MADUGU DONALD VERSHIMA -VS- NIGERIAN SHIPPERS COUNCIL - National Industrial Court of Nigeria

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM

DATE: 24^THJULY, 2026

SUIT NO.: NICN/ABJ/406/2024

BETWEEN:

MADUGU DONALD VERSHIMA CLAIMANT

AND

NIGERIAN SHIPPERS COUNCIL DEFENDANT

REPRESENTATION:

Oladele Gbadeyan, Esq., with him Sunday A. Aborisade, Esq., Olajide O. Owonla, Esq., Babasola Adewumi, Esq., Bolade Akinlawon, Esq., and Toyin Adegbehingbe, (Miss), Esq., for the Claimant.

Abdul Mohammed, SAN with him Obiabo Francis Amedu, Esq., Chiemelie Nneoma Ayo, Esq., Khalifa Ibrahim Shuaibu, Esq., Abusufyanu Abubakar, Esq., Binbol Benjamin Tangden, Esq., Doyinsola I. Olukolade, Esq., Isaac Akwu, Esq., and Michelle Anteyi, Esq. for the Defendant.

JUDGMENT

1. The Claimant commenced this action by a Complaint filed on 1 November 2024, which was subsequently substituted by an Amended Statement of Material Facts filed on 6 December 2024. The reliefs sought are as follows:

1. A DECLARATION that the purported restriction of the Claimant from his duty post by the Defendant is illegal and unlawful.

2. A DECLARATION that the Defendant was in breach of its contractual obligations to the Claimant when she restricted the Claimant from his duty post contrary to the terms and Conditions of Service of the Defendant.

3. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court mandating the Defendant to pay and keep paying the Claimant's arrears of salaries, allowances, necessary entitlements and benefits owed to her by the Defendant from the day of assumption of duty till the day of the judgment and from the day of judgment until the employment is legally determined one way or the other in line with the agreement between the parties, specifically including:

a. Monthly salary: N350,000 (Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira Only)

b. Allowance for New Employee (28 Days Allowance): N1, 020,000 (One Million and Twenty Thousand Naira Only)

c. Child Education Allowance: N500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

d. Leave Allowance: N350,000 (Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira Only)

e. Provision Allowance: N200,000 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

f. Rent Allowance: N1,000,000 (One Million Naira Only)

g. Utility Allowance: N150,000 (One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira Only)

h. Meal Allowance: N200,000 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

i. Entertainment Allowance: N100,000 (One Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

j. Dressing Allowance: N250,000 (Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira Only)

k. House Maintenance: N200,000 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

l. Furniture Allowance: N500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

m. Kilometer Allowance: N300,000 (Three Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

n. Transport Allowance: N150,000 (One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira Only)

o. Proficiency Allowance: N175,000 (One Hundred and Seventy-Five Thousand Naira Only).

4. AN ORDER for General Damages to the tune of N10,000,000 (Ten Million Naira Only) in favour of the Claimant against the Defendant as a result of the suffering, humiliation meted out to the Claimant, loss of earning and psychological trauma suffered by the Claimant by the action of the Defendant.

5. Interest charged at 25% (Twenty-Five per cent) per annum on all the accumulated salaries and allowances due to the Claimant from the date for the first salary to the day of the judgment and charged at the rate of 10% per annum from the day of the judgment until the final liquidation of the judgment debt.

6. The cost of this suit.

2. The Defendant filed its consequential Amended Statement of Defence on 17 December 2024, contending that the Claimant's provisional employment was terminated on 21 November 2023 during probation and that the suit is statute-barred. The Claimant responded by filing a Reply to the Amended Statement of Defence on 7 February 2025, denying that his employment was ever legally terminated.

CLAIMANT’S CASE

3. The Claimant's employment commenced via an offer of provisional appointment dated 10 October 2023, subject to a twelve-month probationary period. While the Claimant's posting letter dated 30 October 2023 deployed him to the Calabar Port Office as a Programme Analyst II, a material discrepancy exists within his case, as his subsequent legal submissions describe him as resuming duty in Bauchi as an Administrative Officer II. The core dispute erupted on 21 November 2023 when the Claimant received an SMS message from Mr. Babatunde Idowu of the Defendant's Human Resources Department directing him to stay away from work, after which he was physically prevented by security personnel from accessing his duty post.

4.The Claimant contends that this restriction was unlawful and that his employment remains subsisting because the Defendant failed to issue a formal written letter of termination or pay salary in lieu of notice as required under the governing Terms and Conditions of Service.

DEFENDANT’S CASE

5. Conversely, the Defendant asserts that the Claimant's probationary employment was validly determined via the electronic text message. More fundamentally, the Defendant raises a threshold challenge to the jurisdiction of this Court, arguing that the suit is statute-barred under Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, having been instituted nearly a year after the cause of action accrued on 21 November 2023.

COMMENCEMNT OF HEARING

6. At the trial, the Claimant testified as CW1 and tendered Exhibits A, B, C, and D, while the Defendant called Mr. Idowu Babatunde Olalekan as DW1, who tendered Exhibits Olalekan A, B, C, D, and E. Upon the conclusion of oral testimony and cross-examination of the witnesses, the court adjourned the matter for the filing and adoption of final written addresses.

DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSIONS

7. Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Abdul Mohammed, SAN (with him Obiabo Francis Amedu, Esq., Chiemelie Nneoma Ayo, Esq., Khalifa Ibrahim Shuaibu, Esq., Abusufyanu Abubakar, Esq., Binbol Benjamin Tangden, Esq., Doyinsola I. Olukolade, Esq., Isaac Akwu, Esq., and Michelle Anteyi, Esq.), submitted that the court is completely stripped of jurisdiction to entertain this suit as the cause of action has become stale under the Public Officers Protection Act. He also submitted that the Claimant's employment was provisional and was lawfully determined during probation via electronic text message, and that the Claimant has failed to prove any entitlement to the special damages claimed.

