Dr Cephas P.A. Gbande -VS- Nasarawa State University Keffi- National Industrial Court of Nigeria

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM

DATE: 23^RD JULY, 2026

SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/101/2024

DR. CEPHAS P. A. GBANDE ... ... ... .. CLAIMANT

AND

NASSARAWA STATE UNIVERSITY, KEFFI ........ DEFENDANT

REPRESENTATIONS:

Chief Akin Olujinmi SAN with Abdulwahab Abayomi Esq for the claimant

S. Y. Tungun Esq for the defendant

JUDGMENT

1.The Claimant commenced this action by a Complaint, Statement of Facts and other accompanying processes dated 16th April, 2024 and filed on 17th April, 2024. The Claimant claims the following reliefs before this Honourable Court:

I. DECLARATION that the purported unilateral conversion of the Claimant's appointment as an academic staff from tenure to contract constitutes a breach of the Claimant's contract of employment with the defendant and is therefore wrongful and null and void.

II. The sum of N5 million naira representing general damages suffered by the Claimant for the breach by the defendant of the Claimant's contract of appointment.

III. AN ORDER directing the defendant to forthwith rectify its record by converting the Claimant's appointment from contract back to tenure and issue to the Claimant a letter confirming the conversion.

IV. DECLARATION that having met all the requirements for his promotion to the position of Professor in the service of the defendant since 2019, the Claimant was entitled to be promoted to the position of Professor with effect from 2019.

V. DECLARATION that the failure of the defendant to effect the promotion of the Claimant to the position of Professor was a breach of the Regulation governing the appointment of the Claimant and amounts to a breach of the Claimant's contract of employment and therefore wrongful.

VI. AN ORDER compelling the defendant to immediately effect the promotion of the Claimant to the position of Professor with effect from 2019 when he qualified for same.

VII. AN ORDER directing the defendant to immediately issue to the Claimant a letter conveying his promotion to the position of Professor.

VIII. AN ORDER directing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the salaries and allowances he would have earned as a Professor with effect from 2019.

IX. IN THE ALTERNATIVE to reliefs (vi) to (viii), an order awarding to the Claimant, the sum of N500 million naira representing general damages suffered by the Claimant for the refusal or failure of the defendant to promote the Claimant to the position of Professor.

X. DECLARATION that the non-payment of the Claimant's salaries and allowances by the defendant from July, 2023 up till now constitutes a breach of the Claimant's contract of employment with the defendant and therefore wrongful.

XI. AN Order directing the defendant to pay to the Claimant forthwith all his unpaid salaries and allowances from July 2023 up to January 2024, amounting to N3,200,000 (three million, two hundred thousand) naira.

XII. AN Order directing the defendant to pay to the Claimant forthwith the arrears of his Earned academic allowance amounting to N4.8million due and unpaid up to February 2023 which the defendant had failed to pay notwithstanding several demands for same.

XIII. The sum of N5 million naira representing general damages suffered by the Claimant for the wrongful withholding of his salaries and allowances by the defendant from July 2023 until payment of the salaries and allowances are paid to the Claimant.

XIV. 10% interest per annum on each head of monetary award until same is paid by the defendant.

2.The Defendant, through learned counsel, joined issue on the pleadings, filed an Amended Statement of Defence on 26th November, 2024, and raised a jurisdictional objection which was, in the interlocutory stage, refused. Trial was had.

BACK GROUND FACTS OF THE CASE

3.The Claimant was employed by the Defendant as a contract staff (Senior Lecturer) in March 2009. The appointment was converted to a tenure appointment in August 2011 and confirmed in June 2013. Following the recommendations of a state government repositioning committee, the Defendant, by a letter dated 22nd June, 2023, unilaterally reverted the Claimant's tenure appointment to a contract appointment on the ground that his tenure appointment at age 55 violated the Public Service Rules and University regulations. Consequently, the Defendant denied the Claimant's promotion to the rank of Professor and stopped the payment of his monthly salaries and academic allowances.

COMMENCEMENT OF HEARING

4.The Claimant testified as CW1 and tendered a bundle of documents marked Exhibits Gbande 1 to 53, with additional exhibits marked 1a, 7a and 20a on 27th November, 2024; he adopted his Additional Witness Statement on Oath on 25th February, 2025. The Defendant called two witnesses: Mrs. Stella Oluwatoyin Asaniyan (DW1), on 13th November, 2025, who tendered Exhibits Stella 1 to 7; and Dr. Bala Isyaka Ahmad (DW2), on 28th January, 2026. Final written addresses were filed and adopted, and I have read them with the attention they deserve. I acknowledge, with gratitude, the industry of Chief Akin Olujinmi, CON, SAN (with him a capable team) for the Claimant, and of Nuhu Egya, Esq. (with him a capable team) for the Defendant.

EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

5.In civil cases such as the present one, the burden of proof rests on the party who asserts a fact, and it must be discharged on the preponderance of evidence, as provided by Sections 131, 132, 133, and 134 of the Evidence Act, 2011. Consequently, the Claimant bears the initial burden of proving his entitlement to the declaratory, injunctive, and monetary reliefs sought by placing before the court cogent, credible, and admissible evidence. Once the Claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the Defendant to adduce evidence to establish its defence, including any assertion of statutory non-compliance or administrative regularization. The standard of proof remains a preponderance of probability, where the court must weigh the evidence of both parties on an imaginary scale of justice to determine which side carries greater weight and credibility.

6.To discharge this burden of proof, the Claimant testified as his own sole witness, CW1, adopting his written statement on oath dated 17th April, 2024, and his additional written statement on oath dated 12th December, 2024. In support of his claims, the Claimant tendered several documents in evidence. Exhibit Gbande 1 is the Nasarawa State University Law, and Exhibit Gbande 2 is the letter of offer of contract appointment dated 12th March, 2009. CW1 testified that he accepted the contract appointment and resumed duties on 2nd April, 2009. The Claimant placed reliance on Exhibit Gbande 3, which is the memo on the conversion of the Claimant's appointment to tenure dated 16th August, 2011, establishing that all terms and conditions of a tenured staff became applicable to him. To demonstrate his confirmation of appointment, CW1 tendered Exhibit Gbande 5, a letter dated 25th June, 2013, which confirmed his appointment with effect from 1st April, 2012, stating in its final paragraph that the Defendant recognized that the Claimant had demonstrated the "spirit of hard work and dedication in the performance of his duties." To prove his academic progression, CW1 tendered Exhibit Gbande 7, a letter dated 24th May, 2017, which conveyed his promotion to Associate Professor with retrospective effect from 2016, noting that the "promotion has been made in recognition of his loyalty, hard work, devotion to duty and sense of responsibility." Regarding his qualification for full professorship, CW1 testified that "three years after his promotion to the position of Associate Professor, the Claimant had by 2019 met the requirements for promotion to full professorship." The Claimant also tendered Exhibit Gbande 14, a memo dated 22nd June, 2023, titled "Conversion of Tenure Appointment to Contract," which stated that the Council of the Defendant had decided to revert his appointment to contract with immediate effect, and further remarked: "Note also that your complaint regarding successful assessment to the rank of Professor in 2019 has been overtaken by events and is therefore, neither tenable nor feasible." To show the financial and professional impact of this decision, CW1 testified that: "Having been so deprived of my elevation to the professorial position, it has become permanently impossible for me to become a Professor in any other university, in my lifetime, now that I have reached the retirement age of 70 years at the time that I was forced out of the defendant university." He further testified that "I have lost the opportunity of the unquantifiable substantial financial benefits that I would have enjoyed as a Professor and I have therefore suffered loss and damage." Regarding his withheld salaries, CW1 testified that the Defendant stopped his salaries from July 2023 up to January 2024, and tendered Exhibit Gbande 29, which contained his pay slips from March to June, 2023, to substantiate his salary rate, alongside Exhibit Gbande 30, which comprised his solicitor's letter of 31st January, 2024, and the Defendant's reply dated 11th March, 2024.

