IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OFNIGERIA
IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT LAGOS
BEFORE HON. JUSTICE JOYCE A. O. DAMACHI
DATE 13th JULY 2026
SUIT NO: NICN/LA/220/2022
BETWEEN
MS ADENIKE LYDIA OLAYIWOLA …….. CLAIMANT
AND
DE UNITED FOODS INDUSTRIES LIMITED DEFENDANT
JUDGEMENT
INTRODUCTION
CLAIMANTS CASE
2. The Claimant was initially employed by the Defendant on 7 March 2016 as an Apprentice (Office Assistant) on a contract basis and was later offered permanent employment as a Human Resources Assistant, effective 2 January 2022. In that role, she worked directly under the Defendant's Group HR & External Relations Director, Chief Kola Hassan, whom she alleges subjected her to persistent verbal abuse and intimidation.
3. On 4 April 2022, the Claimant received an invitation to appear before a seven-man fact-finding committee investigating an anonymous defamatory letter allegedly sent to Chief Kola Hassan. Following the panel's hearing on 7 April 2022, which the Claimant alleges was conducted without affording her a fair hearing, she was issued a query on 8 April 2022 accusing her of being the author of the letter. She responded to the query on the same day.
4. Thereafter, the Defendant terminated the Claimant's employment by a letter dated 11 April 2022. The Claimant further alleges that following her dismissal, Chief Kola Hassan threatened to use his influence and connections to humiliate and intimidate her. She claims she subsequently received threatening phone calls from unknown persons and was subjected to police harassment, causing her psychological trauma, pain, and emotional distress.
5. Aggrieved by what she considers to be the wrongful termination of her employment and the alleged violation of her fundamental rights, the Claimant instructed GRAYLAW Partners to institute this action seeking redress and the payment of her employment benefits under the Defendant's Employee Handbook.
6. The trial commenced on the 17th June 2025 with the examination in chief of the Claimant MS. ADENIKE LYDIA OLAYIWOLA (CW1) the following documents were tendered and admitted by the Court and accordingly marked as follows:
Exhibit C1 - Offer of Appointment dated 12th December 2019.
Exhibit C2 - Letter of Contract of Appointment dated 7th March 2016
Exhibit C3 - Fact Finding/Disciplinary Committee Invite dated 4th April 2022
Exhibit C4 - Query Letter dated 8th April 2022
Exhibit C5 - Claimant’s Response to Query dated 8th April 2022
Exhibit C6 - Termination Letter dated 11th April 2022
Exhibit C7 - Claimant’s Solicitor firm letter dated 5th May 2022
Exhibit C8 - Claimant’s Solicitor firm second letter dated 10th May 2022
Exhibit C9 - Letter of Invitation
DEFENDANTS CASE
7. The Defendant is a registered Nigerian company involved in food production, with its witness being the HR/Administrative Manager at its Ota branch. The witness claims that many of the Claimant’s allegations are false and misleading.
8. Specifically, the witness states that the Claimant was initially hired on a one-year contract in March 2016 and only became a full employee after confirmation on 24 July 2020, following a fresh offer in December 2019. The witness confirms that the Claimant’s termination on 11 April 2022 was lawful, with full benefits paid, including one month’s salary in lieu of notice. However, the Claimant failed to complete the required final clearance as mandated by the Employee Handbook.
9. The defendant witness denies that the Claimant was intimidated or harassed by Chief Kola Hassan, asserting that the Claimant never filed any complaints. The witness attests that the termination process was fair, impartial, and guided by natural justice. A fact-finding committee was set up to investigate a defamatory letter against Chief Hassan, and the committee was independent and impartial. After careful review, the committee implicated the Claimant, leading to her termination. The defendant witness denies any police instigation by the Defendant, affirming that Chief Hassan acted independently. Ultimately, the witness claims that the suit is frivolous, an abuse of process, and should be dismissed with costs.
