IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT LAGOS

BEFORE HON. JUSTICE JOYCE A. O. DAMACHI

DATE: 10TH AUGUST 2026                                  SUIT NO: NICN/LA/214/2025

BETWEEN:

1.       SUNDAY EBULU

2.     ETE OYEGBANREN

3.      EDWIN KOLOH

4.     SAMUEL AKINFE

5.     FOLA OYINBO

6.     ALABA FADOLA

7.     JEREMIAH ODIOR
(Suing for themselves as Concerned Members of Petroleum & Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) Chevron Branch)
... CLAIMANTS

AND

1.       PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION OF NIGERIA (PENGASSAN)

2.     COMRADE FESTUS OSIFO (The National President, PENGASSAN)

3.      COMRADE LUMUMBA IGHOTEMU OKUGBAWA (The General Secretary, PENGASSAN)

4.     EGBADON LAWRENCE

5.     ANI IKECHUKWU

6.     OFOMA UGOCHUKWU

7.     LAWAL ABDUL-KABIR OLUWASEYI

8.     OGBUDU ROLAND

9.     UDOLU PAUL

10.  ASEKUTU WILSON

11.    LAVINE AGHAUNOR
(4th to 11th Defendants as Members/Officers, PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch Caretaker Committee)
... DEFENDANTS

 

JUDGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

1. This Originating summons which is taken out by the Claimants for the determination of all the questions/ issues as contained on the face of the originating process and also seek the  following reliefs: 

1.       A DECLARATION that upon a proper construction of Rule 31.2 of the Constitution of the Petroleum & Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) adopted on 16th December 2022 and the Disciplinary Procedure under Schedule 2 thereof, the Central Working Committee (CWC) of PENGASSAN CANNOT dissolve the Executive Committee of any Branch without the approval of the National Executive Council (NEC) of PENGASSAN.

 

2.       A DECLARATION that the purported dissolution of PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) by the Central Working Committee (CWC) in October 2024 is unconstitutional, null and void, and of no legal effect whatsoever.

 

3.       A DECLARATION that by a proper construction of Rule 31.4 of the Constitution of PENGASSAN (adopted on 16th December 2022, a Caretaker Committee constituted to administer the affairs of a Branch following the dissolution of its Branch Executive Committee cannot lawfully consist of more than five (5) members.

 

4.       A DECLARATION that the Eight-member Caretaker Committee constituted in October 2024 by the Central Working Committee (CWC) for the administration of the affairs of PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch is unconstitutional, null and void, and of no effect whatsoever.

 

5.       A DECLARATION that upon a proper construction of Rule 31.4 of the Constitution of PENGASSAN (adopted on 16th December 2022, the tenure of a Caretaker Committee constituted to administer the affairs of a Branch cannot lawfully extend beyond a maximum period of three (3) months.

 

6.       A DECLARATION that the purported extension of the tenure of the Eight-member Caretaker Committee constituted for PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch by the Central Working Committee (CWC) beyond three (3) months and for a period extending over nine (9) months from October 2024 is unconstitutional, unlawful, null and void.

 

7.       A DECLARATION that upon a proper construction of Rule 31 of the Constitution of PENGASSAN (adopted on 16th December 2022), the CWC is not vested with the power to dissolve a Chapter of PENGASSAN.

 

8.       A DECLARATION that the purported dissolution of PENGASSAN-Chevron Chapters by the Central Working Committee (CWC) is unconstitutional, null and void, and of no effect whatsoever.

 

9.       A DECLARATION that the Caretaker Committees purportedly constituted in October 2024 by the Central Working Committee (CWC) for the administration of the affairs of PENGASSAN-Chevron Chapters are unconstitutional, unlawful, null and void.

 

10.     A DECLARATION that upon a proper construction of Rule 16.3 of the Constitution of PENGASSAN (adopted on 16th December 2022), the Central Working Committee (CWC) has no power to revoke the approved/operational Bye-laws of a Branch.

 

11.      A DECLARATION that the purported revocation of the Bye-laws of PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch dated 10th February 2017, as reviewed and approved in February 2022 by the National Secretariat of PENGASSAN, in July 2025 is unconstitutional, unlawful, null and void.

 

12.      A DECLARATION that the Bye-laws of PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch dated 10th February 2017, as reviewed in February 2022, remain valid, subsisting, and operational for the conduct of elections into offices at the Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) and Chapter Executive Committee (CECOM) of PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch.

 

13.      A DECLARATION that in the face of the valid and subsisting Bye-laws of PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch dated 10th February 2017 (as reviewed in February 2022), the election guidelines issued by the PENGASSAN National Secretariat dated 30th July 2025 for the PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) and Chapter Executive Committee (CECOM) elections are unconstitutional, unlawful, null and void and not binding on PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch.

 

14.     A DECLARATION that only the valid and subsisting Bye-laws of PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch dated 10th February 2017, as reviewed in February 2022, can lawfully regulate the conduct of elections into the Branch Executive Committee and Chapter Executive Committee of PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch.

 

15.      AN ORDER setting aside the purported dissolution of the PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) in October 2024.

 

16.     AN ORDER setting aside the purported dissolution of the PENGASSAN-Chevron Chapters in October 2024.

 

17.      AN ORDER setting aside the purported constituted Eight-member Caretaker Committee for the PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch.

 

18.     AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants, their servants, agents, privies, officers, or howsoever called, from giving or further giving effect to or acting or further upon the purported dissolution of the PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch Executive Committee and Chapters Executive Committee.

 

19.     AN ORDER OF INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants, their servants, agents, privies, officers, or howsoever called, from recognizing, retaining, or continuing to act upon the purported Eight-member Caretaker Committee for the administration of the affairs of PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch.

 

20.     AN ORDER OF INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants, their servants, agents, privies, officers, or howsoever called, from giving effect to or further implementing the purported revocation of the Bye-laws of PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch dated 10th February 2017 as reviewed in February 2022.

 

21.      AN ORDER OF INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants, their servants, agents, privies, officers, or howsoever called, from giving effect to or further acting upon the purported election guidelines dated 30th July 2025 issued by the PENGASSAN National Secretariat for the conduct of elections into the PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch Executive Committee and Chapters Executive Committee.

 

22.     AN ORDER OF INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants, their servants, agents and privies from conducting, supervising or in any manner interfering with elections into the PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) and Chapter Executive Committee (CECOM) EXCEPT in strict compliance with the PENGASSAN Constitution and the extant Bye-laws of the Chevron Branch.

