IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM

 

DATE: 27TH JULY, 2026                   

SUITNO: NICN/ABJ/355/2024

 

BETWEEN:

 

JEREMIAH MKIGHIR           -                                       CLAIMANT

 

AND

 

DEL-TRAZI LIMITED            -                                       DEFENDANT

 

REPRESENTATION:

J. K. Akerigba, Esq.; with A. C. Igbakua, Esq.; for Claimant

P. A. N. Ejiofor, Esq.; with K. C. Obi, Esq.; for Defendant

 

JUDGMENT

 

  1. The Claimants commenced this action via a General Form of Complaint dated 2nd October, 2024 and filed on the same date claiming against the Defendant the following reliefs:

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  1. A DECLARATION that the purported termination of the Claimant’s employment on the 14th day of August, 2024 by the Defendant was unlawful.
  2. AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of Forty Thousand Naira (N40,000.00) only representing the claimant’s outstanding salary for the month of July, 2024 having already paid him One Hundred and Sixty Thousand Naira (N160,000.00) only.
  3. AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Naira (N200,000.00) only as the Claimant’s Salary in lieu of one month notice of termination in line with paragraph III of the terms and conditions of the Defendant’s employment letter dated 14th March, 2022.
  4. AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay to the Claimant the sum of Thirty Million Naira (N30, 000, 000.00) as general damages for the trauma, psychological torture and hardship the Defendant’s breach of contract has exposed and will continue to expose the Claimant to while searching for another source of livelihood.
  5. AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay to the claimant the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Naira (N500,000.00), as cost of this suit.
  6. 20% monthly post judgment interest on the judgment sum to be paid by the Defendant until the judgment sum is fully paid.

 

  1. After being served with the originating process, the Defendant entered its appearance and filed a statement of Defence and Counter Claim to which the Claimant filed a Reply/Defence.

 

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

 

  1. The Claimant was employed by the Defendant as a site engineer, his employment being confirmed by an offer letter (Exhibit A), a letter of confirmation (Exhibit B), and a salary review notification (Exhibit C). By an internal memorandum dated 13th August 2024 (Exhibit D), the Claimant was transferred from the Karu Community Plaza Market Project to the Karu Agro Allied Project and directed to work with QS Inocha Francis Enemakwu with immediate effect. On the same date, the Claimant wrote a handwritten letter (Exhibit E) to the Defendant in which, at the closing paragraph, he stated: "If the management wants me to work at Agro Allied they should consider the above challenges and address it."  The Defendant contends that the Claimant did not report for duty at either the old or the new site on 13th August 2024, did not collect or issue materials to workers as was his primary duty, and that on 14th August 2024 he casually arrived at the Agro Allied site mid-morning, after work had commenced, and proceeded to take photographs rather than perform his duties. The Defendant further contends that QS Francis Enemakwu Inocha was compelled to fill in the gap by signing for and issuing materials on both days. The Defendant also alleges that the Claimant was inciting other workers who had been transferred with him not to comply with the transfer directive. On 14th August 2024, the Defendant terminated the Claimant's employment on the ground of gross insubordination, as evidenced by the termination letter (Exhibit G). The Claimant thereafter wrote to the Defendant requesting payment of outstanding salary (Exhibit H), and his solicitors wrote a letter on the termination (Exhibit I), before the suit was commenced.

 

COMMENCEMENT OF HEARING

 

  1. The Claimant opened his case on 11th March 2025, testified as CW1, adopted his witness statement on oath, and tendered Exhibits A through J, all of which were admitted in evidence. The Claimant was thereafter cross-examined by the Defendant's counsel. On 18th June 2025, the Defendant moved a motion to substitute its witness, Mr. Chuka Obiorah, with Engineer Hazael Anele, which motion was granted. The Defendant opened its defence on 27th July 2025, relied on the exhibits tendered by the Claimant, and in addition tendered Exhibits 1 through 5, being the material issuing notes dated 13th and 14th August 2024, the company policy, the Karu site poor work performance report, PAYE and pension receipts, and a letter from Mr. Emeka Muojeama respectively. The Defendant's witness was thereafter cross-examined by the Claimant's counsel. Both parties subsequently filed their respective final written addresses, with the Claimant filing his Final Written Address and the Defendant filing its Final Written Address together with a Reply on Points of Law in response to the Claimant's address. The matter has accordingly been adjourned for judgment.

 

EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

 

  1. The burden of proof in this civil employment dispute rests squarely on the Claimant, Jeremiah Mkighir, to establish on the balance of probabilities the facts upon which his claims are founded, in accordance with section 131(1) of the Evidence Act 2011. Where the Defendant raises an affirmative case — here, that the termination was justified by gross insubordination — the evidential burden shifts to the Defendant to establish that justification to the same standard. The standard throughout is the balance of probabilities, meaning that the party whose version of events is more probable than not will succeed on each issue.