7.On its part, the Defendant opened its defence by calling Stella O. Asaniyan as DW1, who adopted her witness statement on oath and tendered seven documents. These included Exhibit Stella 1, which comprised the Claimant's application for conversion dated 3rd March, 2010, and a reminder dated 27th January, 2011; Exhibit Stella 2, being query letters dated 13th December, 2019; Exhibit Stella 3, a retirement notice to Dr. Gbande dated 10th June, 2019; Exhibit Stella 4, the Public Service Rules; Exhibit Stella 5, a memo dated 9th November, 2023, regarding the release of salary; Exhibit Stella 6, a reversal of status letter dated 12th March, 2021; and Exhibit Stella 7, a conversion of tenure appointment to contract dated 22nd June, 2023. Under cross-examination, DW1 made critical concessions that significantly eroded the defence's core contentions. Specifically, DW1 admitted that "the Public Service Rules which prescribed 50 years age limit for one to be qualified for appointment on tenure, had no application to the defendant and that the internal regulation of the defendant prescribed 55 years as the age limit." Furthermore, DW1 admitted under cross-examination that "the Claimant did not accept the conversion of his appointment to contract but he continued to render service to the University, which, according to the witness, the defendant did not recognize and so they did not pay him his salaries." DW1 also admitted that "the Claimant was processed for promotion to full professorship but the defendant denied him because of age issue which they raised in Exhibit Gbande 14." The Defendant also led Dr. Bala Isyaka Ahmad, the Registrar of the Defendant, who testified as DW2. DW2 adopted his witness statement on oath and referenced Exhibit Bala, which detailed the appraisal of irregular appointments in the university. However, under cross-examination, DW2 admitted that he wrote Exhibit Gbande 28 in reply to the Claimant's pre-action letter, and confessed that "the Public Service Rules did not apply to the Defendant and that the University Regulation, Exhibit Gbande 20A did not limit the age for tenure appointment to 50 years but 55 years." Crucially, DW2 admitted under cross-examination that "what he stated in his letter, Exhibit Gbande 28 on the issue of age was wrong." DW2 further admitted under cross-examination that "they stopped the Claimant’s salary from July 2023" and that "the Claimant had the option to accept or not to accept the position of the defendant on the conversion of his appointment to contract and that the Claimant did not accept the reversal to contract appointment."

8.Having assessed the individual evidence of both parties, the court must now directly confront the two opposing versions. The Claimant’s case is that his conversion to a tenure appointment in 2011 was valid, that he met all promotion requirements to become a full Professor by 2019, and that the unilateral reversion of his status to a contract staff in 2023 was an unlawful breach of contract. The Defendant’s case is that the conversion to tenure was void ab initio because the Claimant was 55 years old at the time of his appointment in 2009, which supposedly violated the age limit under the Public Service Rules and the University's regulations. The conflict lies in whether the age limit of 50 years under the Public Service Rules applies to the Claimant’s tenure appointment and whether his conversion to a tenured status was indeed a nullity. The court resolves this conflict in favour of the Claimant. The Defendant’s sole justification for reversing the Claimant’s status and withholding his promotion was the alleged age barrier. However, both DW1 and DW2 admitted under cross-examination that the Public Service Rules, which set a 50-year cap, do not apply to the Defendant's academic staff. They further admitted that the Defendant's own Conditions of Service, specifically Exhibit Gbande 20A, set the age limit for tenure appointments at 55 years, and that the Claimant was exactly 55 years old when his tenure appointment took effect. By DW2’s own admission under cross-examination, the Defendant’s reliance on the 50-year limit to reverse the Claimant's appointment was "wrong." The documentary evidence, particularly Exhibit Gbande 20A, read alongside the admissions of DW1 and DW2, completely demolishes the Defendant's assertion of illegality. Thus, the Claimant's version—that his tenure appointment was lawful and that its unilateral reversal was a breach of contract—is far more credible and is accepted by this court.

9.The court notes a profound internal contradiction within the Defendant's evidence. While the Defendant pleaded in its Amended Statement of Defence that the Claimant was ineligible for tenure appointment because he was over 50 years of age, and tendered Exhibit Stella 4 to support this, its own witnesses under cross-examination flatly contradicted this position. DW1 and DW2 both conceded that the Public Service Rules are inapplicable to the Defendant's academic appointments and that the applicable age limit under the university's regulations is 55 years. This constitutes a severe material contradiction that goes to the root of the defence. A party is not allowed to set up a case in its pleadings and then have its own witnesses demolish that case under cross-examination. Furthermore, the Defendant's argument that the Claimant is estopped from challenging the reversal because he did not accept the contract status is logically flawed and contradicted by its own witnesses. DW2 admitted that the Claimant had a right to accept or refuse the new contract terms. The gap in the Defendant's case is its failure to provide any legal basis for its unilateral alteration of a confirmed, tenured contract of employment that had been acted upon for over a decade without any queries regarding the Claimant's age or status.

10.The Defendant has raised the defence of ex turpi causa non oritur actio, arguing that the court cannot enforce an illegality or allow the Claimant to benefit from an irregular appointment. However, for this defence to succeed, there must be an established illegality. The evidence before the court shows that the Claimant's appointment was in perfect alignment with Section 2(2) of the Regulations Governing the Conditions of Service of Nasarawa State University, Keffi, 2005, which permits tenure appointments for persons up to 55 years of age. Since there was no violation of the enabling regulation, the administrative decision of the Repositioning Committee to label the appointment as "irregular" was itself ultra vires and legally baseless. The Defendant cannot create a non-existent illegality, use it as a pretext to unilaterally alter a contract, and then plead the doctrine of illegality as a shield against its own breach. The Defendant also raised the preliminary issues of locus standi and the Claimant's alleged failure to exhaust internal dispute resolution mechanisms under Section 6(6) of the Regulations. The court notes that this jurisdictional objection had already been raised, argued, and dismissed in a considered ruling of this court on 23rd July, 2024. The Defendant did not appeal that ruling. To raise the same jurisdictional arguments in its final written address is an attempt to relitigate a settled issue, which is barred by the doctrine of issue estoppel. The court will not allow the Defendant to reopen a door that has already been judicially closed.

11.In light of the foregoing evaluation, the court makes the following net evidential findings on the issues adopted for determination. First, on the status of employment, the court finds that the Claimant's conversion from contract to a tenure appointment in 2011 was lawful, valid, and fully compliant with the Defendant's Conditions of Service. Consequently, the Defendant's unilateral conversion of the Claimant's appointment from tenure to contract in 2023 was legally ineffective, wrongful, and constituted a fundamental breach of the contract of employment. Second, on the issue of promotion, the court finds that the Claimant satisfied all requirements for promotion to the rank of full Professor in 2019, and that the Defendant's refusal to promote him, based solely on a non-existent age barrier, was wrongful and a breach of its contractual obligations. Third, on the withholding of remuneration, the court finds that the Claimant continued to perform his academic duties up until January 2024, when he was forced out of his office, and that the Defendant's stoppage of his monthly salaries and allowances from July 2023 to January 2024, as a coercive measure to force him to accept the contract conversion, was wrongful, unlawful, and an egregious breach of contract. Finally, on the issue of reliefs, the court finds that the Claimant has established by credible, uncontradicted evidence his entitlement to declaratory reliefs, the recovery of his unpaid salaries and allowances, and general damages for the professional, financial, and emotional injury suffered due to the Defendant's unilateral and wrongful acts.

CLAIMANT'S SUBMISSIONS

12.Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Chief Akin Olujinmi, CON, SAN, submitted that the Claimant's case was fully established by uncontroverted evidence and that the Defendant failed to present any credible defence to the action.

