IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE LAGOS
JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT LAGOS
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE (PROF) ELIZABETH A. OJI
DATE: MONDAY 12TH OCTOBER 2026 SUIT NO:
NICN/LA/15/2023
BETWEEN
BOECKER PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES LIMITED CLAIMANT
AND
GHAZI MUSTAPHA ALI BEST PEST EXTERMINATORS LIMITED DEFENDANTS
Representation:
Emmanuel
Bwala for the Claimant
Mamode Ogbewele for the Defendants
JUDGMENT
Introduction and Claims:
1.
The Claimant commenced this suit by filing a General Form of Complaint
dated 12th January, 2023 and Statement of Facts also dated 12th
January, 2023. The Claimant claims against the Defendants jointly and severally
as follows:
a. A DECLARATION that the 1st Defendant is in breach of the
non-competition undertaking dated the 10th day of January 2020
executed in favour of the Claimant by the 1st Defendant pursuant to
the 1st Defendant’s contract of employment dated the 10th
day of January 2020.
b. A DECLARATION that the 2nd Defendant induced and
promoted the breach of post-employment obligations by the Claimant by retaining
the 1st Defendant in its employment in breach of the Post-Employment
Obligations of the 1st Defendant.
c. The sum of N30,
000,000.00 (Thirty Million Naira) as special damages to the Claimant pursuant
to the breach of post-employment contractual obligations by the 1st
Defendant.
ALTERNATIVELY
General damages in the sum of N30, 000,000.00 (Thirty Million Naira).
d. Cost of the suit.
2. In opposition to
the Claimant’s Claims, the Defendants filed their Statement of Defence and
Counter Claim dated 16th day of February, 2023 wherein, they denied
the Claimant’s allegations and counter claims as follows:
a)
A DECELRATION that the Non-Compete term
signed by the 1st Counter Claimant on the on the 10th January, 2020 merely
cover a period only the period within which the 1st Counter Claimant
worked in Claimant Company and not thereafter.
b) A DECLARATION that the Non-Compete Clause in the Contract of
Service Agreement signed by the 1st Counterclaimant on 10th
January, 2020 in favour of the Claimant
is unreasonable, oppressive and contrary to public policy and same cannot be
enforced against the 1st Counterclaimant
c) A DECLARATION that the 2nd Counterclaimant having
not being a party, to the contract of service Agreement cum the Non-Compete
agreement of 10th January, 2020 between the 1st
Counterclaimant and the Claimant, establishes that the Claimant has no cause of
action against the 2nd Counterclaimant.
d) An order that the Claimant pay to the 1st counter
the sum of N2, 000, 000 (Two Million Naira) covering:
(i)
One Month in lieu of Notice for
wrongful termination of employment being the sum of N1,000, 000 (One Million
Naira Only)
(ii)
The sum of ?1, 000, 000 (One Million Naira) for July, 2022 month salary
e)
Damages in the sum of ?5,000,000 (Five Million Naira) for wrongful termination.
3.
In response to the foregoing, the Claimant filed Reply to the
Defendants’ Statement of Defence and Defence to Counter Claim” dated 4th
day of April 2023. Trial commenced on 13th
June 2023. The Claimant called Adebimpe
Popoola (CW) who adopted her two Witness’s Statements on oaths sworn to on the
12th January 2023 and 4th April 2023 respectively. The
Claimant’s witness was subsequently cross examined. In the course of testimony, CW tendered thirteen
documents marked Exhibits C1 to C13 as follows:
i. Exhibit C1 –
Contract of Service dated the 10th day of January 2020.
ii. Exhibit C2 –
Non-Competition Undertaking dated the 10th day of January 2020.
iii. Exhibit C3 –
Confidentiality Undertaking dated the 10th day of January 2020.
iv. Exhibit C4 –
Expatriate Resident Permit and Expatriate Quota.
v. Exhibit C5 –
Profile of the 2nd Defendant.
vi. Exhibit C6 –
Tenancy Agreement for Accommodation secured for the 1st Defendant by the
Claimant.
vii. Exhibit C7 –
Document showing the designation of the 1st Defendant in the employment of the
2nd Defendant.
viii. Exhibit C8 –
Letter of the Claimant's Solicitors dated the 28th day of November 2022.
ix. Exhibit C9 –
Letter of the Claimant's Solicitors dated the 9th day of December 2022.
x. Exhibit C10 –
Leave request dated the 21st day of June 2022.
xi. Exhibit C11 –
WhatsApp message dated the 20th day of July 2022.
xii. Exhibit C12 –
Disciplinary action dated the 21st day of February 2022.
xiii. Exhibit C13
– Voice recording of GHAZI MUSTAPHA ALI poaching employees of the Claimant
reduced into a flash drive.
4. The Defendants
called Bayode Joseph Olusunde (DW1) who adopted his Witness’s Statement on oathas
his evidence in chief. In the course of his testimony, DW1 tendered 2 documents
which were admitted and marked as Exhibits D1 and D2:
a. Offer letter dated 10th
January 2020 Exhibit D1
b. Work Rule Violation/Termination dated 9th
August 2022 Exhibit D2
The Defendants also called Efe Enejeta, Human Resource
Manager (DW2) who adopted his Witness’s Statement deposed to on the 16th
day of February 2023, as his Evidence in Chief.
Both Defence witnesses were cross examined.
THE CASE OF THE
CLAIMANT
6. The Claimant's
case is that the 1st Defendant, its former employee, breached a Confidentiality
and Non-Competition Undertaking signed on 10th January 2020 by taking up
employment with the 2nd Defendant, which the Claimant says is its direct
competitor operating in the same territory.
