CHAHUU PRINCE ABRAHAM -VS- NIGERIAN SHIPPERS COUNCIL - National Industrial Court of Nigeria

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM

DATE: 24^THJULY, 2026

SUIT NO.: NICN/ABJ/402/2024

BETWEEN:

CHAHUU PRINCE ABRAHAM CLAIMANT

AND

NIGERIAN SHIPPERS COUNCIL DEFENDANT

REPRESENTATION:

OLADELE GBADEYAN, ESQ., WITH HIM SUNDAY A. ABORISADE, ESQ., OLAJIDE O. OWONLA, ESQ., BABASOLA ADEWUMI, ESQ., BOLADE AKINLAWON, ESQ., TOYIN ADEGBEHINGBE, MISS FOR THE CLAIMANT.

ABDUL MOHAMMED SAN, FCIARB. (UK) WITH OBIABO FRANCIS AMEDU ESQ., CHIEMELIE NNNEOMA AYO, ESQ., KHALIFA IBRAHIM SHUAIBU, ESQ., ABUSUFYANU ABUBAKAR, ESQ., BINBOL BENJAMIN TANGDEN, ESQ., DOYINSOLA OLUKOLADE ESQ., ISAAC AKWU ESQ., MICHELLE ANTEYI ESQ. FOR THE DEFENDANT.

JUDGMENT

1.This action was commenced vide a complaint dated the 1st November 2024. The Claimant on the 6th December 2024 filed an amended Statement of Material Facts. The Claimant is praying for the grant of the following reliefs from this Honourable Court:

1. A DECLARATION that the purported restriction of the Claimant from his duty post by the Defendant is illegal and unlawful.

2. A DECLARATION that the Defendant was in breach of its contractual obligations to the Claimant when she restricted the Claimant from his duty post contrary to the terms and Condition of Service of the Defendant.

3. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court mandating the Defendant to pay and keep paying the Claimant's arrears of the salaries, allowances necessary entitlement and benefits owed to her by the Defendants from the day of assumption of duty till the day of the Judgement and from the day of Judgment until the employment is legally determined one way or the other in line with the agreement between the parties, specifically including:

a. Monthly Salary: N350,000 (Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira Only)

b. Allowance for New Employee (28 Days Allowance): N1,020,000 (One Million and Twenty Thousand Naira Only)

c. Child Education Allowance: N500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

d. Leave Allowance: N350,000 (Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira Only)

e. Provision Allowance: N200,000 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

f. Rent Allowance: N1,000,000 (One Million Naira Only)

g. Utility Allowance: N150,000 (One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira Only)

h. Meal Subsidy: N200,000 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

k. House Maintenance Allowance: N200,000 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

I. Furniture Allowance: N500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

m. Kilometre Allowance: N300,000 (Three Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

n. Transport Allowance: N150,000 (One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira Only)

o. Proficiency Allowance: N175,000 (One Hundred and Seventy-five Thousand Naira Only)

4. AN ORDER for General Damages to the tune of N10, 000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira Only) in favour of the Claimant against the Defendant as a result of the suffering, humiliation meted out to the Claimant, loss of earning and psychological trauma suffered by the Claimant by the action of the Defendant.

5. Interest charged at 25% (Twenty-Five per cent) per annum on all the accumulated salaries and allowances due to the Claimant from the due date for the first salary to the day of the judgment and charged at the rate of 10% per annum from the day of the judgment until the final liquidation of the Judgment debt.

6. The cost of this suit.

2.On the 17th December 2024, Upon being served with the Claimant's amended originating process, the Defendant filed an amended Statement of Defence.

CASE OF THE CLAIMANT

3.The Claimant was employed by the Defendant as a permanent and pensionable staff in the position of Operation Officer II on October 10, 2023. Subsequently, he was posted to the Minna Area Office as Operation Officer II on October 30, 2023.In November 2023, the Claimant received an unofficial communication via text message from the private telephone number of one Mr. Babatunde Idowu of the Defendant's Human Resources Department. This communication directed him to stay away from his duty post pending further instructions from the management. The Claimant averred that he initially attempted to continue with his work, but he was resisted by security personnel acting on the Defendant's instructions. Consequently, he was prevented from complaining to his Supervisor or any other person regarding the restriction from work. He was thereby compelled to await further instructions from the Defendant, which were never issued. The Claimant further pleaded that he was never indicted for any offence, breach, or misconduct during or after his probationary period. Following these events, he briefed his Solicitors to demand his outstanding entitlements.

CASE OF THE DEFENDANT

4.The Defendant, in her Amended Statement of Defence, denied that the Claimant's appointment was permanent and pensionable, asserting it was a provisional offer dated October 10, 2023. The Claimant was subsequently posted on October 30, 2023, and his employment was terminated on November 21, 2023. The Defendant maintained that the text message from Mr. Babatunde was an official communication channel. Furthermore, the Defendant contended that the Claimant's disregard of a superior officer's directive constituted a valid ground for dismissal.

COMMENCEMENT OF HEARING

5.The Claimant opened his case on the 19th February, 2025. The Claimant adopted his witness statement on oath and tendered Exhibits A, B, C and D and was cross-examined by the Defendant on the same day. The Claimant then closed his case. On the 11th of June, 2025, the Defendant opened its case by calling Mr. Idowu Babatunde Olalekan who adopted his witness statement on oath and thereafter tendered Exhibits Idowu A, B, C, D and E which were admitted in evidence. At the conclusion of the plenary trial, the Court adjourned the suit for parties to file their respective final written address in compliance with the rules of this Honourable Court.

CLAIMANT'S SUBMISSIONS

6.Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Olasoji O. Olowolafe, SAN, submitted that the suit as constituted is valid, competent, and does not suffer from any legal disability that could render it incompetent or rob this Court of the jurisdiction to entertain it. Counsel contended that in deciphering the question of jurisdiction, the only materials the Court is permitted to look at are the totality of the pleadings of the Claimant, and for this proposition, he relied on Adeyemi v. Opeyori [1976] 9-10 SC 31, UBN Plc v. Integrated Timber & Plywood Products Ltd [2000] 2 NWLR (Pt. 680) 99 at 110, and Okulate v. Awosanya [2000] 2 NWLR (Pt. 646) 530 at 555. Counsel argued that a careful perusal of the Claimant's claims would reveal that the case is not merely based on the purported restriction of the Claimant by the Defendant, but rather on the Defendant's failure to honor the terms of agreement between the parties and the failure to pay settled entitlements. Counsel maintained that it is legally wrong to construe pleadings in parts rather than as a whole, relying on Aqua Ltd v. Ondo State Sport Council [1988] 4 NW 622 and Tukur v. Govt of Gongola State [1989] 4 NW 517 to submit that documents and pleadings must be construed together in their entirety.

