IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM

DATE: 29^TH JULY, 2026                           

SUIT NO.: NICN/ABJ/314/2024

 

BETWEEN:

OKAFOR CHIDI JUSTIN         -                       -                       CLAIMANT    

AND

1.       NLNG SHIPPING AND MARINE SERVICES LIMITED (NSML)                     

2.       ABDULKADIR AHMED                                                              

3.       HAMBALI YUSUF                                                                                     

4.       HENRY UNUAKPOR                  …                              DEFENDANTS

5.       ABIODUN LALEYE

6.       OLAYIWOLA MUTIU

 

REPRESENTATION:

ELIZABETH AKINNIYI, ESQ., FOR THE CLAIMANT.

B. B. LAWAL, SAN WITH E. B. AIGBE, ESQ., FOR DEFENDANTS.

JUDGMENT

a. A Declaration that the termination of the Claimant’s employment by the Defendants is wrongful, null and void.

b. A Declaration that the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant is still subsisting hence the Claimant remains an employee of the 1st Defendant. 

c. An Order reinstating the Claimant to his due position without any loss of renumeration, promotional benefits and advantages of any kind whatsoever by the 1st Defendant. 

d. An Order that the 1st Defendant shall pay to the Claimant all his unpaid salary and allowances from July 2024 until the Claimant’s contract of employment with the 1st Defendant is lawfully determined. 

e. An Award of the sum of $ 100,000,000 (One Hundred Million US Dollars) only as general damages for the Breach of Standard Employment Provisions, refusal to follow due procedure; Human Rights Violation against the Claimant; and Workman Compensation. 

f. The sum of $1,000,000 (One Million US Dollars) only as punitive damages against the Defendants in favour of the Claimant. 

g. The cost of this action to the tune of $5,000,000 (Five Million US Dollars) only. 

h. Interest rate at 10% per annum on all (sic) the judgment sum from the day judgment was delivered till the day the judgment sum is fully liquidated. 

