IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDED AT CALABAR

BEFORE: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANUSI KADO

13^TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2026                                                   SUIT NO: NICN/CA/56/2025

BETWEEN:

Mr. Adefowowe Adebamowo……………………………………………………………………………….……………. claimant

AND

Sterling Bank Limited ………………………………………………………………………………………………………... Defendant

(Formerly known as sterling Bank Plc)

JUDGMENT

1.       On 31^st day of October, 2025, the Claimant commenced this suit via a general form of complaint accompanied by statement of facts, witness statement on oath, list of witnesses, list of documents and photocopies of documents to be tendered as exhibits at the trial. The claimant vide this action is seeking the reliefs set out in paragraph 73 of the statement of facts as follows:-

1.       A DECLARATION that the terms and conditions of employment contained in the Employee (staff) Handbook constitute and form part of the contract of employment between the claimant and the defendant and are binding upon both parties.

2.     A DECLARATION that the actions of the defendant in issuing a suspension letter dated April 24, 2009 and a dismissal letter dated June 29, 2009 without any prior query being issued to the claimant or without availing the Claimant any opportunity to exonerate or explain himself regarding the allegations of fraud levelled against the Claimant and without also waiting for the outcome of the Prosecution of the Claimant at the Federal High Court of Nigeria, was in breach of the terms of employment of the claimant by not following the laid down disciplinary procedures for major/severe offences and not meeting the conditions for which a staff may face summary dismissal as contained in the staff/employees’ handbook.

3.      A DECLARATION that the actions of the defendant in instigating the claimant’s re-arrest and prosecution by the Forces Headquarters of the Nigerian Police Force, Obalende-Lagos, showed a flagrant disregard for the law, showed a flagrant disregard for the claimant’s fundamental rights, and showed malice and cruelty towards him.

4.     A DECLARATION that the suspension of the claimant by the defendant via a letter dated April 24, 2009 and the subsequent dismissal of the claimant via a letter dated June 29, 2009 without being issued a query and without affording the claimant the opportunity to defend himself and without having been found guilty by a court of law, constitutes unfair labour practice, breaches his fundamental human right to fair hearing, showed a flagrant disregard for the claimant’s fundamental rights and showed cruelty and malice.

5.     A DECLARATION that the dismissal of the claimant by the defendant via a letter dated June 29, 2009, after having laid a criminal complaint against him and without having been found guilty by a court of law, showed a flagrant disregard for the law, showed a flagrant disregard for the claimant’s fundamental rights, showed cruelty and malice and same is wrongful and of no legal effect to the extent that it purports to blacklist the Claimant with the Central Bank of Nigeria or any other body.

6.     A DECLARATION that the defendant’s actions in circulating an email to all staff and issuing a notice to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) regarding the claimant’s dismissal for fraud to blacklist him without anv regarding the claimant’s dismissal for fraud to blacklist him, without any prior judicial determination of guilt, constitute a flagrant disregard for the rule of law, a violation of the claimant’s fundamental rights, showed cruelty and malice, and is unfair.

7.     A DECLARATION that the defendant’s actions in dismissing the claimant have caused irreparable damage/harm to the claimant’s career, reputation, employability and earning capacity.

8.     A DECLARATION that the actions of the defendant in dismissing the claimant caused the claimant severe and irreparable emotional And psychological trauma, pain, suffering and mental anguish.

9.     AN ORDER mandating the defendant to withdraw the suspension and dismissal letters issued to the claimant within 14 days,

10.  AN ORDER compelling the defendant to formally notify the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) of the claimant’s acquittal of the fraud allegations, to facilitate the reversal of his blacklisting, and to provide the claimant with a copy of the said notification within 14 days of the order.

11.    AN ORDER mandating the defendant to accept a resignation letter from the claimant after the withdrawal of the suspension and dismissal letters issued to the claimant so ordered in relief 9 above.

12.  AN ORDER mandating the Defendant to pay the sum of N165,250,3’72.16 (One Hundred & Sixty-Five Million, Two Hundred & Fifty Thousand, Three Hundred & Seventy-Two Naira, Sixteen Kobo) to the Claimant as SPECIAL DAMAGES, the said sum representing the Claimant’s accumulative gross emolument for 16 years, calculating from 2009 to 2025 if the Defendant had not wrongfully dismissed the Claimant from his contract of employment subject to further adjustment upon the production of documents on the salary review exercises done by the Defendant between 2009 and 2025 in the Defendant’s exclusive custody evidencing applicable salary reviews (specifically for the Manager designation).

13.   OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO RELIEF (12) ABOVE, AN ORDER mandating the Defendant to pay the sum of accumulative emolument adjusted for inflation, amounting to the sum of N659,245,703.04 (Six Hundred & Fifty-Nine Million, Two Hundred & Forty-Five Thousand, Seven Hundred & Three Naira, Four Kobo) to the Claimant as SPECIAL DAMAGES, the said sum representing the Claimant’s accumulative gross emolument for 16 years, calculating from 2009 to 2025 if the Defendant had not wrongfully dismissed the Claimant from his contract of employment.

14.  OR IN THE ALTERNATJVE TO RELIEF (13) ABOVE, AN ORDER mandating the Defendant to pay the sum of N165,250,372.16 (One Hundred & Sixty-Five Million. Two Hundred & Fifty Thousand, Three Hundred & Seventy-Two Naira, Sixteen Kobo) to the Claimant as SPECIAL DAMAGES, the said sum representing the Claimant’s accumulative gross emolument for 16 years, calculating from 2009 to 2025 if the Defendant had not wrongfully dismissed the Claimant from his contract of employment.

15.  AN ORDER mandating the Defendant to pay the sum of N60, 000, 000.00 (Sixty Million Naira) to the Claimant as SPECIAL DAMAGES, the said sum representing the accumulative purchase price sum for five (5) different Unit VOLKSWAGEN Vehicles counting from 2007 to 2025 at the sum of N12,000,000.00 (Twelve Million Naira) per vehicle which the Claimant would have been entitled to if the Defendant had not wrongfully dismissed the Claimant’s contract of employment.

16.  IN THE  ALTERNATIVE TO RELIEF (15) above, AN ORDER mandating the Defendant to pay the sum of N20,975,000.00 to the Claimant as SPECIAL DAMAGES, the said sum representing the cumulative purchase price sum for five  (5) different Unit VOLKSWAGEN (Jetta 2.0 LT Highline) Vehicles counting from 2007 to 2025 at the sum of N4,195,000.00 (Four Million One Hundred and Forty Ninety-Five Thousand Naira) per vehicle which the Claimant would have been entitled to if the Defendant had not wrongfully dismissed the Claimant’s contract of employment.

17.  AN ORDER mandating the Defendant to pay the sum of N79,285,803.3 (Seventy Nine Million, Two Hundred & Eighty -Five Thousand, Eight Hundred and Three Naira, Three Kobo) to the Claimant as SPECIAL DAMAGES, the said sum representing the accumulative Retirement Savings Pension Fund Entitlement for 16 years, counting/calculating from 2009 to 2025, subject to further adjustment upon the production of documents on the salary review exercises done by the Defendant between 2009 and 2025 in the Defendant’s exclusive custody evidencing applicable salary reviews (specifically for the Manager designation), including interest rate computation which the Claimant would have earned if the Defendant had not wrongfully dismissed him from their contract of employment.

18.  OR IN THE ALTERANTIVE TO RELIEF (17) ABOVE, AN ORDER mandating the Defendant to pay the sum of N79,285,803.3 (Seventy Nine Million, Two Hundred & Eighty-Five Thousand, Eight Hundred and Three Naira, Three Kobo) to the Claimant as SPECIAL DAMAGES, the said sum representing the accumulative Retirement Savings Pension Fund Entitlement for 16 years, counting/calculating from 2009 to 2025, by interest rate computation which the Claimant would have been entitled to if the Defendant had not wrongfully dismissed him from their contract of employment.

19.  OR IN THE ALTERANTIVE TO RELIEF (18) ABOVE, AN ORDER mandating the Defendant to pay the sum of N13,891,735.68 (Thirteen Million, Eight Hundred & Ninety-One Thousand, Seven Hundred &Thirty-Five Naira, Sixty-Eight Kobo) to the Claimant as SPECIAL DAMAGES, the said sum representing the accumulative Retirement Savings Pension Fund Entitlement for 16 years, counting/calculating from 2009 to 2025, which the Claimant would have been entitled to if the Defendant had not wrongfully dismissed him from their contract of employment and subject to further adjustment upon the production of documents on the salary review exercises done by the Defendant between 2009 and 2025, in the Defendant’s exclusive custody evidencing applicable salary reviews (specifically for the Manager designation).

20.AN ORDER mandating the Defendant to pay to the Claimant the sum of N53, 811,325.00 (Fifty-Three Million, Eight Hundred & Eleven Thousand, Three Hundred & Twenty-Five Naira) representing SPECIAL DAMAGES for loss of future earnings from 2025 to 2029, arising from the Defendant’s wrongful dismissal of the Claimant, the Claimant having reasonably expected to attain the General Manager grade by retirement at age Fifty-Five m 2029, subject to further adjustment upon the production of a document on the current Salary Structure Sheets for a General Manager in the Defendant’s exclusive custody.

21.  IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO RELIEF (19) ABOVE, AN ORDER mandating the Defendant to pay the sum of N53,811,325.00 (Fifty-Three Million, Eight Hundred & Eleven Thousand, Three Hundred &Twenty-Five Naira) to the Claimant as SPECIAL DAMAGES, the said sum representing an accumulative 5-year gross emolument at a gross emolument of N10,762,265.00 (Ten Million, Seven Hundred & Sixty-Two Thousand, Two Hundred & Sixty-Five Thousand Naira) per annum with 35% Performance Indexed Pay constituting the Claimant’s future earnings counting from 2025 to 2029-being his contractual retirement age year if the Defendant had not wrongfully dismissed the Claimant’s contract of employment and assuming he were to retire as MANAGER.

22. AN ORDER mandating the Defendant to pay to the Claimant the sum of N121,951,785.6 (One Hundred & Twenty-One Million, Nine Hundred & Fifty-One Thousand, Seven Hundred & Eighty-Five Naira, Six Kobo) as SPECIAL DAMAGES, the said sum being the accumulative gratuity that he would have earned over 18 years of continuous service from 2007 to 2025 if the Defendant had not wrongfully dismissed his contract of employment in 2009, computed  based on the Claimant’s last known monthly emolument of N564, 591.60, subject to further adjustment upon the production of documents evidencing the salary review exercises done by the Defendant between 2009 and 2025 in the Defendant’s exclusive custody (specifically for the Manager designation).

23. OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO RELIEF (21) ABOVE, AN ORDER mandating the Defendant to pay to the Claimant the sum of N121, 951,785.6 (One Hundred & Twenty-One Million, Nine Hundred & Fifty-One Thousand, Seven Hundred & Eighty-Five Naira, Six Kobo) as SPECIAL DAMAGES, the said sum being the accumulative gratuity that he would have earned over 18 years of continuous service from 2007 to 2025 if the Defendant had not wrongfully dismissed his contract of employment in 2009.

24.AN ORDER mandating the defendant to pay the sum of N2,000,000,000.00 (TWO BILLION NAIRA) as GENERAL DAMAGES for the physical, psychological and emotional trauma visited on the Claimant by the actions of the Defendant.

25. AN ORDER mandating the defendant to pay the sum of N5,000,000,000,00 (FIVE BILLION NAIRA) as AGGRAVATED DAMAGES for the flagrant disregard to the claimant’s right to fair hearing, for the flagrant disregard to the law and for the actions of the Defendant fatally and irreparably damaging the Claimant’s career, rendering the Claimant unemployable and visiting unimaginable physical, psychological and trauma, pain, suffering and financial hardship on the Claimant.

26.AN ORDER mandating the defendant to pay the awarded sums within two months of the judgment, failing which a post-judgment interest rate of 25% per annum shall apply on the judgment sum from the date of the judgment till the date of the final liquidation of the judgment sum.

                            THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT:

2.     On 6^th of July, 2007, the claimant was employed by the defendant as manager. While the claimant was serving the defendant in Calabar branch, the defendant’s management came with police officers from criminal Investigation Alagbon Lagos and arrested the claimant on allegation of fraud. After spending two weeks in detention, the claimant was granted bail on condition to be reporting every two weeks. The claimant was neither before, during or after his arrest by the police given any query or asked to explain his role in any alleged fraudulent transactions by the defendant.

3.      Upon return from detention and upon resumption of duty the claimant was on 24/4/2009 suspended from work without waiting for the outcome of police investigation. At one of his visit to Alagbon, claimant was in May, 2009, rearrested by police officers from Headquarters of the police. Upon his return from second detention, on 29/6/2009, the defendant without waiting for the outcome of police investigation and outcome of any prosecution and/or without  giving the claimant any opportunity to be heard or explain himself, he was vide letter dated 24/4/2009, suspended from work and subsequently, vide the letter dated 29/6/2009 dismissed from service. Thereafter, the claimant was charged before the Federal High Court. In its judgment the Federal High Court discharged and acquitted the claimant on the allegation of fraud levelled against him by the defendant. According to the claimant his cause of action arose on 29/6/2022, when he was discharged and acquitted by the Federal High Court.

4.     The claimant also stated that the defendant did not follow due process contained in chapter 6 of staff handbook in dismissing him from service, as he can only be summarily dismissed when found guilty, when he failed to exonerate himself after being given an opportunity to do so. The failure of defendant to follow the requisite procedure, guidelines, mode and manner in which his contract of employment with the defendant can be rightly/rightfully determined by summary dismissal on grounds of being found guilty of commission of severe offence/fraud, has rendered his dismissal wrongful.

5.     According to the claimant before he was wrongfully dismissed his gross emolument was the sum of N10,762,265.00 (Ten Million Seven Hundred and Sixty-Two Thousand Two Hundred and Sixty Five Naira), per annum with 35% performance indexed pay in the sum of N36,176.395 (Thirty Six Thousand One Hundred and Seventy Six Naira Three Hundred and Ninety Five Kobo), monthly deduction and to be paid into retirement savings account. Thereby reducing his gross to become the sum of N10,328,148.26 (Ten Million three Hundred and Twenty-Eight Thousand One Hundred and Forty-Eight Naira, Twenty Six Kobo), per annum and making him to be entitled to retirement savings pension fund of N434,116.74 (Four Hundred Thirty Four Thousand One Hundred and Sixteen Naira Seventy Four Kobo). For 16 years the claimant will be entitled to cumulative sum of N165,250.372.16 for 16 years from 2009 to 2025, when this suit was instituted

THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANT

6.     The defendant in its defence stated that the claimant was one of her officers when massive fraud of over N500 Million took place, the claimant’s claim on having been employed as manager was denied, as according to the defendant exhibits AA1, AA2, AA3, AA4, and AA5, do not support his claim and they were procured and manipulated for the purpose of this case. The defendant stated that it was a victim of fraudulent diversion of customer’s fund kept under trust of the defendant as a banker and invited police to investigate. The police investigation uncovers internal fraud syndicate operating between the Calabar and Port-Harcourt branches where claimant connived with other persons using customer’s account like ‘Nniche Integrated Technologies Limited’ and ‘Atmon Construction Ltd’ using various crafty devices to defraud the defendant humongous amount in millions.