The 1st Defendant was employed as Field Quality Assurance Officer by
virtue of letter of employment dated the 10th January 2020 and was exposed to
the Claimant's trade secrets, business methods, client information, technical
know-how, and operational systems. As
part of his employment, he signed both a confidentiality undertaking and a non-compete
clause restraining him, for 3 years and within territories where the Claimant
or its affiliates operate, from working in a similar field or transferring the
Claimant's know-how. Despite that
undertaking, the 1st Defendant secretly joined the 2nd Defendant. The 2nd Defendant is in the same line of
business as the Claimant and is benefiting from the 1st Defendant's training,
skills, and insider knowledge acquired at the Claimant's expense. After being notified by the Claimant's
solicitors, the 2nd Defendant failed to disengage the 1st Defendant and thereby
encouraged or induced the breach.
7. The Claimant avers that the Agreement with
the 1st Defendant is reasonable, valid and legal considering the
surrounding circumstances of the employment of the 1st Defendant and
the Claimant has furnished consideration for the contract on the following
grounds: -
a. The Claimant was responsible for
obtaining the first entry visa of the 1st Defendant for gaining
entry into Nigeria. The Claimant shall rely on Entry Visa obtained for the 1st
Defendant during trial.
b. The 1st Defendant was able to
work in Nigeria in accordance with Immigration Laws pursuant to the Expatriate
Quota of the Claimant and the 1st Defendant was resident in Nigeria
pursuant to the Resident Permit obtained in his favour by the Claimant. The
Claimant shall rely on a copy of the 1st Defendant’s Expatriate
Resident Permit and Expatriate Quota approval during trial.
c. The 1st Defendant while in the
employment of the Claimant held a sensitive position in the operations of the
Claimant and was exposed to immense trade secrets and innovations with the aim
to attain optimal satisfaction of the customers of the Claimant.
d. The employment of the 1st
Defendant by the Claimant is an investment in human capital that is worthy of protection
vide the non-competition agreement and confidentiality undertaking by the 1st
Defendant.
e. The
Claimant applied for leave and traveled to Lebanon on the 12th day
of July 2022 and refused to return on the pretext that he is no longer willing
to continue in the employment of the Claimant.
f. The 1st Defendant in
contravention of his post-employment obligation surreptitiously got employed by
the 2nd Defendant as its Technical Team Leader.
g. The
Claimant states that the 1st Defendant has in further breach of his
post-employment obligation persuaded and poached other employees of the
Claimant to join the employment of the 2nd Defendant, an unfair
action that has the propensity of crippling the business and investments of the
Claimant.
THE CASE OF THE
DEFENDANTS
8.
The Defendants state that the 1st Defendant upon appointment,
continued to work in the Claimant’s Company until the 9th August,
2022 when his employment was terminated without any justification. The Defendants state that the 1st
Defendants appointment with the Claimant was terminated on the said 9th
August, 2022 without any query and fair hearing. The 1st Defendant
was not given an opportunity to defend himself against the allegation made
against him. They state that the non-compete
clause in the 1st Defendant’s Contract of Service Agreement is
unreasonable and oppressive. The
Defendants aver that the Claimant did not offer any special training to the 1st
Defendant through which he may acquire any special skill, technical knowledge
that is capable of being transferred to companies or organization in similar
fields of operation like the Claimants.
That assuming without conceding that the Non-Compete clause in the 1st
Defendant’s Contract of Service Agreement of 10th January 2020 is valid and
inures even after the employment of the 1st Defendant in the
Claimant’s company, the Claimant cannot get benefit thereof because it did not
give consideration, compensation for such restraint either before, during or
after the employment and the 1st Defendant can work anywhere he
chooses after cessation of his employment with the Claimant. The Defendants avers that the 1st
Defendant does not have access to the Claimants trade secrets, future plan and
confidential information and that the subsequent employment of the 1st
Defendant by the 2nd Defendant is not in breach of non-compete
clause in the Contract of Service Agreement dated 10th January 2020 and also
that being a restraint same is in the circumstance of this case unreasonable
oppressive, injurious and offends public policy. The Defendants aver that the 2nd
Defendant only became aware of the facts relating to the said Non-Compete
Agreement in this suit when the Claimant forwarded its letter dated the 28th
day of November 2022 to the 2nd Defendant. The Defendants aver that the 2nd
Defendant was surprised and embarrassed when it received the Claimant’s letter
dated the 9th day of December 2022 where the Claimant unreasonably
demanded that the 2nd Defendant terminate the employment of 1st
Defendant in its company. The Defendants
aver that the Claimant unjustly, unreasonably and disrespectfully attached the
profile of the 2nd Defendant to the documents in this suit with the
aim of sullying the good name of the 2nd Defendant in the public
light. The Defendants aver that the 2nd
Defendant is not a party to the Service Agreement between the Claimant and the
1st Defendant and that the Claimant was merely embarking on gold
digging venture by joining the 2nd Defendant into this action.
9.
The Defendants in counterclaim aver that The Defendants in counterclaim
state that the 1st Defendant was not served with a query or given an
opportunity to defend himself before the Claimant terminated his employment for
alleged misconduct. That at the time of
the employment of the 1st Defendant was terminated, he was not paid
any compensation or severance package.
He was not given one month notice or any money in lieu of one month
notice of termination of employment by the Claimant. The Defendants state tat the termination of
the 1st Defendant from the Claimant was wrongful and contrary to
fair hearing as he was not informed of any alleged misconduct or given an
opportunity to defend himself before the termination of his employment by the
Claimant. Before the sacking by the
Claimant, the 1st Defendant was earning the sum of $2000 (Two Thousand Dollars)
monthly and was also entitled to annual performance bonus and medical insurance
which is given annually. The Defendants'
position is that the restraint clause cannot stop the 1st Defendant from taking
a new job after leaving, the 2nd Defendant is a stranger to that contract, and
the Claimant is the party actually owing the 1st Defendant money.