On Issue 1: whether the refusal of the defendant to promote the Claimant to full professorship notwithstanding that the Claimant fulfilled the requirements for the promotion was not wrongful and in breach of the defendant’s contractual obligations to the claimant

13.Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Chief Akin Olujinmi, CON, SAN, submitted that the Defendant's refusal to promote the Claimant to the rank of full Professor, despite the Claimant meeting all the requirements since 2019, constituted a clear and wrongful breach of contract. Counsel argued that three years after the Claimant's promotion to the position of Associate Professor in 2016, the Claimant met all the academic and administrative conditions for full professorship. Rather than releasing the promotion, the Defendant issued a memorandum dated November 2, 2020, marked as Exhibit Gbande 23, threatening to unilaterally reverse the Claimant's tenured appointment to a contract appointment on the erroneous ground that his appointment at age fifty-five in 2009 violated the Public Service Rules and the University’s Conditions of Service. Counsel pointed out that the Claimant replied via Exhibit Gbande 22, explaining that he had never worked in the civil service and had no service to transfer. Counsel further argued that the Defendant eventually executed its threat via Exhibit Gbande 14, dated June 22, 2023, by unilaterally changing the Claimant's appointment status from tenure to contract with immediate effect. Counsel submitted that a party to an agreement is not at liberty to unilaterally vary its terms and expect the other party to be bound, relying on the cases of Unity Bank v. Olatunji [2015] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1452) 203; UBA Plc v. Vertex Agric. Ltd (2020) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1754) 467 to support the proposition that any such unilateral variation is null, void, and of no legal effect. Furthermore, Counsel argued that both DW1 and DW2 admitted under cross-examination that the Public Service Rules prescribing a fifty-year age limit had no application to the Defendant, and that the Defendant's internal regulations actually prescribe fifty-five years as the limit for tenure appointments. Since the Claimant was fifty-five years old at the time of his tenure appointment, his status was lawful, and DW2 admitted that his statements regarding the age limit in Exhibit Gbande 28 were wrong. Counsel submitted that the unilateral conversion stripped the Claimant of his rights to promotion, retirement benefits, and pension as provided under sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 14 of Exhibit Gbande 20A, and therefore the refusal to promote him was wrongful and in breach of contract.

On Issue 2: whether the refusal of the defendant to pay the Claimant his monthly salaries and allowances from July 2023 till January 2024 was not wrongful and a breach of the defendant’s contractual obligations to the Claimant

14.Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Chief Akin Olujinmi, CON, SAN, submitted that the Defendant’s refusal to pay the Claimant’s monthly salaries and allowances from July 2023 to January 2024 was wrongful and constituted a severe breach of contract. Counsel argued that the Claimant continued to diligently perform his academic duties as an Associate Professor during this entire period until he was stopped by the Defendant’s letters of January 18 and 19, 2024, marked as Exhibits Gbande 3 and 4. Counsel pointed out that the Defendant did not dispute the stoppage of salaries, and that DW2 admitted under cross-examination that the salaries were withheld solely because the Claimant refused to accept the unilateral conversion of his tenure appointment to a contract appointment. Counsel referred to Sections 3, 4, and 5 of Exhibit Gbande 20A, which guarantee the payment of salaries and allowances to the Defendant's academic staff. Counsel submitted that withholding the Claimant's earnings as leverage to force him to accept an illegal and unilateral change of his employment status was unlawful and a flagrant breach of the contract of employment, especially as the Claimant wrote multiple internal memoranda demanding his salaries, which the Defendant refused to process unless he accepted the contract status.

On Issue 3: What are the reliefs the Claimant is entitled to?

15.Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Chief Akin Olujinmi, CON, SAN, submitted that the Claimant is entitled to all the declaratory, injunctive, and monetary reliefs sought. Counsel argued that the Claimant placed uncontradicted evidence before the Court regarding the immense professional, financial, and personal damage he suffered due to the Defendant's refusal to promote him to the rank of Professor, which is the peak of distinction in the academic world. Counsel pointed out that because the Claimant has reached the retirement age of seventy, he can never achieve the rank of Professor in his lifetime, thereby permanently losing opportunities to serve as an External Examiner, serve on NUC accreditation teams, or work as a visiting professor. Counsel relied on the cases of FBN Plc v. Standard Polyplastic Ind. Ltd [2022] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1854) 517, Damisa v. UBA [2025] 19 NWLR (Pt. 2021) 409, and Ezeanah v. Atta [2004] 7 NWLR (Pt. 813) 468 for the proposition that a court is entitled to believe and act on uncontroverted evidence that has not been discredited under cross-examination. On the claim for general damages, Counsel relied on Eneh v. Ozor [2016] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1538) 219 and Anibaba v. Dana Airlines Ltd [2025] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994) 377 to submit that general damages are awarded at the discretion of the court to compensate for non-pecuniary losses, pain, suffering, and emotional distress, and do not need to be specially pleaded or strictly proved. Counsel further submitted that the Claimant is entitled to the recovery of his unpaid salaries and academic allowances based on the computations supported by his previous pay slips in Exhibit Gbande 39.

16.In response to the Defendant’s arguments on locus standi and the non-exhaustion of internal remedies as raised in its issues three and four, Counsel submitted that this Court had already heard and dismissed those preliminary objections in a ruling delivered on July 23, 2024. Counsel argued that since the Defendant did not appeal against that ruling, it is bound by the doctrine of issue estoppel and cannot re-raise the same issues at this final address stage, relying on the case of Ebba v. Ogodo [2000] 10 NWLR (Pt. 675) 387 for this proposition. Counsel therefore urged the Court to strike out those issues and grant all the reliefs sought by the Claimant.

DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSIONS

17.Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Nuhu Egya, Esq., submitted that the Claimant's action is unmeritorious, premature, founded on illegality, and should be dismissed in its entirety.

On Issue 1: Whether the Defendant has the authority to correct an irregularity in an appointment once it is discovered.

18.Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Nuhu Egya, Esq, submitted that the Defendant possesses the full legal authority and indeed has a binding duty to correct any administrative or statutory irregularity in an employment contract once it is discovered. Counsel argued that the Claimant's employment is governed by the Regulations Governing the Conditions of Service of Nasarawa State University, Keffi, 2005, and the Public Service Rules, 2009. Counsel contended that the Claimant's initial contract appointment was erroneously and illegally converted to a tenure appointment when the Claimant was already over fifty years of age, which directly violated both the Public Service Rules and the University’s internal regulations. Counsel argued that this illegality was discovered during an appraisal by the Nasarawa State Government Repositioning Committee, and the Defendant was duty-bound to correct the anomaly. Counsel submitted that any authority with the power to appoint also has the inherent power to review such appointments to ensure compliance with the law. In the reply on point of law, Counsel further submitted that any administrative act done in violation of a statute is null, void, and of no legal effect, and the mere passage of time cannot validate a void appointment. Counsel relied on the cases of Olaniyan v. University of Lagos [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599 and University of Abuja v. Ologe [1996] 4 NWLR (Pt. 445) 706 for the proposition that a statutory institution must act strictly within its enabling law, and any appointment made in contravention of its governing statutes is void ab initio.

On Issue 2: Whether the reversal of the employment of the claimant to contract appointment breach the claimant’s contract of employment.

