IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
                   IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION
                              HOLDEN AT PORT HARCOURT

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP:

HONOURABLE JUSTICE BUHARI SANI……...JUDGE

ON WEDNESDAY THE 14^TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026
 
 SUIT NO: NICN/PHC/36/2020
 
 BETWEEN:

OBELEMA K.N. BRIGGS ..........................................……………CLAIMANT
 
AND
 
 1. IBINABO HARRY
 2. CHAIRMAN, RIVERS STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
3. ATTORNEY GENERAL, RIVERS STATE ........................ DEFENDANTS

 
                                     JUDGMENT

 This action was commenced by the Claimant, Obelema K.N. Briggs, vide a General Form of Complaint dated and filed on the 10th day of March, 2020. The complaint was accompanied by a Statement of Facts, List of Witnesses, Written Statement on Oath of the Claimant, and a List of Documents to be relied upon at trial.
 
 By an Amended Statement of Claim dated the 18th day of December 2024, the Claimant sought the following reliefs against the Defendants:
 
1. A Declaration that the Claimant is entitled to fair hearing as guaranteed under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Right.

 2. A Declaration that the Claimant's right to fair hearing under the Constitution and the African Charter was infringed upon by the Defendants in its dismissal of the Claimant from his employment in the State Civil Service (Auditor General for Local Government, Rivers State). 
 3. An Order setting aside the dismissal of the Claimant from his employment in the Rivers State Civil Service (Auditor General for Local Government, Rivers State), and reinstating the Claimant as an employee thereof.

 4. An Order of the Honourable Court for the payment of the salaries, benefits, remunerations and entitlements due the Claimant from the date of his dismissal to the day the judgment of this Honourable Court is complied with at the operative salary rate due an employee such as the Claimant who has been in the employ of the Rivers State Civil Service (Auditor General for Local Government, Rivers State) before his dismissal.

5. An Order for the payment of General Damages in the sum of Twenty Million Naira (N20,000,000.00) only against the Defendants in favour of the Claimant.

 The Defendants, in reaction to the Complaint, filed a Statement of Defence and subsequently an Amended Statement of Defence dated the 1st day of June 2022, along with the Written Statement on Oath of their sole witness. The Defendants contended, inter alia, that the Claimant's employment was validly terminated in accordance with the Rivers State Civil Service Rules, that he was given fair hearing, and that the suit is statute-barred.
 
 At the trial, the Claimant testified for himself as CW1 and tendered several documents which were admitted and marked as Exhibits. The Defendants called one witness, Stella Okojaia (DW1), and tendered documents admitted as Exhibits. At the close of trial, parties filed and adopted their Final Written Addresses. The Defendants' Final Written Address was dated 8th March 2023, while the Claimant's Final Written Address was dated 11th May 2023. The matter was thereafter adjourned for judgment.

 

 CASE OF THE PARTIES

The Claimant's Case:
 The Claimant pleaded that he was employed by the Office of the Auditor-General for Local Government of Rivers State via an Offer of Temporary Appointment dated 10th December 1990, which was subsequently formalized to permanent and pensionable upon his success at the confirmation/promotion examination and interview conducted by the Personnel Management Board (Junior Staff Committee), with his appointment confirmed by a letter dated June 1993 as Auditor Assistant I.
 
 The Claimant averred that in 1994, he was issued a query by the then Director of his Department, Mr. Monday Gbarage, to which he replied. A Disciplinary Committee was subsequently set up to investigate him, headed by the same Mr. Monday Gbarage who issued the query. After the investigation, he was demoted from Grade Level 06 to Grade Level 05.
 
 The Claimant further pleaded that he was invited via an Invitation Letter from the Office of the Auditor-General for Local Governments of Rivers State to attend an interview for promotion to be conducted on the 13th and 14th March 1996. He attended as scheduled but was not allowed to participate in the promotion interview exercise while others were interviewed. When he reported to the 1st Defendant, who was the Secretary of the interview Panel, he was advised to see the Functional Auditor-General, Mr. Monday Gbarage, whose office door was locked. The 1st Defendant then informed him that it was an instruction from the Functional Auditor-General to refuse him from attending the promotion interview.
 
