IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM

 

DATE: 24^TH JULY, 2026                

SUIT NO.: NICN/ABJ/403/2024

 

BETWEEN:

 

ANAKURA JOVIS TIMOTHY                                    CLAIMANT

 

AND

 

NIGERIAN SHIPPERS COUNCIL                    DEFENDANT

 

REPRESENTATION:

SUNDAY A. ABORISADE, ESQ., OLAJIDE O. OWONLA, ESQ., BABASOLA ADEWUMI, ESQ., BOLADE AKINLAWON, ESQ., TOYIN ADEGBEHINGBE (MISS), ESQ., FOR THE CLAIMANT.

ABDUL MOHAMMED SAN, FCIARB. (UK) WITH OBIABO FRANCIS AMEDU ESQ., CHIEMELIE NNEOMA AYO, ESQ., KHALIFA IBRAHIM SHUAIBU, ESQ., ABUSUFYANU ABUBAKAR, ESQ., BINBOL BENJAMIN TANGDEN, ESQ., DOYINSOLA OLUKOLADE ESQ., ISAAC AKWU ESQ., AND MICHELLE ANTEYI ESQ. FOR THE DEFENDANT.

 

JUDGMENT

1.The Claimant commenced this action by a Complaint filed on 1 November 2024, and subsequently filed an Amended Statement of Material Facts on 6 December 2024. Claimant seeks the following reliefs:

1. A DECLARATION that the purported restriction of the Claimant from his duty post by the Defendant is illegal and unlawful.

2. A DECLARATION that the Defendant was in breach of its contractual obligations to the Claimant when she restricted the Claimant from his duty post contrary to the terms and Conditions of Service of the Defendant.

3. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court mandating the Defendant to pay and keep paying the Claimant's arrears of salaries, allowances, necessary entitlements and benefits owed to her by the Defendant from the day of assumption of duty till the day of the judgment and from the day of judgment until the employment is legally determined one way or the other in line with the agreement between the parties, specifically including:

a. Monthly salary: N350,000 (Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira Only)

b. Allowance for New Employee (28 Days Allowance): N1, 020,000 (One Million and Twenty Thousand Naira Only)

c. Child Education Allowance: N500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

d. Leave Allowance: N350,000 (Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira Only)

e. Provision Allowance: N200,000 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

f. Rent Allowance: N1,000,000 (One Million Naira Only)

g. Utility Allowance: N150,000 (One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira Only)

h. Meal Allowance: N200,000 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

i. Entertainment Allowance: N100,000 (One Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

j. Dressing Allowance: N250,000 (Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira Only)

k. House Maintenance: N200,000 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

l. Furniture Allowance: NN500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

m. Kilometer Allowance: N300,000 (Three Hundred Thousand Naira Only)

n. Transport Allowance: N150,000 (One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira Only)

o. Proficiency Allowance: N175,000 (One Hundred and Seventy-Five Thousand Naira Only).

4. AN ORDER for General Damages to the tune of N10,000,000 (Ten Million Naira Only) in favour of the Claimant against the Defendant as a result of the suffering, humiliation meted out to the Claimant, loss of earning and psychological trauma suffered by the Claimant by the action of the Defendant.

5. Interest charged at 25% (Twenty-Five per cent) per annum on all the accumulated salaries and allowances due to the Claimant from the date for the first salary to the day of the judgment and charged at the rate of 10% per annum from the day of the judgment until the final liquidation of the judgment debt.

6. The cost of this suit.

CLAIMANT’S CASE

2.The Claimant, Anakura Jovis Timothy, was offered a provisional appointment as an Administrative Officer II by the Defendant, the Nigerian Shippers Council, which is a statutory public body. The relationship between the parties is that of an employer and employee under a contract of service.

Following his appointment on 10 October 2023 and posting to the Makurdi Area Office on 30 October 2023, the Claimant received an SMS text message in November 2023 from an officer of the Defendant directing him to stay away from his duty post. The Claimant was subsequently blocked from accessing his duty post by security personnel, prompting him to serve a solicitor's demand notice on the Defendant on 21 October 2024 for his outstanding entitlements.

DEFENDANT’S CASE

3.The Defendant has resisted the claimant’s claims on both threshold jurisdictional grounds and the substantive merits of the case. Primarily, the Defendant contends that the suit is statute-barred by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, arguing that the cause of action accrued in November 2023 when the Claimant was directed to stay away from work, which occurred nearly a year before the institution of this action. Substantively, the Defendant asserts that because the Claimant was a probationary employee who had not been confirmed, his appointment was validly terminated or suspended by administrative action—specifically through the SMS and physical restriction—without the need to comply with the elaborate dispute resolution or disciplinary procedures reserved for permanent, confirmed staff.

COMMENCEMENT OF HEARING

4.At the trial, the Claimant testified as CW1 and tendered four documents as Exhibits A, B, C, and D, while the Defendant called Mr. Idowu Babatunde Olalekan as DW1, who tendered five documents as Exhibits A, B, C, D, and E. Upon the conclusion of trial, the court adjourned the suit for the filing and adoption of final written addresses.

CLAIMANT'S SUBMISSIONS

On Issue 1: Whether the Claimant's suit was not filed within the time allowed by the Public Officers Protection Act and thereby statute barred?

5.Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Sunday A. Aborisade, Esq., submitted that the suit as constituted is valid, competent, and does not suffer from any legal disability that could render it incompetent or rob this Honourable Court of its jurisdiction. Counsel argued that in determining whether a suit is caught by a limitation law, the court must look exclusively at the pleadings of the Claimant, namely the writ of summons and the statement of claim, and must construe the pleadings as a whole rather than in isolated parts. In support of this proposition, Counsel relied on the decisions in Adeyemi v. Opeyori [1976] 9-10 SC 31, UBN Plc v. Integrated Timber & Plywood Products Ltd [2000] 2 NWLR (Pt. 680) 99 at 110, Okulate v. Awosanya [2000] 2 NWLR (Pt. 646) 530 at 555, Aqua Ltd v. Ondo State Sport Council [1988] 4 NWLR (Pt. 91) 622, and Tukur v. Govt of Gongola State [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517. Counsel contended that the Claimant's case is not founded on the restriction from work itself, but on the Defendant's failure to honor the terms of their agreement and to pay settled entitlements, which crystallized after the Defendant failed to act on the Claimant's demands in the solicitor's letter.