CLAIMANT’S CASE

DEFENDANT’S CASE

COMMENCEMENT OF HEARING

EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

6. The burden of proof in this civil action is governed by the provisions of Section 131, 132, 133, and 134 of the Evidence Act 2011, establishing that he who asserts a fact must prove it, and the standard of proof required is on a balance of probabilities. In an action for wrongful termination of employment, the burden of proof rests squarely on the Claimant, who must place before this Court his contract of service, demonstrate the terms of the contract, and prove by cogent evidence how the Defendants violated those terms in bringing his employment to an end. Conversely, where the employer asserts a positive defence, such as terminating the employment for cause, specifically for unauthorized absence and insubordination in line with established disciplinary procedures, the burden of introducing evidence shifts to the Defendants to justify that they followed their internal disciplinary guidelines and that their allegations of misconduct are substantiated. This bilateral burden dictates that the Claimant must establish his entitlement to the declarations and substantial damages sought on the strength of his own case, whilst the Defendants must establish the factual and procedural validity of their disciplinary action to defeat the Claimant's assertions. 
7. In seeking to establish his case, the Claimant testified as CW1 and adopted his witness statement on oath deposed to on 2nd September 2024 and his additional witness statement on oath deposed to on 28th October 2025. Through CW1, several documents were conditionally admitted and evaluated by the Court. Annexure 1 consists of the Claimant’s Letter of Employment and subsequent promotion letters, establishing that he was employed in 2014 and promoted to the Head 2 salary band in 2022. Annexure 2 is an invoice for a Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) test, which, while authentic, is merely a receipt of payment for diagnostic services and does not constitute a certified medical report from a qualified clinical psychologist or psychiatrist diagnosing the Claimant with any specific mental health illness. Annexures 3(a) to 3(l) are study leave requests and email communications demonstrating that CW1 repeatedly sought study leave under Article 6.8 of the Conditions of Service. Annexures 4(a) to 4(h) are email exchanges depicting what CW1 describes as the tyranny of the Human Resources Manager, showing tense interactions but lacking evidence of systemic harassment. Annexure 5 is the Letter of Suspension, an administrative step taken during the disciplinary process. Annexures 6(a) to 6(j) are email exchanges concerning the 4th Defendant and the Managing Director's reprimands. Annexure 7 is the Letter of Termination of Employment dated 16th July 2024, which is the act complained of, showing that the employment was terminated for unauthorized absence and insubordination. Annexure 8a-b is Clause 13 of the NSML Conditions of Service, which details the disciplinary procedure and forms the contractual bedrock of both parties' cases. Annexures 9 and 10 are the audio recordings of the MS Teams meetings of the Disciplinary Committee on 4th April and 16th April 2024, respectively, which were admitted along with a Certificate of Compliance marked Annexure 21. Annexure 11a-b consists of receipts of salary invoices for June and July. Annexure 12 is the demand letter written by his counsel to the 1st and 2nd Defendants. Annexure 13 is a letter acknowledging receipt of five million Dollars as professional fees, which is a mere receipt from his own counsel and not backed by transaction records, making it highly speculative. Annexure 14 is the Claimant’s 2023 staff appraisal form, showing positive ratings in several deliverables, which CW1 relies on to dispute his low performance ranking. Annexure 15a-f is email correspondence from 29th March 2024 regarding the NBLD program. Annexure 16 is the Guidelines for Flexible Working, which requires line manager approval for working from alternate locations. Annexure 17a-b is a meeting invite and notification screenshot. Annexure 18 is the Terms of Reference of the 1st Defendant. Annexure 19a-d is mail correspondence with the investigation team of NLNG. Annexure 20 is the acknowledgment of receipt of the demand letter.
8. Under cross-examination, CW1 made several material admissions that significantly affect the strength of his case. First, CW1 testified that "the 4th Defendant had sent a response e-mail... where he sympathized with the Claimant’s challenges on his mental health, and stated that they... would discuss later to determine 'what path work'" which confirms that the 4th Defendant did not simply ignore him but engaged with him on his health challenges. Second, CW1 admitted that in the 4th Defendant's email dated 31st March 2024, the 4th Defendant "had informed him that his request could not be approved at the time, citing the reason that the Claimant’s unit had only two (2) staff (including the Claimant) and as such, there would not be sufficient cover for the unit", which establishes a legitimate operational business reason for refusing the study leave. Third, CW1 admitted that "he did not obtain formal approval prior to working at an alternative location between October 2023 to April 2024", which is a crucial admission that directly supports the Defendants' charge of unauthorized absence. Fourth, CW1 admitted under cross-examination that "mental illness is not a form of illness, and he did not apply for a sick leave", which severely undermines his claim that his absence was due to an officially notified medical condition. Finally, CW1 testified that "the directive to anchor the NBLD leadership training was not sent to him by his superior; it was sent to him by a staff of the NLNG", and confirmed that "he instituted this suit against the Defendants for the wrongful termination of his employment and is separate from the suit he instituted against the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Limited (NLNG)". CW1 also stated that "the 5th Defendant said to get the Claimant an express approval while he works at an alternate location" and that "during the disciplinary hearing, the panel asked the medical report which he volunteered to provide".
9. The Defendants called Mr. Henry Unuakpor, the Human Resources and Crewing Manager of the 1st Defendant, who testified as DW1. DW1 adopted his witness statement on oath deposed to on 20th January 2025. Through DW1, several documents were conditionally admitted as Annexures. Annexure 1 is the photocopy of the Claimant's appraisal assessment result for 2023, which ranks the Claimant as the lowest-performing employee in the unit. Annexure 2 consists of the minutes of the disciplinary hearings held on 4th April, 8th April, 16th April, and 18th April 2024. Annexures 3 and 4 are emails between the Claimant and the 4th Defendant, showing communication on mental health. Annexure 5 is the 3rd Edition of the Terms and Conditions of Service for Shore Based Staff, January 2023, which is the primary contract governing the employment. Annexure 6 is the 4th Defendant's email of 3rd April 2024, stating that study leave is for academic pursuit and not a remedy for mental health issues. Annexure 7 is the email of 31st March 2024 detailing why study leave could not be approved. Annexure 8 is the email of 2nd October 2023, showing that the 5th Defendant advised the Claimant to utilize the EAP and seek medical support. Annexure 9 is the Claimant's disciplinary hearing report and Annexure 10 is the addendum to the report. Annexure 11 is an email from Okung John on 21st February 2024, and Annexure 12 is the 2nd Defendant's confirmation of the Claimant as the NBLD focal. Annexure 13 is the 2nd Defendant's reprimand of the Claimant for declining the nomination to a third party before discussing it with his departmental manager. Annexure 14 is the email nominating the Claimant. Annexure 15 is the email of 16th February 2024 regarding the leadership retreat. Annexure 16 is the email of 18th December 2023 regarding absence from a departmental meeting. Annexure 17 is the suspension letter. Annexure 18 is the 4th Defendant's email of 12th January 2024, notifying the Claimant that he has been away without approval and requesting his resumption. Annexure 19 is the Claimant's email of 15th January 2024, stating he cannot resume. Annexure 20 is the query of 19th March 2024 for unauthorized absence and insubordination. Annexure 21 is the Claimant's reply to the query. Annexure 22 is the Terms of Reference of the disciplinary committee. Annexure 23 is the minutes of the disciplinary hearing held on 15th April 2024.
10. Under cross-examination, DW1 made a critical admission when he testified that "the Claimant asked for leaves both study and annual leaves through e-mail, that he was in receipt of these mails during the period when he stated that the Claimant was absent from office, and that the Claimant was in communication with the 1st Defendant still". This admission establishes that although the Claimant was physically absent, there was active communication regarding his requests. DW1 also testified that "his awareness of the Claimant being muted or not during the disciplinary hearing is based on what he heard which was that he was muted and he believes it is contained in the minute of meeting of the disciplinary hearing report he had tendered", which acknowledges that technical issues occurred during the virtual disciplinary hearing. Furthermore, DW1 testified that "Annexure 18 of the Defendants’ evidence was the notification/warning given to the Claimant", and that "upon the Claimant’s contention of mental health challenges, he (DW1) suggested that he uses the service of the employee assistance program", showing that the company did offer some support resources. DW1 also maintained that "the Claimant was given a query for his unauthorized absence from work in line with the conditions of service" and that "the outcome of the staff ranking exercise was approved".