 The Claimant stated that he went back to his outstation location to resume duty and after a year, in October 1997, he came to Port Harcourt for his salary. On reaching the pay point, the Accountant handed over a letter of Termination to him and refused to pay him his salary. He contended that his termination was wrongful because no query was served on him or warning letter issued, and the said Functional Auditor-General was the Head of the Committee that decided the termination without notifying him to defend himself.
 
 The Claimant averred that after the termination, he wrote several letters to the 2nd and 3rd Defendants to intervene in the matter for natural justice, equity and good conscience to prevail, as due process of the Public/Civil Service Rule was not followed. He sought redress in the Rivers State High Court, which matter was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the matter should be heard de novo by the trial Court. He therefore claims the reliefs sought.
 
The Defendants' Case:
 The Defendants pleaded that the Claimant was offered temporary employment as an Audit Assistant on Grade Level 04 Step 1 by a letter dated 10th December 1990, signed by the Auditor-General for Local Government. It is the policy of the Rivers State Civil Service that officers in Grade Levels 01 to 06 are employed directly by the Ministries that need their services.
 
 The Defendants averred that all matters relating to the employment, discipline and retirement/dismissal of officers on Grade Levels 01 to 06 are administered by the Departmental Selection Board (DSB) of the affected Ministry or Department, subject to ratification by the Rivers State Civil Service Commission (the 2nd Defendant) when required by the Public Service Rules.
 
 The Defendants stated that during the Claimant's probation period and before confirmation, his employer had cause to issue two queries to him bordering on his conduct. The first query was issued on 18th November 1991, barely one year after the offer of temporary employment, and the second query was issued in April 1992, less than six months after the first query. The Claimant authored two letters tendering apologies and appealing for leniency in reply to these queries. Notwithstanding this conduct, the Auditor-General magnanimously confirmed the Claimant's appointment in June 1993.
 
 The Defendants further averred that the Claimant continued with acts of misconduct, progressing from malingering and leaving the office without permission to displaying insubordination, disregard for constituted authority, and refusal to adhere to instructions given by his heads of department. He was consequently queried on 9th March 1994. The unsatisfactory behaviour of the Claimant necessitated the Auditor-General to personally minute another query dated 11th March 1994. The Claimant's reply dated 14th March 1994 to the query of 11th March 1994 was deemed a "very serious act of insubordination," and the Deputy Director recommended that the Claimant's conduct be subjected to the deliberations of the Personnel Management Board (Junior Staff Committee).
 
 The Defendants pleaded that the Claimant appeared before the Personnel Management Board (Junior Staff Committee) set up by his Parastatal/Ministry on 28/3/1994 and answered interrogatories regarding the acts of truancy and indiscipline alleged against him. The Board observed that the Claimant was instructed by the Deputy Director to inform other members of staff of a meeting scheduled for 8th March 1994 for briefing on the treasury account. The Claimant, after informing the other members of staff, absconded from the scheduled meeting. The Board also observed that the Claimant refused to sign for the query dated 9th March 1994 until the Deputy Director compelled him to do so. The Board regretted that despite several queries and warnings, the Claimant's attitude of truancy and insubordination persisted, and it resolved to reduce his grade level from 06 to 05, communicated via a letter dated 11th May 1994.
 
 The Defendants averred that the Claimant received the demotion letter but refused to sign for it. He responded with a "Protest Letter" dated 18th May 1994, making unfounded allegations of criminal offences against four of his colleagues. He also caused his solicitors, Amachree & Amachree, to write a letter dated 25th May 1994 threatening legal action. The Office of the Auditor-General replied on 30th May 1994, stating that the Claimant had not exhausted the provisions of the Public Service Rules regulating the procedure for expressing dissatisfaction with a disciplinary decision.
 
 The Defendants further pleaded that the Claimant continued his conduct of truancy, insubordination and disregard for constituted authority, which caused the issuance of another query dated 8th July 1994. The Claimant refused to sign for the query, and his reply was deemed unsatisfactory and filled with disrespectful language. He was issued a warning dated 15th August 1994 in line with the Public Service Rules.
 