7.     The dismissal of claimant was not dependent on the charge before the Federal High Court as claimed or dependent on the outcome of same. Rather the dismissal was found on fraudulent conduct in civil standard which also forms part of the grounds of misconduct upon which dismissal can be done as shown in claimant’s handbook in his exhibit AA13. The claimant was satisfied with the dismissal as he did not appeal to appropriate body as required in the said handbook which failure further renders his action unsustainable and without any reasonable cause of action. At no time police exonerated  the claimant at Alagbon or any other station.

8.     According to the defendant, the claimant’s cause of action arose upon his dismissal in 2009 while his criminal prosecution was an independent and discretionary act of the police. Defendant was not bound to wait for the criminal trial before claimant’s dismissal upon the grounds provided under his alleged terms of employment.

9.     The defendant stated that the staff handbook being relied by the claimant does not support the claimant’s case. As the interpretation given to the various clauses in the said handbook were not correct. Furthermore, the said handbook is not a complete document when compared with its index. As the defendant under oath in suit No. NICN/38/2025 has submitted similar handbook made up of 60 pages as against the present one containing 58 pages.

10.  According to defendant the claimant has not suffered any damage as claimed by him. As his alleged gross emolument, special damages are not benefits accruable to the claimant. The purported special damages are rather speculative and anticipated profit which do not exist as benefit to the claimant.

11.    It is the case of the defendant that the claimant having been dismissed was not entitled  to any accrued pension or  special damages as claimed. The defendant stated that no handbook entitled the claimant to a car either as manager or any other rank. The defendant stated that it is not in possession of the vehicle document of the claimant and cannot be urged to produce same. The claimant’s claim to entitlement to Volkswagen car is speculative and do not exist in real life as car loan transactions do not transform to enforceable claims as special damages except on frivolous grounds. The claimant had no ownership of the vehicles he has made subject of ‘special damages’.

12.  On gratuity defendant stated a dismissed employee like the claimant is not entitled to claim of gratuity. The computation of monthly N121m is false and speculative. Speculative claims do not constitute items of special damages. The claimant as a dismissed staff is not entitled to retirement benefits. The claim for retirement benefit is duplication of claimant’s claim to gratuity. The entire claim is speculative and not subject to verification as special damages.

13.   The claimant’s claim are speculative and is not entitled to any of the  reliefs sought. The claimant’s action is statute barred and an exercise in gold digging.

THE SUBMISSION OF THE DEFENDANT.

14.  Ekpedeme Eyo, Esq; counsel for the defendant adopted the final written address of the defendant franked by him as his argument. In the final written address twin issues were formulated for determination. They are as follows:-

1.       Whether considering the totality of evidence and materials before this court, claimant has proved his case in order to be entitled to the reliefs sought.

2.     Whether considering the materials before the court and the entire circumstances of the case, Claimant’s case is statute barred and bound to be dismissed.

ARGUMENT:

15.  Issue 1: Whether considering the totality of evidence and materials before this court, claimant has proved his case in order to be entitled to the reliefs sought.

16.  In arguing this issue counsel submitted that this is an action for wrongful termination of employment and the burden is on the Claimant to prove his assertion. Such proof must be with credible evidence without gaps to be filled with speculations or assumptions and must also emanate from credible source capable of believe. Guided by this principle, the court in Young v Chevron (2014) All FWLR PT. 747.P.620 at 639 D-E affirmed thus:

17.  ‘’In other words, a claimant must establish his entitlement by credible evidence of such character as would suggest that he is indeed entitled to such an award. Credible evidence is "evidence worthy of belief, and "evidence to be worthy of credit must not only proceed from a credible source but must, in addition, be "credible" in itself, by which is meant that it should be so natural, reasonable and probable in view of transaction which it describes or to which it relates as to make it easy to believe it.

18. According to counsel in the peculiar circumstance of employment, the alleged breach must be proved by valid contract of employment governing the relationship of parties.  It is settled that a contract of employment is like any other contract with agreed terms duly signed as well as offer and acceptance duly accepted by parties. No higher a court than the apex court itself has affirmed this principle severally including the recent  case of Dangote Cement PLC v.  Ager (2024) 10 NWLR P.I at P. 24 B-D.

19. Counsel contended that the claimant’s case for wrongful dismissal founded on his exhibit M, the handbook governing the contract of his employment and like any other contract, there must be evidence of acceptance of the terms for same to be valid especially where such provision for the acceptance is expressly provided for in the document. As stated, exhibit M, ‘houses’ the Claimant’s terms of employment.  At page 60, the provision is expressly made for the acceptance of the terms by signing the spaces provided thus, claimant has the option to express his acceptance or rejection of the terms.  The apex court also affirmed this position in case of Ovivie V Delta Steel Co. Ltd (2023) 14 NWLR PT. 1904 P.  203 at 227 E thus:

“Where an employee is made an offer by the terms and conditions contained in the offer of employment, he has the latitude, unfettered and unreserved right to reject or accept whatsoever is contained therein”.

20.In the instant case, Claimant did not accept the terms in exhibit M by signing or acknowledging same and is therefore estopped from relying on same. Claimant can only be seen to have accepted to go through his employment without being bound by exhibit M.  Or at best, he was yet to accept the terms at the time of his dismissal. Claimant only obtained exhibit M and kept to himself instead of signing to signify his acceptance for the corresponding approval by the defendant. The contract of employment is personal to each party with right to accept or reject the claims.

21.  Counsel further argued, it is in the natural course of business that where provisions are made for a signature in a document, it is intended that the requisite signatures are required to be appended to signify acceptance. The proper presumption here is that where a document has provisions for signature, such document is meant to be signed. Same would  be consistent with S.167 (c) of the Evidence Act which enjoins the court to presume that the common cause of business has been followed in particular cases.  In this case, that exhibit M having provided spaces for signature was bound to be signed for same to be binding.

22. This ought to debunk Claimant’s apparent postulation that ‘terms of employment’ are not usually signed. The apex court dictum above in Dangote Cement PLC v.  Ager also confirms that terms and conditions of employment are signed by parties.  It is even more compelling where expressed provision for attestation is provided for.

23. Counsel also contended that even where a wrong thing has been going on successfully, to wit: documents with provisions for signatures are not signed, it does not become right as the court is not a place to perpetuate errors: on this postulation counsel relied on the c ase of Govt of Akwa Ibom State vs Powercom Nig Ltd (2004) 6 NWLR (Pt.868) 202 at 220 A.

24.According to counsel exhibit M as an unsigned document is fundamentally flawed without any legal efficacy and no legal right can arise from same. The effect of such an unsigned document is now trite in law as same is worthless without any legal consequence: in support of this contention counsel relied on the cases of Omega Bank PLC v O.B.C. Ltd 2005 All FWLR PT.249 P.1964 at 199 (SC); Ojo vs Adejobi (1978) 11 NSCC P.161 at 165. Counsel urged the court to come to the conclusion that claimant has not proved his terms of employment which he was bound to do.

25. Counsel continued his submission, that assuming without conceding that by any stretch of imagination, the court even looks at exhibit M for whatever it may worth, the court would find that the claimant is still estopped from challenging his dismissal on the basis of exhibit M when he himself did not comply with the provisions therein. Particularly Chapter 11 paragraphs 4.1 (iv)-(v) of exhibit  M provides thus:

iv) Executive Management reviews and ratifies/nullifies/amends decisions as the case may be.

v)    Executive Management and then subsequently the Board may hear appeals from you, if you are dissatisfied with the outcome.

26.Counsel argued that the effect of the above constitutes internal machinery within the same rules sought to be relied upon by the claimant. The provisions empower both the ‘executive management’ and the ‘board’ to hear appeals. Particularly, on unsatisfactory decisions. No decision is excluded including a ‘dismissal’. The ‘executive management’ in particular can review and nullify decisions. There is no evidence the Claimant approached any of these bodies if indeed he was not satisfied with the decision taken. Consequently, Claimant is estopped from selectively relying on the same provision he failed to comply with: S. 169 Evidence Act.

27. Counsel submitted that the Claimant has  sought to fault his dismissal on grounds that it ought to have waited for the conclusion of his criminal trial. Exhibit G shows that Claimant was dismissed on grounds of ‘various fraudulent activities’ and ‘compromised position’ which also border on dishonesty, incompetence, negligence and fraud in civil standard. ‘Fraudulent dealings’ was captured in Banjoko v Ogunlaja (2013) LPELR-20373(CA) thus:

"The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 7th Edition defines fraudulent as: "Intended to cheat, usually in order to make money illegally.”

28.Counsel further submitted that in civil form, the court in Onuchukwu v Nnoli (2013) LPELR-21223(CA), stated thus:

“Fraud for the purpose of civil law includes acts, omissions and concealment by which an undue and unconscientious was advantage taken of another”

29.                        Consequently, words like ‘fraudulent dealings’ or ‘fraud’ itself is generic and not necessarily ‘stealing’ for purposes of a typical criminal trial. In the circumstance, counsel argued that an employer is not bound to keep a ‘dangerous’ staff and wait for the outcome of criminal trial before effecting his dismissal. For this counsel relied on the apex court case of Awala v NITEL PLC (2019) 15 NWLR PT.1695 P.372 at 403 A-C thus:

‘I think the appellant in the instant case holds tenaciously to the issue of being dismissed during the pendency of trial as if it is a talisman (courtesy: Learned senior counsel for the respondent). As it turns out, it cannot fly. He has forgotten completely other issues of misconduct and negligence which borders on incompetence found against him by the committee set up to investigate the management of the Training School. Having said that, I agree with the court below that the appellant was dismissed based on acts of negligence and misconduct and not on issue of theft which was pending in court at that time.

30. Also in Atadi vs U.B.N PLC (2005) ALL  F.W.L.R. PT.285 P.517 at 534 para F, it was held thus:

the dismissal of the Appellant was a culmination of all the above facts put together, and not only the issue of the missing N40,000.00 upon which he was charged for misappropriation. In other words, there were series of gross misconduct which the Appellant was liable for”

31.   Again the apex court dictum in Maikyo vs Itodo (2007) All FWLR PT.363 P.66 at P.80 para A-C thus:

“ The contention that the allegation made against the Appellant being criminal in nature, the disciplinary action taken against him should not have been embarked upon until after his trial by a competent court is also untenable.”

32. Also, Maliki vs Michael Imodu Institute for Labour Studies (2009) All FWLR PT.491 P.979 at 1012 paras F-G (SC); Arinze vs FBN PLC (2004) All FWLR, PT.217,  P.668 at 676 para G (SC).

33. Counsel submitted that flowing from authorities of the apex court, an employer does not need to go to court and secure a conviction before a dismissal can be effected. The sum of the foregoing is that claimant failed to prove his claim for wrongful dismissal and same is bound to fail.

34.On damages counsel submitted that they are aware that damages constitute ancillary claims and can only be considered upon the success of the main claims. But for purposes of arguments, Claimant in this case has claimed various heads of “special damages” of what he would have earned up to date of his action’.  In other words, Claimant erroneously considers his service as continuous . The claims are also in the nature of ‘anticipated damages’ which are not applicable in the peculiar circumstances of a ‘master servant’ employment.

35. Counsel continued his submission that Claimant’s employment was a master servant and not statutory. That being so, he is not entitled to arrears of salaries for the period he was not on duty for the master but for what he would have earned had the properly notice been given or damages for wrongful dismissal if proved. To support his contention counsel relied on the case of DANGOTE CEMENT PLC V. AGER (2024) 10 NWLR PT. 1945 P.1 at 40 E-F (SC) thus:

In this appeal the damages the respondents were entitled to for the wrongful termination of their employment by the appellant was the salaries the respondents would have earned had the employment been terminated by the giving of the requisite prior notice or payment in place thereof, as provided for in paragraph,19,02 of exhibit. 1.Once again, the respondents are not entitled to, by the nature of their contract of service with the appellant, which was of pure master-servant relationship, claim and be awarded arrears of salaries and re-instatement from the date or time of the termination of the employment by the appellant.

36. See also Damisa v UBA PLC (2025) 19NWLR PT.2021 P. 409 at 425 F-G (SC) thus:

Parties are ad idem as to the nature of the  employment relationship between the appellant and the respondent. It is a mere contract of employment guided by the agreement of the parties. In cases governed only by agreement of parties and not by statue, removal by way of termination of appointment or dismissal will be in the form agreed to. Any other form connotes wrongful termination or dismissal but not to declare such dismissal null and void. The only remedy available is a claim for damages for the wrongful dismissal and nothing more.

37. Counsel submitted that in clear disobedience to the established principle, Claimant in seeking to prove  his imaginary and humongous damages  invented ‘strange and fraudulent’ formulas for his computation as shown in  his appendices ‘A & B’ as annexures to his pleadings. Perhaps, the intention was to mislead the court. Under cross examination on 4/3/2026 concerning the propriety of the said formulas for computation of damages, claimant responded that his  ‘appendix A’  is from the Central Bank of Nigeria while appendix B in from his exhibit N’ . The said CBN material was not placed before the court, while his exhibit N only represents his ‘certificate of compliance’ for computer generated document. The proper conclusion here is ‘figment of imaginations’.

38. Also, the documents of invoices and ownership of cars do not bear Claimant’s name but the name of the defendant., (Sterling bank), see Claimant’s  exhibits P - Q.  They cannot by any stretch of imagination constitute proof of special damages in favour of the claimant as he was never the owner.  An entitlement to a vehicle by way of  an Institutional loan package is not enforceable by a party who provided no consideration. This explains why such vehicles are usually impounded and recovered by the owners at the end of the employments.

39.This deficit in credibility of Claimant’s claims  equally applied to his claims for cumulative pension damages. The statement of account exhibit O, purporting to emanate from Stanbic IBTC bank is  without any attestation from the said Financial Institution for purposes of credibility. When confronted with same under cross examination, CW1 only response was that it was from an email. Nothing on the face of it confirmed the source of the mail. All these ‘bogus’ documentation characterized the claims of the claimant.

40.                        In the circumstances, counsel submitted that the claimant has not proved the damages sought. Besides, compensation or damages is not granted out of sentiment but upon legally stipulated basis: Mbachu v Anambra – Imo Basin development Authority (2006) All FWLR PT. 342 P.1482 at 1497 E-H, (SC). Counsel urged the court to discountenance the claimant’s claim.