11. In confronting the two versions on each material issue, the first major conflict is whether the Claimant's physical absence from work was authorized. CW1 asserts that he was absent due to severe mental health issues and that his requests for study and annual leaves were unjustifiably refused or ignored, while the 5th Defendant verbally approved his working from Canada. DW1 asserts that the Claimant was absent from October 2023 to April 2024 without obtaining any formal approval, which is a flagrant breach of the company's Guidelines for Flexible Working. This conflict must be resolved in favor of the Defendants. Under cross-examination, CW1 admitted that "he did not obtain formal approval prior to working at an alternative location between October 2023 to April 2024". While the Claimant points to verbal assurances from the 5th Defendant, the Guidelines for Flexible Working (Annexure 16) require a formal written approval process. The Claimant's unilateral decision to remain in Canada and work remotely without a formal written permit constitutes unauthorized absence. Although DW1 admitted under cross-examination that the Claimant was actively communicating and requesting leaves, the mere application for leave or study leave does not equal approval. An employee cannot unilaterally proceed on leave or work from an alternate country simply because they have applied for it or because they are undergoing health challenges. The operational needs of the unit, which DW1 stated was severely understaffed with only two employees, constituted a reasonable basis for the refusal of the study leave, as confirmed by CW1's admission regarding the content of the 4th Defendant's email of 31st March 2024. Therefore, the conflict is resolved in favor of the Defendants: the Claimant's physical absence from work without formal approval was unauthorized.
12. The second material conflict is whether the Claimant's refusal to participate in the NBLD Program was an act of insubordination. CW1 asserts that his declining of the nomination was not insubordinate because the invitation came from a staff of the NLNG (a separate entity) and not directly from his line manager, and because he was already facing severe mental health challenges. DW1 asserts that the Claimant bypassed his departmental manager and communicated his refusal directly to a third party (NLNG), which constitutes insubordination and a breach of corporate communication protocols. Under cross-examination, CW1 admitted that "the directive to anchor the NBLD leadership training was not sent to him by his superior; it was sent to him by a staff of the NLNG". However, the email from the 2nd Defendant (Defendants' Annexure 13) reveals that the 1st Defendant had formally nominated him as the focal point. For the Claimant to reject the nomination directly to a third party without first seeking clearance from his line manager violates established corporate hierarchy. An employee's direct refusal to perform an assigned company role, coupled with bypassing internal reporting channels, is an act of insubordination. The conflict is resolved in favor of the Defendants.
13. The third material conflict is whether the Disciplinary Committee was improperly constituted and whether the Claimant was denied a fair hearing. CW1 asserts that the committee was improperly and maliciously constituted because the secretary, Anthony Kpakol, was of rank NSD/1 and not the contractually mandated rank of NSH/11 under Clause 13 of the Conditions of Service. He further claims he was denied fair hearing because he was muted during the virtual hearing of 16th April 2024 and was prevented from submitting his medical report. DW1 asserts that the committee was a standing committee whose membership matched the Conditions of Service and that the secretary's role was purely administrative. On the issue of the secretary's rank, CW1 failed to introduce any documentary or oral evidence of Anthony Kpakol's actual rank during the trial. Pleadings without evidence go to no issue. Furthermore, CW1 admitted in his additional witness statement that "the ranks and offices of the Defendants match the required members for selection for the panel save the secretary". The core members of the committee met the requirements of Clause 13. Regarding fair hearing and being muted, DW1 admitted under cross-examination that "his awareness of the Claimant being muted or not during the disciplinary hearing is based on what he heard which was that he was muted". This is a significant admission that the Claimant was indeed muted at some point. However, the minutes of the disciplinary hearing (Defendants' Annexure 2) and the Claimant's own pleadings show that he had an extensive opportunity to state his case on 4th April 2024, where he spoke for hours and addressed all charges. While muting an employee during a virtual disciplinary proceeding is administratively clumsy, it does not vitiate the entire hearing where the employee had previously responded in writing to a query and made extensive oral representations. The core of fair hearing is the opportunity to be heard, which the Claimant had. The conflict is resolved in favor of the Defendants, as the disciplinary process was conducted in substantial compliance with Clause 13.
14. Regarding the admissibility and probative value of Claimant's Annexures 9 and 10 (the Teams audio recordings), the Defendants contend that these documents have no probative value because they were not played or demonstrated in open court. The Claimant's counsel admits this omission as a regrettable oversight but argues that the documents are linked to the pleadings and accompanied by a Certificate of Compliance (Annexure 21). Satisfying Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 is merely a hurdle for admissibility and does not automatically translate to probative weight. When electronic recordings are dumped on the court without being demonstrated or played in open court, the court cannot rely on them to determine disputed facts. Consequently, this Court attaches no probative value to Annexures 9 and 10. Conversely, the Claimant challenges the Defendants' Annexure 2 (the minutes of the disciplinary hearings) on the ground of potential fabrication or omission of facts. This Court finds that minutes of a meeting are administrative summaries of proceedings and are not required to be verbatim transcripts. Since the Claimant does not deny that the hearings took place and that he participated, the minutes are accepted as a reliable summary of the proceedings and are accorded full probative value.
15. There is a material inconsistency in the Claimant's case regarding the constitution of the disciplinary panel. On one hand, the Claimant argues in his pleadings that the panel was maliciously and specially constituted to target him. On the other hand, in his additional witness statement on oath filed on 28th October 2025, he admits that "the ranks and offices of the Defendants match the required members for selection for the panel save the secretary". This admission completely destroys his claim of a maliciously structured or biased panel, as the core panel composition was in alignment with Clause 13 of the Conditions of Service. Another material gap in the Claimant's case is the absolute lack of expert medical evidence. While the Claimant built his entire defence around severe mental health challenges and workplace toxicity, he failed to tender any psychiatric evaluation or medical report. Claimant's Annexure 2 is merely an invoice for an MMPI-2 test, and under cross-examination, CW1 admitted that "mental illness is not a form of illness, and he did not apply for a sick leave". In the absence of professional medical certification, his claims of mental health incapacity remain self-serving assertions that cannot legally excuse his prolonged absence from work.
16. The Court must engage directly with the Claimant's alternative explanation that his prolonged remote work in Canada was justified by the 5th Defendant's verbal assurance. The Claimant argues that he acted in good faith relying on the HSEQ Manager's promise to obtain formal approval from the Managing Director. This explanation, while sympathetic, fails under corporate governance rules. The Guidelines for Flexible Working (Annexure 16) clearly outline a formal approval process which must be written and approved by the designated authorities. An employee of the Claimant's senior rank (Head of HR & IR) must be held to a high standard of compliance with company procedures. Relying on an informal verbal promise while physically relocating to Canada for six months without a written approval letter is a reckless disregard of contractual obligations. The company cannot be bound by informal, unproven verbal representations that directly contradict its written policies.
17. Based on the foregoing bilateral evaluation of the evidence, this Court makes the following net evidential findings: First, that the Claimant was physically absent from his duties at the 1st Defendant's office from October 2023 to April 2024 without obtaining the formal written approval required under the Guidelines for Flexible Working (Annexure 16), which constitutes an act of unauthorized absence. Second, that the Claimant's refusal to anchor the NBLD program and his direct communication of this refusal to a third party without his manager's permission constitutes an act of insubordination. Third, that the Defendants complied with the disciplinary procedures stipulated in Clause 13 of the Conditions of Service (Annexure 8a-b) by issuing a written notification/query, receiving the Claimant's written defense, and convening a properly constituted standing Disciplinary Committee. Fourth, that the Claimant was afforded a fair hearing during the disciplinary proceedings, having had the opportunity to respond to the query and make extensive oral presentations, and his allegations of bias are unsubstantiated by any credible evidence. Fifth, that the Claimant has failed to establish any expert medical evidence to justify his absence on medical grounds. These established findings of fact will carry forward into the final determination of the reliefs in the judgment.