19.Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Nuhu Egya, Esq., submitted that reverting the Claimant's employment from tenure to contract did not breach his contract of employment because the tenure appointment itself was an illegality that could not create enforceable rights. Counsel relied on the cases of Umera v. N.R.C. [2022] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1839) 355-361 and U.B.N Ltd. v. Ogboh [1995] 2 NWLR (Pt. 380) 647 to argue that a contract of employment is the foundation of any claim for wrongful termination, and where an employment is governed by statute, the statutory provisions govern both appointment and termination. Counsel contended that because the Claimant's tenure appointment violated the statutory age limits, the conversion to contract was a lawful administrative correction to align the employment with the law. In the reply on point of law, Counsel argued that the appointment letter is merely derivative and cannot override the statutory framework of the Public Service Rules, which have statutory flavor and bind both parties. Counsel submitted that equity cannot be used to override clear statutory provisions, and relied on the cases of Adesanya v. Otuewu [1993] 1 NWLR (Pt. 270) 414 and A.G. Rivers State v. A.G. Akwa Ibom State [2011] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1248) 31 for the proposition that a party cannot benefit from an illegality under the maxims ex turpi causa non oritur actio and nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam conditionem facere potest. Counsel argued that when the Defendant sought to regularize the Claimant's status by offering him a contract appointment in line with the law, the Claimant recalcitrantly refused while his colleagues accepted the correction. Counsel relied on the cases of Ajide v. Kelani [1985] 3 NWLR (Pt. 12) 24 and Eneke v. IMB (Nig) Ltd [2006] 19 NWLR (Pt. 1013) 146 for the proposition that equity will not aid a party who is in breach of a lawful obligation or who rejects a lawful corrective administrative action.

On Issue 3: Whether the claimant have locus standi to institute the action before this court having fail to exhaust internal dispute resolution mechanisms before filing this suit.

20.Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Nuhu Egya, Esq., submitted that the Claimant lacks the locus standi to commence this suit because he failed to exhaust the internal dispute resolution mechanisms provided under the University's Conditions of Service before filing the action. Counsel argued that Section 6(6) of the Regulations Governing the Condition of Service of Senior Staff, 2005, expressly prohibits any staff member from resorting to court action without first exhausting the internal avenues for settling disputes or grievances in the University. Counsel relied on the case of Friday v. Gov., Ondo State [2022] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1857) 617-618 to argue that locus standi is a threshold issue of competence that must be disclosed on the face of the originating processes and statement of claim. Counsel submitted that because the Claimant failed to comply with Section 6(6) as well as Sections 5 sub 4 and 6(5) sub 4 of the Regulations, he had no competence to institute the action.

On Issue 4: Whether the Claimant’s failure to exhaust internal dispute resolution mechanisms robs this Court of jurisdiction.

21.Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Nuhu Egya, Esq., submitted that the Claimant's failure to exhaust the mandatory internal dispute resolution procedures deprives this Court of the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Counsel relied on the case of Obiuweubi v. CBN [2011] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 465 to argue that the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental to adjudication, and where a court lacks jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are a nullity. Counsel cited the cases of Isah v. INEC [2016] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1554) 125 and Okwiate v. Awosanya [2000] 2 NWLR (Pt. 646) 530 for the proposition that courts are creatures of statute and their jurisdiction is strictly circumscribed by the laws creating them. To further illustrate the strict constitutional limits of judicial power, Counsel relied on Okereke v. Yar'Adua [2008] LPELR-24467, Utih v. Onoyirwe [1991] 1 NWLR (Pt. 166) 255, Obi v. INEC [2009] 5 EPR 370, Audu v. APC [2019] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1702) 379, Dangana v. Usman [2013] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1349) 50, Etim v. Obot [2010] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1207) 108, Iheabe v. Zakari [2012] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1316) 517, Mobil Producing Nig. Ltd v. Lasepa [2002] 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 1, Ndayako v. Dantoro [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 181, and Ugba v. Susuan [2014] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1427) 264. Counsel submitted that a court cannot expand its jurisdiction or assume it in the interest of justice. Counsel relied on the case of Eti-Osa Local Government v. Jegede [2007] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 537 for the proposition that where there is non-compliance with a statutory condition precedent for setting a legal process in motion, any suit instituted in contravention of that law is incompetent and the court lacks jurisdiction to hear it.

On Issue 5: Whether the Claimant has proved entitlement to any of the reliefs sought.

22.Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Nuhu Egya, Esq., submitted that the Claimant has failed to discharge the burden of proof placed on him by Sections 131 to 134 of the Evidence Act. Counsel argued that promotion in the public service is not an automatic right but a privilege that must be earned, relying on the case of University of Ilorin v. Rasheedat Adesina [2010] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1199) 331. Counsel contended that as a contract staff under the Defendant's regulations, the Claimant is not eligible for promotion to the rank of Professor. On the claim for unpaid salaries, Counsel argued that because the Claimant refused to accept the converted contract appointment, he cannot claim salary for a period where he did not perform work under a valid contract, relying on the cases of U.B.N v. Soares [2012] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1312) 550 ; Olatunbosun v. NISER Council [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 25. Counsel further submitted that the Claimant's claims seek to compel the Defendant to retain and promote him, which is legally impermissible as courts will not impose an employee on an unwilling employer, citing the cases of Shitta-Bey v. F.P.S.C. [1981] 1 SC 40 and Oloruntoba-Oju v. Abdul-Raheem [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 83.

23.Counsel contended that since the Claimant seeks declaratory reliefs, he must establish his entitlement on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence, relying on Friday v. Gov., Ondo State [2022] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1857) 612-613, West African Offshore Ltd v. Mr. Christopher Ariri & Ors [2015] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1490) 177, and Umera v. N.R.C. (supra). Counsel cited Okoye v. Nwankwo [2014] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1429) 93, Ogunjomu v. Ademolu [1995] 4 NWLR (Pt. 389) 254, Ezeokonkwo v. Okeke [2002] 11 NWLR (Pt. 777) 1, Nwokudu v. Okanu [2010] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1181) 362, and Chukwuma v. Shell Petroleum (Nig.) Ltd. [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512 for the proposition that declaratory reliefs are only granted upon positive proof by evidence and never upon mere admissions. In the reply on point of law, Counsel further submitted that salary is an incident of a valid contract, and where the contract is void ab initio, no legal obligation to pay salary arises, relying on the case of Spring Bank Plc v. Babatunde [2012] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1292) 83. Counsel therefore urged the Court to refuse all monetary, general, and interest claims and dismiss the suit in its entirety.

COURT’S DECISION

24.Having meticulously considered the pleadings, the comprehensive evidence adduced, the exhibits tendered, and the detailed submissions of learned counsel on both sides, and drawing upon the legal frameworks proposed by each party, this Court distils the following four pivotal issues as determinative and sufficient to dispose of the entirety of this suit:

(i) Whether the Defendant’s preliminary objection, predicated on the alleged non-exhaustion of internal dispute-resolution mechanisms, effectively divests this Court of its constitutionally conferred jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit.

(ii) Whether the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant is one imbued with statutory flavour, and, if so, whether the purported unilateral conversion of that employment from a tenure appointment to a contract appointment by the Defendant’s memorandum of 22nd June, 2023 (Exhibit Gbande 14) was lawful, valid, and enforceable.

(iii) Whether the Defendant’s persistent refusal to release the Claimant’s promotion to the substantive rank of Professor and the deliberate withholding of his salaries and allowances from July 2023 to January 2024 were lawful, justifiable, or constituted a breach of his employment contract and an unfair labour practice.

(iv) What reliefs, if any, is the Claimant legally and equitably entitled to receive from this Honourable Court?

25.The subject-matter of this suit falls squarely and exclusively within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. By virtue of the express provisions of section 254C(1)(a), (f), (h) and (k) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act, 2010), and further reinforced by section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, this Court is unequivocally invested with exclusive jurisdiction over all civil causes and matters relating to or connected with labour, employment, conditions of service, unfair labour practices, and the application and interpretation of international best practices in labour. The Supreme Court, speaking through Nweze, J.S.C., in the landmark case of Skye Bank Plc v. Iwu [2017] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1590) 24, has definitively confirmed the expansive amplitude and unassailable nature of this Court’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, given that the Defendant is a State University established by statute, the Claimant’s employment is, as a matter of law, properly to be regarded as one with statutory flavour, a critical aspect of which will be elaborated upon below.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE

26.The Defendant vigorously urges this Court to hold that the Claimant lacks the requisite locus standi to institute this suit, and that this Court is consequently deprived of jurisdiction, on the premise that the Claimant allegedly failed to exhaust the internal grievance mechanism prescribed by section 6(6) of the Defendant’s Regulations Governing the Conditions of Service of Senior Staff, 2005. In support of this contention, the Defendant relies, inter alia, on the authorities of Friday v. Governor of Ondo State [2022] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1857) 617; Obiuweubi v. C.B.N. [2011] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 465; and Eti-Osa Local Government v. Jegege [2007] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 537.