On Issue 1: WHETHER THE CLAIMANT'S SUIT WAS NOT FILED WITHIN THE TIME ALLOWED BY THE PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION ACT AND THEREBY STATUTE BARRED?

7.Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the cause of action in this suit crystallized after the Defendant failed to act on the Claimant's demands as contained in the Solicitors' letter of demand dated 21st October 2024. Counsel argued that the case falls within the well-recognized exceptions to the application of the Public Officers Protection Act. He submitted that to determine whether a suit is caught by the limitation law, the Court must examine the writ of summons and the statement of claim to ascertain when the cause of action accrued and when the suit was filed, citing Wulima v. Usman [2014] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1432) 160, Egbe v. Adefarasin (No. 2) [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1, and Eregbowa v. Obanor [2010] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1218) 33. Counsel submitted that the Defendant's actions were not done in good faith, as the Defendant's witness, DW1, confirmed under cross-examination that the actions went against the express provisions of the Terms and Conditions of Service. Counsel relied on Hassan v. Aliyu [2010] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 547 at 589 and Offoboche v. Ogoja L.G. [2001] 16 NWLR (Pt. 739) 458, which referred to CBN v. Okojie [2004] 10 NWLR (Pt. 882) 488, for the proposition that the protection of the Public Officers Protection Act will not avail a public officer who fails to act in good faith, or who acts in abuse of office, maliciously, or without any semblance of legal justification.

8.Furthermore, Counsel argued that another established exception to the application of the Public Officers Protection Act is where the action is predicated on a breach of contract. Counsel submitted that the relationship between the parties constituted a valid contract of employment, supported by the Offer of Provisional Appointment (Exhibit A) and the Claimant's acceptance by resuming duty upon being posted, which constituted valuable consideration. Counsel cited African (Nig) Ltd v. A.G of the Federation [1996] 9 NWLR (Pt. 475) 634 at 656-671 and Orient Bank (Nig) Plc v. Bilante International Ltd. [1997] 8 NWLR (Pt. 515) 37 to outline the essential elements of a contract. He argued that acceptance can be demonstrated by conduct, citing Federal Government of Nigeria v. Zebra Energy Ltd. [2002] 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 162 at 211 and Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Ozigi [1991] 2 All NLR 45; Oyedeji v. Fasheun [1976] UILR 134 to assert that the performance of a condition is evidence of acceptance. Counsel relied on the Supreme Court decision in Roe Ltd. v. UNN [2018] LPELR-43855(SC) and Salako v. I.E.D.B (1953) 20 NLR 169 to argue that the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to cases of breach of contract, and cited Anolam v. F.U.T.O [2025] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1984) 651 for the proposition that the Act applies to contracts of employment with statutory flavor, meaning the Defendant cannot use the Act to escape its common-law contractual obligations.

9.In responding to the Defendant's reliance on Okoronkwo v. INEC [2025] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1991) 131, Counsel argued that the facts of that case are completely dissimilar and inapplicable. Counsel submitted that in Okoronkwo's case, the employee received an official letter of suspension which was a direct and positive act on a specific date, whereas the Claimant in this case only received an unofficial SMS message from the personal number of Mr. Babatunde Idowu directing him to stay away from work. Counsel also pointed out that the employee in Okoronkwo's case pleaded that his employment had statutory flavor and was guided by the Civil Service Rules, whereas the Claimant here asserts a purely contractual employment. Counsel quoted extensively from Okoronkwo v. INEC Supra to demonstrate that the Supreme Court's decision was based on a claim for wrongful suspension under statutory flavor, rather than an action for breach of contract under common law.

10.Counsel submitted that even if the Public Officers Protection Act were applicable, the cause of action only crystallized when the Defendant refused to pay the Claimant's outstanding salaries and allowances after the Solicitors' demand letter dated 21st October 2024. Counsel cited CIL Risk & Asset Management Ltd. v. Ekiti State Government [2020] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1738) 203 at 247, Thomas v. Olufosoye [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 659, and S.P.D.C (Nig) Ltd. v. X.M.I Fed. Ltd. [2006] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1004) 189 to define a cause of action. He argued that the wrongful act and its attendant injury continued unabated until the probationary period of twelve months elapsed, making the suit filed on 1st November 2024 competent and within time, relying on Abubakar v. Michelin Motor Services Ltd. [2020] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1739) 555 at 574 and Cookey v. Fombo [2005] 15 NWLR (Pt. 947) 182.

11.Counsel contended that the SMS message sent by Mr. Babatunde Idowu on 21st November 2023 was unofficial and sent in contravention of the Staff Manual. He cited Ransome Kuti v. A.G. Federation [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 6) 211; National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria v. Powerind Engineering Co. Ltd. [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 14) 1 to show that parties are bound by their pleadings. Counsel argued that the Defendant's actions amounted to an abuse of office, defined as using power to achieve ends other than those for which power was granted, citing Uniport v. John [2020] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1731) 106 at 134, Radiographers Regd. Board Nig. v. M & HWUN [2021] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1777) 149, Peak Merchant Bank Ltd. v. C.B.N [2017] LPELR-42324; Nigerian Army v. Abayomi [2019] LPELR-47084. Counsel pointed out that DW1 admitted during cross-examination that there was no valid basis for disallowing the Claimant from working, that the Claimant was never queried, and that the SMS did not comply with the written notice requirement of paragraph 3.2.18 of the Terms and Conditions of Service. Counsel relied on Ogbeide v. Osule [2004] 12 NWLR (Pt. 886) 86 at 117 and Adama v. K.S.H.A [2019] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1699) 501 to submit that evidence elicited under cross-examination of an opponent's witness is admissible and should be given full probative value.

ON ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE CLAIMANT FALLS WITHIN THE CATEGORY OF PERMANENT AND PENSIONABLE EMPLOYMENT WITHIN THE DEFENDANT'S ESTABLISHMENT AND IF SO, WHETHER THE DEFENDANT CAN TERMINATE THE CLAIMANT'S APPOINTMENT WITHOUT FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURES LAID OUT IN THE DEFENDANT'S TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE?