CLAIMANT'S SUBMISSIONS

 

19. Begin the submissions on that issue immediately after the heading. Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the standard of proof in civil matters is on a balance of probabilities and that the Claimant has discharged the burden placed on him by Section 132 of the Evidence Act, 2011. Counsel argued that while the general rule places the onus of proving wrongful termination on the employee, as established in Angel Spinning & Dyeing Limited v. Ajah (2000) All FWLR (Pt. 23) 1332 and Amodu v. Amode (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 356, the Claimant in this instance has placed before the Court the bedrock of his employment relationship, which is the 1st Defendant's Terms and Conditions of Service for Shore Based Staff, January 2023. Relying on Ukoha & Anor v. Osilama (2016) LPELR-42936(CA), W.N.D.C. v. Abimbola (1966) 2 SCNLR p.21, Nigerian Produce Marketing Board v. Adewunmi (1972) 11 S.C. p.111, and Abalogu v. S.P.D.C. Ltd. (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 837) p.333, Counsel argued that the contract of service is the absolute foundation upon which the Court must determine the respective rights and obligations of the parties. Counsel submitted that under Article 13(a) of the Conditions of Service, the disciplinary procedure mandates a preliminary stage of notification and the issuance of a verbal warning before any formal disciplinary steps can be taken. Counsel argued that the Defendants' reliance on the email of 12th January 2024, marked as Defendants' Annexure 18, as a notification was highly flawed because the said correspondence failed to convey any warning in the manner prescribed by the contract to constitute the first stage of a valid disciplinary procedure. Counsel cited NITEL PLC & Anor v. Akwa (2005) LPELR-5971(CA) to support the argument that an employer must strictly comply with the terms of the employment contract when terminating an employee's services. Counsel further relied on Egharevba v. Osagie (2009) 40 NSCQR 469, Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nig Ltd v. Lawson-Jack (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 454) 249, and Sonny Ekedayen v. Rasheed Olaoluwa & Anor (2022) Suit No. NICN/LA/569/2015 to submit that the Court cannot look outside the written agreement and that any termination carried out in breach of contractual procedures or without a valid and justifiable reason is wrongful.
20. Regarding the admissibility and probative value of the electronic evidence, Counsel submitted that the MS Teams audio recordings of the disciplinary committee meetings held on 4th and 16th April 2024, marked as Claimant's Annexures 9 and 10, are highly relevant and admissible. Counsel conceded that the failure to play the audio recordings in open court during trial was a regrettable oversight on the part of legal counsel, but argued that the inadvertence of counsel must not be allowed to defeat the justice of the Claimant's case, citing Iyalabani Company Limited v. Bank of Baroda (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 389) 20 and Ikenta Best Nigeria Limited v. Attorney General Rivers State (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1084) 612. Counsel argued that these documents were not dumped on the Court because they were explicitly linked to specific paragraphs of the pleadings, such as paragraph 14 of the Statement of Facts and paragraphs 10, 25, and 54 of the Reply to the Statement of Defence, where detailed timestamps of the recordings were set out. Counsel further submitted that the recordings were accompanied by a certificate of compliance under Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011, which authenticated the secondary electronic evidence. Counsel relied on Hon. Dickson v. Chief Sylva (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1567) 167 and Mr. Effiom George Eden v. Ishie Microfinance Bank Nig Ltd (NICN/CA/29/2016) to argue that satisfying Section 84 of the Evidence Act provides sufficient legal foundation for the Court to admit and ascribe weight to computer-generated documents.
21. Conversely, Counsel objected to the minutes of the disciplinary hearings, marked as Defendants' Annexure 2, urging the Court to reject the document and deny it any probative value on the ground that it was fabricated, false, and a potential forgery. Counsel cited Nwobodo v. Onoh (1984) All NLR 1 at 77, Smart v. State (1974) LPELR-3076(SC), Section 137 of the Evidence Act, 2011, and Miss Christiana Sunday v. Manal Nigeria Limited & 2 Ors (2023) Suit No. NICN/LA/95/2021 to argue that the Court must discountenance fabricated records. Counsel pointed out that a comparison of the minutes with the actual audio recordings revealed material omissions, such as the suppression of the Claimant's testimony that his mental health was exacerbated by the 4th Defendant's actions, and the omission of the 5th Defendant's admission regarding a phone call on 9th October 2023.
22. Counsel further submitted that the disciplinary committee was improperly and maliciously constituted in flagrant breach of Article 13 of the Conditions of Service because the appointed secretary to the panel, Anthony Kpakol, was an NSD/1 rank officer instead of an NSH/11 rank officer as mandated by the regulations. Counsel argued that this structural defect rendered the panel's composition invalid, and that the Conditions of Service must prevail over any conflicting provisions in the 1st Defendant's internal Terms of Reference. Counsel also contended that the Claimant was completely denied a fair hearing during the disciplinary proceedings, arguing that the 3rd Defendant, who chaired the committee, showed actual bias by initially directing the Claimant to produce a medical report from a clinical psychologist but subsequently canceling that resolution and ordering its deletion from the records. Furthermore, Counsel argued that the Claimant was actively muted during the session on 16th April 2024, as evidenced by timestamps 00:09:35 to 00:11:26 of Annexure 10, and was abruptly shut out from defending himself. Counsel cited Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee v. Fawehinmi [1985] NWLR (Pt 7) 300 and Private Etim Idorenyin Anthony v. The Nigerian Army (2025) Suit No. NICN/ABJ/350/2022 to argue that any procedural defect in disciplinary hearings invalidates the entire process. Counsel further relied on Egbuchu v. CMB PLC & Ors (2016) SC.192/2003, Mfa v. Inongha (2014) LPELR-22010(SC), Chime v. Onyia [2009] 2 NWLR (Pt 1124) 18, Adigun v. Attorney-General of Oyo State (1987) Suit No. SC/98/1986, Sifax Nig Ltd v. Phoenix Capital Ltd (2023) LPELR-59979(SC), Ridge v. Baldwin (1964) AC 40, Tamti v. Nigerian Custom Service Board [2009] 7 NWLR (Pt 1141) 636, and Tsokwa Motors (Nig.) Ltd. v. UBA PLC (2008) All FWLR (Pt 403) 1240 to submit that a breach of the fundamental right to a fair hearing renders the entire disciplinary proceedings a complete nullity.
23. On the allegations of unauthorized absence and insubordination, Counsel argued that the grounds for termination were completely pretextual and unjustifiable. Counsel submitted that the Claimant was away in Canada on approved annual leave and had sought outstanding leave days on 14th February 2024. Although the 4th Defendant maliciously ignored this request, the Claimant escalated the matter to the 5th Defendant's deputizing officer, who gave approval for him to prioritize his health. Counsel argued that the Claimant's alternate location work was verbally approved by the 5th Defendant, who promised to secure the 2nd Defendant's formal approval. Regarding the insubordination claim concerning the NBLD program, Counsel submitted that the invitation came from a third party (NLNG) on 21st March 2024, post-dating the query of 19th March 2024, and was never an official directive from his direct managers. Counsel relied on Mr. Akintoye Daniel Oyeyele v. Nile University of Nigeria (2025) NICN/ABJ/377/2023 and Fatoba Olugbenga John v. First Bank of Nigeria Ltd (2025) NICN/IL/04/2019 to argue that terminating an employee's contract under such oppressive circumstances constitutes a gross violation of employment rights and international best practices.
24. Finally, Counsel submitted that the Claimant is entitled to reinstatement, unpaid salaries, and substantial damages. Counsel argued that reinstatement is appropriate because the Claimant gave ten years of exemplary, unblemished service to the 1st Defendant, and the termination was a premeditated act of reprisal. On the claim for damages, Counsel relied on Garuba v. Kwara Investment Co. Ltd (2005) NWLR (Pt. 917) 160, Gari v. Seirafina Nig. Ltd (2007) LPELR-8397(CA), Arab Construction Ltd. v. Isaac (2012) LPELR-9787(CA), and Mekwunye v. Emirate Airlines (2019) 23 WRN 23 to submit that general damages flow naturally and automatically from the breach of contract and the egregious violation of the Claimant's rights by the Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' SUBMISSIONS