 

  1. Turning first to the Claimant's evidence, PW1 (Jeremiah Mkighir) testified by adopting his witness statement on oath and tendered ten documentary exhibits, namely: his offer of employment (Exhibit A), letter of confirmation (Exhibit B), salary review notification (Exhibit C), the internal memo transfer letter of 13 August 2024 (Exhibit D), his handwritten letter dated 13 August 2024 (Exhibit E), photographs (Exhibit F), the termination letter (Exhibit G), his letter requesting salary (Exhibit H), his counsel's letter on termination (Exhibit I), and a legal fees receipt of N500,000 (Exhibit J). These documents were admitted without objection at the time of tendering and form part of the record. The Claimant's case, as distilled from his pleadings and testimony, is that his employment was unlawfully terminated, that he is owed outstanding salary, and that he suffered trauma, psychological hardship, and financial loss as a result of the termination, entitling him to damages including the cost of legal fees. The Claimant's credibility is significantly undermined by a series of admissions made under cross-examination that are directly adverse to his own claims. He admitted that his employment was not tied to any particular project, which is a concession of fundamental importance: it means the Defendant's right to transfer him between project sites was not contractually restricted. He admitted that as a site engineer, his primary duty was to collect materials and issue them to workers. He admitted that his July and August 2024 salaries had been fully paid. He admitted that he has no medical report evidencing trauma or psychological injury. He admitted that he has no acknowledged copy of any handover note. He admitted that he has no photographic evidence of handing over at the Karu Community Plaza site. He admitted that he obtained new employment at Zam Global Nig Ltd in Karu Community Plaza within three weeks of his termination. He admitted that lateness and poor supervision carry penalties under the defendant's regime. He admitted that he was aware of lawful deductions from his salary. These admissions are not peripheral; they go to the heart of his claims for unpaid salary, general damages for trauma, and the legitimacy of the termination.

 

  1. The admission that July and August 2024 salaries were fully paid is particularly decisive. A party's admission under cross-examination is the highest form of proof against that party, and what is admitted needs no further proof. The Claimant cannot, having made this admission, maintain a claim for unpaid salary for those months. This finding is clear and unambiguous on the record. The admission that he has no medical evidence of trauma or psychological injury is equally fatal to his claim for general damages on those heads. Claims for trauma, psychological torture, and hardship are not established by bare assertion; they require medical or expert evidence to ground an award. The Claimant produced none. The further admission that he secured alternative employment within three weeks of termination materially diminishes any claim for hardship or loss of income flowing from the termination.

 

  1. Regarding Exhibit E the Claimant's handwritten letter of 13 August 2024  this document is central to the entire dispute and its contents are not in controversy. The letter was tendered by the Claimant himself and its text is on the record. The closing paragraph, which reads: 'If the management wants me to work at Agro Allied they should consider the above challenges and address it,' is unambiguous. Read in its ordinary and natural meaning, this sentence conditions the Claimant's compliance with the transfer directive upon the Defendant first satisfying a list of demands. The Claimant's attempt under cross-examination to characterise Exhibit D (the transfer memo) as merely directing a handover rather than directing him to work is not credible when the face of Exhibit D is examined. Exhibit D expressly states that the Claimant and the foreman Emeka were 'transferred from Karu Community Plaza Market project to Karu Agro Allied project' and were 'to work with QS Inocha Francis Enemakwu,' with the transfer described as 'immediate and as urgent.' The Claimant's interpretation that this language did not require him to work is strained to the point of being untenable, and I reject it. A site engineer of his experience and seniority could not reasonably have understood a directive to transfer 'immediately and urgently' and 'to work with' a named colleague as merely a handover instruction.

 

  1. Exhibit F (photographs) was tendered by the Claimant. The photographs purport to show the Claimant at the Agro Allied site. However, the Defendant's case supported by the testimony of DW1 (Engineer Hazael Anele) is that the Claimant strolled into the Agro Allied site mid-morning on 14 August 2024, after work had already commenced, and was taking photographs rather than performing his duties. The photographs, rather than helping the Claimant, are consistent with the Defendant's narrative that the Claimant was present at the site not to work but to document conditions in furtherance of his conditional stance. The Claimant has no acknowledged handover note and no photographic evidence of handing over at Karu Community Plaza, which means he cannot establish that he properly discharged his obligations on either site on 13 or 14 August 2024.

 

  1. Turning to the Defendant's evidence, DW1 (Engineer Hazael Anele, who was substituted for the originally named witness by court order of 18 June 2025) testified and tendered five additional exhibits: material issuing notes dated 13 and 14 August 2024 (Exhibit 1), the company policy (Exhibit 2), the Karu site poor work performance report (Exhibit 3), PAYE and pension receipts (Exhibit 4), and a letter from Mr. Emeka Muojeama (Exhibit 5). The Claimant objected to the admissibility of Exhibits 1, 3, 4, and 5 on grounds of non-pleading and non-front-loading. The Defendant's Reply on Points of Law addresses this objection by reference to paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 21 of the statement of defence, which pleaded the facts that these documents are tendered to prove, and by reliance on the principle that documents need not be specifically pleaded so long as the facts they support are pleaded: He placed reliance on Sanni-Omotosho v Obidairo [2014] 37 WRN P.47. On the front-loading point, the Defendant relies on Yongopila v Nenshi (2017) 24 WRN P.115 R.9, which holds that non-compliance with front-loading requirements does not render a document inadmissible, and that a party who elects to proceed without seeking an adjournment waives the objection. These are sound legal positions. The Claimant did not seek an adjournment when the documents were tendered and elected to proceed with cross-examination of DW1. The objection to admissibility on front-loading grounds is therefore overruled. On the pleading point, paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 21 of the statement of defence do plead the underlying facts, and the documents are tendered in proof of those facts. The admissibility objection fails.

