IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT PORT HARCOURT.

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HONOURABLE JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR Ph.D.

Dated: 8^th Day of September, 2026                    

SUIT NO: NICN/PH/141/2022

 

 

BETWEEN:

 

MR. LOT SAMUEL AKINTOYE------------------------------CLAIMANT

AND

UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC. ------------------------DEFENDANT

 

REPRESENTATION:

I. R. Ogbowu for the Claimant.

Okey Wali, SAN, with D. I. Onubu and E. Imegi for the Defendant.

 

 

JUDGEMENT

This suit was commenced by a General Form of Complaint filed on 11^th October, 2022, together with a Verifying Affidavit, Statement of Facts, List of Witnesses, Witness Statements on Oath, List of Documents and copies of the documents intended to be relied upon at trial.

 

By the Statement of Facts, the Claimant seeks the following reliefs against the Defendant:

a.     A DECLARATION that the termination of the Claimant’s employment by the Defendant on the 17^th of October, 2017 without a valid reason and without any prior notice of termination of his employment nor salary in lieu of notice is wrongful, irregular, unfair, fraudulent, unlawful and an unfair labour practice.

 

b.    A DECLARATION that the Defendant’s acts of punishing the Claimant for the failure of the Defendant’s customer to repay a loan/overdraft by suspending the Claimant indefinitely without the Defendant subjecting the Claimant to any Disciplinary Committee trial in violation of the terms of the said suspensions, withholding the Claimant’s  salaries pending the full recovery of the said loan/overdraft and compelling the Claimant to ensure that the said customer repays the loan/overdraft as a condition for the payment of the Claimant’s withheld salaries until the wrongful termination of the Claimant’s employment on the 17^th of October, 2017 by the reason of which termination of employment the Defendant has refused to pay to the Claimant his withheld salaries till date are wrongful, irregular, fraudulent, unlawful, an unfair labour practice and a breach of the Claimant’s fundamental Rights to fair hearing and dignity of his person.

 

c.     A DECLARATION that the Defendant’s act of denying the Claimant till date of his salary for the 17 (Seventeen) days for which he worked for the Defendant in the month of October, 2017 is wrongful, irregular, fraudulent, unlawful and an unfair labour practice and a breach of the Claimant’s fundamental Rights to dignity of his person.

 

d.    AN ORDER of this honourable court directing the Defendant to immediately pay to the Claimant the sum of N 3, 592,906.20 (Three Million, Five Hundred and Ninety-Two Thousand, Nine Hundred And Six Naira, Twenty Kobo) being the Claimant’s arrears of salary as at the date and time of the termination of his employment.

 

e.     The sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) as General, Special and Exemplary Damages in favour of the Claimant and against the Defendant for the defendant’s reckless and fraudulent actions of wrongfully terminating the Claimant’s employment, unfair labour practices and breach of the Claimant’s fundamental rights to fair hearing and dignity of his person.

 

f.       The sum of N1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) in favour of the Claimant and against the Defendant being the cost of litigation of this suit.

 

g.     Post judgment interest on the judgment sum in this suit at the rate of 21 % per annum from the date of the Judgment until same is fully liquidated.

 

h.    AND ANY OTHER ORDER(S) as this honourable court may deem fit to make in the circumstance of this suit.

 

The Defendant, in response to the claims of the Claimant, filed its Statement of Defence on 7th July, 2023, together with a List of Witnesses, Witness Statement on Oath, List of Documents and copies of the documents intended to be relied upon at trial.

 

The Claimant subsequently filed a Reply to the Statement of Defence on 18th October, 2023.

 

Trial commenced on 2nd December, 2024, with the Claimant opening his case by presenting one Babafemi Akenroye as his sole witness. The witness testified as CW1 and adopted his Witness Statements on Oath, marked as C1(a) and C1(b).

 

Through CW1, sixteen (16) documents were tendered and admitted in evidence as Exhibits C2–C17. Exhibits C2, C6, C7, C8, C16 and C17 were, however, admitted under protest.

 

Arising from the Statement of Facts and the Witness Statements on Oath, the case of the Claimant is that he was both a shareholder and an employee of the Defendant, having been employed by the Defendant in September 2006 until his employment was terminated on 17th October, 2017 on the ground of alleged gross misconduct.

The Claimant maintained that, on two separate occasions, he was placed on suspension and initially paid half salary, after which the payment of his salary was completely stopped. He further contended that he was denied fair hearing in the disciplinary processes leading to the sanctions imposed upon him.

 

According to the Claimant, following a directive by the Defendant to review customers who qualified for credit facilities, one Teslat Global Resources Ltd was granted a loan in the sum of ?20,000,000.00. The Claimant stated that when the company was suspected of diverting the loan, he was placed on suspension with effect from 15th September, 2015, with half of his salary withheld. He was allegedly directed to ensure the recovery of the loan within three months, failing which the payment of his salary would cease. He was also required to report to the office periodically to give progress reports on the recovery of the facility.

 

The Claimant further stated that from December 2015 to June 2016, no salary was paid to him. He added that the repayment terms of the facility were subsequently renegotiated between the Defendant and its customer, but when the customer again failed to repay in accordance with the renegotiated terms, the Claimant was placed on another suspension in October 2016.

 

The Claimant also asserted that the Defendant instituted an action against its debtor and obtained judgment in its favour for recovery of the outstanding indebtedness. He contended, however, that the Defendant elected not to enforce the judgment on the ground that a representative of the debtor had undertaken to make payment.

 

The Claimant further narrated an incident involving a customer who intended to make a deposit but whose National Identification Number was yet to be verified. According to him, the customer left the sum of ?120,000.00 with him pending completion of the verification process. The incident subsequently led to the issuance of a query against him and, eventually, the termination of his employment on 17th October, 2017.

 

The Claimant maintained that his employment was terminated without prior notice and without payment of salary in lieu of notice.

 

He further averred that sometime in May 2021, the Defendant caused his savings account maintained with Guaranty Trust Bank, bearing Account No. 0264574755, to be frozen, and also froze his current account maintained with the Defendant, bearing Account No. 1006105760.

 

Under cross-examination, CW1 testified that he is a legal practitioner who was called to the Nigerian Bar in 2008 and presently practices law in his own firm. He admitted that he had never worked with the Defendant and, therefore, had no personal knowledge of the internal operations of the Defendant except for information disclosed to him by the Claimant in 2021. CW1 further admitted that the suit was instituted in 2022 and that he had written letters to the Defendant upon the instructions of the Claimant, which letters were admitted in evidence. CW1 maintained that the Claimant was suspended because the Defendant held him responsible for the failure of a customer to repay a loan which was secured by collateral.

 

He further testified that the Claimant’s employment was terminated following an incident involving an illiterate customer who visited the Defendant to open an account. According to CW1, the verification of the customer’s National Identification Number took about ten days, during which period the customer left the sum of ?120,000.00 with the Claimant pending completion of the verification.

CW1, however, admitted under cross-examination that he was not present when the incident occurred.

 

Upon the discharge of CW1, the Claimant closed his case. The Defendant thereafter opened its defence by presenting one witness, Emmanuel Oluyori, who testified as DW1. He adopted his Witness Statement on Oath, marked as D1.

 

Through DW1, thirteen (13) documents were tendered and admitted in evidence as Exhibits D2–D14, with Exhibits D2, D4, D5 and D14 admitted under protest.

 

Arising from the Statement of Defence and the Witness Statement on Oath, the case of the Defendant is that the Claimant was its employee from 20th September, 2006 until 17th October, 2017, when he was dismissed from its employment after a Disciplinary Committee, before which the Claimant appeared, found him culpable of cash suppression involving the sum of ?120,000.00.

 

The Defendant further maintained that the Claimant was not diligent in the discharge of his duties and had, in the course of his employment, been subjected to several suspensions. According to the Defendant, by virtue of its Group HR Disciplinary Process and Sanctions Policy, a member of staff placed on suspension is entitled to 50% of his remuneration for the first three (3) months of the suspension, while any suspension extending beyond three months attracts zero pay.

 

The Defendant also stated that following the Claimant’s appeal against his dismissal, a Corporate Office Disciplinary Committee was constituted and sat on 27th October, 2017, with the Claimant in attendance. According to the Defendant, the Committee, upon reconsideration of the matter, again found the Claimant culpable of cash suppression. Consequently ,the defendant denied violating the Claimant’s right to fair hearing.

 

With respect to the restriction placed on the Claimant’s accounts, the Defendant maintained that it is regulated by the Regulatory Framework for Bank Verification Number (BVN) Operations and Watch-List for the Nigerian Banking Industry, referenced BPS/DIR/GEN/CIR/04/010 and dated 18th October, 2017. The Defendant stated that the regulatory framework requires banks to render monthly reports on fraud and forgery to the Central Bank of Nigeria and that, pursuant thereto, it reported the Claimant’s case of cash suppression to the CBN for the purpose of placing his BVN on the watch-list.

 

The Defendant accordingly denied the entirety of the Claimant’s claims.

 

Under cross-examination, DW1 admitted that he knew one Mr. Eniola Alao as a colleague, but stated that he was unaware whether the said Mr. Alao testified before the Disciplinary Committee. He equally stated that he was not aware that any customer had informed Mr. Alao that the Claimant did defraud him.