10. The following documents were admitted and marked:
Exhibit D1 - Letter dated 24th July 2020
Exhibit D2 - Letter dated 12th December 2019
Exhibit D3 - Letter dated 7th March 2016
Exhibit D4-Letter of Termination dated 11th April 2022
Exhibit D5 - Employee Handbook
Exhibit D6-Confirmation of Receipt of Employee Handbook
Exhibit D7 - Letter of Invitation dated 4th April 2022
Exhibit D8 - Report of the Fact Finding/ Disciplinary Committee dated 7th April 2022.
Exhibit D9 - Letter of Query dated 8th April 2022.
Exhibit D10 - The Claimant’s response to the query letter issued to her dated 8th April 2022.
Exhibit D11 - Letter of withdrawal of petition dated 13th May 2022.
Exhibit D12 - Affidavit confirming withdrawal of petition dated 13th May 2022.
11. DEFENDANTS FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS
12. ISSUE 1 “Whether from the facts and evidence before this court, the Claimant has been able to establish her case to warrant the intervention of this court by the grant of the relief sought”
The Defendant contends that the Claimant failed to prove any wrongdoing by the Defendant, and therefore, she is not entitled to the reliefs sought. They emphasize that the burden of proof rests on the Claimant, as established by the Supreme Court in key cases, including Odunukwe v. Administrator-General.
13. That the Claimant’s claims, such as wrongful termination and lack of fair hearing, are unsupported by evidence. The Defendant argues that the employment relationship was governed by the four key exhibits (offer letter, contract, confirmation, and employee handbook), which set out the terms of her employment and its termination. They assert that the Defendant complied with these terms, including paying one month’s salary in lieu of notice.
14. The Supreme Court precedent in Kaydee Ventures held that parties are bound by agreed contract terms. The Claimant failed to prove any breach of these terms, as the Defendant terminated her employment in line with the contract. Thus, the Claimant’s claims fail.
15. Additionally, the Defendant argues that the Claimant’s claims for general and specific damages were not proven. For general damages, the Claimant failed to present legal evidence of entitlement. For specific damages, the Claimant did not particularize or strictly prove the amounts claimed. Thus, the Defendant urges the Court to dismiss the suit for lack of proof, as the employment termination complied with the contract, and no damages were properly established.
16. ISSUE 2 Whether the Claimant was not accorded right of fair hearing and whether she did not waive her right to fair hearing when she failed and refused to utilize the opportunities accorded to her?
17. The Defendant argues that the panel set up by the Defendant complied with the principles of fair hearing. They rely on Exhibits D7 (invitation), D8 (query), and D10 (Claimant’s response), asserting that the Claimant was invited, present, and given a chance to respond—facts she admitted during cross-examination.
18. They argue that, since the Claimant was given a full opportunity to defend herself, she waived her right to fair hearing by choosing not to fully utilize that chance. The Defendant also states that the Claimant failed to report any harassment via the employee handbook channels. Furthermore, they assert that, during the panel, she had the chance to cross-examine witnesses but chose not to, and at trial, she avoided key questions.
19. The Defendant argues that the Claimant’s conduct showed she deliberately waived her right to fair hearing, citing case law (e.g., Eze v. FRN) that fair hearing can be waived if a party chooses not to fully engage. They urge the Court to dismiss the Claimant’s claims, as she failed to prove a denial of fair hearing. Ultimately, the Defendant argues that the Claimant must succeed on the strength of her own case, which, they assert, lacks sufficient evidence.
20. ISSUE 3: Whether this honorable court has the jurisdiction to entertain and validly decide this suit without Chief Kola Hassan being joined as a necessary party
The Defendant argues that the court lacks jurisdiction because the Claimant did not join Chief Kola Hassan, the central figure of her allegations. They point out that multiple paragraphs of the Claimant’s statements contain personal accusations against Hassan, who must defend himself. They cite Supreme Court cases (e.g., AMCON v. Suru Worldwide (20240 18 NWLR (Pt 1970), Jegede v. INEC(2021)14 NWLR (Pt1797) Pg 578 emphasizing that a necessary party’s presence is crucial; without him, the suit is incompetent. The Claimant’s failure to join Hassan deprives the court of jurisdiction. Thus, they urge the court to dismiss the case in its entirety, asserting the Claimant failed to prove her case and urging an award of costs to the Defendant.