 

  1. Exhibit 1 (material issuing notes of 13 and 14 August 2024) is probatively significant. It shows that it was Mr. Francis E. Inocha, the Quantity Surveyor, who collected and issued materials to workers on those two days not the Claimant. This is consistent with the Defendant's case that the Claimant failed to perform his primary duty on those days. The Claimant himself admitted under cross-examination that collecting and issuing materials was his first and primary duty as site engineer. The combination of this admission and Exhibit 1 establishes, on the balance of probabilities, that the Claimant did not perform his core duties on 13 and 14 August 2024.

 

  1. Exhibit 2 (company policy) is relevant to the contractual basis for summary termination. The Defendant relies on clauses 2(ii), (iii), and (x) and clause 3 of the policy under the caption 'Resignation/Termination/Staff Exit Handover,' as well as clause IV of the offer of employment (Exhibit A), which provides for termination without notice and without benefits in cases of gross misconduct, serious breach of duty, or professional misconduct. These provisions are not disputed as to their existence or content. The question is whether the Claimant's conduct falls within them.

 

  1. Exhibit 3 (Karu site poor work performance report) is tendered to establish a pattern of poor performance. The Claimant acknowledged under cross-examination that lateness and poor supervision carry penalties and that he was aware of deductions from his account. This acknowledgment lends some corroboration to the existence of performance issues, though the weight of Exhibit 3 standing alone as a unilaterally prepared internal document must be assessed with appropriate caution. However, since the Claimant did not deny the substantive facts pleaded in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 21, 25, 27, and 28 of the statement of defence, those facts are deemed admitted and require no further proof.

 

  1. Exhibit 4 (PAYE and pension receipts) establishes that the Defendant made statutory deductions and remittances on behalf of the Claimant. The Claimant admitted awareness of these deductions under cross-examination. This exhibit is uncontroversial and establishes compliance with statutory obligations.

 

  1. Exhibit 5 (letter from Mr. Emeka Muojeama) is the only exhibit that the Defendant's Reply on Points of Law acknowledges was not pre-existing before the suit. Its weight must be assessed accordingly. As a document created after the dispute arose, it is self-serving in nature and must be treated with caution. However, its precise content and the use to which it is put are not fully elaborated in the excerpts available, and I note this limitation.

 

  1. DW1's testimony was cross-examined by Claimant's counsel. The Defendant's Reply on Points of Law addresses a specific point arising from that cross-examination: the Claimant's counsel apparently suggested in the Claimant's final written address (paragraph 2.8) that DW1 admitted the Claimant was disengaged while at work at the Karu market site, or that DW1 'met with the claimant.' The Defendant's Reply categorically denies this characterisation and asserts that it was the Claimant who strolled in to meet DW1 where DW1 was working. This factual assertion in paragraph 8 and 9 of the statement of defence was not denied in the Claimant's pleadings. The failure to deny a specific pleaded fact is a significant evidential gap on the Claimant's side.

 

  1. On the question of the validity of the Claimant's final written address, the Defendant raises the objection that the address bears the names of four lawyers but the signature cannot be traced to any of them, relying on GTB v Innoson Nig Ltd SC/694/2014(R). This is a procedural objection going to the competence of the address as a court process. The Supreme Court's position in GTB v Innoson is that a court process must bear not only the signature of the legal practitioner but also his name clearly shown indicating that the signature is his. If the signature on the Claimant's final written address is indeed unattributable to any of the named counsel, this is a serious defect. However, this Court notes that the address has been filed and the submissions therein have been engaged with by the Defendant in its Reply. The practical effect of this objection on the weight to be given to the submissions in the address, as distinct from the evidence already on record, is a matter to be addressed in the Judgment. The evidence itself the testimony and exhibits stands independently of the written address.

 

  1. Regarding the claim for solicitor's fees (Exhibit J, a receipt for N500,000), the law is well settled that a claim for solicitor's fees as a head of damages is offensive to public policy and will not be awarded: Guinness Nigeria Plc v Nwoke [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt. 689) 135; Ihekwoaba v ACB Ltd [1998] 10 NWLR (Pt. 571) 590. The Claimant has produced the receipt but the legal basis for recovery is unsound. Exhibit J establishes that the Claimant paid N500,000 to his lawyers; it does not establish any legal entitlement to recover that sum from the Defendant.