 

DW1 further testified that Ado Lawal was not called as a witness before the Defendant’s internal disciplinary panel because he was a customer and, according to him, it was inconsistent with the Defendant’s internal process to invite customers to testify as witnesses. He nevertheless stated that the investigative team contacted the customer, who confirmed that he had given the Claimant the sum of ?120,000.00 which ought to have been deposited into a sundry account. DW1 admitted that the loan granted to Ajasin University was cash-collateralized. He, however, stated that he was unaware whether the Defendant had obtained judgment against any of the companies to which it had granted a loan or whether any steps had been taken to enforce such judgment. DW1 further admitted that the Claimant was placed on 50% salary while on suspension following the failure of Teslat Global Resources Ltd to repay its loan. He added that senior employees were permitted to exercise discretion in the performance of their duties, but that such discretion must be exercised within the confines of the Defendant’s policy.

 

DW1 maintained that the allegation against the Claimant was one of fraud, specifically cash suppression. He further stated that the composition and proceedings of a Disciplinary Committee may vary from case to case and confirmed that the Committee which considered the Claimant’s case had a Secretary. He was, however, unaware whether the Claimant was ever charged before any court in respect of the allegation.

 

Upon the discharge of DW1, the Defendant closed its case and the matter was adjourned for adoption of Final Written Addresses.

 

The Defendant thereafter filed its Final Written Address on the 1^st day of April, 2026. Arising therefrom, learned counsel for the Defendant formulated three issues for determination, namely:

 

1.       WHETHER THE EVIDENCE OF CW1, WHO LACKS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE ALLEGED WRONGFUL DISMISSAL, IS HEARSAY AND THEREFORE INCAPABLE OF SUSTAINING THE CLAIMANT’S CASE.

 

2.     WHETHER HAVING REGARD TO THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE BEFORE THIS HONOURABLE COURT, THE CLAIMANT’S DISMISSAL WAS LAWFUL AND JUSTIFIED.

 

3.     WHETHER FROM THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE BEFORE THIS COURT, THE CLAIMANT HAS PROVED HIS CASE TO BE ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS SOUGHT. 

 

In arguing issue one, counsel cited Sections 37, 38 and 126 of the Evidence Act 2011 to contend that oral evidence must, in all cases, be direct; and where it is the opinion of any body, it must be the testimony of such person who holds that opinion. Counsel cited the cases of IMPACT SOLUTIONS LTD. V. INT’L BREWERIES PLC (2018) 16 NWLR (PT. 1645) 377, P. 400, PARA. D and OMISORE V. AREGBESOLA (2015) 15 NWLR (PT. 1482) 205, P. 323, PARA. E while referring to the answer of CW1 during cross examination to contend that competency to testify is not a private arrangement. Counsel also posited that the Claimant’s case of residing in USA does not come within the exceptions provided is section 39 of the Evidence Act. 

 

Counsel submitted that the evidence of CW1 has fallen short of being admissible while adding that the conduct of CW1 standing to testify despite being a legal practitioner who has acted in such capacity to the Claimant and therefore raises ethical issues. Counsel cited Rules 20 (1), (3) and (4) (a) of the Rules of professional Conduct 2023.

 

In arguing issue two, counsel foremost submitted that the dismissal of the Claimant from the employment of the Defendant was both lawful and justified, having been carried out in compliance with the applicable law, the terms of employment of the Claimant and the principles of fair hearing. 

 

Counsel cited the case of DARAMOLA V. F.U.T., YOLA (2026) 4 NWLR (PT. 2033) 181, P. 204, PARA. F, P. 205 PARA. G on what is required to effect a dismissal before positing that exhibit D3 reflects the antecedent to the Claimant’s dismissal. 

Counsel argued that the conduct of the Claimant violated Section 15 of the Defendant’s Group HR Disciplinary Process and Sanctions Policy which provides for categories of offence, and attract the penalty of dismissal, of which the Claimant’s offence also falls under the provision of Section 15.1.3 of the Defendant’s Sanction Policy, which provides for ‘Unauthorized alteration of instruments and vouchers; Suppression of vouchers, cash, cheques, and deposit.

 

Counsel narrated that in establishing that the Defendant followed due process and ensured that the Claimant was afforded a fair hearing, DW1 testified and tendered Exhibit D7 (electronic mail correspondence dated 22^nd, 2017, being a query sent to the Claimant, a reminder to answer the query, and the Claimant’s response to the query). By the said Exhibit D7, which was uncontroverted, the Defendant informed the Claimant of the allegation of Cash Suppression against him and afforded the Claimant the opportunity to respond. 

 

Counsel added that the Claimant was thereafter brought before the Regional Office Disciplinary Committee of the Defendant for the alleged case of Cash Suppression, and after findings were made, it was established that the Claimant was guilty of cash suppression of the deposit made by a customer of the Defendant for 10 days while the Disciplinary Committee recommended the dismissal of the Claimant in line with Section 15 (15.1.3) and Section 17 (17.3.2) (ix) of the Defendant’s Group HR Disciplinary Process Sanctions Policy “Exhibit D8”. 

 

Counsel further submitted that the recommendation of the Defendant’s Regional Disciplinary Committee was approved by the Defendant’s Management and consequently, the Claimant was dismissed and the terms of his dismissal is as evidenced in Exhibit D10.

 

Counsel added that the Claimant also exercised his right of appeal to the Defendant’s Corporate Office Disciplinary Committee, which the Claimant attended on the 27^th October, 2017 and following which the Defendant’s Corporate Office Disciplinary Committee approved the decision of the Regional Disciplinary Committee and the decision was communicated to the Claimant as evidenced by Exhibit D11 dated 1^st November, 2017. 

 

Counsel argued that having dismissed the Claimant from employment, he is not entitled to notice nor salary in lieu of notice and cited the cases of U.B.N. PLC V. SOARES (2012) 11 NWLR (PT. 1312) 550; EKUNOLA V. C.B.N. (2013) 15 NWLR (PT. 1377) 224 P.269, PARAS. B.

 

Counsel also argued that Article 7 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No 158 (1982) which Claimant intends to rely on is inapplicable having given the Claimant sufficient opportunity and fair hearing. Counsel added that it is an established principle of employment law that the prosecution of an employee before the law court is not a sine qua nonto the exercise of the power of dismissal of an employee for gross misconduct and cited the cases of MUSA V. FED. MIN., TOURISM, CULTURE, NAT. ORIENTATION (2013) 10 NWLR (PT. 1363) 556 P. 584, PARA. E-F.; A. G., KWARA STATE V. OJULARI (2007) 1 NWLR (PT. 1016) 551.

 

In arguing issue three, counsel posited that the position of the law is that the standard of proof in civil matters is on the preponderance of evidence, which is sometimes used as a balance of probability. Counsel cited the case of MAGAJI V. A.P.C. (2024) 1 NWLR (PT. 1918) 1, P. 39, PARAS. B-C.

 

Counsel submitted that the entirety of the Claimant’s reliefs, particularly the claims for declaration, damages, and cost of action are fundamentally anchored on the allegation that his dismissal by the Defendant was wrongful and unfair. Counsel posited thereon that the Claimant having sought for declaratory relief, the burden is on him to discharge.

 

Counsel argued that in the instant case, the Claimant has failed to discharge this burden, having not established any breach of the contract of employment or any wrongful act on the part of the Defendant pursuant to any of the terms of his employment. Counsel added that the Claimant ought to have pleaded the terms of his employment and thereafter show the Honourable Court how his dismissal was a breach of any of the terms of his employment. Counsel cited the case of OVIVIE V. DELTA STEEL CO. LTD. (2023) 14 NWLR (PT. 1904) 203, PP. 227, PARA. H.

 

Counsel reiterated the foregoing argument before adding that the Claimant’s suspensions were in line with Section 13.4 of the Defendant’s Group HR Disciplinary and sanction policy (Exhibit 8) and that the Claimant failed to adduce evidence in support of the narration that his salary for 17 days in October was not paid. 

With regards to claim for N50, 000, 000. 00 as general damages, counsel contended that the measure of damages, where wrongful termination is established, is strictly limited to what the employee would have earned during the period of notice, however, where the dismissal is justified on grounds of gross misconduct, no damages are payable.

 

With regards to the Claimant’s claim for the payment of N 3,592, 906. 20 (Three Million, Five Hundred and Ninety-Two Thousand, Nine Hundred and Sixty Naira, Twenty Kobo), being arrears of salary at the date and time of his dismissal of his appointment, counsel contended that  the Defendant paid the Claimant his due salary during the period of suspension in line with the terms of the Defendant’s Group HR Disciplinary Process Sanctions Policy “Exhibit D8”, and the payment pursuant to Exhibit D8 is reflected in the Claimant’s Statement of account “Exhibits D14A, D14 B and D14C”.

 

With regards to claim for cost, counsel argued that the cost of litigation as sought by the Claimant, assuming but not conceding that he is entitled to it, ought to have been itemized in details and supported by proof to enable a just assessment.

 

Counsel added that the Claimant’s dismissal arose directly from his act of cash suppression, a serious breach of trust and gross misconduct clearly established by the terms of the contract between the Claimant and the Defendant, and to grant any of the reliefs sought would amount to rewarding misconduct and undermining discipline within the banking sector.

 

Counsel concluded by urging this Court to dismiss all the claims of the Claimant, having failed to prove them and award cost in favour of the Defendant.