 The Defendants stated that the Claimant's behaviour continued to deteriorate to the extent that he absented himself from duty for twenty-one working days between 2nd and 31st January 1996, whilst sneaking into the office to collect his salary for January 1996. He also absented himself without authorisation for another nine working days between 1st and 13th February 1996. These activities were contrary to the Public Service Rules 04201 and 04202, and the appropriate sanction was dismissal, for which he was issued another query dated 14th February 1996.
 
 The Defendants averred that the Departmental Selection Board (Junior Staff Committee) met on 13th March 1996 to consider promotion, upgrading, confirmation and discipline of staff based on the records in the Office of the Auditor-General. The Board considered the activities of the Claimant, including the queries he earned since 18th November 1991 and his conduct after demotion. It was the finding of the DSB (JSC) that the Claimant's conduct merited outright dismissal. However, the decision to terminate his employment instead of dismissal was taken on humane/humanitarian grounds as stated in the minutes of 13th March 1996. This decision was sent to the Rivers State Civil Service Commission for approval, which was granted by a letter dated 26th June 1996.
 
 Consequently, the Claimant was issued a letter dated 15th July 1996 terminating his appointment with effect from 1st August 1996. The Defendants contended that the Claimant was given adequate opportunity to be heard at all times as regulated by the terms of his employment, and that the suit discloses no reasonable cause of action and should be dismissed as unmeritorious, vexatious and a mere gold-digging exercise. They also contended that the action is statute-barred.
 
 
  ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
 
 The Claimant, in his Final Written Address, formulated two issues for determination:
 
 1. Whether the termination of the Claimant's appointment followed the due process of law as such liable to be quashed and the Claimant reinstated.
 2. Whether the suit as constituted is statute barred or not.
 
 The Defendants, in their Final Written Address, formulated three issues for determination:
 
 1. Whether in view of the series of acts of misconduct of the complainant, as averred in the defendants' statement of defence, the defendants are right in the termination of the complainant's employment.
 2. Whether the defendants followed due process as required in the termination of the complainant's employment.
 3. Whether the suit is statute barred, the complainant's right of action having accrued on the 15th of July 1996.
 
 Having considered the issues formulated by the parties, this Court adopts the following as issues for determination:
 
 1. Whether the Claimant's employment was one with statutory flavour.
 2. Whether the termination of the Claimant's appointment complied with the due process of law and the principles of fair hearing.
 3. Whether the suit is statute barred.
 
  PARTIES' SUBMISSIONS
 
The Claimant's Submission:
 Learned Counsel for the Claimant submitted that the Claimant was a confirmed employee whose employment was governed by the Public Service Rules. He argued that the Defendants failed to comply with the mandatory procedure for termination as prescribed by the Rules. Specifically, Counsel relied on Rules 04203 and 04302 of the Public Service Rules, and Rule 04306 (v) and (vi), which require that an officer be notified in writing of the grounds for discipline, given access to documents, and given an opportunity to defend himself before a disciplinary board.
 
 Counsel contended that the Claimant was not invited to the meeting of the Personnel Management Board (Junior Staff Committee) that recommended his termination, and that the Chairman of that Committee, Mr. D.E. Asuru, was also the person who issued the queries against the Claimant. This, he argued, constituted a breach of the nemo judex in causa sua principle. Counsel placed heavy reliance on Shitta-Bey v. Federal Public Service Commission (1981) 1 SC 40, Olaniye v. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599, and Imoloame v. WAEC (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 265) 303, to submit that where an employment has statutory flavour, termination must strictly comply with the enabling statute, failing which the termination is null and void.
 
 On the issue of limitation, Counsel submitted that although the cause of action arose in 1996, the Claimant promptly approached the Rivers State High Court in Suit No. PHC/2876/2010, which was struck out on appeal for improper procedure. Relying on Sifax Nigeria Limited v. Migo Nigeria Limited (2015) LPELR-24655 (CA), Counsel argued that time stops running when an action is commenced in a court that lacks jurisdiction, and that the suit is not statute-barred.
 