 

  1. On the question of whether the Defendant's counter-claim remains live, the Defendant's Reply on Points of Law expressly withdraws the counter-claim and urges the Court to strike it out. This is noted. The net evidential position on each material issue is as follows. On the issue of whether the termination was lawful: the evidence establishes, on the balance of probabilities, that the Claimant received a clear, lawful, and reasonable transfer directive (Exhibit D) requiring immediate compliance; that he did not comply but instead wrote Exhibit E conditioning his compliance on the satisfaction of demands; that he did not perform his primary duties on 13 and 14 August 2024 (established by Exhibit 1 and his own admission); that his employment contract (Exhibit A, clause IV) and the company policy (Exhibit 2) authorised summary termination without notice or benefits for gross misconduct and serious breach of duty; and that the Claimant's conduct on the evidence constitutes insubordination within the meaning of those provisions. On the issue of unpaid salary: the Claimant's own admission under cross-examination that his July and August 2024 salaries were fully paid is conclusive against this claim. On the issue of general damages for trauma and psychological injury: the Claimant has no medical evidence, obtained new employment within three weeks, and the claim is not established. On the issue of solicitor's fees: the claim is legally untenable regardless of the receipt tendered. On the counter-claim: it has been withdrawn and falls away.

 

DEFENDANT’S WRITTEN SUBMISSION

 

  1. Learned Counsel to the Defendant, P. A. N. Ejiofor, Esq., and K. C. Obi, Esq., of Nnaemeka Ejiofor & Associates, submitted their Final Written Address and a Reply on Points of Law in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/355/2024. Their submissions are addressed issue by issue as formulated by the Defendant.

 

  1. On Issue 1, Whether the Claimant giving the Defendant conditions for his resumption to work amounts to insubordination, breach, refusal and/or neglect of his terms of employment: Learned Counsel to the Defendant submitted that the burden of proof in civil proceedings lies on the party asserting a fact, and that such proof is discharged on the balance of probability or preponderance of evidence, relying on Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act and the case of F.I.P.D.C. v. Executive Aviation Service Ltd. [2006] 35 WRN P.143 R6 per Ba'aba, JCA @ pp. 178–179 lines 35–5. Counsel submitted that the termination of the Claimant's employment was lawful and in accordance with the terms of the employment contract, particularly Clause IV of the offer of employment (Exhibit A), which provides that the contract may be terminated without notice and without benefits where the employee engages in gross insubordination, serious breach of duty, professional misconduct, or fails to professionally discharge responsibilities. Counsel further submitted that upon receipt of the internal memo (Exhibit D) transferring the Claimant from Karu Community Plaza Market Project to Karu Agro Allied Project, the Claimant, rather than comply, wrote a letter dated 13th August 2024 (Exhibit E) imposing conditions on the Defendant, the operative and concluding sentence of which reads: 'If the management wants me to work at Agro Allied they should consider the above challenges and address it.' Counsel submitted that the ordinary and necessary meaning of that sentence is that the Claimant would not work at Agro Allied unless the stated conditions were met, and that any reasonable person would perceive this as insubordination and disobedience to a company directive. Counsel submitted that the Claimant himself admitted under cross-examination that his employment was not tied to any particular project, thereby acknowledging his susceptibility to transfer to any of the Defendant's sites. Counsel submitted that the Claimant did not go to take over the new site on 13th August 2024, did not hand over the site he was redeployed from to the incoming engineer, and only casually strolled into the Agro Allied Project site mid-morning on 14th August 2024 after work had long commenced merely to take photographs, rather than to perform his primary duty of collecting and issuing materials to workers. Counsel submitted that the Claimant himself admitted under cross-examination that his duty as site engineer was to collect materials and issue them to workers, and that it was QS Francis Enemakwu Inocha who had to fill in the gap and signed off on the material issuing notes for 13th and 14th August 2024, as evidenced by Exhibit 1. Counsel submitted that the Claimant was also inciting other workers transferred with him not to comply with the transfer directive, a fact contained in paragraph 21 of the Statement of Defence which was never denied and is therefore deemed admitted, relying on Adesanoye v. Adewole [2000] 9 NWLR Pt. 671 P. 145, Orianzi v. AG Rivers & Ors [2017] LPELR 41737 SC, and Section 123 of the Evidence Act. Counsel submitted that insubordination requires: a direct order being given, the employee knowing and understanding the order, the order being lawful and reasonable, and willful disobedience characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude rather than a mere misunderstanding. Counsel submitted that all four conditions were satisfied on the facts of this case. Counsel further relied on the Company Policy (Exhibit 2), specifically Clauses 2(ii), (iii), (x) and Clause 3 under the caption Resignation/Termination/Staff Exit Handover, as well as the offer of employment (Exhibit A) under Other Terms and Conditions Clause IV, as expressly authorizing termination for insubordination. Counsel also relied on the decision of this Court in Bakare & Anor v. CGC Nig. Ltd. [2013] 30 N.L.L.R Pt. 87 P. 379 at 424 Paras G–H per Shogbola J., to the effect that an employer has the right to transfer or redeploy any of its workers as it desires and the worker has no right to refuse such posting, even where the worker holds a trade union position. Counsel submitted that the Claimant's use of the conjunction 'If' and the modal verb 'should' in the last paragraph of Exhibit E placed the letter beyond a mere expression of opinion and constituted a compulsory condition precedent to his acceptance of the transfer, relying on artificial intelligence definitions of those words to support the grammatical and legal construction of the sentence. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the Claimant's conduct amounted to gross insubordination warranting termination without notice.