25. Learned Counsel to the Defendants, Olawale Akoni, SAN, submitted that the Claimant's case is completely unmeritorious, vexatious, and a speculative attempt to convert a lawful termination of employment into an unjust enrichment claim. 
    1. Whether the Claimant has provided sufficient evidence before this Honourable Court to establish that the Defendants wrongfully terminated his employment
26. Begin the submissions on that issue immediately after the heading. Learned Counsel to the Defendants submitted that the relationship between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant is strictly one of master and servant, which is governed solely by the terms of the contract of service. Counsel relied on Skye Bank Plc v. Adegun (2024) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1960) 1 to submit that the contract is the absolute measure of the parties' rights. Counsel argued that the burden of proving that the termination of employment was wrongful rests squarely on the Claimant, and that it is not the duty of the employer to prove that it complied with the contract. Counsel cited Idoniboye-Obu v. N.N.P.C. (2003) 2 NWLR (Pt. 805) 589 and U.B.N. v. Chinyere (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1203) 453 to support this contention. Counsel argued that the 1st Defendant strictly complied with the disciplinary procedure laid down in Article 13 of the Conditions of Service, which consists of notification, query, defence, and sanction. Counsel submitted that the 4th Defendant sent a notification email on 12th January 2024 drawing the Claimant's attention to his unauthorized absence and instructing him to resume, which the Claimant ignored. Counsel argued that the Claimant was subsequently issued a formal query on 19th March 2024, provided a written reply on 21st March 2024, and was subjected to disciplinary committee hearings in April 2024 before the committee recommended termination. 
27. Counsel further submitted in the Defendants' Reply Address that under Article 13(a) of the Conditions of Service, the preliminary stage requires only a "verbal warning" and notification. Counsel argued that the Claimant never denied receiving a verbal warning regarding his infractions, and therefore, the Ordinary Meaning Rule must apply to give the contractual terms their plain meaning, citing Inua v. FBN Plc (2014) LPELR-23379(CA). Counsel submitted that under Article 13(1)(B) of the Conditions of Service, unauthorized absence and insubordination are classified as misconduct that can lead directly to termination without any requirement for prior written warning letters. Counsel argued that the Claimant's admitted absence from work between October 2023 and April 2024 while residing in Canada without obtaining written approval from his line manager violated the 1st Defendant's Guidelines for Flexible Working, marked as Claimant's Annexure 16. Counsel relied on Okeke v. First Bank Nig. Ltd (NICN/ABJ/72/2020) to argue that prolonged absence from duty without formal authorization is a serious breach that justifies termination. Counsel further cited Imonikhe v. Unity Bank PLC (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1262) 624 to submit that once an employer complies with its contractually prescribed disciplinary procedures, any resulting termination is lawful and valid.

 