The Defendants' Submission:
 Learned Counsel for the Defendants, Uzor Ikenga, Esq., submitted that the Claimant's employment was a purely master-servant relationship governed by the Civil Service Rules. He argued that the Claimant was issued numerous queries between 1991 and 1996 which he answered, and that the Departmental Selection Board (Junior Staff Committee) considered his disciplinary record before recommending termination. Counsel relied on NWOBOSI v. ACB (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 404) 658 and Cadbury Nigeria Plc v. Oni (2012) LPELR-19821 (CA) to submit that an employer has the right to terminate employment for misconduct.
 
 Counsel further argued that the suit is statute-barred, having been filed in 2020, about 24 years after the cause of action arose in 1996. He relied on Section 16 of the Limitation Law of Rivers State, Cap 80, Laws of Rivers State of Nigeria 1999, which prescribes a 5-year limitation period for actions founded on contract. He cited P.N. Udeh Trading Company Ltd. v. Sunday Abere (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 723) 114 and SPDC v. West (2018) LPELR-44290 (CA) to submit that the suit is incompetent and robs the Court of jurisdiction.
 
  COURT'S DECISION
 
 The Claimant was employed by the Office of the Auditor-General for Local Government, Rivers State, via an Offer of Temporary Appointment dated 10th December 1990. His appointment was formalized and confirmed in 1993 as Audit Assistant I, Grade Level 06. Between 1991 and 1996, the Claimant was issued several queries by the Office of the Auditor-General for various acts of misconduct, including malingering, leaving office without permission, insubordination, and absenteeism.
 
 In 1994, the Claimant was demoted from Grade Level 06 to Grade Level 05 by the Personnel Management Board (Junior Staff Committee) based on the queries. The Claimant protested the demotion, but the protest was not upheld. In March 1996, the Departmental Selection Board (Junior Staff Committee) met and considered the Claimant's disciplinary record. The Committee recommended his termination from service. This recommendation was ratified by the Rivers State Civil Service Commission via a letter dated 26th June 1996. The Claimant was subsequently issued a letter of Termination of Appointment dated 15th July 1996, effective from 1st August 1996.
 
 The Claimant contested his termination by first instituting an action at the Rivers State High Court in Suit No. PHC/2876/2010, seeking enforcement of his fundamental rights. That suit was dismissed for being improperly commenced. On appeal, the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/PH/147/2012, in a judgment delivered on 2nd February 2015, held that the Claimant's employment had statutory flavour and that the High Court should have heard the matter on its merits. The Court of Appeal set aside the High Court's decision and ordered that the suit be heard de novo by a different Judge.
 
  Determination of Preliminary Objection
 
 The Defendants raised a preliminary objection that the suit is statute-barred. It is well settled that the issue of limitation of action is a jurisdictional issue which can be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal. The Defendants pleaded the defence of limitation in paragraph 36 of their Amended Statement of Defence and argued it in their Final Written Address.
 
 It is equally settled law that the plea of statute of limitation must be specifically pleaded, and the relevant limitation law must be stated. The Defendants pleaded that "this action is statute barred" but did not specifically plead the Rivers State Limitation Law, Cap 80, in their pleadings. They only introduced the law in their Final Written Address. While this could be fatal, this Court must consider the substance of the objection.
 
 The Claimant's cause of action accrued on 15th July 1996 when his appointment was terminated. He first sought redress at the Rivers State High Court in 2010. The Court of Appeal in its judgment of 2nd February 2015 struck out the suit for being improperly commenced and ordered a fresh trial. The Claimant then filed the instant suit on 10th March 2020, within 5 years of the Court of Appeal judgment.
 
 The settled position of the law, as articulated in Sifax Nigeria Limited v. Migo Nigeria Limited (2015) LPELR-24655 (CA) and Alhaji Haruna Kassim (Trading as Cash Stores) v. Herman Ebert (1966-69) NNLR 75, is that where a matter has been struck out, it remains "pending" for the purpose of limitation. Time stops running against a claimant from the moment an action is commenced. Therefore, the period between 2010 and 2015, when the matter was in court, is discounted for the purpose of computing the limitation period. Consequently, the instant suit, filed in 2020, is not statute-barred.