6.Counsel further submitted that the action falls within the established exceptions to the Public Officers Protection Act. Firstly, Counsel argued that the protection under Section 2(a) of the Act does not avail a public officer who acts in bad faith, in abuse of office, maliciously, or without legal justification. Counsel referenced Wulima v. Usman (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1432) 160, Egbe v. Adefarasin (No. 2) [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1, Eregbowa v. Obanor [2010] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1218) 33, Hassan v. Aliyu [2010] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 547 at 589, Offoboche v. Ogoja L.G. [2001] 16 NWLR (Pt. 739) 458, and CBN v. Okojie [2004] 10 NWLR (Pt. 882) 488. Counsel maintained that the Defendant acted arbitrarily and ultra vires, as evidenced by the testimony of the Defendant’s witness, DW1, who admitted under cross-examination that the Claimant's restriction was carried out without any query, indictment, or compliance with the written notice procedures of the Terms and Conditions of Service.

7.Secondly, Counsel submitted that the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to cases of breach of contract, debt recovery, or contracts of employment. Counsel relied on Roe Ltd. v. UNN [2018] LPELR-43855(SC) and Salako v. I.E.D.B [1953] 20 NLR 169. Counsel further cited Anolam v. F.U.T.O [2025] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1984) 651 for the proposition that the limitation law only applies to employment contracts clothed with statutory flavour, whereas the Claimant's employment is strictly contractual and governed by the terms of the Staff Manual.

8.Counsel distinguished the Supreme Court decision in Okoronkwo v. INEC [2025] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1991) 131, arguing that the Appellant in that case received a formal written correspondence suspending him, which created a direct and positive act that crystallized the cause of action, whereas the present Claimant received an unofficial, informal SMS message from a personal phone number. Additionally, Counsel noted that the Appellant in Okoronkwo's case pleaded that his employment had statutory flavour under the Civil Service Rules, whereas the present Claimant's relationship is purely contractual under common law and the Defendant’s Terms and Conditions of Service. Counsel also pointed out that the Appellant's reliefs in Okoronkwo's case did not seek a remedy for breach of contract, unlike the present suit where the Claimant specifically seeks a declaration of breach of contract.

9.On the crystallization of the cause of action, Counsel submitted that the aggregate set of facts arose on 21st October 2023 when the unofficial SMS message was sent directing the Claimant to stay away from work, and that this injury continued unabated until the 12-month probationary period elapsed, forcing the Claimant to make a demand through his solicitors. Counsel contended that the cause of action finally accrued when the Defendant refused and treated the solicitor's letter of demand dated 21st October 2024 with disdain. Consequently, Counsel submitted that the suit, having been filed on 1st November 2024, which is a mere ten days after the crystallization of the cause of action, is well within the three-month period. Counsel relied on Thomas v. Olufosoye [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 659, SPDC (Nig) Ltd. v. X.M Fed. Ltd. [2006] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1004) 189, Abubakar v. Michelin Motor Services Ltd. [2020] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1739) 555 at 574, and Cookey v. Fombo [2005] 15 NWLR (Pt. 947) 182 at 202 to define a cause of action as the bundle of aggregate facts giving a right to sue.

9.Counsel also submitted that the Defendant’s acts constituted an abuse of office, defined as the use of power to achieve ends other than those for which power was granted, citing Uniport v. John [2020] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1731) 106 at 134; and Radiographers Regd. Board Nig. v. M & HWUN [2021] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1777) 149. Counsel relied on Peak Merchant Bank Ltd. v. C.B.N [2017] LPELR-42324; Nigerian Army v. Abayomi [2019] LPELR-47084; and INEC v. Ogbadibo Local Government [2016] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1498) 167 at 191-192 to show that the lack of official written process and the reliance on oral directives demonstrated bad faith and disentitled the Defendant to the protection of POPA. Counsel also argued that evidence elicited under cross-examination of DW1 confirmed the lack of a lawful or valid basis for the Defendant's action, and such evidence must be relied upon, citing Ogbeide v. Osule [2004] 12 NWLR (Pt. 886) 86 and Adama v. K.S.H.A [2019] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1699) 501.

On Issue 2: Whether the employment of the Claimant falls within the category of permanent and pensionable employment within the Defendant's establishment and if so, whether the Defendant can terminate the Claimant's appointment without following the procedures laid out in the Defendant's Terms and Conditions of Service?

10.Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Sunday A. Aborisade, Esq., submitted that the relationship between the parties is strictly a contract of employment with all essential elements of offer, acceptance, and consideration present. Counsel argued that the offer was made via Exhibit A and accepted by the Claimant's conduct in reporting for duty, which constitutes valuable consideration, relying on African (Nig) Ltd v. A.G. of the Federation [1996] 9 NWLR (Pt. 475) 634 at 656-671, Orient Bank (Nig) Plc v. Bilante International Ltd. [1997] 8 NWLR (Pt. 515) 37, Federal Government of Nigeria & Ors v. Zebra Energy Ltd. [2002] 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 162 at 211, Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Ozigi (1991] 2 All NLR 45, and Oyedeji v. Fasheun [1976] UILR 134.

11.Counsel submitted that the plain and ordinary meaning of Exhibit A and Exhibit C shows that the Claimant's employment is permanent and pensionable, subject to a probationary period of twelve months, citing Abacha v. F.R.N [2006] 4 NWLR (Pt. 970) 239. Counsel argued that probation is not a separate category of employment, but merely an observation period. Under Section 3.2.2 and Section 3.2.18 of the Staff Manual, the Defendant's power to terminate during probation is not absolute but must be exercised in accordance with the contractually laid down procedure, which requires one month's salary in lieu of notice and a written communication.

12.Counsel argued that since the Defendant failed to issue any written termination letter or pay one month's salary in lieu of notice, there was no valid termination known to law. Counsel maintained that where a document or legislation lays down a specific procedure for doing a thing, no other mode is permissible, relying on Okereke v. Yar'Adua [2008] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100) 95 at 127, C.C.B Plc v. Anambra State [1992] 10 SCNJ 137 at 163, and Bamisile v. Osasuyi [2007] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1042) 225 at 272. Counsel also relied on Ogunyade v. Oshunkeye [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1057) 218 at 246 and Owners M/V Gongola Hope v. S.C Nig Ltd [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1056) 189 at 215 to show that the Claimant's pleadings were supported by credible documentary evidence and the admissions of DW1 under cross-examination.

On Issue 3: Whether the Claimant is not entitled to the reliefs sought?

13.Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Sunday A. Aborisade, Esq., submitted that the Claimant is fully entitled to all the reliefs sought in the Amended Statement of Material Facts. Counsel argued that the Supreme Court decision in Ondo State University v. Folayan [1994] LPELR-2673(SC) is distinguishable from the present case because the plaintiff in Folayan argued that the employer's silence after the probation period amounted to a "deemed confirmation", whereas the present Claimant contends that his employment was never terminated in the first place due to the absence of any written termination. Counsel suggested that in line with the Supreme Court's reasoning, this Court should presume a "deemed extension" of the probationary period, leaving the employment subsisting.