21. CLAIMANTS FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS
22. ISSUE 1: Whether from the facts and evidence before this court, the claimant has not been able to establish her case to warrant the intervention of this court by the grant of the relief sought
23. The Claimant submits that she has discharged the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities by producing credible evidence of her employment, confirmation, satisfactory service, and termination. While the Defendant admits terminating her employment, it has failed to justify the termination with credible evidence.
24. The Claimant argues that where an employer relies on misconduct as the reason for terminating an employee, the employer bears the burden of proving the alleged misconduct. Since the Defendant justified the termination on the ground that the Claimant authored an anonymous defamatory letter, it was incumbent upon the Defendant to establish that allegation. The Claimant relies on authorities which hold that once an employer gives a reason for termination, the Court is entitled to examine whether the reason has been proved.
25. She further contends that the burden of proof shifted to the Defendant once she established the existence of her employment and the fact of its termination. The Defendant, however, failed to discharge that burden, as it produced no credible evidence linking her to the alleged defamatory letter.
26. The Claimant submits that the allegation against her amounted to misconduct with criminal implications and, therefore, required proof beyond reasonable doubt. She argues that the Defendant failed to meet this standard, relying instead on the report of a disciplinary panel which she describes as biased, lacking independence, and devoid of evidential value.
27. The Claimant also argues that the Defendant's reliance on the Letter of Appointment and Employee Handbook is misplaced. Although parties are generally bound by the terms of their contract, the National Industrial Court is empowered under Section 254C of the Constitution to apply international best practices in labour relations. Consequently, an employer must act fairly and not arbitrarily, even where the contract permits termination.
28. She further submits that the Defendant cannot rely on its contractual right to terminate without assigning any reason because, having actually assigned misconduct as the reason for her dismissal, it became legally obliged to justify that allegation. The payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice, she contends, does not cure a termination founded on unproven allegations of misconduct. The Claimant maintains that the disciplinary process was fundamentally flawed because:
29. She also points out that the alleged anonymous letter, which formed the basis of her dismissal, was never produced before the Court or shown to her during the disciplinary proceedings. Furthermore, the Defendant's witness admitted that he was not a handwriting expert and merely relied on information supplied by members of the panel, thereby failing to establish that the Claimant authored the letter.
30. Finally, the Claimant argues that the Defendant's reliance on her alleged failure to complete clearance formalities is misconceived, as clearance is merely a post-termination administrative process and cannot defeat her claim for wrongful termination or deprive her of her employment benefits.
31. Accordingly, the Claimant urges the Court to hold that she has proved that her employment was wrongfully terminated, the disciplinary process was unfair and unlawful, and the Defendant failed to prove the misconduct upon which it purportedly relied to terminate her employment.
32. ISSUE 2: Whether the claimant waived her right of fair hearing from the totality of fact and evidence adduced in this suit
33. The Claimant contends that the Defendant's assertion that she was accorded fair hearing, or that she waived her right to fair hearing, is misconceived and contrary to established legal principles.
She argues that the right to fair hearing is a fundamental constitutional right under S.36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, and any disciplinary proceedings conducted in breach of that right are null and void.
34. The Claimant submits that fair hearing is not satisfied merely because an employee is invited to a disciplinary panel, attends the hearing, or responds to a query. Rather, the process must be fair, impartial, free from bias, and consistent with the principles of natural justice.
35. She argues that the disciplinary proceedings were fundamentally flawed because the panel was investigating allegations involving the Group HR Director, Chief Kola Hassan, who had allegedly threatened her before the proceedings by stating that he would use his influence to "deal with her" and make an example of her. According to the Claimant, this created a reasonable apprehension of bias and deprived her of an impartial hearing.
36. The Claimant further contends that she did not waive her constitutional right to fair hearing. On the contrary, she honoured the invitation to the panel, appeared before it, and responded promptly to the query issued against her. These actions, she argues, demonstrate that she actively exercised, rather than abandoned, her right to be heard.