8. On whether the suit of the Claimant against the Defendant is statute barred, learned Counsel to the Defendant submitted that the Defendant is a public officer within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap 319, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, and is therefore protected by the three-month limitation period. Counsel relied on Ibrahim v. J.S.C. Kaduna State [1998] 14 NWLR (pt.584); p.1 Offoboche v. Ogoja Local Government [2001] 16 NWLR (pt. 739) p.458; Kolo v. A-G Federation [2003] 10 NWLR (pt. 829) p.602; Daudu v. University of Agriculture Makurdi [2003] FWLR (pt.176) p. 687; Nwafor v. MDCN [2016] LPELR-41495 (CA); Central Bank of Nigeria v. Hudro Air Pty Ltd [2014] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1434) 482; and Utomodu v. Mil. Gov, Bendel State [2014] 11 NWLR (pt.1417) 97. for the proposition that actions against public bodies or officers must be commenced within three months from the date of the act complained of. Counsel admitted that prior to the decision in Okoronkwo v. INEC [2025] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1991) 131, there were conflicting decisions on whether the limitation law applied to contracts of employment, citing Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission v. Ajibola Johnson [2019] 2 NWLR pt. 1656, 247; Idachaba v. University of Agriculture Makurdi [2021] 11 NWLR (pt. 1787) 209; and Rector Kwara Poly v. Adefila [2024] 9 NWLR (pt.1944) 529. However, Counsel argued that when faced with conflicting decisions, the court is bound to follow the latest decision of the Supreme Court, relying on Cyril O. Osakue v. Federal College of Education, Asaba [2010] 10 NWLR (pt. 1201) 1; Osude v. Azodo [2017] 15 NWLR (pt. 1688) 295 and Edeoga & Anor v. INEC & Ors [2023] LPELR-61806 (SC) (Pp.31-44 paras. B) Counsel highlighted the concurring judgment of Ogbuinya, JSC, in Okoronkwo v. INEC supra which held that an action rooted in a contract of employment is indeed amenable to the limitation under Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act. Counsel submitted that the Claimant's cause of action crystallized in November 2023 when he received the SMS message from Mr. Babatunde Idowu of the Human Resources Department directing him to stay away from the duty post pending further instructions. Counsel contended that since the Claimant instituted this action on 1st November 2024, nearly a year had elapsed, rendering the suit statute-barred. Counsel submitted that a statute-barred action robs the court of jurisdiction and must be dismissed, relying on JFS Investment Ltd v. Brawal Line Ltd & Ors [2010] 12 SCNJ 275. William O. Olagunju & Anor v. PHCN Plc [2011] 4 SCNJ 192; Chief Ikedi Ohakim v. Chief Martin Agbaso [2010] 7 SCNJ 137 Odebiyi v. Wema Bank Plc & Ors [2014] LPELR-22993 (CA); P.N. Udoh Trading Co. Ltd v. Abere [2001] 11 NWLR (pt. 723) 114; Odubeko v. Fowler [1993] 7 NWLR (pt. 308) 637. In the Defendant's Reply on Point of Law, Counsel further submitted that the Claimant's attempt to distinguish Okoronkwo v. INEC supra is a distinction without a difference, as the ratio decidendi remains binding on all employment contracts. Counsel argued that the demand letter cannot resurrect a stale cause of action, and that the Claimant failed to plead or prove any bad faith that would disentitle the Defendant to the statutory protection.

On Issue 1:

Whether from the totality of facts in this suit, particularly the Defendant's Letter of Employment and condition of service, the Claimant has proved that his employment is one of permanent and pensionable as to require the Defendant comply with the dispute resolution procedure contained in Defendant's Terms and Condition of Service?

9. Learned Counsel to the Defendant submitted that the contract between the parties is governed strictly by the letter of provisional appointment dated 10th October 2023 and the Conditions of Service, and that the court cannot look outside these terms, relying on Katto v. CBN [1999] LPELR-1677 (SC) 10. Counsel argued that the Claimant's assertion of being a permanent and pensionable staff is false because his employment was still subject to a twelve-month probation period under Paragraph 3.2.2 of the Conditions of Service. Counsel submitted that a probationary employee does not enjoy the same status, security, or rights as a confirmed employee, and that the process of removing an unconfirmed staff is not subject to the strict procedural rules governing confirmed officers, citing Alhaji Baba v. Nigerian Civil Aviation Training Centre Zaria & Anor [1991] 5 NWLR (pt.192) 388; Al-Bishak v. National Productivity Centre & Anor [2015] LPELR-24659 (CA); Counsel also relied on Ihezukwu v. University of Jos & 2 Ors [1990] 4 NWLR (pt.146) 598. For the proposition that an employer retains the unfettered right to terminate a probationary contract upon reasonable notice to test suitability, and that there is no such concept as automatic or deemed confirmation where the contractual conditions are unfulfilled. Counsel contended that the termination of the Claimant's employment via SMS was valid and constituted substantial compliance with the requirement of notice. Counsel submitted that in the digital age, electronic communication such as SMS, WhatsApp, and emails are recognized as legitimate and formal means of communication, citing Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011, ENL Consortium Ltd v. Shambilat Shelter (Nig.) Ltd [2018] LPELR-43902 (SC); Continental Sales Ltd v. R. Shipping Inc [2012] LPELR-7905 (CA); C.E. & M.S.V. Pazan [2020] 1 NWLR (pt.1704) 70. and Sterling Bank v. Akintoye Akinbode [2018] LPELR-50669 (CA). Counsel argued that the Claimant admitted receiving and understanding the SMS message but chose to ignore it and was subsequently resisted by security, which demonstrates that the notice was effective. Relying on Celtel Nigeria BV v. Econet Wireless Ltd Ors [2014] LPELR-22430; Akinyemi v. Odu'a Investment Co. Ltd [2012] 17 NWLR (pt.1329) 209 at 240. Counsel submitted that courts should not set aside administrative exercises of discretion based on minor procedural defects during probation. Counsel also cited the unreported National Industrial Court decision in Saifullah Muhammad Aliyu v. Nigerian Ports Authority (Suit No: NICN/ABJ/20/2023) to argue that termination of a probationer by stopping his salary rather than a formal letter is not void. Furthermore, in response to the Claimant's invitation to strike out Paragraph 6 of the Statement of Defence, Counsel submitted that the application was belated as pleadings have closed, and that Finnih v. Imade supports the preservation of the paragraph as conclusions of law can be drawn from the admitted material facts on the record.