41.  Issue 2: whether considering the facts and materials before this court claimant’s case is statute barred and bound to be dismissed.

42.Counsel submitted that Claimant’s case is statute barred and that Claimant’s right of action had long been extinguished. As from the materials before the court, Claimant was disengaged from the services of the defendant in 2009, see exhibit G, but his action for wrongful dismissal was filed on 31/10/2025, more than 16 years after. By section 16 of the limitation law of Cross River State, being the parent state for the cause of action, the 5 years limited for contract related action had long expired and the cause of action ought to have been extinguished.

43. According to counsel in deciding the issue of  limitation, the Law now is that the court is enjoined to consider the pleadings of the claimant and the defendant, especially where evidence has been taken as in the instant case.  For this, counsel rely on the apex court’s dictum in Pan Atlantic Shipping And Transport Agencies  v. Babatunde (2025) 15 NWLR (Pt.2008) 287 at 312 D-F and the case of Karshi v Gwagwa (2022) 9 NWLR (PT.1834) 139 (SC).

44.                        The claimant’s contention is that his cause of action arose after the criminal trial and acquittal in 2022. It is also part of his case that his cause of action was continuous. On the contrary, counsel submitted that the criminal trial had no effect on the independent dismissal by the defendant as employee can still be dismissed even during the pendency of a criminal trial. Same has been affirmed severally including the apex court decision in Awala v NITEL PLC (2019) NWLR Pt. 1965 P.372  at 403 A-C (SC) and that of Maikyo v Itodo (2007) All FWLR PT.363 P.66 at P.80 para A-C.

45.Counsel further submitted that Claimant’s dismissal was founded on other grounds of fraudulent dealings and ‘compromise position’ which have connotations of dishonesty, incompetence, negligence as well fraud in civil standard. See Banjoko v Ogunlaja (2013) LPELR-20373(CA) (supra); Onuchukwu v Nnoli (2013) LPELR-21223(CA) (supra).

46.                        Counsel also, argued that on a plethora of authorities that both civil and criminal causes of action can accrue simultaneously. Reliance was placed on the case of AKAN V AARON (2025) LPELR-81611(CA), thus:

"Criminal conduct can emerge out of a civil transaction and vise versa. In any of the cases, the law is settled that Civil action can co-exist simultaneously with Criminal matter arising from the same transaction. See MISS IFEYINWA OGOEJEOFO VS DANIEL CHIEJIMA OGOEJEOFO (2006) 3 NWLR (PT. 966) PG. 205"

47.Counsel submitted that claimant’s right of action arose since 2009 was not in any way hindered by the criminal proceeding.  The action is statute barred and bound to be dismissed.  Counsel urged the court to so hold and dismiss the claimant’s suit for being statute barred.

SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT.

48.                        The claimant’s counsel Adongoi Godgift Robert, Esq; in oral adumbration adopted the final written address of the claimant as his argument. In the final written address three issues were formulated for determination. They Are:

1.       Whether considering the totality of the evidence adduced by the Claimant at trial, it can be rightly adjudged that the Claimant has proved her claims against the Defendant to be entitled to same?

2.     Whether considering the fact that DW1 testified in his capacity as the Regional Legal Officer of the Defendant and not as the Internal Control Officer of the Defendant and couple with the fact that DW1 was employed by the Defendant on the 15^th of February, 2021, it can be rightly adjudged that this Court cannot attach any probative value to the evidence and exhibit adduced by DW1?

3.      Whether having regard to the statutes of limitation of actions or limitation of actions laws, the Claimant’s action is statute barred.

ARGUMENT:

49.                        Issue 1: Whether considering the totality of the evidence adduced by the Claimant at trial, it can be rightly adjudged that the Claimant has proved his claims against the Defendant to be entitled to same?

50.                        In arguing issue 1, counsel submitted that the law is trite that for a Claimant-Employee to be adjudged or deemed to have proven his allegation or assertion of or to have discharged his burden of proof of wrongful termination of contract of employment, he is required by law to plead and lead credible cum cogent evidence to prove the following conditions precedent or ingredients of the civil wrong of wrongful determination of contract of employment to wit:

                              I.            That he is an employee of the Defendant;

                          II.            The terms and conditions of his contract of employment with the Defendant;

                        III.            The requisite agreed mode of determination of his contract of employment with the Defendant; and,

                        IV.            The manner by which the Defendant wrongfully determined his contract of employment contrary to the requisite mutually agreed mode of determination of the aforesaid contract of employment. In support of this contention counsel relied on the cases of AKPABIO V. UNION BANK [2021] LPELR-54301[CA], OAK PENSIONS LTD & ORS V. OLAYINKA (2017) LPELR-43207(CA), UBN PLC V. TOYINBO (2008) LPELR-5056(CA).

51.  Counsel submitted that the above enunciated principle of law ably conveyed by the above explicit judicial authorities further finds judicial expressions cum pronouncements in the following respective judicial authorities: ENUGUNUM & ORS V. CHEVRON (NIG) LTD (2014) LPELR-24088(CA); ODESANMI V. FHA (2006) LPELR-11599(CA); LIGHTENING NETWORKS LTD V. NYADA & ORS [2023] LPELR-61010 [CA]; AJUZIE V. FBN PLC (2016) LPELR-40459(CA); NITEL PLC & ANOR V. AKWA (2005) LPELR-5971(CA); WAEC & ORS V. IKANG (2013) LPELR-20422(CA); ETC.

52. According to counsel in view of the totality of the evidence adduced by the Claimant and same corroborated by the Defendant, the Claimant has satisfactorily shown and proved to wit:

That he is an employee of the Defendant. The Claimant, by paragraphs 5 to 37 of his Statement on Oath of 31^st of October, 2025, has shown that he was an employee of the Defendant. Same testimony is further corroborated and authenticated cum amplified by EXHIBITS A, B, C, D AND E collectively;

53. The terms and conditions of his contract of employment with the Defendant. The Claimant, by paragraphs 30 to 37 of his Statement on Oath of 31^st of March, 2025, has shown the terms and conditions of his contract of employment with the Defendant. And same are further corroborated and attested to by EXHIBITS A, B and M collectively.

54.Counsel submitted that the requisite agreed mode of determination of his contract of employment with the Defendant have been stated by the Claimant, in paragraphs 31 and 32 of his Statement on Oath of 31^st of October, 2025, as contained in Chapter 6, paragraph 6.1.3 at page 23 and Chapter 11, paragraphs 11.4 (v) and 11.4.1 at page 38 of exhibit M.

55. According to counsel, the claimant hasby paragraphs 11 to 37 of his Statement on Oath of 31^st of October, 2025, has shown the manner by which the Defendant wrongfully determined his contract of employment contrary to the requisite mutually agreed mode of determination of the aforesaid contract of employment and same is corroborated and authenticated by Chapter 6, paragraph 6.1.3 at page 23 and chapter 11, paragraphs 11.4 (v) and 11.4.1 at page 38 of exhibit M and exhibits F, G, H, I, J, K, L and S.

56.On exhibit M counsel submitted that contrary to the submissions contained in paragraphs 3.1–3.10 of the Defendant’s Final Written Address, the Defendant’s contention that exhibit M (the Employee Handbook) is not binding on the Claimant merely because the Claimant did not append his signature thereto is misconceived and contrary to settled principles of employment and contract law. The law is trite that a contract of employment may be embodied in several documents which must be read together in determining the rights and obligations of the parties. In P.T.E. Ltd v WPC Ltd 2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) 478, the Court held that where a contract is contained in more than one document, the Court is duty bound to examine all documents exchanged between the parties as well as the conduct of the parties in determining whether agreement had been reached on the material terms of the contract.  Similarly, in Chukwumah v SPDC Nigeria Ltd (1993) 4 NWLR (PT.289) 512 the Court held that documents relating to contracts of employment must be read together as a whole in order to ascertain their true import and effect.

57. Counsel submitted that in the instant case, the Claimant remained in the employment of the Defendant under the terms and conditions regulating the employment relationship, including the provisions of exhibit M. The Defendant itself relied on and applied the provisions of the said Handbook in regulating the Claimant’s employment, discipline and eventual dismissal. The defendant having conducted the employment relationship on the basis of exhibit M, throughout the subsistence of the employment, the Defendant cannot now approbate and reprobate by contending that the same Handbook is not binding on the Claimant merely because the Claimant did not formally sign same. Counsel insisted that exhibit M forms part of the contractual documents governing the employment relationship between the parties and is binding on both parties notwithstanding the absence of the Claimant’s signature thereon.

58.                        Counsel further submitted, in response to the Defendant’s contention in paragraph 3.11 – 3.13 of its Final Written Address, that the Claimant is estopped from relying on exhibit M for failure to invoke the appellate procedure under Chapter 11 paragraph 11.4.1 thereof, that the said contention is misconceived. The appellate procedure contemplated under the Handbook presupposes that the Claimant was first subjected to the disciplinary procedure and afforded fair hearing in accordance with the provisions of exhibit M. In the instant case, the Claimant was neither given the opportunity to defend himself before any disciplinary committee nor afforded the right to exonerate himself before his dismissal. Indeed, DW1 admitted under cross-examination that the Defendant has no evidence showing that the Claimant was invited to appear and exonerate himself and equally tendered no query allegedly issued to the Claimant.

59.                        Counsel contended having failed to comply with the mandatory disciplinary procedure prescribed under exhibit M, the Defendant cannot now rely on the appellate provisions of the same Handbook to defeat the Claimant’s claims. The Defendant cannot simultaneously deny the binding effect of exhibit M and at the same time seek to rely on selected provisions thereof against the Claimant.

60.                        Counsel submitted that the Defendant, by paragraphs 3.11 to 3.13 of her Final Written Address filed on the 21^st of May, 2026, has argued extensively, but without merit, that the Claimant in placing reliance on exhibit M cannot pick and choose, as the Claimant has failed also to comply with the provisions of Chapter 11, paragraph 11.4.1 (iv)-(v) of exhibit M. In reaction to the foregoing unmeritorious cum unsustainable argument of the Defendant, counsel submitted that the requirement to appeal to the executive management and the Board of the Defendant is discretionary and not mandatory, as the word “May” is used, while the requirement of issuance of query to the Claimant in terminating the contract of employment of the Claimant is mandatory as required by Chapter 11, paragraph 11.4.1 (i) of exhibit M, which the Defendant failed to so do from the ample of evidence before this Court. Furthermore, the requirement to appeal to the executive management and the Board of the Defendant is conditioned upon the issuance of a query to the Claimant of which the Defendant failed to so do. Arising therefrom, the Claimant cannot be barred or estopped from placing reliance on exhibit M in advancing and prosecuting his case.

61.  Counsel continued his submission that the Defendant through her witness DW1, has attested to the fact that the Claimant was her employee and was employed as manager and also the fact that she wrongfully determined the Claimant’s contract of employment, DW1, under cross-examination.

62.Counsel submitted that the law is trite that whenever an employer reports an employee to the Police for investigation on an allegation of commission of a crime, the employer is duty-bound to await the outcome of the criminal investigation and the criminal trial before taking any further steps or disciplinary measures against such an employee. Arising therefrom, any employer who takes any disciplinary steps against an employee without awaiting the outcome of the criminal investigation cum trial does that at his or her own peril or detriment. In lending judicial credence to the foregoing legal submission, the Supreme Court, in NPA v AJOBI (2006) 13 NWLR (PT. 998) 477 @ 489, enunciated and held inter alia to wit:

“…A defendant or employer who reports his employee to the police in a criminal charge is required to await the conclusion of the criminal proceedings before he can take any further step in their internal disciplinary measures. Having referred the matter to the police for investigation, the appellant was bound to wait for the outcome of the trial. The respondent was liable to dismissal only if he was convicted by the Court.”

63.                        The Court of Appeal, in upholding the above judicial principle of law authored by the Supreme Court, via the instrumentality of PER BARKA, JCA in NIGERIAN BOTTLING COMPANY PLC v EKPO (2020) LCN|14826 (CA), articulated and enunciated inter alia to wit:

“…I agree that there is no law that states that an employer must wait for the employee to be convicted by a Court of law before his employment is terminated, but where, as in the instant case, the employer makes it a duty to report the employee to the police for investigation as to whether the offence alleged against him was in fact committed or not, the employer must await the result of the investigation and or the conviction or dismissal of the employee before proceeding to act as it deems fit. Once an employer makes a report to the police, the employer must await the outcome of the criminal trial before taking any action it deems fit in the circumstance in accordance with the holding in NPA vs. AJOBI(SUPRA).”

64.                        It is submission of counsel that the evidence before this Court indisputably shows that while the Claimant was being investigated by the Police and charged to the Federal High Court for Prosecution and while the Federal High Court was yet to delivered its judgment, the Defendant, on the 29^th of June, 2009, issued and served the Claimant a letter of dismissal terminating the Claimant’s contract of employment with her on the grounds of fraud which the Claimant was being prosecuted for in the Federal High Court. The said letter of dismissal dated 29^th of June, 2009 is admitted as exhibit G, while the judgment of the Federal High Court delivered on the 29^th of September, 2022 is admitted as exhibit H. Thus, the Defendant wrongfully, erroneously and mistakenly terminated the Claimant’s contract of employment when, having reported the Claimant to the police, she failed to await the judgment of the Federal High Court of Nigeria before going ahead to terminate the Claimant’s contract of employment.

65.                        It is submission of counsel that the Defendant having dismissed the Claimant on the 29^th of June, 2009 without awaiting the judgment of the Federal High Court of Nigeria is deemed to have wrongfully and mistakenly dismissed the Claimant. In support of this contention counsel refers to the case of in SKYE BANK PLC v ADEGUN (2024) 15 NWLR (PT.1960) AT PAGES 12 AND 13, HOLDING 7, explicated thus:

“Despite the fact that an employer has a right to dismiss an employee, the dismissal should not be wrongful. The Courts will consider the following in determining whether a dismissal is proper or wrongful:

Was the dismissal carried out in line with the procedure laid down in the Employee Handbook or any document governing the employment relationship

Was the issuer of the letter of dismissal competent to do so? Or was the dismissal process carried out by a competent authority?

Was the employee afforded fair hearing during the dismissal process?”