12.Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Olasoji O. Olowolafe, SAN, submitted that the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant is strictly a contract of employment governed by the Terms and Conditions of Service. Counsel cited Ogunyade v. Oshunkeye [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1057) 218 at 246; Owners M/V Gongola Hope v. S.C Nig Ltd [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1056) 189 at 215 to submit that pleadings must be supported by credible and cogent evidence. Counsel argued that Exhibit A (Letter of Appointment), Exhibit C (Terms and Conditions of Service), and the admissions of DW1 show that the Claimant's employment falls under the "permanent and pensionable" category under paragraph 3.2.2 of the Staff Manual, even though it was subject to a probationary period of twelve months. Counsel argued that "probation" is not a separate category of employment, but merely an observation period. Counsel submitted that under paragraph 3.2.2, a permanent and pensionable appointment entitles a person to permanent and continuous service, which cannot be terminated or abrogated except as expressly provided by the Staff Manual. Counsel cited Abacha v. F.R.N [2006] 4 NWLR (Pt. 970) 239 for the proposition that the Court will give the words of a document their plain and ordinary meaning. He argued that since the Claimant was never indicted for any misconduct, he was not affected by the disqualification provisions under paragraph 3.2.15 of the Terms and Conditions of Service. Counsel argued that DW1 confirmed that the Claimant's employment falls under the permanent and pensionable category, that he was never queried, and that the Defendant did not terminate his employment for any of the reasons contained in the Terms and Conditions of Service. Counsel submitted that where a document has laid down a procedure for doing a thing, no other mode or method should be followed, citing Okereke v. Yar'Adua [2008] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100) 95 at 127, C.C.B Plc v. Anambra State [1992] 10 SCNJ 137 at 163, and Bamisile v. Osasuyi [2007] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1042) 225 at 272, and therefore urged the Court to give full effect to the provisions of the Staff Manual.

ON ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE CLAIMANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS SOUGHT?

9.Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Olasoji O. Olowolafe, SAN, submitted that the Claimant has proved his case and is entitled to all the reliefs sought. Counsel distinguished Ondo State University v. Folayan [1994] LPELR-2673(SC) from the facts of this case. Counsel submitted that in Folayan, the employee argued that the expiration of the probationary period amounted to a "deemed confirmation," which the Supreme Court rejected as forcing a willing servant on an unwilling master. Counsel argued that in this case, there was no termination at all, meaning the contract remains intact and subsisting, and the court can simply deem that there was an extension of the probationary period. Counsel submitted that even during probation, an employer is bound to follow the laid-down conditions for termination of the appointment, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Ihezukwu v. University of Jos [1990] LPELR-1461(SC) and Al-Bishak v. National Productivity Centre & Anor [2015] LPELR-24659(CA) to argue that an employer must show that the contract was terminated in accordance with its express terms, whether on a permanent or probationary basis. Counsel submitted that the Defendant failed to write any termination letter or pay the required one-month salary in lieu of notice under paragraph 3.2.18 of the Terms and Conditions.

10.Regarding the claims for salaries, allowances, and entitlements, Counsel submitted that although these fall under the head of special damages, they only require credible evidence. He relied on Amadi v. Chinda [2009] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1148) 107 at 131 to argue that there is nothing extraordinarily sacrosanct about special damages and their proof. Counsel argued that the Claimant specifically pleaded these special damages and led oral evidence which was unchallenged and uncontroverted, and the Court has a duty to act on such unchallenged evidence, citing Boye Ltd v. Sowemimo [2022] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1817) 195 at 219, Inegbedion v. Selo-Gemen [2013] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 211 at 236, and Badejo v. Federal Ministry of Education [1996] 8 NWLR (Pt. 464) 15 at 42. He argued that the Defendant cannot plead its own default of illegally restricting the Claimant as a defence to non-payment of salaries. Counsel submitted that as long as an employee's appointment is not validly determined, he remains on the pay list and is entitled to salaries and allowances, relying on Bamisile v. NJC & Ors [2012] LPELR-8381.

11.Regarding general damages, Counsel submitted that the law implies general damages in every breach of contract. He cited Stanbic IBTC Bank v. Longterm Global Capital Ltd & Ors [2021] LPELR-55610(CA), Unity Bank Plc v. Ahmed [2020] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1705) 364; Cameroon Airlines v. Otutuizu [2005] 9 NWLR (Pt. 929) 202 at 223 to support this claim. Counsel also submitted that the Court has the power to award post-judgment interest, citing Cappa & D'Alberto (Nig.) Plc v. NDIC [2021] LPELR-53379 (SC). In response to the Defendant's argument that termination can be done by text message, Counsel argued that ENL Consortium Ltd v. Shambilat Shelter (Nig.) Ltd [2018] LPELR-43902(SC) does not establish a general rule allowing parties to depart from written contractual terms. He cited Mbat v. Hon. Minister, FCT [2024] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1965) 451 at 482 to assert that courts will recognize and enforce terms willingly entered into. Counsel also urged the Court not to follow the unreported decision in Saifullah Muhammed Aliyu v. NPA (Suit No. NICN/ABJ/20/2023), as it is of coordinate jurisdiction and only persuasive, and instead follow Supreme Court precedents such as Iyeke v. PTI (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 217, Ihezukwu v. Unijos (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 598; Ondo State University v. Folayan (supra), which mandate that termination during probation must comply with the contractually agreed procedure.

DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSIONS

12.Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Abdul Mohammed, SAN, submitted that the Claimant's suit is incompetent and should be dismissed in its entirety. Counsel raised critical threshold issues regarding the jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate upon the claims and further argued that the Claimant's substantive case is completely devoid of merit. Counsel contended that the Claimant's relationship with the Defendant was strictly provisional and temporary, and that the contract had been lawfully terminated within the probationary period without any procedural violations.

13. On Whether the suit of the Claimant against the Defendant is statute barred, learned Counsel to the Defendant, Abdul Mohammed, SAN, submitted that the Claimant's suit is statute-barred under Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. Counsel submitted that the Defendant is a public officer, relying on Ibrahim v. J.S.C Kaduna State [1998] 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) p. 1, Offoboche v. Ogoja Local Government [2001] 16 NWLR (Pt. 739) p. 458, Kolo v. A-G, Federation [2003] 10 NWLR (Pt. 829) p. 602, and Daudu v. University of Agriculture Makurdi [2002] 17 NWLR (Pt. 796) 362, as well as Nwafor v. MDCN [2016] LPELR-41495(CA), Central Bank of Nigeria v. Hydro Air Pty Ltd [2014] 16 NWLR (Part 1434) 482, and Utomodu v. Mil. Gov, Bendel State [2014] 11 NWLR (Part 1417) 97. Counsel submitted that prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Okoronkwo v. I.N.E.C. [2025] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1991) 131, there had been conflicting decisions regarding whether the Act applies to contracts of employment, mentioning Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission v. Ajibola Johnson [2019] 2 NWLR (Part 1656) 247, Idachaba v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi [2021] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1787) 209, and Rector Kwara Poly v. Adefila [2024] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1944) 529. Counsel submitted that where there are conflicting decisions, the Court is bound to follow the latest decision of the Supreme Court, citing Cyril O. Osakue v. Federal College of Education, Asaba [2010] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1201) 1, Osude v. Azodo [2017] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1688) 295, and Edeoga & Anor v. INEC & Ors [2023] LPELR-61806(SC). Counsel cited Okoronkwo v. I.N.E.C. to argue that an action rooted in a contract of employment is indeed subject to the Public Officers Protection Act. Counsel argued that the Claimant's cause of action arose in November 2023 when he received a text message directing him to stay away from his duty post, but the suit was only filed on 1st November 2024. Counsel calculated that a period of almost one year had elapsed, rendering the suit statute-barred. Counsel cited JFS Investment Ltd v. Brawal Line Ltd & Ors [2010] 12 SCNJ 275, William O. Olagunju & Anor v. Power Holding Co. of Nigeria Plc [2011] 4 SCNJ 192, Chief Ikedi Ohakim v. Chief Martin Agbaso [2010] 7 SCNJ 137, and Odebiyi v. Wema Bank Plc & Ors [2014] LPELR-22993(CA) to submit that a statute-barred action robs the court of jurisdiction and must be dismissed.