 

23.     AN ORDER directing the 1st – 3rd Defendants to recognize and give full effect to the extant and subsisting Bye-laws of PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch dated 10th February 2017 (as reviewed in February 2022) as the valid legal instrument regulating the conduct of elections into the Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) and Chapter Executive Committee (CECOM) of the PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch.

 

24.     AND FOR SUCH FURTHER OR OTHER ORDERS as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case.

2. HARMONISED FACTS

3. This action, designated as Suit No. NICN/LA/214/2025, was commenced by an Originating Summons filed on 26 August 2025 by Sunday Ebulu and six other concerned members of the Chevron Branch of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) against the association, its National President and General Secretary, and the members of a Caretaker Committee appointed to run the branch.

4. The dispute arises from a sequence of administrative and disciplinary measures taken by the national leadership of the 1st Defendant. Following a vote of no confidence passed on the Branch Chairman (the 11th Defendant) by the Chevron Branch Executive Committee on 12 September 2024, the Central Working Committee (CWC) of PENGASSAN dissolved the Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) and Chapter Executive Committees (CECOM) on 8 October 2024, subsequently appointing an eight-member Caretaker Committee. The 1st Defendant further revoked the Chevron Branch Bye-Laws of 10 February 2017 and issued new election guidelines on 30 July 2025.

5. The Claimants grouse is that  national organs thereafter extended the Caretaker Committee's tenure beyond the constitutional limit, unilaterally revoked the Chevron Branch Bye-Laws of February 2017 (as reviewed in 2022), and issued centralized election guidelines on 30 July 2025.

6. The Claimants seek several declaratory and injunctive reliefs to nullify these actions, set aside the Caretaker Committee's appointments, and preserve their democratic franchise.

7. The litigation escalated dramatically when, despite the service of court processes and a pending motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the electoral process, the Defendants went ahead to conduct the branch delegate and executive elections on 16 September 2025. This prompted the Claimants to file an Affidavit of Fact on 17 September 2025, urging the Court to set aside the elections as an attempt to overreach the judicial process and foist a fait accompli on the Court.

8. The Defendants on the other hand, have resisted the suit through a fifty-paragraph Counter-Affidavit, asserting that the dissolution was a necessary response to administrative paralysis and operational chaos, that the action was subsequently ratified by the National Executive Council (NEC), and that the branch bye-laws were lawfully revoked due to non-submission for mandatory national revalidation.

9. In line with the rules of court, the Claimant filed a written address and raised 2   Issues for Determination

10. ISSUE 1:  Whether having regards to the provisions of the Constitution of the 1st Defendant, the dissolution of the Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) and Chapter Executive Committees (CECOM) is valid. If YES whether the 8-member constituted Caretaker Committee and extended tenure from 2024 till August 2025 is lawful and binding

 

11 On Issue 1: Learned Counsel to the Claimants, Ebun-Olu Adegboruwa, SAN, submitted that the Constitution of PENGASSAN is a binding document enforceable by all parties to it. Counsel relied on Imonikhe v. A.-G., Bendel State (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.248) 396 and Mohammed v. Sokoto (2021) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1766) 205 at p. 218 for the proposition that the constitution of an association is the organic instrument regulating the affairs of its members and binding them by its provisions. It was further submitted that because PENGASSAN and its officers are established by a constitution, every action done by them must be in strict alignment with that constitution to be valid. Counsel relied on Nwosu & Anor v. Ibekwe (2022) LPELR-58820 (Pp. 37-38) for the proposition that the constitution serves as the touchstone for every action affecting the association and its members, and any action that does not align with it is invalid and must be discountenanced.

12. Learned Counsel to the Claimants contended that the dissolution of the Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) and Chapter Executive Committees (CECOM) of the Chevron Branch was not founded on the organic instrument of the 1st Defendant. Under Rule 31.2 of the Constitution, the Central Working Committee (CWC) may suspend or dissolve the Executive Committee of any Branch in accordance with the Rules of the Constitution and the procedure in Schedule 2, subject to the approval of the National Executive Council (NEC). Counsel argued that the provisions of the Constitution are clear and unambiguous and must be given their ordinary literal meaning. Counsel relied on Ezeadukwa v. Maduka (1997) 8 NWLR (pt 518) 635 at p. 669 for the proposition that it is a fundamental rule of construction of documents that words bear their ordinary dictionary meaning, and no person is allowed to introduce extraneous words or meanings that give an entirely different complexity to the document.

13. LCC argued that the literal and ordinary meaning of Rule 31.2 denotes two explicit conditions: first, dissolution by the CWC is not self-executing but is strictly subject to NEC approval, and second, Schedule 2 imposes a mandatory procedure of fair hearing, which includes the issuance of a 14-day notice of charges to be conducted before the Grievance and Disciplinary Committee before any recommendation is made to the NEC.

14. It was submitted that the Defendants in October 2024 dissolved the Chevron BECOM and CECOM without NEC approval and without recourse to the disciplinary procedure in Schedule 2. Counsel argued that where a procedure is prescribed by law, it must be strictly followed, and any deviation renders the act an exercise in futility. Counsel relied on Abubakar v INEC (2020) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1737) 37 for the proposition that once a procedure is prescribed, it must be strictly followed.

15. Learned Counsel to the Claimants further submitted that the 8-member Caretaker Committee constituted by the 1st to 3rd Defendants is a patent violation of Rule 31.4 of the Constitution. Rule 31.4 provides that in the event of a valid dissolution, a caretaker committee of not more than five persons shall be constituted for a maximum period of three months only to run the affairs of the branch and conduct elections. It was contended that upon the expiration of the three-month period, the Caretaker Committee had no authority to extend its own tenure or continue running the affairs of the branch, and the CWC was duty-bound to reconstitute a new committee. Counsel argued that where express words of a constitution prescribe a limit, neither the association nor its officers may expand it. Counsel relied on ANPP v Goni (2012) 7 NWLR (pt. 1298) 147 at 182-183 for the proposition that neither the association nor its officers can expand the limit assigned by a constitution, as the national executives must act within the scope of their delegated authority.