CLAIMANT’S REPLY TO
THE STATEMENT OF DEFENCE
8. In reply, the Claimant states that the
non-compete undertaking signed by the 1st Defendant was meant to operate after
the employment ended, not only during employment; it would make no sense to say
the restraint applied only during employment, because the contract did not
contemplate the 1st Defendant working for another employer while still in the
Claimant's service. The
Claimant states further that the 1st Defendant travelled on leave
with an intention not to return as he was due to return to work on the 2nd
day of August 2022, but failed and after several attempts to have the 1st
Defendant back to work, he refused to resume, hence the Claimant had no option
but to terminate the employment and avert the loses accruing to the Claimant
pursuant to the deliberate absenteeism of the 1st Defendant from
work. At the time the 1st
Defendant applied for leave he had no intention of returning to the employment
of the Claimant as he surreptitiously emptied the apartment secured for him by
the Claimant and withdrew his children from school without informing the
Claimant. The Claimant upon noticing the manner of departure of the 1st
Defendant reached out to the 1st Defendant vide WhatsApp message of
the 20th day of July 2022. inquiring about the future of the 1st
Defendant with the Claimant. The
appointment of the 1st Defendant was terminated pursuant to the
abscondment from duty by the 1st Defendant and the 1st
Defendant never questioned or protested the termination of his appointment
because he was resolute on not returning to the employment of the Claimant at
time he went on leave as aforesaid in view of the fact that he refused to
return to work weeks after the expiration of his leave without any reason. The discreet departure of the 1st
Defendant under the pretext of going on leave amounts to a breach of contract
of employment by the 1st Defendant, as the contract of employment
cannot be abruptly disrupted by a party in the manner done by the 1st
Defendant. The Claimant further states that the Non-competition Undertaking
executed by the 1st Defendant is reasonable, fair and protective of
the interest and investment of the Claimant in Human Capital Development. The 1st Defendant was recruited on
the recommendation of the parent company of the Claimant in Beirut having
acquired enormous expertise and while in the employment of the Claimant he
operated as the Field Quality Assurance Officer, a position that afforded him
an opportunity of growth and contact with the clients of the Claimant, thereby
exposing the 1st Defendant to sensitive trade secrets expertise and
experience on the credit of the Claimant. The Claimant that it has furnished
sufficient consideration to a post contract obligation from the Defendant as
the 1st Defendant had voluntarily executed the Undertaking and has
in the course of his employment garnered experience and has been exposed to
sensitive business secrets which he has transmitted to the 2nd
Defendant for its benefit albeit wrongfully.
The Claimant further states that as the Field Quality Assurance Officer,
the 1st Defendant occupied a prominent position in the employment of
the Claimant and had access to trade secrets, that accounts for the execution
of Confidentiality Undertaking dated the 10th day of January 2020 to
restrain the 1st Defendant from divulging sensitive and valuable
trade secrets, which the 1st Defendant has breached by deploying the
trade secrets to the benefit of the 2nd Defendant.
9. The 2nd Defendant became aware of the
restriction, and after making inquiries through its HR officer, still continued
to retain the 1st Defendant in employment; because of that, the 2nd Defendant
is said to be a necessary party and to have induced or collaborated in the
breach. In response to the Defendants'
counterclaim, the Claimant says that: that the 1st
Defendant was queried for work rule violation during the course of his
employment and the termination of his employment was sequel to his abscondment
and after efforts were made to reach to resume work to no avail. The 1st
Defendant/Counter Claimant having deserted his employment post unannounced by
travelling on leave and refusing to return is not entitled to any compensation
or severance package as the departure and extinguishment of the relationship by
the 1st Defendant breaches the contract of employment between the
parties. The 1st Defendant
has the obligation to give one month’s notice of his intention to resign from
the employment of the Claimant and to also comply with the Non-competition
Undertaking, which he has woefully failed.
The 1st Defendant/Counter Claimant having absconded and
refused to return prior to the termination of his employment, the opportunity
of granting him fair hearing was not available and impracticable following the
desertion of the Counter Claimant.
DEFENDANTS'
SUBMISSIONS
10. The Defendants
formulates the following issues for determination:
1.
Is this suit
as constituted valid in the light of Section 68 (e) of the Federal Competition
and Consumer Act 2019?
2.
Whether based
on the facts and evidence adduced in this case, the Claimant has proved its
case on the preponderance of evidence as required by law to be entitled to the
reliefs sought?
3. Whether the Defendants have
established and proved their Counter Claim?
11. One issue one; the
Defendants submit that the present action is predicated entirely on a
restrictive covenant, namely the Non-Competition Undertaking allegedly executed
by the 1st Defendant in favour of the Claimant. In law, covenants in restraint
of trade are prima facie unenforceable unless shown to be reasonable as between
the parties and consistent with the public interest. Reliance is placed on Andreas
I. Koumolis v. Leventis Motors Ltd (1973) 11 SC 100 and Dr. Shinsh
Tanksale v. Rubee Medical Centre Ltd (2013) LPELR-21445 (CA). The Defendants further contend that the
relevant statutory regime is the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection
Act 2019. By section 1 FCCPA, one of the objectives of the Act is to prohibit
restrictive and unfair business practices which prevent, restrict or distort
competition. More specifically, section 68(e) FCCPA permits restrictive clauses
in contracts of service only to the extent that the restriction, whether during
or after termination, does not exceed two years. The covenant relied upon by the Claimant
imposes a restraint for three years. The Defendants therefore argue that the
covenant is inconsistent with section 68(e), void, contrary to public policy,
and unenforceable. On that footing, the Claimant's suit, being anchored on the
enforcement of an invalid covenant, is said to be not maintainable and liable
to dismissal. The Defendants also argue
in the alternative that, even on the wording of the clause itself, the
three-year period ran from 28 November 2018 and had already expired before the
alleged breach occurred.
12. One issue two;
the Defendants submit that the Claimant has failed to prove its case on the
balance of probabilities as required by section 134 of the Evidence Act 2011.