 

Upon the foregoing Claimant filed his address on the 11^th of June, 2026 and arising therefrom, counsel to the Claimant, I.R. Ogbowu Esq. formulated four issues for determination as follows        ;

 

1.       Whether from the totality of the pleadings and evidence before this honourable court and by the International Best Practices and Standards, the dismissal of the Claimant from the Defendant’s   employment on the 17^th day of October, 2017, automatically extinguishes the Claimant’s right to demand and receive salaries which were earned and due but were withheld by the Defendant before the dismissal as well as all existing debts owed the Claimant by the Defendant?

 

2.     Whether from the totality of the pleadings and evidence before this honourable court and by the International Best Practices and Standards, the Claimant has established his claims that the Defendant subjected him to the Defendant’s unfair labour practices during the period of his employment?

 

3.     Whether from the totality of the pleadings and evidence before this honourable court and by the International Best Practices and Standards, the dismissal of the Claimant from the Defendant’s employment on the 17^th day of October, 2017 is wrongful and without an objectively valid reason?

 

4.     Whether from the totality of the pleadings and evidence before this honourable court and by the International Best Practices and Standards, the Claimant is entitled to the favourable judgment of this honourable court as per the Claimant’s Claim in this suit? 

 

In arguing issue one, counsel cited that case of NATURAL GAS SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION (PENGASSAN) vs. SCHLUMBERGER ANADRILL NIGERIA LIMITED

(2008) 11 N.L.L.R (PT. 29) 164 to contend that it is trite that unfair labour practice is any workplace act, omission or employment condition that violates labour laws, disregards human rights or deviates from international best practices and equity.

 

Counsel also argued that by Section 5 (1) and (7) of the Labour Act LFN 2004 no employer shall make any deductions from the Salary of an employee unless with the written consent of a labourofficer, and, any deduction so made in a month shall not exceed one third of the salary of the employee for the said month. 

 

Counsel contended that Recovery Suspension has been held to be an unfair labour practice in the banking industry in Nigeria, citing the case of OKEKE IFEANYI CHUKWUNONSO VS. ECOBANK LTD (unreported) Suit No: NICN/EN/17/2019, Judgment of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria delivered on Thursday 18^th day of November, 2021  per Hon. Justice O. O. AROWOSEGBE.

 

Counsel submitted that the Claimant was subjected to various acts of unfair labour practice including compelling him to sign court processes and placing him on Recovery Suspension while adding that the Defendant violated the provision of Section 13.2.1 (xi) and (xiii) (a) and (b) of Exhibit D8 (Defendant’s Group HR Disciplinary Process & Sanctions Policy).

 

In arguing issue two, counsel submitted that the law is trite that the dismissal of an employee does not extinguish his right to demand and recover any debt owed him by the employer or any arrears of salaries which had accrued and were due for payment but were wrongfully withheld by the Employer before the said dismissal. The employer is only entitled to a set-off therefrom if the employee is also indebted to the employer. Counsel cited the case of UDEGBUNAM VS. FCDA (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt. 829) 487 SC.

 

Counsel added that by Exhibit C11, it is beyond doubt that, the Claimant repeated his demand for payment of the said arrears of salary but the Defendant refused to do so citing her policy.

 

In arguing issue three, counsel humbly submitted that the era of an employer having the liberty to dismiss an employee for whatever reason or no reason is over in Nigeria. Rather, the dismissal or termination of the employment of an employee by an employee will only be justified and not wrongful if the employer provides an objectively valid reason for same failing which the dismissal will be held to be wrongful. Counsel cited the case of NATURAL GAS SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION (PENGASSAN) vs. SCHLUMBERGER ANADRILL  NIGERIA   LIMITED (supra), Article 4 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No 158 (1982); EBERE ONYEKACHI ALOYSIUS VS. DIAMOND BANK OF NIGERIA (2015) 58 N.L.L.R (Pt. 199) 92 and DURU vs. SKYE BANK PLC (2015) 59 N.L.L.R (PT. 207) 680.

 

Counsel also argued that the law is trite that once the employer gives a reason for the dismissal, burden of proof of the objectivity and validity of the reason lies not on the employee but on the employer. Counsel referred to several paragraphs of the statement of fact and defence and witness statements before submitting that the Dismissal of the Claimant from employment by the Defendant on the 17^th day of October, 2017 is wrongful and without an objectively valid reason.

 

In arguing issue four, counsel contended that the CW1 on 14^th day of July, 2023 became a former counsel before the instant counsel to the Claimant and that the said CW1 had to be called as witness for the Claimant when the Defendant contended against the Claimant’s application for virtual hearing.

 

Counsel added that the provisions of Section 20 of the Rules of Professional Conduct 2023 cited by the Defendant’s counsel in his address only requires that the said Babafemi Akenroye Esq. should first withdraw from being a Counsel in this suit before he testifies which in the instant case he had already done before he was called as a witness even before the leave of court was sought for him to be called as a witness.

 

Counsel also argued that the composition of the Defendant’s Regional Office Disciplinary Committee Membership was contrary to Section 19 of Exhibit D8 and therefore invalid. Counsel concluded by submitting that the Claimant has proved his entitlement to the favourable judgment of this honourable court as per his claims in this suit and urged the court to so hold.

 

By way of Reply on Point of Law filed on the 22^nd of June, 2026, Counsel to the Defendant contended with regards to the allegation of unfair labour practice to content that the measures taken by the Defendant were taken in accordance with the terms governing the Claimant’s employment. Counsel added that section 5,7 and 9 of the Labour Act that was relied upon bears no relevance to discipline of an employee while section 9(5) is inapplicable because the Claimant was not dismissed based on indebtedness of a customer but based on cash suppression. Counsel added that the lapses in the administrative process of recovery process and has no bearing on the subsequent finding of cash suppression which culminated in the Claimant’s dismissal. Counsel also argued that the Claimant has been paid his due salaries and it is speculative to contend that the Defendant’s policy is an unfair labour practice. Counsel argued that it is firmly settled that an employer is entitled to dismiss an employee for gross misconduct.  Counsel reargued the position of CW1 in relation to testimony provided before the court while adding that the Claimant has not been prejudiced by the Claimant’s defence as all that is required is for him to be accorded fair hearing. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the Claimant’s suit for lacking in merit.

 

In view of the foregoing, I have carefully considered all the processes filed by the parties in this suit. I have equally reviewed the testimonies of the witnesses called by both parties, observed their demeanour, and evaluated the documentary evidence tendered and admitted at trial. I have also considered the submissions of learned counsel to the respective parties in their Final Written Addresses and the Reply on Points of Law.

 

Arising from the totality of the facts, evidence and submissions placed before this Court, the sole issue which calls for determination is namely;

 

“Whether, having regard to the facts and evidence before this Court, the Claimant has proved his case so as to be entitled to the reliefs sought.”

Before proceeding to determine the substantive issue, I consider it necessary to first resolve the objections relating to the exhibits which were admitted under protest. These are Exhibits C2, C6, C7, C8, C16 and C17 on the one hand, and Exhibits D2, D4, D5 and D14 on the other.

 

With respect to Exhibit C2, learned counsel to the Defendant contended that the document is a photocopy, it is unsigned and was tendered without compliance with section 90(e) of the Evidence Act, 2011, on the ground that it constitutes an entry in a banker’s book.

 

Learned counsel to the Claimant argued to the contrary that Exhibit C2 is not a document relating to banking business, nor did it emanate from the Defendant or any other bank. Counsel submitted that the document is a Purchase Contract Note evidencing transactions between the Claimant and his stockbroker, and that CW1 laid the requisite foundation for the tendering of the photocopy. Counsel further submitted that the absence of a signature does not, in the circumstances, render the document inadmissible.

 

In relation to Exhibits C6, C7 and C8, learned counsel to the Defendant argued that CW1 was neither the maker of the documents nor the person to whom they were addressed. Counsel further contended that the documents were unsigned and that their tendering through CW1 did not satisfy the requirements of section 83 of the Evidence Act.

 

In response, learned counsel to the Claimant submitted that the documents were specifically pleaded and are relevant to the issues submitted for determination. Counsel accordingly urged the Court to discountenance the objections raised by the Defendant.

 

No argument was advanced by learned counsel to the Defendant in support of the objections earlier raised against Exhibits C16 and C17. The objections to those exhibits are therefore deemed abandoned and I so hold.

 

Similarly, although Exhibits D2, D4, D5 and D14 were admitted under protest at the instance of the Claimant, learned counsel to the Claimant advanced no argument against their admissibility in the Claimant’s Final Written Address. The objections to the said exhibits are consequently deemed abandoned.

 

It follows that the only subsisting objections requiring determination are those relating to Exhibits C2, C6, C7 and C8.

 

I have examined the said exhibits. Exhibit C2 is a photocopy of a Purchase Contract Note issued by United Capital Securities and bears no signature in the spaces provided for the persons who prepared and checked the document. Exhibit C6 is a copy of a letter relating to the Claimant’s credit recovery suspension, while Exhibits C7 and C8 are copies of email correspondence.

 

Upon due consideration, I find that the documents were pleaded and are relevant to the determination of the matters in controversy between the parties. This is particularly so with respect to Exhibits C6, C7 and C8, which bear directly on the circumstances surrounding the Claimant’s suspension and the disciplinary process culminating in the cessation of his employment.