37. She distinguishes the authorities relied upon by the Defendant, arguing that they concern situations where a party voluntarily declined to participate in disciplinary proceedings. In the present case, the complaint is not one of non-participation but of a process tainted by bias and procedural unfairness.
38. The Claimant also submits that the allegations against her, which involved purported authorship of a defamatory letter, carried criminal implications. Consequently, the Defendant was required to ensure that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted by an impartial panel and in strict compliance with the rules of natural justice.
39. She further argues that the Defendant's reliance on the Employee Handbook and its contention that she failed to report alleged harassment through internal channels are irrelevant to the issue of whether she received a fair hearing during the disciplinary process.
40. The Claimant also challenges the Defendant's reliance on the panel's characterization of her as "uncooperative," contending that the findings of a panel whose independence is questionable cannot cure the procedural defects or serve as a valid basis for her dismissal.
41. Finally, the Claimant submits that once a breach of fair hearing is established, the entire disciplinary proceedings and the resulting termination are rendered a nullity, irrespective of the merits of the allegations. She therefore urges the Court to hold that the disciplinary process was biased, procedurally defective, and conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice, and that she did not waive her constitutional right to fair hearing.
42. ISSUE 3: Whether or not the court can decide wholly on this matter without Chief Kola Hassan being joined in this suit?
43. The Claimant submits that the Defendant's objection that the Court lacks jurisdiction because Chief K. Hassan was not joined as a party is misconceived and contrary to settled law. She argues that non-joinder does not defeat an action unless the absent party is indispensable for the effectual and complete determination of the issues before the Court.
44. The Claimant contends that the real issue in the suit is whether the Defendant wrongfully terminated her employment, and this issue can be fully determined without joining Chief K. Hassan. She emphasizes that the Defendant, as her employer, is the proper party to answer the claim.
45. She further argues that Chief Kola Hassan acted at all material times as an agent of the Defendant in his capacity as Group HR Director. Consequently, under the principle of vicarious liability, any acts allegedly committed by him in the course of his employment are attributable to the Defendant, making it unnecessary to sue him personally.
46. The Claimant submits that the reliefs sought—declarations of wrongful termination, payment of employment benefits, and damages—are directed solely against the Defendant and do not require any order against Chief Kola Hassan personally. Accordingly, his presence is not essential for the Court to effectively adjudicate the dispute.
47. She also distinguishes the authorities relied upon by the Defendant, arguing that they relate to electoral matters or issues concerning proper parties and are therefore inapplicable to an ordinary employment dispute. The Claimant further contends that even if Chief Kola Hassan were considered a necessary party, the appropriate remedy would be an order for joinder rather than dismissal of the suit, since non-joinder is merely a procedural irregularity that does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction.
48. Finally, the Claimant submits that the allegations concerning Chief Kola Hassan were pleaded only as part of the factual background leading to her wrongful termination and not as the basis for any personal relief against him. She therefore urges the Court to hold that the Defendant alone is the proper and sufficient party to defend the action and that the objection based on non-joinder should be dismissed.
49. ISSUE 4: Whether the Claimant, from the totality of facts and evidence adduced at trial, is not entitled to the reliefs as sought?
50. Counsel asserts that it is undisputed, from both pleadings and trial evidence, that the Claimant’s employment was wrongfully terminated. She was falsely accused, subjected to threats by the Defendant and its agents, and suffered significant trauma and hardship. Counsel acknowledges the traditional common law rule that one cannot force a willing employee on an unwilling employer. However, recent National Industrial Court decisions have allowed reinstatement where wrongful termination is proven. In this case, however, the Claimant does not seek reinstatement but damages, given the hostile environment and threats she endured.
Counsel submits that the termination was malicious, arbitrary, and caused significant stigma. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Skye Bank v. Adegun (SUPRA), Counsel argues that damages should cover all consequential losses, not just the notice period.