28. Begin the submissions on that issue immediately after the heading. Learned Counsel to the Defendants submitted that the Claimant was afforded a full and fair hearing in strict compliance with Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. Counsel argued that the disciplinary committee was a standing committee of management constituted in accordance with Article 13 of the Conditions of Service, and was not specially or maliciously set up to target the Claimant. Counsel submitted that the Claimant admitted in his pleadings that the ranks and offices of the panel members matched the required structure. Regarding the secretary of the committee, Anthony Kpakol, Counsel argued in the Reply Address that the Claimant failed to lead any credible evidence to show that Mr. Kpakol was an NSD/1 officer rather than an NSH/11 officer, thereby failing to discharge the burden of proof under the rule that he who asserts must prove, as settled in Idoniboye-Obu v. N.N.P.C. (2003) 2 NWLR (Pt. 805) 589. Counsel argued that under the Terms of Reference, marked as Defendants' Annexure 18, the secretary's role was strictly administrative and had no influence over the committee's deliberations.
29. Counsel submitted that the Claimant's allegations of bias and denial of fair hearing are based on mere sentiment and speculation, which cannot form the basis of a judicial decision, citing Omokaro v. State (2025) LPELR-81202(SC). Counsel argued that the minutes of the hearings (Annexure 2) prove that the Claimant made extensive representations and was fully heard. Counsel submitted that the Claimant's objection to Annexure 2 on allegations of forgery and fabrication must be rejected because the Claimant failed to prove any fraud beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the required standard of proof for criminal allegations in civil suits, citing Fhomo (Nig) Ltd v. Zenith Bank (2016) LPELR-42233(CA) and Elemoro & Anor v. Abiodun (2014) LPELR-23195. Counsel further argued that the Claimant's refusal to attend official engagements and his self-justified absence cannot be excused. Counsel cited Ndukauba v. Kolomo (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt. 915) 411 to argue that a refusal of an adjournment or the strict management of proceedings does not constitute a denial of fair hearing.
30. Regarding the Claimant's Annexures 9 and 10, Counsel submitted that these audio recordings have no probative value because they were dumped on the Court. Counsel argued that the recordings were never played in open court, were not transcribed, and were not linked to the specific issues in dispute by any witness testimony. Counsel relied on Buhari v. INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 246, Makinde v. Adekola (2022) 9 NWLR (Pt 1834) 13, and Ashiemar v. Guaranty Trust Bank Plc & Anor (2022) LPELR-59057(CA) to submit that the Court cannot embark on a voyage of discovery or perform the duty of linking documents in chambers. Counsel further relied on Ugochukwu v. Ogbonna & Ors. (2023) LPELR-60200(CA) to argue that counsel cannot use a final written address to supply missing links or repair evidential defects. Counsel submitted that the Section 84 certificate of compliance only satisfies admissibility requirements and does not translate to the court ascribing probative value to unplayed audio, relying on Hon. Dickson v. Chief Sylva (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1567) 167.
31. On the issue of reinstatement, Counsel submitted that the Claimant's employment is a pure master-servant relationship devoid of statutory flavor. Counsel argued that the Court cannot impose a willing employee on an unwilling employer or order reinstatement in a private employment contract. Counsel relied on Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum (Nig.) Ltd. (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512, NNPC v. Idoniboye-Obu (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt. 427) 655, Nigerian Society of Engineers v. Ozah (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1454) 76, NEPA v. Isieveore (1997) 7 NWLR (Pt. 511) 135, and the Supreme Court decision in Obanye v. Union Bank of Nigeria PLC (2018) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1648) 375. Counsel further submitted that even where termination is found to be wrongful in a master-servant relationship, the sole remedy is an award of damages limited to what the employee would have earned during the contractual period of notice, citing Olafimihan v. Nova Lay-Tech Ltd (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 547) 608, Rank Xerox (Nig) Limited v. Centrex (Nig.) Ltd (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 374) 703, and Nwaubani v. Golden Guinea Breweries Plc (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 400) 184. Counsel pointed out that the Claimant has already been paid all his accrued benefits and entitlements upon termination.
    100. Whether the Claimant is entitled to damages
32. Begin the submissions on that issue immediately after the heading. Learned Counsel to the Defendants submitted that damages are a function of liability, and where a plaintiff fails to establish that the defendant committed a wrong, no damages can be awarded. Counsel cited Anike v. S.P.D.C.N. Ltd. (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1246) 227 for this proposition. Counsel argued that since the principal claim of wrongful termination has failed, all ancillary claims for damages must also fail, relying on Awoniyi v. Reg. Trustees of Amorc (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 676) 522. Counsel submitted that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted strictly in line with contract terms and did not infringe on the Claimant's human rights, citing University of Ilorin v. Oluwadare (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 751. Counsel argued that general damages must be the direct and natural consequence of a proven breach, relying on Agu v. Ezenwa (2020) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1732) 233 and Ajigbotosho v. Reynolds Const. Co. Ltd (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1659) 287.
33. Regarding the claims for mental health challenges, Counsel submitted that medical conditions require expert proof, and the Claimant failed to tender any psychiatric reports or call medical experts, making the claims speculative and unproven. Counsel cited Hardwick (Nig) Ltd & Anor v. Access Bank (2024) LPELR-80870(CA) and Olorunkunle v. Adigun (2012) 6 NWLR (Pt.1297) 407. Counsel further relied on Waziri v. BOA Limited (2023) LPELR-60477(CA) and Ibama v. SPDC Nig. Limited (2005) 17 NWLR (Pt. 954) 364 to submit that the Claimant failed to prove any breach of the Conditions of Service.
34. Regarding punitive damages, Counsel argued that such damages are only awarded where there is clear evidence of violence, malice, or oppressive conduct, which the Claimant failed to prove, citing Onubogu v. Anazonwu (2023) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1914) 425. On the claim of $5,000,000 for the cost of litigation, Counsel submitted that public policy and ethics abhor passing on the burden of a litigant's solicitor's fees to the opposing party. Counsel relied on Kabo Air Ltd. v. Mumi Bureau De Change Ltd. (2020) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1715) 488, Guinness Nigeria Plc v. Nwoke (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 689) 135, and Nwanji v. Coastal Services (Nig.) Ltd. (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt. 885) 552. Counsel further argued that the professional fee letter from the Claimant's counsel (Annexure 13) is not proof of payment in the absence of transaction receipts or bank statements, citing DHL Intl Nig. Ltd. v. Eze-Uzoamaka (2020) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1751) 445 and Hein Nebelung Isensee K.G. v. U.B.A. Plc (2012) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1326) 357.
    500. Whether the Claimant is entitled to 10% post-judgment interest from the date of judgment till the date same is fully liquidated
35. Begin the submissions on that issue immediately after the heading. Learned Counsel to the Defendants submitted that interest is an ancillary relief that is wholly dependent on the success of the principal claim. Counsel argued that since the Claimant has failed to establish any entitlement to the principal judgment sums sought against the Defendants, he cannot be entitled to any post-judgment interest whatsoever. Counsel relied on Veepee Industries Ltd v. Cocoa Industries Limited (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1105) 486 for the settled principle that the burden of proving a particular fact is on the party who seeks to rely on it, and where such proof is lacking, the claim must be deemed abandoned and dismissed.

COURT’S DECISION

Whether the Claimant has proved his case to be entitled to the reliefs sought.

SOLE ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION

WHETHER THE CLAIMANT HAS PROVED HIS CASE TO BE ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS SOUGHT. 

37. To resolve this comprehensive issue, this Court must determine three fundamental sub-questions: first, whether the termination of the Claimant's employment by the 1st Defendant was wrongful under the contract of service; second, whether the disciplinary process that preceded the termination complied with the constitutional and contractual requirements of a fair hearing; and third, whether the Claimant has established his entitlement to the specific declaratory, monetary, and restorative reliefs claimed.
38. On the first sub-question of whether the termination of the Claimant's employment was wrongful, the analysis must begin with the allocation of the burden of proof in civil proceedings. In an action for wrongful termination of employment, the burden of proof rests squarely on the employee, who must place before the court the contract of service and demonstrate with clarity the specific terms thereof and how those terms were violated by the employer. On this point, the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of Ovivie & Anor v. Delta Steel Co. Ltd (2023) LPELR-60460 (SC) held that 

"It is the law that when an employee complains that his employment has been wrongfully terminated, he has the onus, first, to place before the Court the terms of the contract of employment and, second, to prove in what manner the said terms were breached by the employer. It is not in principle for the employer who is a defendant to an action brought by the employee to prove any of these." 

"As the contract of service is the bedrock upon which an aggrieved employee must found his case, he succeeds or fails upon the terms thereof. Therefore, in a written or documented contract of service, the Court will not look outside the terms stipulated or agreed therein in deciding the rights and obligations of the parties." 

"Part of the novel idea introduced in the third alteration is in the area of international best practices, which Section 254 (1) (f) of the Third Alteration Act makes Provision for... It is an innovative provision which seems to be directed at enthroning an entirely new employment and labour jurisprudence." 