On Issue 2:

Whether the Claimant has shown an entitlement to the grant of the Reliefs sought in this suit herein?

10. Learned Counsel to the Defendant submitted that because the Claimant's substantive claims fail, he is not entitled to any declaratory or monetary reliefs. Counsel argued that declaratory reliefs are discretionary and equitable, requiring a claimant to prove his case on the strength of his own evidence with clean hands, citing Col. Nicholas Ayanru (Rtd) v. Mandilas Ltd [2007] 4 SCNJ 388; Nweke v. Okorie [2015] LPELR-40650; Ifekandu & Anor v. Uzoegwu [2008] LPELR-1435; Yaro v. Arewa Construction Ltd & Ors [2007] LPELR-3516 (SC); and Kuburi International Trading Co. Ltd & Anor v. Bulama Musti & Anor. [2018] LPELR-44104 Counsel submitted that the Claimant's claims for arrears of salaries and numerous allowances constitute special damages which must be strictly pleaded and proved with concrete evidence, relying on Produce Marketing Board v. A.O. Adewunmi [1972] 11 SC 111/24; Board of Management of FMC, Makurdi v. Kwembe [2015] LPELR-40486 (CA) Counsel contended that since the Claimant did not work beyond November 2023, granting him salaries and benefits for work not done would violate the principle against unjust enrichment. Counsel further submitted that all ancillary claims for general damages and interest must fail automatically since the main claims have failed, citing Fafunwa v. Bellview Travels Ltd [2013] LPELR-20800 (CA); McDonald Scientific Emporium Ltd v. Access Bank [2021] LPELR-53301 (CA); Eligwe v. Okpokiri [2015] 240 LRCN 28; Jimoh v. Jimoh & Ors [2018] LPELR-(CA).

CLAIMANT'S SUBMISSIONS

11. Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Olasoji O. Olowolafe, SAN (with him Oladele Gbadeyan, Esq., Sunday A. Aborisade, Esq., Olajide O. Owonla, Esq., Babasola Adewumi, Esq., Bolade Akinlawon, Esq., and Toyin Adegbehingbe, Miss), submitted that the suit is competent, having been filed within ten days of the accrual of the cause of action, and is not statute-barred. He further submitted that the Claimant's employment was permanent and pensionable, and that the Defendant's unilateral restriction of the Claimant via an unofficial SMS was illegal, invalid, and in breach of the contractual procedure for termination.

On Issue 1:

Whether the Claimant's suit was not filed within the time allowed by the Public Officers Protection Act and thereby statute barred?

12. Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the suit is competent and that this court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain it. Counsel argued that in determining whether a court has jurisdiction, the court must look exclusively at the Claimant's pleadings as a whole, relying on Adeyemi v. Opeyori [1976] 9-10 SC 31; UBN Plc v. Integrated Timber & Plywood Produces Ltd [2000] 2 NWLR (pt.680) 99 at 110; and Okulate v. Awosanya [2000] 2 NWLR (pt.646) 530 at 555. Counsel submitted that a document or pleading must be construed in its entirety and not in isolated parts, citing Aqua Ltd v. Ondo State Sport Council [1988] 4 NWLR (pt.91) 622; and Tukur v. Govt of Gongola State [1989] 4 NWLR (pt.117). Counsel argued that the cause of action crystallized on 6th November 2024 when the Defendant refused to accede to the demands contained in the Claimant's solicitor's letter dated 21st October 2024, and not when the SMS was received. Counsel submitted that the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to this suit because it falls under two recognized exceptions. First, Counsel argued that the limitation law does not apply to cases of breach of contract or recovery of debt, citing Roe Ltd v. UNN [2018] LPELR-43855 (SC) Salako v. I.E.D.B [1953] 20 NLR 169; and Anolam v. F.U.T.O [2025] 5 NWLR (pt.1984) 651 Counsel argued that the parties' relationship is a common law contract of service where the resumption of duty constituted acceptance and valuable consideration, relying on African (Nig) Ltd v. A.G. of the Federation, Orient Bank (Nig) Plc v. Bilante International Ltd, FGN v. Zebra Energy Ltd, Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Ozigi, and Oyedeji v. Fasheun. Second, Counsel argued that the Public Officers Protection Act does not protect a public officer who acts in bad faith, malice, or without legal justification, citing Hassan v. Aliyu [2010] 17 NWLR (pt.1223) 547 at 589 SC; Offoboche v. Ogoja L.G [2001] 16 NWLR (Pt. 739) 458; and CBN v. Okojie [2004] 10 NWLR (pt.882) 488. Counsel contended that the Defendant's arbitrary restriction of the Claimant without following the Staff Manual was done in bad faith and ultra vires. Counsel distinguished the Supreme Court decision in Okoronkwo v. INEC [2025] 8 NWLR (pt. 1991) 131 at pg. 153-154 on the grounds that in Okoronkwo, there was a formal, positive correspondence of suspension, the employment was statutory (clothed with statutory flavour), and the reliefs did not seek a declaration for breach of common law contract of service. Counsel relied on Okoronkwo v. INEC supra to submit that the apex court confirmed that POPA only applies to contracts of employment with statutory flavour, and does not bar actions based on common law contracts of service.

On Issue 2:

Whether the employment of the Claimant falls within the category of permanent and pensionable employment within the Defendant's establishment and if so, whether the Defendant can terminate the Claimant's appointment without following the procedures laid out in the Defendant's Terms and Conditions of Service?

13. Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the Claimant's employment is permanent and pensionable, subject to a probationary period, as evidenced by the Letter of Appointment and the Terms and Conditions of Service. Counsel relied on Ogunyade v. Oshunkeye [2007] 15 NWLR (pt.1057) 218 at 246; and Owners M/V Gongola Hope v. S.C. Nig Ltd [2007] 15 NWLR (pt.1056) 189 at 215, to argue that this status was backed by credible documentary evidence and the oral admission of the Defendant's witness, DW1, under cross-examination. Counsel submitted that "probation" is merely an observation period and does not constitute a separate category of employment. Counsel argued that for any termination to be valid under Paragraph 3.2.18 of the Conditions of Service, it must be communicated "in writing" and accompanied by one month's salary in lieu of notice. Counsel contended that since the Defendant never served any formal letter of termination or paid salary in lieu, there was no valid termination known to law. Counsel submitted that where a contract specifies a procedure for doing a thing, that procedure must be strictly followed, relying on Okereke v. Yar'Adua [2008] 12 NWLR (pt.1100) 95 at 127 paras. E-F; C.C.B. Plc v. Anambra State [1992] 10SCNJ 137 at 163; [1992] 8 NWLR (pt.261) 528; and Bamisile v. Osasuyi [2007] 10 NWLR (pt.1042) 225 at 272. Counsel argued that even during probation, an employer is bound to satisfy and comply with the conditions for termination set out in the contract, citing Iyeke v. PTI [2019] 2 NWLR (pt.1656) 217; Ihezukwu v. Unijos [1990] 4 NWLR (pt.146) 598 and Ondo State University v. Folayan Counsel submitted that the SMS sent by Mr. Babatunde Idowu was an "unofficial" and "informal" message from a personal phone number, which does not satisfy the contractual requirement of being "in writing". Counsel distinguished cases like ENL Consortium Ltd v. Shambilat Shelter (Nig.) Ltd [2018] LPELR-43902 SC and argued that modern electronic service rules cannot be extended to allow parties to unilaterally violate express contractual terms, citing Mbat v. Hon. Minister, FCT. Counsel highlighted that DW1 admitted under cross-examination that the Claimant was never queried, that the SMS did not comply with paragraph 3.2.18, and that the instruction to send the SMS was oral. Counsel relied on Ogbeide v. Osule and Adama v. K.S.H.A. to submit that these admissions support the Claimant's case and must be acted upon by the court.

On Issue 3:

Whether the Claimant is not entitled to the reliefs sought?

13. Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the Claimant is entitled to all the reliefs sought in the Amended Statement of Facts. Counsel argued that because there was no valid termination, the Claimant's employment remains subsisting, and he is entitled to his salaries and allowances, relying on Bamisile v. NJC & Ors [2012] LPELR-8381. Counsel submitted that the claims for salaries and allowances were specifically pleaded in paragraph 11 of the Amended Statement of Facts and proved by unchallenged oral testimony in paragraph 13 of the Claimant's witness statement on oath. Counsel argued that the court must act on unchallenged, uncontradicted evidence, citing Amadi v. Chinda [2009] 10 NWLR (pt.1148) 107 at 131; Boye Ltd v. Sowemimo [2022] 3 NWLR (pt. 1817) 195 at 219 C-F; Inegbedion v. Selo-Gemen [2013] 8 NWLR (pt. 1356) 211 at 236; and Badejo v. Federal Ministry of Education [1996] 8 NWLR (pt.464) 15 at 42. Counsel contended that the Defendant cannot plead its own default in restricting the Claimant from work as a basis for denying him payment. Counsel further submitted that the breach of contract automatically implies general damages, which are within the court's discretion, citing Stanbic IBTC Bank v. Longterm Global Capital Ltd & Ors [2021] LPELR-55610; Unity Bank Plc v. Ahmed [2020] 1 NWLR (pt.1705) 364; and Cameroon Airlines v. Otutuizu [2005] 9 NWLR (pt.929) 202 at 223. Counsel also submitted that the court has the power to award post-judgment interest under its rules, relying on Cappa & D'Alberto (Nig.) Plc v. NDIC [2021] LPELR-53379 SC.

COURT’S DECISION

14. Having meticulously considered the pleadings, the evidence adduced by all parties, and the comprehensive written submissions of counsel, this Honorable Court hereby formulates the pivotal issues requiring determination as follows:

1. Whether the restriction of the Claimant from his duty post by means of an SMS message constituted a breach of the express and implied terms and conditions of service governing the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant.

2. Whether the Defendant was legally obligated to adhere to the prescribed procedures for terminating an appointment during the probationary period, as stipulated in the contract of employment, and whether the Defendant’s failure to comply with these mandatory procedures rendered the purported restriction or termination unlawful and void.

3. Whether the present suit is statute-barred by virtue of the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap. P41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, or any other applicable limitation statute.

4. Whether, in light of the findings on the preceding issues, the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in the Amended Statement of Material Facts.

15. It is evident from the originating process that the Claimant primarily seeks declaratory reliefs. This Court notes that a claim for declaratory relief is a discretionary remedy, not granted as a matter of course or merely upon admission by the adverse party. Consequently, a claimant seeking such relief must rely on the inherent strength of their own case, adducing credible evidence in support of the pleaded facts and sought reliefs, rather than on any perceived weakness in the defendant's case. See TSY Ltd v. Nwachukwu [2024] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1954) 147@173-174, Paras F-A (SC); Aliyu v. Namadi [2023] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1885) 161@214, Paras C-E (SC); Adamu v. Nigerian Airforce [2022] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1822) 159@177, Paras F-G; 178, Paras E-G (SC); and Adesina v. Air France [2022] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1833) 523@555-556, Paras H-B. The burden of proof, therefore, rests squarely on the Claimant to establish his case on the preponderance of evidence, or balance of probabilities. However, it is equally crucial to note that where the Defendant raises affirmative defences, such as statute bar or valid termination, the burden shifts to the Defendant to establish such defences by the same standard of proof. The Claimant is only entitled to leverage aspects of the Defendant’s case that unequivocally support his own. See Hanatu v. Amadiu [2020] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1728) 115@128, Paras A-C (SC); C.D.C (Nig) Ltd v. SCOA (Nig) Ltd [2007] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1030) 300@327, Paras A-F (SC).