 

  1. On Issue 2,  Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought on the totality of the evidence adduced before the Court: Learned Counsel to the Defendant submitted that the payment of one month's notice or salary in lieu of notice is not automatically awarded and that Clause IV of the termination letter (Exhibit G) expressly provides that where an employee is terminated for gross misconduct, including insubordination, the contract shall be terminated without notice and no benefits shall be payable as mentioned in Clause III. Counsel submitted that since the Claimant's termination was grounded in insubordination, he is not entitled to salary in lieu of notice, general damages, or any other monetary relief. Counsel submitted that the Claimant himself admitted under cross-examination that his July and August 2024 salaries had been fully paid, and that what is admitted needs no further proof, relying on Alh. Manu Kano v. The Govt. of Adamawa State & Ors [2014] LPELR–24161 (CA) P. 53 Para A. Counsel submitted that the claim for trauma, psychological torture, and hardship are medical conditions requiring medical proof, and that the Claimant tendered no medical report in support of those claims. Counsel further submitted that the Claimant himself admitted under cross-examination that he obtained another job with Zam Global Nig. Ltd. at Karu Community Plaza within three weeks of the termination of his employment, which negates any claim of prolonged hardship. Counsel submitted that the Claimant acknowledged that lateness and poor supervision carry penalties, and that he was fully aware of deductions from his salary for PAYE and pension, both of which were evidenced by Exhibit 4. Counsel submitted that the Karu Poor Work Performance Report (Exhibit 3) was tendered without counter or objection and stands unchallenged. Counsel relied on Erinfolami v. Oso [2011] LPELR–15357 (CA) for the proposition that a plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence, and submitted that the Claimant's several admissions and evasive answers under cross-examination fatally undermined his case. Counsel also relied on Edosomwan v. Ogbeifun [1996] LPELR–1019 SC P. 25 Para A in support of the position that termination for insubordination or dereliction of duty cannot be rewarded with payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss all the Claimant's reliefs.

 

  1. On Issue 3, Whether the Claimant can claim solicitor's fees from the Defendant: Learned Counsel to the Defendant submitted that it is unethical and an affront to public policy to pass the burden of a party's solicitor's fees to the opposing party. Counsel submitted that the Claimant tendered a receipt of N500,000.00 paid to his lawyer (Exhibit J) and sought to recover same from the Defendant. Counsel relied on Guinness Nigeria Plc v. Nwoke [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt. 689) 135, where the court held that a claim for solicitor's fees is outlandish and offensive to public policy; Michael v. Access Bank [2017] LPELR (41981) 1 @ 48–49; and Ihekwoaba v. A.C.B. Ltd. [1998] 10 NWLR (Pt. 571) 590 @ 610–611, where the Court of Appeal refused a claim for solicitor's fees on the same grounds. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the claim for solicitor's fees must fail.

 

  1. On the validity of the Claimant's Final Written Address; Learned Counsel to the Defendant submitted, in the Reply on Points of Law, that the Claimant's Final Written Address bears the names of four lawyers but that the signature thereon cannot be traced to any of the four named lawyers, rendering the address incompetent. Counsel relied on GTB v. Innoson Nig. Ltd. SC/694/2014(R), where the Supreme Court held that a court process purportedly settled by a legal practitioner must bear not only the signature of the legal practitioner but also his name clearly shown and indicating that the signature is his, and on SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC, to the same effect. Counsel urged the Court to strike out the Claimant's Final Written Address on this ground. On the admissibility of Exhibits 1, 3, 4, and 5, Learned Counsel to the Defendant submitted, in the Reply on Points of Law, that this Court is not bound by the strict rules of the Evidence Act, and that the admissibility of documentary evidence is ordinarily governed by Section 83 of the Evidence Act. Counsel submitted that the objection that Exhibits 1, 3, 4, and 5 were not pleaded is false, as paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 21 of the Statement of Defence pleaded the facts in proof of which those exhibits were tendered, and those paragraphs were never denied by the Claimant and are therefore deemed admitted. Counsel submitted that Exhibit 1 the material issuing notes for 13th and 14th August 2024  directly proves that the Claimant failed to perform his primary duty of collecting and issuing materials, since it was QS Francis Inocha who signed off on those notes. Counsel submitted that it is facts that are pleaded and documents are tendered in proof of those facts, relying on Sanni-Omotosho v. Obidairo [2014] 37 WRN P.47 R.5 @ P. 78–79 lines 25–45 per Iyizoba, JCA, to the effect that documents in support of facts pleaded need not be specifically pleaded to be admissible so long as the facts they support are expressly pleaded. Counsel further submitted that admissibility can also be based on relevance, relying on Tayo v. State [2016] 27 WRN P.152 R.4 @ P. 174 line 20 per Daniel-Kalio, JCA. Counsel submitted that all of Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 except Exhibit 5 predate the suit and therefore cannot be said to have been made while the suit was pending. On the issue of front-loading, Counsel relied on Yongopila v. Nenshi [2017] 24 WRN P.115 R.9, where the Court held that the essence of front-loading is speed of trial and putting the other party on notice, and that non-compliance does not render a document inadmissible. Counsel submitted that the Claimant, having elected to proceed without requesting an adjournment, cannot at this stage raise the issue of documents not being front-loaded. Counsel urged the Court to hold all the defence exhibits as proper evidence.