Reliance is placed on Health Care Products Nigeria Ltd v. Bazza (2004) 3
NWLR (Pt. 861) 582 at 605-606. The
Claimant, to succeed, must prove:
13. The Defendants
argue that the Claimant failed to establish any legitimate proprietary interest
warranting protection by a restrictive covenant. While the Claimant alleged
exposure of the 1st Defendant to trade secrets, trade data, know-how, training,
and confidential business information, no credible evidence was led to
identify; the actual trade secrets, the specific confidential processes, the
1st Defendant's access to such information, or how any such information was
deployed to the benefit of the 2nd Defendant.
On this point, the Defendants rely on C.F.A.O. v. George Lilbro
(1918) 3 NLR 67, where the Court held that a party seeking to enforce a
restraint must show that the employee had access to trade secrets and was in a
position to disclose them to a rival. They also rely on Newbreed
Organisation Ltd v. J.E. Erhomosele (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt. 974) 499 at 545
paras C-D, for the principle that pleadings unsupported by evidence are deemed
abandoned. The Defendants further argue
that the covenant is unreasonable in its geographical scope, economic reach,
and duration. They cite Infinity Tyres Ltd v. Mr. Sanjay Kumar & 3 Ors,
NICN/LA/170/2014, judgment delivered 10 July 2018, where the Court held that
reasonableness is assessed by reference to the geographical area covered, the
economic activity restrained, and the duration of the restraint.
14. Here, the
covenant applies to all local and international territories where the Claimant
or its affiliated, sister, or parent companies operate. The Defendants submit
that this is excessively wide and oppressive. They also contend that the
Claimant failed to clearly define the exact scope of its field of activity,
thereby making the economic reach of the restraint vague and limitless. The Defendants additionally rely on 7th Heaven
Bistro v. Mr. Amit Desphande, NICN/LA/396/2018, judgment delivered 27
September 2018, for the proposition that the reasonableness test must balance
the interests of the employer, the employee, and the public. They submit that
the covenant, if enforced, would unduly deprive the 1st Defendant of his right
to earn a living and would not serve the public interest in fair
competition. The Defendants submit that
since the covenant is void, expired, or otherwise unenforceable, the mere fact
that the 1st Defendant took employment with the 2nd Defendant cannot amount to
breach. They argue that no valid post-employment restraint subsisted at the
material time. The Defendants contend
that the 2nd Defendant was not a party to the contract between the Claimant and
the 1st Defendant and cannot be fixed with liability for inducing breach. In
any event, the 2nd Defendant only became aware of the alleged covenant after
receiving the Claimant's letter. Since the underlying covenant is said to be
invalid or unenforceable, there was no actionable breach capable of being
induced.
15. The Defendants
then submit that the Claimant is not entitled to the declaratory or monetary
reliefs sought. First, declaratory
reliefs are not granted as a matter of course; they must be established by
credible evidence. The Claimant, in the Defendants' view, has failed to prove
enforceability of the covenant, breach by the 1st Defendant, or inducement by
the 2nd Defendant. Second, the claim for
N30,000,000.00 special damages, or alternatively general damages, has not been
proved. The Defendants argue that no credible evidence of actual loss, injury,
diversion of business, misuse of confidential information, or measurable damage
was adduced. They therefore submit that the claim for damages is speculative
and must fail. On issue three, the
Defendants submit that their counterclaim has been proved and ought to be
granted. Their case is that the 1st
Defendant is entitled to his unpaid employment benefits, including his annual
performance bonus.
CLAIMANT'S
SUBMISSIONS
16. The Claimant raised two issues in its Final
Address, namely:
1. Whether the Claimant has established its claim and thus
entitled to the reliefs prayed by the present suit?
2. Whether the Counter Claimants are entitled to the reliefs
prayed by the Counter Claim?
17. One issue one;
the Claimant submits that the burden rests on the party asserting facts to
prove them, and that it has discharged that burden by credible pleadings,
documentary evidence, and oral testimony. Reliance is placed on sections
131(1), 131(2), and 132 of the Evidence Act 2011, as well as Akande v. Adisa
(2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1324) 538 at 558 paras. A-G. The Claimant argues that the employment
relationship between itself and the 1st Defendant is undisputed and was
governed by Exhibits C1, C2, and C3, being the employment offer, non-competition
undertaking and confidentiality undertaking. These documents, it submits,
created binding contractual obligations that both parties were bound to honour.
On the binding nature of contract terms, the Claimant relies on Fedpoly,
Idah v. Egbeke (2023) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1865) 227 at 256 paras. F-G. It is further submitted that the 1st
Defendant voluntarily executed the non-compete undertaking and that the
Defendants admitted the execution of the agreement. Accordingly, the Claimant
argues that admitted facts require no further proof, citing Eweje v. O. M.
Oil Ind. Ltd (2021) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1765) 117 at 142 para. E. The Claimant also
contends that parties are bound by their pleadings and cannot depart from them,
relying on BAC Electrical Co. Ltd v. Adesina (2020) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1745)
548 at 566 paras. B-C. The Claimant
maintains that the non-compete undertaking was clearly intended to operate as a
post-employment obligation, not merely during the subsistence of employment.
Its argument is that the contract of employment did not permit the 1st
Defendant to take another job while still in the Claimant's service, and therefore
the covenant could not sensibly have been meant to expire during the currency
of the employment. The Claimant points out that this position was reinforced in
cross-examination when the 1st Defendant admitted that he was not permitted to
take another job while employed by the Claimant.
18. The Claimant
further argues that the 2nd Defendant carries on the same business as the
Claimant and operates in the same territory, namely Lagos, Nigeria. It says
this fact was supported by Exhibit C4, the 2nd Defendant's profile, and was not
specifically denied in the pleadings. On the effect of failure to specifically
deny pleaded facts, the Claimant relies on Balogun v. E.O.C.B. (Nig.) Ltd
(2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1028) 584 at 600 paras. E-F.