14.Counsel further submitted that even during a probationary period, an employer is bound to follow the contractually laid down procedures for termination, relying on Ihezukwu v. University of Jos & Ors [1990] LPELR-1461(SC) and Al-Bishak v. National Productivity Centre & Anor [2015] LPELR-24659(CA). Counsel contended that because the Defendant failed to comply with Section 3.2.18 of the Terms and Conditions of Service, the contract remains intact, and the Claimant is entitled to his salaries and allowances as itemized.

15.On the requirement to prove special damages, Counsel submitted that there is nothing extraordinarily sacrosanct about special damages and their proof, as the rule only requires credible evidence of such a character as to demonstrate entitlement, citing Amadi v. Chinda [2009] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1148) 107 at 131. Counsel argued that the Claimant specifically pleaded these entitlements in paragraph 11 of the Amended Statement of Facts and led unchallenged, uncontradicted oral evidence in paragraph 13 of his Witness Statement on Oath. Counsel relied on Boye Ltd v. Sowemimo [2022] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1817) 195 at 219, Inegbedion v. Selo-Gemen [2013] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 211 at 236, and Badejo v. Federal Ministry of Education [1996] 8 NWLR (Pt. 464) 15 at 42 for the proposition that a court has a duty to act on uncontradicted and unchallenged evidence. Counsel argued that the Defendant cannot plead its own default of restricting the Claimant as a defense to non-payment, citing Bamisile v. NJC & Ors (2012) LPELR-8381(CA) to show that as long as employment is not validly determined, the employee remains on the pay list.

16.Regarding general damages, Counsel submitted that general damages flow naturally from the breach of contract and are within the discretion of the court to award, citing Stanbic IBTC Bank v. Longterm Global Capital Ltd & Ors [2021] LPELR-55610(CA), Unity Bank Plc v. Ahmed [2020] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1705) 364, and Cameroon Airlines v. Otutuizu [2005] 9 NWLR (Pt. 929) 202 at 223. Counsel also argued that the court has the power to award post-judgment interest, citing Cappa & D'Alberto (Nig.) Plc v. NDIC [2021] LPELR-53379(SC).

17.In response to the Defendant's reliance on the unreported decision in Saifullah Muhammed Aliyu v. NPA (Suit No: NICN/ABJ/20/2023), Counsel noted that the Defendant failed to provide a copy of the unreported decision as required. Furthermore, Counsel argued that the decision of a court of coordinate jurisdiction is only persuasive, and the case was decided on its own peculiar facts where the employee conceded termination, which is not the case here. Counsel urged the court to instead follow the binding authorities of the Supreme Court in Iyeke v. PTI [2019] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 217, Ihezukwu v. Unijos, and Ondo State University v. Folayan.

DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSIONS

18. On whether the suit of the Claimant against the Defendant is statute barred, learned Counsel to the Defendant, Abdul Mohammed SAN, submitted that the Claimant's suit is statute-barred under Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, which strips the court of jurisdiction to hear the matter. Counsel submitted that the Defendant is a public officer within the meaning of the Act and is entitled to the three-month limitation protection. In support of this proposition, Counsel cited Ibrahim v. J.S.C Kaduna State [1998] 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) p. 1, Offoboche v. Ogoja Local Government [2001] 16 NWLR (Pt. 739) p. 458, Kolo v. A-G, Federation [2003] 10 NWLR (Pt. 829) p. 602, Daudu v. University of Agriculture Makurdi [2003] FWLR (Pt. 176) p. 687, Nwafor v. MDCN [2016] LPELR-41495(CA), Central Bank of Nigeria v. Hydro Air Pty Ltd [2014] 16 NWLR (Part 1434) 482, and Utomodu v. Mil. Gov, Bendel State [2014] 11 NWLR (Part 1417) 97.

19.Counsel admitted that there had been previous judicial conflict as to whether the Public Officers Protection Act applies to employment contracts, citing Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission v. Ajibola Johnson [2019] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 247, Idachaba v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi [2021] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1787) 209, and Rector Kwara Poly v. Adefila [2024] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1944) 529. However, Counsel submitted that where faced with conflicting decisions, the trial court is bound to follow the latest decision of the Supreme Court, relying on Cyril O. Osakue v. Federal College of Education, Asaba [2010] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1201) 1, Osude v. Azodo [2017] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1688) 295, and Edeoga & Anor v. INEC & Ors [2023] LPELR-61806(SC). Counsel submitted that the Supreme Court has now settled the position in its latest decision in Okoronkwo v. I.N.E.C. [2025] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1991) 131, where the apex court, per Ogbuinya, JSC, held that an action rooted in a contract of employment is amenable to the limitation law under Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act.

20.Counsel argued that on the face of the Claimant's pleadings, the cause of action crystallized in November 2023 when the Claimant received a text message directing him to stay away from his duty post pending further instructions. A mathematical calculation from November 2023 to the date of filing this suit on 1st November 2024 shows a lapse of almost one year, which violates the mandatory three-month limit. Counsel submitted that a statute-barred action must be dismissed in its entirety, relying on JFS Investment Ltd v. Brawal Line Ltd & Ors [2010] 12 SCNJ 275, William O. Olagunju & Anor v. Power Holding Co. of Nigeria Plc [2011] 4 SCNJ 192, Chief Ikedi Ohakim v. Chief Martin Agbaso [2010] 7 SCNJ 137, and Odebiyi v. Wema Bank Plc & Ors [2014] LPELR-22993(CA). Counsel also referenced P.N. Udoh Trading Co. Ltd v. Abere [2001] 11 NWLR (Pt. 723) 114, Odubeko v. Fowler [1993] 7 NWLR (Pt. 308) 637, Eboigbe v. NNPC [1994] 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 649, Araka v. Ejeagwu [2000] 12 SC (Pt. 1) 99, Obiefuna v. Okoye (1961) 1 All NLR 357, N.P.A. Plc v. Lotus Plastics Ltd [2005] 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 158, Denca Service Ltd v. Ifeanyi Chukwu (Osundu) Co [2013] LPELR-22005(CA), Shamusideen Abolore Bakare v. Nigerian Railway Corporation [2007] 7-10 SC 1, and Dr. Charles Oladeinde Williams v. Madam Olaitan Williams [2008] 4-5 SC (Pt. II) 253.

