution of the 2^nd claimant that indulges in acts antithetical to law and order in the society which includes handing such erring member to the appropriate authorities to be prosecuted or treated in accordance with the laws of the land.

Rule Twelve of the 2^nd claimant’s Constitution, zone 1(e) and 4 (a) (b) (c) and d state that:

1 (d) There shall be six Zonal Councils of Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria. Each Zonal Council shall consist of Chapters as stated:

(d) South East: Anambra, Imo, Enugu, Ebonyi, and Abia State,

4. The duties and responsibilities of Zonal Councils shall be the following:

a) Enforcement of discipline among officers and members of the Union within the Zone.

b) Supervising the activities of the Union in the Zone and as might be directed by N. E. C. National Secretariat.

c) Making comprehensive, timely and accurate report of the activities, problems and achievements of the Zonal Secretariats of the Union to the National Headquarters.

d) Collecting information about the activities within State Chapters under the Zonal Council.

The very definition of a trade union under the TUA provides insight into the point. I seek to make section 1(1) of the TUA defines a trade union in these words:

“trade union” means any combination of workers or employers, whether temporary or permanent, the purpose of which is to regulate the terms and conditions of employment of workers, whether the combination in question would or would not, apart from this Act, be an unlawful combination by reason of any of its purposes being in restraint of trade, and whether its purposes do or do not include the provision of benefits for its members.”

From this provision, the primary purpose of trade unions is the regulation of terms and conditions of employment of workers. Subsection (2) of course permits other purposes so long as the said other purposes are lawful, are authorized by the trade union’s rules and are for the benefit of the members of the trade union, subject to the ban for application of funds for political purposes. However, the fact that an agreement has been reached between an employer and persons employed by him as to terms and conditions of that employment is not sufficient reason for a verdict that thereby a trade union has been formed. See section 1(3)(a) of the TUA. This is understandable because registration under the TUA by the Registrar of Trade Unions is a prerequisite for the formation of a trade union. See sections 2(1) and 3(1) of the TUA. Since the primary purpose of a trade union is the regulation of terms and conditions of employment, would a dispute within a trade union (intra-union dispute) and that between trade unions (inter-union dispute) not logically be one over terms and conditions of employment and so a trade dispute within the definition of the term under section 48(1) of the TDA and section 54(1) of the NIC Act 2006? I think so. Even disputes such as strikes over increase in price of fuel by workers, which would meet the International Labour Organization’s (ILO’s) allowance that organizations responsible for defending workers’ socio-economic and occupational interests should, in principle, be able to use strike action to support their position in the search for solutions posed by the major social and economic policy trends which have a direct impact on their members and on workers in general, in particular as regards employment, social protection and the standard of living even when this is not strictly speaking a trade dispute in the real sense of the word. See FGN & anor v. NLC & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/179/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 15^th July 2016.

The next issue is whether given the reliefs the claimant is seeking, reliefs that include declaratory and injunctive reliefs, the instant case can appropriately go through the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the TDA including any hearing at the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP). Here again, the claimant and the 2^nd defendant argued that only this Court, not the IAP, can grant these reliefs, relying on sections 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the NIC Act 2006 and Eng. Ugwu v. Eke (2009) 15 LRLR (Pt. 4) 409 at 422. In truth, by section 9(6) and 13 of the TDA, the IAP, as part of the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the TDA, is empowered to make an award when it sits over a trade dispute that has been referred to it by the Minister of Labour. Under the old dispensation i.e. prior to the NIC Act 2006 and the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution, even the NIC was held by the Courts not to have the power to grant declaratory and injunctive reliefs. This posture was taken in cases such as Western Steel Workers Ltd v. NLC (2003) 8 NWLR 1 and Kalango v. Dokubo (2003) 15 WRN 32 simply because Part I of the TDA gave the AIP and NIC power to make awards when they sit over trade dispute referrals from the Minister of Labour.

