IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM
DATE: 29TH JULY, 2026
SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/37/2025
BETWEEN:
DR (MRS) REBECCA OINE JULIUS OAMEN - CLAIMANT
AND
- FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION - DEFENDANTS
- NATIONAL BIOSAFETY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
- THE ACCOUNTANT GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION
REPRESENTATION:
J. A. AUDU, ESQ., FOR CLAIMANT.
BINGA DINSHIYA, ESQ., FOR THE 1ST DEFENDANT.
HABIBATU U. CHIME, ESQ., WITH OYEBISOLA BAJULAIYE, ESQ., FOR THE 2ND DEFENDANT.
T. D. AGBE, ESQ., WITH ABIMBOLA AKINNIFESI ESQ., FOR THE 3RD DEFENDANT.
JUDGMENT
- The Claimant claims against the Defendants jointly and severally the following reliefs:
- A DECLARATION that by virtue of the 1st Defendant’s letter dated the 2nd day of October, 2020 and the letter from the 2nd Defendant’s office dated 28th day of December, 2020, the Claimant’s last promotion is on level of CANRAISS 15 which is equivalent to grade level 17 in the mainstream civil service.
- A DECLARATION that by virtue of the 1st Defendant’s letter dated the 2nd day of October, 2020, the Claimant remains a permanent staff of the 2nd Defendant until she attains the retirement age of 60 years or 35 years in service in line with the provision of Section 5 Rule 020501(a) of the Public Service Rules 2021 Edition and cannot be posted to the office of the 3rd Defendant or any other agency except within the office of the 2nd Defendant.
- A DECLARATION that the posting of the Claimant, a permanent staff of the 2nd Defendant by the Defendants contrary to the provision of Section 5 Rule 020501(a) of the Public Service Rules 2021 Edition was illegal, unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
- A DECLARATION that the Claimant cannot be demoted to the Grade Level 14 by the 1st Defendant without any query or any substantiated allegation against the Claimant and/or due process laid down by the Public Service Rules 2021 Edition.
- A DECLARATION that the claimant is entitled to remain in the service of the Federal Civil Service of Nigeria as a Director (Administration and Finance) on Grade level 17 or above until she attains the retirement age of 60 years or 35 years in service.
- A DECLARATION that the purported removal of the name of the Claimant from the pay roll of the National Biosafety Management Agency the 2nd Defendant and the non-payment of the Claimant’s salaries, entitlements, benefits and emolument as a Director (Administration and Finance) from December, 2023 till date is unwarranted, illegal, unlawful and unconstitutional.
- A DECLARATION that any policy or directive intended to cause the Claimant to be recalled to the office of the 3rd Defendant as Chief Executive Officer (Accounts) GL. 14, an over seven-year demotion from her current grade level as a Director on Grade level of CANRAISS 15 which is equivalent to grade level 17 in the mainstream civil service after so many years of meritorious service as a civil servant is unwarranted, illegal and unconstitutional.
- A DECLARATION that having not retired or attained the statutory age of 60 years or put in 35 years of service as at 12th day of December, 2023, the Defendants have no right to keep the Claimant out of service and in suspense indefinitely.
- A DECLARATION that the arbitrary reduction of the Claimant’s salary from the sum of N355,915.47 (Three Hundred and Fifty-Five Thousand, Nine Hundred and Fifteen Naira, Forty-Seven Kobo) only to N154,105.67 (One Hundred and Fifty-Four Thousand, One Hundred and five Naira Sixty-Seven Kobo) only is illegal, unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
- AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendants jointly and severally to pay the Claimant the difference in her valid grade level CANRAISS 15 which is equivalent to grade level 17 in the mainstream civil service at the sum of at N201,809.08 (Two Hundred and One Thousand, Eight Hundred and Nine Nair, Eight Kobo) only being the difference in her valid grade level CANRAISS 15 salary from February, 2024 being the month the 3rd Defendant began to pay her N154,105.67 (One Hundred and Fifty-Four Thousand, One Hundred and five Naira Sixty-Seven Kobo) only based on grade level 14 till judgement.
- AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the 1st Defendant to reinstate the Claimant forthwith to her present position in the office of the 2nd Defendant as Director on Grade level of CANRAISS 15, which is equivalent to grade level 17 in the mainstream civil service with all the benefits that accrue thereof.
- AN ORDER of Mandatory Injunction compelling the 3rd Defendant to remit with immediate effect all sums illegally withheld from the Claimant from December 2023 till judgement, amounting to her statutory entitlements and allowances with pre/post-judgment interest fixed at 10% per month until final liquidation thereof, to the Claimant.
- AN ORDER of Mandatory Injunction restraining the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants from implementing the contents of the 1st Defendant’s letter dated 12th day of December, 2023.
- Specific damages in the sum of N711,830.94 (Seven Hundred and Eleven Thousand, Eight Hundred and Thirty Naira, Ninety-Four Kobo) only being special damages for Claimant’s salary withheld from December, 2023 to January, 2024 by the Defendants with 20% pre and post judgment interest per month from when the sum became due till final liquidation of the judgment sum.
- AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendants jointly and severally to pay the Claimant the sum of N100, 000, 000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) as general and exemplary damages for conversion and detinue, i.e., the unwarranted removal of the name of the Claimant from the pay roll of the 2nd Defendant, the illegal transfer of the Claimant from the office of the 2nd Defendant, the emotional trauma and denial of her salaries, entitlements, benefits and emoluments from December, 2023 till judgement.
- AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendants jointly and severally to pay the Claimant the sum of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) being legal fees and cost of prosecuting this suit.
- The Defendants filed their respective Statements of Defence denying the claims. The 3rd Defendant filed a Counter-Claim seeking refund of alleged overpayments.
BACK GROUND FACTS OF THE CASE
- The Claimant was a staff of the 3rd Defendant on Grade Level 14 until 2018. By letter dated 2nd October 2020, the 1st Defendant approved her transfer to the 2nd Defendant. By Circulars dated 22nd August and 22nd September 2023, she was posted out of the 2nd Defendant. By letter dated 12th December 2023, the 1st Defendant declared the transfer erroneous and directed her return to the 3rd Defendant on Grade Level 14. The Claimant commenced this action by an Amended Complaint dated and filed 15th May 2024. She seeks declarations regarding her status as a permanent staff of the 2nd Defendant, the illegality of her demotion, and payment of salary arrears.