21.In response to the Claimant's arguments, Counsel submitted in the Reply on Point of Law that the Claimant's concession that his employment is contractual and has no statutory flavour places the relationship purely under common law as a master-servant relationship. Under common law, an employer has an unfettered right to terminate a servant's employment for good, bad, or no reason at all, without any statutory formalities, relying on the Supreme Court decision in U.T.C. (Nig) Plc v. Peters [2022] LPELR-57289 per Augie, JSC.

22.Counsel further submitted that the Claimant's attempt to evade the limitation statute by tagging the SMS notice as "unofficial" must fail. Counsel argued that an SMS is a valid and recognized means of official communication under Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011, and that the term "in writing" must be given a purposive, digital-age interpretation rather than an archaic view limited to pen and paper. Counsel cited ENL Consortium Ltd v. Shambilat Shelter (Nig.) Ltd. [2018] LPELR-43902(SC), Continental Sales Ltd v. R. Shipping Inc [2012] LPELR-7905(CA), C.E & M.S.V Pazan [2020] 1 NWLR (Part 1704) 70, and Sterling Bank v. Akitoye Akinbode [2018] LPELR-50669(CA). Counsel submitted that because the Claimant failed to address or counter these authorities in his brief, the point is deemed conceded, relying on Kanu v. FRN [2022] LPELR-58768, Alhaji M. K. Gujba v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc & Anor [2011] LPELR-8971(CA), and Nwankwo v. Yar'Adua [2010] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1209) 518.

23.Counsel argued that the case of Abubakar v. Michelin Motor Services Ltd [2020] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1739) 555 actually supports the Defendant, as it demonstrates that an action is unsustainable once the cause of action is stale. Counsel argued that under the two-pronged test in Abubakar, the cause of action crystallized on 21st November 2023 when the wrongful act (the SMS to stay away) and the consequent damage (restriction from premises) existed side-by-side, and not on the date of the solicitor's letter. Counsel also argued that the Claimant failed to plead or prove any facts of bad faith to escape the limitation law under the test in Radiographers Regd. Board Nig v. M & HWUN [2021] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1777) 149. Finally, Counsel urged the court to decline the Claimant's invitation to strike out paragraph 6 of the Statement of Defence, as pleadings had closed, relying on the decision in Finnih v. Imade [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt. 219) 511 to argue that conclusions of law can be drawn from material facts pleaded.

On Issue 1: Whether from the totality of facts in this suit: particularly the Defendant's Letter of Employment and condition of service, the Claimant has proved that his employment is one of permanent and pensionable as to require the Defendant comply with the dispute resolution procedure contained in Defendant's Terms and Condition of Service?

24.Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Abdul Mohammed SAN, submitted that because the termination occurred during the probationary period of the employment, the Claimant has no right to insist that his employment has been converted to permanent and pensionable or that his termination is void. Counsel argued that under the contract of employment (Exhibit A and Exhibit E), the relationship is governed by the terms freely signed by the parties, citing Katto v. CBN [1999] LPELR-1677(SC).

25.Counsel argued that Section 3.2.2 and Section 3.2.18 of the Terms and Conditions of Service show that newly employed staff hold their appointments on probation during the first twelve months. Counsel submitted that during probation, the Council retains an unfettered right to terminate the employment of an unconfirmed officer, and no statutory procedure is provided for or needs to be followed. Counsel cited Alhaji Baba v. Nigerian Civil Aviation Training Centre Zaria & Anor [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 388, Al-Bishak v. National Productivity Centre & Anor [2015] LPELR-24659(CA) at 40-41, Igwilo v. C.B.N [2000] 9 NWLR (Pt. 672) 302, Alhassan v. ABU, Zaria [2011] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1259) 417, Ihezukwu v. University of Jos [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 598 at 609, and Kusamotu v. Wemabod Estates [1976] 11 S.C. 279.

26.Counsel submitted that the Claimant admitted under cross-examination that he was never confirmed. Counsel argued that staying beyond the probationary period does not result in an automatic confirmation, as such a contention is "manifestly absurd" and would amount to imposing a willing servant on an unwilling master. Counsel relied on the decisions in Ondo State University & Anor v. Folayan [1994] LPELR-2673(SC) at page 48; NITEL Plc & Anor v. Akwa [2005] LPELR-5971(CA).

27.Counsel also cited the decision of this Court in Saifullah Muhammad Aliyu v. Nigerian Ports Authority (Suit No: NICN/ABJ/20/2023), where the court refused to reinstate an unconfirmed staff whose termination was carried out by withholding his salaries and allowances, finding it absurd to set aside termination on the ground that a formal letter of notice was not given. Counsel further relied on Celtel Nigeria BV v. Econet Wireless Ltd & Ors [2014] LPELR-22430 on the general usage of administrative discretion. Counsel maintained that the SMS sent by the HR department, followed by the physical restriction at the premises, was sufficient administrative action to terminate the probationary employment.

On Issue 2: Whether the Claimant has shown an entitlement to the grant of the Reliefs sought in this suit herein?

28.Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Abdul Mohammed SAN, submitted that the Claimant is not entitled to any of the reliefs sought. Counsel argued that declaratory reliefs are equitable and are not granted on a platter of gold, but must be strictly proved by the Claimant on the strength of his own case, relying on Col. Nicholas Ayanru (Rtd) v. Mandilas Ltd [2007] 4 SCNJ 388, Nweke v. Okorie [2015] LPELR-40650, Ifekandu & Anor v. Uzoegwu [2008] LPELR-1435(SC), Yard v. Arewa Construction Ltd & Ors [2007] LPELR-3516(SC), and Kuburi International Trading Co. Ltd & Anor v. Bulama Musti & Anor [2018] LPELR-44104.

29.Counsel submitted that granting the Claimant's relief for salaries and allowances from November 2023 till date would be "manifestly absurd" under Ondo State University & Anor v. Folayan (supra). Counsel argued that the Claimant offered no proof that he actually worked during this period, and that equity frowns at unjust enrichment, citing Obeya v. Okpoga Microfinance Bank Ltd [2019] LPELR-47615(CA) and Eboni Finance and Securities Ltd v. Wole-Ojo Technical Services Ltd [1996] 7 NWLR (Pt. 461) 464.

30.Counsel further submitted that the claims for monthly salaries, 28-day allowance, child education allowance, and other entitlements are in the nature of special damages, which require strict, concrete, and easily cognisable proof under Sections 130 to 133 of the Evidence Act 2011. Counsel cited Produce Marketing Board v. A.O. Adewunmi [1972] 11 SC 111/24 and Neka B.B.B. Manufacturing Company Ltd v. African Continental Bank Ltd [2004] LPELR-1982(SC). Counsel maintained that because the Claimant failed to present any such concrete proof, the court cannot quantify or award these sums, as the court cannot make a contract for the parties, citing Board of Management of FMC, Makurdi v. Kwembe [2015] LPELR-40486(CA), Baba v. N.C.A.T.C. [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) p. 388, and Ladipo v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd. [2005] 1 NWLR (Pt. 907) p. 277.