27.With the utmost respect to learned counsel for the Defendant, this preliminary objection is fundamentally misconceived and unsustainable for several compelling reasons.

28.First, the documentary exhibits tendered before this Court speak volumes and are self-evident. The record unequivocally demonstrates that between November 2020 and January 2024, the Claimant initiated and pursued no fewer than a dozen internal memoranda and communications addressed to the Registrar and the Vice-Chancellor of the University (see Exhibits Gbande 5, 8, 9, 10, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 37 and 38, inter alia). Each of these earnest attempts at internal resolution was either met with an unsatisfactory response or, more often, was simply ignored by the Defendant, ultimately culminating in the definitive and unequivocal rejection of the Claimant’s grievances as embodied in Exhibits Gbande 14 (dated 22nd June, 2023) and Gbande 28 (dated 11th March, 2024). Following these rejections, the Claimant was compelled to cause a solicitor’s letter (Exhibit Gbande 34, dated 31st January, 2024) to be issued, to which the Defendant responded with Exhibit Gbande 28. On any fair, objective, and dispassionate view of the entire record, it is abundantly clear that the Claimant did far more than merely knock at the door of the University’s internal machinery; he diligently and persistently pounded upon it for the better part of four years, exhausting every conceivable internal avenue. It is therefore disingenuous, vexatious, and an abuse of process for the Defendant now to belatedly complain of non-exhaustion of internal remedies.

29.Secondly, and more fundamentally, an internal grievance clause embedded within an employer’s regulations does not, and cannot, operate to oust or diminish the constitutional jurisdiction expressly conferred upon this Court by section 254C(1) of the Constitution (as altered). It is a well-settled principle of law that while internal or domestic machinery clauses are encouraged as a prudent first port of call for dispute resolution, they do not, under any circumstances, constitute an absolute or insurmountable bar to the constitutional right of access to Court. This is particularly true where, as in the present case, the internal avenues have been demonstrably shown to be ineffectual, futile, or have been fully exhausted by the aggrieved party: Eguamwense v. Amaghizemwen [1993] 9 NWLR (Pt. 315) 1; NEPA v. Ango [2001] 15 NWLR (Pt. 737) 627; University of Ilorin v. Idowu Oluwadare [2006] LPELR-5590 (CA). The Court of Appeal has, on numerous occasions, emphatically held that a right of recourse to Court, being a fundamental constitutional right, is not to be lightly held extinguished or curtailed by a mere private-law clause contained in a staff manual or internal regulations. As eloquently stated by the Court of Appeal in Eguamwense v. Amaghizemwen [1993] 9 NWLR (Pt. 315) 1:

“The right of recourse to court is a constitutional right which cannot be taken away or restricted by any private arrangement or by a clause in a staff manual, save to the limited extent to which the aggrieved person is required first to exhaust the domestic machinery. Once he has genuinely sought internal redress and has been rebuffed, his right of resort to the courts becomes complete and unassailable.”

30.Thirdly, it is a matter of record that an interlocutory application challenging this Court’s jurisdiction on the very same ground now re-agitated in the Defendant’s Final Written Address was previously heard, fully considered, and definitively refused at an earlier stage of these proceedings. Where a specific interlocutory point has been ruled upon by a court properly seised of the substantive matter, the losing party is legally precluded from, at the address stage, seeking to re-litigate the identical point under a different guise. Such an attempt would offend the sacrosanct principle of finality of interlocutory decisions and the doctrine of functus officio as it applies at the trial-court level: Onwuchekwa v. NDIC [2002] 5 NWLR (Pt. 760) 371; Ukachukwu v. Uba [2005] 18 NWLR (Pt. 956) 1; Alhaji Dahiru Saude v. Alhaji Halliru Abdullahi 1989] 4 NWLR (Pt. 116) 387. For these cumulative and compelling reasons, Issue One is accordingly resolved in favour of the Claimant. This Court is properly and lawfully seised of jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO

32.The Defendant is a State University, a public institution established by the Nasarawa State University Law (Exhibit Gbande 1). Its senior academic staff, including the Claimant, are governed by the comprehensive Regulations Governing the Conditions of Service of Nasarawa State University, Keffi, 2005 (Exhibit Gbande 20A). It is a fundamental and well-established principle of Nigerian labour law that where the conditions of service of an employee are prescribed by, or by regulations made pursuant to, a statute, the employment automatically attracts statutory flavour. Such an employment cannot, under any circumstances, be determined or varied otherwise than in strict accordance with the prescribed statutory procedure. Any purported deviation from this procedure renders the action null and void ab initio. This principle is settled beyond peradventure: Olaniyan v. University of Lagos [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599; Shitta-Bey v. Federal Public Service Commission [1981] 1 SC 40; Bamgboye v. University of Ilorin [1999] 10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 290; Oloruntoba-Oju v. Abdul-Raheem [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 83; Iderima v. Rivers State Civil Service Commission [2005] 16 NWLR (Pt. 951) 378. As authoritatively pronounced by Eso, J.S.C., in Olaniyan v. University of Lagos [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599:

“Where an employment is governed by statute or has a statutory flavour, the employer must strictly comply with the procedure prescribed for termination or discipline. Any purported termination or variation of the employment in violation of such procedure is null and void.”

33.It therefore follows, as a matter of inescapable legal consequence, that Exhibit Gbande 20A, being the University’s own statutory Regulations, provides the sole and mandatory substantive and procedural yardstick against which any purported variation or alteration of the Claimant’s terms of employment is to be measured. This I so find and hold.

34.The Defendant’s primary justification for unilaterally reverting the Claimant’s appointment to a contract status, as explicitly stated in Exhibit Gbande 14 and reiterated in Exhibit Gbande 28, rests entirely on the singular proposition that the Claimant, having been over fifty years of age at the date of his tenure appointment in 2011, ought never to have been so appointed under “the Public Service Rules and the extant regulations,” and that the University was therefore under a purported duty to correct this alleged “irregularity.”

35.This central proposition, forming the bedrock of the Defendant’s defence, was decisively given its coup de grâce by the Defendant’s own witnesses under rigorous cross-examination. Both DW1 and DW2 individually and unequivocally admitted — in categorical and unambiguous terms — the following critical facts: (i) that the Public Service Rules (which stipulate a fifty-year cap for eligibility) do not, and have never, applied to the Defendant University; (ii) that the University’s own Regulations (Exhibit Gbande 20A) expressly stipulate an age limit of fifty-five (55) years for tenure appointment, save in respect of professorial cadres for whom the limit is sixty (60) years; and (iii) that DW2’s letter (Exhibit Gbande 28) had erroneously asserted the wrong age limit against the Claimant. Indeed, Section 2(2) of Exhibit Gbande 20A itself makes clear provision for tenure appointment of persons “not below the age of 18 years or above the age of 55 or 60 years for the professor and other Cadres respectively.”