- The Defendants collectively challenge the validity of the Claimant's appointment and transfer. The 1st Defendant contends that the October 2020 approval was granted in error regarding the Claimant's substantive grade level and was properly withdrawn in December 2023. The 2nd Defendant submits that it acted in good faith in appointing the Claimant but asserts that no cause of action lies against it once the transfer approval was withdrawn by the competent authority. The 3rd Defendant, in addition to supporting the withdrawal, prosecutes a counter-claim seeking refund of alleged overpaid salaries from January 2019 to November 2023, premised on the argument that the Claimant's appointment as Deputy Director was unconstitutional and void, and that she remained substantively on Grade Level 14 throughout the material period.
COMMENCEMENT OF HEARING
- The Claimant testified as CW1 on 22nd October 2024 and tendered documentary exhibits including Rebecca 1 through 42 and Oamen 2 through 8 to substantiate her claim to Director-level status. The Defendants countered with testimony from Awon E Dominic (DW1) for the 1st Defendant, Mr Ugo Agwu Nnamchi (DW2) for the 2nd Defendant, and Mrs Vivian Isioma Archibong (DW3) and Mr Alabi Adesina Sakiru (DW4) for the 3rd Defendant, tendering exhibits including Archibong 1 through 10 and Sakiru 1 through 3. These exhibits purport to establish that the Claimant's appointment breached the Public Service Rules regarding prerequisite qualifications and that her substantive grade remained Grade Level 14. In response to the counter-claim, the Claimant tendered additional exhibits including Audu 1 through 4 and Sakiru 5 through 8.
EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE
- In civil jurisprudence, the burden of proof rests on the party who asserts the affirmative of any issue, and this burden must be discharged on a preponderance of evidence or the balance of probability. By the joint operations of Sections 131 and 134 of the Evidence Act, 2011, the Claimant in this suit bears the ultimate burden of establishing her entitlement to the declaratory and injunctive reliefs sought in her main claim. Conversely, the Third Defendant, as Counter-Claimant, bears an identical legal burden to prove the assertion that the Claimant was overpaid the sum of N9,717,643.04 (Nine Million, Seven Hundred and Seventeen Thousand, Six Hundred and Forty-Three Naira, Four Kobo) and is obliged to refund same. The imaginary scale of justice requires that the court place the oral and documentary proof of both parties on opposite sides of the scale to determine which side weighs more. Crucially, the court must remain mindful that uncontroverted evidence is not automatically credible; the court is bound to evaluate the quality, consistency, and alignment of the evidence with admitted facts and documents before assigning probative value.
- The Claimant, testifying as CW1, led evidence both oral and documentary to establish her employment history, progression, and ultimate transfer of service. CW1 testified that she was posted to the Second Defendant to fill a vacancy to kick-start the new agency, which was directed by "Exhibit Rebecca 10", a posting letter dated the 25th day of August, 2016, and "Exhibit Rebecca 11", a posting circular from the office of the Third Defendant dated the 31st day of August, 2016. CW1 further testified that, desirous of regularising her stay with the Second Defendant, she applied for a transfer of her service from the mainstream civil service to the Second Defendant. This was done via "Exhibit Rebecca 15", an application dated the 15th day of December, 2018. Following this application, the Third Defendant wrote "Exhibit Rebecca 16", a letter dated the 23rd day of January, 2019, to the First Defendant stating its approval and non-objection to the said transfer. The First Defendant, upon receiving the Second and Third Defendants' clearances, approved the transfer of service via "Exhibit Rebecca 17", a letter dated the 2nd day of October, 2020. CW1 also tendered "Exhibit Rebecca 42", which comprises her education certificates, qualifications, marriage certificate, and affidavit of change and correction of name. Under cross-examination, CW1 maintained that her transfer was fully completed, and she denied drawing salaries from two government agencies simultaneously, asserting that she only received salaries from the Third Defendant during the posting phase before the Second Defendant stabilized.
- To counter the Third Defendant's counterclaim, the Claimant relied on documents extracted from the Defendants' witnesses during cross-examination. Specifically, during the cross-examination of the Third Defendant's witness, DW4 (Sakiru), the Claimant confronted the witness with "Exhibits Sakiru 7 and 8", which are her pay slips for June and July 2014. Under cross-examination, DW4 admitted that "'Exhibits Sakiru 7 and 8 represent pay slips showing the refund of the overpayments'" alleged to have been made to the Claimant. The Claimant's case is that these exhibits show a total regularisation of any payroll discrepancy, a material fact that the Third Defendant suppressed in its pleadings and witness depositions.
- The Defendants, on their part, led evidence to challenge the validity of the transfer and to assert the counterclaim. The First Defendant's witness, who testified in defence of the main action, tendered "Exhibit FCSC9" and "Exhibit Awom 8". These documents, ironically, contain records showing the conversion of the Claimant from the Executive Officer (Accounts) cadre to the Administrative/Accounting Officer cadre. The Third Defendant's witness, DW4, testified that the Claimant's transfer was done in error because she had not completed her cadre conversion and was therefore ineligible to progress beyond Salary Grade Level 14. DW4 also sought to prove the counterclaim by tendering "Exhibits Sakuri 1, 2, and 3", which were pay slips and payroll computations showing that the Claimant was overpaid salaries to the tune of N9,717,643.04. However, under cross-examination, DW4 admitted that the records of service showing the complete transactional history of the Claimant's refunds were not attached to his deposition, and he further admitted that "'the pay slips, Exhibits Sakiru 7 and 8, show deductions made from the Claimant's salary as refund for the overpayments.'"