How ever, the most important and fascinating legal issue is that the initial suit filed at the High Court of Justice, Rivers State which later became subject of appeal before the Court of appeal, was caught by limitation law of Rivers State. As earlier indicated, the Claimant’s cause of action accrued in 1996 and did not first approach the court until 2010, about 14 years after, which is obviously more than 5years contemplated under the limitation law of Rivers State. 

A critical examination of the Sifax’s case principle reveals that it is only applicable where the first action was filed within the limitation period. The rationale is to protect a diligent claimant who commenced an action timeously but lost time in the wrong court. It does not apply to revive a cause of action that was already dead on arrival.
 
 In the instant case, the Claimant did not approach the Rivers State High Court until the year 2010, a period of 14 years after the cause of action accrued. By the time the Claimant filed Suit No. PHC/2876/2010 in 2010, his right of action had already been extinguished by the statute of limitation. The Court of Appeal judgment of 2015, which struck out the 2010 suit for improper procedure, could not have breathed life into a cause of action that had been dead for 9 years. The Court of Appeal merely dealt with the procedural competence of the 2010 suit; it did not and could not override the statute of limitation.
 
 Consequently, the instant suit, filed on 10th March 2020, is grossly statute-barred. The Claimant slept on his rights for 14 years before taking the first step to court. The law does not aid the indolent.
 
 I therefore hold that the Defendants' preliminary objection succeeds. The suit is statute-barred. This Court is robbed of the jurisdiction to entertain the substantive claims. It is a fundamental principle of law that where a court lacks jurisdiction, any proceeding conducted therein, no matter how beautifully conducted, is a nullity. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341.

Since this Court is a Court of first instance, its decisions are subject to appeal at the Court of appeal and having had the opportunity of hearing the matter on merit, I shall proceed to determine the merit of the case. This is because in the event of appeal against the decision and the Court of appeal over ruled this court’s decision on objection regarding limitation period, the court may proceed with the merit of the case without remitting it back for trial on merit.
 
  I shall therefore resolve the issues for determination as follows:
 
 On Issue 1: Whether the Claimant's employment was one with statutory flavour.
 
 The law recognizes three categories of contracts of employment: (a) purely master and servant; (b) servants who hold office at the pleasure of the employer; and (c) employments with statutory flavour. See LONGE v. FBN PLC (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1189) 1.
 
 An employment is said to have statutory flavour when the conditions for appointment and termination are governed by an enabling statute or regulations made pursuant to a statute. In such cases, the employment is protected by the statute and termination must strictly comply with the statutory procedure. See Shitta-Bey v. Federal Public Service Commission (1981) 1 SC 40 and Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599.
 
 In the instant case, the Claimant was employed by the Office of the Auditor-General for Local Government, a department of the Rivers State Civil Service. His employment was confirmed and governed by the Rivers State Civil Service Rules (Public Service Rules). The Court of Appeal, in its judgment in Appeal No. CA/PH/147/2012, explicitly held that the Claimant's employment had statutory flavour and that the Civil Service Commission was the authority vested with disciplinary powers. This Court is bound by that finding.
 
 Furthermore, the Defendants' own pleadings and evidence established that the Claimant's employment was regulated by the Civil Service Rules. The Defendants pleaded the Public Service Rules extensively in their Statement of Defence and relied on the circular with Ref. No. CPSC/8/VOL.11/289 dated 16th July 1979. This confirms that the Claimant's employment was not a mere master-servant relationship but one clothed with statutory flavour.
 
 I therefore hold that the Claimant's employment was one with statutory flavour.
 
 Issue 2: Whether the termination of the Claimant's appointment complied with the due process of law and the principles of fair hearing.
 
 Having found that the Claimant's employment had statutory flavour, it follows that the procedure for his discipline and termination must strictly comply with the Rivers State Civil Service Rules. Any breach of the statutory procedure renders the termination null and void. See Federal Polytechnic, Mubi v. Yusuf (1988) 1 SCNJ 1 and Afribank Plc v. Nwanze (1998) 6 NWLR (Pt. 553) 283.
 