16. The foundational principle of civil litigation dictates that a claimant initiating an action must prove their case to secure a favorable judgment. This is the primary rule of evidence: any party making an assertion bears the burden of proving it. See Olusesi v. Oyelusi and Others [1986] 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 31) 634; Chukwudi and Another v. Unachuku [1979] 3 C.A. 114. Before delving into the substantive issues formulated for determination, this Court deems it necessary to address certain preliminary matters that came up in the course of this proceedings.

17. The Claimant, in paragraph 12 of his Amended Statement of Facts, averred that the Public Service Rules (PSR) do not apply to the employment relationship between him and the Defendant, asserting that the relationship is instead regulated by the Defendant’s Staff Manual. The Defendant, conversely, countered this in paragraph 8 of its Amended Statement of Defence, implying the applicability of statutory flavour. This Court is mindful that the Claimant’s averment seeks to establish a master-servant relationship, while the Defendant contends otherwise.

18. Having meticulously reviewed Exhibit A, the letter of employment, and Exhibit C, the Staff Manual, this Court recognizes that staff handbooks, manuals, circulars, and administrative guidelines are commonly issued by management in government agencies to ensure workplace standardization. While these documents may be incorporated by reference into a contract of employment, they do not inherently confer "statutory flavour" upon the employment relationship. The law is trite: where a handbook is merely an internal agreement between management and staff, and has not been laid before the legislature or published as a statutory instrument (where required by an enabling Act), it remains a purely contractual document. The Supreme Court, in Adedeji & Ors v. Central Bank of Nigeria & Attorney-General of the Federation [2023] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1878) 531, emphatically cautioned against the liberal expansion of the doctrine of employment with statutory flavour. The Apex Court reiterated that internal documents, such as staff manuals, cannot create a statutory flavoured employment relationship unless they are expressly authorized by or derived from a statute. Furthermore, the Supreme Court emphasized that public institutions can, and frequently do, engage in master-servant relationships when the specific terms of engagement are not grounded in a legislative instrument. This, in the considered view of this Court, is precisely the situation in the instant suit. The mere fact that the Defendant is a creature of statute does not automatically transform the employment relationship with its employees into one with statutory flavour. The Defendant’s Staff Manual does not qualify as subsidiary legislation in the eyes of the law. Only rules, regulations, or orders made by an authority (such as a Minister, Council, or Board) under powers granted by a principal Act of the National Assembly can be said to have statutory flavour, as these are referred to as subsidiary legislation. This is demonstrably not the case here. I therefore find and hold that the relationship between the parties in this suit is one of master and servant.

19. The Claimant, through his counsel, in their written brief, urged this Court to strike out Paragraph 6 of the Defendant's Statement of Defence, contending that it constituted an "argument or legal conclusion" rather than a statement of material fact, thereby offending the rules of pleading. The Defendant, conversely, argued that the application was belated, as pleadings had long since closed, and therefore ought not to be entertained.

20. On this point, this Court is guided by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the import and application of Rules of Court. In Obi v. INEC & Ors [2008] LPELR-2167 (SC) and Oloba v. Akereja [1988] 7 SC (Pt. 1), the apex court underscored the necessity of obeying Rules of Court. However, this obedience is not to be slavish, as eloquently articulated by Peter-Odili, JSC, in Federal Republic of Nigeria v. T.A. Dairo & Ors [2015] LPELR-24303 (SC), quoting Niki Tobi, JSC, in Abubakar v. Yar’adua [2008] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1078) SC 465 @ 511 Para E-G:

“Rules of Court are meant to be obeyed of course. That is why they are made. There should be no argument about that. But there is an important qualification or caveat and it is that their obedience cannot or should not be slavish to the point that justice in the case is destroyed or thrown overboard. The greatest barometer as far as the public is concerned is whether at the end of the litigation process, justice has been done to the parties. Therefore, if in the course of doing justice, some harm is done to some procedural rules which hurts the rule such as paragraph 7 of the Practice Directions, the Court should be happy that it took the line of action in pursuance of justice.”

21. It is a well-established principle that mandatory words in the Rules of Court are not sacrosanct and are applied permissively, allowing for their discretionary application by the Court in the paramount interest of justice. See Obi v. INEC [2008] 1-2 SC 23 SC and Katto v. CBN [1991] 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 126. While Rules of Practice are undoubtedly meant to be respected and obeyed, they serve as handmaids of the law, designed to aid in the due administration of justice, not to impede it. This Court finds no compelling or convincing reason in the arguments advanced by the Claimant to warrant the striking out of Paragraph 6 of the Statement of Defence at this stage. The Court retains the inherent power to sift through pleadings and distinguish between facts and legal conclusions during the evaluation of evidence and submissions. To strike out the paragraph would potentially prejudice the Defendant's ability to present its full defence and would elevate procedural technicality over substantive justice. On this ground, I find that the Claimant's submission to strike out Paragraph 6 of the Defendant’s Statement of Defence is not meritorious and is hereby discountenanced.

22. The Claimant’s core grievance in this case is that in November 2023, during the probationary period of his appointment as Programme Analyst II with the Defendant, he received an unofficial communication via SMS message from the Defendant, directing him to stay away from his duty post pending further instructions from Management. The Claimant testified that he initially disregarded the message and attempted to continue with his work, but was physically resisted by security personnel acting on the Defendant's instructions. In essence, the Claimant asserts that his employment relationship with the Defendant was unilaterally and forcefully suspended or terminated by the Defendant, in direct contravention of the terms and conditions regulating their relationship. In resolving this dispute, this Court shall now proceed to consider the issues formulated for determination, addressing them serially as itemized.

Issue 1:

Whether the Restriction of the Claimant from his Duty Post by Means of an SMS Message Constituted a Breach of the Terms and Conditions of Service Between the Claimant and the Defendant.