16. Learned Counsel to the Claimants argued that resorting to any mode other than the one provided by the law renders the act incompetent. It was submitted that a constitutional or statutory right shared with the public in common cannot be waived. Counsel relied on Odua Investment Co. Ltd v Talabi (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 170) 761 and Amaechi v. INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1080) 227 for the proposition that if a document prescribes a method by which an act could be validly done, and such method is not followed, the act cannot be accomplished. Thus, the non-compliance with the organic instrument of the 1st Defendant makes the dissolution exercise and the constituted Caretaker Committee fatal and void, because one cannot add something to nothing.

17. Learned Counsel to the Claimants, in the Reply on Points of Law, further submitted that the court has the substantive and procedural power to intervene in the internal affairs of an association where there is injustice or oppression. Counsel relied on Ijagbemi & Anor v. Ige & Anor (2009) LPELR-4289(CA) and UBA PLC v. Coker (1996) LPELR-13909(CA) (referencing Elder v. Elder & Watson Ltd (1952) S.L.T. 112 and Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd v. Meyer (1958) 3 All E.R. 66 H.L.) for the proposition that when the affairs of an association are conducted in a manner oppressive to a part of the members, it connotes an abuse of power that injures their rights, justifying judicial intervention under Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Counsel argued that procedural non-compliance does not rob the court of jurisdiction. Counsel relied on Odu'a Investment Co. Ltd v. Michael (2024) LPELR-62622(SC) and Julius Berger (Nig) Plc v. Almighty Projects Innovative Ltd & Anor (2021) LPELR-56611(SC) for the proposition that a challenge to procedural rules cannot defeat the substantive jurisdiction of the court.

18. On Issue 2: Whether the revocation of the PENGASSAN-Chevron Bye-Laws and the purported Branch election guidelines of July 30, 2025 as issued by the 3rd Defendant are valid and binding.

19. Learned Counsel to the Claimants submitted that while the Constitution of the 1st Defendant allows the branches to establish and manage their respective internal affairs through bye-laws, it is ultra vires the 1st to 3rd Defendants to abolish the operational framework of a branch as found in its operative bye-laws. It was submitted that under Rule 16.3 of the Constitution, a branch is vested with the power to make and operate bye-laws, and once they are approved by the National Secretariat, they are valid and binding. The Chevron Branch Bye-laws of 10th February 2017, as reviewed and approved in February 2022, remain valid and subsisting, and the CWC or National Secretariat has no power of unilateral revocation. Counsel argued that the terms of the association must be strictly observed by all parties under the principle of sanctity of contract. Counsel relied on Chukwuma v. Shell Petroleum (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt.289) 512 for the proposition that where parties have reduced the terms of their association into a constitution and bye-laws, those terms must be observed and executive actions must conform to them.

20. Learned Counsel to the Claimants submitted that the unilateral election guidelines dated July 30, 2025, issued by the National Secretariat, contradict the Chevron Branch Bye-laws by replacing the democratic election of delegates with nomination or selection, thereby disenfranchising members. It was submitted that inferior provisions, such as the National Secretariat's guidelines, cannot override the statutory and constitutional provisions of the Chevron Branch Bye-laws. Counsel relied on Elaigwu v. Tong (2016) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1532) 165 at pp. 188-189 for the proposition that an inferior provision cannot override a superior or statutory provision. Counsel argued that the revocation of the bye-laws and substitution with the unilateral guidelines is an attempt to extinguish the constitutional franchise of the Claimants.

21. He submitted that voluntary associations are bound to obey their own constitutions and guidelines. Counsel relied on PDP v Sylva (2012) 13 NWLR (pt. 1316) 85 at p. 145 and Oshiomhole v. Salihu (No.1) (2021) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1778) 237 at 269 for the proposition that once constitutions and guidelines are made and agreed upon, they become binding on the respective associations and their members, and courts will not allow them to act arbitrarily or disobey their own rules. Counsel argued that the Claimants are entitled to the declaratory and injunctive reliefs sought to protect their suffrage and prevent the foisting of an undemocratic, alien electoral process on the Chevron Branch.

 

22. Defendants also filed a written address and raise 2 Issues for Determination:

23. ISSUE 1 Whether, having regard to the Constitution of the Association and the supervisory powers inherent in its national organs, the Association acted within its lawful authority in dissolving the Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) and Chapter Executive Committee (CECOM) and constitution of a Caretaker Committee (CTC) pending the resolution of disputes and/or conduct of elections, is valid and lawful notwithstanding allegations of irregularity in its composition in the circumstances of this case.

24. Learned Counsel to the Defendants, Amb. Joseph Olusola Iji, Esq., submitted that voluntary associations are self-governing entities and that their internal dispute resolution and supervisory mechanisms must be respected by the courts without unnecessary interference.

25. He argued that the constitution of an association is the organic and fundamental law that establishes its institutions and defines its powers. Counsel relied on A.P.C. v. E.S.I.E.C. (2021) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1801) 1 and Imonikhe v. A-G., Bendel State (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 248) 396 for the proposition that a constitution is the organic system of fundamental principles by which an organization is governed, and any act in compliance with it is valid. It was argued that under Rule 2.1 of the PENGASSAN Constitution, the constitution is supreme and binding on all members and offices, and that it is the Claimants who have flagrantly disregarded the hierarchy and acted with impunity.

26. LDC submitted that under Rule 10.7 of the Constitution, the CWC has the power to discipline members and officers of the Association at all levels for effective performance of its oversight functions, subject to the ratification of the NEC. It was contended that the infighting within the Chevron Branch, including the invalid vote of no confidence passed against the Branch Chairman in violation of Schedule 2.61 and 2.62(1) of the Constitution, created a chaotic and dysfunctional environment that threatened industrial peace and business operations, as complained of by Chevron Nigeria Limited's management. This state of emergency necessitated the CWC to dissolve the BECOM and CECOM, which was subsequently ratified by the NEC at its meeting on 3rd December 2024. LD Counsel argued that ratification validates a previous unauthorized act from the moment it was performed. Counsel relied on Mikano Intl Ltd. v. Ehumadu (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1387) 100 and Regd. Trustees, A.C.C. v. Regd. Trustees, G.C.C. (2021) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1801) 105 for the proposition that ratification retrospectively confirms and accepts a previous act, making it valid from its inception and putting the parties in the same position as if it had been authorized beforehand.