41. Consequently, where an employer gives specific reasons for terminating an employee’s appointment, those reasons must be established to the satisfaction of the Court.
42. In the present case, the contract of service governing the relationship between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant is the 3rd Edition of the Terms and Conditions of Service for Shore Based Staff, January 2023, which was admitted as Defendants' Annexure 5 and also identified in the Claimant's evidence as Annexure 8a-b. Under Article 13(1)(B) of the Conditions of Service, unauthorized absence from work and insubordination are classified as serious misconduct that can lead directly to termination without any requirement for prior written warning letters, provided a disciplinary committee hearing is held before the sanction is imposed.
43. On the factual question of whether the Claimant’s physical absence from work between October 2023 and April 2024 was unauthorized, the oral and documentary evidence on record must be evaluated together. The law is well settled that where there is a combination of oral and documentary evidence, the latter must be used as a reliable standard to assess the veracity of the former, serving as a hanger from which to assess oral testimony. Under cross-examination, the Claimant, testifying as CW1, made a crucial admission when he stated that "he did not obtain formal approval prior to working at an alternative location between October 2023 to April 2024". The 1st Defendant's Guidelines for Flexible Working, which the Claimant tendered as Annexure 16, clearly requires formal, written managerial approval for any alternative location working arrangements. The Claimant’s unilateral decision to remain in Canada and work remotely without such a formal written permit is a direct infraction of this corporate policy. The Claimant's assertion that the 5th Defendant gave him verbal approval to work from Canada while formal approval was being processed is completely contradicted by the documentary evidence on record. The 4th Defendant's email of 12th January 2024, admitted as Defendants' Annexure 18, expressly notified the Claimant that he was away without approval and requested his immediate physical resumption. Under cross-examination, DW1 testified that "Annexure 18 of the Defendants’ evidence was the notification/warning given to the Claimant". In his reply dated 15th January 2024, admitted as Defendants' Annexure 19, the Claimant stated that he could not resume due to mental health challenges, but notably made no reference to any prior verbal approval. If such verbal authorization had truly existed, a senior employee of the Claimant's standing, who served as the Head of Human Resources and Industrial Relations, would have surely raised it as a shield. He did not.
44. Furthermore, although DW1 admitted under cross-examination that "the Claimant asked for leaves both study and annual leaves through e-mail, that he was in receipt of these mails during the period when he stated that the Claimant was absent from office, and that the Claimant was in communication with the 1st Defendant still", this admission does not translate to approval. An employee cannot unilaterally proceed on leave or relocate to another continent simply because they have applied for it. The operational needs of the unit, which DW1 stated was severely understaffed, constituted a reasonable and justifiable basis for the refusal of the study leave. This is confirmed by the Claimant’s own admission under cross-examination that in the 4th Defendant's email dated 31st March 2024, the 4th Defendant "had informed him that his request could not be approved at the time, citing the reason that the Claimant’s unit had only two (2) staff (including the Claimant) and as such, there would not be sufficient cover for the unit".
45. The Claimant's alternative justification that his prolonged absence was necessitated by workplace-induced mental health challenges is also unsupported by credible evidence. While the 1st Defendant was aware of the Claimant’s health complaints, and DW1 confirmed under cross-examination that "upon the Claimant’s contention of mental health challenges, he (DW1) suggested that he uses the service of the employee assistance program", the Claimant failed to place any medical report, psychiatric evaluation, or certificate of medical unfitness before his employers or this Court. The document marked as Claimant's Annexure 2 is merely an invoice for a Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 test, which is a billing document and not a clinical diagnosis. Crucially, under cross-examination, CW1 admitted that "mental illness is not a form of illness, and he did not apply for a sick leave". In the absence of professional medical certification or a formal application for sick leave under the Conditions of Service, the Claimant's unauthorized physical absence from his duty post cannot be legally excused on health grounds.
46. Regarding the allegations of insubordination concerning the NBLD Program, the evidence shows that the 1st Defendant formally nominated the Claimant as the program's focal point, as shown in the email from the 2nd Defendant (Defendants' Annexure 12). Under cross-examination, CW1 admitted that the directive to anchor the NBLD leadership training was not sent to him by his superior; it was sent to him by a staff of the NLNG. However, for the Claimant to bypass his departmental manager and directly communicate his refusal to a third-party entity (NLNG), as shown in the 2nd Defendant’s reprimand (Defendants' Annexure 13), violates basic corporate protocols. In a contract of service, an employer has the inherent right to direct its employees and manage its operations. The Claimant's refusal to perform an assigned company role and his bypassing of internal reporting structures constituted clear acts of insubordination. Consequently, the first sub-question must be resolved against the Claimant: the reasons for the termination of his employment—unauthorized absence and insubordination—have been substantively proved by the Defendants, and the termination was not wrongful.
47. The second sub-question is whether the disciplinary process that preceded the termination complied with the requirements of a fair hearing. The record shows that the 1st Defendant complied with the contractually prescribed disciplinary procedures by issuing a written notification (Defendants' Annexure 18), followed by a formal query on 19th March 2024 (Defendants' Annexure 20), receiving the Claimant’s written response on 21st March 2024 (Defendants' Annexure 21), and subsequently convening Disciplinary Committee hearings in April 2024. This sequence satisfied the requirements of procedural fairness. The Claimant, however, raised two major procedural objections: first, that the Disciplinary Committee was improperly constituted because the secretary, Anthony Kpakol, was of rank NSD/1 instead of the contractually mandated rank of NSH/11; and second, that he was muted and prevented from presenting his medical report during the virtual session on 16th April 2024.
48. On the first objection regarding the secretary's rank, the Claimant failed to lead any oral or documentary evidence of Mr. Kpakol's actual rank during the trial. It is a fundamental principle of pleadings that averments on which no evidence is led go to no issue. More importantly, in his additional witness statement on oath, the Claimant admitted that "the ranks and offices of the Defendants match the required members for selection for the panel save the secretary". The secretary of a disciplinary committee performs purely administrative and clerical duties and does not participate in the decision-making or voting process. A minor clerical irregularity in the rank of a non-voting administrative officer does not affect the competence or jurisdiction of the panel. The modern judicial approach in our Court strongly disfavours allowing technicalities to defeat substantive justice. As insightfully stated by the Supreme Court in Senator Iyiola Omisore & Anor v. Ogbeni Rauf Adesoji Aregbesola & Ors (2015) LPELR-24803 (SC): 

"Now, it is no longer in doubt that this court, and indeed, all courts, have made a clean sweep of the picture of the law and its technical rules triumphant... by its current mood, it is safe to assert that this court has, firmly and irreversibly, spurned the old practice where the temple of justice was converted into a forensic abattoir where legal practitioners, employing such tools of their trade like 'the whirligig of technicalities,' daily butchered substantive issues in courts..." 

"Courts of equity make a distinction in all cases between that which is a matter of substance and that which is a matter of form; and if they found by insisting on the form, the substance will be defeated, they hold it to be inequitable to allow a person to insist on such form, and thereby defeat the substance."