36.These admissions, made by the Defendant’s own witnesses under oath, are of the highest evidentiary value and are legally binding. By section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011, facts admitted need no further proof; and the Supreme Court has consistently held that admissions against interest, made by a party’s own witness under oath, constitute the best and most conclusive evidence a Court can have: Ibrahim v. Usman [2023] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1911) 515; Cardoso v. Daniel [1986] 2 NWLR (Pt. 20) 1; Egbunike v. A.C.B. [1995] 2 NWLR (Pt. 375) 34; Seismograph Service (Nig.) Ltd v. Ogbeni [1976] 4 SC 85. The uncontroverted and admitted evidence before this Court is that the Claimant was fifty-five (55) years of age at the date of his 2011 tenure appointment. This age fell squarely and perfectly within the outer limit expressly contemplated and permitted by the Defendant’s own Regulations. There was, in short, absolutely no irregularity whatsoever for the Defendant to “correct” in 2023. The premise for the Defendant’s action was factually false and legally baseless.

37.Learned counsel for the Defendant further urges this Court to consider the settled principle that a body which possesses the power to appoint also inherently possesses the power to review its appointment, and cites the ex debito justitiae duty of a public body to correct its own errors. While that principle is unassailable in the abstract and in appropriate circumstances, it is here fundamentally misapplied. The principle presupposes the existence of an antecedent, genuine error: Wilson v. Attorney-General of Bendel State [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 572. Where, as has been conclusively established in this case, the appointment was made in strict and full conformity with the University’s own Regulations, there was no error, irregularity, or defect to correct. The invocation of the doctrine of self-correction in such circumstances becomes a mere pretext, a smokescreen for an unlawful act.

38.More importantly, even assuming, arguendo, that a power of correction genuinely existed, its exercise must, as a matter of constitutional imperative, be procedurally fair, strictly guided by the fundamental audi alteram partem rule (the right to be heard), and subject to the mandatory requirements of section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered). Any purported correction without affording the affected party a fair hearing is a nullity: Garba v. University of Maiduguri [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550; Federal Civil Service Commission v. Laoye [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 106) 652; Adigun v. Attorney-General of Oyo State [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 53) 678. There is absolutely no evidence on the record, nor was any adduced, to suggest that the Claimant was afforded any form of hearing or opportunity to make representations before the University’s Council took the unilateral decision embodied in Exhibit Gbande 14. This egregious failure to observe the principles of natural justice and constitutional due process alone would vitiate and render null and void the purported correction, wholly apart from the underlying factual falsity and legal baselessness of the age argument.

39.The Defendant’s reliance on the recommendation of the “Repositioning Committee (2018)” and its subsequent adoption by Council on 9th–10th December, 2021, adds absolutely nothing of legal substance or merit to its case. A committee report, however well-intentioned or diligently prepared, cannot, under any legal principle, displace or override the express, mandatory provisions of a public university’s statutory regulations. Nor can such a report validate an otherwise invalid, unlawful, or unconstitutional administrative act. The fundamental principle that no authority, however high, may act outside the law (ultra vires) is, on the clear and compelling evidence of this record, one that operates decisively against the Defendant, and certainly not in its favour.

40.Independent of the statutory-flavour analysis, elementary principles of contract law unequivocally forbid the unilateral variation of a concluded bargain or contract of employment. Any attempt to alter the terms of a contract without the express consent of both parties is a fundamental breach and of no legal effect: Unity Bank Plc v. Olatunji [2015] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1452) 203 at 243F–H; U.B.A. Plc v. Vertex Agric. Ltd [2020] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1754) 467; Best (Nig.) Ltd v. Blackwood Hodge (Nig.) Ltd [2011] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1239) 95. The Claimant expressly and unequivocally signified his non-acceptance of the purported conversion of his tenure appointment (as evidenced by Exhibits Gbande 21 and 22). The Defendant’s attempt to impose this unilateral variation upon him was accordingly a fundamental breach of contract and entirely devoid of legal effect.

41.Beyond the rigorous doctrinal analysis of statutory flavour and contract law, the Defendant’s cumulative conduct in this matter — unilaterally downgrading a senior academic’s tenure appointment fourteen years after it had been regularly and lawfully made, on a demonstrably false factual premise, without affording him any hearing or due process, and simultaneously withholding his legitimate salaries as an instrument of pressure and coercion — answers the precise description of an unfair labour practice within the meaning and contemplation of section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution (as altered). This Court is empowered and enjoined to address such practices: Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Mrs. Olawunmi Oyebola [2020] LPELR-51806 (CA); Aloysius v. Diamond Bank Plc [2015] 58 NLLR (Pt. 199) 92; Bello Ibrahim v. Ecobank Plc (Unreported, Suit No. NICN/ABJ/144/2018, judgment delivered 17th December, 2019, per Sanusi Kado, J.

42.For all the foregoing comprehensive and compelling reasons, this Court finds and holds on Issue Two that the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant was, at all material times, one with statutory flavour; that his tenure appointment made in 2011 was in full conformity with the Defendant’s own Regulations; that the purported unilateral conversion of that tenure appointment to a contract appointment by Exhibit Gbande 14 was both procedurally and substantively flawed, wholly unsupported by the Defendant’s own witnesses under cross-examination, constituted a fundamental breach of the elementary rule against unilateral variation of contract, and amounted to an unfair labour practice within the meaning of section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution (as altered). Issue Two is accordingly resolved decisively in favour of the Claimant.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE THREE

43.DW1, a witness for the Defendant, admitted, in terms which cannot be gainsaid or retracted, that the Claimant was formally processed, assessed, and found eligible for promotion to the substantive rank of full Professor in 2019. DW1 further admitted that the release of this promotion was subsequently withheld solely on the purported ground of age. That ground has, as this Court has already conclusively found and held, entirely collapsed under the weight of the evidence and the admissions of the Defendant’s own witnesses. It therefore follows, as an inescapable legal conclusion, that the sole basis upon which the Defendant refused to release the Claimant’s duly earned promotion was legally untenable, wrongful, and unjustifiable.

44.It is a settled and prudential principle governing this Court’s jurisdiction that this Court will not, save in the most exceptional and rare circumstances, itself confer a professorial title upon a candidate whom the appointing institution has not itself elevated. This is because promotion within the academy inherently involves complex questions of scholarly assessment, peer review, and institutional discretion, areas which a Court of law is neither structured nor equipped to displace or substitute its judgment for: Oloruntoba-Oju v. Abdul-Raheem [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 83; University of Ilorin v. Rasheedat Adesina [2010] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1199) 331; N.N.P.C. v. Ayoola [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1341) 315.

45.It is, moreover, common ground between the parties that the Claimant, having reached the statutory retirement age of seventy (70) years, has since retired from the active service of the Defendant. This Court cannot, therefore, issue an order compelling any physical promotion to an active post from which the Claimant has already exited by effluxion of time. What the Court can, and indeed ought to, do in these peculiar circumstances is: (i) to declare unequivocally that the Claimant was legally and justly entitled to have been promoted to the substantive rank of Professor with effect from 1st October, 2019, when he was duly processed, assessed, and found fit for that rank; and (ii) to direct that the Claimant’s post-retirement entitlements — including pension, gratuity, and any consolidated retirement benefits payable under the Defendant’s Regulations and the applicable pensions legislation — be re-computed and paid on the basis of the salary and status of a retired full Professor of the University, with the professorial rank deemed effective from 1st October, 2019. This regularisation of records and entitlements, coupled with appropriate damages, represents the most appropriate, just, and substantive remedy in the peculiar circumstances of this case, and is entirely consonant with the modern, expansive approach to remedies articulated by the Supreme Court in Skye Bank Plc v. Adegun [2024] LPELR-62219 (SC), and by the Court of Appeal in Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Oyebola (supra), which emphasize that the remedies available in modern labour adjudication are not to be hidebound by the old notice-period rule but should genuinely repair the consequential loss and injury suffered by the innocent party.