 

Although Exhibits C6, C7 and C8 were not addressed to CW1, this Court cannot overlook the explanation placed before it concerning the unavailability of the Claimant, to whom some of the documents were addressed or by whom some of the communications were made.

 

In the circumstances, I consider this an appropriate case to invoke the provision of section 12(2)(b) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, which empowers this Court, where the interest of justice so requires, to depart from the strict application of the rules of evidence.

 

Accordingly, having found Exhibits C2, C6, C7 and C8 relevant to the issues for determination in this suit, I find no sufficient basis to expunge them from the records. Accordingly, The objections raised by learned counsel to the Defendant are therefore overruled, and the said exhibits shall remain part of the evidence to be considered by this Court, subject, of course, to the appropriate weight to be attached to each of them.

 

Having resolved the foregoing objections, I consider it equally necessary to address the status of CW1 and the evidential value of his testimony.

 

Learned counsel to the Defendant contended that the testimony of CW1 is hearsay and indirect, having been given pursuant to a letter of authority from the Claimant. Counsel argued that neither the Evidence Act nor the Rules of this Court permit a litigant, particularly a natural person, to delegate the giving of evidence concerning facts personal to him to another person.

 

Counsel further submitted that CW1 is a legal practitioner who had acted professionally for the Claimant in relation to this matter and was therefore precluded from testifying as a witness in the same proceedings.

 

In response, learned counsel to the Claimant submitted that although Babafemi Akenroye, Esq., CW1, was the counsel who commenced this action on behalf of the Claimant, the Claimant subsequently changed counsel and retained Ikechukwu Richard Ogbowu, Esq., who had acted as his solicitor since 18th June, 2021.

 

Counsel further submitted that CW1 testified with the express consent and authority of the Claimant, as evidenced by Exhibit C13, and that his credibility was neither successfully impugned nor his character impeached under cross-examination.

Counsel also contended that the Defendant ought not to complain about the Claimant’s physical absence at trial, having opposed the application earlier made by the Claimant seeking leave to testify virtually.

 

I have carefully considered the respective submissions.

 

The record of this Court shows that Babafemi Akenroye, Esq., filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel on 12th July, 2023. His Witness Statements on Oath were subsequently filed on 18th October, 2023 and 27th November, 2024, respectively, and he eventually testified as CW1 on 2nd December, 2024.

 

The foregoing chronology makes it clear that, at the time CW1 entered the witness box, he was no longer appearing as counsel in the proceedings. He was therefore not simultaneously acting as counsel to the Claimant and testifying as a witness in the same proceedings.

In that circumstance, the reliance placed by learned counsel to the Defendant on Rule 20 of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not avail the Defendant.

I must, however, distinguish the competence of CW1 as a witness from the probative value of the evidence given by him.

 

The mere fact that CW1 is competent to testify does not necessarily render every factual assertion made by him evidence of equal probative value. Where his testimony relates to matters which he personally saw, heard or otherwise perceived, such evidence will be evaluated on its merits. Conversely, where his testimony consists of facts narrated to him by the Claimant or other persons and of which he has no personal knowledge, the Court must determine the evidential value, if any, to be attached to such testimony in accordance with the applicable rules of evidence.

Indeed, CW1 admitted under cross-examination that he had never worked with the Defendant and that his knowledge of several material events arose from information supplied to him by the Claimant.

 

Consequently, while I find that CW1 is a competent witness and was not disqualified from testifying merely by reason of his previous professional involvement with the Claimant, the weight to be attached to the various aspects of his evidence must necessarily depend upon whether the facts testified to were within his personal knowledge or were derived from information supplied to him by others.

 

The objection to the competence of CW1 is therefore without merit and is accordingly discountenanced. The probative value of his testimony shall, where necessary, be considered in the course of the substantive evaluation of the evidence before the Court.

 

I now turn to the sole issue formulated for determination, namely, whether, having regard to the facts and evidence before this Court, the Claimant has proved his case so as to be entitled to the reliefs sought.

 

At the outset, it is apparent from the reliefs sought by the Claimant that his case rests principally on two complaints. The first relates to the termination or dismissal of his employment by the Defendant, while the second concerns the withholding of his salaries for various periods during which he was placed on suspension on account of the failure of certain customers of the Defendant to repay credit facilities granted to them.

 

It is upon these two principal complaints that the Claimant predicates the three declaratory reliefs sought, which in turn constitute the foundation for the ancillary monetary and consequential reliefs.

 

I consider it necessary to state that, the Claimant having sought declaratory reliefs, bears the burden of establishing his entitlement thereto by credible and cogent evidence. The law is settled that declaratory reliefs are granted on the strength of the claimant’s own case and not on the weakness of the defence.

 

In DIAMOND BANK PLC v. YAHAYA & ANOR (2011) LPELR-4036(CA), the Court held thus:

 

“The law is settled that the courts do not grant declaratory relief based on the admission of the defendant. The plaintiff must satisfy the court by cogent, credible and convincing evidence called by him that he is entitled to the declaratory relief. So where the plaintiff on his own evidence fails to prove his claim for declaration, his claim must fail. See Ayanru V. Mandilas Ltd, (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 462; Ndayako V. Dantoro (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187.” Per ONYEMENAM, J.C.A. (P. 27, paras. B-D).

 

Similarly, in MATANMI & ORS v. DADA & ANOR (2013) LPELR-19929(SC), the Supreme Court held:

“I agree with the learned counsel that the plaintiffs must establish their claim on the strength of their case. They cannot place any reliance on the weakness of the defence; if any. The burden of proof on the plaintiffs in establishing their declaratory relief to the satisfaction of the court is quite heavy in the sense that such a declaratory relief is not granted even on admission by the defendant where the plaintiffs fail to establish their entitlement to the declaration sought by their own evidence. See: Nwokidu v. Okaru (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1181) 362, Dantata v. Mohammed (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt. 664) 176; Ekundayo v. Beruwa (1965) 2 NWLR 211 and Dumiez Nig. Ltd. v. Nwakhoba (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt.1119) 361 at 373.” Per FABIYI, J.S.C.

 

Having stated the foregoing principle, I shall first consider the Claimant’s complaint concerning the termination of his employment on 17th October, 2017.

 

Relief one seeks for, “A DECLARATION that the termination of the Claimant’s employment by the Defendant on the 17^th of October, 2017 without a valid reason and without any prior notice of termination of his employment nor salary in lieu of notice is wrongful, irregular, unfair, fraudulent, unlawful and an unfair labour practice”.

 

By the first declaratory relief, the Claimant contends that the termination of his employment was effected without a valid reason, without prior notice and without payment of salary in lieu of notice, thereby rendering the termination wrongful, irregular, unfair, fraudulent, unlawful and an unfair labour practice.

 

The law is equally settled as to what an employee who alleges wrongful termination of employment must establish. In U.T.C. NIGERIA LTD v. PETERS (2009) LPELR-8426(CA), the Court held:

 

“It is a fundamental and well settled principle, that the terms and conditions of employment is the bedrock on which any claim predicated thereupon ought to squarely rest. Thus, where an employee as in the instant case, complains of a wrongful termination of his employment, he has the onus- (i) To place before the trial court the terms of the contract of employment; (ii) To prove the manner in which the said terms were breached by the employer thereof. See GARUBA V. KIC LTD (2005) …; JOMBO V. PEFM (2005) 14 NWLR (Part 945) 443; AKINFE V. UBA PLC (2007) 10 NWLR (Part 1041) 185…”
Per SAULAWA, J.C.A.

 

In similar vein, the Court of Appeal held in SIMEON v. COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, EKIADOLOR BENIN (2014) LPELR-23320(CA) that:

“Under the common law, an employer is entitled to bring the appointment of his employee to an end for any reason or no reason at all. As long as he acts within the terms of his employment, the terms of his employment or motive for doing so is irrelevant. A servant as in this case, who complains that his employment has been wrongfully terminated must found his claim on the contract of service and show what manner the wrong was done. It therefore is not the duty of the employer as defendant to prove that the termination was not wrongful.

 

See: IDONIBOYE-OBU V. NNPC (2003) 2 NWLR (PT. 805) 589.”
Per EKPE, J.C.A.

 

The foregoing authorities make it clear that the starting point in an allegation of wrongful termination is the contract governing the employment relationship. The Claimant must not only place the relevant terms before the Court, but must also demonstrate the specific manner in which the Defendant acted in breach of those terms.

 

Against that background, I shall now consider the factual circumstances which culminated in the cessation of the Claimant’s employment.

 

Arising from the Statement of Facts and the evidence presented on behalf of the Claimant, the events leading to the termination of the Claimant’s employment arose after he had been recalled from a series of suspensions and resumed his duties with the Defendant.

 

The Claimant’s account is that an uneducated customer was referred to him for the purpose of opening an account with the sum of ?120,000.00. According to the Claimant, the customer informed him that, being a petty trader, he might need to withdraw part of the money within the same week.

 

The Claimant stated that he informed the customer that his National Identification Number or other means of identification would first require verification, which process could take seven days or more. He further stated that, under the Defendant’s policy, funds received from a customer whose identification had not yet been verified ought to be lodged into a sundry deposit account pending completion of the verification process.