14.In the Reply on Point of Law, Counsel submitted that the Claimant's concession that his employment has no statutory flavor means it is a master/servant relationship governed by common law, which can be terminated without any formality. Counsel relied on U.T.C (Nig) Plc v. Peters [2022] LPELR-57289 per Augie JSC for the proposition that a master has the right to terminate a servant's employment for good, bad, or no reasons at all. Counsel also submitted that the Claimant's failure to respond to the authorities cited by the Defendant regarding the validity of SMS as a means of communication means the Claimant has conceded the issue, citing Kanu v. FRN [2022] LPELR-58768 and the decision of Obande Ogbuinya, JCA in Alhaji M. K. Gujba v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc & Anor [2011] LPELR-8971(CA), which referred to Nwankwo v. Yar'Adua [2010] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1209) 518. He cited ENL Consortium Ltd v. Shambilat Shelter (Nig) [2018] LPELR-43902(SC), Continental Sales Ltd v. R. Shipping Inc [2012] LPELR-7905(CA), C.E & M.S. v. Pazan [2020] 1 NWLR (Part 1704) 70, and Sterling Bank v. Akintoye Akinbode [2018] LPELR-50669(CA) to argue that electronic service and communication are legally recognized. Counsel submitted that under Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011, electronic records are documents, and the term 'in writing' must be given a purposive, digital-age interpretation. Counsel argued that the Claimant's reliance on Abubakar v. Michelin Motor Services Ltd [2020] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1739) 555 actually supports the Defendant, as the Supreme Court in that case dismissed the appeal because the action was filed eight years after accrual, and held that a cause of action consists of a wrongful act and consequent damage, both of which occurred on 21st November 2023. Counsel further argued that the Claimant failed to plead or prove any facts showing bad faith or abuse of office as defined in Radiographers Regd. Board Nig v. M & HWUN [2021] 8 NWLR (Pt. 177) 149. Finally, Counsel argued that the Claimant's invitation to strike out paragraph 6 of the Statement of Defence is belated because pleadings had closed, citing Finnih v. Imade [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt. 219) 511 to submit that conclusions of law can be drawn from material facts pleaded, and the fact that the Claimant ignored his superior's instructions was admitted in the pleadings.

On Issue 1: Whether from the totality of facts in this suit: particularly the Defendant's Letter of Employment and condition of service, the Claimant has proved that his employment is one of permanent and pensionable as to require the Defendant comply with the dispute resolution procedure contained in Defendant's Terms and Condition of Service

15.Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Abdul Mohammed, SAN, submitted that because the termination occurred during the probationary period, the Claimant cannot insist that his employment has become permanent and pensionable or that the termination is void. Counsel cited Katto v. CBN [1999] LPELR-1677(SC) to argue that the parties are bound by the written terms of their contract and the court cannot look outside those terms. Counsel referred to Exhibit A (the Letter of Provisional Appointment) and sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.18 of the Terms and Conditions of Service to argue that a probationary employee holds a temporary status and does not enjoy the same conditions of service as a confirmed employee. Counsel cited Alhaji Baba v. Nigerian Civil Aviation Training Centre Zaria & Anor [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 388, Al-Bishak v. National Productivity Centre & Anor [2015] LPELR-24659(CA), Igwilo v. C.B.N [2000] 9 NWLR (Pt. 672) 302, and Alhassan v. ABU, Zaria [2011] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1259) 417 to submit that no procedure need be followed when terminating a probationary employee as long as the employer is satisfied there is cause. He cited Ihezukwu v. University of Jos & Ors [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 598 for the proposition that an employer retains the right not to confirm an appointment and may lawfully dismiss an employee before the expiration of the probationary period. Counsel also cited Ondo State University & Anor v. Folayan [1994] LPELR-2673(SC) to show that confirmation is not automatic and a "deemed confirmation" would be ultra vires, and that the courts will not foist a servant on an unwilling master. 16.Counsel cited Nitel Plc & Anor v. Akwa [2005] LPELR-5971(CA) to reiterate that a company can terminate a probationary employee's appointment for unsuitability. Counsel also relied on the National Industrial Court decision in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/20/2023, Saifullah Muhammad Aliyu v. Nigerian Ports Authority, where the court followed appellate decisions to hold that it is an administrative process and the court will not absurdly interfere with the employer's discretion. He cited Celtel Nigeria BV v. Econet Wireless Ltd & Ors [2014] LPELR-22430 to argue that courts do not set aside administrative acts on the ground that a particular process was not followed. Counsel argued that the Claimant's appointment was terminated through the SMS message, and the Claimant acknowledged this by replying that he would participate in a fresh recruitment exercise, showing he knew his provisional appointment had ended.

On Issue 2: Whether the Claimant has shown an entitlement to the grant of the Reliefs sought in this suit herein?