- Confronting the two versions on the issue of cadre conversion and the validity of the transfer of service, the court finds a sharp conflict between the oral depositions of the Third Defendant's witness and the documentary evidence tendered by the First Defendant. While the Third Defendant asserted that the Claimant was never converted and remained a Chief Executive Officer on Grade Level 14, "Exhibit FCSC9" and "Exhibit Awom 8"—both being official documents from the custody of the First Defendant (the Federal Civil Service Commission)—explicitly confirm that the Claimant was indeed converted from the Executive cadre to the Accounting Officer cadre. This conversion legally unlocked her progression through the service ranks. It is an established principle of law that documentary evidence is the best evidence and is used as a hanger to test the veracity of oral testimony. The Third Defendant cannot assert a lack of conversion when the regulatory body of the civil service (the First Defendant) has produced documentary evidence of such conversion. Consequently, the court resolves this conflict in favour of the Claimant and finds that she was duly converted.
- On the issue of the validity of the transfer, the Third Defendant's assertion that "Exhibit Rebecca 17" (the transfer approval letter) was issued in error is unsupported by any credible administrative record. The Third Defendant's own letter, "Exhibit Rebecca 16", clearly expressed "no objection" to the transfer. Once a statutory body acts within its powers and conveys approval, it cannot retrospectively assert a unilateral "error" to defeat vested rights, especially where no fraud is alleged or proved. A party is not allowed to approbate and reprobate on the same issue. Having consented to the transfer in "Exhibit Rebecca 16", the Third Defendant is estopped from challenging the First Defendant's approval in "Exhibit Rebecca 17". Furthermore, the Third Defendant's attempt to recall and demote the Claimant to Grade Level 14 via "Exhibit Rebecca 31" without any query, disciplinary panel, or proof of misconduct violates the provisions of the Public Service Rules. Demotion is a severe disciplinary measure that can only be imposed after compliance with strict fair hearing procedures. No evidence of such procedures was placed before this court.
- Regarding the counterclaim for N9,717,643.04, the court must resolve the conflict between the Third Defendant's payroll computations in "Exhibits Sakuri 1, 2, and 3" and the Claimant's pay slips in "Exhibits Sakiru 7 and 8". The Third Defendant merely dumped these computations on the court without linking them to the specific months of alleged overpayment or accounting for the refunds. By contrast, the Claimant's "Exhibits Sakiru 7 and 8", which DW4 admitted showed refunds of the overpayment, remain uncontroverted. The Third Defendant's failure to present the Claimant's comprehensive record of service to show any outstanding balance after the June and July 2014 deductions triggers the presumption of withholding evidence under Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011. The court must presume that if the complete record of service had been produced, it would have shown that the alleged overpayment had been fully liquidated.
- In conclusion, the net evidential findings of this court are that the Claimant's conversion from the Executive to the Accounting cadre was validly completed as proved by "Exhibit FCSC9" and "Exhibit Awom 8"; her transfer of service to the Second Defendant on the grade level of CANRAISS 15 (equivalent to Grade Level 17) was formally approved via "Exhibit Rebecca 17" following the Third Defendant's written non-objection in "Exhibit Rebecca 16"; and the attempt to demote her to Grade Level 14 and recall her to the Third Defendant's office was an administrative act devoid of due process and contrary to the Public Service Rules. Lastly, the court finds that the Third Defendant failed to prove its counterclaim, as "Exhibits Sakiru 7 and 8" establish that the alleged overpayment was subject to refunds, and the Third Defendant failed to prove any subsisting indebtedness.
CLAIMANT'S SUBMISSIONS
- Learned Counsel to the Claimant, J.N. Egwuonwu, SAN, submitted that the Claimant's employment is protected by statute and that her posting, demotion, and the stopping of her salaries are unlawful, ultra vires, and void.
- Whether the posting, purported recall, and demotion of the Claimant from her position of Director on CANRAISS 15 (equivalent to Grade Level 17) to Chief Executive Officer on Grade Level 14 is illegal, unconstitutional, null, void, and of no effect.
- Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that demotion is not a remedy freely available to employers to use as a disciplinary measure, and the power to demote an employee must be expressly stated in the conditions of service. Counsel relied on the case of Dingoli v. Dr. Barau & Ors [2012] 27 NLLR (Pt. 78) 332 CA to argue that demotion is a part of employee discipline and is not disclosed anywhere in the Public Service Rules as a mode of discipline. Counsel submitted that where a statute has prescribed the manner of carrying out anything, nothing short of that prescription will suffice, citing Adeniyi v. Governing Council of Yabatech [1993] 6 NWLR (Pt. 426) 461 and Olufeagba v. Abdul-Raheem [2009] 18 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599. Counsel argued that the 1st Defendant promoted the Claimant to Grade Level 15 vide a letter dated 8th December, 2004, and she received salaries and acted on that grade level for seven years. Consequently, Counsel submitted that under Section 169 of the Evidence Act 2011, the Defendants are estopped by conduct from denying her status as a Grade Level 15 officer, placing reliance on Ladan Liman Tirwun v. Musa Ibrahim Jakkada [2013] LPELR-22795(CA). Counsel further submitted that the Claimant's transfer of service from the 3rd Defendant to the 2nd Defendant was done in compliance with the Public Service Rules. Counsel pointed to Exhibit Rebecca 15, being her application for transfer, Exhibit Rebecca 16, the 3rd Defendant's letter of non-objection dated 23rd January, 2019, and Exhibit Rebecca 17, the 1st Defendant's approval of her transfer of service dated 2nd October, 2020. Counsel argued that the 3rd Defendant had full knowledge and gave its approval to the transfer, and therefore, under the maxim "quod approbo non reprobo," the Defendants cannot approbate and reprobate on the same issue, citing Ajuwon & Ors v. Governor of Oyo State & Ors (2021) LPELR-55339 (SC). Counsel contended that the purported recall of the Claimant vide Exhibit Rebecca 31 to serve as a Chief Executive Officer on Grade Level 14 is a seven-year demotion from her valid rank of Director on CANRAISS 15 (equivalent to Grade Level 17) and is completely void.
- Whether the Claimant is entitled to all the reliefs sought in her Statement of Facts, including the payment of her outstanding salaries, emoluments, and the difference in her salary.
- Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that having not retired or attained the statutory age of 60 years or 35 years in service, the Defendants have no right to keep the Claimant out of service or in suspense indefinitely. Counsel argued that the arbitrary reduction of her salary from N355, 915.47 to N154, 105.67 was illegal, and she is entitled to be paid the monthly difference of N201, 809.08 from February 2024. Counsel also submitted that the stopping of her salaries by the 2nd Defendant since December 2023 was unwarranted, and she is entitled to the recovery of all her withheld salaries and emoluments. Counsel relied on Buraimoh v. Bamgbose (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 352, Calabar East Co-Op Thrift & Credit Society v. Ikot (1999) LPELR-826(SC), and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited v. Chief G.B.A. Tiebo & Ors (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 931) 439 to argue that the court is fully empowered to grant these declarations and compensatory orders.
- Whether the 3rd Defendant's Counter-Claim should be dismissed for lack of proof and for being discredited by evidence of prior refund.
- Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the 3rd Defendant/Counter-Claimant completely failed to prove that the Claimant was overpaid the sum of N9,717,643.04. Counsel pointed out that this claim was thoroughly discredited under cross-examination through Exhibits Sakiru 7 & 8, which are the Claimant's June and July 2014 pay slips showing that a full refund of the alleged overpayment had already been made. Counsel argued that the 3rd Defendant failed to disclose this refund, representing an inconsistent and contradictory case that must be rejected, citing Popoola v. State (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1628) 485 and Awosika v. State (2018) LPELR-44351(SC). Counsel submitted that because the 3rd Defendant did not deny or controvert Exhibits Sakiru 7 & 8, the contents therein are deemed admitted and need no further proof under Section 125 of the Evidence Act 2011, relying on Cappa & D'Alberto Ltd. v. Akintilo [2021] 7 NWLR (Pt. 824) and Al-Hassan v. Ishaku (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1520) 230. Counsel further argued that the 3rd Defendant merely dumped Exhibits Sakiru 1 to 3 on the court without demonstrating their contents or linking them to its counter-claim, submitting that a court has no duty to evaluate dumped documents, citing Omisore v. Aregbesola (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1482) 205 and Samuel & Anor v. Tanimu Musa & Ors (2019) LPELR-50988(CA). Counsel urged the court to invoke the presumption of withholding evidence under Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011 because the 3rd Defendant failed to tender the Claimant's record of service, citing Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 941) 198. Counsel submitted that the submissions of counsel on the counter-claim, no matter how brilliant, cannot take the place of evidence, citing UBN PLC & Anor v. Ayodare & Sons (Nig) Ltd & Anor (2007) LPELR-3391(SC) and Access Bank Plc v. K.C. International Limited (2018) LPELR-43668(CA).
1ST DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSIONS
- Learned Counsel to the 1st Defendant, D.O. Naiyeju, Esq., submitted that the 1st Defendant acted within its constitutional powers under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and the Public Service Rules in correcting the Claimant's grade level and posting.
- Whether the 1st Defendant acted within its statutory powers under the Constitution and the Public Service Rules in correcting the Claimant's erroneous grade level from CANRAISS 15 to Grade Level 14.
- Learned Counsel to the 1st Defendant submitted that the Federal Civil Service Commission is constitutionally vested with the authority to appoint, promote, and exercise disciplinary control over officers in the civil service. Counsel argued that this power inherently includes the right to correct any administrative error, irregularity, or erroneous promotion that was done contrary to the civil service regulations. Counsel contended that when an error is discovered in an officer's placement, the Commission is legally bound to correct it to preserve the integrity of the public service. Counsel submitted that correcting an erroneous placement does not constitute a disciplinary action or demotion, and therefore does not require a query or disciplinary procedure under the Public Service Rules. Counsel urged the court to hold that the correction of the Claimant's grade level to Grade Level 14 was a lawful administrative act.
- Whether the Claimant's failure to undergo a proper conversion from the Executive Cadre to the Professional Cadre invalidates her promotion beyond Grade Level 14.
- Learned Counsel to the 1st Defendant submitted that the Claimant was originally in the Executive Officer (Accounts) cadre, which is a sub-professional cadre that terminates at Grade Level 14 (Chief Executive Officer). Counsel argued that for an officer in the Executive Cadre to progress to Grade Level 15 and above, there must be a formal and approved conversion to the Professional Cadre (such as the Accounting or Administrative Cadre) in line with the relevant Scheme of Service. Counsel contended that the Claimant never underwent a valid conversion, and her purported promotion to Grade Level 15 and subsequent placement on CANRAISS 15 were highly irregular and void ab initio. Counsel submitted that Exhibit FCSC9 and Exhibit Awom 8, which the Claimant relied upon to argue her conversion, do not demonstrate compliance with the formal requirements for conversion in the civil service. Counsel submitted that the Claimant cannot claim a right based on an erroneous promotion and urged the court to dismiss her suit.
2ND DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSIONS
- Learned Counsel to the 2nd Defendant, Habibatu Udunma Chime (Mrs.), submitted that the 2nd Defendant is a statutory agency under the federal public service and is bound by the decisions and directives of the 1st and 3rd Defendants in respect of personnel administration.
- Whether the 2nd Defendant is bound by the directives of the 1st and 3rd Defendants in respect of the Claimant's salary structure, grade level, and posting.
- Learned Counsel to the 2nd Defendant submitted that the 2nd Defendant does not have the independent authority to create a distinct salary structure or determine the grade level of its staff in disregard of the directives of the Federal Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation. Counsel pointed out that the Claimant was posted to the 2nd Defendant as a pioneer staff from her parent office. Counsel argued that once the 1st Defendant corrected her transfer and held that her valid grade level in the civil service is Grade Level 14, the 2nd Defendant was legally bound to comply with that decision. Counsel submitted that the 2nd Defendant could not continue to pay the Claimant on the CANRAISS 15 salary scale when the regulatory authorities had invalidated her transfer and placement on that level.
- Whether the 2nd Defendant can be held liable for stopping the payment of the Claimant's salary under CANRAISS 15 and updating her payroll status following her recall.