27. Learned Counsel to the Defendants argued that courts are slow to interfere in the internal affairs and management of voluntary associations where they act in good faith and within their constitutional powers. Counsel relied on Aguma v. A.P.C. (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1796) 351 to argue that the doctrine of ultra vires does not apply to the internal affairs of a voluntary association. It was further submitted that disputes within voluntary associations must be resolved by the majority decision of their members in line with majority rule. Counsel relied on A.P.C. v. Moses (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1796) 278, Abubakar v. Smith (1973) 6 SC 31, and the rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 for the proposition that disputes arising within associations must be resolved internally by majority decision. Counsel also relied on Pam v. A.N.P.P (2008) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1077) 219 for the proposition that the internal affairs of associations are exclusive to them and outside the competence of the court, meaning courts have no jurisdiction to make appointments or run their affairs.

28. On the composition and extension of the Caretaker Committee's tenure, he opined the action must be interpreted purposively to avoid a leadership vacuum and ensure administrative continuity. Counsel relied on P.P.A. v. Saraki (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 453, A.-G, Lagos State v. A.-G., Fed. (2003) 2 NWLR (Pt. 833) 1, Olafisoye v. F.R.N. (2004) 4 NWLR (Pt. 864) 580, and State v. Egigia (2024) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1949) 203 for the proposition that statutory interpretation must employ a purposive approach that considers the context, language, and true intention of the scheme to avoid absurd results. It was argued that the Caretaker Committee was a temporary holding structure and that the CWC lawfully extended its tenure under Rule 10.10 due to exigent circumstances.

29. Furthermore, he argued that regarding the eight-member composition of the Caretaker Committee, only five members with portfolios were substantive appointees. The other three names sat merely as advisory figures by virtue of their ex-officio status to provide institutional memory and did not expand the substantive committee. It was argued that even if the composition was irregular, it was a mere procedural irregularity that did not defeat the substantive jurisdiction of the CWC to constitute a Caretaker Committee. Counsel relied on Benue State University v. Mogaji, Odom & Ors v. PDP & Ors (2015) LPELR-24351(SC), and Obiuweubi v. CBN (2011) LPELR-2185(SC) for the proposition that once substantive jurisdiction exists, procedural defects or irregularities cannot defeat the validity of the action.

30. On Issue 2: Whether the bye-laws of a branch of the Association are subordinate to the Association’s Constitution, and if so, whether such bye-laws can be revoked, suspended, or varied by the Association’s governing organs.

31. Learned Counsel to the Defendants submitted that under Rule 2.1, 2.4, and 2.8 of the PENGASSAN Constitution, the constitution is supreme and overrides any branch bye-law. It was submitted that Rule 16.3 explicitly provides that a branch may make administrative regulations subject to the overriding authority of the constitution, and any branch bye-law that is inconsistent with the constitution is null and void to the extent of its inconsistency. It was argued that there is a hierarchy in legislation and sources of law, and a higher law in the hierarchy must dominate a lower law in the event of a conflict. Counsel relied on Ogboru v. Ibori (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 942) 319, A.-G., Abia State v. A.-G., Federation (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 763) 264, Lakanmi v. A.-G., Western State (1971) UILR 201, A.-G., Ogun State v. A.-G., Fed. (1982) 3 NCLR 166, and Giremabe v. Bornu N. A. (1961) All NLR 489 for the proposition that laws of a higher pedestal dominate lower ones, meaning subsidiary branch bye-laws are subordinate and can be revoked, suspended, or varied by the national governing organs.

32. He submitted that the Chevron Branch failed to forward its bye-laws to the National Secretariat for review and revalidation in line with the July 19, 2024 directive. Consequently, the National Secretariat acted within its lawful authority under the constitution in revoking the bye-laws in July 2025 alongside those of other non-compliant branches, requiring them to default to the supreme PENGASSAN Constitution for the conduct of their elections.

 

33. In evaluating the evidence in this matter, this court is guided by the well-settled principles governing the burden and standard of proof in civil proceedings, as enacted under Sections 131 to 134 of the Evidence Act, 2011. The standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities, requiring the party who asserts a fact to adduce more convincing and credible evidence than the adversary.

34. In this Originating Summons, the Claimants bear the primary burden of proof to establish, through cogent and compelling affidavit and documentary evidence, that the dissolution of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) Chevron Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) and Chapter Executive Committees (CECOM), the constitution and subsequent tenure extensions of the eight-member Caretaker Committee, the revocation of the Chevron Branch Bye-Laws, and the conduct of the elections on 16th September 2025 were unconstitutional, ultra vires, and void.

35. Conversely, where the Defendants assert positive facts—such as the existence of a state of emergency, operational paralysis at the branch, the non-submission of the branch bye-laws, and the validity of the CWC and NEC resolutions—the burden of proof shifts to them to establish those facts by a preponderance of evidence.

36. Now to the crux of this matter, to discharge this burden, the Claimants relied on the affidavit evidence of Sunday Ebulu, the 1st Claimant, (designatesd as CW1) who deposed in the Affidavit in Support of the Originating Summons and the Affidavit of Fact dated 17th September 2025, and the Further Affidavit deposed to by Ete Oyegbanren, the 2nd Claimant (CW2) and the following documents were tendered :

Exhibit A, which is the PENGASSAN Constitution, 2022;

Exhibit B and B1, which are the email dated 23rd February 2022 and the revised and approved Chevron Branch Bye-Laws;

Exhibit D, the letter dated 13th September 2024 communicating the branch vote of no confidence against the 11th Defendant; Exhibit E, the letter of dissolution dated 8th October 2024;

Exhibit F series, which are the CWC circulars extending the Caretaker Committee's tenure;

Exhibit O series, which are WhatsApp print-out transcripts showing the 11th Defendant directing and confirming the submission of the Branch Bye-Laws on 29th July 2024; and

Exhibit N, N1, N2, P which are the official NEC notice, agenda, and draft minutes of the meeting held on 3rd December 2024.

 

37. The defendants on the other hand in opposition to the claims they   relied on the Counter-Affidavit deposed to by one Femi Abimbola, Esq., a legal practitioner in the law firm representing the Defendants, whom this court designates as DW1, he tendered   

Exhibit PENG 1, the letter appointing a three-man fact-finding committee;

Exhibit PENG 2, the report of the three-man committee;

Exhibit PENG 3, a letter from Chevron Nigeria Limited's HR Director dated 11th September 2024;

Exhibit PENG 4, the minutes of the NEC meeting held on 3rd December 2024;

Exhibit PENG 5, the minutes of the emergency CWC meeting held on 1st October 2024 in Kigali, Rwanda;

Exhibit PENG 6, the letter dated 8th October 2024 announcing the dissolution and caretaker appointments;

Exhibit PENG 7A, 7B, and 7C, the letters extending the caretaker committee's tenure;

Exhibit PENG 8, a letter from the Caretaker Committee acknowledging the revocation of the bye-laws;

Exhibit PENG 9, the revocation circular dated 8th July 2025; and Exhibit PENG 12A, 12B, and 12C, the disciplinary letters issued to some of the Claimants.