17.Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Abdul Mohammed, SAN, submitted that the Claimant is seeking declaratory reliefs, which are equitable, discretionary, and require clear and credible evidence. He cited Col. Nicholas Ayanru (Rtd) v. Mandilas Ltd [2007] 4 SCNJ 388, Nweke v. Okorie [2015] LPELR-40650, Ifekandu & Anor v. Uzoegwu [2008] LPELR-1435(SC), Yaro v. Arewa Construction Ltd & Ors [2007] LPELR-3516(SC), and Kuburi International Trading Co. Ltd & Anor v. Bulama Musti & Anor [2018] LPELR-44104. Counsel argued that the Claimant's claim to be paid salaries and allowances from November 2023 till the day of judgment is "manifestly absurd" and would result in forcing an employee on an unwilling master, relying on Ondo State University & Anor v. Folayan (supra). Counsel submitted that there is no evidence that the Claimant actually worked beyond November 2023, and equity frowns at unjust enrichment, citing Obeya v. Okpoga Microfinance Bank Ltd [2019] LPELR-47615(CA) and Eboni Finance and Securities Ltd v. Wole-Ojo Technical Services Ltd [1996] 7 NWLR (Pt. 461) 464. Counsel argued that the sums claimed are in the nature of special damages, which must be strictly pleaded and proved with quantification, relying on Produce Marketing Board v. A.O. Adewunmi (1972) 11 SC 111/24; Neka B.B.B. Manufacturing Company Ltd v. African Continental Bank Ltd [2004] LPELR-1982(SC). Counsel submitted that the Claimant failed to provide any proof of entitlement to these specific amounts, and the Court cannot write a contract for the parties or award sums without a clear basis, citing Board of Management of FMC, Makurdi v. Kwembe [2015] LPELR-40486(CA). Finally, Counsel submitted that where the main claims fail, the ancillary claims for damages, interest, and costs must also fail, citing Fafunwa v. Bellview Travels Ltd (2013] LPELR-20800(CA), McDonald Scientific Emporium Ltd v. Access Bank [2021] LPELR-53301(CA), Eligwe v. Okpokiri [2015] 240 LRCN 28, Jimoh v. Jimoh & Ors [2018] LPELR-43793(CA), Kakih v. PDP & Ors [2014] LPELR-23277(SC), and Gov. of Kogi State & Anor v. Simon [2024] LPELR-73317(CA).

COURT’S DECISION

18.Having meticulously considered the pleadings, the evidence adduced by all parties, and the comprehensive written submissions of counsel, this Honorable Court hereby formulates the pivotal issues requiring determination as follows:

1. Whether the restriction of the Claimant from his duty post by means of an SMS message constituted a breach of the express and implied terms and conditions of service governing the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant.

2. Whether the Defendant was legally obligated to adhere to the prescribed procedures for terminating an appointment during the probationary period, as stipulated in the contract of employment, and whether the Defendant’s failure to comply with these mandatory procedures rendered the purported restriction or termination unlawful and void.

3. Whether the present suit is statute-barred by virtue of the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap. P41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, or any other applicable limitation statute.

4. Whether, in light of the findings on the preceding issues, the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in the Amended Statement of Material Facts.

19.It is evident from the originating process that the Claimant primarily seeks declaratory reliefs. This Court notes that a claim for declaratory relief is a discretionary remedy, not granted as a matter of course or merely upon admission by the adverse party. Consequently, a claimant seeking such relief must rely on the inherent strength of their own case, adducing credible evidence in support of the pleaded facts and sought reliefs, rather than on any perceived weakness in the defendant's case. See TSY Ltd v. Nwachukwu [2024] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1954) 147@173-174, Paras F-A (SC); Aliyu v. Namadi [2023] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1885) 161@214, Paras C-E (SC); Adamu v. Nigerian Airforce [2022] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1822) 159@177, Paras F-G; 178, Paras E-G (SC); and Adesina v. Air France [2022] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1833) 523@555-556, Paras H-B. The burden of proof, therefore, rests squarely on the Claimant to establish his case on the preponderance of evidence, or balance of probabilities. However, it is equally crucial to note that where the Defendant raises affirmative defences, such as statute bar or valid termination, the burden shifts to the Defendant to establish such defences by the same standard of proof. The Claimant is only entitled to leverage aspects of the Defendant’s case that unequivocally support his own. See Hanatu v. Amadiu [2020] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1728) 115@128, Paras A-C (SC); C.D.C (Nig) Ltd v. SCOA (Nig) Ltd [2007] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1030) 300@327, Paras A-F (SC).

20.The foundational principle of civil litigation dictates that a claimant initiating an action must prove their case to secure a favorable judgment. This is the primary rule of evidence: any party making an assertion bears the burden of proving it. See Olusesi v. Oyelusi and Others [1986] 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 31) 634; Chukwudi and Another v. Unachuku [1979] 3 C.A. 114. Before delving into the substantive issues formulated for determination, this Court deems it necessary to address certain preliminary matters.

21.The Claimant, in paragraph 12 of his Amended Statement of Facts, averred that the Public Service Rules (PSR) do not apply to the employment relationship between him and the Defendant, asserting that the relationship is instead regulated by the Defendant’s Staff Manual. The Defendant, conversely, countered this in paragraph 8 of its Amended Statement of Defence, implying the applicability of statutory flavour. This Court is mindful that the Claimant’s averment seeks to establish a master-servant relationship, while the Defendant contends otherwise.

22.Having meticulously reviewed Exhibit A, the letter of employment, and Exhibit C, the Staff Manual, this Court recognizes that staff handbooks, manuals, circulars, and administrative guidelines are commonly issued by management in government agencies to ensure workplace standardization. While these documents may be incorporated by reference into a contract of employment, they do not inherently confer "statutory flavour" upon the employment relationship. The law is trite: where a handbook is merely an internal agreement between management and staff, and has not been laid before the legislature or published as a statutory instrument (where required by an enabling Act), it remains a purely contractual document. The Supreme Court, in Adedeji & Ors v. Central Bank of Nigeria & Attorney-General of the Federation [2023] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1878) 531, emphatically cautioned against the liberal expansion of the doctrine of employment with statutory flavour. The Apex Court reiterated that internal documents, such as staff manuals, cannot create a statutory flavoured employment relationship unless they are expressly authorized by or derived from a statute. Furthermore, the Supreme Court emphasized that public institutions can, and frequently do, engage in master-servant relationships when the specific terms of engagement are not grounded in a legislative instrument. This, in the considered view of this Court, is precisely the situation in the instant suit. The mere fact that the Defendant is a creature of statute does not automatically transform the employment relationship with its employees into one with statutory flavour. The Defendant’s Staff Manual does not qualify as subsidiary legislation in the eyes of the law. Only rules, regulations, or orders made by an authority (such as a Minister, Council, or Board) under powers granted by a principal Act of the National Assembly can be said to have statutory flavour, as these are referred to as subsidiary legislation. This is demonstrably not the case here. I therefore find and hold that the relationship between the parties in this suit is one of master and servant.

23.The Claimant, through his counsel, in their written brief, urged this Court to strike out Paragraph 6 of the Defendant's Statement of Defence, contending that it constituted an "argument or legal conclusion" rather than a statement of material fact, thereby offending the rules of pleading. The Defendant, conversely, argued that the application was belated, as pleadings had long since closed, and therefore ought not to be entertained.