23. To resolve this critical issue, it is imperative to meticulously examine the nature and form of the communication sent to the Claimant and to measure it against the established contractual framework governing the employment relationship. The evidence before this Court unequivocally establishes that the Claimant was employed under the Defendant's Terms and Conditions of Service, Exhibit C, which constitutes the binding contractual code between the parties. See Olaniyan v. University of Ilorin [2004] 15 NWLR (Pt. 896) 357.

24. Paragraph 3.2.18 of Exhibit C prescribes a specific and mandatory mode of communication for the termination of probationary appointments, unequivocally mandating that the employee "shall receive written communication of the termination." The phrase "in writing" within the context of a formal employment relationship, particularly in a government parastatal, carries a precise technical and legal meaning. It connotes formal correspondence, typically a letter on the organization's official letterhead, duly signed by an authorized officer, and delivered through established official channels. The fundamental purpose of such a requirement is to ensure certainty, provide an official record, prevent ambiguity, and uphold due process in matters of grave professional consequence.

25. An SMS message, by its very nature, is an inherently informal and ephemeral medium of communication. It is ordinarily reserved for casual exchanges and is wholly unsuitable for the conveyance of decisions of such profound professional consequence as the termination of employment or the exclusion of an employee from their duty post. The SMS sent to the Claimant, which merely directed him to "stay away from your duty post pending further instructions from Management," demonstrably lacked the requisite formality, clarity, and official imprimatur demanded by Exhibit C. Furthermore, the content of the message was inherently ambiguous; the phrase "pending further directive" suggested an interim suspension rather than a final, unequivocal, and definitive determination of the employment relationship. Such ambiguity is precisely what formal written communication is designed to prevent. By utilizing this informal, ambiguous, and procedurally deficient mode of communication to effect a restriction of such magnitude, the Defendant acted in a manner that was fundamentally inconsistent with, and in clear contravention of, the express procedural requirements of the contract. This Court therefore finds, without hesitation, that the restriction of the Claimant from his duty post by means of the SMS message constituted a clear, material, and actionable breach of the terms and conditions of service governing their employment relationship.

26. This Court, exercising its constitutional jurisdiction under Section 254C (1) of the 1999 Constitution (Third Alteration), has developed a robust jurisprudence rooted in the ILO Conventions, fundamental rights, and the dignity of the human person as guaranteed by Section 34 of the Constitution. In Duru v. Skye Bank Plc [2015] 59 NLLR (207) 680, this Court held that the manner of termination is not merely a procedural nicety but reflects the respect owed to an employee as a person possessed of dignity. The Court reasoned that where the employment manual prescribed a formal written notice, understood in the context of official correspondence, a text message fails both the formal requirement and the dignity standard. See also Aloysius v. Diamond Bank Plc [2015] 58 NLLR (Pt. 199) 92. The Supreme Court in Longe v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc [2010] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1189) 1 reaffirmed that where the contract prescribes a specific termination procedure, the employer must comply strictly. The Court distinguished between the substantive entitlement to terminate (which the employer may generally possess) and the procedural competence to effect termination (which depends entirely on contractual compliance). The import for SMS termination is decisive: even if the employer has the right to terminate, exercising that right through an unauthorized, informal, and ambiguous channel is procedurally incompetent and legally ineffective. On this premise, I find and hold that an SMS, being informal, instantaneous, and incapable of bearing the formal attributes of a letter of termination (official letterhead, signature, date of service, acknowledgment), cannot ordinarily satisfy a requirement for "written notice" within the contemplation of the Claimant’s employment manual.

Issue 2:

Whether the Defendant was Required to Follow the Procedure Laid Down in the Contract for Terminating an Appointment During the Probationary Period, and Whether the Failure to Do So Rendered the Restriction Unlawful.

27. It is a well-established and immutable principle of employment law, fortified by a consistent line of decisions from the Supreme Court, including Iyeke v. Petroleum Training Institute [2019] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 217, Ihechukwu v. University of Jos [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 598, and Ondo State University v. Folayan [1994] 7 NWLR (Pt. 354) 1, that an employer is absolutely bound by the procedural requirements stipulated in the contract of employment, even where the employee is serving a probationary period. The fact that an employee is on probation does not, and cannot, confer upon the employer an unfettered discretion to disregard the contractual framework. On the contrary, the employer must exercise its rights strictly in accordance with the terms agreed upon. See Savannah Bank (Nigeria) Ltd v. Ajilo [1989] 1 NWLR (Pt. 97) 305.

28. Paragraph 3.2.18 of Exhibit C establishes a mandatory, two-fold requirement for the lawful termination of a probationary appointment: first, the communication of the termination in writing, and second, the payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice to the employee. These requirements are not discretionary; they are prescriptive conditions precedent to a lawful termination. Failure to satisfy these conditions renders the purported termination null and void. See Odulaja v. Haddad [1973] 11 SC 357.

29.The evidence before the Court is unequivocal and uncontradicted that the Defendant failed to comply with either of these mandatory requirements. No formal letter of termination was ever issued to the Claimant, and no one month's salary in lieu of notice was paid. Moreover, the evidence further reveals a critical procedural flaw: the directive to restrict the Claimant was purportedly issued by one Mr. Idowu Babatunde Olalekan on the basis of an alleged oral instruction from one Alhaji Gata. This is in stark contrast to the explicit provisions of paragraph 3.4.3 of the Terms and Conditions of Service, which designate the Council of the Defendant as the body exclusively empowered to terminate appointments. Any action taken by an individual or body without the requisite authority, particularly in matters of employment termination, is not merely a breach of contract but is ultra vires and a nullity ab initio. Such an act lacks legal force and cannot be validated by any subsequent ratification.