 

38. The Claimants commenced this action by an Originating Summons filed on 26th August 2025, seeking the determination of several questions touching upon the construction of the Constitution of the 1st Defendant (adopted on 16th December 2022). Consequently, the Claimants seek twenty-four (24) reliefs, which principally include:

1.       Declarations that the Central Working Committee (CWC) of the 1st Defendant lacks the unilateral power to dissolve the Chevron Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) and Chapter Executive Committees (CECOM) without prior approval of the National Executive Council (NEC) and without complying with the disciplinary procedures under Schedule 2 of the PENGASSAN Constitution.

2.     Declarations that the constitution of an eight-member Caretaker Committee, the extension of its tenure beyond the constitutionally prescribed three (3) months, the unilateral revocation of the PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch Bye-laws (2017, as reviewed in 2022), and the issuance of centralized election guidelines dated 30th July 2025 are unconstitutional, ultra vires, null, void, and of no legal effect.

3.      Orders setting aside the said dissolution, the appointment of the Caretaker Committee, and the branch/chapter elections conducted on 16th September 2025 pendente lite.

4.     Injunctive Orders restraining the Defendants from acting upon the purported dissolution, recognizing the Caretaker Committee, implementing the revoked bye-laws, or acting on the 30th July 2025 election guidelines.

 

                                                COURT’S RESOLUTION

39. For a concise and effective resolution of this dispute, this Court adopts the following consolidated issues:

1.       Whether, having regard to Rule 31.2 and Schedule 2 of the 1st Defendant's Constitution, the dissolution of the Chevron BECOM and CECOM on 8th October 2024 was valid, and whether the subsequent appointment and tenure extensions of the eight-member Caretaker Committee were lawful.

2.     Whether the 1st Defendant's national organs have the constitutional power to unilaterally revoke the approved PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch Bye-laws, and whether the subsequent election guidelines of 30th July 2025 are valid.

3.      Whether the elections conducted by the Defendants on 16th September 2025 during the pendency of this suit are valid in the face of the active challenge to the res of this litigation.

 40. Issue 1: Validity of the Dissolution of BECOM/CECOM and the Caretaker Committee

41. Having made a request for the removal of the Branch Chairman by BEC, the procedure in Schedule 2 of Exhibit A establishes a clear disciplinary path, requiring an investigation to be conducted by a five-member Ethical, Grievance, and Disciplinary Committee, which must afford the affected officers a fair hearing, including a 14-day notice of any charges against them.

42. The Defendants in their defense have argued that the vote of no confidence was NOT appropriately passed in accordance with Schedule 2.61 and 2.62(1) of the Constitution  which provides that the Branch Chairman and Branch Secretary can only be removed by the ZECOM in Session. In other words, the BEC/BECOM cannot remove a sitting Branch Chairman 

43. On this submission, the court agrees with the defendant on the strength of Rule 2.62(1) of Exh A. However it should be noted that the letter of September 13 2024 addressed to the Gen Secretary  of the union that kick started this crisis was a letter requesting for ratification of the removal of the branch Chairman, “….therefore we request ratification.”  I think it’s important to state that the letter transmitted to the GS was Not a letter informing the GS of the removal of the said Branch Chairman rather it was a request for ratification of their vote to remove the Branch chairman.

44. The defendant having cloaked itself with the above constitutional provision, (i.e Schedule  2.62(1) the defendant rather than activate the constitutionally mandated procedure, in Rule 31 on DISCIPLINE & schedule 2 which provides for constituting a disciplinary committee (Grievance and Disciplinary Committee (GDC) empowered to hear and determine the charges, while affording the person an opportunity to be heard before recommending appropriate action, failed to take this step. The national body upon the recommendation of the 3 man fact finding committee dissolved the BECOM &CECOM.

45. The question now is can this 3 man committee substitute for the constitutionally designated disciplinary body? The Fact-Finding Committee and its report was the basis of the   dissolution of all the organs in the branch i.e  the  Branch and Chapter leadership, whereas the Constitution only makes provisions for dissolution of BECOM. Schedule 2.6.3 of the Constitution provides “The entire elected Branch Officers can only be removed from office by Branch Delegates Conference/a Special Branch Delegates Conference/conference as applicable, convened for that purpose.” From the exhibits tendered,  No Terms of Reference of this committee was placed before the court neither was there was an imminent state of affairs to justify the recommendation of dissolution of the entire branch Exco.

It is trite that where a constitution or statute prescribes a specific method for performing an act, that method and no other must be followed, and any departure therefrom renders the act incompetent and void. I so find and hold.   Having found that this 3 man committee is  first and foremost unknown to the constitution, its report and recommendation are hereby set aside and declared null and void.

 

46. If for a moment, this court is to turn a blind eye to the recommendation of the Fact finding Committee, which it will not,  the court still has an obligation to interrogate the actions/steps taken by the   Central Working Committee whether it acted within its constitutional boundaries when it dissolved the democratically elected leadership of the Chevron Branch on 8th October 2024 and constituted a caretaker Committee (CTC) as well as examine its composition and   extended tenure.

47. The organic contract binding the members of the 1st Defendant is its Constitution. In resolving disputes of this nature, the law requires the court to look strictly at the provisions of the constitution of the association, as the constitution represents the terms of the contract which the members have voluntarily entered into and agreed to be bound by.

48. The power of the Central Working Committee to suspend or dissolve a branch executive committee is not absolute; it is a qualified power subject to strict constitutional conditions. Rule 31.2 of the PENGASSAN Constitution, 2022, which is Exhibit A, explicitly provides that the Central Working Committee may suspend or dissolve the Executive Committee of any Branch "in accordance with the Rules of this Constitution and the procedure in Schedule 2, subject to the approval of the National Executive Council (NEC).”

49. The Defendants further contend that the dissolution was necessitated by a state of emergency and operational paralysis, relying on a letter from the Director HR & Medical, Chevron Nigeria Limited’s (i.e Management ) (Exhibit PENG 3).