 

The Claimant’s case, however, is that the customer pleaded with him to keep the money personally so that he could have easy access to part of it whenever the need arose. The Claimant consequently acceded to the request and retained the sum of ?120,000.00 in his drawer rather than paying it into the prescribed sundry account.

In summary, the Claimant was issued a query in respect of the incident and was subsequently invited to appear before a Regional Disciplinary Committee. The Claimant contended that the customer involved in the transaction was neither invited to appear before the Committee nor was the Claimant permitted to call him as a witness. Notwithstanding this, the Committee found the Claimant guilty of gross misconduct, following which he was dismissed from the Defendant’s employment.

 

The Claimant further averred that although he had worked for seventeen (17) days in the month in which his employment was brought to an end, he was not paid salary for those seventeen days. He also complained that the Defendant deducted the sum of ?32,651.39 from his account as unearned leave allowance.

 

The Claimant thereafter appealed against the decision of the Regional Disciplinary Committee to the Head Office Disciplinary Committee, but maintained that the appeal did not yield a favourable outcome. See paragraphs 28–42 of the Claimant’s Statement of Facts.

 

The Defendant, on its part, admitted that the Claimant was dismissed from its employment after its Disciplinary Committee found him culpable of cash suppression involving the sum of ?120,000.00.

 

The Defendant substantially confirmed the circumstances surrounding the transaction involving the prospective customer who sought to open an account and had completed the requisite account-opening documentation. The Defendant’s position, however, is that rather than lodge the sum of ?120,000.00 into the appropriate sundry deposit account pending completion of the account-opening process, the Claimant retained the money in his custody and thereby suppressed the cash.

According to the Defendant, it was on account of this conduct that the Claimant was issued a query, investigated and subsequently invited before the Disciplinary Committee to answer an allegation of cash suppression, an offence said to be punishable under section 15, particularly subsection 15.1.3, of the Defendant’s Group HR Disciplinary Process and Sanctions Policy.

 

Against the foregoing factual background, I have carefully examined the documentary evidence placed before this Court in relation to the cessation of the Claimant’s employment.

 

Of particular significance is Exhibit C3, being the letter by which the Defendant brought the Claimant’s employment to an end. A perusal of Exhibit C3 reveals that the Defendant did not purport to terminate the Claimant’s employment simpliciter. Rather, the letter expressly communicated the dismissal of the Claimant from the Defendant’s employment.

 

This distinction is material. Although termination and dismissal both have the effect of bringing an employment relationship to an end, they are not invariably attended by the same incidents. Ordinarily, a termination in accordance with the contract of employment requires the giving of the stipulated notice or payment of salary in lieu thereof. A summary dismissal for misconduct, on the other hand, is generally effected without notice, provided that the employer has acted in accordance with the applicable contractual procedure and the requirements of fair hearing.

 

In OLANIYAN v. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (1985) NWLR (Pt. 9) 599, the Supreme Court explained the nature and effect of dismissal in the following terms:

 

“In law however dismissal means such act or acts on the part of the master as amount to a repudiation by him of the essential obligations imposed on the servant by the contract. Thus a man may dismiss his servant if he refuses by word or conduct to allow the servant to fulfil his contract of employment: see Re Rubel Bronze etc, and Vos (1918) 1 K.B. 315. Loss of benefit is not at the root of dismissal but repudiation of the servant’s obligations under the contract is. Once there is that repudiation by the master then there is a dismissal or termination or removal - it does not matter which expression is used, the effect is the same.” Per OPUTA, J.S.C. (P. 49, paras. B-E).

 

It follows from the foregoing that the substance of the Defendant’s action, rather than the nomenclature employed by the Claimant in framing his relief, is what this Court must examine.

 

In the present case, the Claimant was not merely relieved of his employment by ordinary termination. He was summarily dismissed on an allegation of gross misconduct, namely cash suppression. Consequently, the gravamen of the Claimant’s complaint cannot properly rest merely on the absence of notice of termination or payment of salary in lieu thereof. The more fundamental questions are whether the allegation which formed the basis of the dismissal was brought to his attention, whether he was afforded a fair opportunity to answer the allegation, and whether the procedure prescribed by the Defendant for dealing with such misconduct was substantially complied with.

 

Where those requirements are shown to have been satisfied, the Claimant cannot successfully impeach the dismissal solely on the ground that he was not given notice or paid salary in lieu of notice.

This is particularly so because certain settled principles govern the dismissal of an employee for misconduct, especially in an employment which, as in the instant case, is not clothed with statutory flavour.

 

In FUT, YOLA v. MAIWUYA & ORS (2010) LPELR-9001(CA), the Court of Appeal held as follows:

 

“In the dismissal or termination of the appointment of an employee on grounds of misconduct, all that the employer needs to establish to justify his action is to show that the allegation was disclosed to the employee; that he was given a fair hearing, that is to say, that the Rules of natural justice were not breached and that the disciplinary panel followed the laid down procedure, if any, or that the employee accepted that he committed the act after investigation. University of Calabar Vs. Essien (1996) 10 NWLR Pt 477 Pg 225, Olatunboson Vs. NISER Council (1988) 3 NWLR Pt 80 Pg 25, Yusuf Vs U.B.N (1996) 36 NWLR Pt 457 Pg 632.”
Per NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A. (P. 18, paras. D-G).

 

 

In the same vein, the Court of Appeal in UBA PLC v. ORANUBA (2013) LPELR-20692(CA) held thus:

 

“It is settled law that in an action for wrongful dismissal from employment, the burden is always on the Claimant to prove the terms and conditions of his contract of employment and in what manner the said terms were breached by the employer. Angel Spinning & Dyeing Ltd v Ajah (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt.685) 532. Further, in a contract of employment between a master and a servant without statutory flavour, once the master complies with the terms of the agreement, he may relieve the servant of his job with or without reason. But where the master gives a reason, the burden rests on him to establish that reason. Olatunbosun v. Nigerian Institute of Social & Economic Research Council (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt 80) 25. The master must in addition give the servant a fair hearing as enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.”
Per IYIZOBA, J.C.A. (P. 20, paras. A-B).

 

 

The implication of the foregoing authority is that the central enquiry before this Court, in relation to the Claimant’s dismissal, is whether the Defendant afforded him fair hearing and complied with the disciplinary procedure governing the employment relationship before arriving at the decision to dismiss him.

It is to that enquiry that I now turn.

 

Having regard to the foregoing authorities and the evidence before this Court, I find considerable difficulty in accepting the Claimant’s contention that his dismissal from the Defendant’s employment on 17th October, 2017 was wrongful, irregular, unfair, fraudulent, unlawful or amounted to an unfair labour practice.

 

This is because, by the Claimant’s own pleadings, particularly paragraphs 28–42 of the Statement of Facts, he acknowledged that the allegation of cash suppression was brought to his attention, first orally and subsequently by a formal query. He equally admitted that he was invited to appear before a Disciplinary Committee in relation to the allegation and that he appeared before the Committee before a finding of culpability was made against him.

 

The principal complaint of the Claimant in relation to the disciplinary process is that the customer involved in the transaction was neither invited by the Defendant to testify nor was the Claimant permitted to call the customer as a witness. The Claimant also maintained that his retention of the customer’s money in his drawer ought not to have been regarded as an infraction because the customer did not complain and, according to him, he acted for the convenience of the customer.

This contention cannot avail the Claimant.

 

By his own account, the Claimant admitted that the Defendant’s prescribed procedure required money received from a customer whose account-opening process had not been completed to be lodged into a sundry deposit account. Notwithstanding his knowledge of that procedure, the Claimant elected to retain the sum of ?120,000.00 in his personal custody.

 

The explanation offered by the Claimant as to why he departed from the prescribed procedure does not alter the fact that the conduct complained of was inconsistent with the Defendant’s laid down internal policy. Whether the Claimant believed that he was acting in the customer’s interest or whether the customer himself lodged no complaint is not determinative of whether the Claimant breached the Defendant’s internal rules.

 

The employment relationship was between the Claimant and the Defendant. It was therefore the Defendant, and not the customer, that was entitled to prescribe the standards of conduct governing the manner in which its employees handled customers’ funds.

 

I must also observe that an internal disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial and is not required to assume all the procedural characteristics of proceedings before a court of law. What the law requires, fundamentally, is that the employee be informed of the allegation against him and be afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond before an adverse decision is taken.

 

In the instant case, the Claimant admitted that he was issued a query, was informed of the allegation against him, appeared before the Disciplinary Committee and made representations in his defence.

 

Having been afforded an opportunity to state his case and having in fact done so, the Claimant cannot successfully contend that he was denied fair hearing merely because the disciplinary process did not adopt the procedure he preferred or because its eventual outcome was adverse to him.

Fair hearing does not import a guarantee of a favourable decision. What it guarantees is a fair opportunity to be heard before a decision affecting the person is reached.

 

I have equally considered the argument advanced by learned counsel to the Claimant in the Final Written Address concerning the composition of the Disciplinary Committee. In my view, that contention does not arise from the Claimant’s pleaded case.

 

The Claimant did not plead any defect in the composition of the Committee as one of the factual grounds upon which his right to fair hearing was allegedly breached. It is settled law that the address of counsel, however forceful or ingenious, cannot take the place of pleadings or evidence. A party cannot therefore introduce through a Final Written Address a factual complaint which was neither pleaded nor established by evidence at trial.