According to the Claimant, the 1st Defendant breached the non-compete
undertaking by taking employment with the 2nd Defendant, while the 2nd
Defendant became liable because, after being notified of the restrictive
covenant and the ongoing breach through Exhibits C5 and C6, it refused to
disengage the 1st Defendant and continued to benefit from his services. On the
liability of a third party who, after notice, continues to employ a person in
breach of a restrictive covenant, the Claimant relies heavily on Nissan
(Nig.) Ltd v. Yoganathan (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1183) 135 at 153 paras. B-H and
158 paras. B-C. The Claimant submits
that the covenant is reasonable and enforceable because it protects its trade
skills, confidential information, client exposure, and investment in human
capital development. It emphasizes that the 1st Defendant worked for over three
years, acquired expertise while in the Claimant's employment, and that DW2
admitted under cross-examination that the 2nd Defendant employed the 1st
Defendant because of his expertise in pest control. The Claimant characterizes
this evidence as an admission against interest and relies on Offodile v.
Offodile (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1698) 189 at 211 para. F. The Claimant also attacks the Defendants'
evidence as contradictory. It argues that the Defendants simultaneously
contended that the covenant expired during the 1st Defendant's employment and,
at the same time, that it was unreasonable and oppressive. The Claimant says
these are inconsistent positions amounting to approbation and reprobation. On
this point, it relies on Intercontinental Bank Ltd v. Brifina Ltd (2012)
13 NWLR (Pt. 1316) 1 at 22 para. H. It further submits that the contradiction
was repeated in the witness deposition and oral evidence, thereby undermining
the credibility of the defence, citing Emeka v. Okoroafor (2017) 11 NWLR
(Pt. 1577) 410 at 514 paras. B-D.
19. Issue two – the
counterclaim; the Claimant submits that a counterclaim is a separate and
independent action, and the Counter-Claimants bear the burden of proving it on
the balance of probabilities. The Claimant relies on Susainah (Trawling
Vessel) v. Abogun (2007) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1016) 456 at 488 paras. B-E, section
131(1) and 132 of the Evidence Act 2011, and Access Bank Plc v. Ogboja Plc
(2022) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1812) 547 at 581 paras. B-C.
The Claimant argues that the Counter-Claimants failed to prove their
core assertion that the non-compete obligation ran only during the 1st
Counter-Claimant's employment. He points
out that the Claimant expressly pleaded that the 1st Defendant could not have
exhausted the restraint period while still employed because he had no liberty
to take another job during that time, and this was confirmed by DW1 under
cross-examination. The Claimant emphasizes that this pleading was not specifically
denied, and therefore is deemed admitted, relying on P.I.P.C.S. Ltd v.
Vlachos (2008) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1076) 19 paras. B-C. The Claimant also submits that DW1 and DW2
gave contradictory evidence on whether the restraint could expire during
employment. It argues that such contradiction renders the Counter-Claimants'
case unreliable and cites Osadim v. Taiwo (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1189) 155
at 180 para. C. As to the
Counter-Claimants' alternative prayer that the non-compete clause is
unreasonable, oppressive, contrary to public policy, and yet also expired upon
termination, the Claimant contends that the relief is self-defeating and
internally contradictory. It argues that the Court should not grant a strange
or inconsistent relief and again relies on Nissan (Nig.) Ltd v. Yoganathan
at 156 paras. G-H. The Claimant says the Counter-Claimants are merely advancing
inconsistent positions to evade liability, likening this to a sham defence. For
that proposition, it cites Okoli v. Morecab Finance (Nig.) Ltd (2007) 14
NWLR (Pt. 1053) 37 at 69 paras. A-C. The
Claimant further submits that the Counter-Claimants' declaratory reliefs must
fail because declaratory reliefs are not granted as a matter of course and must
be supported by credible and sufficient evidence. On that standard, the
Claimant relies on Ofongo v. APC (2022) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1821) 543 at 573
paras. G-H.
21. Regarding the 2nd
Counter-Claimant's prayer that there is no cause of action against it, the
Claimant argues that this misconceives its case. Its complaint against the 2nd
Defendant is not that it was a party to the original contract, but that, after
being notified of the 1st Defendant's post-employment obligations, it retained
him and induced the continuing breach. The Claimant says its pleadings disclose
all the material facts necessary for a cause of action and relies on Egbe v.
Adefarasin (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) 549, where cause of action was defined as
the factual situation which, if proved, entitles the plaintiff to a
remedy. On the 1st Counter-Claimant's
claim for N1,000,000 annual performance bonus, the Claimant submits that no
contractual basis was pleaded or proved. It argues that rights and entitlements
in a master-servant relationship depend on the agreed terms of employment,
citing Umera v. NRC (2022) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1838) 349 at 395 paras. D-E and Adebayo
v. O.A.U.T.H.C.M.B. (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt. 673) 585 at 607 para. B. The Claimant also argues that the
Counter-Claimants failed to file a reply to the Defence to Counter-Claim where
the Claimant had pleaded that the resignation was abrupt, that the bonus and
medical insurance claim was an afterthought, and that the monetary reliefs were
baseless. Since a counterclaim is an independent action governed by the usual
rules of pleadings, the failure to reply amounts to an admission. On this, the
Claimant relies on Effiom v. Ironbar (2000) 11 NWLR (Pt. 678) 344 at 357
para. C, Order 33 Rule 2 of the NICN Rules 2017, and Ansa v. Ntuk (2009)
9 NWLR (Pt. 1147) 557 at 590 para. D.
Lastly, on the claim for N5,000,000 general damages, the Claimant
submits that the Counter-Claimants did not prove any wrongful act by the
Claimant or any loss flowing from such act. It cites Osuji v. Isiocha
(1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 623 at 636 para. C on the nature of general damages,
and argues that even general damages require a proven wrongful act as
foundation.
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ON
POINTS OF LAW
22.