50. This court is appalled that the 1st Defendant under the leadership of the 2nd and 3rd defendant who have risen to the height of president and Gen Secretary  of a celebrated Senior Staff Association such as PENGASSAN would subscribe to a letter from the Director HR and without any evidence of the “unwholesome situation created by BECOM”   rely on the receipt of such letter to dissolve a Branch and Chapter Exco. This speaks volumes of the tenacity and capability of the Gen Secretary  who  is expected to be a seasoned labour leader, the chief administrator and accounting  officer of the union.

51. In Nigeria, the courts have strictly prohibited employers from interfering in the formation, administration, management, or activities of trade unions. The independence of trade unions from employer control is protected through constitutional, statutory, and international legal frameworks  As established,  Section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended); Section 9(6) of the Labour Act, Cap. L1,   (LFN) 2004.  Under Article 2 (ILO) Convention No. 98 (Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949), which Nigeria has ratified, these legal framework are designed to ensure workers' and employers' organisations enjoy adequate protection against any acts of interference by each other the independence of trade unions from employer interference is absolute. The National Industrial Court of Nigeria consistently protects union autonomy.   Any employer intervention that seeks to compromise the independence of a trade union constitutes an unfair labour practice and is actionable. The 1st to 3rd Defendants acted unconstitutionally by relying on an employer's administrative complaint (Exhibit PENG 3) to dissolve democratically elected union structure.

 52. Regarding the requirement of NEC approval, Exhibit E shows the dissolution took place on 8th October 2024. The NEC meeting where this act was purportedly approved did not occur until 3rd December 2024 (Exhibit PENG 4). NEC approval is a condition precedent, not a subsequent remedy. The doctrine of ratification cannot retroactively validate an act that was fundamentally void ab initio. As held in MacFoy v. United Africa Co. Ltd (1961) 3 All ER 1169, you cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there; it will collapse. The dissolution of BECOM and CECOM on 8th October 2024 was a nullity.

53. The defendants also averred in their defence that on 1st of October, 2024 in Kigali Rwanda, the CWC at the Emergency CWC Meeting,  deliberated and resolved to dissolve the BECOM and CECOM, which culminated in the issuance of the 8th October 2024 letter to the DHR of CHEVRON intimating them  of the dissolution of the BECOM &CECOM, this court is not convinced and swayed by    the defendants  averment  that NEC approval was obtained  before the letter of dissolution was issued on 8/OCT/2024.

 

54. The constitution is unequivocal on the CWC’s power of dissolution, it strictly provides that it is  "subject to the approval of the National Executive Council." and must be "in accordance with the procedure in Schedule 2." The procedure in Schedule 2 mandates an investigation by a five-member Ethical, Grievance, and Disciplinary Committee (EGDC), which was never constituted. In its stead,  the Defendants set up an ad-hoc three-man "Fact-Finding Committee" (Exhibit PENG 2), which is entirely alien to the Constitution. This approval is a condition precedent to the validity of the dissolution. see Rule 31.2 of Exhibit A,   The record reveals and it is not in doubt that that approval came about 3 months after the dissolution. The dissolution was executed on 8th October 2024 (Exhibit E) before any NEC meeting was held to approve it. 

55. It is clear from the record that while the management of Chevron Nigeria Limited was promptly notified of the CWC's resolution to dissolve BECOM and CECOM on 8th October 2024, the 1st to 3rd Defendants failed to communicate any such resolution to the affected substantive officers of the Chevron Branch. What played out was an administrative contrivance wherein the CWC unilaterally dissolved the branch organs, and the NEC subsequently sought to ratify the act on 3rd December 2024 to retrospectively validate it. Compounding this anomaly, the 11th Defendant—the very officer against whom the branch had passed a vote of no confidence—was appointed to the Caretaker Committee. By executing the dissolution without the mandatory prior approval of the NEC, the CWC bypassed a critical condition precedent, rendering its action ultra vires and void at the time it was done.

56.The Defendants' argument that this unilateral act was cured by subsequent NEC ratification is legally untenable and reveals a fundamental misconception of the doctrine of ratification. It is a settled principle of Nigerian jurisprudence that ratification can only validate acts that are merely irregular or voidable; it cannot breathe life into an act that is fundamentally void ab initio for failure to satisfy a mandatory constitutional condition precedent. Since the CWC lacked the unilateral capacity under Exhibit A to dissolve the branch organs without prior NEC approval and strict compliance with the Schedule 2 procedure, the purported dissolution of 8th October 2024 was a complete nullity from its inception, incapable of being resurrected by any subsequent administrative ratification.

57.The doctrine of ratification cannot retroactively validate an act that was fundamentally void ab initio for failure to comply with a statutory or constitutional condition precedent. Consequently, the Claimants' version is more credible, as it aligns strictly with the literal provisions of Exhibit A.

58. The law is clear that you cannot ratify a nullity. The classic principle of law on this point was laid down by the court in MacFoy v. United Africa Co. Ltd. (1961) 3 All E.R. 1169, where it was held that: "If an act is void, then it is in law a nullity. It is not only bad, but incurably bad. There is no need for an order of the court to set it aside. It is automatically null and void without more, and of no effect, and every proceeding which is founded on it is also bad and incurably bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse." This is the finding of the court.

59. Applying this principle, since the dissolution of 8th October 2024 was void ab initio, there was nothing in existence for the National Executive Council to ratify on 3rd December 2024. The purported ratification was an exercise in futility. This court is convinced that the CWC therefore proceeded to dissolve the Chevron Branch executive organs without obtaining the prior approval of the NEC. Which is against the constitutional provision in Exh A.  

60. On the constitution of a CTC , Rule 31.4 limits a Caretaker Committee to not more than five (5) members for a maximum period of three (3) months only to run the branch and conduct elections.  

61. In the instant case, the invalidity of the dissolution inevitably dooms the appointment of the Caretaker Committee. Even if the dissolution had been valid, the constitution and subsequent tenure extensions of the Caretaker Committee were carried out in open defiance of Exhibit A.

62. Rule 31.4 of the PENGASSAN Constitution states that in the event of a valid dissolution, "a caretaker committee of not more than five persons shall be constituted for a maximum period of three months only to run the affairs of the branch and conduct elections."