46.The Defendant admittedly ceased paying the Claimant’s legitimate salaries and allowances from July 2023, and failed to pay them up to the date of his forced exit from active service in January 2024. The Defendant not only admits this stoppage but candidly explained that this cessation of payment was deliberately designed to coerce the Claimant into accepting the unlawful reversion of his appointment. It is an unassailable principle of employment law that where an employer unlawfully withholds an employee’s salary while the employee remains in service and is ready, willing, and able to render that service, such withholding is inherently unlawful and constitutes a fundamental breach of contract. Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Exhibit Gbande 20A (the University’s own Regulations) expressly prescribe the payment of salaries and allowances, and these mandatory provisions cannot be unilaterally suspended or abrogated at the arbitrary will of the employer: Miss Ebere Ukoji v. Standard Alliance Life Assurance Co. Ltd [2014] 47 NLLR (Pt. 154) 531 (NICN, Kanyip J.); Aloysius v. Diamond Bank Plc (supra).

47.The Defendant’s attempt to justify this unlawful stoppage by reference to the “no work, no pay” principle, and by reliance on Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Soares [2012] LPELR-8018 (CA), is entirely misplaced and misconceived. The overwhelming evidence — which was accepted by this Court, and indeed not seriously contested by the Defendant — is that the Claimant continued to render academic service diligently and faithfully until he was formally and unlawfully stopped from doing so on 18th–19th January, 2024 (Exhibits Gbande 3 and 4). The doctrine of “no work, no pay” applies exclusively where an employee has, in fact, not worked or has refused to work; it has absolutely no application where the employer has unilaterally, unlawfully, and coercively refused to pay a working employee who is ready, willing, and able to perform his duties.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE FOUR (RELIEFS)

48.(a) The first, fourth, fifth and tenth reliefs sought in paragraph 55 of the Statement of Facts are declaratory in nature. While it is acknowledged that declarations are not granted as a matter of course and a claimant must succeed on the strength of his own case (Bello v. Eweka [1981] 1 SC 101; Dumez (Nig.) Ltd v. Nwakhoba [2008] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 361; Adamu v. Nigerian Air Force [2022] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1822) 159; also reported as LPELR-56587 (SC)), this Court finds that the Claimant has, on the totality of the admissible and compelling evidence, including the crucial admissions of the Defendant’s own witnesses, overwhelmingly made out a strong and unassailable case for each of the said declarations. Reliefs (i), (iv), (v) and (x) are, accordingly, granted as prayed.

49.(b) Rectification of records — relief (iii). Flowing from this, a consequential order, properly made under the expansive powers conferred by section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution (as altered), is hereby issued, directing the Defendant to forthwith rectify its official records to accurately reflect that, throughout the entire period from 16th August, 2011 (the date of Exhibit Gbande 26) until the Claimant’s statutory retirement, his appointment with the Defendant was unequivocally a tenure appointment and not a contract appointment. The Claimant having retired, this is a records-rectification order, backward-looking in its effect, and is not an order for active re-engagement. It represents the minimum, essential step required to restore the parties, so far as the passage of time now permits, to the status quo ante and to correct the unlawful alteration of the Claimant’s employment status.

50.(c) Compelled promotion and back-professorial salary — reliefs (vi), (vii) and (viii). For the comprehensive reasons already articulated in the resolution of Issue Three, this Court declines to make any order compelling the Defendant to formally promote the Claimant to Professor or to issue him a letter of promotion. He has retired from active service, and no such active, forward-looking order can now sensibly or practically be made. In lieu of those specific reliefs, however, and in full vindication of the Claimant’s established and undeniable right to have been promoted with effect from 1st October, 2019, this Court will: (i) declare that entitlement; and (ii) direct the comprehensive pension and gratuity recomputation, along with appropriate damages, as set out in sub-paragraph (b) of the Resolution of Issue Three above and further detailed in the Orders below. Reliefs (vi), (vii) and (viii) are, on that footing, expressly refused, their substantive content and underlying economic harm being fully and adequately absorbed by the declaratory and executory orders now made, particularly the recomputation of retirement benefits and the award of general damages for the non-economic components of the wrong.

51.(d) Salaries and allowances — relief (xi). The Claimant claims the sum of ?3,200,000.00 (Three Million, Two Hundred Thousand Naira) as unpaid salaries and allowances from July 2023 to January 2024. This claim is firmly grounded in his sworn testimony at paragraphs 47 to 52 of his witness statement, which is further corroborated by Exhibit Gbande 29 (pay slips for March to June 2023). The Defendant’s own admission of the stoppage, coupled with this Court’s finding that the Claimant continued in active service until 18th–19th January, 2024, conclusively disposes of this point. Relief (xi) is therefore granted in full.

52.(e) Earned Academic Allowance — relief (xii). The claim for ?4,800,000.00 (Four Million, Eight Hundred Thousand Naira) as arrears of Earned Academic Allowance due and unpaid up to February 2023 is in the nature of special damages, and as such, requires strict proof: Dumez v. Nwakhoba (supra); Odulaja v. Haddad [1973] 11 SC 357; Oshinjinrin v. Elias [1970] 1 All NLR 153. The Claimant has led credible and unchallenged evidence of this entitlement in his witness statement. Crucially, the Defendant has neither denied the existence of this entitlement nor disputed the specific figure claimed with any particularity or counter-evidence. In these compelling circumstances, the claim for Earned Academic Allowance is deemed strictly established, and the full amount is accordingly awarded.

53.(f) General damages — reliefs (ii), (ix) and (xiii). This Court reminds itself, at this critical juncture, of the settled and fundamental principle that a claimant is not to be twice compensated for the same wrong or head of damage: SPDC v. Tiebo VII [2005] 9 NWLR (Pt. 931) 439; Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Ajabule [2011] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1278) 152. This Court has, in its resolution of Issue Three above and in Order [4] below, directed that the Claimant’s retirement benefits, pension, and gratuity be comprehensively re-computed and paid on the basis of the salary and status of a retired full Professor with effect from 1st October, 2019. That specific order effectively absorbs and addresses the economic component of the Claimant’s claim for the wrongful denial of the professorship, specifically, the differential between his Associate-Professor emoluments and his Professor entitlements from 2019 to retirement, which will now be capitalized into his enhanced pension and gratuity. It therefore follows that any monetary award now made under relief (ix) must be strictly confined to the non-economic component of the wrong — encompassing the profound indignity of the withholding, the severe career-defining injury of being denied a scholarly title conclusively earned, the anxious and prolonged correspondence and administrative hurdles to which the Claimant was unjustly subjected, and the significant emotional distress and psychological trauma consequent upon the unlawful stoppage of his livelihood in the closing years of his distinguished working life.

54.The award of general damages lies squarely within the sound discretion of the Court, a discretion that must be exercised judiciously and on established principles, and which requires no special proof beyond the fact of the wrong itself: Eneh v. Ozor [2016] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1538) 219; Odiba v. Azege [1998] 9 NWLR (Pt. 566) 370; Cameroon Airlines v. Otutuizu [2011] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1238) 512. However, I am of the opinion that such damages must always be reasonable, proportionate, and compensatory, and never extravagant or punitive.

55.Weighing all these critical considerations — and, in particular, meticulously ensuring that the economic core of the promotion-denial wrong is fully and adequately met by the pension and gratuity recomputation ordered under Order [4] below, thereby scrupulously avoiding any double compensation — this Court awards the following sums as general damages:

(i) The sum of ?10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) as general damages for the wrongful and unilateral conversion of the Claimant’s tenure appointment to a contract appointment, in terms of relief (ii).

(ii) The sum of ?10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) as general (and purely non-economic) damages, awarded in lieu of reliefs (vi), (vii) and (viii) and in vindication of relief (ix), for the wrongful, prolonged, and unjustifiable denial of the Claimant’s duly-earned promotion to the substantive rank of Professor. This figure carefully recognizes the profound seriousness and impact of the non-economic wrong done to the Claimant’s reputation and dignity, while simultaneously avoiding the double compensation that a substantial further award would produce alongside the comprehensive pension recomputation.