50. On the second objection regarding being muted during the virtual hearing, DW1 admitted under cross-examination that "his awareness of the Claimant being muted or not during the disciplinary hearing is based on what he heard which was that he was muted and he believes it is contained in the minute of meeting of the disciplinary hearing report he had tendered". While muting an employee during a virtual disciplinary hearing is undesirable, the minutes of the disciplinary hearing (Defendants' Annexure 2) and the Claimant's own pleadings establish that the Claimant was afforded an extensive opportunity to state his case on 4th April 2024, where he spoke at length and addressed all charges. The right to a fair hearing requires that a party be given a reasonable opportunity to present his defense, not an infinite right to interrupt or control the proceedings. The Claimant had previously responded to the query in writing and had participated extensively across multiple dates of the hearing.
51. In addressing this allegation of a denial of fair hearing, this Court is heavily guided by the admonition of the Supreme Court in Adebayo v. Attorney General of Ogun State [2008] 7 NWLR (Pt 1085) 201 at 205-206, where it was held: 

"Learned counsel for the Appellant roped in the fair hearing principle. I have seen in recent times that parties who have bad cases embrace and make use of the constitutional provision of fair hearing to bamboozle the adverse party and the Court, with a view to moving the Court away from the live issues in litigation. They make so much weather and sing the familiar song that the constitutional provision is violated or contravened. They do not stop there; they rake the defence in most inappropriate cases because they have nothing to canvass in their favour in the case. The fair hearing provision in the Constitution is the machinery or locomotive of Justice not a spare part to propel or invigorate the case of the user. It is not a casual principle of law available to a party to be picked up at will in a case and force the Court to apply it to his advantage. On the contrary, it is a formidable and fundamental provision available to a party who is really denied fair hearing because he was not heard or that he was not properly heard in the case. Let litigants who have nothing useful to advocate in favour of their cases leave the fair hearing constitutional provision alone because it is not available to them just for the asking."

52. To support his allegation of denial of fair hearing, the Claimant sought to rely on the MS Teams audio recordings of the disciplinary meetings, marked as Claimant's Annexures 9 and 10, which were accompanied by a certificate of compliance under Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 (Annexure 21). However, these audio recordings were never played, demonstrated, or transcribed in open court during the trial. The law is clear that satisfying Section 84 of the Evidence Act is merely a hurdle for admissibility and does not automatically translate to probative weight. When electronic or audio evidence is dumped on the court without being demonstrated or played in open court, the court cannot rely on it to determine disputed facts. The detailed timestamp-indexed summary of the audio recordings contained in the Claimant's written address is a submission of counsel and cannot serve as a substitute for evidence. Consequently, this Court attaches no probative value to Annexures 9 and 10. The minutes of the disciplinary hearings (Defendants' Annexure 2) are accepted as a reliable administrative summary of the proceedings and are accorded full probative value. The Court finds that the disciplinary process was conducted in substantial compliance with the requirements of a fair hearing, and this sub-question is resolved against the Claimant.
53. The third sub-question is whether the Claimant is entitled to any of the specific reliefs sought in this action. The resolution of the first two sub-questions against the Claimant is determinative of his claims for relief, as all his claims are predicated on the premise that his termination was wrongful. The claim for a declaration that his termination was wrongful and that his employment is subsisting must fail because the termination was lawful and contractually compliant.
54. The claim for reinstatement must also fail. Reinstatement is not an available remedy in a contract of employment that lacks statutory flavour. In Rector Kwara Poly v. Adefila [2024] 9 NWLR 537, the Court of Appeal clarified the nature of statutory flavour, holding that: 

"An employment enjoys statutory flavour when the contract of service is governed by statute or where the conditions of service are contained in regulations derived from statutory provision. In the circumstances, they invest the employee with a legal status higher than the ordinary master/servant relationship... where the contract of employment is determinable by the agreement of the parties simpliciter, there is no question of the contract having a statutory flavour. The fact that the other contracting party is the creation of a statute does not make any difference." 

55. The Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant, a private limited liability company, is a pure master-servant relationship. Under the authority of the Supreme Court in Obanye v. Union Bank of Nigeria PLC (2018) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1648) 375, the court cannot impose a willing employee on an unwilling employer in a pure master and servant relationship. Reinstatement is therefore refused.
56. The claim for the payment of unpaid salary and allowances from July 2024 is refused because the contract of employment was lawfully terminated on 16th July 2024, and no salaries can accrue after the termination of services.
57. The claims for general damages of $100,000,000 and punitive damages of $1,000,000 are refused. General damages flow naturally from a proven breach of contract or civil wrong. Since no wrongful termination or breach has been established, no basis exists for an award of general damages. In Mogaji v. Benue State University (2022) LPELR-56727(CA), the court affirmed that with an award for salaries and allowances (or where the termination is lawful), there is no damage occasioned to qualify for general damages. Punitive or exemplary damages are only awarded where the defendant's conduct is shown to be oppressive, arbitrary, or malicious. The Defendants acted within their contractual rights, followed the prescribed disciplinary procedure, and terminated the employment on established grounds of misconduct.
58. The claim for special damages for unpaid allowances, bonuses, and accrued benefits must also fail due to a fundamental pleading defect. The law is clear that special damages must not only be specifically pleaded, they must be strictly proved by credible and compelling evidence. The Claimant failed to plead any specific particulars of the monetary sums claimed. In Gabriel Ativie v. Kabelmetal (Nig.) Ltd [2008] LPELR-591(SC), the Supreme Court held that 

"A claim is circumscribed by the reliefs claimed. The duty of a Plaintiff therefore is to plead only such facts and materials as are necessary to sustain the reliefs and adduce evidence to prove same... He never gets more. Nor does he obtain reliefs not claimed." 

"a trial Judge should not embark on a voyage seeking to repair the damage caused by counsel in failing to plead material facts necessary to obtain judgment in the temple of justice since Courts are not carpenter’s workshops where Judges toil to mend defects in pleadings."

"The issue of damages as an aspect of solicitor’s fees is not one that lends itself to support in this country. There is no system of costs taxation to get a realistic figure." 

61. Moreover, the professional fee letter from the Claimant's counsel (Annexure 13) is a self-serving letter and is not backed by any transaction receipts or bank statements to prove actual payment. The claim for 10% post-judgment interest is also refused as it is an ancillary relief dependent on the success of the principal monetary claims, which have all failed.
62. In the final result, the Claimant has failed to establish his case on the single adopted issue for determination. The termination of the Claimant's employment by the 1st Defendant by the letter dated 16th July 2024 was lawful and contractually compliant, and the Claimant was afforded a fair hearing. Accordingly, the suit of the Claimant fails and is hereby dismissed in its entirety.
63. Costs of this action are awarded to the Defendants against the Claimant, assessed at N500, 000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira).
64. Judgment is hereby entered.

 

 

………………..

Hon. Justice E. D. Subilim

JUDGE