- Learned Counsel to the 2nd Defendant submitted that the 2nd Defendant did not unilaterally stop the Claimant's salary or remove her name from the payroll. Counsel explained that the payroll of the 2nd Defendant is managed through the Integrated Personnel and Payroll Information System (IPPIS), which is under the direct administration of the 3rd Defendant. Counsel argued that the adjustment of the Claimant's salary and her subsequent recall were done by the competent authorities in the federal public service, and the 2nd Defendant merely complied with the administrative processes on the IPPIS platform. Counsel submitted that no liability can attach to the 2nd Defendant for complying with lawful directives and centralized payroll rules, and therefore urged the court to dismiss the Claimant's claims against the 2nd Defendant.
3RD DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSIONS
- Learned Counsel to the 3rd Defendant, T.D. Agbe, Esq., submitted that the 3rd Defendant has a duty to manage the public treasury with financial discipline and that the counter-claim for the recovery of public funds is fully supported by the evidence.
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- Whether the Claimant's career progression and transfer of service from the 3rd Defendant to the 2nd Defendant were illegal, invalid, and contrary to the Public Service Rules.
- Learned Counsel to the 3rd Defendant submitted that the Claimant's career progression was fundamentally flawed. Counsel argued that the Claimant, as an officer in the Executive Cadre, had a terminal grade of Grade Level 14. Counsel contended that her transfer of service to the 2nd Defendant on a grade level equivalent to Grade Level 17 (Director) did not comply with Chapter 2, Section 5, Rules 020506 and 020507 of the Public Service Rules. Counsel submitted that Rule 020506 strictly prohibits transfer-on-promotion except in response to an advertised post, and Rule 020507 requires that any transfer must not jeopardize the prospects of serving officers and must align with the Scheme of Service. Counsel argued that because these rules were violated, the transfer was void, and the 3rd Defendant acted lawfully in bringing the error to the attention of the 1st Defendant and issuing the letter of recall, Exhibit Rebecca 31. Counsel submitted that correcting such administrative errors does not amount to an unlawful demotion.
- Whether the 3rd Defendant/Counter-Claimant has proved its Counter-Claim to entitle it to the refund of N9,717,643.04 being the amount overpaid to the Claimant.
- Learned Counsel to the 3rd Defendant submitted that because the Claimant's proper grade level was Grade Level 14 (Chief Executive Officer), her placement on the CANRAISS 15 scale (equivalent to Grade Level 17) resulted in an erroneous and illegal payment of higher salaries and allowances over several years. Counsel argued that this overpayment amounted to N9,717,643.04, which represents public funds paid without legal justification, constituting unjust enrichment. Counsel submitted that the 3rd Defendant placed before the court various payroll records and pay slips, including Exhibits Sakiru 1 to 3, to demonstrate the exact calculation of the overpayment. Counsel argued that the Claimant is under a statutory and common law duty to refund this sum as money had and received. Counsel submitted that the pay slips relied upon by the Claimant, Exhibits Sakiru 7 & 8, did not represent a complete liquidation of her indebtedness and that the 3rd Defendant is entitled to the recovery of the outstanding sum. Counsel urged the court to grant the counter-claim in its entirety.
COURT’S DECISION
- Upon a thorough examination of the pleadings, the documentary and oral evidence adduced by the parties, and the issues formulated in their respective final written addresses, this Court is of the view that a consolidation of the issues is necessary for a streamlined and comprehensive resolution of the entire dispute. Consequently, the Court adopts the following consolidated issues for the determination of both the main suit and the counter-claim:
- Whether the posting, demotion, recall, and subsequent reduction and stoppage of the salary of the Claimant by the Defendants were illegal, unlawful, and in violation of the Public Service Rules.
- Whether the Claimant is entitled to the declaratory, injunctive, and monetary reliefs sought in her Statement of Facts.
- Whether the 3rd Defendant/Counter-Claimant has proved its entitlement to the sum of N9,717,643.04 (Nine Million, Seven Hundred and Seventeen Thousand, Six Hundred and Forty-Three Naira, Four Kobo) claimed as overpayment of salaries against the Claimant.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE
WHETHER THE POSTING, DEMOTION, RECALL, AND SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION AND STOPPAGE OF THE SALARY OF THE CLAIMANT BY THE DEFENDANTS WERE ILLEGAL, UNLAWFUL, AND IN VIOLATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE RULES.
- In resolving this issue, the starting point is the trite position of our law that a party who initiates a judicial process and seeks declaratory reliefs must establish her case on the strength of her own evidence and not rely on the weakness of the defence. This fundamental principle of proof is captured in the locus classicus of Nimanteks Association Limited & Another v. Marco Construction Company Limited & Others (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 174) 411, where the Supreme Court held that
"...a plaintiff who commences an action in a court of law must prove that action in order to have judgment in his favour. This is the first law; the first order in the realm of proof. There is the second one and it is more generally put: a party who makes an assertion must prove it."
- The Claimant, testifying as CW1, has laid before this Court a narrative of unlawful career disruption, asserting that her transfer from the mainstream civil service under the Third Defendant to the Second Defendant was validly executed and approved by the First Defendant at the grade of CANRAISS 15, and that her subsequent recall, demotion to Grade Level 14, and the stoppage of her emoluments constitute a gross infraction of her statutory rights under the Public Service Rules.
- The First and Third Defendants have resisted this claim by contending that the Claimant's career progression was fundamentally plagued by a fatal irregularity, specifically that she was an officer in the sub-professional Executive Officer (Accounts) cadre whose career terminal point is Grade Level 14, and that she never underwent a formal conversion to the professional Accounting Officer cadre. They further assert that the First Defendant's approval of her transfer on the CANRAISS 15 scale was a product of administrative error which the public service is empowered to correct, and that such correction does not constitute a disciplinary measure so as to attract the procedural safeguards of the Public Service Rules.