In conclusion, Counsel respectfully urges the Court to find in favor of the Claimant, as she has proven her case and is entitled to the reliefs sought, including damages, with costs.
DEFENDANTS REPLY ON POINT OF LAW
51. The Defendant argues that the Claimant has failed to discharge the burden of proving wrongful termination. Relying on UTC (Nig.) Plc v. Peters SUPRA and Ude v. Efobi,SUPRA the Defendant submits that it is the duty of an employee alleging wrongful termination to place the terms of employment before the Court and demonstrate how those terms were breached. According to the Defendant, the Claimant neither proved any breach of her contract nor tendered the Employee Handbook containing the applicable termination procedure, whereas the Defendant established that the termination complied with the terms of employment.
52. The Defendant further contends that the Letter of Employment and Employee Handbook constitute the binding contractual framework governing the employment relationship. Citing the principle of pacta sunt servanda and authorities including Union Homes Savings & Loans Plc v. Blue Wing Travel & Tours SUPRA and Skye Bank Plc v. Adegun (SUPRA), the Defendant argues that parties are bound by the terms they freely agreed to and that the Claimant cannot rely on alleged international best practices to evade those contractual obligations.
53. On the issue of international best practices, the Defendant submits that although the National Industrial Court may apply such practices, a party relying on them must specifically plead and prove their existence in accordance with Order 14A Rule 2(1) of the NICN Rules 2017. The Defendant argues that the Claimant neither pleaded nor proved any identifiable international best practice and therefore cannot rely on that doctrine at the address stage.
54. Regarding fair hearing, the Defendant maintains that the Claimant was afforded ample opportunity to defend herself. She appeared before the disciplinary panel, was shown the allegations against her, responded to a query, and was given opportunities to make representations. The Defendant contends that the Claimant chose not to meaningfully respond to the allegations, and that her conduct amounted to a waiver of her right to complain of lack of fair hearing. The Defendant further argues that an employer is entitled to investigate allegations of misconduct through an internal panel and that the procedure adopted was consistent with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Baba v. Nigerian Civil Aviation Training Centre SUPRA
55. The Defendant also reiterates its objection that Chief Kola Hassan was a necessary party to the proceedings. It argues that the Claimant's allegations of intimidation, threats, bias, and victimization were directed personally against him which amounts to personal torts for which Chief Kola Hassan may be personally liable, and failure to join him deprives the Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate upon those issues.
56. Finally, the Defendant submits that the Claimant failed to prove her claims for general and special damages and failed to respond to the Defendant's arguments challenging those claims. The Defendant argues that this omission amounts to an admission of its position and is fatal to the Claimant's claim for damages. In conclusion, the Defendant urges the Court to dismiss the suit in its entirety, contending that the Claimant failed to prove wrongful termination, failed to establish any breach of contract or international best practice, failed to prove her entitlement to damages, and instituted a claim that is speculative, incompetent, and lacking in merit.
COURT DECISION
57. The case before this court is an employment dispute commenced by the Claimant challenging the termination of her employment on 11th April 2022. The Claimant alleges that her termination was wrongful, tainted by a lack of fair hearing before an investigative panel, and instigated by personal animosity and victimization by the Defendant's Group HR Director, Chief Kola Hassan.
58. On the other hand, the Defendant contends that the Claimant’s employment was lawfully terminated in accordance with the terms of her contract of employment, that she was accorded a fair hearing during an internal investigation into an anonymous defamatory letter, and that this Court lacks jurisdiction due to the non-joinder of Chief Kola Hassan.
59. Having carefully considered the pleadings, evidence adduced by the parties, the documentary exhibits tendered, and the final written addresses of learned counsel, this Court is of the considered view that the issues raised by the parties can conveniently be distilled into the following for determination:
Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction to determine this suit due to the non-joinder of Chief Kola Hassan.
The Defendant argues that because the Claimant made specific, personal tortious allegations against Chief Kola Hassan (the Group HR Director), he is a necessary party whose absence deprives the Court of jurisdiction, relying on AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd (2024) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1970).