31.Finally, Counsel submitted that since the main claims must fail, the ancillary claims for general damages, interest, and costs must also fail, relying on Fafunwa v. Bellview Travels Ltd [2013] LPELR-20800(CA), Mcdonald Scientific Emporium Ltd v. Access Bank [2021] LPELR-53301(CA), Eligwe v. Okpokiri [2015] 240 LRCN 28, Jimoh v. Jimoh & Ors (2018) LPELR-43793(CA), Kakih v. PDP & Ors [2014] LPELR-23277(SC), and Gov. of Kogi State & Anor v. Simon [2024] LPELR-73317(CA).

COURT’S DECISION

32.Having meticulously considered the pleadings, the evidence adduced by all parties, and the comprehensive written submissions of counsel, this Honorable Court hereby formulates the pivotal issues requiring determination as follows:

1. Whether the restriction of the Claimant from his duty post by means of an SMS message constituted a breach of the express and implied terms and conditions of service governing the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant.

2. Whether the Defendant was legally obligated to adhere to the prescribed procedures for terminating an appointment during the probationary period, as stipulated in the contract of employment, and whether the Defendant’s failure to comply with these mandatory procedures rendered the purported restriction or termination unlawful and void.

3. Whether the present suit is statute-barred by virtue of the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap. P41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, or any other applicable limitation statute.

4. Whether, in light of the findings on the preceding issues, the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in the Amended Statement of Material Facts.

33.It is evident from the originating process that the Claimant primarily seeks declaratory reliefs. This Court notes that a claim for declaratory relief is a discretionary remedy, not granted as a matter of course or merely upon admission by the adverse party. Consequently, a claimant seeking such relief must rely on the inherent strength of their own case, adducing credible evidence in support of the pleaded facts and sought reliefs, rather than on any perceived weakness in the defendant's case. See TSY Ltd v. Nwachukwu [2024] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1954) 147@173-174, Paras F-A (SC); Aliyu v. Namadi [2023] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1885) 161@214, Paras C-E (SC); Adamu v. Nigerian Airforce [2022] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1822) 159@177, Paras F-G; 178, Paras E-G (SC); and Adesina v. Air France [2022] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1833) 523@555-556, Paras H-B. The burden of proof, therefore, rests squarely on the Claimant to establish his case on the preponderance of evidence, or balance of probabilities. However, it is equally crucial to note that where the Defendant raises affirmative defences, such as statute bar or valid termination, the burden shifts to the Defendant to establish such defences by the same standard of proof. The Claimant is only entitled to leverage aspects of the Defendant’s case that unequivocally support his own. See Hanatu v. Amadiu [2020] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1728) 115@128, Paras A-C (SC); C.D.C (Nig) Ltd v. SCOA (Nig) Ltd [2007] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1030) 300@327, Paras A-F (SC).

34.The foundational principle of civil litigation dictates that a claimant initiating an action must prove their case to secure a favorable judgment. This is the primary rule of evidence: any party making an assertion bears the burden of proving it. See Olusesi v. Oyelusi and Others [1986] 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 31) 634; Chukwudi and Another v. Unachuku [1979] 3 C.A. 114. Before delving into the substantive issues formulated for determination, this Court deems it necessary to address certain preliminary matters.

35.The Claimant, in paragraph 12 of his Amended Statement of Facts, averred that the Public Service Rules (PSR) do not apply to the employment relationship between him and the Defendant, asserting that the relationship is instead regulated by the Defendant’s Staff Manual. The Defendant, conversely, countered this in paragraph 8 of its Amended Statement of Defence, implying the applicability of statutory flavour. This Court is mindful that the Claimant’s averment seeks to establish a master-servant relationship, while the Defendant contends otherwise.

36.Having meticulously reviewed Exhibit A, the letter of employment, and Exhibit C, the Staff Manual, this Court recognizes that staff handbooks, manuals, circulars, and administrative guidelines are commonly issued by management in government agencies to ensure workplace standardization. While these documents may be incorporated by reference into a contract of employment, they do not inherently confer "statutory flavour" upon the employment relationship. The law is trite: where a handbook is merely an internal agreement between management and staff, and has not been laid before the legislature or published as a statutory instrument (where required by an enabling Act), it remains a purely contractual document. The Supreme Court, in Adedeji & Ors v. Central Bank of Nigeria & Attorney-General of the Federation [2023] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1878) 531, emphatically cautioned against the liberal expansion of the doctrine of employment with statutory flavour. The Apex Court reiterated that internal documents, such as staff manuals, cannot create a statutory flavoured employment relationship unless they are expressly authorized by or derived from a statute. Furthermore, the Supreme Court emphasized that public institutions can, and frequently do, engage in master-servant relationships when the specific terms of engagement are not grounded in a legislative instrument. This, in the considered view of this Court, is precisely the situation in the instant suit. The mere fact that the Defendant is a creature of statute does not automatically transform the employment relationship with its employees into one with statutory flavour. The Defendant’s Staff Manual does not qualify as subsidiary legislation in the eyes of the law. Only rules, regulations, or orders made by an authority (such as a Minister, Council, or Board) under powers granted by a principal Act of the National Assembly can be said to have statutory flavour, as these are referred to as subsidiary legislation. This is demonstrably not the case here. I therefore find and hold that the relationship between the parties in this suit is one of master and servant.

37.The Claimant, through his counsel, in their written brief, urged this Court to strike out Paragraph 6 of the Defendant's Statement of Defence, contending that it constituted an "argument or legal conclusion" rather than a statement of material fact, thereby offending the rules of pleading. The Defendant, conversely, argued that the application was belated, as pleadings had long since closed, and therefore ought not to be entertained.

38.On this point, this Court is guided by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the import and application of Rules of Court. In Obi v. INEC & Ors [2008] LPELR-2167 (SC) and Oloba v. Akereja (1988) 7 SC (Pt. 1), the apex court underscored the necessity of obeying Rules of Court. However, this obedience is not to be slavish, as eloquently articulated by Peter-Odili, JSC, in Federal Republic of Nigeria v. T.A. Dairo & Ors [2015] LPELR-24303 (SC), quoting Niki Tobi, JSC, in Abubakar v. Yar’adua [2008] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1078) SC 465 @ 511 Para E-G:

“Rules of Court are meant to be obeyed of course. That is why they are made. There should be no argument about that. But there is an important qualification or caveat and it is that their obedience cannot or should not be slavish to the point that justice in the case is destroyed or thrown overboard. The greatest barometer as far as the public is concerned is whether at the end of the litigation process, justice has been done to the parties. Therefore, if in the course of doing justice, some harm is done to some procedural rules which hurts the rule such as paragraph 7 of the Practice Directions, the Court should be happy that it took the line of action in pursuance of justice.”