24.On this point, this Court is guided by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the import and application of Rules of Court. In Obi v. INEC & Ors [2008] LPELR-2167 (SC) and Oloba v. Akereja (1988) 7 SC (Pt. 1), the apex court underscored the necessity of obeying Rules of Court. However, this obedience is not to be slavish, as eloquently articulated by Peter-Odili, JSC, in Federal Republic of Nigeria v. T.A. Dairo & Ors [2015] LPELR-24303 (SC), quoting Niki Tobi, JSC, in Abubakar v. Yar’adua [2008] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1078) SC 465 @ 511 Para E-G:

“Rules of Court are meant to be obeyed of course. That is why they are made. There should be no argument about that. But there is an important qualification or caveat and it is that their obedience cannot or should not be slavish to the point that justice in the case is destroyed or thrown overboard. The greatest barometer as far as the public is concerned is whether at the end of the litigation process, justice has been done to the parties. Therefore, if in the course of doing justice, some harm is done to some procedural rules which hurts the rule such as paragraph 7 of the Practice Directions, the Court should be happy that it took the line of action in pursuance of justice.”

25.It is a well-established principle that mandatory words in the Rules of Court are not sacrosanct and are applied permissively, allowing for their discretionary application by the Court in the paramount interest of justice. See Obi v. INEC [2008] 1-2 SC 23 SC and Katto v. CBN [1991] 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 126. While Rules of Practice are undoubtedly meant to be respected and obeyed, they serve as handmaids of the law, designed to aid in the due administration of justice, not to impede it. This Court finds no compelling or convincing reason in the arguments advanced by the Claimant to warrant the striking out of Paragraph 6 of the Statement of Defence at this stage. The Court retains the inherent power to sift through pleadings and distinguish between facts and legal conclusions during the evaluation of evidence and submissions. To strike out the paragraph would potentially prejudice the Defendant's ability to present its full defence and would elevate procedural technicality over substantive justice. On this ground, the Claimant's submission to strike out Paragraph 6 of the Defendant’s Statement of Defence is hereby discountenanced.

26.The Claimant’s core grievance in this case is that in November 2023, during the probationary period of his appointment as Operations Officer II with the Defendant, he received an unofficial communication via SMS message from the Defendant, directing him to stay away from his duty post pending further instructions from Management. The Claimant testified that he initially disregarded the message and attempted to continue with his work, but was physically resisted by security personnel acting on the Defendant's instructions. In essence, the Claimant asserts that his employment relationship with the Defendant was unilaterally and forcefully suspended or terminated by the Defendant, in direct contravention of the terms and conditions regulating their relationship. In resolving this dispute, this Court shall now proceed to consider the issues formulated for determination, addressing them serially as itemized.

Issue 1:

Whether the Restriction of the Claimant from his Duty Post by Means of an SMS Message Constituted a Breach of the Terms and Conditions of Service Between the Claimant and the Defendant.

27.To resolve this critical issue, it is imperative to meticulously examine the nature and form of the communication sent to the Claimant and to measure it against the established contractual framework governing the employment relationship. The evidence before this Court unequivocally establishes that the Claimant was employed under the Defendant's Terms and Conditions of Service, Exhibit C, which constitutes the binding contractual code between the parties. See Olaniyan v. University of Ilorin [2004] 15 NWLR (Pt. 896) 357.

Paragraph 3.2.18 of Exhibit C prescribes a specific and mandatory mode of communication for the termination of probationary appointments, unequivocally mandating that the employee "shall receive written communication of the termination." The phrase "in writing" within the context of a formal employment relationship, particularly in a government parastatal, carries a precise technical and legal meaning. It connotes formal correspondence, typically a letter on the organization's official letterhead, duly signed by an authorized officer, and delivered through established official channels. The fundamental purpose of such a requirement is to ensure certainty, provide an official record, prevent ambiguity, and uphold due process in matters of grave professional consequence.

28.An SMS message, by its very nature, is an inherently informal and ephemeral medium of communication. It is ordinarily reserved for casual exchanges and is wholly unsuitable for the conveyance of decisions of such profound professional consequence as the termination of employment or the exclusion of an employee from their duty post. The SMS sent to the Claimant, which merely directed him to "stay away from your duty post pending further instructions from Management," demonstrably lacked the requisite formality, clarity, and official imprimatur demanded by Exhibit C. Furthermore, the content of the message was inherently ambiguous; the phrase "pending further directive" suggested an interim suspension rather than a final, unequivocal, and definitive determination of the employment relationship. Such ambiguity is precisely what formal written communication is designed to prevent. By utilizing this informal, ambiguous, and procedurally deficient mode of communication to effect a restriction of such magnitude, the Defendant acted in a manner that was fundamentally inconsistent with, and in clear contravention of, the express procedural requirements of the contract. This Court therefore finds, without hesitation, that the restriction of the Claimant from his duty post by means of the SMS message constituted a clear, material, and actionable breach of the terms and conditions of service.

29.This Court, exercising its constitutional jurisdiction under Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution (Third Alteration), has developed a robust jurisprudence rooted in the ILO Conventions, fundamental rights, and the dignity of the human person as guaranteed by Section 34 of the Constitution. In Duru v. Skye Bank Plc [2015] 59 NLLR (207) 680, this Court held that the manner of termination is not merely a procedural nicety but reflects the respect owed to an employee as a person possessed of dignity. The Court reasoned that where the employment manual prescribed a formal written notice, understood in the context of official correspondence, a text message fails both the formal requirement and the dignity standard. See also Aloysius v. Diamond Bank Plc [2015] 58 NLLR (Pt. 199) 92. The Supreme Court in Longe v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc [2010] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1189) 1 reaffirmed that where the contract prescribes a specific termination procedure, the employer must comply strictly. The Court distinguished between the substantive entitlement to terminate (which the employer may generally possess) and the procedural competence to effect termination (which depends entirely on contractual compliance). The import for SMS termination is decisive: even if the employer has the right to terminate, exercising that right through an unauthorized, informal, and ambiguous channel is procedurally incompetent and legally ineffective. On this premise, I find and hold that an SMS, being informal, instantaneous, and incapable of bearing the formal attributes of a letter of termination (official letterhead, signature, date of service, acknowledgment), cannot ordinarily satisfy a requirement for "written notice" within the contemplation of the Claimant’s employment manual.

Issue 2:

Whether the Defendant was Required to Follow the Procedure Laid Down in the Contract for Terminating an Appointment During the Probationary Period, and Whether the Failure to Do So Rendered the Restriction Unlawful.

30.It is a well-established and immutable principle of employment law, fortified by a consistent line of decisions from the Supreme Court, including Iyeke v. Petroleum Training Institute [2019] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 217, Ihechukwu v. University of Jos [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 598, and Ondo State University v. Folayan [1994] 7 NWLR (Pt. 354) 1, that an employer is absolutely bound by the procedural requirements stipulated in the contract of employment, even where the employee is serving a probationary period. The fact that an employee is on probation does not, and cannot, confer upon the employer an unfettered discretion to disregard the contractual framework. On the contrary, the employer must exercise its rights strictly in accordance with the terms agreed upon. See Savannah Bank (Nigeria) Ltd v. Ajilo [1989] 1 NWLR (Pt. 97) 305.