 

I have also taken cognizance of the submissions of learned counsel to the Claimant founded on international labour standards and conventions relating to the requirement for a valid or objective reason for termination of employment, as well as the requirement for notice or payment in lieu of notice. These submissions appear to form part of the basis upon which the Claimant urges this Court to hold that the cessation of his employment amounted to an unfair labour practice.

 

The difficulty with that contention, however, is that the Claimant was not subjected to an ordinary termination of employment without cause. Exhibit C3 expressly communicates a dismissal arising from an allegation of misconduct.

 

On the evidence before this Court, the Claimant was informed of the misconduct alleged against him, responded to the query issued in respect thereof and appeared before the disciplinary body constituted by the Defendant. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Claimant was duly informed of the reason for the action taken against him.

 

Being a dismissal for misconduct, the question of prior notice or salary in lieu of notice does not arise in the same manner as it would in an ordinary termination of employment.

 

For completeness, Exhibit D7 constitutes documentary evidence of the Claimant’s response to the query issued to him in respect of the allegation. Exhibit D8, being the Defendant’s Group HR Disciplinary Process and Sanctions Policy, also categorizes the suppression of cash, cheques and deposits as an offence attracting the sanction of dismissal.

 

When Exhibit D7 is considered alongside Exhibit D8 and the Claimant’s own admission that the ?120,000.00 was retained in his drawer rather than lodged into the appropriate sundry deposit account, I find that the Defendant established the reason it gave for dismissing the Claimant.

 

Accordingly, I find that the Claimant has failed to establish that his dismissal on 17th October, 2017 was wrongful on account of lack of fair hearing, absence of a valid reason, failure to give notice or failure to pay salary in lieu of notice.

 

In essence, the Claimant was fully aware of the reason for his dismissal. Exhibit C3 expressly states that the Claimant was dismissed for gross misconduct, while the Claimant himself understood and acknowledged that the allegation of gross misconduct arose from the incident of cash suppression.

 

In my view, the reason communicated to the Claimant was sufficiently clear, specific and objective. It therefore satisfies the requirement for the communication of a valid reason for dismissal upon which the Claimant relied in his reference to international labour standards.

 

I also consider it necessary to state that an employer is not required to await the outcome of a criminal prosecution before exercising its disciplinary powers against an employee for misconduct, even where the conduct complained of bears some criminal character.

 

The position of the law in this regard was restated by the Supreme Court in ARINZE v. F.B.N. LTD (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 888) 663, where the Court held thus:

 

“As Wali, JSC pointed out at pages 214 - 215 in the latter case: ‘It is not necessary, nor is it a requirement under section 33 of the 1979 Constitution that before an employer summarily dismisses his employee from his services under the common law, the employee must be tried before a court of law where the accusation against the employee is of gross misconduct involving dishonest bordering on criminality … to satisfy the rule of natural justice and fair hearing a person likely to be affected directly by disciplinary proceeding must be given adequate notice of the allegation against him to afford him opportunity for representation in his own defence. The complaint against him must not necessarily be drafted in the form of a formal charge. It is sufficient if the complaint as formulated conveys to him the nature of the accusation against him.’’ Per ONU, J.S.C. (P. 11, paras. A-E).

 

Applying the foregoing principle to the instant case, the fact that the Claimant was not prosecuted before a court of law for cash suppression does not invalidate the disciplinary proceedings conducted by the Defendant or the consequent dismissal.

 

Having considered the totality of the evidence, I find that the Claimant was informed of the allegation against him, was issued a query, responded thereto and appeared before the appropriate disciplinary body to make representations in his defence. The Defendant also established that the conduct for which the Claimant was disciplined constituted an offence under its applicable disciplinary policy and attracted the sanction of dismissal.

 

In the circumstances, I find that the Claimant has failed to establish his entitlement to the declaration sought in relief (a). The said relief accordingly fails and is hereby refused.

 

I now turn to the second declaratory relief, which concerns the Claimant’s suspensions and the consequential withholding of his salaries during the subsistence of his employment.

 

The substance of the Claimant’s complaint under this head is that he was subjected to disciplinary measures on account of the failure of customers of the Defendant to repay loan and overdraft facilities granted to them. He therefore urges the Court to hold that suspending him, withholding his salaries and making the payment of those salaries dependent upon the recovery of customers’ indebtedness constituted wrongful and unfair labour practices.

 

For clarity, relief (b) seeks “A DECLARATION that the Defendant’s acts of punishing the defendant for the failure of the Defendant’s customer to repay a loan /overdraft by suspending the Claimant indefinitely without the Defendant subjecting the Claimant to any Disciplinary Committee trial in violation of the terms of the said suspensions, withholding the Claimant’s salaries pending the full recovery of the said loan / overdraft and compelling the Claimant to ensure that the said customer repays the loan / overdraft as a condition for the payment of the Claimant’s withheld salaries until the wrongful termination of the Claimant’s employment on the 17th of October, 2017 by the reason of which termination of employment the Defendant has refused to pay to the Claimant his withheld salaries till date are wrongful, irregular, fraudulent, unlawful, an unfair labour practice and a breach of the Claimant’s fundamental Rights to fair hearing and dignity of his person.”

 

The factual basis of this relief, as pleaded by the Claimant, is that following a directive from his Branch Manager to review the inflow and outflow of customers with a view to identifying those suitable for overdraft facilities, he recommended Teslat Global Resources Limited for an overdraft facility.

 

According to the Claimant, the said company was subsequently granted an overdraft facility in the sum of ?20,000,000.00, secured by a legal mortgage over the personal property of one Mr. Badmus Tesleem Rasheed.

 

The Claimant stated that following the customer’s default in repaying the facility, he was placed on suspension with effect from 18th September, 2015, during which he was paid only 50% of his monthly salary. He was further directed to ensure recovery of the outstanding indebtedness within three months, failing which the payment of his salary would cease completely and he would be subjected to disciplinary proceedings by 17th December, 2015. The Claimant maintained that by December 2015, the Defendant did not convene any Disciplinary Committee to consider his case but nevertheless ceased paying his salary altogether.

 

He further stated that the collateral securing the facility was subsequently sold by the Defendant for the sum of ?14,000,000.00. According to him, an arrangement was reached with Mr. Badmus under which the Defendant would retain ?10,000,000.00 from the proceeds while the sum of ?4,000,000.00 would be released to the company as working capital to enable it continue its business and liquidate the outstanding balance by monthly payments of ?1,000,000.00.

 

The Claimant alleged that the Defendant failed to release the sum of ?4,000,000.00 to the company, while the company in turn failed to make the proposed monthly repayments.

 

The Claimant further averred that he was recalled from suspension in June 2016 but was not paid the salaries withheld during the period of suspension. He was, however, directed to continue following up on the customer’s obligation to make monthly repayments of ?1,000,000.00.

 

According to the Claimant, he later discovered that the customer’s petroleum sales/filling station had been leased out. Upon bringing this development to the attention of the Defendant’s Branch Manager, he was again placed on suspension on 20th July, 2016, with substantially the same consequences for his remuneration as the earlier suspension.

 

The Claimant further stated that sometime in November 2016, the Defendant instructed its solicitor to institute proceedings against the defaulting customer and required the Claimant to append his signature to the originating processes prepared for the litigation. Following this development, the Claimant was recalled from suspension on 28th November, 2016.

 

The Claimant also averred that judgment was subsequently obtained in favour of the Defendant against the customer, but that the Defendant deliberately declined to enforce the judgment and instructed its officers not to pursue execution on the ground that Mr. Teslim had become a Commissioner in Ondo State.

 

These averments are contained substantially in paragraphs 9–27 of the Claimant’s Statement of Facts.

 

It was upon this factual foundation that the Claimant, in paragraph 49 of the Statement of Facts, particularized the salaries allegedly withheld from him during the respective periods of suspension in the total sum of ?3,397,151.39.

 

The question which now arises is whether, having regard to the contractual documents and the evidence before this Court, the Defendant was entitled to suspend the Claimant in the manner it did and, more importantly, whether the withholding of his remuneration for the periods complained of was contractually or otherwise legally justified.

 

The Defendant, in response to the foregoing, admitted that the Claimant was indeed issued a letter of suspension dated 18th September, 2015, by which he was placed on what the Defendant termed Credit Recovery Suspension for failure to regularize the past-due obligations arising from the facility granted to Teslat Global Resources Limited. The Defendant further admitted that the Claimant was recalled from the said suspension by a letter dated 10th June, 2016.

 

The Defendant equally admitted that the Claimant was again placed on suspension from 20th July, 2016 until 28th November, 2016. Its case, however, is that by virtue of the Defendant’s Group HR Disciplinary Process and Sanctions Policy, Version 2.2 of June 2010, the Claimant was entitled only to 50% of his salary for a maximum period of three months while on suspension and was not entitled to allowances during the period.

 

Against the foregoing background, the real question is no longer whether the Claimant was suspended, paid half salary for part of the period and subsequently placed on zero pay. Those facts are substantially common ground between the parties.

 

The more fundamental question is whether a policy which subjects an employee to suspension, reduction of salary and eventual non-payment of salary merely because a customer of the employer has defaulted in the repayment of a loan facility constitutes an unfair labour practice, notwithstanding that the employer has embodied such a practice in an internal policy under the nomenclature of “Credit Recovery Suspension”.