39.It is a well-established principle that mandatory words in the Rules of Court are not sacrosanct and are applied permissively, allowing for their discretionary application by the Court in the paramount interest of justice. See Obi v. INEC [2008] 1-2 SC 23 SC and Katto v. CBN [1991] 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 126. While Rules of Practice are undoubtedly meant to be respected and obeyed, they serve as handmaids of the law, designed to aid in the due administration of justice, not to impede it. This Court finds no compelling or convincing reason in the arguments advanced by the Claimant to warrant the striking out of Paragraph 6 of the Statement of Defence at this stage. The Court retains the inherent power to sift through pleadings and distinguish between facts and legal conclusions during the evaluation of evidence and submissions. To strike out the paragraph would potentially prejudice the Defendant's ability to present its full defence and would elevate procedural technicality over substantive justice. On this ground, the Claimant's submission to strike out Paragraph 6 of the Defendant’s Statement of Defence is hereby discountenanced.

40.The Claimant’s core grievance in this case is that in November 2023, during the probationary period of his appointment as Administrative Officer II with the Defendant, he received an unofficial communication via SMS message from the Defendant, directing him to stay away from his duty post pending further instructions from Management. The Claimant testified that he initially disregarded the message and attempted to continue with his work, but was physically resisted by security personnel acting on the Defendant's instructions. In essence, the Claimant asserts that his employment relationship with the Defendant was unilaterally and forcefully suspended or terminated by the Defendant, in direct contravention of the terms and conditions regulating their relationship. In resolving this dispute, this Court shall now proceed to consider the issues formulated for determination, addressing them serially as itemized.

Issue 1: Whether the Restriction of the Claimant from his Duty Post by Means of an SMS Message Constituted a Breach of the Terms and Conditions of Service Between the Claimant and the Defendant.

41.To resolve this critical issue, it is imperative to meticulously examine the nature and form of the communication sent to the Claimant and to measure it against the established contractual framework governing the employment relationship. The evidence before this Court unequivocally establishes that the Claimant was employed under the Defendant's Terms and Conditions of Service, Exhibit C, which constitutes the binding contractual code between the parties. See Olaniyan v. University of Ilorin [2004] 15 NWLR (Pt. 896) 357.

42.Paragraph 3.2.18 of Exhibit C prescribes a specific and mandatory mode of communication for the termination of probationary appointments, unequivocally mandating that the employee "shall receive written communication of the termination." The phrase "in writing" within the context of a formal employment relationship, particularly in a government parastatal, carries a precise technical and legal meaning. It connotes formal correspondence, typically a letter on the organization's official letterhead, duly signed by an authorized officer, and delivered through established official channels. The fundamental purpose of such a requirement is to ensure certainty, provide an official record, prevent ambiguity, and uphold due process in matters of grave professional consequence.

43.An SMS message, by its very nature, is an inherently informal and ephemeral medium of communication. It is ordinarily reserved for casual exchanges and is wholly unsuitable for the conveyance of decisions of such profound professional consequence as the termination of employment or the exclusion of an employee from their duty post. The SMS sent to the Claimant, which merely directed him to "stay away from your duty post pending further instructions from Management," demonstrably lacked the requisite formality, clarity, and official imprimatur demanded by Exhibit C. Furthermore, the content of the message was inherently ambiguous; the phrase "pending further directive" suggested an interim suspension rather than a final, unequivocal, and definitive determination of the employment relationship. Such ambiguity is precisely what formal written communication is designed to prevent. By utilizing this informal, ambiguous, and procedurally deficient mode of communication to effect a restriction of such magnitude, the Defendant acted in a manner that was fundamentally inconsistent with, and in clear contravention of, the express procedural requirements of the contract. This Court therefore finds, without hesitation, that the restriction of the Claimant from his duty post by means of the SMS message constituted a clear, material, and actionable breach of the terms and conditions of service.

44.This Court, exercising its constitutional jurisdiction under Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution (Third Alteration), has developed a robust jurisprudence rooted in the ILO Conventions, fundamental rights, and the dignity of the human person as guaranteed by Section 34 of the Constitution. In Duru v. Skye Bank Plc [2015] 59 NLLR (207) 680, this Court held that the manner of termination is not merely a procedural nicety but reflects the respect owed to an employee as a person possessed of dignity. The Court reasoned that where the employment manual prescribed a formal written notice, understood in the context of official correspondence, a text message fails both the formal requirement and the dignity standard. See also Aloysius v. Diamond Bank Plc [2015] 58 NLLR (Pt. 199) 92. The Supreme Court in Longe v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc [2010] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1189) 1 reaffirmed that where the contract prescribes a specific termination procedure, the employer must comply strictly. The Court distinguished between the substantive entitlement to terminate (which the employer may generally possess) and the procedural competence to effect termination (which depends entirely on contractual compliance). The import for SMS termination is decisive: even if the employer has the right to terminate, exercising that right through an unauthorized, informal, and ambiguous channel is procedurally incompetent and legally ineffective. On this premise, I find and hold that an SMS, being informal, instantaneous, and incapable of bearing the formal attributes of a letter of termination (official letterhead, signature, date of service, acknowledgment), cannot ordinarily satisfy a requirement for "written notice" within the contemplation of the Claimant’s employment manual.

Issue 2: Whether the Defendant was Required to Follow the Procedure Laid Down in the Contract for Terminating an Appointment During the Probationary Period, and Whether the Failure to Do So Rendered the Restriction Unlawful.

45.It is a well-established and immutable principle of employment law, fortified by a consistent line of decisions from the Supreme Court, including Iyeke v. Petroleum Training Institute [2019] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 217, Ihechukwu v. University of Jos [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 598, and Ondo State University v. Folayan (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 354) 1, that an employer is absolutely bound by the procedural requirements stipulated in the contract of employment, even where the employee is serving a probationary period. The fact that an employee is on probation does not, and cannot, confer upon the employer an unfettered discretion to disregard the contractual framework. On the contrary, the employer must exercise its rights strictly in accordance with the terms agreed upon. See Savannah Bank (Nigeria) Ltd v. Ajilo [1989] 1 NWLR (Pt. 97) 305.

46.Paragraph 3.2.18 of Exhibit C establishes a mandatory, two-fold requirement for the lawful termination of a probationary appointment: first, the communication of the termination in writing, and second, the payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice to the employee. These requirements are not discretionary; they are prescriptive conditions precedent to a lawful termination. Failure to satisfy these conditions renders the purported termination null and void. See Odulaja v. Haddad [1973] 11 SC 357.