66.                       Counsel posited that the evidence of parties before this Court clearly shows or answers questions ‘a’ and ‘c’ of the above Supreme Court authority of SKYE BANK PLC v ADEGUN (2024) 15 NWLR (PT.1960) AT PAGES 12 AND 13, HOLDING 7 in the negative (that is, a big “NO” ANSWER). This is because the dismissal of the Claimant was never carried out in line with the procedure laid down in exhibit M. Again, the Claimant was never afforded fair hearing during the dismissal process, as the evidence of DW1 corroborates this factual truth when he testified that he does not have any evidence before the Court of invitation of the Claimant to appear to exonerate himself and also does not have any Query Letter before the Court to show that the Claimant was served with a query letter. In DARAMOLA v F.U.T, YOLA (2026) 4 NWLR (PT.2033) AT PAGES 190 AND 191, HOLDING 8, the Supreme Court held thus:

“It is a legal requirement that the principle of fair hearing be observed before an employee is dismissed or his employment terminated for disciplinary reasons. Irrespective of the nature of employment, an employer may dismiss an employee who has committed gross or grave misconduct or a misconduct of such a nature that warrants the dismissal of the employee, as long as the employee is given a fair hearing.”

67.                        Thus, the Claimant’s contract of employment is indeed wrongfully terminated/determined by the Defendant having failed to grant the Claimant fair hearing. The Claimant, by paragraphs 30 to 37 of his Statement on Oath of 31^st of October, 2025, has shown how his right to fair hearing has been violated by the Defendant corroborated by exhibit M.

68.                       Counsel further refers to SKYE BANK PLC v ADEGUN (2024) 15 NWLR (PT.1960) AT PAGE 14, HOLDING 9, where the Supreme Court held thus:

“An employer is not obliged to give any reason for terminating or dismissing an employee, but once the employer gives any reason, the burden lies on him to satisfactorily prove same. In the instant case, the appellant did not satisfactorily justify the reason for the summary dismissal of the respondent.”

69.                        Counsel submitted that a painstaking perusal of Paragraph 1 of exhibit G, being the letter of dismissal issued to the Claimant, clearly reveals that the Defendant predicated the dismissal of the Claimant on allegations of fraud allegedly committed by the Claimant at the Defendant’s Calabar Branch. The burden therefore lies on the Defendant to satisfactorily justify the said reason for dismissal. The evidence before this Honourable Court further reveals that exhibit DW1A formed part of the documentary evidence already tendered and evaluated by the Federal High Court in the criminal proceedings instituted against the Claimant on substantially the same allegations of fraud which ultimately culminated in the discharge and acquittal of the Claimant vide exhibit H. It is respectfully submitted that while the Defendant may seek to justify the dismissal on the allegation of fraud, this Honourable Court, sitting as a civil Court, is not called upon to determine afresh the criminal culpability of the Claimant on substantially the same allegations of fraud already subjected to criminal adjudication before the Federal High Court. In AWULU v POLARIS BANK LTD (2022) LPELR-57374 (CA), the Court of Appeal held thus:

“The law is trite where an employer terminates the appointment of an employee on the ground of misconduct, the employer is only expected to be satisfied that there was misconduct established against the employee. If the employee disagrees, or challenges the termination of his appointment in a Court of law, the Court can only consider whether the employer complied with the relevant procedure in terminating the appointment or not. The Court cannot delve into the issue of whether the employee was guilty of the misconduct or not. To prove guilt of a person in doing an act is not within the province of the jurisdiction of a civil Court.”

70.                        According to counsel, the issue before this Honourable Court is not the criminal culpability of the Claimant, but whether the Defendant complied with the applicable disciplinary procedure and principles of fair hearing before dismissing the Claimant. The Defendant having so stated, the burden lies on the Defendant to satisfactorily prove same to this Court. The Defendant merely dumped exhibit DW1A before this Court without more. Apart from merely dumping exhibit DW1A before this Court, DW1 is not the competent witness to testify to exhibit DW1A as he testified as the Regional Legal Officer of the Defendant and never as the Internal Control Officer of the Defendant. Again, under cross-examination, DW1 testified thus:

“QS-‘It seems you are not aware that the statement of account you tendered in evidence (exhibit DW1A) is one of the documents tendered in evidence at the criminal trial of the Claimant?’ He answered thus: ‘It is not true.’

QS-‘Do you have any evidence before this Court to show that exhibit DW1A is not one of the documents tendered in evidence at the criminal trial of the Claimant?’ He answered thus: ‘I don’t have any evidence to prove same.’”

71.  Additionally, exhibit H, being the judgment of the Federal High Court of Nigeria, which discharged and acquitted the Claimant of the fraudulent allegations of the Defendant, has exonerated the Claimant of any of the content of exhibit DW1A. Counsel submitted that the Defendant has failed to satisfactorily prove to this Court the reason adduced or stated by her in exhibit G for dismissing the Claimant.

72. Counsel further refers to SKYE BANK PLC v ADEGUN (2024) 15 NWLR (PT.1960) AT PAGES 7 and 9, HOLDINGS 1 AND 2, and submitted that damages awardable in cases of wrongful dismissal in not only salary in lieu of notice because of stigma. According to counsel the Claimant, by paragraphs 38 to 39 of his statement on oath of 31^st of October, 2025, has shown the consequential damage and losses he suffered as a result of the Defendant’s wrongful determination of his contract of employment via summary dismissal. Thus, on the strength of the above Supreme Court authority, the quantum of damages awardable to the Claimant in this case should be in accordance with the general law on contract on award of damages for breach of contract, which would involve a consideration of the consequential loss that has arisen or would arise from the breach of the contract of employment having regard to the monthly wage, current age of the Claimant and the due date of retirement. The Claimant’s Affidavit of Age Declaration which is exhibit R is very fundamental for this purpose.

73. Counsel also refers to the case of ONYIORAH v. ONYIORAH & ANOR (2019) LPELR-49096(SC), where the Supreme Court held thus:

“Special damages must be specially pleaded and strictly proved by the claimant. To succeed in a claim for special damages the claimant must plead the special damages and give necessary particulars and adduce credible evidence in support. The claimant must satisfy the court as to how the sum claimed as special damages was quantified. Special damages are awarded for actual or exact losses suffered.” PER O. RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C.

74.Counsel also submitted that the Claimant, by paragraphs 40 to 43 of his Statement on Oath of 31^st of October, 2025, has sufficiently proved his special damages of gross emolument covering 2009 to 2025 with Appendix A. same is further corroborated and amplified and proved by exhibits C and D.

75. Counsel submitted that the Claimant, also by paragraphs 44 to 48 of his statement on oath of 31^st of October, 2025 with Appendix B and paragraph 11 of his further statement on oath of 8^th of January, 2026, has proved his special damages of retirement savings pension fund entitlement covering 2009 to 2025. Same claims are further proved and authenticated by exhibit N, O, R and M. The Defendant in corroborating the foregoing claims of the Claimant, DW1, under cross-examination, testified thus:

“QS-‘In paragraph 14 of your statement on oath, you asserted that the Claimant’s pension fund statement of account with Stanbic IBTC Pension Managers (exhibits N & O) never emanated from Stanbic Pension Managers?’ He answered thus: ‘Yes.’

QS-‘Have you tendered in evidence any document before this Court authenticating your assertion that the Claimant’s pension fund statement of account with Stanbic IBTC Pension Managers (exhibits N & O) never emanated from Stanbic Pension Managers?’ He answered thus: ‘No, My Lord.’”

76.                        Counsel submitted that the Defendant’s contention regarding exhibit N is misconceived and does not represent the true state of the record before this Honourable Court. The statement of the Claimant’s Retirement Savings Account together with the accompanying Certificate of Compliance were originally frontloaded and tendered by the Claimant as a single composite document. However, during the process of tendering and marking of exhibits, the said document was inadvertently separated and marked as exhibits N and O respectively. Consequently, exhibits N and O are not separate and unrelated documents but constitute different portions of the same electronically generated RSA, Statement of Account together with its accompanying certificate of Compliance.

77. Counsel submitted that the inadvertent separation and marking of the documents as exhibits N and O does not derogate from their evidential value, admissibility or compliance with the provisions of the Evidence Act relating to electronically generated evidence. Furthermore, the Claimant’s claim for retirement savings pension fund entitlement in Appendix B includes not only the pension contributions lost as a result of the wrongful dismissal, but also the accrued returns and investment earnings which the said contributions would ordinarily have generated had the Claimant remained in the Defendant’s employment. The loss of such accrued investment returns therefore constitutes a quantifiable financial loss flowing directly from the wrongful dismissal of the Claimant. It is submitted that the said accrued returns and earnings, being interest which the pension contributions would ordinarily have earned, properly constitute a claim in the nature of pre-judgment interest and special damages capable of precise calculation as shown in Appendix B and further corroborated by exhibits N and O reflecting the performance and accrued returns on the Claimant’s RSA account. The law is settled that a claim for pre-judgment interest is maintainable where the facts grounding same are specifically pleaded and credible evidence led in proof thereof. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the cases of Intercontinental Bank Ltd v. Brifina Ltd [2012] 13 NWLR (Pt.1316) SC 1 @ 23 Para, F, NPA v. Aminu Ibrahim & Co [2018] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1632) 62.

78.                        Counsel also submitted that the Claimant, by paragraphs 49 to 54 of his statement on oath of 31^st October, 2025 and paragraph 11 of his further statement on oath of 8^th of January, 2026, has proved his special damages of vehicle entitlement covering 2007 to 2025. Same claims are further proved and amplified by exhibits P, Q and M. The Defendant in also corroborating the Claimant’s evidence in this regard, DW1, under cross-examination, testified thus:

“QS-‘In paragraph 14 of your statement on oath, you asserted that the Defendant’s staff handbook (exhibit M) does not confer on the Claimant any entitlement to a car either as manager or any other rank?’ He answered thus: ‘Yes, My Lord.’

QS-‘Take a look at Chapter 12, paragraph 12.1(i) at page 39 of exhibit M and confirm to this Court that managers are entitled to status cars?’ He answered thus: ‘Yes, My Lord.’

QS-‘Have you tendered in evidence before this Court any Defendant’s Staff handbook that speaks otherwise or contrary to Chapter 12, paragraph 12.1(i) at page 39 of exhibit M?’ He answered thus: ‘I have not tendered any staff handbook that speaks contrary to Chapter 12, paragraph 12.1(i) at page 39 of exhibit M.’”

79.                        Counsel further submitted that the Claimant, by paragraphs 56 to 62 of his statement on oath of 31^st of October, 2025 and paragraph 11 of his further statement on oath of 8^th of January, 2026, has proved his gratuity claims covering 2007 to 2025. Same are further proved and authenticated by exhibit M. The Claimant having placed credible evidence before this Honourable Court establishing his pension and retirement benefit entitlements, same ought to be granted accordingly.

80.                        According to counsel, pension and gratuity are not gratuitous benefits at the pleasure of an employer, but accrued proprietary and vested rights earned by an employee in the course of service. The law is settled that an unlawful dismissal cannot operate to divest an employee of his earned pension and gratuity entitlements. In NEPA v Adeyemi (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1021) 315, the Court held thus:

“Entitlement to pension and gratuity is a vested right which can only be taken away by the dismissal of the employee from his employment. Once the dismissal is declared unlawful, and the respondent had spent the number of years stipulated in the conditions of service in the appellant’s organization, he should be entitled to draw his pension and be paid his gratuity.”

81.  Similarly, in Ifeta v S.P.D.C. Nig. Ltd, the Court reaffirmed that retirement benefits accruing to an employee in the course of employment remain enforceable rights once properly established before the Court.

82.Finally, the Claimant, by paragraphs 63 to 69 of his statement on oath of 31^st of October, 2025, has proved his special damages of future earnings covering 2025 to 2029. Same are further proved by exhibits M, C, D and R.

83. Counsel on the strength of the above judicial authorities, evaluation of evidence cum our legal arguments, submitted that considering the totality of the evidence adduced by the Claimant at trial, it can be rightly adjudged that the Claimant has proved her claims against the Defendant to be entitled to same. Counsel urged the court to so find and hold.

84.                        Issue 2: Whether considering the fact that DW1 testified in his capacity as the Regional Legal Officer of the Defendant and not as the Internal Control Officer of the Defendant and couple with the fact that DW1 was employed by the Defendant on the 15^th of February, 2021, it can be rightly adjudged that this Court cannot attach any probative value to the evidence and exhibit adduced by DW1?

85.                        In arguing issue 2, counsel submitted that the law is trite that for the testimony of an employee of a company to command judicial cum legal weight, it has to be the testimony of the officer whose job description relates to the issue. On this reliance was placed on the case of EKPEAZU v ACB LTD (1965) NMLR 375). In OGUGUA v ARMELS TRANSPORT LTD (1974) 4 ECSLZR 43 @ 385 SC, the Supreme Court refused to give weight to the testimony of a company’s business manager because he was neither a mechanical engineer nor an automobile engineer. In TUGBOGBO v ADELEGUN (1974) 1 ALL NLR (PT.1) 49, the Supreme Court considered the testimony of a company’s secretary as specious and clearly unreliable. In JELICO LTD v OWONOBOYS TECHNICAL SERVICES LTD (1995) 4 NWLR (PT.391) 534, the Supreme Court upheld the contention that where the conduct and affairs of a particular officer in respect of a specific transaction is in dispute, it is that officer who is in charge of such transactions or whose job-description is such transaction that should be called to explain the transaction and not an officer who never had anything to do with the transaction or whose job-description is unrelated to the transaction in issue.

86.                        Counsel argued arising from the above decisions of the Supreme Court, a company that opts to get a staff who was not directly involved in a transaction to testify risks the testimony not having any evidential value. In the case at hand, DW1 is the Regional Legal Officer of the Defendant and never the Internal Control Officer of the Defendant, and as such, he is not in a better position to testify on behalf of the Defendant against the Claimant on issues bothering on the allegation of frauds levelled against the Claimant. Secondly, under cross-examination, DW1 testified that he was employed by the Defendant on the 15th of February, 2021, which simply entails that at the time when the Claimant was arrested by the Police and charged to Court for prosecution and the Claimant was dismissed from the employ of the Defendant on the 29^th of June, 2009, DW1 was not in the employ of the Defendant and therefore knew nothing about the transaction in question. Thus, all the testimony of DW1 before this Court is nothing, but hearsay evidence and as such, they are all inadmissible and liable to be expunged by this Court on the strength of the provisions of Sections 37 and 38 of the Evidence Act, as amended.

87.Counsel in the light and strength of the above statutory cum judicial authorities and our argument cum evaluation of evidence, submitted that considering the fact that DW1 testified in his capacity as the Regional Legal Officer of the Defendant and not as the Internal Control Officer of the Defendant and couple with the fact that DW1 was employed by the Defendant on the 15^th of February, 2021, it can be rightly adjudged that this Court cannot attach any probative value to the evidence and exhibit adduced by DW1.

88.                        Issue 3: Whether having regard to the statutes of limitation of actions or limitation of actions laws, the Claimant’s action is statute barred.