The Defendants in reply submit that the Claimant's assertions that the
1st Defendant acquired special expertise, skills, and know-how from the
Claimant are speculative and unsupported by evidence. They argue that courts
decide cases on evidence, not conjecture. For this proposition, they cite Zabusky
v. Israeli Aircraft Ind. (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1070) 109 at 133 paras. F-G for
the principle that courts are not given to speculation. They also submit that where there is any
conflict in oral testimony, documentary evidence is the safest guide to the
truth. On that point, they rely on BFI Group Corp v. B.P.E. (2012) 18
NWLR (Pt. 1332) 209 at 236 para. E, where the Supreme Court emphasized that
documentary evidence serves as the hanger on which the truth may be unearthed.
The Defendants therefore contend that the Claimant's failure to tender
documentary proof of the alleged skills transfer, trade secrets, or specialized
training - particularly in light of the payback agreement wording in Exhibit C3
- leaves the Claimant's assertions speculative and unproved.
23. On whether the
Counter-Claimants are entitled to the reliefs sought in the counterclaim; the
Defendants reply specifically to the Claimant's argument that failure by the
Counter-Claimants to file a further reply to the Claimant's defence to
counterclaim amounts to an admission of the facts raised therein. The
Defendants submit that this is a wrong statement of law. Their argument is that a reply is not
required where the original pleading has already joined issues on the relevant
facts. In other words, where the statement of claim or counterclaim has already
asserted facts contrary to those later repeated in the defence, no further
reply is necessary because the issues are already joined. For that proposition, the Defendants rely on Iwuoha
& Anor v. NIPOST Ltd & Anor (2003) LPELR-1569(SC), where the
Supreme Court held that a reply to a statement of defence is only necessary
where the facts raised have not already been addressed by the earlier pleading,
and that duplicative pleadings are unnecessary once issues have been joined. The Defendants therefore maintain that they
and the Claimant had already joined issues in respect of the counterclaim, and
that their failure to file a further reply cannot be treated as an admission of
the Claimant's averments in defence to counterclaim.
COURT’S DECISION
24. Having considered the pleadings, evidence,
exhibits, and submissions of learned counsel, I find that the issues that call
for determination are:
1.
Whether the Non-Competition Undertaking dated 10th
January 2020 is valid and enforceable against the 1st Defendant.
2.
If issue one is answered in the affirmative, whether
the Claimant has proved that the 1st Defendant breached the undertaking and
that the 2nd Defendant induced or promoted that breach.
3.
Whether the Claimant is entitled to the declaratory
and monetary reliefs sought.
4.
Whether the Defendants/Counterclaimants have proved
their counterclaim.
Issue One - Whether the
Non-Competition Undertaking dated 10th January 2020 is valid and enforceable.
28. The law is settled that covenants in
restraint of trade are prima facie unenforceable unless shown to be reasonable
with reference to the interests of the parties and the public. See Andreas
I. Koumolis v. Leventis Motors Ltd (1973) 11 SC 100. The reasonableness of
such a covenant depends on its duration, geographical scope, subject matter,
and the proprietary interest sought to be protected. See also Infinity Tyres
Ltd v. Sanjay Kumar & Ors NICN/LA/170/2014 and 7th Heaven Bistro v.
Amit Desphande NICN/LA/396/2018. The
starting point must be the text of Exhibit C3. The clause provides as follows:
Due to the
significance and materiality of the consideration provided by the company and
in consideration of the benefits I received, the sufficiency of which is hereby
acknowledged, I agreed that within all local and international territories
where Boecker or any of its affiliated or sister or parent companies and for a
period of three (3) years, I shall not directly or indirectly own, manage,
operate, use, work in similar filed and/or transfer information or know how of
any kind including without limitation technical and managerial know how any
training accreditation, any client information, any system or method of work or
administration related to the company or its fields of activity.
29. Two questions immediately arise from relief
one sought in this case:
·
whether the restraint is to run during employment or
after cessation; and
·
whether, in either event, it is reasonable and enforceable.
On the first question,
I agree with the Claimant that the more sensible construction of the clause is
that it was intended to operate post-employment. A construction that it was to
expire during the subsistence of employment would render the clause
commercially pointless, since the 1st Defendant could not in the ordinary
course lawfully take up employment with a competitor while still in the
Claimant's service. DW1 himself acknowledged under cross-examination that he
was not permitted to take another employment while in the employment of the
Claimant. I therefore reject the Defendants' contention that the covenant was
exhausted merely by the passage of three years during active service. That, however, does not conclude the
matter. The Defendants also argued that
section 68(e) of the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2019
limits such restrictions to two years.
30.
The Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act (FCCPA) 2019 is very
instructive on this issue. It makes
provisions governing restrictive covenants in Nigeria and that; amongst other
objectives that it has which relate to competition and consumer protection, and
unfair business practices. Section 1 of
the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2019 provides as follows:
The objectives of the Act are:
Promote
and maintain competitive markets in Nigeria;
(a) Promote economic efficiency;
(b)
Protect and promote the interest and
welfare of consumers by providing consumers with wider variety of quality
products at competitive prices;
(d)
prohibit restrictive and unfair
business practices which prevent, restrict or distort competition or constitute
an abuse of a dominant position of market power in Nigeria
(e) Contribute to the
sustainable development of the Nigerian economy.
31.
In line with the general principle of law earlier stated, the FCCPA 2019
disallows restraint of trade and competition by Companies but it has also
advanced same by providing a significant exception to the position of the law.
Specifically on the issue of restraint of trade, section 68(e) of the Federal
Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2019 provides as follows:
Nothing
in this Act prohibits:
A contract of service
in so far as it contains provisions by which a person agrees to accept
restrictions as to work whether as an employee or otherwise in which that
person may engage during or after the termination of the contract and this
period shall not be more than two (2) years.