60. From the pleading and testimony, parties are in agreement that a contract of employment exists between the Claimant and the Defendant (a corporate entity). The defendant company is a company duly incorporated and also a disclosed principal,
61. In addition, the facts reveal that Chief Kola Hassan was a director with the defendant company as stated in para 14 of the SOF. It is a settled principle of agency, that an agent is a person authorised by another person (principal) to act for or in place of him. That is, one entrusted with another person's business. (P. 81, para. H) Ukpanah v. Ayaya (2011) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1227) 61 CA; (Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited v. Monokpo (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 852) 346
62. Furthermore, the non-joinder of a party does not defeat an action see Green v. Green (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 480). The reliefs sought in this suit—declarations of wrongful termination, payment of entitlements, and damages—are directed solely against the corporate employer, not the director personally. It is the finding of this court that the Chief Kola Hassan acted at the material time as an agent of a disclosed principal, he is merely an employee and a director in the defendant company he is not an indispensable party to the determination of the contract of service. The objection on non-joinder is dismissed. I so hold.
63. Having found that this Court possesses the requisite jurisdiction to determine this suit, I shall now proceed to consider a Fundamental issue, whether the Claimant's right to fair hearing was breached during the disciplinary process that culminated in the termination of her employment.
64. The Claimant contends that the Fact-Finding/Disciplinary Panel constituted on 7 April 2022 was biased, predetermined, and procedurally defective, and that the disciplinary proceedings culminating in the termination of her employment were consequently null and void. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on Bamgboye v. University of Ilorin (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 290.
65. The law is, however, well settled that an administrative or disciplinary panel established by an employer is not a court of law but merely a domestic fact-finding body. Accordingly, the strict rules applicable to judicial proceedings do not apply to such panels. What the law requires is that the employee be afforded a fair opportunity to know the allegations against him or her and to respond before any disciplinary decision is taken.
66. Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), guarantees the right to fair hearing. It requires that a party be given the opportunity to be heard before their rights are determined. In the context of employment disciplinary proceedings, the Nigerian courts have held in cases like Adegboye v. UBA (2022) LPELR-58778(CA) that the requirement of fair hearing is satisfied if the employee is informed of the allegations against them and given an opportunity to respond. This was the dictum in Baba v. Nigerian Civil Aviation Training Centre (1991) LPELR-692(SC). This is often achieved through the 'query and response' mechanism. In this case, the evidence shows a multi-stage process: first there was an invitation to a fact-finding committee (Exhibit C3/D7); secondly, there was an actual hearing on April 7, 2022; and thirdly, a formal query was issued clearly setting out the allegations against her (Exhibit C4/D9) followed by the Claimant's response (Exhibit C5/D10). These facts are not in dispute.
67. The legal standard for administrative or domestic panels is not the same as a criminal trial; the focus is on 'audi alteram partem' (hear the other side). This sequence of events demonstrates substantial compliance with the principles of audi alteram partem.Since the Claimant admitted to receiving the query and providing a response, the threshold for fair hearing in an employment context appears to have been met. I so find.
68. It is pertinent to note that the Claimant's dissatisfaction with the committee's findings (Exhibit D8) does not equate to a denial of fair hearing. Fair hearing is concerned with the opportunity to be heard and not with whether the decision reached accords with a party's expectations. The law does not guarantee a favourable outcome; it guarantees only a fair opportunity to present one's case.
69. The Court of Appeal in Agwarangbo v. Nakande (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt. 672) 341 reiterated that the essence of the rule of natural justice is that a party must be afforded an opportunity to present his case without let or hindrance.
70. A decision by the Claimant not to answer particular questions or to decline to challenge the evidence presented before the Committee cannot be converted into a complaint against the employer. An employee who has been afforded an opportunity to defend herself but elects not to fully utilise that opportunity cannot subsequently contend that she was denied fair hearing.
The burden rested on the Claimant to establish, by credible evidence, that she was denied the opportunity to present her defence or that the proceedings were tainted by actual bias or circumstances giving rise to a real likelihood of bias. Which was not the finding of the court.