63. The letter of appointment, Exhibit E, reveals that the Defendants appointed an eight-member Caretaker Committee. The Defendants’ explanation under DW1 that only five of these members held substantive portfolios while the remaining three were merely advisory ex-officio members is a superficial post-facto attempt to circumvent the clear numerical limit of five persons.

64. The words of Rule 31.4 are clear, precise, and unambiguous; they must be given their literal meaning. No distinction is made in the constitution between portfolio-holding members and ex-officio members for the purpose of the five-person limit.

65. Furthermore, the Caretaker Committee’s tenure was repeatedly extended by the CWC beyond the "maximum period of three months only," keeping them in office for over nine months, as shown in the Exhibit F series and Exhibit PENG 7A-7C. The Defendants’ attempt to justify these extensions under the general, supervisory powers of the CWC in Rule 10.10 is unconstitutional. Under the cardinal canon of construction generalia specialibus non derogant, specific provisions override general ones.

66. Rule 31.4 is a specific, self-contained provision governing caretaker committees, and its clear time limit of three months cannot be expanded by invoking general supervisory powers. The Caretaker Committee was therefore unconstitutionally constituted, and its tenure was unlawfully extended.

67. On this  issue, I find that the dissolution of the Chevron BECOM and CECOM, and the extended tenure of the Caretaker Committee, are unconstitutional and void.   This issue is resolved in favour of the Claimants.

68. Issue 2: Revocation of the Chevron Branch Bye-Laws and the July 2025 Election Guidelines

69. While Rule 2.1 establishes the supremacy of the PENGASSAN Constitution, Rule 16.3 guarantees the right of branches to make and operate bye-laws for their internal administration. The PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch Bye-laws were duly reviewed and approved by the National Secretariat in February 2022 (Exhibits B and B1). Any branch bye-law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution is, to the extent of that inconsistency, null and void. However, the fact that a branch bye-law is subordinate to the national constitution does not mean it can be unilaterally destroyed, revoked, or ignored by the national officers at their whim. The power to make and operate bye-laws is a right vested in the branches under Rule 16.3 of the Constitution.

70. Once those bye-laws are approved by the National Secretariat,  as in the instant case, they become a binding subsidiary contract regulating the internal affairs and democratic processes of the branch i.e  The Chevron Branch Bye-Laws of 10th February 2017 (reviewed and approved in 2022)

71. A careful examination of Exhibit A reveals that the National Secretariat is only vested with the power to approve branch bye-laws; it is nowhere given the power to unilaterally revoke or abolish them in their entirety. Under the guise of regulatory review, the National Secretariat issued a circular on 8th July 2025, Exhibit PENG 9, purposed to revoke the Chevron Branch Bye-Laws.

72. On the critical issue of whether the Chevron Branch Bye-Laws were submitted for review and subsequently revoked, there is a sharp and fatal contradiction between the parties' evidence. DW1 deposed in paragraph 31 of the Counter-Affidavit that Chevron "inadvertently did not submit its Byelaws for review," and therefore the National Secretariat revoked them via Exhibit PENG 9. However, the Claimants' further deponent, CW2, produced Exhibit O series, which contains clear, uncontroverted WhatsApp communication print-out transcripts from the 11th Defendant (Lavin Aghaunor, then Chevron Branch Chairman) on 28th and 29th July 2024. In those messages, the 11th Defendant explicitly directed the Branch Secretary to submit the Bye-Laws and subsequently acknowledged: "BS, thank you for sending the Bye-Laws to the General Secretary today." This documentary evidence of the Whatsapp correspondence completely demolishes the credibility of DW1's assertion that Chevron failed to submit its Bye-Laws. The Defendants’ claim of non-submission is a manufactured excuse designed to justify an unconstitutional power grab.

73. From the fore going, the Defendants attempted to justify this high-handed action by claiming under DW1 that the Chevron Branch had failed to submit its bye-laws for review and revalidation in line with a national directive. This justification has been completely exposed as a falsehood.

74. Quite fascinating is the fact that DW1, being a legal practitioner who was not a member of the union and had no personal involvement in these day-to-day communications, was merely deposing to facts of which he had no personal knowledge, whereas CW2's evidence is direct, contemporaneous, and backed by unimpeachable digital records. Furthermore, a careful perusal of Rule 16.3 of the PENGASSAN Constitution (Exhibit A) reveals that the National Secretariat or CWC is only vested with the power to approve branch bye-laws; it is nowhere vested with the power to unilaterally revoke them in their entirety.  The unilateral revocation of these bye-laws was ultra vires and void.

75. Overall, I find that while the branch bye-laws are subordinate to the 1st Defendant’s Constitution, the National Secretariat possessed no constitutional authority to unilaterally revoke the branch bye-laws, and because the pretext for doing so was false, the purported wholesale revocation of the Chevron Branch Bye-Laws via Exhibit PENG 9 was ultra vires and void. The Chevron Branch Bye-Laws of February 2017, as reviewed in 2022, remained valid, subsisting, and binding on the parties,

76. Consequently,  it follows that the centralized election guidelines issued by the 3rd Defendant on 30th July 2025, which sought to bypass the provisions of the Chevron Branch Bye-Laws by replacing the democratic election of delegates with a system of nomination and selection, are completely invalid.

Administrative guidelines issued by national officers cannot override or extinguish the democratic suffrage secured under subsisting branch bye-laws. Issue 2 is resolved in favour of the Claimants.

77. Issue 3: Validity of the Elections Conducted Pendente Lite

78. The Defendants have further urged this Court to decline jurisdiction and refrain from interfering in this matter on the ground that trade unions are voluntary associations with internal dispute resolution mechanisms, relying on the rule in Foss v. Harbottle SUPRA and cases like Aguma v. A.P.C. SUPRA

79. While this Court acknowledges that voluntary associations must be allowed the latitude to manage their internal affairs, this principle of non-interference only holds water where the association acts in good faith and in compliance with its own rules. The courts will not fold their arms and allow domestic organs to tyrannize their members in flagrant violation of their own organic law. The Supreme Court of Nigeria in Oshiomhole v. Salihu (No.1) (2021) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1778) 237 at 269 established that: "Once constitutions and guidelines are made and agreed upon, they become binding on the respective associations and their members, and courts will not allow them to act arbitrarily or disobey their own rules."

80. Where there is a clear breach of the constitution of an association, the court has a duty to intervene to protect the contractual rights of the members and enforce the rule of law. The dissolution of the BECOM and CECOM of the Chevron Branch was a grave infraction of Exhibit A, and this Court has the absolute jurisdiction to declare it void.