47.The evidence before the Court is unequivocal and uncontradicted that the Defendant failed to comply with either of these mandatory requirements. No formal letter of termination was ever issued to the Claimant, and no one month's salary in lieu of notice was paid. Moreover, the evidence further reveals a critical procedural flaw: the directive to restrict the Claimant was purportedly issued by one Mr. Idowu Babatunde Olalekan on the basis of an alleged oral instruction from one Alhaji Gata. This is in stark contrast to the explicit provisions of Section 3.4.3 of the Terms and Conditions of Service, which designate the Council of the Defendant as the body exclusively empowered to terminate appointments. Any action taken by an individual or body without the requisite authority, particularly in matters of employment termination, is not merely a breach of contract but is ultra vires and a nullity ab initio. Such an act lacks legal force and cannot be validated by any subsequent ratification.

48.The Defendant failed to tender any documentary evidence whatsoever, such as minutes of a Council meeting or a formal resolution, to demonstrate that the Council authorized the restriction or termination of the Claimant's employment. The failure to produce this crucial evidence, which was clearly within the Defendant's power and possession, raises a strong adverse inference under Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011, that such evidence, if produced, would have been unfavourable to the Defendant or not even in existence. See Nigerian Agip Oil Co. Ltd v. Izegbuwa [2016] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1542) 349; Oduola & Sons Ltd v. Central Bank of Nigeria [2016] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1544) 575. This Court, in line with its mandate under Section 254C (1) (f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), to apply international best practices and standards, is ready to import and rely on the English law principle of an implied term of ‘mutual trust and confidence’, which was demonstrably breached by the Defendant's actions. Consequently, the restriction of the Claimant was not merely a breach of contract; it was fundamentally ultra vires, unlawful, and void, as it was executed without proper authority and in flagrant disregard of the mandatory procedural safeguards enshrined in the contract of employment. It therefore follows that the Defendant was required to follow the procedure laid down in the contract for terminating an appointment during the probationary period. This I find and hold.

49.In the course of this judgment, this Court observed that counsels dedicated significant time and attention to the fundamental issue of whether the Claimant's employment was permanent and pensionable or merely probationary. The Claimant strenuously argued that his employment was permanent and pensionable, as pleaded in Paragraph 1 of his Statement of Facts, evidenced by the Letter of Employment and Exhibit C (the Terms and Conditions of Service) which govern the employment relationship, subject only to an initial probationary period of 12 months. Counsel for the Claimant submitted that the Claimant’s appointment, being intrinsically linked to the right to permanence and continuous service, could not be unilaterally terminated, disqualified, or abrogated by the Defendant in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Manual. The Defendant, however, presented a divergent view, making reference to Exhibit A (the Letter of Provisional Appointment) and Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.18 of Exhibit C. The Defendant insisted that the Claimant, being a probationary staff, was seeking reliefs typically reserved for a confirmed or permanent employee. In essence, the core of counsels' arguments revolved around the scope of an employee's rights under an employment contract. In labour jurisprudence, employment rights are recognized as inuring at distinct levels, a principle firmly affirmed in Akande Ishola v. Lilygate Nig. Ltd Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/209/2016 delivered on 06/11/2017. In that case, this Court held that employment rights inure at three levels, each with its own scope of legal protection and potential for dispute resolution:

i. Pre-employment rights: Covering disputes that arise before an individual formally commences employment.

ii. Employment rights: Encompassing matters such as wrongful termination, unfair labour practices, breach of employment contracts, disputes over wages, salaries, allowances, conditions of service, promotion, demotion, disciplinary actions, workplace harassment, health and safety issues, and trade union disputes.

iii. Post-employment rights: Pertaining to disputes that arise after the termination or cessation of employment.

50.It is unequivocally clear that the present suit, as constituted by the Claimant’s reliefs, falls squarely within the ambit of the second category, namely ‘employment rights’ strictu senso. Both parties are in agreement on this fundamental position. The crucial dividing line in their arguments, however, lies in the precise legal description and implications of ‘probationary’ versus ‘permanent and pensionable’ employment. Exhibit C, the comprehensive Terms and Conditions regulating the employment relationship between the parties, makes adequate provisions for both permanent and pensionable appointments in Section 3.2.2 and probationary appointments in Section 3.2.18. Counsels, in their submissions, made specific reference to the Letter of Appointment issued to the Claimant by the Defendant, marked as Exhibit A. The Defendant's threshold argument is that the Claimant’s appointment, being probationary as explicitly stated in the letter of appointment, meant that the Claimant was not a full employee deserving the full protection and entitlements of a permanent and pensionable employee under Exhibit C. This argument, however, fundamentally misapprehends the established principles of employment law.

51.The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512, laid down the controlling principle regarding probationary employment. The Court held unequivocally that a probationary employee is indeed an employee, and that the probationary character of the appointment goes only to the confirmation of the employment, not to the existence of the employment relationship itself. Crucially, the Supreme Court further held that the employer must respect and comply with the contractual terms governing the probationary period. Any purported termination that does not comply with those terms is wrongful. This authoritative position was reinforced by the Court of Appeal in Aiyetan v. Nigerian Institute for Oil Palm Research (NIFOR) (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) 48, where the court held that a probationary employee retains the full panoply of his contractual rights during the probation period, and an employer cannot use the cloak of probation to bypass its own procedural obligations.

52.From a holistic reading of the provisions of Exhibit C, it is evident that the Terms and Conditions of Service contemplate the Claimant’s employment as a permanent and pensionable status, subject to the successful completion of the probationary period. While the employment relationship in this case is described as probationary, it is, in the eyes of the law, an existing employment relationship endowed with inherent employment rights. I find that from a community reading of Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.18 of Exhibit C, the probationary character of the Claimant’s appointment pertains only to the ‘confirmation of the employment’ and does not negate the existence of the employment relationship or the applicability of the contractual terms during that period. The letter of offer, Exhibit A, is categorical that Exhibit C is applicable to the appointment of the Claimant. I therefore hold that the Claimant’s employment relationship is of a permanent and pensionable nature, subject to the probationary period as explicitly provided in the Terms and Conditions of Service.

Issue 3: Whether the Suit is Statute-Barred by Virtue of the Public Officers Protection Act or Any Other Applicable Limitation Statute.

53.The Defendant contends that this suit is statute-barred by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap. P41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 (POPA), which stipulates that no action shall be brought against a public officer for acts done in the execution of public duty unless commenced within three months next after the act, neglect, or default complained of, or, in the case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof. The Defendant argues that the suit was commenced more than three months after the SMS was sent.