71. In the instant case, beyond the bare allegations contained in her pleadings, no cogent evidence was placed before this Court demonstrating that the Committee was improperly constituted, that she was prevented from presenting her defence, or that the proceedings were conducted in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice. The court took a close look at the composition of the fact finding committee and noted that its membership was culled from different affiliated companies of the defendant as well as relevant labour unions and other members of staff who were suspected to have a hand in the alleged defamatory letter were all invited to appear before the committee.
72. In the circumstances, this court is satisfied that the Defendant complied with the procedural requirements of a domestic disciplinary process. The Claimant was informed of the allegations against her, appeared before the disciplinary panel, received a formal query, and submitted a written response. Consequently, the constitutional and common law requirements of fair hearing were duly observed. The mere fact that the Committee ultimately reached findings adverse to the Claimant does not render the proceedings biased or procedurally defective. I therefore hold that the Claimant has failed to establish that her right to fair hearing was breached during the disciplinary proceedings.
73. Now on whether the Claimant's employment was wrongfully terminated, the Claimant argues that since her termination was triggered by allegations of misconduct (the anonymous defamatory letter), the Defendant was bound to prove the misconduct beyond reasonable doubt she relied on Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. v. Olanrewaju (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 1).
74. It must be noted that the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant is classified as a master-servant relationship, governed strictly by the terms of the contract of service. According to the Supreme Court in U.T.C. (Nig) Plc v. Peters (2022) LPELR-57289(SC), an employer has the inherent right to terminate an employee's appointment at any time and for any reason, or even for no reason at all, provided the termination complies with the terms of the contract especially where notice or payment in lieu of notice are satisfied. see Isheno v. Julius Berger (Nig) PLC (2008) LPELR-1544(SC)).
75. While it is true that where an employer gives a reason for termination, the burden shifts to the employer to justify that reason see Obanye v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc (2018) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1648) 375), this principle applies strictly where the employment is summarily dismissed on those grounds.
76. In this case, the Defendant did not dismiss the Claimant. The Defendant exercised its right under the contract (Exhibit D2 and Exhibit D5) to terminate the employment by issuing a Letter of Termination (Exhibit D4/Exhibit C6) offering one month's basic salary in lieu of notice.
77. The termination letter did not state misconduct as the basis for the termination; it stated that her services were "no longer required." The offer of payment in lieu of notice brings the termination squarely within the terms of the contract of service.
78. The evidence before the court demonstrates that the Defendant issued a Letter of Termination (Exhibit C6/D4) and offered one month's salary in lieu of notice, which aligns with the provisions of the employment contract (Exhibit C1/D2). The Claimant's allegations of bad faith, intimidation, or the unfounded nature of the anonymous letter allegations do not invalidate a termination that complies with the agreed notice period. Consequently, the Defendant acted within its legal rights, and the termination cannot be deemed wrongful under Nigerian labor law principles.
79. The primary test for determining the wrongfulness of a termination is whether the procedure stipulated in the contract (such as the length of notice or payment in lieu) was followed. Where a contract provides for notice or payment in lieu, the employer satisfies the legal requirement by providing such payment. The Claimant's allegations of 'negligence' or 'lack of respect' do not, in themselves, render a termination wrongful if the contractual terms were met.
80. The court's role is not to compel an unwilling employer to retain an employee in a private contract of service. Since the Defendant issued a termination letter (Exhibit D4) offering salary in lieu of notice, the burden shifts to the Claimant to prove that this was a breach of a specific clause in Exhibit C1/D2. Without proof that the notice period was insufficient or the payment was not tendered, the termination is generally held to be lawful, as the motive for termination is irrelevant in a master-servant relationship.