 

  1. On the Defendant's counter-claim; Learned Counsel to the Defendant submitted, in the Reply on Points of Law, that the Defendant withdraws its counter-claim, is not joining issue on the Claimant's submissions in respect of it, and urges the Court to strike it out.

 

CLAIMANT’S WRITTEN SUBMISSION

 

  1. Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Joel K. Akerigba, Esq., and Aondohemba Cosmas Igbakua, of Global Solicitors & Partners, filed the Claimant's Final Written Address. Their submissions are addressed issue by issue as discernible from the record, including as reflected in the Defendant's Reply on Points of Law which responds to and quotes from the Claimant's address.

 

  1. On Issue A - the question of insubordination Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted a definition of insubordination at paragraph 4.3 of the Claimant's Final Written Address, which definition was adopted by the Defendant in its Reply. Counsel submitted, at paragraph 4.5, that the Termination Letter (Exhibit G) stated that the Claimant refused to accept the directive of transfer as contained in Exhibit D, and that the directive was merely for a handover from Karu Market site to Karu Agro Allied Project, rather than a directive to immediately commence work at the new site. Counsel submitted, at paragraphs 4.6 to 4.10, that the last paragraph of Exhibit E the Claimant's handwritten letter dated 13th August 2024 was not a refusal to accept the transfer but rather a mere expression of opinion and an exercise of the Claimant's freedom of expression, and that it did not amount to insubordination. Counsel submitted that the Claimant's conduct did not satisfy the legal threshold for insubordination and that the termination was therefore wrongful.

 

  1. On Issue B - entitlement to reliefs Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted, at paragraph 4.22 of the Final Written Address, that the termination of the Claimant's employment did not fall within the category of gross misconduct attracting summary dismissal without notice or benefits, and that the Claimant was therefore entitled to one month's salary in lieu of notice and other reliefs claimed. Counsel submitted that the Claimant's July and August 2024 salaries had not been fully paid as claimed by the Defendant, and that the Claimant was entitled to outstanding salary, general damages for trauma, psychological torture, and hardship suffered as a result of the wrongful termination, as well as the sum of N500,000.00 representing legal fees paid to his solicitors as evidenced by Exhibit J.

 

  1. On the admissibility of the Defendant's exhibits, Learned Counsel to the Claimant objected to the admissibility of Exhibits 1, 3, 4, and 5 on the grounds that those documents were not pleaded in the Statement of Defence and were not front-loaded with the Defendant's processes, submitting that their admission was therefore irregular and contrary to the rules of pleading and the front-loading regime of this Court. On the Defendant's counter-claim, Learned Counsel to the Claimant filed submissions opposing the counter-claim, the details of which are reflected in the Defendant's Reply on Points of Law, though the counter-claim was subsequently withdrawn by the Defendant.

 

COURT’S DECISION

 

  1. Having regard to the issues formulated by both parties, the Court is of the view that the Defendant's formulation more precisely captures the live controversies that must be resolved, while the Claimant's formulation, though broader, is subsumed within the Defendant's issues. The Court accordingly adopts the following issues for determination:

 

  1. Whether the Claimant's conduct in issuing conditions to the Defendant prior to complying with the transfer directive contained in Exhibit D amounted to insubordination, and whether the consequent termination of his employment was lawful.

 

  1. Whether the Claimant is entitled to any of the reliefs sought, including salary in lieu of notice, general damages for trauma and psychological hardship, and outstanding emoluments, on the totality of the evidence adduced before the Court.

 

  1. Whether the Claimant is entitled to recover solicitor's fees paid to his counsel as a head of damages against the Defendant.

 

  1. Resolution of Issue One: Whether the Claimant's conduct in issuing conditions to the Defendant prior to complying with the transfer directive contained in Exhibit ‘D’ amounted to insubordination, and whether the consequent termination of his employment was lawful. In addressing this issue, the Court must examine the contemporary landscape of Nigerian employment law, which has undergone a significant transformation since the enactment of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Third Alteration) Act 2010. By virtue of Section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution, this Court is vested with the jurisdiction to apply international best practices and protect employees from unfair labor practices. Under this modern legal regime, the absolute common law power of an employer to terminate an employee for no reason or for any reason whatsoever has been fundamentally curtailed. Where an employer chooses to state a reason for the termination of an employee’s contract of employment, the law imposes upon that employer the burden of establishing the truth and validity of that reason. In Aloysius v. Diamond Bank Plc [2015] 58 NLLR (Pt. 199) 92, this Court held that: "With the current state of labour law in Nigeria, particularly with the jurisdiction of this Court, it is no longer the law that an employer can terminate an employee's employment for good, bad or no reason at all. The employer must state the reason and justify that reason." Consequently, since the Defendant in the instant case elected to terminate the Claimant’s employment on the ground of gross insubordination as stated in the letter of termination, Exhibit G, the Defendant must satisfy this Court by credible evidence that the Claimant’s conduct indeed constituted gross insubordination.