89.                        Counsel submitted that the Defendant, by paragraph 18 of her Statement of Defence filed on the 3^rd of December, 2025 and by paragraph 18 of DW1’s Statement on Oath dated, deposed to and filed on same 3^rd of December, 2025, as well as in issue 2 of its Final Written Address, has challenged the competence of this action on the ground that same is statute barred and thereby urging this Court to dismiss same on the strength of being statute barred. Furthermore, the Defendant has contended that the Claimant’s cause of action accrued immediately upon his dismissal from employment. Counsel submitted that this argument is untenable in view of the peculiar circumstances of the instant case.

90.                        Counsel contended that the law is settled that a cause of action comprises the entire set of facts and circumstances which give rise to an enforceable claim and arises on the date the event becomes complete, when the aggrieved party can begin and maintain his action. A cause of action accrues only when all facts necessary to sustain the action have occurred. See Mobil Oil (Nig.) Plc v Malumfashi (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt. 406) 246; Adekoya v F.H.A. (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1099) 539. In ascertaining the period of limitation, the court must determine the period when all the facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the claimant to succeed. See Board of Trade v Cayzer, Irvine & Co. Ltd (1927) A.C. 610.  Accordingly, the determination of when time begins to run depends on the peculiar facts constituting the Claimant’s grievance and the nature of the reliefs sought.

91.  Counsel argued that a reasonable cause of action means either a single fact, or combination of facts averred by a Claimant in his pleadings which the law recognizes as giving him a right to make claim against a Defendant and seeking judicial remedy from the Court, Chevron Nigeria Limited v Lonestar Drilling Nig. Limited (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 723) 186, Thomas v. Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669.

92.                        Counsel further submitted that the Defendants’ plea of limitation cannot avail them in respect of the Claimant’s claim for gratuity, same constituting a distinct, accrued and subsisting entitlement arising from the Claimant’s years of service with the Defendants. The Claimant’s claim for gratuity is not merely ancillary to the complaint of dismissal but constitutes an independent claim for terminal benefits alleged to have accrued from services already rendered by the Claimant during the course of his employment with the Defendants. The law recognizes that accrued terminal benefits remain enforceable claims notwithstanding disputes relating to dismissal or allegations of misconduct. Thus, whether the Claimant’s dismissal lawfully extinguished his entitlement to gratuity is a substantive issue for determination upon consideration of the applicable conditions of service and surrounding circumstances of the case and not an issue capable of summary defeat under the guise of limitation. In EMCON (Nig.) Plc v Bello, the Court recognized that accrued retirement and terminal benefits are capable of enforcement notwithstanding the fact of dismissal where such entitlements had accrued from services already rendered by the employee.  It was  submitted that the Claimant’s gratuity claim remains a live, enforceable and subsisting claim before this Honourable Court and consequently cannot properly be defeated by the Defendants’ plea of limitation.

93.Counsel submitted that the law is recently trite under Nigerian legal system cum jurisprudence that statutes of limitation of actions or limitation of actions laws are inapplicable to contract of employment or contract of services. The Supreme Court, in upholding the foregoing submission of ours, in NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILIZATION ALLOCATION AND FISCAL COMMISSION & ORS v AJIBOLA JOHNSON & ORS (2019) 2 NWLR (PT.1656) 247 @ 270-271, held that limitation law does not apply to contracts of employment. By the judicial authority of NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILIZATION ALLOCATION AND FISCAL COMMISSION & ORS v AJIBOLA JOHNSON & ORS (2019) 2 NWLR (PT.1656) 247 @ 270-271, the Supreme Court has insurmountably demonstrated and laid to rest the inapplicability of statutes of limitation to contract of employment.

94.                        Counsel insisted that the Claimant’s action is not statute barred as inadvertently argued and submitted by the Defence. Even if it is conceded that the statutes of limitation is applicable to employment contracts, it is again submitted that the application of limitation is not absolute and does not operate to extinguish claims disclosing continuous injury and subsisting obligations. The law is trite that limitation statutes admit exceptions in cases of continuing injury or continuing damage. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the case of AREMO II  V, ADEKANDE (2004) ALL FWLR (PT.224)2113 AT 2132.

95.According to counsel, the instant case does not relate merely to a completed or isolated act of dismissal. Rather, the Claimant’s complaint arises from a series of interconnected acts originating from the allegations of fraud made against the Claimant by the Defendants, which allegations were subsequently reported to the Nigerian Police and culminated in the criminal prosecution of the Claimant for over a decade. The dismissal of the Claimant was itself predicated upon the same allegations which formed the basis of the criminal proceedings. Consequently, the Claimant’s grievance cannot be viewed in isolation from the criminal proceedings which remained pending for several years until their eventual determination in favour of the Claimant. The allegations made against the Claimant by the Defendants remained unresolved and formed the subject matter of criminal proceedings which subsisted for several years until the eventual vindication of the Claimant by the Court.

96.                        In Nigerian Ports Authority v Ajobi, the Supreme Court recognized that where an employee’s dismissal is founded upon allegations of criminal conduct pending before a criminal court, the employee’s cause of action in respect of certain reliefs may only become maintainable upon the determination of the criminal proceedings in his favour.

97.The law is settled that for the doctrine of continuing injury to apply, the wrongful act complained of must remain continuing and not merely its consequences. See Aremo II v Adekanye. It is therefore humbly submitted that having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the Defendants’ objection is misconceived and ought to be dismissed.

98.                        Additionally, judicial authorities abound that where dismissal from employment is founded on allegation of crime, the injury continues until the criminal process or trial is concluded, which is one of the exceptions to the legal principle of limitation of action law (see ADERIMOLA v BABATUNDE (2006) LPELR-44762 (SC)) and which constitutes the facts of the case at hand. The Claimant, by his pleadings and evidence adduced before this Court, has shown that he was reported to the Police by the Defendant on allegation of commission of the crime of fraud for onward investigation and whereupon he was investigated and arraigned before the Federal High Court of Nigeria for criminal prosecution in 2009 and he was prosecuted and found not guilty and consequentially discharged and acquitted of all the count-charges proffered against him by the Federal High Court on the 29^th of September, 2022 which is authenticated by the Judgment of the Federal High Court dated the 29^th of September, 2022 and admitted in evidence as exhibit H. Arising therefrom, it entails that the Claimant’s cause of action arose on the 29^th of September, 2022 when he was discharged and acquitted of all the count-charges proffered against him by the Federal High Court of Nigeria and never on the 29^th of June, 2009 when the Claimant was wrongfully and incompetently issued and served a Dismissal Letter by the Defendant. And by computation of time, from 29^th of September, 2022 to 31^st of October, 2025 when the Claimant filed this suit is 3 years, 1 month and 1 day, which is within the 5-year statutory timeframe required by Section 16 of the Limitation Law of Cross River State, 2004 for institutions of actions bothering on contract.

99.                        In concluding his submission counsel submitted that:-

                               I.            That considering the totality of the evidence adduced by the Claimant at trial, it can be rightly adjudged that the Claimant has proved her claims against the Defendant to be entitled to same;

                            II.            That considering the fact that DW1 testified in his capacity as the Regional Legal Officer of the Defendant and not as the Internal Control Officer of the Defendant and couple with the fact that DW1 was employed by the Defendant on the 15^th of February, 2021, it can be rightly adjudged that this Court cannot attach any probative value to the evidence and exhibit adduced by DW1; and

                        III.            That statutes of limitation of actions or limitation of actions laws has not extinguished the Claimant’s cause of action.

100.                     Counsel on the strength of the above judicial authorities, evaluation of evidence and argument, pray and urged this Court to grant the Claimant all his claims against the Defendant.

REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW:

101.                       In reply on points of law counsel submitted that the sum of claimant’s arguments in his paragraphs 3.7 - 3.9 is that his invalid hand book, exhibit M merely forms part of this contract of employment. Counsel argued that same is rather being evasive as it is exhibit M and no other document that forms the crux of Claimant’s claim of wrongful dismissal. By section 122 (2) (m) of the Evidence Act, your Lordship is urged to take judicial notice of Claimants pleadings, to wit: that no other document contains the terms of employment said to have been breached.

102.                     On Claimant’s argument that whoever reports an employee to the Police on allegation of crime must wait for the outcome of criminal trial. He cited cases including NPA V Ajobi (2006). See paragraphs 3.15 – 3.22 of his address. Counsel submitted in response that claimant has missed the point. The subsequent supreme decisions are clear that employee can be dismissed on other ground other than crime despite the existence of criminal option. Claimant has failed to confront the grounds for his dismissal but rather cites cases and argue generally without distinction: Awala v NITEL PLC (2019) 15 NWLR PT.1695 P.372 at 403 A-C (SC); Maikyo vs Itodo (2007) All FWLR PT.363 P.66 at P.80 para A-C (SC). It is also now trite that a case is authority for the facts it decides. Counsel urged the court to discountenance his argument on this issue.

103.                      On Claimant’s argument in his paragraph 3.23 – 3.25 that defendant’s exhibit DW1A was also subject of criminal trial where Claimant was discharged. We submit in response that no such evidence was placed before this court. By S.131(1) Evidence Act, it was the place of claimant to lead relevant evidence including the record of the criminal trial or CTC of such document to show that DW1A was subject of claimant’s discharge. But, counsel failed to do so.

104.                    Counsel contended that the said Exhibit DW1A is relevant in showing that the claimant is not before this court with ‘clean hands’, claimants has not also been able to pointedly address his culpability in exhibit DW1A, apart from the refrains like: ‘it is not relevant’ ‘I was already discharged’ etc. the court is not a place to perpetuate error or award fraudulent conduct: Govt. of Akwa Ibom State v Powercom Nig. Ltd 2004 6 NWLR (Pt.868) 202 at 220 A. Furthermore, the said exhibit is also relevant to show that the defendant had reasonable grounds to invite the Police for investigation. Above all, since the exhibit imputes on the character of the Claimant, the exhibit is relevant in evaluating the quantum of damages claimed. S.79 of the Evidence Act affirmed thus:

‘’Notwithstanding section 78, in civil cases the fact that the character of any person is such as to affect the amount of damages which he ought to receive may be given in evidence’’.

105.                     In the instant case since exhibit DW1A unequivocally shows how the claimant actively defrauded the defendant but managed to escape via technicality in criminal trial, it is relevant in considering his quantum of damages.

106.                     Counsel refers to Claimant’s argument in his paragraphs 3.29 – 3.35 that his entitlement is properly calculated with his ‘special formulas’ in appendices A & B” and that the separation of his exhibit N and exhibit O was in error. Counsel argued in response that Claimant is merely trying to divert attention from his inability to frontally address how he used  ‘bogus’ formulas like  appendices A & B to ‘manufacture’ humongous figures as claims before this court. The issue is not whether exhibit N & O are separated or not but whether ‘appendices A & B’ represents any legitimate formula for computation.  Claimant has failed to prove his entitlement to the quantum of damages placed before this court. Counsel submitted that address of counsel cannot now take the place of requisite evidence: CHIMA V. DIRIWARI & ORS (2023) LPELR-59992(CA).

107.                     Issue 2: According to counsel the crux of Claimant’s argument in his issue 2 is that DW1 is not a competent witness for the Defendant on grounds that:

He is not special internal regulatory officer

He was employed in 2021.

108.                     Counsel submitted in response that the entire argument is grossly misconceived by the current state of our laws. In the first place, the matter did not call for a special witness. In any event, even if such ‘special witness’ was required which is not conceded, then it is DW1 as the legal officer and no other person that  is best suited to give evidence on a case bordering on the legality of breach of contract of employment.

109.                     Counsel continued his submission be that as it may and for purposes of arguments, the prevailing law is that any officer can testify on behalf of a corporate body notwithstanding that he was not employed at the time of incident, especially where there are also sufficient documentary evidence to look at as in the instance case. on this contention counsel relied on a plethora of decisions including the apex court case of INTERDRILL (NIGERIA) LTD & ANOR V U.B.A. PLC (2017) 13 NWLR (PART 1581) 52 AT 69 D - H TO 70 A - C per NWEZE, JSC thus:

Indeed, from the facts and circumstances of the instant appeal, the apt authority should be the decision of this Court in Saleh v. Bank of North Ltd. (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 976) 316, 326-327 paras., H-A; (2006) LPELR, (2991) (SC) 10-11; F-A where it held thus: ‘the mere fact that - a bank staff was not around when a customer's bank account was opened was not enough to prevent the staff from testifying, or giving evidence on customer's account. See Kate Enterprises Ltd. v Daewoo (Nig) Ltd. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.5) NWLR; See also Ishola v. SGB (Nig.) Ltd. (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt. 488) 405; also, Anyaebosi v. R.T. Briscoe (Nig.) Ltd. (1987) 3 NWLR (pt.59) 84: Igbodim v. Obianke (1976) 9-10 SC 179. This posture no doubt, finds solid anchorage on this Court's view in Kate Enterprises Ltd. v. Daewoo (Nig.) Ltd. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.5) 116 at 130-137, paras. H-B that: "To insist that the very person in the appellant company who negotiated the transaction with the respondents must be called as a witness when the documents relating to the transaction are available and have been admitted in evidence without objection and PW1 is in a position to know about the transaction by the office he holds is, in my view, a negation of the very essence of the corporate personality of the appellants. Companies have no flesh and blood. Their existence is a mere legal abstraction. They must therefore, of necessity, act through their directors, managers and officials. PW1 was clearly in a position to know enough about the transaction as to testify to it on behalf of the appellant. Besides his evidence is substantially unchallenged and supported by documents tendered. I am satisfied that if the learned trial Judge had borne these facts in mind, he would have given due weight to the oral evidence tendered by the appellants before him.’’

110.                       See also   Kate Enterprises Ltd. v. Daewoo (Nig.) Ltd. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.5) 116 at 130-137, paras. H-B; Ishola v. SGB (Nig.) Ltd. (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt. 488) 405; AYODEJI V. FRN (2018) LPELR-45839(CA).

111. Counsel argued that in the circumstance, DW1 was more than qualified to testify as a competent witness. Again, looking at the state of claimant’s case with a worthless exhibit M’ and appendices A & B as the basis of his claims, his case would still fail even without the defendant calling any witness.

112.                       According to counsel, the old cases relied upon by the Claimant in this issue made no reference to any question of ‘specialized’ or ‘internal regulatory officer’ as the competent person to give evidence in a corporate body as posited in Claimant’s address. For instance, in the case of  EKPEAZU V ACB LTD (1965) NMLR (sic) cited by the claimant in his paragraph 3.42, the same case is also reported as IKPEAZU V ACB LTD (1965) NMLR P. 374, the said case dealt with issue of  privity  of contract and liability of partner in a bank’s loan. It has no reference whatsoever to the submission of the Claimant that ’the testimony of employee would have no weight if the issue is not within his job description’.