54.After a thorough review of the circumstances surrounding this case, this Court observes that the SMS message itself, by its express terms referencing "pending further directive," did not constitute a definitive, final, or unequivocal act of termination from which time could begin to run. The employment relationship was not unequivocally repudiated on the date the SMS was sent; rather, the Claimant was deliberately left in a state of uncertainty, awaiting further instructions that never materialized. The wrong complained of was therefore not a single, isolated act but a continuing wrong, consisting of the ongoing denial of access to his duty post and the persistent withholding of his salary and entitlements. In accordance with the principle established in Egbe v. Adefarasin [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1, the limitation period for a continuing wrong does not begin to run until the wrong ceases. Each month that the Defendant withheld the Claimant's salary constituted a fresh and distinct breach of the contractual obligation. See Shell Petroleum Development Co. Ltd v. Aniete [1999] 12 NWLR (Pt. 632) 452.

55.And most fundamentally, the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (NICN) derives its expansive and exclusive jurisdiction from Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). The Constitution grants it a comprehensive and exclusive authority over employment and labour relations matters. The weight of judicial authority, including the definitive decision of the Supreme Court in Skye Bank Plc v. Iwu [2017] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1590) 24, firmly supports the position that the Public Officers Protection Act does not operate to defeat or circumscribe the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court in matters of employment disputes, particularly where the cause of action is rooted in a contractual relationship and constitutes a continuing wrong or injury. The POPA is primarily intended to protect public officers acting bona fide in the execution of public duty, not to shield employers from liability for breaches of contractual obligations in an employment relationship. When a public institution acts as an employer, it is bound by the terms of the contract of employment, and any breach thereof is a private contractual matter, not an act done in the execution of a public duty in the sense contemplated by the POPA. To hold otherwise would render the constitutional provisions establishing this Court and its jurisdiction nugatory in a significant class of cases, thereby undermining the very essence of specialized labour adjudication. For these compelling reasons, the Court finds and holds that the present suit is not statute-barred.

Issue 4: Whether the Claimant is Entitled to the Reliefs Sought in the Amended Statement of Material Facts.

56.Having meticulously found that the restriction of the Claimant was unlawful and constituted a fundamental breach of contract, and having further determined that the suit is not statute-barred, the Court now turns to the crucial question of remedies and the Claimant's entitlement to the reliefs sought.

57.The Claimant seeks declarations that the restriction from duty was illegal and unlawful, and that the Defendant breached its contractual obligations. Based on the unequivocal findings under Issues 1 and 2, these declarations are hereby granted as prayed.

58.The Claimant further seeks an order for the payment of arrears of salaries and allowances. The unchallenged evidence before this Court establishes that the Claimant has not received any salary or allowances since the date of the unlawful restriction. The Claimant's evidence specifically detailed a monthly salary of N350,000, as well as specific allowances including a rent allowance of N1,000,000 and a furniture allowance of N500,000. These figures were not specifically denied or controverted by the Defendant in its pleadings or evidence. In the context of the general provisions of Exhibit C, which clearly contemplate and provide for such allowances for employees, the Court accepts the Claimant's evidence on the quantum of remuneration as established on the balance of probabilities. See Mogaji v. Odofin [1978] 3 SC 91; Ogu v. Ikwe [2016] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 225. The Defendant is therefore ordered to pay all arrears of salaries and allowances from the date of the unlawful restriction to the date of this judgment, computed at the rates established in evidence, specifically covering the probationary period for which he was unlawfully denied payment.

59.The Claimant also claims general damages in the sum of N10,000,000 for suffering, humiliation, loss of earnings, and psychological trauma. General damages are awarded to compensate for loss or suffering that is not easily quantifiable but flows naturally from the defendant's breach, beyond the mere pecuniary loss specifically proven. See Kode v. Nigerian Army [2018] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 288; Abalaka v. University of Lagos [2018] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 1. The circumstances of this case, where the Claimant was summarily excluded from his livelihood by an informal text message, without due process, without stated reason, and left in a prolonged state of limbo and uncertainty, undoubtedly warrant compensation for the anguish, indignity, and disruption to his life suffered. However, while the suffering is evident, the sum claimed is, in the considered view of this Court, excessive and disproportionate to the nature of the breach in a contractual employment setting. In the judicious exercise of the Court's discretion, and having regard to the need for proportionality and the principle of restitutio in integrum (restoration to the original position as far as money can achieve), the Court awards the sum of N3,000,000 as general damages.

60.Regarding interest, the Claimant seeks 25% per annum pre-judgment and 10% per annum post-judgment. The rate of 25% for pre-judgment interest is, in the current economic climate and prevailing judicial practice, excessive and not reflective of equitable considerations. See Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Aplin [2018] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 115. The Court, exercising its inherent powers to award interest to compensate for the delay in payment and to ensure full justice, awards pre-judgment interest at 10% per annum on the accumulated salaries and allowances from the date the first salary fell due until the date of this judgment. Post-judgment interest is awarded at 10% per annum on the total judgment sum from the date of this judgment until final liquidation.

61.Finally, having regard to the conduct of the Defendant in this matter, which demonstrated a clear disregard for established contractual procedures and the dignity of the Claimant, and considering the substantial success achieved by the Claimant in his claims, the Court awards costs in favour of the Claimant, assessed at N500,000. See Bank of the North Ltd v. Daboh [2008] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1083) 374; Adebowale v. Doherty [1997] 4 NWLR (Pt. 497) 361.

63.On the whole, and for the reasons extensively articulated above, this Court hereby enters judgment for the Claimant on the following definitive terms:

a. It is hereby declared that the restriction of the Claimant from his duty post by the Defendant, Nigerian Shippers Council, is illegal, unlawful, and constitutes a nullity.

b. It is further hereby declared that the Defendant was in fundamental breach of its contractual obligations to the Claimant.

c. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay the Claimant all arrears of salaries and allowances from the date of the unlawful restriction during the probationary period only to the date of this judgment, computed at the rates established in evidence.

d. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay the Claimant the sum of N3,000,000 (Three Million Naira) as general damages for the suffering, humiliation, and psychological trauma occasioned by the unlawful restriction.

e. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the accumulated salaries and allowances from the date the first salary fell due until the date of this judgment.

f. The Defendant is further ordered to pay post-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the total judgment sum (comprising arrears of salaries and allowances, general damages, and pre-judgment interest) from the date of this judgment until the date of final liquidation.

g. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay costs of N500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) to the Claimant.

64. Judgment is hereby entered accordingly.

 

…………………..

Hon. Justice E. D. Subilim

JUDGE