32. I am not persuaded that the FCCPA point is
decisive here. In my respectful opinion, even apart from section 68(e), the
Court must still test the covenant against the long-settled common law and
labour-law principles governing restraint of trade. Whether or not the FCCPA
applies directly, the covenant must still be shown to be reasonable. The principle in C.F.A.O. v. George Lilbro
(1918) 3 NLR 67 remains instructive: an employer seeking to enforce a restraint
must show that the employee had access to trade secrets and placed himself in a
position to disclose them to a rival. Mere pleading is not enough. See also Newbreed
Organisation Ltd v. Erhomosele (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt. 974) 499. The covenant here is also extremely wide. It
extends not merely to Lagos or Nigeria, but to all local and international
territories where the Claimant or its related companies operate. It also
restrains the 1st Defendant from working in a "similar field" without
sufficiently narrowing the economic activity covered. This geographic and temporal scope is vastly
overbroad, punitive, and industry-stifling. A three-year blanket restriction on
a worker's right to seek alternative livelihood in their field of expertise is
oppressive and contrary to public policy.
33. The Claimant has urged the Court to enforce
the restraint only within Nigeria. While
the Court cannot rewrite the parties’ covenant; the Court can excise from a
contract, any part that is excessive, and enforce that which is reasonable. The Claimant has tendered
in evidence, as Exhibit C5, the
profile of the 2nd Defendant showing that the 2nd
Defendant carries on the same business as the Claimant, in Lagos, Nigeria. This
places the 2nd Defendant in the category of employers not to engage
the 1st Defendant after leaving the employment of the Claimant;
locally.
34. The
Claimant led evidence that:
·
The
1st Defendant during his
employment with the Claimant as the Field Quality Assurance Officer was exposed
to business and trade data with a view to engender efficiency and optimal
performance by the 1st Defendant in the operations and business of
the Claimant as the Technical Engineering Officer/Operation Officer of the
Claimant.
·
The
1st Defendant’s act of taking employment with the 2nd
Defendant its arch – rival in the same location is greatly prejudicial to its
business as the 1st Defendant has been exposed to all the trade and
operational secrets of the Claimant in the course of his employment with the
Claimant.
35. In the La
Casera Company Plc v Mr. Prahlad Kottappurath Ganghadaran (unreported
Appeal No. CA/L/1059/2016, judgment delivered on the 9th
of July 2025) the Nigerian Court of Appeal addressed the doctrine of restraint
of trade, non-compete clauses, and executive employment. The landmark case
focused on a 5-year restrictive covenant and a high-profile corporate
resignation. The La Casera Company Plc
(Appellant/Employer) and Mr. Prahlad Kottappurath Ganghadaran
(Respondent/Former Chief Operating Officer).
Mr. Prahlad resigned from his role as COO on November 27, 2012 and soon
joined a direct industry competitor as a New Business Development Manager. The Court of Appeal invalidated the
indefinite restraint, holding that a perpetual restriction on employment was
inherently unreasonable and contrary to public policy. The Court upheld the
five- year restraint, finding it reasonable in the circumstances, given the
Respondent’s sensitive position, access to confidential information, and the
competitive nature of the beverages industry.
As Chief Operating Officer, the Respondent exercised oversight across
the organisation and had access to sensitive strategic and operational
information capable of causing significant competitive harm
post-employment.
36. The position of
the Court of Appeal in disallowing the restraint in the LaCasera case
with respect to the clause relating to restraint in perpetuity, is comparable
to the restraint in this case applying “within all local and international
territories where Boecker or any of its affiliated or sister or parent
companies and for a period of three (3) years”.
The scope is indeed too wide to be enforced. It is instructive that in the said case of LaCasera,
the Court justified the five-year ban based on the proof of the position of
the Respondent in the company. I have
considered the evidence led in this case, and find that the Claimant is in the
same business with the 2nd Defendant, and within the same locality of Lagos,
Nigeria. The Claimant gave evidence of
the 1st Defendant having customer connection and as having acquired enormous expertise while in
the employment of the Claimant as Field Quality Assurance Officer. Further,
in the clause in question, the 1st Defendant affirmed to having received
adequate consideration in exchange for the restraint. The clause started as follows:
Due to the significance and
materiality of the consideration provided by the Company and in consideration
of the benefits I received, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged
An employee of the 1st Defendant’s status cannot feign
ignorance of the import of the above clause; and would not be allowed to deny
receiving any consideration in exchange for the restraint, as he now
argues. I am convinced in the
reasonableness of the restraint, only with respect to Lagos; the locality where
both the Claimant and the 2nd Defendant, operate. The position the 1st
Defendant occupied as Field Quality Assurance Officer, was such as can harm the
business of the Claimant if taken freely to a competing company as the 2nd Defendant. Exhibit C13, which content is not denied,
shows a record of the 1st Defendant poaching the staff of the Claimant in a
blatant and brazen manner. The evidence
of the DW2 shows that the DW2 started dealing with the 1st Defendant before he
joined the 2nd Defendant and he was employed because of his expertise, as he
was employed because of his expertise in pest control. However, I find it unreasonable to restrain
the 1st Defendant “within all local and international territories where Boecker
or any of its affiliated or sister or parent companies”. With
respect to the three years restraint, I adopt the two years permissible
restraint provided in section 68(1)(e) of the Federal Competition and Consumer
Protection Act (FCCPA) 2019, which provides a statutory and thereby more
context into the use of clauses governing post-contract work restrictions in
contracts of service or contracts for the provision of services. Apart from the provision of the FCCPA, I find
a two-year restraint reasonable in the circumstances of this case.
37. Issue Two - Whether the 1st Defendant
breached the undertaking and whether the 2nd Defendant induced that
breach. From the finding under issue
one, the 1st Defendant breached the undertaking, to the extent found by the
Court to be reasonable; that is, as it relates to Lagos and for within two
years. On the issue of the 2nd Defendant
inducing the Claimant to breach his contract, the Claimant in this case, in exhibit
C13 established the active poaching of the Claimant’s staffs for the benefit of
the 2nd Defendant. I do not
agree with any suggestion that the 2nd Defendant was not aware of
the activities of the 1st Defendant, actively enticing the staff of
the Claimant for its benefit. I do not
accept that there is no cause of action against the 2nd Defendant before
and after the letters of 28th November and 9th December.