113.                        Also, the case of JELICO LTD V OWONOBOYS TECH. SERVICES (1995) cited in his paragraph 3.44, no case exist by such name and year of citation. However, a similar named case that exist in JELICO LTD V OWONIBOYS TECH. SERVICES (1994) 4 NWLR (PT.391) 354 makes no reference to the principle ascribed to it by the claimant, to wit:’ that a witness in a particular job description is the only one competent to testify on behalf of the company’. Little wonder, claimant could not specify the pages and paragraphs he lifted the principle as the best practices in citation of cases demand.

114.                       Also, the case Ogugua v Armels Transport Ltd in his paragraph 3.42 is reported as Ogugua v Armels Transport Ltd (1974) 9 NSCC P.169.  This case dealt with the issue of negligence in bailment contract without any reference the principle ascribed to it by the Claimant. The same applies to the case of Tugbogbo v Adelagun in his paragraph 3.43. The same case is reported as Tugbogbo v Adelagun (1974) 9 NSCC P. 253, the Supreme court never in that case considered the testimony of any company secretary as incompetent on grounds of his scheduled duty. Claimant deliberately failed to specify which portion of the judgment  he obtained his claims.

115.                        Counsel continued his submission that this ‘copy and paste’ of irrelevant and misleading cases apply to other cases cited on the issue. Counsel argued that ‘Claimant’s team’ owe the court and the adverse counsel a duty of candour under the Rules of Professional conduct, which would include the duty not to deliberately cite misleading and irrelevant cases as displayed here. Counsel urged the court to be circumspect in the entire cases cited by the claimant. In the same vein, counsel urged the court to rely only on his record of proceedings and not  the one ‘reproduced’ by the Claimant in his address.

116.                       Notwithstanding, even if, those old cases were to be relevant which is not conceded, they stand overruled by implication in view of current decision of the Supreme Court on the same matter. Counsel relies on the apex court decision in Oil & Gas Export Free Trade Zone Authority v Osanakpo (2019) NWLR Pt. 1668. P. 225 at 241 H (SC) thus:

“more importantly, lower courts are enjoined to follow the decision of this court that is more recent on a particular issue…”

117.                       Also, in Fapohunda v RCCN (2019) NWLR Pt. 1658 P. 163 at 183 H (SC), it was stated thus: “

“I agree with learned counsel for the 1^st and 2^nd Respondents that even if the decisions in those cases were to the effect that a decision to set aside a default judgment were interlocutory, the decision in Ogbodo v Ogolo, which was decided later in time has overruled those decisions.”

118.                       See further Central Bank of Nigerian & Ors v Okogie (2015) All FWLR PT. 807 P.478 at 506 E-F (SC). Counsel urged the court to discountenance Claimant’s arguments.        

119.                       Issue 3, Claimant has argued in his paragraphs 3.51 – 3.52 that terminal benefits alone are enforceable notwithstanding the dismissal of an employee. He relied on the case of EMCON (Nig) PLC v Bello. Counsel submitted upon a matter of trite Law that a dismissal takes away the rights of benefit. Regrettably again, the case of EMCON Nig PLC V Bello relied upon in his paragraph 3.52 of his address has no citation and does not exist also.

120.                     Claimant has argued in his paragraphs 3.53 -3.56 that there is no limitation in contract of employment. He relied on the Supreme Court decision in NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILIZATION ALLOCATION AND FISCAL COMMISSION & ORS v AJIBOLA JOHNSON & ORS (2019) 2 NWLR (PT.1656) 247. Counsel submitted that claimant has misconceived the dictum of the apex court in that case. The decision was  specific that the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to cases of contract which is common knowledge. Counsel relied on the same case with same citation where it was held at page 270 F thus: “there is no doubt, a careful reading of the respondents’ claim will show clearly that it is on contract of service. It is now settled law, that section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to cases of contract”.

121.                       Counsel argued that the instant limitation issue, is not founded on the Public officers’ Protection Act. A case is an authority for the facts it decided: Oteri Holdings Ltd v Oluwa (2021) 4NWLR PT. 1766 P.376 H (SC). It is therefore inapplicable. Counsel urged the court to discountenance same.

122.                      The summary of Claimant’s further argument in his paragraphs 3.57 –3.64 is that his case was that of continuous injury as such limitation law would not apply. In response counsel argued that claimant has not given any evidence of ‘continuous injury and cannot rely on same. His claim that he was ‘blacklisted and reported to Central bank to hinder further employment’ had no such evidence placed before the court. Under cross examination, Claimant only said ‘he was told about his report to Central bank’. No evidence of being denied employment anyway arising from such report was also placed before the court. Claimant is bound to prove his positive assertion and cannot rely on failure to do so: S. 131(1) Evidence Act.

123.                      According to counsel in the instant case, his dismissal was once and not dependent solely on the same ground for his trial. The ground for his dismissal included “compromised position” which took place before the charge was filed.  The cases cited do not avail the claimant in the circumstances.

COURT’S DECISION:

124.                     I have considered the processes filed, evidence adduced by the parties at the trial, as well as written and oral submission of counsel for the parties regarding the position of their respective clients.

125.                      In the final written address of the defendant twin issues were formulated for resolution. While in the claimant’s final written address three issues formulated for determination.

126.                     The claimant’s case is principally for wrongful dismissal from service, payment of special damages for wrongful dismissal, payment of pension, payment of gratuity and payment for status cars. There are also claims on damages and interest.

127.                      Before proceeding to determine the substantive claim before the court, it behooves on this court to first and foremost thrash the objection of the defendant claiming that this suit is statute barred. In paragraph 8 and 19 of the statement of defence the defendant has averred that the suit of the claimant is statute barred. Argument in support of the assertion on statute barred has been canvassed in the final written address of the defendant under second issue for determination.

128.                     The defendant through her counsel has argued that the claimants’ case is incompetent as it is caught by the provisions of section 16 of the Cross River State Limitation Law, which requires an action in contract or tort to be instituted within five years. According to the defendant the claimants’ action in all ramifications cannot be maintained in law. The defendant urged the court to dismiss the claimants’ action as he has lost the right to enforce his cause of action because the case was not commenced within the period stipulated by the statute of limitation.

129.                     In his final written address, the claimant dedicated issue three to argument in opposition to the claim that this suit is statute barred. The claimant insisted that his suit is not statute barred. As it was argued for the claimant that his cause of action arose when he was discharged and acquitted as per exhibit H, judgment of Federal High Court i.e. on 29/9/2022. According to the claimant time started running for purpose of limitation law as from 29/6/2022 to 31/10/20125, when this suit was filed before this court. This means from the date of accrual of cause of action to when this suit was instituted on 31/10/2025, is a period of three years one month which is within five years provided for in section 16 of the Cross River State Limitation Law for an action of this nature to be instituted. The claimant further argued that limitation law is not applicable to contract of service. He further stated that even if his suit is caught by limitation law, it is within exception as his suit is that of continuous injury. He also argued that the claim for pension and gratuity cannot be caught by limitation law.

130.                      From the pleadings and evidence before the court the main claimant’s claim borders on propriety of his dismissal from service because he was neither queried or tried by a disciplinary committee and found guilty as provided in exhibit M, the employees handbook, which contained the terms and conditions of his service, and thereby violated his right to fair hearing. It is also submitted that the defendant having reported the claimant to police for criminal investigation and prosecution must not take any action leading to his dismissal until conclusion of police investigation and prosecution before a competent court of law. Therefore, for the claimant limitation law cannot operate until after conclusion of his criminal trial.

131.                        It should be noted that the purpose of limitation Law, is meant to prevent stale action or situation of falling into deep slumber thereby occasioning loss of evidence due to time lag. Where statute has provided period within which an action can be commenced, proceedings shall not be brought after the expiration of the period prescribed. Any action instituted or commenced after the period prescribed for its commencement will be statute bared. See IBRAHIM V JSC KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt.584) 1, EGBE V ADEFARASIN (1986).

132.                      Section 16 of the Cross River State Limitation Law provide as follows:-

‘’16.-No action founded on contract, tort or any other action not specifically provided for in parts ii and iii of this law shall be brought after the expiration of 5 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.’’

133.                      The provisions of section 16 of Limitation law of Cross River State clearly prescribed 5 years period within which an action founded in contract should be instituted or an action for recovery of any sum under any enactment. This means the claimant’s action can only be held to be validly brought before the court if and only if it was instituted within the periods stipulated in the state limitation law.

134.                      In ascertaining whether an action is statute barred, the court looks at the date when the action was instituted and the date when the cause of action arose. Thus, the determination of whether an action is caught by the statute of limitation is a matter of calculation of raw figures and a court of law has no discretion in the matter. See Adekoya v. FHA (2000) 4 NWLR (Pt.652) 215; Egbe v. Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.47) 1; Adekoya v. F.H.A. (2008) 11 NWLR (p.1099) 539; APM V INEC (2023) 9  NWLR (Pt.1890) 419.

135.                      In the case of Power Products INT'L Ltd v. Wema Bank (2012) LPELR-7952(CA), the Court of Appeal Lagos division, has this to say:-

‘‘In law, time begins to run when there is in existence not only a person who can sue, and another who can be sued, but all facts must have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the claimant to succeed." See also the decision of the Supreme Court in OMNIA VS DYKTRADE (2007) 7 SCNJ 228.

136.                      The claimant in this case has stated that in April, 2009, based on a complaint by the defendant regarding allegation of fraud, police officers came and arrested him. He was detained and interrogated by the police about some allegations of fraud.  But he was neither queried or asked to explain his role. He was re-arrested and detained. Upon his release from police custody on bail for the second time, the defendant vide letter of 24/4/2009 suspended him from work and subsequently dismissed him from service vide letter dated 29/6/2009, exhibit G. Subsequently he was charged before the Federal High Court but he was discharged and acquitted as per exhibit H.

137.                      The parties in this case are at ad idem that claimant’s dismissal which he is challenging by this suit was determined on 29/6/2009, in the circumstances, time begins to run for purposes of limitation from 29/6/2009 to 31/10/2025, by way of arithmetical calculation as at 31/10/2025, when this suit was instituted was a period of sixteen (16) years and one (1) month. This means the claimant’s action is caught by section 16 of the Cross River State Limitation Law, as he did not commence his suit within the five (5) years allowed by the law.

138.                      Therefore, reliefs 1 – 16, 20 - 21, 24 – 26, having been predicated on wrongful dismissal are all caught up by 16 of the Cross River State Limitation Law. The reason being that this action was filed after the 5-year window has passed. The suit becomes statute-barred, and the court loses jurisdiction to hear the merits of the dispute on wrongful dismissal of claimant from the employment of the defendant.

139.                      For reliefs 17, 18, 19 and 23, they are on pension and gratuity. The law is well settled that pension and gratuity are immune to limitation law or period. See the case of Ugbeche v NNPC (2016) LPELR-42033 (CA) and Sections 173 and 201(1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Court of appeal in OGBECHE”S case after reviewing the constitutional provisions and other decided cases came to the conclusion that no claim for pension and gratuity shall be invalid merely because the claimant failed to present his claim within the specified period (If any). The court has held that payment of pension and gratuity is not a bounty to the employee by the employer. It is the right of an employee to claim pension and gratuity. The amount should be disbursed without delay and where payment is delayed, the employer cannot challenge the employee’s claim for payment of pension and gratuity on the ground of limitation period.

140.                     In abidance to the settled position of law on pension and gratuity, I have no choice than tpo come to the conclusion that the reliefs on pension and gratuity in this case cannot be affected by the provision of section 16 of the Cross River State Limitation Law.

141.                       Now, the next issue to be considered is the claimant’s argument that even if his case was caught by limitation, his suit is still maintainable because it falls within exception to limitation as his suit is that of continuous of damage/injury.

142.                     Having satisfied that the instant case in so far as it relates to issues of wrongful dismissal, payment of salaries is caught up by the limitation laws the next step would be to ascertain whether the matter comes within any of the permitted exceptions to the limitation law that the injury in question is a continuing injury. The exception on continuing injury was provided in the Public Officers Protection Law of Cross River State and not in Cross River State Limitation Law.

143.                      Even it has been provided it will not apply to this case. The reason being that for the continuing injury exception to apply, the employee would need to be in employment; for otherwise, the claim that the deprivation continues would not stand. In the instant case, the claimants ceased to be in office in 2009. There is, therefore, no question as to the existence of a deprivation of an entitlement which comes in periodically and has not ceased after 2009. This being the case, the claimant in the instant case cannot claim the benefit of the exception to continuing injury, as there is no such continuance in this case.

144.                     In any event, the definition of the phrase continuance of the injury by case law authorities to mean continuance of the act which caused the injury and not the injury itself I find and hold that in this instant case the claimant cannot be availed of the exception of continuing injury as he is  no longer in employment and therefore the question as to the existence of an entitlement which comes periodically and has not ceased after 2009 is untenable. In the instant case, the claimant has never ever been paid the monthly salary so the issue of continuous of such is not tenable.

145.                      The apex Court of the land has interpreted the phrase ‘“continuance of damage or injury” to means the continuance or repeat of the act which caused the injury. It does not and cannot be said to mean the concomitant effect of the damage or injury. See INEC v. OGBADIBO LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ORS (2015) LPELR-24839 (SC). In view of the definition of the phrase ‘‘continuance of damage or injury’’ as provided by the Supreme Court, the question to be asked is, does the act complained of in this suit of continuous damage or injury? Since this suit was commenced via Complaint, to find answer to the question posed, the claims as contained in the Complaint and statement facts will be looked at to determine this issue. This is in line with principle of law that in determining issue of statute bar, it is the writ of summons and the statement of claim of the plaintiff (Respondent in this case) that the Court would look into. SEE OLAOSEBIKAN V WILLIAMS & ANR. (1996) 5 NWLR (449) 437. From the evidence before the court claimant’s dismissal was on 29/6/2009 when he received letter of dismissal, this means time for purpose of limitation will start running from 29/6/2009 and not when claimant was discharged and acquitted. This because the alleged injury i.e. dismissal did not continued as the Claimant want the Court to believe going by the definition of ‘’continuous damage or injury; as defined by the Supreme Court in the case cited above.

146.                     The claimant has also heavily relied on section 31(1) (C) of the Cross River State Limitation Law and submitted that his action is for claims/reliefs as a consequence of the defendant’s mistake in dismissing him on 29/6/2009 without waiting for the judgment of the Federal High Court and period of limitation shall not begin to run until the claimant has discovered the mistake.

147.                     Section 31 of Cross River State Limitation Law cap L14, on postponement of limitation period in case of fraud, concealment, or mistake, provides:-

31 (1) subject to subsection (d) , where in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this law, either

(a)  ……………………..