The New Oxford American Dictionary defines an award as: “give or order the giving of (something) as an official payment, compensation, or prize to (someone)”. The Cambridge English Dictionary on its part defines the word as: “to give money or a prize following an official decision.” What then is a declaration, for which in making an award neither the IAP nor the then NIC could make or grant? It was His Lordship Oputa, JSC in Western Steel Works Ltd v. Iron & Steel Workers Union of Nigeria who actually held that the NIC could not make declarations or order injunctions, a holding that the Court of Appeal subsequently upheld in cases such as AG, Oyo State v. NLC (2003) NWLR (Pt. 821) 1 at 28 and Kalango v. Dokubo. But His Lordship Oputa, JSC went on to state that a “declaratory judgment is merely a judicial statement confirming or denying a legal right of the applicant. A declaratory judgment merely declares and goes no further in providing a consequential relief to the applicant. While consequential relief may be joined, the Court still has the power to issue a pure declaration without any coercive direction for its enforcement”. The Court of Appeal in Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE) v. National Union of Electricity Employees (NUEE) (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 837) 382, reiterated this view when it held that a declaratory judgment is just a pronouncement of the legal state of affairs. Given the explanation as to what a declaration is, the question that arises is whether in making an award, an arbitral tribunal such as the IAP cannot confirm or deny a legal right of the parties before it?

Incidentally, the Court of Appeal in Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria & ors v. Mr. Olufemi Ajewole & ors (2016) LPELR-41271 (CA) did not consider the effect of section 254C(3) of the 1999 Constitution. This is understandable. The cause of action dealt with in Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria & ors v. Olufemi Ajewole & ors was one that pre-dated the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution. In fact the ruling that led to the appeal was delivered by this Court on 18^th May 2009. On this ground, Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria & ors v. Olufemi Ajewole & ors is distinguishable. I rely on Nasarawa State Specialist Hospital Management Board & ors v. Mohammed (2018) LPELR-44551 (CA) in coming to this conclusion. Accordingly, having made the specific finding that a dispute over jurisdictional scope and as to who between the claimant and the 1^st defendant can unionise workers/employees of the 2^nd defendant is a trade dispute within the meaning of the term, I find and hold that the instant case is one that ought to exhaust the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the TDA before the appellate jurisdiction of this Court can be activated. Incidentally, by paragraphs 12 to 14 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons, the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the TDA have actually been activated by the 1^st defendant and the Federal Ministry of Labour had intervened in terms of its power to mediate and conciliate. I am of the firm view that parties ought to have allowed that process to be exhausted before rushing to this Court as the claimant did. For all the reasons I have given, placing reliance on especially section 254C(3) of the 1999 Constitution, which does not prelude the NIC from entertaining and exercising appellate and supervisory jurisdiction over an arbitral tribunal in respect of any matter that the NIC has jurisdiction to entertain or any matter as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly, and the finding that the instant dispute is actually a trade dispute, I hold that the claimant is prematurely before this Court in this suit…

Commenting in Senior Staff Association of Statutory Corporations and Government Owned Companies (SSASCGOC) v. Hon. Minister of Labour & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/39/2021, the judgment of which was delivered on 10 March 2022, this is what this Court said especially of both RTEAN & ors v. Ajewole & ors (supra) and NASU v. Jacob in paragraph 97 and 98:

[97] I acknowledge that there is an older Court of Appeal (case) that appears to go contrary to NASU v. Jacob (supra) but which was not cited in the said NASU v. Jacob. The case is Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria & ors v. Mr. Olufemi Ajewole & ors (2016) LPELR-41271 (CA), which held that an inter and intra-union dispute is not a trade dispute for purposes of the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the TDA. The case, however, also held that an inter and intra union dispute will only go through processes of Part I of the TDA if it qualifies as a trade dispute. But in National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers v. National Union of Air Transport Employees & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/207/2018, the judgment of which was delivered on 4 July 2019, this Court distinguished RTEAN & ors v. Ajewole & ors which distinct applies with equal force here to make NASU v. Jacob more preferable, in spite of it being the more recent authority.

[98] Particular note should be taken of the italicized portion of the quotation from the Court of Appeal above. The Court of Appeal is quite specific that this Court and IAP cannot have concurrent jurisdiction over trade disputes, including inter and intra union disputes. The Court of Appeal was also very specific in holding that the jurisdiction granted to NIC by the Constitution and by statutory provisions as found in the NIC Act regarding trade disputes such as, inter and intra union disputes, is an appellate jurisdiction, exercisable after the said disputes have gone through the conciliatory and arbitration body. The Court of Appeal even cited section 254C(1)(j) of the 1999 Constitution and section 7(4) of the NIC Act 2006 in justification…

Given the analysis of the case law authorities (and the reasons adduced therein) NASU v. Jacob (supra) is to be preferred over RTEAN & ors v. Ajewole & ors (supra). NASU v. Jacob & ors (supra) in the main affirms the consistent position of this Court that trade disputes, inter union disputes and intra union disputes must go through the dispute resolution processes of Part I of the TDA before coming to this Court. In other words, the jurisdiction of this Court in such disputes is appellate, not original. The only outstanding issues are interpretation disputes and trade union election disputes, over which this Court had all along held that it has original jurisdiction.