31.Paragraph 3.2.18 of Exhibit C establishes a mandatory, two-fold requirement for the lawful termination of a probationary appointment: first, the communication of the termination in writing, and second, the payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice to the employee. These requirements are not discretionary; they are prescriptive conditions precedent to a lawful termination. Failure to satisfy these conditions renders the purported termination null and void. See Odulaja v. Haddad [1973] 11 SC 357.

32.The evidence before the Court is unequivocal and uncontradicted that the Defendant failed to comply with either of these mandatory requirements. No formal letter of termination was ever issued to the Claimant, and no one month's salary in lieu of notice was paid. Moreover, the evidence further reveals a critical procedural flaw: the directive to restrict the Claimant was purportedly issued by one Mr. Idowu Babatunde Olalekan on the basis of an alleged oral instruction from one Alhaji Gata. This is in stark contrast to the explicit provisions of Section 3.4.3 of the Terms and Conditions of Service, which designate the Council of the Defendant as the body exclusively empowered to terminate appointments. Any action taken by an individual or body without the requisite authority, particularly in matters of employment termination, is not merely a breach of contract but is ultra vires and a nullity ab initio. Such an act lacks legal force and cannot be validated by any subsequent ratification.

33.The Defendant failed to tender any documentary evidence whatsoever, such as minutes of a Council meeting or a formal resolution, to demonstrate that the Council authorized the restriction or termination of the Claimant's employment. The failure to produce this crucial evidence, which was clearly within the Defendant's power and possession, raises a strong adverse inference under Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011, that such evidence, if produced, would have been unfavourable to the Defendant or not even in existence. See Nigerian Agip Oil Co. Ltd v. Izegbuwa [2016] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1542) 349; Oduola & Sons Ltd v. Central Bank of Nigeria [2016] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1544) 575. This Court, in line with its mandate under Section 254C (1) (f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), to apply international best practices and standards, is ready to import and rely on the English law principle of an implied term of ‘mutual trust and confidence’, which was demonstrably breached by the Defendant's actions. Consequently, the restriction of the Claimant was not merely a breach of contract; it was fundamentally ultra vires, unlawful, and void, as it was executed without proper authority and in flagrant disregard of the mandatory procedural safeguards enshrined in the contract of employment. It therefore follows that the Defendant was required to follow the procedure laid down in the contract for terminating an appointment during the probationary period. This I find and hold.

34.In the course of this judgment, this Court observed that counsels dedicated significant time and attention to the fundamental issue of whether the Claimant's employment was permanent and pensionable or merely probationary. The Claimant strenuously argued that his employment was permanent and pensionable, as pleaded in Paragraph 1 of his Statement of Facts, evidenced by the Letter of Employment and Exhibit C (the Terms and Conditions of Service) which govern the employment relationship, subject only to an initial probationary period of 12 months. Counsel for the Claimant submitted that the Claimant’s appointment, being intrinsically linked to the right to permanence and continuous service, could not be unilaterally terminated, disqualified, or abrogated by the Defendant in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Manual. The Defendant, however, presented a divergent view, making reference to Exhibit A (the Letter of Provisional Appointment) and Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.18 of Exhibit C. The Defendant insisted that the Claimant, being a probationary staff, was seeking reliefs typically reserved for a confirmed or permanent employee. In essence, the core of counsels' arguments revolved around the scope of an employee's rights under an employment contract. In labour jurisprudence, employment rights are recognized as inuring at distinct levels, a principle firmly affirmed in Akande Ishola v. Lilygate Nig. Ltd Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/209/2016 delivered on 06/11/2017. In that case, this Court held that employment rights inure at three levels, each with its own scope of legal protection and potential for dispute resolution:

i. Pre-employment rights: Covering disputes that arise before an individual formally commences employment;

ii. Employment rights: Encompassing matters such as wrongful termination, unfair labour practices, breach of employment contracts, disputes over wages, salaries, allowances, conditions of service, promotion, demotion, disciplinary actions, workplace harassment, health and safety issues, and trade union disputes;

iii. Post-employment rights: Pertaining to disputes that arise after the termination or cessation of employment.

35.It is unequivocally clear that the present suit, as constituted by the Claimant’s reliefs, falls squarely within the ambit of the second category, namely ‘employment rights’ strictu senso. Both parties are in agreement on this fundamental position. The crucial dividing line in their arguments, however, lies in the precise legal description and implications of ‘probationary’ versus ‘permanent and pensionable’ employment. Exhibit C, the comprehensive Terms and Conditions regulating the employment relationship between the parties, makes adequate provisions for both permanent and pensionable appointments in Section 3.2.2 and probationary appointments in Section 3.2.18. Counsels, in their submissions, made specific reference to the Letter of Appointment issued to the Claimant by the Defendant, marked as Exhibit A. The Defendant's threshold argument is that the Claimant’s appointment, being probationary as explicitly stated in the letter of appointment, meant that the Claimant was not a full employee deserving the full protection and entitlements of a permanent and pensionable employee under Exhibit C. This argument, however, fundamentally misapprehends the established principles of employment law.

36.The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512, laid down the controlling principle regarding probationary employment. The Court held unequivocally that a probationary employee is indeed an employee, and that the probationary character of the appointment goes only to the confirmation of the employment, not to the existence of the employment relationship itself. Crucially, the Supreme Court further held that the employer must respect and comply with the contractual terms governing the probationary period. Any purported termination that does not comply with those terms is wrongful. This authoritative position was reinforced by the Court of Appeal in Aiyetan v. Nigerian Institute for Oil Palm Research (NIFOR) (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) 48, where the court held that a probationary employee retains the full panoply of his contractual rights during the probation period, and an employer cannot use the cloak of probation to bypass its own procedural obligations.

37.From a holistic reading of the provisions of Exhibit C, it is evident that the Terms and Conditions of Service contemplate the Claimant’s employment as a permanent and pensionable status, subject to the successful completion of the probationary period. While the employment relationship in this case is described as probationary, it is, in the eyes of the law, an existing employment relationship endowed with inherent employment rights. I find that from a community reading of Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.18 of Exhibit C, the probationary character of the Claimant’s appointment pertains only to the ‘confirmation of the employment’ and does not negate the existence of the employment relationship or the applicability of the contractual terms during that period. The letter of offer, Exhibit A, is categorical that Exhibit C is applicable to the appointment of the Claimant. I therefore hold that the Claimant’s employment relationship is of a permanent and pensionable nature, subject to the probationary period as explicitly provided in the Terms and Conditions of Service.

Issue 3:

Whether the Suit is Statute-Barred by Virtue of the Public Officers Protection Act or Any Other Applicable Limitation Statute.