 

  1. Insubordination, as established by our labour jurisprudence, consists of a willful or intentional refusal by an employee to obey a lawful, reasonable, and clear instruction of the employer. It strikes at the very root of the master-and-servant relationship, which is built upon the cornerstone of obedience and mutual trust. For the Defendant to succeed in justifying the termination on this ground, it must show that a direct, lawful, and reasonable order was given to the employee, that the employee understood the order, and that the employee willfully refused or neglected to comply under circumstances manifesting a perverse or defiant attitude. On the question of whether a lawful and reasonable order was given, the Court must look to Exhibit D, which is an internal memorandum dated 13th August 2024. By this document, the Defendant directed the Claimant’s transfer from the Karu Community Plaza Market Project to the Karu Agro Allied Project, with instructions to work with QS Inocha Francis Enemakwu with immediate effect. The Claimant’s counsel has strenuously argued that this transfer directive was merely a handover instruction rather than a directive to immediately commence work at the new site. I find this argument to be completely devoid of merit. The language of Exhibit D is clear, direct, and urgent; it describes the transfer as "immediate and as urgent." No site engineer of the Claimant’s standing and experience could have honestly or reasonably misconstrued a directive to transfer "immediately" and "to work with" a named colleague at a new site as a mere invitation to perform handover formalities. Furthermore, under cross-examination, CW1 admitted that "his employment was not tied to any particular project." This is a profound admission. It demonstrates that the Claimant was fully aware that the Defendant possessed the contractual right to deploy him to any of its project sites as operational exigencies dictated. The law is well settled that the right of an employer to transfer or redeploy an employee to any of its branches or project sites is a legitimate exercise of managerial prerogative. In Bakare & Anor v. CGC Nig. Ltd. [2013] 30 N.L.L.R Pt. 87 P. 379 at 424, this Court held that "an employer has the right to transfer or redeploy any of its workers as it desires and the worker has no right to refuse such posting." The directive in Exhibit D was therefore lawful, reasonable, and within the contract of employment.

 

  1. Did the Claimant comply with this lawful directive? The answer is written in the Claimant's own hand in Exhibit E, a letter dated 13th August 2024 which he addressed to the Defendant. The concluding paragraph of Exhibit E states: "If the management wants me to work at Agro Allied they should consider the above challenges and address it." The Claimant's counsel has argued that this letter was a mere expression of opinion and a constitutionally protected exercise of freedom of expression. This argument is a complete mischaracterization of the nature of the employment relationship. An employee cannot under the guise of "freedom of expression" hold his employer to ransom or dictate the terms upon which he will obey a lawful and urgent instruction. The sentence in Exhibit E is structured as a conditional defiance. By using the conjunction "If" and the modal verb "should," the Claimant clearly set up a condition precedent to his resumption of work at the new site. He essentially told his employer that he would only work at the Agro Allied Project if his demands were met. This is the very definition of insubordination.

 

  1. The Claimant’s subsequent conduct on 13th and 14th August 2024 further underscores his willful refusal to obey. Under cross-examination, CW1 admitted that "collecting and issuing materials was his first and primary duty as site engineer." Yet, the Defendant’s witness, DW1, testified that the Claimant did not perform this duty on either the 13th or 14th of August 2024. This testimony is strongly corroborated by Exhibit 1, which are the material issuing notes for those dates. These notes were signed and issued by QS Francis Enemakwu Inocha, who had to fill the gap left by the Claimant’s absence and neglect. The Claimant’s physical presence at the Agro Allied site mid-morning on 14th August 2024 was merely to take photographs, as shown in Exhibit F. This cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as compliance with his primary duties. He arrived late, did not collect or issue materials, and did not execute the work he was directed to do. Moreover, the Defendant’s averment in paragraph 21 of the Statement of Defence that the Claimant was actively inciting other workers transferred with him to disobey the transfer directive was never denied by the Claimant in his pleadings. It is an elementary principle of our adjectival law that facts pleaded which are not specifically denied are deemed admitted and require no further proof.

 

  1. On the first issue, therefore, I find that the Claimant's conduct in issuing conditions to the Defendant prior to complying with the transfer directive contained in Exhibit D, coupled with his failure to perform his duties on 13th and 14th August 2024 and his incitement of other workers, amounted to gross insubordination. Consequently, the termination of his employment by the Defendant via Exhibit G was entirely lawful and justified.