His Lordship Ogakwu JCA in Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Mrs Olawunmi Oyebola (2020) LPELR-51806 (CA) pointed the way in urging that except patently wrong, decisions of this Court should enjoy some deference. These are His Lordship’s words:

It has to be remembered that the National Industrial Court is a specialized Court exclusively established primarily for labour and employment related matters. In that regard, except where patently and manifestly wrong, there has to be some deference to the decisions of that Court in that area of the core competence and specialization of the Court. This has been recognized internationally. For instance, the Appellate Courts in England have stated that employment judges have a good knowledge of the world of work and a sense, derived from experience, of what is real there and what is window-dressing. Such employment tribunals are to be realistic and worldly wise, and sensible and robust in order to prevent form undermining substance. See UBER B. V. (UBV) vs. YASEEN ASLAM 2018) EWCA CIV 2748 (19^th December 2018) at Paragraphs 48 and 49 and AUTOCLENZ LTD vs. BELCHER (2011) UKSC 41 or (2011) ICR 1157.

Except for subject matter-based jurisdiction, this Court has consistently held that bodies not registered as trade unions have no locus filing any suit as claimants on behalf of others or employers. In other words, only registered trade unions have the locus to come before this Court on behalf of the workers. In this regard, associations that are not registered as trade unions but are nevertheless registered under some other law such as under Part C of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) and so have the capacity to sue and be sued, are denied the right of audience at the NIC. See The Hon. Attorney General of Enugu State v. National Association of Government General Medical and Dentist Practitioners (NAGGMDP) & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/EN/16/2010 delivered on June 20, 2011 and Dr Awkadigwe Fredrick Ikenna v. Dr. Olusegun Olaopa & 2 ors, unreported Suit No. NICN/EN/26/2019, the judgment of which was delivered on 27^th February 2020… In fact, during the hearing of Senior Staff Association of University Teaching Hospitals, Research Institutions and Associated Institutions (SAUTHRIA) and ors v. Federal Ministry of Health and anor (2008) 10 NLLR (Pt. 26) 222, this Court had cause to stop profession associations in the health sector that were not registered as trade unions from further participation in the matter before the Court.

Of course, where the subject matter in issue is one over which this Court has jurisdiction e.g. payment of salary, then this Court will assume jurisdiction over the matter, even if the claimant is a body not registered as a trade union. In Nigerian Union of Pharmacists, Medical Technologies and Professions Allied to Medicine (NUMPTAM) v. Obafemi Awolowo University Teaching Hospital Complex Management Board (OAUTHCMB) unreported Suit No. NIC/8/2006 delivered on May 22, 2007, this Court held that under “the NIC Act 2006, jurisdiction is subject based, which means that any legal entity that can sue and be sued can approach this Court if the grievance in question falls within any of the subject matters stipulated in section 7 of the NIC Act.”

In the instant case, the 1^st claimant is not a trade union. He is Sir Ubaka Nwafor, Financial Secretary, Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria (MOUN) Nnewi Branch. The 2^nd claimant is Motorcycle Operators Union of Nigeria (MOUN) Nnewi Branch, Anambra State. Section 1(1) of the Trade Unions Act defines “trade union” as:

Any combination of workers or employers, whether temporary or permanent, the purpose of which is to regulate the terms and conditions of employment of workers, whether the combination in question would or would not, apart from the Act, be an unlawful combination by reason of any of its purposes being in restraint of trade, and whether its purposes to or do not include the provision of benefits for its members.

See the Registered Trustees of Association of Transporters and Quarry Owners of Nigeria v. Yusuf & ors (2011) LPELR-5024 (CA). so not being a registered trade union, the 1^st and 2^nd claimants have no business coming to this Court as the claimants/applicants did. They have no locus whatsoever to be before this Court. I so hold.

In Lawyers Alert Initiative for the Protection of the Rights of Children, Woman and the Indigent Applicant v. The Hon. Attorney General of the Federation unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/37/2019, the judgment of which was delivered on June 10, 2020, this Court held that “Except for subject matter jurisdiction, this Court has consistently held that bodies not registered as trade unions have no locus filing any suit as claimants on behalf of workers or employees. In other words, only registered trade unions have the locus to come before this Court on behalf of workers.

The instant case is accordingly liable to be struck out. Same is accordingly struck out. I so order.

Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost.

Hon. Justice J.I. Targema, PhD