30.The Defendant failed to tender any documentary evidence whatsoever, such as minutes of a Council meeting or a formal resolution, to demonstrate that the Council authorized the restriction or termination of the Claimant's employment. The failure to produce this crucial evidence, which was clearly within the Defendant's power and possession, raises a strong adverse inference under Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011, that such evidence, if produced, would have been unfavourable to the Defendant or not even in existence. See Nigerian Agip Oil Co. Ltd v. Izegbuwa [2016] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1542) 349; Oduola & Sons Ltd v. Central Bank of Nigeria [2016] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1544) 575. This Court, in line with its mandate under Section 254C (1) (f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), to apply international best practices and standards, is ready to import and rely on the English law principle of an implied term of ‘mutual trust and confidence’, which was demonstrably breached by the Defendant's actions. Consequently, the restriction of the Claimant was not merely a breach of contract; it was fundamentally ultra vires, unlawful, and void, as it was executed without proper authority and in flagrant disregard of the mandatory procedural safeguards enshrined in the contract of employment. It therefore follows that the Defendant was required to follow the procedure laid down in the contract for terminating an appointment during the probationary period. This I find and hold.

31.In the course of this judgment, this Court observed that counsels dedicated significant time and attention to the fundamental issue of whether the Claimant's employment was permanent and pensionable or merely probationary. The Claimant strenuously argued that his employment was permanent and pensionable, as pleaded in Paragraph 1 of his Statement of Facts, evidenced by the Letter of Employment and Exhibit C (the Terms and Conditions of Service) which govern the employment relationship, subject only to an initial probationary period of 12 months. Counsel for the Claimant submitted that the Claimant’s appointment, being intrinsically linked to the right to permanence and continuous service, could not be unilaterally terminated, disqualified, or abrogated by the Defendant in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Manual. The Defendant, however, presented a divergent view, making reference to Exhibit A (the Letter of Provisional Appointment) and paragraphs 3.2.2 and 3.2.18 of Exhibit C. The Defendant insisted that the Claimant, being a probationary staff, was seeking reliefs typically reserved for a confirmed or permanent employee. In essence, the core of counsels' arguments revolved around the scope of an employee's rights under an employment contract. In labour jurisprudence, employment rights are recognized as inuring at distinct levels, a principle firmly affirmed in Akande Ishola v. Lilygate Nig. Ltd Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/209/2016 delivered on 06/11/2017. In that case, this Court held that employment rights inure at three levels, each with its own scope of legal protection and potential for dispute resolution:

i. Pre-employment rights: Covering disputes that arise before an individual formally commences employment.

ii. Employment rights: Encompassing matters such as wrongful termination, unfair labour practices, breach of employment contracts, disputes over wages, salaries, allowances, conditions of service, promotion, demotion, disciplinary actions, workplace harassment, health and safety issues, and trade union disputes.

iii. Post-employment rights: Pertaining to disputes that arise after the termination or cessation of employment.

32.It is unequivocally clear that the present suit, as constituted by the Claimant’s reliefs, falls squarely within the ambit of the second category, namely ‘employment rights’ strictu sensu. Both parties are in agreement on this fundamental position. The crucial dividing line in their arguments, however, lies in the precise legal description and implications of ‘probationary’ versus ‘permanent and pensionable’ employment. Exhibit C, the comprehensive Terms and Conditions regulating the employment relationship between the parties, makes adequate provisions for both permanent and pensionable appointments in Section 3.2.2 and probationary appointments in Section 3.2.18. Counsels, in their submissions, made specific reference to the Letter of Appointment issued to the Claimant by the Defendant, marked as Exhibit A. The Defendant's threshold argument is that the Claimant’s appointment, being probationary as explicitly stated in the letter of appointment, meant that the Claimant was not a full employee deserving the full protection and entitlements of a permanent and pensionable employee under Exhibit C. This argument, however, fundamentally misapprehends the established principles of employment law.

33.The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512, laid down the controlling principle regarding probationary employment. The Court held unequivocally that a probationary employee is indeed an employee, and that the probationary character of the appointment goes only to the confirmation of the employment, not to the existence of the employment relationship itself. Crucially, the Supreme Court further held that the employer must respect and comply with the contractual terms governing the probationary period. Any purported termination that does not comply with those terms is wrongful. This authoritative position was reinforced by the Court of Appeal in Aiyetan v. Nigerian Institute for Oil Palm Research (NIFOR) [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) 48, where the court held that a probationary employee retains the full panoply of his contractual rights during the probation period, and an employer cannot use the cloak of probation to bypass its own procedural obligations.

34.From a holistic reading of the provisions of Exhibit C, it is evident that the Terms and Conditions of Service contemplate the Claimant’s employment as a permanent and pensionable status, subject to the successful completion of the probationary period. While the employment relationship in this case is described as probationary, it is, in the eyes of the law, an existing employment relationship endowed with inherent employment rights. I find that from a community reading of paragraphs 3.2.2 and 3.2.18 of Exhibit C, the probationary character of the Claimant’s appointment pertains only to the ‘confirmation of the employment’ and does not negate the existence of the employment relationship or the applicability of the contractual terms during that period. The letter of offer, Exhibit A, is categorical that Exhibit C is applicable to the appointment of the Claimant. I therefore hold that the Claimant’s employment relationship is of a permanent and pensionable nature, subject to the probationary period as explicitly provided in the Terms and Conditions of Service.

Issue 3:

Whether the Suit is Statute-Barred by Virtue of the Public Officers Protection Act or Any Other Applicable Limitation Statute.

35.The Defendant contends that this suit is statute-barred by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap. P41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 (POPA), which stipulates that no action shall be brought against a public officer for acts done in the execution of public duty unless commenced within three months next after the act, neglect, or default complained of, or, in the case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof. The Defendant argues that the suit was commenced more than three months after the SMS was sent.

36.After a thorough review of the circumstances surrounding this case, this Court observes that the SMS message itself, by its express terms referencing "pending further directive," did not constitute a definitive, final, or unequivocal act of termination from which time could begin to run. The employment relationship was not unequivocally repudiated on the date the SMS was sent; rather, the Claimant was deliberately left in a state of uncertainty, awaiting further instructions that never materialized. The wrong complained of was therefore not a single, isolated act but a continuing wrong, consisting of the ongoing denial of access to his duty post and the persistent withholding of his salary and entitlements. In accordance with the principle established in Egbe v. Adefarasin [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1, the limitation period for a continuing wrong does not begin to run until the wrong ceases. Each month that the Defendant withheld the Claimant's salary constituted a fresh and distinct breach of the contractual obligation. See Shell Petroleum Development Co. Ltd v. Aniete [1999] 12 NWLR (Pt. 632) 452.