 

  1. Resolution of Issue Two: Whether the Claimant is entitled to any of the reliefs sought, including salary in lieu of notice, general damages for trauma and psychological hardship, and outstanding emoluments, on the totality of the evidence adduced before the Court. The claims of the Claimant must be evaluated in the light of the finding that his termination was lawful and justified by his own gross insubordination. On the claim for one month's salary in lieu of notice, the Court must look to the terms of the contract of employment. Clause IV of the offer of employment, Exhibit A, and Clause 3 of the Company Policy, Exhibit 2, both expressly provide that where an employee is terminated for gross misconduct, including gross insubordination and serious breach of duty, the employment may be terminated summarily without notice and without any benefits. The Supreme Court of Nigeria has consistently held that where an employer dismisses or terminates an employee for gross misconduct, the employee is not entitled to notice or salary in lieu of notice. In Edosomwan v. Ogbeifun [1996] LPELR–1019 SC, the apex Court affirmed that "termination for insubordination or dereliction of duty cannot be rewarded with payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice." The Court cannot rewrite the contract for the parties; its duty is to give effect to the clear and unambiguous terms agreed upon. The claim for salary in lieu of notice is therefore refused.

 

  1. On the claim for outstanding salary for July and August 2024, the Claimant’s case has suffered a self-inflicted and fatal blow. Under cross-examination, CW1 admitted that "his July and August 2024 salaries had been fully paid." It is a basic and well-entrenched principle of our law of evidence that what is admitted requires no further proof. This admission is conclusive against the Claimant’s claim for unpaid salary for these months. This head of claim must fail and is hereby dismissed.

 

  1. On the claim for general damages for trauma, psychological torture, and hardship, the Claimant has offered nothing but bare assertions. He did not tender any medical report, psychiatric evaluation, or expert testimony of any kind to support these claims. Furthermore, under cross-examination, CW1 admitted that "he obtained another job with Zam Global Nig. Ltd. at Karu Community Plaza within three weeks of the termination of his employment." It is difficult to conceive how an employee who secured alternative employment within three weeks of his termination, in the very same vicinity as his previous job, can be said to have suffered the kind of extreme psychological trauma or hardship that would justify an award of general damages. In Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Oyebola (2020) LPELR-51806(CA), the Court of Appeal recognized that while this Court possesses the power to apply international best practices in awarding damages, such awards must be compensatory and anchored on a finding of a wrong committed by the employer. Having found that the Defendant acted within its contractual rights and that the termination was lawful and justified, there is no wrong committed by the Defendant to ground any award of general damages. On the second issue, I find that the Claimant is not entitled to any of the reliefs sought.

 

  1. Resolution of Issue Three: whether the claimant is entitled to recover solicitor's fees paid to his Counsel as a head of damages against the defendant. The Claimant has tendered Exhibit J, which is a receipt in the sum of N500,000.00 representing the professional fees paid to his solicitors for the prosecution of this action, and seeks to recover this sum from the Defendant. It is a long-standing and immutable principle of our jurisprudence that a claim for solicitor's fees as a head of damages is unknown to our jurisprudence and is offensive to public policy. A party's cost of litigation, including the fees paid to his legal practitioners, cannot be shifted to the opposing party as a substantive head of damages. In Guinness Nigeria Plc v. Nwoke [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt. 689) 135, the Court of Appeal held that "a claim for solicitor's fees is outlandish and offensive to public policy." This position was further reinforced by the Court of Appeal in Michael v. Access Bank [2017] LPELR-41981(CA), where it was held that the cost of hiring counsel is a private arrangement between a litigant and his solicitor and cannot be passed on to the losing party under the guise of damages. Exhibit J merely proves that the Claimant paid his solicitors; it does not and cannot create a legal right to recover that sum from the Defendant. On the third issue, I find that the Claimant is not entitled to recover solicitor's fees.

 

  1. I must briefly address the Defendant's counter-claim. In the Reply on Points of Law, the Defendant's counsel stated that the Defendant withdraws its counter-claim and urged the Court to strike it out. The counter-claim, having been formally withdrawn, is hereby struck out.

 

  1. In the final analysis, the Claimant has failed to prove any entitlement to any of the reliefs sought in this action. His suit collapses under the weight of his own admissions and the uncontroverted documentary evidence on record. The termination of his employment was the direct result of his own gross insubordination and conditional compliance with a lawful managerial directive. This suit is totally lacking in merit and is hereby dismissed.

 

  1. On the whole and for the reasons articulated above this court hereby makes the following ORDERS:

 

  1. The Claimant's claim for one month's salary in lieu of notice is hereby refused and dismissed.

 

  1. The Claimant's claim for outstanding salaries for July and August 2024 is hereby refused and dismissed.

 

  1. The Claimant's claim for general damages for trauma, psychological torture, and hardship is hereby refused and dismissed.

 

  1. The Claimant's claim for recovery of solicitor's fees in the sum of N500,000.00 is hereby refused and dismissed.

 

  1. The Defendant's counter-claim, having been withdrawn by the Defendant's counsel, is hereby struck out.

 

  1. Each party shall bear its own costs.

 

  1. Judgment is hereby entered.

 

 

 

 

                                                                         ……………………………….

                                                                         Hon Justice E. D. Subilim

JUDGE