(b) …………………….

(c)  the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake,

the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake (as the case may be) or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.

148.                     After careful perusal of section 31 of the Cross River State Limitation Law, I do not see how claimant’s dismissal can be termed mistaken. There is nothing before the court to show that the dismissal was an unintentional error or done by accident. Since the claimant has not shown that the action, decision of the defendant in dismissing him from service was based on judgment that produces an unwanted or unintentional result he cannot not rely on mistake to have limitation law suspended or postponed in his case. The clock can only be suspended, if there is actual discovery of mistake which is absent in this case. Therefore, the clock for purposes of limitation law in this case has not paused.

149.                     There is nothing shown by the claimant to establish that his action was built upon a fundamental mistake of fact or law, to warrant finding that the limitation period will only begin once the mistake is discovered. The claimant has a duty to show both parties operated under a critical, hidden error that obscured the right to sue until its discovery.

150.                     In this case the claimant was fully aware he was dismissed on 29/6/2009, therefore the cause of action was clear and visible and started running on the day of dismissal. The decision of the claimant to wait for the conclusion of a criminal trial is a choice of convenience, not based on any legal disability caused by the defendant’s concealment, to ground reliance on any mistake.

151.                        From all I have been saying above the claimant has not convinced this  court that his case comes within any exceptions provided for in section 31 of the Cross River State Limitation Law for him to benefit from pausing of running period of limitation.

152.                      The claimant in arguing that as at 29/6/2009, his cause of action was not complete because of defendant’s report to police and his criminal trial at Federal High, is a clear misconception of cause of action. On 29/6/2009, the claimant becomes aware that the defendant has dismissed him from service as per exhibit G. He is also aware of existence of the defendant who is to be sued for the alleged wrongful dismissal and the claimant as the person to sue was also in existence as at that date, this means the cause of action was complete.

153.                      It is also to be made clear that the mere fact that a criminal trial of the claimant was on going in respect of the allegation of fraud, is not an excuse for the claimant not to have commenced his action within five years as provided by section 16 of the Limitation Law of Cross River State. Furthermore, in law an employer has unfettered right to discipline his employee by way of termination or dismissal notwithstanding any pendency of criminal prosecution. An employer can take administrative action to deal with his employee. See Osakwe v. Nigerian Paper Mill Ltd. (1998) 7 SCNJ 222 at 231 and 233 or (1998) 10 NWLR (Pt.568) 1 SC.

154.                      There is no need for the defendant after reporting claimant to police for investigation and prosecution to wait for completion of investigation and prosecution of claimant before a court of law. See the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Samson Babatunde Olarewaju v. Afribank Nigeria Plc (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt.731) 691, (2001) 7 SCNJ 493 at 510; AVRE vs. NIPOST (2014) LPELR-22629 (CA) pg. 36-38, paras. B – F.

155.                      In ARINZE Vs. F.B.N. LTD (2004) 12 NWLR (pt. 888) 663; (2004) LPELR-551 (SC) pg. 11, the Supreme Court of Nigeria per ONU, JSC held that: "As Wali, JSC pointed out at pages 214 - 215 in the latter case: 'It is not necessary, nor is it a requirement under Section 33 of the 1979 Constitution that before an employer summarily dismisses his employee from his services under the common law, the employee must be tried before a Court of law where the accusation against the employee is of gross misconduct involving dishonest bordering on criminality’’.

156.                     It is clear from the  cases cited above, an employer is not bound to wait for outcome of criminal trial before dismissing employee. The law is well settled and has been restated by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court that it is not an essential requirement that before an employer can summarily dismiss his employee, he must have been tried by a Court of law. See AJUZIE vs. FBN PLC (2016) LPELR-40459 (CA) Pg. 36, and OBIANWUNA vs. NEPA (2016) LPELR-40935 (CA) Pg. 21-23, where Court of Appeal  held that:

"...However, where fraud is alleged in a general sense such as in a contract of employment as in the instant case, it is not the same as fraud understood and cognizable under criminal law, therefore the employee need not be prosecuted in a criminal Court and found guilty before he can be dismissed by his employer..."

157.                      The prosecution of an employee before the law court is not a sine qua non to the exercise of the power of summary dismissal by an employer of his employee for gross misconduct. See Arinze v. F.B.N. Ltd. (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt888) 663; Yusuf v. UBN Ltd. (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt.457) 632; Okike v. L.P.D.C. (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt.949) 471.

158.                     It is also not necessary nor is it a requirement under section 36 of the 1999 Constitution that before an employer summarily dismisses his employee from his services under the common law, the employee must be tried before a court of law where the accusation against the employee borders on criminality. See Onwusukwu v. Civil Service Commission (2020) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1731) 179; Musa v. Fed. Min., Tourism, Culture Nat. Orientation (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1363) 556; U.B.N. v. Chinyere (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1203) 453.

159.                     Going by case law the claimant in this case was wrong to insist that the defendant ought to have waited for outcome of his prosecution before dismissing him from service, it is also not right by suggesting that limitation period cannot begin to run until after final determination of his prosecution for criminal offence. As pointed out earlier once there is person to sue and person  to be sued, as well as the wrongful act, waiting for decision on criminal matter is unnecessary and uncalled for. OMNIA VS DYKTRADE (2007) 7 SCNJ 228.

160.                     Having found out that all the reliefs in respect of wrongful dismissal and ancillary reliefs connected with wrongful dismissal have been caught up by section 16 of the Cross River State Limitation Law, I shall now proceed to consider the merit of the reliefs respecting pension and gratuity, since they are immune to Limitation law.

161.                       In reliefs 17, 18 and 19, the claimant is claiming payment of the sum of N79,285,803.03 (Seventy Nine Million Two Hundred and Eighty Five Thousand Eight Hundred and Three Naira, Three Kobo), as special damages, the said sum representing accumulated retirement savings pension fund entitlement for 16 years counting/calculating from 2009 to 2025, subject to further adjustment upon the production of documents on the salary review exercise done by the defendant between 2009 to 2025, including interest which claimant would have earned if the defendant had not wrongfully dismissed the claimant from its employment.

162.                     In the alternative, he is seeking for the sum of N13,891,735.68 (Thirteen Million Eight Hundred and Ninety One Thousand Seven Hundred and Thirty Five Naira, Sixty Eight Kobo), as special damages, the said sum representing the accumulative retirement savings pension fund entitlement for 16 years, counting/calculating from 2009 to 2025, which claimant would have been entitled to if defendant had not wrongfully dismissed him from their contract of employment and subject to further adjustment upon the production.

163.                      I note reliefs 17 and 18 are same, they are claiming one and same thing, so I consider them as one relief. While relief 19 stands as the alternative relief. In line with settled principle of law I shall first consider the main relief on pension, if it is established it will be granted, but if it is not proved I then consider the alternative relief.

164.                     Let me make it very clear that a claim for payment of pension contribution being monetary in nature is generally considered a claim for special damages. Special damages are those losses that are quantifiable, ascertainable, and directly attributable to the breach of contract or duty. Unlike general damages, which are presumed to flow from the wrong and are left to the discretion of the court, special damages must be specifically pleaded, particularized and strictly proved by the claimant.

165.                     The classification and principles governing special damages are primarily established and reinforced by judicial pronouncements from superior courts, particularly the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. These courts have consistently held that any claim for a specific, quantifiable financial loss must be treated as special damages. See NEKA B.B.B. MANUFACTURING CO. LTD v. ACB LTD (2004) LPELR-1982(SC) Pp. 7-8, Paras. E-A, and ARISONS TRADING & ENGINEERING CO LTD v. MILITARY GOVERNOR OF OGUN STATE & ORS (2009) LPELR-554(SC), these cases both emphasize the duty on a claimant who claims special damages to prove it strictly. These cases establish the fundamental principle that special damages are not awarded on mere conjecture but on concrete evidence. See also GTB PLC v. MOBCOM TECHNOLOGIES LTD (2023) LPELR-60658(CA), which provides guidance on how to plead and prove special damages, reiterating the necessity for specific pleading and strict proof. The case of OGUEJIFOR & ANOR v. UBAKASON (NIG) LTD (2022) LPELR-56783(CA), further clarifies the instance at which a claimant is said to have discharged the onus of proving special damages, reinforcing the high standard of proof required.

166.                     For the claimant to prove a claim for unpaid pension contributions, as with any claim for special damages, requires meticulous attention to pleading and evidence. The claimant must satisfy the court on two main fronts: the entitlement to the contributions and the exact amount due. This means the claimant must specifically plead the claim for unpaid pension contributions in the statement of facts. This involves stating the precise amount claimed and providing the particulars of how that amount is arrived at. For instance, the claimant should specify the period for which contributions were made, the monthly or annual salary on which the contributions were to be based, and the applicable percentage rate of contribution. Failure to specifically plead special damages will result in the court not awarding them, even if there is evidence to support the claim, as held in GTB PLC v. MOBCOM TECHNOLOGIES LTD (supra). The burden of proof lies squarely on the claimant. He must adduce credible and cogent evidence to substantiate every item of the special damages claimed. This typically involves: documentary evidence, such as including pension contributions; pay slips showing deductions (or lack thereof) for pension; statements from the pension fund administrator (PFA) indicating contributions received; If the claim involves interest, the basis for calculating such interest must also be provided. The claimant is also to give oral testimony to explain the documents and the circumstances surrounding the payment.

167.                     The claimant must present a clear calculation of the total amount owed. This is not merely stating a figure but demonstrating how that figure was arrived at. For example, if the contribution rate is 8% of basic salary, housing, and transport allowances, the claimant must show the monthly sum of these components and the 8% calculation for each month of default. The strict proof for special damages, means that the evidence must be direct, specific, and leave no room for speculation. As established in NEKA B.B.B. MANUFACTURING CO. LTD v. ACB LTD (supra) and ARISONS TRADING & ENGINEERING CO LTD v. MILITARY GOVERNOR OF OGUN STATE & ORS (supra), the claimant must prove not only that he suffered the loss but also the exact amount of that loss. If the evidence presented is clear, cogent, and unchallenged by the defendant, the court will accept it as sufficient proof.

168.                     Therefore, for the claimant to be granted his claim on pension he must discharge onus of proof with concrete credible admissible evidence. Since the claim is monetary it falls within the specie of relief termed special damages which by law must be specifically pleaded, particularized and proved strictly. See ONYIROH v ONYIROH (2019) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1695) 227, (Pp. 240, paras. C-D; 243, paras. C-D; 247, para. E).

169.                     Exhibit M, employee handbook which claimant relied for his claim on pension has provided in clause 13.2.2, that:

‘’The Bank operates a Contributory Pension Scheme for staff in line with the Pension Reform Act 2004’’ (now Pension Reform Act 2014).

170.                     By the provision of section 4 of the Pension Reform Act, 2014, which governs the contribution for the Contributory Pension Scheme in Nigeria, it requires a minimum total contribution of 18% of an employee's monthly emoluments, split into 10% by the employer and 8% by the employee. According to the claimant upon being employed he provided his retirement savings account with IBTC pension Managers, for his pension contributions, where the sum of N36,176.395 was being deducted from his salary and paid into the account on monthly basis. While the defendant is also required to contribute equal sum of N36,176.395, making the total sum to N72,352.79 in alignment with the provisions and terms of chapter 13, paragraph 13.2.2 of staff handbook exhibit M.

171.                       I note section 4 of Pension Reform Act, provides for 10% and 8% contribution and not equal contribution as shown by the pleadings and evidence of claimant.

172.                      From the pleadings and evidence in the witness statement on oath the claimant multiplied what he claimed to be his monthly pension by 12 and by 16, arriving at the sum of N13,891,735.68 as his pension entitlement for 16 years from 2009 to 2025, when this suit was commenced. With interest added the amount become the sum of N79,285,803.03. see paragraphs 43 – 47 of the statement of facts and paragraphs 44 – 48 of the witness statements on oath.

173.                      I have examined exhibits N and O there is nothing in these exhibits which were in respect of claimant’s pension remittances to show where the sum of N36,176.395 were remitted as claimant’s pension contribution deducted from his monthly salary. There is also equally no any entry of N36,176.395 remitted as defendant’s contribution to claimant pension funds with IBTC Pension Managers. The claimant failed to tender relevant evidence that will establish his salary and amount due. The claimant’s failure to tender his pay-slip is fatal to his case, as pay-slip would have shown items constituting what the claimant is entitled as his salary, what was deducted as pension, tax, union dues and any other deductions statutorily allowed from the gross salary. The reason being that what the claimant is entitled as his take home pay is the net pay after all deductions which are shown in pay-slip and not gross salary. The failure of the claimant to do that has left the court in the dark.

174.                     Furthermore, payment of equal sum into claimant’s retirement savings account is not in compliance with section 4 of the Pension Reform Act, 2014, which governs pension contribution, as the percentage of contribution is 10% and 8%, respectively.

175.                      It is even more surprising that the claim of the claimant on pension was for period when claimant was not in employment of the defendant i.e. 2009 to 2025. Vide exhibit G, claimant’s employment with the defendant was ended by dismissal, this means by operation of law claimant is no longer entitled to pension contribution from the defendant as he was no longer employee of the defendant. This position remains even where the dismissal was wrongful, as the law is that in master and servant relationship dismissal whether wrongful or proper has ended the relationship. Since there is no longer employment relationship between the claimant and the defendant as from 29/6/2009, the claimant is not entitled to any pension, as per his employment with the defendant. This is because, even where employer ended his employee’s service in breach of terms of the contract of employment the only remedy available for employee is not pension but damages for the said breach. Where dismissal is not in compliance with the terms and conditions, it is wrongful but certainly not null and void.

176.                     The law is trite where the termination of a contract of service is wrongful, the measure of damages the claimant would be entitled to would be salaries for the length of time during which notice of the termination would have been given in accordance with the contract of employment. Also, the claimant would be paid other legitimate entitlements due to him at the time the employment was brought to an end. As it is not the business of the court to force a willing employee on an unwilling employer, except with respect to a contract with statutory flavour, which is not the case here. Thus, an employee whose employment has been dispensed with by his employer cannot claim for pension when he is no longer on salary as he was no longer in service. By claiming pension contribution for period he was not in service, the claimant is treating his employment as still subsisting, that cannot be. See OBOT V CBN (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt.310) 140; YUSUF v. U.B.N. Plc (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 457) 632; OLARENWAJU v. AFRIBANK PLC (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 731) 691; U.B.N. v. CHINYERE (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt.1203) 453.

177.                      It is to be noted that in a relationship of master and servant parties are at liberty to enter and exit the relationship at will without let or hindrance. Even where there is non-compliance with rules and regulations court cannot compel compliance. See KATTO V CBN (1999) 5 SCNJ 1; IDONIBOYE-OBU V NNPC (2003) 1 SCNJ 87.