 

In considering this issue, I am mindful that the concept of unfair labour practice is not confined to a closed or exhaustive category. The Court has recognized that what may constitute an unfair labour practice depends substantially on the facts and circumstances of each case. See NATURAL GAS SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION (PENGASSAN) v. SCHLUMBERGER ANADRILL NIGERIA LIMITED (2008) 11 N.L.L.R. (Pt. 29) 164.

 

In the instant case, the policy under consideration effectively places upon an employee the personal consequences of a customer’s failure to discharge a loan obligation owed to the employer.

 

In my considered view, such a practice is conceptually akin to visiting upon one person the consequences of the default or wrongdoing of another, merely because of some connection between them. It bears some resemblance to the discredited practice of arresting a relative of a suspect in place of the suspect, a practice which section 8(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 expressly prohibits. While the two situations arise in different legal contexts, the underlying concern is similar: culpability ought ordinarily to attach directly to the person responsible for the default complained of and should not, without more, be transferred to another person merely because of association.

 

It is particularly worrisome that a bank which has itself assessed a customer’s creditworthiness, approved the facility and secured the loan with collateral would nevertheless seek to make an employee personally bear the financial consequences of the customer’s subsequent default by withholding the employee’s earned remuneration.

 

The inequity becomes even more apparent when one considers the converse situation. Where the customer services the facility regularly and the Bank earns interest and other benefits from the transaction, those gains accrue to the Bank. They do not ordinarily inure personally to the employee who processed or recommended the facility. It is therefore difficult to justify a system under which the commercial benefit belongs exclusively to the employer when the transaction succeeds, but the employee is made personally to absorb the financial consequences when the customer defaults. Such an arrangement, in my view, is inequitable and inconsistent with contemporary principles of natural justice and fair labour practice.

 

I find support for this conclusion in the decision of my learned brother, Hon. Justice O. O. Arowosegbe, in CHUKWUNONSO v. ECOBANK LTD, Suit No. NICN/EN/17/2019, judgment delivered on 18th November, 2021. In that case, His Lordship deprecated the practice of holding bank employees who merely processed or facilitated loan transactions personally responsible for customers’ repayment defaults and regarded such conduct as constituting an unfair labour practice.

 

I find the reasoning in that decision persuasive and I respectfully agree with same.

Accordingly, I hold that, in the absence of proof of fraud, collusion, negligence or some other culpable misconduct personally attributable to the Claimant in the grant or administration of the facility, the Defendant’s policy of suspending the Claimant and reducing or withholding his salary due to default on the part of Teslat Global Resources Limited  in the repayment of its loan constitutes an unfair labour practice.

I am not unmindful of the submission of learned counsel to the Defendant that the Claimant was remunerated during the period of suspension strictly in accordance with the Defendant’s Group HR Disciplinary Process and Sanctions Policy.

 

I am equally mindful of the submissions of learned counsel to the Claimant founded on the provisions of the Labour Act, particularly in relation to the reduction of the Claimant’s salary to 50% and the subsequent cessation of payment pursuant to the Defendant’s internal policy.

 

While learned counsel to the Claimant referred to sections 5(1) and 9 of the Labour Act, I consider section 9(5) of the Act particularly instructive. It provides in clear terms as follows:

“No worker shall be bound by virtue of any contract under this Act to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of any other person.”

 

The language of this provision is significant. It embodies the broader principle that an employee ought not, by reason merely of the employment relationship, to be made personally answerable for the debt or default of another person.

 

Although the Defendant seeks to justify its actions by reference to its internal disciplinary policy, an internal policy cannot, merely by being incorporated into the employer’s administrative framework, insulate a practice which is inconsistent with statutory protection or which this Court finds to be unfair and inequitable in the context of contemporary labour relations.

 

Consequently, to the extent that the Defendant’s Credit Recovery Suspension policy operated in the instant case to make the Claimant personally bear the financial consequences of the default of Teslat Global Resources Limited through suspension, reduction of salary and eventual cessation of salary, I find that the policy, as applied to the Claimant, amounted to an unfair labour practice.

 

Bearing the foregoing statutory provision in mind, I am fortified in my earlier finding that the Defendant’s policy of placing the Claimant on what it termed “Credit Recovery Suspension”, during which he was paid only 50% of his salary for part of the period and no salary at all for other periods between 18th September, 2015 and 28th November, 2016, constitutes an unfair labour practice.

 

Section 9(5) of the Labour Act is unequivocal in prohibiting an arrangement by which a worker is made to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person. The effect of the provision is that an employee cannot be bound by a contractual or internal policy which seeks to impose such liability upon him.

 

In the instant case, the Defendant seeks to rely on its Group HR Disciplinary Process and Sanctions Policy as justification for the reduction and eventual withholding of the Claimant’s salaries. However, to the extent that the policy operated to make the Claimant bear the financial consequences of a customer’s default in repaying a loan facility, it runs contrary to the clear tenor of section 9(5) of the Labour Act.

The words employed by the statute are plain and unambiguous and, in my view, admit of no secondary interpretation.

 

Learned counsel to the Defendant, apparently mindful of the effect of section 9(5) of the Labour Act, sought in the Reply on Points of Law to contend that the Defendant did not dismiss the Claimant on account of the debt of another person.

With respect, that submission does not address the real complaint under consideration. The issue here is not the Claimant’s eventual dismissal, but the earlier suspensions and the corresponding reduction and non-payment of his salaries, which were expressly tied to the recovery of the customer’s outstanding loan facility.

 

Indeed, Exhibit C4, being the letter of suspension dated 18th September, 2015, puts the matter beyond speculation. The third paragraph of the letter provides as follows:

“Please note that regularization must be achieved within three months from the date of suspension to entitle you to a refund of the balance of your 50% withheld salaries, as failure to recover will result in a forfeiture of withheld salaries.”

The language of the letter makes it clear that the continued withholding and possible forfeiture of the Claimant’s salary were made dependent upon the recovery or regularization of the customer’s indebtedness.

 

Consequently, I find that the Claimant has established that the Defendant penalized him for the failure or default of its customer to satisfy a loan obligation owed to the Defendant, notwithstanding that the Defendant had its own contractual and legal mechanisms for recovering the facility.

 

In the circumstances, I find that the Claimant has proved his entitlement to the declaration sought in relief (b). Relief (b) is therefore granted.

 

I now turn to relief (c), wherein the Claimant seeks “A DECLARATION that the Defendant’s act of denying the Claimant till date of his salary for the 17 (Seventeen) days for which he worked for the Defendant in the month of October, 2017 is wrongful, irregular, fraudulent, unlawful and an unfair labour practice and a breach of the Claimant’s fundamental Rights to dignity of his person.”

 

The factual basis of this relief is straightforward. The Claimant contends that he worked for seventeen (17) days in October 2017 before his dismissal on 17th October, 2017, but was not paid any salary in respect of those days.

 

The Claimant proceeded to make a prorated computation of what he considered to be the amount due to him for the seventeen days. However, no contractual or documentary basis was placed before the Court establishing the formula adopted for the said computation.

 

The question, therefore, is whether the Claimant, having been dismissed on 17th October, 2017, had acquired an enforceable entitlement to a proportion of his monthly salary for the days worked prior to the dismissal.

 

It is settled that dismissal brings the employment relationship to an immediate end and disentitles the employee from earning benefits prospectively. It does not, however, ordinarily extinguish rights or benefits which had already accrued before the effective date of dismissal.

 

The Claimant’s pleadings and evidence consistently describe his remuneration as a monthly salary. There is no suggestion that he was engaged or remunerated on a daily or weekly basis.

 

Section 15 of the Labour Act provides as follows:

 

“Wages shall become due and payable at the end of each period for which the contract is expressed to subsist, that is to say, daily, weekly, or at such other period as may be agreed upon:

Provided that where the period is more than one month, the wages shall become due and payable at intervals not exceeding one month.”

 

The effect of the provision is that wages become due in accordance with the agreed wage period. In the instant case, the Claimant’s remuneration was monthly and was therefore ordinarily payable at the end of the monthly wage period.

 

However, the fact that the agreed payment date had not yet arrived as at 17th October, 2017 does not necessarily mean that work already performed by the Claimant during that month was rendered gratuitously. The relevant question remains whether, by virtue of the contract of employment and the circumstances of the dismissal, the Claimant had earned remuneration for the period actually worked before the employment relationship came to an end.

 

That question must be determined by reference to the contractual documents and the evidence establishing the basis upon which the Claimant’s monthly remuneration was earned and computed.

 

In the instant case, there is no evidence before the Court that the Claimant’s employment was structured on a daily or weekly wage basis. Rather, the Claimant’s case is that he was employed by the Defendant in 2006 and remained in its employment until his dismissal in 2017, with his remuneration being paid monthly.

Accordingly, the Claimant falls within the category contemplated by the proviso to section 15 of the Labour Act, such that his salary became due and payable at the end of the relevant monthly wage period.

 

The consequence is that, as at 17th October, 2017 when the Claimant was dismissed from employment, his salary for the month of October 2017 had not yet become due and payable.

 

In the circumstances, I find that the Claimant has failed to establish his entitlement to the declaration sought in relief (c). The said relief therefore lacks merit and is accordingly refused.