- To resolve this threshold conflict regarding the Claimant’s cadre conversion, this Court must painstakingly evaluate the documentary evidence against the oral assertions. The Third Defendant’s witness, DW4, insisted in his deposition that the Claimant remained a sub-professional officer who had never converted. However, official records produced from the custody of the First Defendant—the regulatory custodian of the civil service—namely Exhibit FCSC9 and Exhibit Awom 8, explicitly record the formal conversion of the Claimant from the Executive cadre to the professional Accounting/Administrative Officer cadre. Under the fire of cross-examination, DW4 was confronted with these documents and could not offer any coherent denial, admitting that "the records confirm her conversion." It is an immutable principle of our jurisprudence that documentary evidence is the best evidence and serves as an anchor to test the veracity of oral testimony. In Shuaibu v. Muazu (2014) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1409) 207, the Court of Appeal held that:
"Where there is a combination of oral as well as documentary evidence, the latter should be used as a hanger from which the former is to be assessed and weighed. This is because documents when tendered and admitted in court are like words uttered and do speak for themselves. They are more reliable and authentic than word from the vocal cords of a man as they are neither transient nor subject to distortion and or misrepresentation, but remain permanent and indelible. Memories fade but what is written does not suffer memory lapses."
- Applying this sound principle, the oral ipse dixit of DW4 must bow to the permanent and authentic records in Exhibit FCSC9 and Exhibit Awom 8, and I find as an established fact that the Claimant was indeed duly converted to the professional cadre, which legally unlocked her progression beyond the terminal ceiling of Grade Level 14.
- In presenting a defence that flatly contradicts their own official records, Counsel for the Defendants have engaged in a highly disingenuous forensic exercise. This Court must express its profound disapproval of this approach. Legal practice is not an arena for the manipulation of facts or the suppression of truth, and Counsel owes a paramount duty to the Court as an officer of the temple of justice. In Olufemi Taiwo & Another v. Nigeria Bottling Company Plc & Another (2025) LPELR-81142(SC), the Supreme Court, with commendable clarity, cautioned that
"Now, while it is correct that in putting across his client's case, a Counsel is duty bound to be fearless and courageous, he is not permitted to descend to the area of mischief or calculated attempt to misguide or mislead the Court with submissions that border on ridicule and which if erroneously acted upon by the court could lead to injustice."
- Similarly, in Mr. Oluwasoji Olamiju v. Mr. Dahunsi Oluwatoyin (2022) LPELR-58243(CA), the Court of Appeal reminded the bar that "Counsel, as an officer of the Court, owe the Court the professional duty of presenting accurate facts to the Court." The attempt by the Defendants' Counsel to argue against the Claimant's conversion in the teeth of their own documents, Exhibit FCSC9 and Exhibit Awom 8, represents an attempt to mislead this Court which I must strongly deprecate.
- Regarding the validity of her transfer of service, the record reveals a seamless administrative sequence. CW1 applied for the transfer of her service to the Second Defendant via Exhibit Rebecca 15. The Third Defendant, by its official letter, Exhibit Rebecca 16, formally conveyed its consent and "no objection" to the transfer. Upon this foundation, the First Defendant issued Exhibit Rebecca 17, formally approving her transfer of service on the grade of CANRAISS 15. Under Section 169 of the Evidence Act 2011, the law of estoppel by conduct is firmly enacted. Having actively represented to the Claimant and the Second Defendant that there was no objection to her transfer, and having formally approved and executed the same, the Defendants cannot now, several years later, turn around to assert a unilateral administrative "error" to dismantle the Claimant's career and deprive her of her vested rights. A public authority is bound by the rules of fair play and cannot treat its own statutory approvals as write-offs to be discarded at its whim. The Defendants are heavily estopped from denying the validity of the transfer of service.
- The Defendants' contention that the recall and demotion of the Claimant to Grade Level 14 was a mere administrative correction that did not require compliance with the Public Service Rules is a legal fallacy. The directive of the Defendants in Exhibit Rebecca 31, which recalled the Claimant to the office of the Third Defendant as a Chief Executive Officer on Grade Level 14, is a severe demotion. In our public service jurisprudence, a contract of employment with statutory flavour invests the employee with a legal status higher than the ordinary master-and-servant relationship, and any disciplinary action or alteration of status must strictly conform to the enabling statute or regulations. As held in Rector, Kwara State Polytechnic v. Adefila [2024] 9 NWLR 537, where an employment enjoys statutory flavour, the terms and conditions must be complied with, and any other manner of determination or disciplinary action inconsistent with the relevant statute is of no effect. Demotion is a severe disciplinary sanction that cannot be unilaterally imposed under the guise of an administrative correction without a query, a disciplinary panel, or proof of misconduct. In Dingoli v. Dr. Barau & Others [2012] 27 NLLR (Pt. 78) 332 CA, the Court of Appeal held that:
"Position-demotion is not a remedy that is freely available to employers to use as a disciplinary measure and Courts and tribunals have to be circumspect/cautious in making an order for demotion... Demotion is part of discipline of employee on the grounds of misconduct. However, the power to demote an employee must be expressly stated in the conditions of service regulating the employment of the employee."
- The Public Service Rules contain no provision authorizing a multi-grade demotion without due process and a fair hearing. Where a statute or regulation has prescribed the manner of doing an act, nothing short of that prescription will suffice, as established in Adeniyi v. Governing Council of Yabatech [1993] 6 NWLR (Pt. 426) 461 and Olufeagba v. Abdul-Raheem [2009] 18 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599. The Claimant was promoted to Grade Level 15 as far back as 8 December 2004, acted on that grade, and received salaries on that scale for seven years. To allow the Defendants at this late stage to deny her status would be a monumental injustice and a flagrant breach of Section 169 of the Evidence Act 2011, as supported by the case of Ladan Liman Tirwun v. Musa Ibrahim Jakkada [2013] LPELR-22795(CA). It is on this basis that I find that the act of the Defendants demoting the Claimant to Grade Level 14 and recalling her via Exhibit Rebecca 31 is ultra vires, illegal, and void.
- Before parting with this issue, this Court must address the Defendants' procedural objection that the Claimant’s suit is premature because she failed to exhaust internal administrative remedies. This objection touches on the subset of procedural jurisdiction. There is a fundamental difference between procedural jurisdiction and substantive jurisdiction. While the failure to comply with a statutory condition precedent before initiating an action is a matter of procedural jurisdiction, any irregularity in invoking the court's jurisdiction must be raised by the opponent at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it is deemed waived. In Julius Berger Nigeria Plc v. Almighty Projects Innovation Ltd (2022) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1804) 201, this Court made the point that
"A party becomes aware of a procedural defect in a process upon being served with that process. The application to set aside the process on the ground of such defect must be made immediately after being served with the process and before taking any further step in the proceedings. If a party takes a further step in the proceedings and continues to participate in it without complaining about the procedural defect in the process the right to so complain or object to the process is waived."