81. Now to the most egregious aspect of the Defendants’ conduct. During the pendency of this suit, and with full knowledge of the Claimants' motion for an interlocutory injunction which had been served on them since 1st September 2025, the Defendants rushed ahead and conducted the branch delegate and executive elections on 16th September 2025.

82. This was a deliberate, calculated attempt to overreach this Court, destroy the res of the litigation, and present the judicature with a fait accompli. The law of this country does not permit parties to a suit to engage in such high-handed self-help once a matter has been submitted to a court of competent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Nigeria in the landmark case of Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621 made this principle clear, holding that: "Once a dispute has been submitted to the court, and there is a pending application before it, the court will not allow its hands to be tied or its decision to be preempted by any of the parties resorting to self-help. The court has the power, and indeed the duty, to restore the status quo ante."  Similarly, in Amaechi v. INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1080) 227, the apex court reiterated that any action taken by a party during the pendency of a suit to overreach the court or render its final judgment nugatory is a nullity and must be set aside. The Defendants' conduct in conducting the elections on 16th September 2025 in the teeth of pending judicial proceedings was an affront to the dignity and authority of this Court. This Court will not allow its processes to be desecrated or treated with such levity.

83. I find it vital to bring to the fore, the fact that Trade union elections are more than just internal administrative procedures;  they are vital democratic processes where members assign authority to individuals responsible for protecting their collective rights and interests. Therefore, Union elections at all levels whether unit, Chapter, branch, zonal or national must be carried out transparently, verifiably, and responsibly, ensuring they are free, fair, and beyond reproach.

84. The law does not tolerate a situation where union leaders emerge through a process shrouded in secrecy, manipulation, intimidation, procedural impropriety, or disregard of the governing legal framework. Every stage of the electoral process, from the issuance of notices, nomination of candidates, conduct of elections, declaration of results, and resolution of disputes, must withstand scrutiny and democratic fidelity to the Constitution of the Union, constitutional values, and applicable statutory provisions.

85. Trade unions are democratic institutions. Their legitimacy derives not from the mere declaration of election results but from the integrity of the process that produces those results. Any departure from the union Constitution, any infringement of members’ democratic rights, or any violation of the law undermines the credibility of the election and erodes members’ confidence in the institution. Courts have consistently emphasized that democratic governance within trade unions is not optional. It is a legal imperative. Those entrusted with conducting union elections bear a solemn duty to ensure strict compliance with the governing rules and principles. An election outcome, however popular or convenient, cannot be sanitized if the process leading to it was fundamentally flawed.

86. The branch elections conducted by the Defendants on 16th September 2025 are a complete sham, unconstitutional, and are hereby set aside. This Issue is again resolved in favour of the Claimants.

87. This Court, finding the Claimants' case meritorious, hereby grants the following reliefs:

1.       IT IS DECLARED that the purported dissolution of the PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) and Chapter Executive Committees (CECOM) by the Central Working Committee (CWC) on 8th October 2024 is unconstitutional, null, void, and of no legal effect.

2.     IT IS DECLARED that the constitution of the eight-member Caretaker Committee and the subsequent extensions of its tenure beyond the constitutional limit of three (3) months are unconstitutional, invalid, and void.

3.      IT IS DECLARED that the Chevron Branch Bye-laws dated 10th February 2017 (as reviewed in February 2022) remain valid, subsisting, and operational, and the purported unilateral revocation of the same by the National Secretariat on 8th July 2025 is unconstitutional and void.

4.     IT IS DECLARED that the election guidelines issued by the PENGASSAN National Secretariat dated 30th July 2025 are unconstitutional, invalid, and not binding on the Chevron Branch.

5.     IT IS ORDERED setting aside the branch delegate and executive elections conducted by the Defendants on 16th September 2025, and any offices assumed or actions taken pursuant thereto are hereby declared a nullity.

6.     AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION is hereby granted restraining the Defendants, their agents, privies, or officers from giving effect to the dissolved Caretaker Committee, the revoked bye-laws, or the void elections of 16th September 2025.

88.                        In addition, this court shall proceed to make a consequential order, which is an integral part of the judgment itself, flowing naturally and directly from the main decision above see SAM & ANOR v. KALU (2011) LPELR-4092(CA); APC & ORS v. KARFI & ORS (2017) LPELR-47024(SC).

89. A court possesses the inherent power to grant a consequential order even if it was not specifically asked for by the parties in their pleadings. This is permissible provided the order relates to the main relief that was contested by the parties and pronounced upon by the court see AMAECHI v. INEC & ORS (2008) LPELR-446(SC); AFRICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS LTD & ANOR v. MINISTRY OF LAND & PHYSICAL PLANNING & ANOR (2023) LPELR-60513(CA); BUNYAN & ORS v. AKINGBOYE & ORS (1999) LPELR-817(SC)).

90. It is also intended to give full effect to the judgment and ensure that justice is completely served, making it clear and leaving no room for ambiguity, in other words  to ensure that the justice of the case is fully realized-APC & ORS v. KARFI & ORS SUPRA; WEST AFRICAN UTILITIES METERING & SERVICES LTD v. AKWA IBOM PROPERTY AND INVESTMENTS CO. LTD (2019) LPELR-47089(CA); AFRICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS LTD & ANOR v. MINISTRY OF LAND & PHYSICAL PLANNING & ANOR (SUPRA); SAM & ANOR v. KALU (2011) LPELR-4092(CA).

7.     BY WAY OF CONSEQUENTIAL ORDER, the 1st Defendant is hereby directed to conduct fresh, democratic branch elections in strict compliance with the PENGASSAN Constitution and the PENGASSAN-Chevron Branch Bye-laws (2017, as reviewed in February 2022) within thirty (30) days from today.

8.     IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the South West Zonal Director of Labour, Federal Ministry of Labour, Lagos, shall supervise the conduct of the said elections and file a compliance report to this Court within seven (7) days of the election.

9.     COSTS of this action are assessed at N1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira only) to be paid by the 1st Defendant to the Claimants.

This judgement is entered accordingly.

 

___________________________________
HON. JUSTICE JOYCE A. O. DAMACHI
Judge, National Industrial Court of Nigeria

 

 

APPEARANCES

Friday Eneawaji (Holding the brief of Oluwatosin Adesioye) for the claimant

Femi Abimbola ..For the defendant