38.The Defendant contends that this suit is statute-barred by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap. P41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 (POPA), which stipulates that no action shall be brought against a public officer for acts done in the execution of public duty unless commenced within three months next after the act, neglect, or default complained of, or, in the case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof. The Defendant argues that the suit was commenced more than three months after the SMS was sent.

After a thorough review of the circumstances surrounding this case, this Court observes that the SMS message itself, by its express terms referencing "pending further directive," did not constitute a definitive, final, or unequivocal act of termination from which time could begin to run. The employment relationship was not unequivocally repudiated on the date the SMS was sent; rather, the Claimant was deliberately left in a state of uncertainty, awaiting further instructions that never materialized. The wrong complained of was therefore not a single, isolated act but a continuing wrong, consisting of the ongoing denial of access to his duty post and the persistent withholding of his salary and entitlements. In accordance with the principle established in Egbe v. Adefarasin [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1, the limitation period for a continuing wrong does not begin to run until the wrong ceases. Each month that the Defendant withheld the Claimant's salary constituted a fresh and distinct breach of the contractual obligation. See Shell Petroleum Development Co. Ltd v. Aniete [1999] 12 NWLR (Pt. 632) 452.

39.And most fundamentally, the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (NICN) derives its expansive and exclusive jurisdiction from Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). The Constitution grants it a comprehensive and exclusive authority over employment and labour relations matters. The weight of judicial authority, including the definitive decision of the Supreme Court in Skye Bank Plc v. Iwu [2017] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1590) 24, firmly supports the position that the Public Officers Protection Act does not operate to defeat or circumscribe the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court in matters of employment disputes, particularly where the cause of action is rooted in a contractual relationship and constitutes a continuing wrong or injury. The POPA is primarily intended to protect public officers acting bona fide in the execution of public duty, not to shield employers from liability for breaches of contractual obligations in an employment relationship. When a public institution acts as an employer, it is bound by the terms of the contract of employment, and any breach thereof is a private contractual matter, not an act done in the execution of a public duty in the sense contemplated by the POPA. To hold otherwise would render the constitutional provisions establishing this Court and its jurisdiction nugatory in a significant class of cases, thereby undermining the very essence of specialized labour adjudication. For these compelling reasons, the Court finds and holds that the present suit is not statute-barred.

Issue 4:

Whether the Claimant is Entitled to the Reliefs Sought in the Amended Statement of Material Facts.

40.Having meticulously found that the restriction of the Claimant was unlawful and constituted a fundamental breach of contract, and having further determined that the suit is not statute-barred, the Court now turns to the crucial question of remedies and the Claimant's entitlement to the reliefs sought.

41.The Claimant seeks declarations that the restriction from duty was illegal and unlawful, and that the Defendant breached its contractual obligations. Based on the unequivocal findings under Issues 1 and 2, these declarations are hereby granted as prayed.

42.The Claimant further seeks an order for the payment of arrears of salaries and allowances. The unchallenged evidence before this Court establishes that the Claimant has not received any salary or allowances since the date of the unlawful restriction. The Claimant's evidence specifically detailed a monthly salary of N350,000, as well as specific allowances including a rent allowance of N1,000,000 and a furniture allowance of N500,000. These figures were not specifically denied or controverted by the Defendant in its pleadings or evidence. In the context of the general provisions of Exhibit C, which clearly contemplate and provide for such allowances for employees, the Court accepts the Claimant's evidence on the quantum of remuneration as established on the balance of probabilities. See Mogaji v. Odofin [1978] 3 SC 91; Ogu v. Ikwe [2016] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 225. The Defendant is therefore ordered to pay all arrears of salaries and allowances from the date of the unlawful restriction to the date of this judgment, computed at the rates established in evidence, specifically covering the probationary period for which he was unlawfully denied payment.

43.The Claimant also claims general damages in the sum of N10,000,000 for suffering, humiliation, loss of earnings, and psychological trauma. General damages are awarded to compensate for loss or suffering that is not easily quantifiable but flows naturally from the defendant's breach, beyond the mere pecuniary loss specifically proven. See Kode v. Nigerian Army [2018] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 288; Abalaka v. University of Lagos [2018] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 1. The circumstances of this case, where the Claimant was summarily excluded from his livelihood by an informal text message, without due process, without stated reason, and left in a prolonged state of limbo and uncertainty, undoubtedly warrant compensation for the anguish, indignity, and disruption to his life suffered. However, while the suffering is evident, the sum claimed is, in the considered view of this Court, excessive and disproportionate to the nature of the breach in a contractual employment setting. In the judicious exercise of the Court's discretion, and having regard to the need for proportionality and the principle of restitutio in integrum (restoration to the original position as far as money can achieve), the Court awards the sum of N3,000,000 as general damages.

44.Regarding interest, the Claimant seeks 25% per annum pre-judgment and 10% per annum post-judgment. The rate of 25% for pre-judgment interest is, in the current economic climate and prevailing judicial practice, excessive and not reflective of equitable considerations. See Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Aplin [2018] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 115. The Court, exercising its inherent powers to award interest to compensate for the delay in payment and to ensure full justice, awards pre-judgment interest at 10% per annum on the accumulated salaries and allowances from the date the first salary fell due until the date of this judgment. Post-judgment interest is awarded at 10% per annum on the total judgment sum from the date of this judgment until final liquidation.

45.Finally, having regard to the conduct of the Defendant in this matter, which demonstrated a clear disregard for established contractual procedures and the dignity of the Claimant, and considering the substantial success achieved by the Claimant in his claims, the Court awards costs in favour of the Claimant, assessed at N500,000. See Bank of the North Ltd v. Daboh [2008] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1083) 374; Adebowale v. Doherty [1997] 4 NWLR (Pt. 497) 361.

46.On the whole, and for the reasons extensively articulated above, this Court hereby enters judgment for the Claimant on the following definitive terms:

a. It is hereby declared that the restriction of the Claimant from his duty post by the Defendant, Nigerian Shippers Council, is illegal, unlawful, and constitutes a nullity.

b. It is further hereby declared that the Defendant was in fundamental breach of its contractual obligations to the Claimant.

c. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay the Claimant all arrears of salaries and allowances from the date of the unlawful restriction during the probationary period only to the date of this judgment, computed at the rates established in evidence.

d. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay the Claimant the sum of N3,000,000 (Three Million Naira) as general damages for the suffering, humiliation, and psychological trauma occasioned by the unlawful restriction.

e. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the accumulated salaries and allowances from the date the first salary fell due until the date of this judgment.

f. The Defendant is further ordered to pay post-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the total judgment sum (comprising arrears of salaries and allowances, general damages, and pre-judgment interest) from the date of this judgment until the date of final liquidation.

g. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay costs of N500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) to the Claimant.

47. Judgment is hereby entered accordingly.

…………………..

Hon. Justice E. D. Subilim

JUDGE