- The Defendants, having entered a full defence and participated in the trial on the merits without timeously raising this objection, have waived the right to do so. Even if the objection had been raised timeously, it is a settled principle of law that where a dispute involves constitutional rights or challenges ultra vires acts, the requirement to exhaust internal administrative mechanisms is not mandatory. In A-G Kwara State v. Adeyemo (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) 216, the Supreme Court held that "Where the matter involves constitutional rights or ultra vires acts, exhaustion is not required." Furthermore, the word "may" in statutory dispute resolution provisions is permissive and discretionary, as established in Ibrahim v. Osim (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 82) 257, which held that "The word 'may' is permissive and connotes discretion." The Claimant’s suit, which challenges ultra vires acts of demotion and the infraction of her constitutional right to fair hearing, is therefore properly before this Court.
- This conclusion is further reinforced by the contemporary constitutional framework governing labour relations in Nigeria under the Third Alteration Act 2010. Section 254C (1)(f) of the 1999 Constitution vests this Court with exclusive jurisdiction over civil causes and matters "relating to or connected with unfair labour practice or international best practices in labour, employment and industrial relation matters," while Section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 mandates that the Court shall have due regard to good or international best practices. In NUHPSW v. Outsourcing Services Ltd (2023) LPELR-60683(CA), the Court of Appeal emphasized that
"...part of the novel idea introduced in the third alteration is in the area of international best practices, which Section 254C (1) (f) of the Third Alteration Act makes Provision for... It is an innovative provision which seems to be directed at enthroning an entirely new employment and labour jurisprudence."
- As affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Mrs. Olawunmi Oyebola (Appeal No: CA/L/1091/2016), this Court is fully empowered to depart from traditional common-law restrictions on remedies to build a robust jurisprudence on unfair labour practices. Unilaterally demoting an active officer, recalling her in total disregard of her approved transfer, and stopping her salaries without a fair hearing represents an unfair labour practice that falls far below the contemporary world of work's decency threshold. The first consolidated issue is accordingly resolved in favour of the Claimant.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO
WHETHER THE CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO THE DECLARATORY, INJUNCTIVE, AND MONETARY RELIEFS SOUGHT IN HER STATEMENT OF FACTS.
- Having established that the recall and demotion of the Claimant are ultra vires and void, the Claimant remains, in the eye of the law, a permanent and validly appointed staff of the Second Defendant on her substantive grade of Director on the CANRAISS 15 scale. The Second Defendant has sought to shield itself from liability by arguing that it merely complied with the Integrated Personnel and Payroll Information System (IPPIS) centrally managed by the Third Defendant. This argument is wholly untenable. An employer cannot hide behind centralized electronic payment architectures or bureaucratic hierarchies to escape liability for the infraction of an employee's statutory and constitutional rights. The IPPIS is a technological tool for payment administration; it is not a constitutional or statutory shield that legitimizes the unlawful withholding or reduction of an employee's earned emoluments. The right to payment of salary is a fundamental and accrued benefit that cannot be taken away or reduced by unilateral administrative action. As held in Petroleum Training Institute v. Iyeke Matthew & Others (2012) FWLR (Pt. 623) 1949,
"The situation is so clear-cut that even if the employee’s claim for wrongful dismissal, termination or retirement from service is successful or dismissed, his claim for benefits or entitlements which had accrued, before his dismissal or termination, or retirement are always paid. This is because the entitlement accruing to the respondent in the instance are personal to him and is akin to savings."
- Furthermore, in Chinweorder Chukwu Awa v. Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund [2015] 60 NLLR (Pt. 211) 544, this Court held that
"An employee cannot be promoted to his detriment; and it cannot be a real promotion where no financial benefits accrue to the employee... in labour relations, where benefits have accrued under a contract of employment, any clause in the conditions of service which seeks to take away that benefit must be strictly construed."
- By unilaterally reducing the Claimant's monthly salary from N355,915.47 to N154,105.67, and completely stopping her salary since December 2023, the Defendants have committed a flagrant breach of her fundamental right to her wages. Under the present constitutional configuration, as articulated in Basil Offoh v. Institute of Management and Technology, Enugu (Unreported Suit No: NICN/EN/49/2023),
"The argument that breach of labour/employment rights cannot amount to breach of fundamental right is… not correct under the current configuration of the Third Alteration Act," and "Right to pay is fundamental right in Nigeria and could only be sued upon or enforced as breach of fundamental right simpliciter in the NIC alone, provided the breach arose from employment relations."
- The Claimant is therefore entitled to the recovery of her outstanding salaries and the payment of the monthly salary differential of N201,809.08. While the law is clear that special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved, as held in Gabriel Ativie v. Kabelmetal (Nig.) Ltd [2008] LPELR-591(SC), the Claimant has meticulously pleaded and proved the exact monthly reduction and the exact duration of the stoppage. This is not a case of vague or unparticularized monetary claims.
- The Claimant has also sought the recovery of her solicitor's fees as part of her damages. On this point, the law draws a sharp distinction between a claim for solicitor's fees sought as a substantive relief in an action and costs awarded to a successful party under the Rules of Court. A claim for solicitor's fees sought as a substantive relief is an item of special damages that must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. As cautioned by the Supreme Court in Nwanji v. Coastal Services Limited [2004] 36 WRN 1 and the Court of Appeal in Guinness Nigeria Plc v. Nwoke [2000] NWLR (Pt. 689) 135, it is not only "unethical and an affront to public policy to pass on the burden of solicitor’s fee to the other party," but a claim for solicitor’s fee is also outlandish and should not be allowed as it does not arise as a result of damage suffered in the course of the transaction between the parties. However, the cost of legal representation is a legitimate factor to be taken into consideration by the Court in exercising its judicial discretion to award costs to the successful party at the close of the case. In Onyebuchi Iroegbu & Another v. Richard Okwordu (1990) NWLR (Pt. 159) 643, the Court held that "The exercise of judicial discretion simply means the Judges are to act according to the rules of reason and justice not according to private opinion, and according to law and not humour." Acting according to these rules, the Claimant is entitled to reasonable costs under the Rules of this Court, while her substantive claim for solicitor's fees is disallowed. The second consolidated issue is resolved in favour of the Claimant.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE THREE
WHETHER THE THIRD DEFENDANT/COUNTER-CLAIMANT HAS PROVED ITS ENTITLEMENT TO THE SUM OF N9,717,643.04 CLAIMED AS OVERPAYMENT OF SALARIES AGAINST THE CLAIMANT.