38. Issue three - Whether the Claimant is
entitled to the declaratory and monetary reliefs sought. Having resolved Issue One in favour of the
Claimant only in part, namely that the Non-Competition Undertaking is
enforceable only to the extent that it restrains the 1st Defendant within Lagos
and for a period of two years, and having further found under Issue Two that
the Defendants breached that enforceable restraint, I now turn to the reliefs
sought by the Claimant. The Claimant seeks two
declaratory reliefs and monetary reliefs in damages. A declaratory relief is not granted as a
matter of course. A party seeking it must succeed on the strength of its own case
and place sufficient credible evidence before the Court. In the present case,
the Claimant tendered Exhibits C1, C2 and C3 showing the employment
relationship, the confidentiality undertaking and the non-competition
undertaking. I have already held that the restraint in Exhibit C3 is not wholly
void, but is enforceable only within reasonable bounds; that is, within Lagos
and for two years post-employment. I have also found that the 1st Defendant, by
taking employment with the 2nd Defendant in Lagos within that enforceable
restraint period, acted in breach of the undertaking to that limited
extent. Accordingly, relief (a) succeeds
only in part. It is hereby declared that the 1st Defendant is in breach of the
Non-Competition Undertaking dated 10th January 2020, to the extent
that the undertaking validly restrained him from taking up similar employment
within Lagos for two years after the cessation of his employment with the
Claimant.
39. On relief (b),
the Claimant asks for a declaration that the 2nd Defendant induced and promoted
the breach by retaining the 1st Defendant in its employment. I have found
evidence of the 1st Defendant inducing staff of the Claimant for the benefit of
the 2nd Defendant. The 2nd Defendant therefore
cannot escape responsibility. I declare that the 2nd Defendant
induced and promoted the breach of post-employment obligations by the Claimant
by retaining the 1st Defendant in its employment in breach of the
Post-Employment Obligations of the 1st Defendant.
41. I now consider
the monetary claims. The Claimant claims N30,000,000.00 as special damages, or
alternatively N30,000,000.00 as general damages. Special damages must be specifically pleaded
and strictly proved. The Claimant was under a duty to show actual loss flowing
from the breach, such as diversion of customers, loss of business, misuse of
confidential information, identifiable pecuniary loss, or some computation
linking the Defendants' conduct to the amount claimed. That was not done. No
concrete evidence was led to justify the sum of N30,000,000.00 as special
damages. The claim for special damages therefore fails. The alternative claim for general damages
stands on a different footing. Once a breach of contractual obligation is
established, the Court may award general damages as compensation for the legal
injury flowing naturally from the breach. The Claimant has established that the
1st Defendant breached the enforceable part of the non-compete clause. The
Court has also found that the 2nd Defendant was complicit in the breach. Although the Claimant did not prove special
damage in the strict sense, it is plain that some injury flowed from the
violation of the enforceable covenant. That
said, the Court must be careful not to reward overreach. The covenant as
drafted was excessively wide, and the Claimant has only succeeded in part. The
damages to be awarded must therefore reflect the limited success of the
Claimant and the restricted extent to which the covenant has been upheld. The
Claimant sought for N30,000,000 as general damages. In my view, an award of N10,000,000.00 against
the Defendants, as general damages is fair and reasonable in the
circumstances. On the claim for costs,
costs ordinarily follow the event. Since the Claimant has succeeded only in
part, I assess costs at N3,000,000.00 in favour of the Claimant.
43. Issue Four -
Whether the Counterclaim has been proved.
A counterclaim is a separate and independent action and must stand or
fall on its own evidence. See Susainah (Trawling Vessel) v. Abogun
(2007) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1016) 456 and Access Bank Plc v. Ogboja (2022) 1 NWLR
(Pt. 1812) 547. The Counterclaimants
seek declarations that the non-compete clause covered only the period of
employment, or alternatively that it is unreasonable and unenforceable. I have already held that the argument that
the covenant operated only during the subsistence of employment is not
persuasive; and that the restraint as it relates to Lagos is reasonable. I also
reject the contention that it simply expired by passage of three years during
employment. Those declaratory reliefs therefore fail. On the prayer that the 2nd Counterclaimant is
not a party to the contract, that much is true as a matter of privity; however,
the Claimant's case against the 2nd Defendant was not based on privity but on
alleged inducement of breach. The proper question is not whether the 2nd
Defendant signed the contract, but whether the Claimant disclosed a cause of
action against it. The pleadings did disclose one, as held under issue
three. I therefore decline to grant the
declaration that there was no cause of action against the 2nd Defendant. On the claim for “An order that the Claimant
pay to the 1st counter (sic) the sum of N2, 000, 000 (Two Million
Naira) covering One month in lieu of Notice for wrongful termination of
employment being the sum of N1, 000, 000 (One Million Naira) and the sum of N1,
000, 000 (One Million Naira) for July, 2022 monthly salary; I find no basis to
make this order. The Claimant gave
uncontradicted evidence of how the 1st Defendant went on leave, refused to
return and only to join the 2nd Defendant.
The 1st Defendant cannot be rewarded for absconding from work. The Defendants tendered exhibit D2 which
clearly gave an account of the 1st Defendant’s abscondment from work leading to
his termination. These reliefs fail for
being unjustified. The claim for
N5,000,000.00 general damages equally fails as no actionable wrong by the
Claimant has been sufficiently established to warrant that award. The counter claim fails in its entirety.
Judgment is entered
accordingly.
--------------------------------------------
Hon. Justice (Prof) Elizabeth A. Oji