178.                     It is clear to me that the claimant has not proved entitlement to payment of pension from 2009 to 2025, when he was no longer in service of the defendant. The court would have entertained his pension claim if the claim is based on earned pension and not unearned as special damages. Even, if court had found the dismissal wrongful it will not change anything regarding pension as court is not permitted to order reinstatement in cases of master and servant, nor can the employment be deemed continuous.

179.                     In view of the foregoing exposition of the law and reasons given, I hereby dismissed reliefs 17, 18 and 19, for failure of claimant to prove entitlement to same.

180.                     Reliefs 22 and 23 are for gratuity the claimant is claiming the sum of N121,951,785.06 as gratuity he would have been entitled to for 18 years of continuous service from 2007 to 2025, if claimant had not wrongfully dismissed claimant from its service. According to the claimant the amount being claimed is computed based on last salary of the claimant. See paragraphs 55 – 60 of the statement of fac ts and paragraphs 56 – 61 of the witness statement on oath.

181.                       It is clear from the pleadings and evidence that, the claimant’s claim included period when he was not in service of the claimant. The claimant stated the amount being claimed is what he would have been entitled to if not because of his dismissal.

182.                     Gratuity is an entitlement which is granted by terms and conditions of service. The claimant place reliance on exhibit M staff handbook, he specifically relied on Clause 13.2.1(ii) of Chapter 13 of staff handbook. 

183.                      The provision of clause 13.2.1 on gratuity payment provide;

As a staff of Sterling Bank you may benefit from the Bank’s non-contributory Gratuity Scheme.

In order to be eligible for gratuity payments, you would have spent a minimum of five years in the Bank’s employment. Your gratuity payment would be computed on the basis of your Total Monthly Emolument for each completed year of service.

You will however not be entitled to any gratuity benefit if you are dismissed from service or if you resign in order to pre-empt dismissal.

184.                     Furthermore, clause 13.3.4 of exhibit M, on Summary Dismissal, provides:

Fraud, attempted fraud and other forms of gross misconduct could earn you a summary dismissal from the Bank’s employment. In event of this happening, you will be required to settle all indebtedness to the Bank on exit. AII Bank property in the staff’s possession must be returned immediately.

(ii)    You will only be entitled to your earned salary for the month, and your 13^th month and leave allowances computed on a pro-rata basis……’’

185.                     It is clear from the above provisions of Employee Handbook that for an employee of the defendant like the claimant in this suit to be entitled to gratuity he must have served the defendant for a period of not less than 5 years. And if the employee was summarily dismissed, he forfeits gratuity no matter the number of years served.

186.                     In this case from the evidence before the court the claimant served from 2007 to 29/6/2009, when he was dismissed from service this clearly shows that his service was less than three years, see exhibits A and G, in the circumstance he is not entitled to any gratuity. Even if claimant has served for the minimum period of five years to qualify for gratuity his dismissal as per exhibit G, has deprived him of such entitlement to gratuity.

187.                     In this case the claimant claiming for gratuity despite having been dismissed from service seem to be claiming that he is still in service i.e. his service is continuous despite his dismissal. The law as regarding master and servant is that once an employee is dismissed or have his contract of service terminated his dismissal termination even if wrongful subsist. This means that even where court found dismissal wrongful claimant cannot be allowed to treat his employment as if it did not happen. This means the claimant service has ended on 29/6/2009, vide exhibit G and by arithmetical calculation from 2007 – 2009, is not up to 5 years to make him eligible for gratuity.

188.                     Therefore, the claim of the claimant for gratuity failed, same is hereby dismissed. For once employee is dismissed, he lost right to gratuity. It is only those who have ceased to be employees on grounds of voluntary resignation, retirement, redundancy or on attainment of retirement age or compulsorily retired that can be eligible for gratuity. Therefore, the claimant having been dismissed from service as per exhibit G is not entitled to any gratuity payment. In the circumstances reliefs 22 and 23 failed they are hereby dismissed.

189.                     From the foregoing, the claim of the claimant failed, as the reliefs on wrongful dismissal, payment of special damages predicated on what would have been earned if not because of wrongful dismissal have been caught by section 16 of Cross River State Limitation Law, all those reliefs which I have earlier identified and enumerated in this judgment bordering on wrongful dismissal are hereby dismissed for being statute barred. The reliefs bordering on pension and gratuity have equally failed on the merit, as they were not based on earned entitlements, they are equally hereby dismissed and the entire case is dismissed for lacking in merit.

190.                     The above findings have brought to an end the life span of this case, but this court being court of first instance, will not stop at that, therefore I shall proceed to consider the merit of the reliefs caught by limitation, in case there is appeal, the court of appeal will have the benefit of having the views of this court on those reliefs. The reliefs are; reliefs 1 – 16, 20 - 21, 24 – 26, having been predicated on wrongful dismissal.

191.                       I shall start consideration on merit with reliefs, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, which are seeking for declaration. The law is trite in a claim for declaratory reliefs, the claimant must prove his entitlement thereto, by cogent and credible evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence, if any. Indeed, a declaratory relief will not be granted on the basis of an admission by the adverse party. See Dumez Nig. Ltd. v. Nwakhoba (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 361;  Bello v. Eweka (1981) 1 SC 63 (Reprint); Emenike v. P.D.P. (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt.1315) 556; Matonmi v. Dada (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt.1323) 319; Mohammed v. Wammako (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 573.

192.                     The claimant’s case was built around wrongful dismissal. According to the claimant he was alleged to had been involved in fraud against the defendant. consequently, the defendant reported him to the police he was arrested and detained, after spending two weeks in police custody he was released on bail. However, on visiting the police in fulfilment of bail conditions he was re-arrested by another set of police officers from the Force Headquarters and was detained. Upon his second release from detention, he was issued with suspension letter and subsequently with letter of dismissal. Exhibits F and G, respectively. The suspension and dismissal were without any query issued to the claimant or appearing before disciplinary committee as provided by the handbook exhibit M.

193.                     The defendant in their part sought to impugned exhibit M, due to absence of signature, claiming that the claimant who had not signed exhibit M, cannot rely on it. I have given deep consideration to the argument of the parties on the efficacy of exhibit M. It my view that exhibit M, being staff Handbook which defendant had not denied is applicable to the claimant’s case notwithstanding non signing by the claimant. The objection of the defendant to exhibit M, cannot hold water, when claimant has admitted claimant’s being her former employee. The defendant did not object to exhibit M when it was tendered in evidence. The defendant has not also disputed the authenticity of the said exhibit as a forgery. The defendant seems to have misconceived exhibit M, in that it is not the contract of employment between the claimant and the defendant. Exhibit M is terms and conditions of service for all employees of the defendant. It is also not a special terms peculiar to claimant. Exhibit A, letter of employment is the basis of the relationship between the claimant and the defendant.

194.                    The claimant’s grouse in this case is that he was summarily dismissed without query or hearing, this has violated his right to be heard before being dismissed. The defendant has not adduced any evidence to show claimant was queried or given opportunity to defend the allegations levelled against him based on which he was dismissed. The law is trite both in employment with statutory flavour or in master servant relationship, employer has unfettered right to disciplined his staff by way of summary dismissal. However, for justification for summary dismissal the employer defendant in this case must show that the servant claimant in this case was given opportunity to react to the allegations against him i.e. the employer must comply with doctrine of natural justice audi alterem partem’.

195.                     In  PATRICK ZIIDEEH v. RIVERS STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2007) LPELR-3544(SC), the Supreme Court stated thus:-

‘’...it is now firmly settled that in statutory employment, just as in private employment, an employer can summarily dismiss the servant in all cases of gross misconduct provided of course, the employee is given the opportunity of fair hearing…... See the recent case of Francis Arinze v. First Bank of Nig. Ltd. (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 888) 663; (2004) 5 SCNJ 183; (2004) 5 S.C. (Pt. 1) 160; (2004) 5 S.C. 35." Per IKECHI FRANCIS OGBUAGU, JSC (Pp. 28-29, paras. F-A).

196.                     Therefore, to satisfy the rule of natural justice and fair hearing, a person likely to be affected directly by disciplinary proceeding must be given adequate notice of the allegation against him to afford him opportunity for representation in his own defence. The complaint against him must not necessarily be drafted in the form of a formal charge. It is sufficient if the complaint, as formulated, conveys to him the nature of accusation against him. In the case at hand the claimant was issued with exhibit G, without issuing him with a query or a hearing giving him opportunity to exonerate himself. The failure by the defendant to query or make claimant appear before disciplinary committee has rendered dismissal of the claimant wrongful. However, this finding does not mean that the claimant’s employment remains intact or subsisting, the dismissal though wrongful has ended the relationship and the claimant’s remedy is in damages. See KATTO V CBN (supra) and SKYE BANK PLC V ADEGUN (supra) relied by the claimant.

197.                     The finding that claimant’s employment was wrongly dismissed goes to establish that the report made to CBN, for blacklisting of claimant based on the claimant’s wrongful dismissal cannot stand. The defendant is hereby ordered to withdraw the said letter sent to CBN. However, since the employment of the claimant in the eye of the law stands despite being declared wrongful, the claimant cannot be granted an order for mandating the defendant to withdraw same as the remedy available for wrongful dismissal is for damages.

198.                    The claimant is also not entitled to an order for the defendant to accept his letter of resignation. The reason being that in master and servant relationship parties are free to enter and exit the relationship, consequently, to order acceptance of resignation will interfere with parties free will, since defendant has exercised its right though wrongful court cannot arm twist defendant on its choice of way to end the relationship, the path taken by defendant has consequences that is payment of damages.

199.                    Reliefs 16, 13 and 14, are not grantable because they are claim for period the claimant did not serve. The claimant by making these claims is in a way saying he is still in service when in law his employment relationship with the defendant has ended on 29/6/2009 with exhibit G, letter dismissing him from service.

200.                   Reliefs 15 and 16, are respecting status car, clause 13.5,1 of exhibit M, provides;-

(i)   On separation from the Bank’s employment, the Bank reserves the right to sell your official status car to you. This will be sold at the higher of Net Book Value of the vehicle or l0% of its cost. It is Executive Management’s prerogative to consider any requests for discounts.

(ii)      However, in the case of a summary dismissal, you will not be eligible for the sale option.

(iii) In Sterling Bank, cars are amortized over a period of 4 years.  Ownership of the car will automatically revert to you if you remain in the Bank’s employment for the duration of the amortization at 10% of the original cost.

201.                     It is clear from the above lucid provisions of the employees handbook exhibit M, that status car, is only entitlement when employee of the defendant is still in service , but when there is separation the defendant reserves the right to sell the status car to the employee the official status car at the higher or Net book value of the vehicle or at 10% of its cost and the employee must apply to buy the said status car after which the executive management will consider the request. It is clear from the provisions of the handbook quoted above that the status car is not an entitlement that an employee that has left service can lay a claim on. The claimant has woefully failed to prove entitlement to grant of reliefs 15 and 16, they are hereby refused.

202.                    Reliefs 24 and 25, are for general damages and aggravated damages. I have thoroughly, considered the entirety of the facts of this case as provided by the parties in their processes. As pointed out earlier in this judgment where there is finding of wrongful dismissal of a contract of service, the measure of damages the claimant would be entitled to would be salaries for the length of time during which notice of the termination would have been given in accordance with the contract of employment. Also, the claimant would be paid other legitimate entitlements due to him at the time the employment was brought to an end i.e. all earnings prior to dismissal. See UDEGBUNAM V FCDA (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt.829) 487; UNDERWATER ENGR. CO. LTD C DUBEFON (1995) 6 NWLR (PT.400) 156. Vide exhibits A and M, either party has right to end the relationship by giving one month notice or payment of one month salary in lieu of notice. The claimant is therefore, entitled to be paid one month salary in lieu of notice.

203.                    On the other claim for damages, the claimant heavily relied on the case of SKYE BANK PLC V ADEGUN (supra) in justification of his claim for heavy damages to be granted. From the facts as disclosed by the parties, the claimant was never made to appear before disciplinary committee and his complaint borders on absence of according him fair hearing before his dismissal. By the decision in the case of BRITISH AIRWAYS V MAKANJUOLA (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt.311) 276, it was held that the quantum of damages recoverable by an employee depends on whether the wrongful separation was as a result of failure to give the required notice or as a result of an alleged malpractice and if the former, the quantum of damages may be the employee’s salary in lieu of notice, but if the latter then since such a termination/dismissal carries with it some stigma on the character of the employee, he shall be entitled to substantial damages far beyond payment of salary in lieu of notice.

204.                   I have taken into consideration the principles enunciated in the case of SKYE BANK PLC V ADEGUN (supra), as well the content of exhibit H, the judgment of Federal High Court , which clearly shows that the discharge and acquittal of the claimant was not based on a full blown trial, in the circumstance I hereby award the claimant the sum of N1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) as damages for his wrongful dismissal.

205.                    Let me made it clear that the earlier dismissal of this case based on Cross River State Limitation Law, which rendered all reliefs on wrongful dismissal statute barred and dismissal on merit of all the reliefs on pension and gratuity, still stands. As the subsequent consideration and findings regarding the merit of reliefs based on wrongful dismissal was in keeping with abidance with admonition of the supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, to the effect that courts should determined all issues submitted for resolution even where a preliminary issue can dispose of a case. See FABUNMI V UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN (2006) (2026) 11 NWLR (Pt. 2050) 61; SEA TRUCKS LTD V PAYNE (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 514.

206.                   Before closing Chapters of this judgment, let me advise counsel to always be circumspect in preparing processes for filing before the court, so as to avoid making mistake in citation or not providing citation at all to authorities relied on in address. This is against the lamentation of counsel for the defendant regarding in accuracy of citation of some cases in the address of counsel for the defendant.

207.                    On issue 3, formulated by counsel for the claimant challenging the competency of DW1, to give evidence in this suit. I reserved my comment till end of the judgment. Having regards , to the facts and law governing this suit, I consider the issue not significant to have any substantial impact on the case on the case. Considering the fact that in law burden of proof is on the claimant who made assertions to prove his assertions before burden shift on the defendant.

208.                   The defendant in this case is an artificial person, that in law can only acts through its employees and officers. DW1 being employee of the defendant is competent to testify on its behalf.

209.                   From all I have been saying above, the claimant in this case has woefully failed to establish entitlement to any of the reliefs sought in the circumstance I hereby dismissed his case for lacking in merit.

210.                     I make no order as to cost. Parties to bear their respective costs.

211.                       Judgment is hereby by entered accordingly.

 

 

 

Sanusi Kado,

Judge.

REPRESENTATION:

Adongoi Godgift Robert, Esq; for the claimant.

V. N. Nwankwo, Esq; for the defendant.