- The Third Defendant, as Counter-Claimant, bears the legal burden of proving its claim on a preponderance of evidence, as a counter-claim is a separate and independent suit. Having already resolved the first issue by finding that the Claimant's placement on the CANRAISS 15 scale was validly approved, the legal foundation of the counter-claim has collapsed. Even if this Court were to examine the counter-claim on its merits, the evidence led by the Third Defendant is completely discredited. To prove the alleged overpayment, the Third Defendant relied on Exhibits Sakiru 1, 2, and 3, which are generic payroll computations. However, the Claimant successfully demolished this evidence during the cross-examination of the Third Defendant's sole witness, DW4. Under cross-examination, DW4 admitted that "the pay slips, Exhibits Sakiru 7 and 8, show deductions made from the Claimant's salary as refund for the overpayments" and further admitted that "Exhibits Sakiru 7 and 8 represent pay slips showing the refund of the overpayments." This admission is fatal to the Counter-Claimant's case. An admission against interest is the best evidence of the opponent and requires no further proof. As held in Ali & Another v. Lakeside Mews Ltd (2021) LPELR-56134(CA), quoting Seismograph Services Nig. Ltd v. Eyuafe (1976) 9-10 S. C. 135,
"...A statement oral or written, made by a party to a civil proceeding and which statement is adverse to his case is admissible in the proceedings as evidence against him of the truth of the facts asserted in the statement..."
- In Onyenge v. Ebere (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 1, the Supreme Court held an admission against interest to be "the best evidence," and in Shittu Sanusi & 2 Ors. v. Buraimo Obafunwa & Another [2006] LPELR-11863(CA), the Court held that "facts admitted require no proof... what is not denied is deemed admitted and what is admitted need not be proved." This principle is also codified in Section 125 of the Evidence Act 2011. Since the Third Defendant's own witness admitted that the pay slips, Exhibits Sakiru 7 and 8, show deductions and refunds of the overpayments, the Third Defendant's claim for the same sum is a clear attempt to double-recover public funds. Furthermore, the Third Defendant failed to produce the Claimant's comprehensive, uninterrupted record of service, which would have shown the complete ledger of her transactions and any remaining indebtedness. This failure triggers the statutory presumption under Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011, which provides that "evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it." By withholding the complete record of service, the Third Defendant has failed to displace the clear evidence of refund. Additionally, the record shows that the Third Defendant failed to respond to the Claimant's written demands and representations regarding this payroll reconciliation. As established in Coscharis Beverages Ltd v. ITF & Another (2021) LPELR-56849(CA) and Rematon Services Ltd v. NEM Ins. Plc [2020] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1744) 298, 'failure to respond to a business letter which by the nature of its contents require a response, amounts to an admission.' The Third Defendant's silence and subsequent failure to prove any subsisting, unliquidated debt requires that the counter-claim be dismissed. The third consolidated issue is resolved in favour of the Claimant, and the counter-claim is hereby dismissed.
- Before concluding, this Court must address the First Defendant's objection regarding the validity of the Claimant's deposition, raising the argument that the statement on oath was not made before a Commissioner for Oaths. The law on this point is well settled. While a mere affidavit stands on its own and is intrinsically inadmissible if it does not meet the requirements of the Oaths Act, a witness statement on oath adopted in open court regularizes the deposition. As held in Nwogu v. SCOA (Nig) Ltd (2018) LPELR-49785(CA), 'where a witness is in Court to say that he/she is adopting an irregular written deposition, the implication is that the witness is reasserting on oath what is contained in the irregular deposition, such adoption makes all the evidence in the written deposition admissible.' The Claimant, CW1, was duly sworn in open court and adopted her written deposition. This subsequent oath cures any defect in the previous oath. The objection of the First Defendant is therefore purely technical and must be rejected in the interest of substantial justice. In the result, the Claimant's action succeeds in its entirety, and the Third Defendant's Counter-Claim fails and is dismissed.
- Consequently, this Court hereby makes the following orders:
- It is declared that the Claimant’s transfer of service from the 3rd Defendant to the 2nd Defendant was validly approved by the 1st Defendant on 2 October 2020 on the grade of CANRAISS 15, and the Claimant remains a permanent and active staff member of the 2nd Defendant at her current substantive rank of Director (CANRAISS 15).
- It is declared that the directive of the Defendants recalling the Claimant to the office of the 3rd Defendant as Chief Executive Officer (Accounts) on Grade Level 14, and her subsequent demotion, reduction, and stoppage of her salary are illegal, unconstitutional, null, void, and of no effect whatsoever.
- An order of perpetual injunction is hereby made restraining the Defendants, whether by themselves, their agents, privies, or officers, from further acting on the directive of recall, interfering with the Claimant's employment status, or demoting her from her substantive rank of Director (CANRAISS 15).
- The 2nd Defendant is ordered to immediately restore the Claimant's name to its payroll and pay all outstanding salaries, allowances, and withheld emoluments due to her as a Director on CANRAISS 15 from December 2023 to the date of this judgment.
- The Defendants are ordered to pay to the Claimant the monthly salary differentials of N201,809.08 (being the difference between N355,915.47 and N154,105.67) from February 2024 to the date of this judgment.
- The Counter-Claim filed by the 3rd Defendant is hereby dismissed in its entirety for lack of proof.
- Costs of this action are awarded to the Claimant in the sum of N500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) against the 1st Defendant and N300,000.00 (Three Hundred Thousand Naira) against the 3rd Defendant.
- Judgment is hereby entered.
…………………..
Hon. Justice E. D. Subilim
JUDGE