 The Defendants relied on the provisions of the Public Service Rules, particularly Rule 030307 (as quoted in their Final Written Address), which prescribes the procedure for dismissal. The Claimant, on the other hand, relied on Rules 04203, 04302, and 04306 (v) and (vi) of the Public Service Rules.
 
 The crux of the Claimant's complaint is that he was not invited to the meeting of the Departmental Selection Board (Junior Staff Committee) where the decision to terminate his appointment was taken. Exhibit D19X, the minutes of the meeting of 13th March 1996, shows the deliberations of the Committee. The Claimant's name appears in the minutes, and the Committee resolved to recommend his termination. However, there is no indication that the Claimant was present at this meeting or that he was given an opportunity to defend himself before the Committee.
 
 The Claimant also alleged that the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. D.E. Asuru, was the same person who issued the queries against him. This allegation was not denied by the Defendants. The principle of nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be a judge in his own cause) is a fundamental principle of natural justice. Where the accuser is also the judge, the proceedings are vitiated by bias. See NDU v. The State (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 164) 350.
 
 The Defendants argued that the Claimant was given ample opportunity to defend himself through the numerous queries he answered. However, answering queries is not the same as appearing before a disciplinary panel to defend oneself. The Public Service Rules, particularly Rule 04306 (vi), requires that the officer "shall be informed that, on a specific day, the question of his/her dismissal shall be brought before the board and he/she shall be required to appear before it to defend himself/herself." The Defendants did not provide any evidence that the Claimant was invited to appear before the Committee or that he was given access to the documents used against him.
 
 The failure to invite the Claimant to the disciplinary proceedings, coupled with the fact that his accuser chaired the Committee, constitutes a gross violation of the principles of fair hearing guaranteed by Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution and the Civil Service Rules. The termination of the Claimant's appointment is therefore null and void.
 
 I therefore resolve Issue 2 in favour of the Claimant.
 
 Issue 3: Whether the suit is statute barred.
 
 This issue has already been addressed in the determination of the preliminary objection.
 
 Having resolved the issues in favour of the Claimant, I grant the following reliefs:
 
 1. A Declaration that the Claimant is entitled to fair hearing as guaranteed under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
 2. A Declaration that the Claimant's right to fair hearing was infringed upon by the Defendants in the mode of termination of his employment.
 3. An Order setting aside the termination of the Claimant's employment as being in breach of the Claimant's fundamental rights, and null, void and of no effect.
 4. An Order reinstating the Claimant to his employment with the Rivers State Civil Service (Auditor General for Local Government, Rivers State).
 
 As regards the claim for payment of salaries from the date of dismissal until reinstatement, the law is that an employee who is reinstated following a declaration that his termination was null and void is entitled to his salaries and allowances for the period he was out of employment. The Claimant is entitled to be paid all his salaries, allowances and entitlements from the date of his purported termination on 1st August 1996 up to the date of his reinstatement.
 
 However, regarding the claim for General Damages of N20,000,000.00, this Court notes that the Claimant's employment was terminated in 1996, and he has been out of work since then. The Court is empowered to award damages where a termination is wrongful. However, in the circumstances of this case, the primary relief is reinstatement, and the award of general damages is discretionary. The Claimant did not provide sufficient evidence to justify the award of N20,000,000.00 as general damages. I therefore decline to award general damages.
 
 In the final analysis, the Claimant's suit succeeds in part. The termination of the Claimant's appointment by the Defendants is declared null and void. The Claimant is reinstated to his employment with the Rivers State Civil Service (Auditor General for Local Government, Rivers State). The Defendants are ordered to pay the Claimant all his salaries, allowances and entitlements from the date of his purported termination on 1st August 1996 up to the date of filing this suit with the costs of N200,000.00.

As earlier held in this judgment, this suit is statute barred and accordingly struck out.
 
 Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

 

 

HON. JUSTICE BUHARI SANI

JUDGE

 

 

APPEARANCES:

Dr. Uzor Ikenga,Esq, (D.D. Ministry of justice, Rivers State) with Enemausi, Esq, for the Defendants.