37.And most fundamentally, the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (NICN) derives its expansive and exclusive jurisdiction from Section 254C (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). The Constitution grants it a comprehensive and exclusive authority over employment and labour relations matters. The weight of judicial authority, including the definitive decision of the Supreme Court in Skye Bank Plc v. Iwu [2017] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1590) 24, firmly supports the position that the Public Officers Protection Act does not operate to defeat or circumscribe the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court in matters of employment disputes, particularly where the cause of action is rooted in a contractual relationship and constitutes a continuing wrong or injury. The POPA is primarily intended to protect public officers acting bona fide in the execution of public duty, not to shield employers from liability for breaches of contractual obligations in an employment relationship. When a public institution acts as an employer, it is bound by the terms of the contract of employment, and any breach thereof is a private contractual matter, not an act done in the execution of a public duty in the sense contemplated by the POPA. To hold otherwise would render the constitutional provisions establishing this Court and its jurisdiction nugatory in a significant class of cases, thereby undermining the very essence of specialized labour adjudication. For these compelling reasons, the Court finds and holds that the present suit is not statute-barred.

Issue 4:

Whether the Claimant is Entitled to the Reliefs Sought in the Amended Statement of Material Facts.

38.Having meticulously found that the restriction of the Claimant was unlawful and constituted a fundamental breach of contract, and having further determined that the suit is not statute-barred, the Court now turns to the crucial question of remedies and the Claimant's entitlement to the reliefs sought.

39.The Claimant seeks declarations that the restriction from duty was illegal and unlawful, and that the Defendant breached its contractual obligations. Based on the unequivocal findings under Issues 1 and 2, these declarations are hereby granted as prayed.

40.The Claimant further seeks an order for the payment of arrears of salaries and allowances. The unchallenged evidence before this Court establishes that the Claimant has not received any salary or allowances since the date of the unlawful restriction. The Claimant's evidence specifically detailed a monthly salary of N350,000, as well as specific allowances including a rent allowance of N1,000,000 and a furniture allowance of N500,000. These figures were not specifically denied or controverted by the Defendant in its pleadings or evidence. In the context of the general provisions of Exhibit C, which clearly contemplate and provide for such allowances for employees, the Court accepts the Claimant's evidence on the quantum of remuneration as established on the balance of probabilities. See Mogaji v. Odofin [1978] 3 SC 91; Ogu v. Ikwe [2016] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 225. The Defendant is therefore ordered to pay all arrears of salaries and allowances from the date of the unlawful restriction to the date of this judgment, computed at the rates established in evidence, specifically covering the probationary period for which he was unlawfully denied payment.

41.The Claimant also claims general damages in the sum of N10,000,000 for suffering, humiliation, loss of earnings, and psychological trauma. General damages are awarded to compensate for loss or suffering that is not easily quantifiable but flows naturally from the defendant's breach, beyond the mere pecuniary loss specifically proven. See Kode v. Nigerian Army [2018] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 288; Abalaka v. University of Lagos [2018] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 1. The circumstances of this case, where the Claimant was summarily excluded from his means of livelihood by an informal text message, without due process, without stated reason, and left in a prolonged state of limbo and uncertainty, undoubtedly warrant compensation for the anguish, indignity, and disruption to his life suffered. However, while the suffering is evident, the sum claimed is, in the considered view of this Court, excessive and disproportionate to the nature of the breach in a contractual employment setting. In the judicious exercise of the Court's discretion, and having regard to the need for proportionality and the principle of restitutio in integrum (restoration to the original position as far as money can achieve), the Court awards the sum of N3,000,000 as general damages.

43.Regarding interest, the Claimant seeks 25% per annum pre-judgment and 10% per annum post-judgment. The rate of 25% for pre-judgment interest is, in the current economic climate and prevailing judicial practice, excessive and not reflective of equitable considerations. See Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Aplin [2018] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 115. The Court, exercising its inherent powers to award interest to compensate for the delay in payment and to ensure full justice, awards pre-judgment interest at 10% per annum on the accumulated salaries and allowances from the date the first salary fell due until the date of this judgment. Post-judgment interest is awarded at 10% per annum on the total judgment sum from the date of this judgment until final liquidation.

44.Finally, having regard to the conduct of the Defendant in this matter, which demonstrated a clear disregard for established contractual procedures and the dignity of the Claimant, and considering the substantial success achieved by the Claimant in his claims, the Court awards costs in favour of the Claimant, assessed at N500,000. See Bank of the North Ltd v. Daboh [2008] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1083) 374; Adebowale v. Doherty [1997] 4 NWLR (Pt. 497) 361.

45.On the whole, and for the reasons extensively articulated above, this Court hereby enters judgment for the Claimant on the following definitive terms:

a. It is hereby declared that the restriction of the Claimant from his duty post by the Defendant, Nigerian Shippers Council, is illegal, unlawful, and constitutes a nullity.

b. It is further hereby declared that the Defendant was in fundamental breach of its contractual obligations to the Claimant.

c. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay the Claimant all arrears of salaries and allowances from the date of the unlawful restriction during the probationary period only to the date of this judgment, computed at the rates established in evidence.

d. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay the Claimant the sum of N3,000,000 (Three Million Naira) as general damages for the suffering, humiliation, and psychological trauma occasioned by the unlawful restriction.

e. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the accumulated salaries and allowances from the date the first salary fell due until the date of this judgment.

f. The Defendant is further ordered to pay post-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the total judgment sum (comprising arrears of salaries and allowances, general damages, and pre-judgment interest) from the date of this judgment until the date of final liquidation.

g. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay costs of N500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) to the Claimant.

46.Judgment is hereby entered accordingly.

…………………

Hon. Justice E. D. Subilim

JUDGE