 

I now turn to relief (d), wherein the Claimant seeks “AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to immediately pay to the Claimant the sum of ?3,592,906.20 (Three Million, Five Hundred and Ninety-Two Thousand, Nine Hundred and Six Naira, Twenty Kobo) being the Claimant’s arrears of salary as at the date and time of the termination of his employment.”

 

This relief is substantially consequential upon relief (b), which this Court has already granted. What therefore remains for determination is whether the monetary sum claimed by the Claimant as withheld and unpaid salaries has been sufficiently established.

 

There is no doubt that a claim for arrears of salary in a specifically quantified sum is in the nature of special damages and must ordinarily be specifically pleaded and strictly proved.

 

In the instant case, the Claimant particularized the various periods during which he was placed on suspension and identified the months in respect of which he alleged that only part of his salary was paid or no salary was paid at all.

 

I am, however, equally mindful that the Defendant itself admitted that, pursuant to its Group HR Disciplinary Process and Sanctions Policy, an employee placed on suspension was entitled to only 50% of his salary for the first three months of suspension and thereafter to no salary where the suspension extended beyond that period. The Defendant further maintained that where the employee failed to achieve the required recovery within the stipulated period, the withheld portion of the salary became forfeited.

 

Having already held that the Defendant’s policy, insofar as it operated to withhold the Claimant’s remuneration for the purpose of compelling recovery of a customer’s loan obligation, constituted an unfair labour practice and was contrary to section 9(5) of the Labour Act, it follows that the Claimant is entitled to recover the salary sums unlawfully withheld pursuant to that policy.

 

While the Claimant did not independently establish every individual non-payment by tendering his own statement of account, the law remains settled that facts admitted require no further proof.

 

More importantly, the Defendant tendered Exhibit D14, being the Claimant’s statement of account maintained with the Defendant. A careful examination of Exhibit D14 reveals entries corresponding with the sums particularized by the Claimant in his Statement of Facts in respect of the relevant periods of suspension.

Upon reconciling the pleaded particulars with the entries contained in Exhibit D14, I find that the amount established as salary withheld or unpaid during the relevant periods is ?3,397,151.39.

 

It must, however, be observed that the Claimant claimed the sum of ?3,592,906.20 under relief (d), whereas the amount which the evidence before this Court establishes as unpaid or withheld salaries arising from the unlawful Credit Recovery Suspension is ?3,397,151.39.

 

A Court is entitled to grant a lesser amount than that claimed where the lesser sum is established by the evidence, provided it does not grant more than what was sought.

Consequently, relief (d) succeeds only to the extent proved.

 

Accordingly, I order the Defendant to pay to the Claimant the sum of ?3,397,151.39 (Three Million, Three Hundred and Ninety-Seven Thousand, One Hundred and Fifty-One Naira, Thirty-Nine Kobo), being the arrears of salary unlawfully withheld from the Claimant during the relevant periods of Credit Recovery Suspension.

 

Relief (d) is therefore granted in part to the extent of the sum of ?3,397,151.39.

 

Relief (e) is seeks for “The sum of ?50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) as General, Special and Exemplary Damages in favour of the Claimant and against the Defendant for the Defendant’s reckless and fraudulent actions of wrongfully terminating the Claimant’s employment, unfair labour practices and breach of the Claimant’s fundamental rights to fair hearing and dignity of his person.”

Upon a consideration of the manner in which this relief has been framed, I agree with learned counsel to the Defendant that the claim is fundamentally defective. General, special and exemplary damages are distinct species of damages, each governed by different legal principles and evidential requirements, and cannot simply be aggregated into one undifferentiated lump sum without indicating what portion is claimed under each head.

 

General damages are those which the law presumes to flow from the wrongful act complained of and ordinarily do not require strict proof. Special damages, on the other hand, must be specifically pleaded, particularized and strictly proved, except where they are expressly admitted. See SEVEN-UP BOTTLING COMPANY PLC v. NKANGA & ORS (2008) LPELR-8462(CA).

 

Exemplary damages stand on a different footing altogether. They are generally awardable only in exceptional circumstances, including where expressly authorized by statute, where there has been oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional conduct by servants of government, or where the Defendant’s conduct was calculated to procure for him a profit which might exceed the compensation otherwise payable to the Claimant. See OBINWA v. C.O.P. (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1045) 411 at 426–427.

In the instant case, the Claimant has lumped together general, special and exemplary damages in the sum of ?50,000,000.00 without distinguishing the respective sums claimed under each head or laying the distinct factual and evidential foundation required for each.

 

This Court cannot speculate as to the portion of the ?50,000,000.00 intended as general damages, the portion intended as special damages, or the portion intended as exemplary damages. To do so would amount to descending into the arena and reformulating the Claimant’s case on his behalf.

 

More importantly, the Claimant’s complaints of wrongful dismissal and denial of fair hearing, which constitute substantial parts of the foundation upon which this claim for damages was predicated, have not succeeded.

 

Consequently, relief (e), as presently constituted, is uncertain and unsustainable. The said relief is accordingly refused.

 

I now turn to relief (f), wherein the Claimant seeks “The sum of ?1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) in favour of the Claimant and against the Defendant being the cost of litigation of this suit.” It is settled that the award of costs is discretionary, although such discretion must at all times be exercised judicially and judiciously.

 

In AFRICAN CONTINENTAL BANK LTD & ANOR v. AJUGWO (2011) LPELR-3637(CA), the Court held:

 

“It is trite that the award of costs is always at the discretion of the court but such discretion must be exercised judiciously and judicially.” Per OSEJI, J.C.A. (P. 41, para. G).

 

Similarly, in EMPERION WEST AFRICA LTD v. AFLON LTD & ANOR (2014) LPELR-22975(CA), the Court of Appeal held:

 

“…although a court has the sole discretion to award cost, such award should not be made to serve as a punitive measure or as punishment. Rather, it should merely serve as indemnity or to compensate the wronged party on the out of pocket expenses he incurred in the prosecution or attendance of the suit or to cushion the cost of litigation incurred by the successful party in the suit. See PSO Olasipe vs. National Bank of Nigeria Ltd & Anor (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt. 11) 147 at 152 para B.”
Per SANUSI, J.C.A. (P. 73, paras. D-F).

 

While costs ordinarily follow the event, the Court must consider the overall degree of success attained by the party seeking costs.

 

In the instant case, although the Claimant has not succeeded in his challenge to his dismissal and has equally failed in some of the other reliefs sought, he has succeeded on a substantial aspect of his case. In particular, this Court has found that the Defendant’s practice of subjecting the Claimant to Credit Recovery Suspension and withholding his remuneration on account of a customer’s loan default amounted to an unfair labour practice. The Court has also found the Claimant entitled to recover the salaries withheld pursuant to that practice.

 

The Claimant was therefore compelled to institute this action in order to vindicate his entitlement to those withheld salaries and to obtain relief against the unfair labour practice established against the Defendant.

 

In the circumstances, I consider an award of costs appropriate. Accordingly, relief (f) succeeds and the Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of ?1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) as costs of this action.

 

Relief (g) seeks for Post-judgment interest on the judgment sum in this suit at the rate of 21% per annum from the date of the Judgment until same is fully liquidated.”

Although the Claimant seeks post-judgment interest at the rate of 21% per annum, no contractual or statutory basis has been placed before this Court to justify the award of interest at that particular rate.

 

In the circumstances, I consider it appropriate to resort to the Rules of this Court. Order 47 Rule 7 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules empowers the Court, at the time of delivering judgment or making an order, to prescribe the period within which a monetary award is to be paid and to award post-judgment interest at a rate not less than 10% per annum.

 

Having regard to the monetary awards made in respect of reliefs (d) and (f), I find it appropriate to grant post-judgment interest in the following terms:

The Defendant shall pay all monetary sums awarded in favour of the Claimant within ten (10) days from the date of delivery of this Judgment, failing which the outstanding sums shall attract interest at the rate of 20% per annum until fully liquidated.

 

Relief (g) is accordingly granted to that extent.

 

Having considered and determined all the specific reliefs sought by the Claimant, I find that the remaining contentions advanced in the course of the proceedings do not call for separate determination, as they are not anchored to any distinct relief requiring a further pronouncement by this Court.

 

Consequently, the sole issue formulated for determination is resolved partly in favour of the Claimant, to the extent that the Claimant has succeeded in respect of reliefs (b), (d), (f) and (g).

 

In the final analysis, the Claimant’s case succeeds in part. For clarity, the orders of this Court are as follows:

1.       Relief (a) is refused.

2.     Relief (b) is granted.

3.     Relief (c) is refused.

4.     Relief (d) is granted in part, and the Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of ?3,397,151.39 (Three Million, Three Hundred and Ninety-Seven Thousand, One Hundred and Fifty-One Naira, Thirty-Nine Kobo), being the arrears of salary unlawfully withheld from the Claimant during the relevant periods of Credit Recovery Suspension.

5.     Relief (e) is refused.

6.     Relief (f) is granted, and the Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of ?1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) as costs of this action.

7.     Relief (g) is granted to the extent that all monetary sums awarded in favour of the Claimant shall be paid within ten (10) days from the date of this Judgment, failing which the outstanding sums shall attract interest at the rate of 20% per annum until fully liquidated.

 

All other claims not specifically granted are hereby dismissed.

 

Judgment is accordingly entered.

 

 

.............................................

HON. JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR, Ph.D.

JUDGE