81. The legal justification for this resolution is rooted in the principle that the court will not compel an employer to retain an employee in a private contract of service. In U.T.C. (Nig) Plc v. Peters (2022) LPELR-57289(SC), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that an employer can terminate an employee's services provided the procedure in the contract is followed. Section 11 of the Labour Act, Cap L1, LFN 2004, provides the statutory framework for termination by notice. Specifically, Section 11(6) allows an employer to provide payment in lieu of notice, which the Defendant did in this case. This provision applies here because the Claimant's contract (Exhibit D2) stipulated a notice period that the Defendant satisfied through the offer of salary in lieu. Furthermore, Section 11(9) clarifies how such payments are calculated, ensuring the employee receives the monetary equivalent of their basic wages. Since the Defendant complied with these requirements, the motive for the termination is legally irrelevant, as held in Obanye v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc (2018) LPELR-44702(SC). The termination of the Claimant's employment is hereby declared lawful and consistent with the governing contract of service.
82. The Claimant claims N20,000,000 as general damages and N200,000,000 as specific damages.
Under Nigerian civil procedure, special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved (A.G. Abia State v. A.G. of the Federation (2022) LPELR-57010(SC)). The Claimant failed to provide any particulars or led credible evidence to prove the loss of N200,000,000.
83. General damages are only awarded upon the establishment of a civil wrong flowing from the wrong complained of. Having held that the termination of employment was lawful and complied with the contract of service, no claim for damages can arise.
84. Accordingly, the Claimant's claim for ?20,000,000.00 as compensation for trauma is unsupported by law, as no medical evidence or legal authority was presented to justify such an award. Where termination is lawful, no damages are recoverable; where it is wrongful, the appropriate remedy is limited to salary in lieu of notice and other accrued contractual benefits. Damages in employment contracts remain compensatory rather than punitive, except where proven workplace harassment or similar exceptional circumstances have caused quantifiable harm.
85. The Claimant's claims for general and special damages arising from the alleged wrongful termination have no foundation and are liable to be dismissed.
86. In a master-servant employment relationship, the measure of damages is strictly limited to the salary the employee would have earned during the contractual notice period and any accrued entitlements. Since the Defendant offered one month's salary in lieu of notice, being the notice period stipulated in the contract, the Claimant has already been offered the maximum remedy available in law. Claims for emotional distress, trauma, or loss of reputation are generally not recoverable in employment contract disputes unless supported by proof of an independent tort or exceptional circumstances, which the Claimant failed to establish.
87. The courts have consistently held that a claimant must provide credible evidence to support every item of special damages-Nigeria Security Printing & Minting Plc v. Umoh (2022) LPELR-56924(CA). This requires a high standard of proof, often involving receipts, vouchers, or detailed calculations of loss.
88. In the present case, the Claimant's request for N200,000,000.00 appears as a round figure without a breakdown of how this sum was arrived at. In employment law, specific damages usually cover unpaid salaries, allowances, or bonuses already earned but not paid. The Claimant has not demonstrated how the termination of her role as an HR Assistant resulted in a quantifiable loss of N200,000,000.00. Without specific pleading of the facts constituting this loss and strict proof thereof, the claim fails the legal test for special damages. The court cannot engage in speculation or grant a windfall that is not supported by the evidence of actual financial loss incurred by the Claimant. Consequently, the claim for specific damages is likely to be dismissed for want of proof.
89. This Court finds that:
However, the second arm of Relief 1 succeeds to the extent that the claimant is entitled to one month's salary in lieu of notice and should be paid immediately.
90. Consequently, the 1st arm of Reliefs 1, 2, 3, & 4 are hereby dismissed in its entirety for lacking in merit. While the 2nd arm of Relief 1 succeeds
91. Parties shall bear their respective costs.
92. All sums awarded in this judgment shall be paid within 30 days from the date of delivery of this judgment, failing which they shall attract simple interest at the rate of 10% per annum until fully liquidated.
93. I make no order as to cost. Judgment is accordingly entered.
HON. JUSTICE JOYCE . A. O. DAMACHI
JUDGE
Appearance
Kingsley Kenechukwu Esq. with C.E.Ezechi Esq…for the Claimant
M. Adenaike Esq; I. Lawrence Esq.; M .Hammed Esq.; O. Qudus Esq. M. Abdulhakeem Esq. ---for the Defendant