(iii) The sum of ?3,000,000.00 (Three Million Naira) as general damages for the wrongful, unlawful, and coercive withholding of the Claimant’s legitimate salaries and allowances between July 2023 and January 2024, in terms of relief (xiii).

56.(g) Interest. By virtue of Order 47 Rule 7 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, and applying the well-established principles enunciated in Ekwunife v. Wayne (W.A.) Ltd [1989] 5 NWLR (Pt. 122) 422 and Berliet (Nig.) Ltd v. Kachalla [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 420) 478, the Claimant is legally entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate of ten per centum (10%) per annum on the aggregate monetary awards herein made, calculated from the date of delivery of this Judgment until the entire sums are fully and finally liquidated.

57.(h) Costs. The award of costs is a matter squarely within the discretion of the Court, a discretion that must be exercised judiciously and judicially, guided by Order 55 Rules 1 and 4 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017; Rewane v. Okotie-Eboh [1960] SCNLR 461; NNPC v. Clifco (Nig.) Ltd [2011] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1255) 209. Having regard to the protracted internal correspondence and the Claimant’s diligent efforts to resolve the matter internally, the two-year duration of these proceedings, and the undeniable fact that the Defendant’s entire defence ultimately collapsed under the weight of its own witnesses’ admissions during cross-examination, this Court finds it just and equitable to award the Claimant costs, which are hereby assessed at the sum of ?1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira).

58.In conclusion, the Claimant’s suit succeeds substantially and decisively in its principal particulars. The Defendant’s ill-conceived attempt to justify the unlawful reversion of a fourteen-year-old tenure appointment on the footing of an age limit that its own witnesses unequivocally admitted does not exist in its Regulations was, with respect, legally and factually baseless. The deliberate withholding of the Claimant’s legitimate salaries as an instrument of coercion, and the unjustifiable denial of a duly processed promotion on a demonstrably false premise, are the very antithesis of the good conscience, equity, and international best practice that section 254C(1)(f) and (h) of the Constitution (as altered) and section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, expressly enjoin this Court to uphold and enforce.

59.This Court hastens, however, to reiterate that it will not arrogate to itself the functions of a university’s appointing organs. The actual conferral of the professorial title remains a matter peculiarly within the province and discretion of the academic community. Nevertheless, where a candidate has been diligently shepherded through the rigorous assessment process and has been unlawfully denied the rightful reward of that assessment on a legally impermissible ground, and has since retired, the appropriate and practical remedy is the comprehensive regularisation of his post-retirement entitlements at the professorial rate, coupled with a just and moderate award of damages for the non-economic wrong suffered. That is the reasoned, equitable, and legally sound course this Court has adopted, taking meticulous care to avoid any double compensation that would arise if a substantial damages award were made alongside the comprehensive pension recomputation for the same underlying economic wrong.

60.On the whole, for the reasons given above, this court hereby makes the following orders:

1. It is hereby declared that the purported unilateral conversion of the Claimant’s appointment as an academic staff of the Defendant from tenure to contract status, as communicated by the Defendant’s memorandum dated 22nd June, 2023 (Exhibit Gbande 14), was in fundamental breach of the Claimant’s contract of employment, contrary to the express and mandatory provisions of the Regulations Governing the Conditions of Service of Nasarawa State University, Keffi, 2005 (Exhibit Gbande 20A), and constituted an unfair labour practice within the meaning of section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered by the Third Alteration Act, 2010); the same is accordingly declared wrongful, unlawful, null and void, and of no legal effect whatsoever.

2. It is hereby ordered that the Defendant shall forthwith rectify its official records to accurately reflect that, throughout the entire period from 16th August, 2011 (the date of Exhibit Gbande 26) until the date of the Claimant’s statutory retirement, the Claimant’s appointment with the Defendant was explicitly a tenure appointment, and not a contract appointment; and the Defendant shall issue to the Claimant a formal letter confirming that rectification of records.

3. It is hereby declared that, the Claimant having been formally processed, assessed, and found eligible for promotion to the substantive rank of Professor in 2019, the Defendant’s subsequent refusal to release the said promotion, solely on the ground of an age limit that does not, on the Defendant’s own Regulations and as admitted by its witnesses, apply to the Claimant, was in fundamental breach of the Regulations Governing the Conditions of Service of the Defendant and was wrongful, unlawful, unjustifiable, and an unfair labour practice.

4. It is hereby ordered that the Defendant shall re-compute and pay to the Claimant all his retirement benefits, pension, gratuity, and any consolidated retirement entitlements payable under the Regulations Governing the Conditions of Service of the Defendant and the applicable pensions legislation on the basis of the rank, status, and consolidated salary scale of a retired full Professor of the University, with the professorial rank deemed effective from 1st October, 2019; and any resulting differential (over and above what has already been paid to the Claimant on Associate-Professor rates) shall be paid to

the Claimant within the compliance window prescribed in Order [14] below.

5. It is hereby declared that the withholding of the Claimant’s legitimate salaries and allowances by the Defendant from July 2023 up to and including January 2024, notwithstanding the Claimant’s continued rendering of academic service, constituted a fundamental breach of the Claimant’s contract of employment and was wrongful, unlawful, and an unfair labour practice.

6. It is hereby ordered that the Defendant shall pay to the Claimant the sum of ?3,200,000.00 (Three Million, Two Hundred Thousand Naira) being the Claimant’s unpaid salaries and allowances from July 2023 to January 2024.

7. It is hereby ordered that the Defendant shall pay to the Claimant the sum of ?4,800,000.00 (Four Million, Eight Hundred Thousand Naira) being the arrears of the Claimant’s Earned Academic Allowance due and unpaid up to February 2023.

8. It is hereby ordered that the Defendant shall pay to the Claimant the sum of ?10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) as general damages for the wrongful and unilateral conversion of the Claimant’s appointment from tenure to contract.

9. It is hereby ordered that the Defendant shall pay to the Claimant the sum of ?10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) as general damages, strictly confined to the non-economic component of the wrong, for the wrongful, prolonged, and unjustifiable denial of the Claimant’s duly-earned promotion to the substantive rank of Professor. For the avoidance of doubt, this award is made in lieu of, and not in addition to, any back-salary at professorial rate, the economic component of the said wrong having been separately and fully met by the pension and gratuity recomputation directed in Order [4] above.

10. It is hereby ordered that the Defendant shall pay to the Claimant the sum of ?3,000,000.00 (Three Million Naira) as general damages for the wrongful, unlawful, and coercive withholding of the Claimant’s salaries and allowances from July 2023 to January 2024.

11. The Claimant’s prayers for orders (i) compelling the Defendant to promote the Claimant to the substantive rank of Professor with effect from 2019, (ii) directing the Defendant to issue a letter conveying that promotion, and (iii) directing payment of the salaries and allowances of a Professor from 2019 (reliefs (vi), (vii) and (viii) of the Statement of Facts) are, having been fully and adequately addressed by the declaration in Order [3], the comprehensive pension and gratuity recomputation in Order [4], and the specific damages award in Order [9] above, are accordingly hereby REFUSED.

12. It is hereby ordered that the aggregate of the monetary sums awarded together with any differential payable under Order [4] above, shall carry post-judgment interest at the rate of ten per centum (10%) per annum from the date of delivery of this Judgment until the entire sums are fully and finally liquidated.

13. It is hereby ordered that the Defendant shall pay to the Claimant the sum of ?1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) as the costs of this suit.

14. It is hereby ordered that the Defendant shall comply with Order [2] above within thirty (30) days of the delivery of this Judgment; and shall comply with Orders [4], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10] and [13] above within sixty (60) days of the delivery of this Judgment.

62. Judgment is hereby entered accordingly.

………………..

Hon. Justice E. D. Subilim

JUDGE