IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT NIGERIA
IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
BEFORE HER LADYSHIP HON. JUSTICE O. A.
OBASEKI-OSAGHAE
DATE: NOVEMBER 5, 2026
SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/268/2025
BETWEEN:
USMAN SALISU CLAIMANT
AND
1. NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY SERVICE COMMISSION
2. SENATOR GARBA MUSA MAIDOKI DEFENDANTS
REPRESENTATION
A.Y.
Jibrin for the Claimant, with S.E Ukeh.
James Ocheche
for the 1st Defendant, with Tijjani Abubakar.
No representation
for the 2nd Defendant.
JUDGMENT
Introduction and
claims
[1] The Claimant filed this
Complaint against the Defendants on 8 September 2025 together with the
accompanying processes seeking the following reliefs:
i.
A Declaration that the purported termination of the
Claimant’s appointment by the 2nd Defendant vide letter dated 27th August 2025 is a direct
usurpation of the statutory powers of the 1st Defendant and
therefore unlawful, null and void.
ii.
A Declaration that the failure of the 2nd
Defendant to afford the Claimant an opportunity to answer to any purported
allegations of misconduct leveled against him by the 2nd Defendant
before purporting to exercise the power of termination is repugnant to natural
justice and a breach of the Claimant’s fundamental right to fair hearing.
iii. A Declaration that the purported summary termination of the appointment
of the Claimant without giving the Claimant the required period of notice or
salary in lieu thereof is unlawful and therefore a nullity.
iv. A Declaration that the Claimant having not been validly disengaged
remains entitled to his salary and all other allowances accruable to him as a
Senior Legislative Aide to the 2nd Defendant for the remainder of
the 2nd Defendant’s legislative tenure until 2027.
v.
An Order directing the 1st Defendant not
to recognize or document any substitute or replacement presented by the 2nd
Defendant and/or validate or give effect in any manner whatsoever to the 2nd
Defendant’s letter of termination of appointment dated 27th August,
2025 for being a nullity.
vi. An Order of this Honourable Court mandating the 1st Defendant
to continue to pay to the Claimant all the outstanding salaries and allowances
until the end of the legislative term of the 2nd Defendant in 2027.
vii. General damages in the sum of N20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira)
against the Defendants jointly and severally
viii. 21% percent monthly interest on
the judgment sum from the date of judgment till final liquidation of same.
ix. Cost of action Five Million Naira only.
[2] The 1st Defendant
filed a statement of defence together with the accompanying processes on the 29
September 2025. The 2nd Defendant did not enter appearance or file
any processes in defence. The matter went to trial.
Case of the Claimant
[3] The Claimant’s case on the pleadings is that he is the Senior
Legislative Aide to the 2nd Defendant, a Politician and Senator
representing Kebbi-South Senatorial District. The Claimant averred that he was
employed by the 1st Defendant as a Senior Legislative Aide upon the
recommendation of the 2nd Defendant by a letter dated 11th
August 2023 on Salary Grade Level 16, Step 9, at an annual salary of ?4,018,340.00, having satisfied the statutory requirements for the
appointment. The Claimant averred that the appointment was non-pensionable and
was at the pleasure of the 2nd Defendant on whose recommendation the
1st Defendant can terminate his appointment by giving one month’s
notice or payment of one month salary in lieu of notice. The Claimant averred that
the exercise of the power to recommend termination is subject to due process of
law. The Claimant stated that he accepted the appointment and has diligently
and conscientiously discharged his duties over the last two years of his
engagement; and he has never been queried, accused of misconduct, or found
guilty of violating any code of conduct.
[4] The Claimant averred that he received a letter dated 27th
August 2025 from the 2nd Defendant purportedly terminating his
appointment. The Claimant further averred that the letter written by the 2nd
Defendant to the Chairman of the 1st Defendant accused him of
indulging in activities unbecoming of his appointment. The Claimant stated that
he had not committed any offence or been notified of any disciplinary
allegation or called upon to defend himself against any allegation of wrong
doing, and had not been found guilty of misconduct by any committee. The
Claimant stated that the 2nd Defendant failed to provide particulars
of the alleged misconduct, issue him a query or afford him an opportunity to be
heard or defend himself before relieving him of his employment .The Claimant
averred that, although his appointment is at the pleasure of the 2nd
Defendant, he cannot terminate his appointment without compliance with the due
process of law under the National Assembly Service Commission Guidelines.
[5] The Claimant stated that it is the 1st Defendant that has
the power to hire, fire, and discipline staff for members of the National
Assembly Service based on the recommendation or complaint of a member of the
National Assembly; and that the 2nd Defendant’s termination of his
appointment is null and void. The Claimant stated that the action of the 2nd
Defendant in summarily disengaging him without issuing him a query amounts to a
violation of his right to a fair hearing. The Claimant averred that his
appointment having not been validly terminated, he is entitled to continue to
receive his monthly salary, allowances, participation in
training programs and workshops for the remainder of the 2nd
Defendant’s legislative tenure to run until 2027.
[6] The Claimant (CW) testified.
He adopted his statements on oath which was in the exact terms of the
pleadings. In cross-examination, CW told the court that he is 64 years old, and
that he was employed in 2023 when he was sixty-one (61) years old. CW said he
understood the basic principles of public service, and that he was appointed
because the 2nd Defendant forwarded his name for appointment. CW
admitted that if the 2nd Defendant had not forwarded his name, he
would not have been appointed. CW told the court that the Senator terminated
his appointment, and that he understands what it means for someone’s job to be
at the pleasure of another. CW told the court that the 1st Defendant
did nothing to offend him, and that he joined the 1st Defendant
because the 1st Defendant is his employer, and the 2nd
Defendant Senator has no power to terminate his employment.
Case of the 1st
Defendant
[7] The 1st Defendant’s case on the pleadings is that the Claimant
was given a non-pensionable appointment by virtue of the letter dated 11th
August 2023, and the appointment was at the pleasure of the 2nd
Defendant. The 1st Defendant stated that the 2nd Defendant chose,
selected and appointed the Claimant whose name was sent to 1st
Defendant who then approved and formalized the appointment. The 1st
Defendant averred that the Claimant’s appointment subsists at the pleasure of
the 2nd Defendant and can be determined at any time with or without
reason once his pleasure to that effect is conveyed to it. The 1st
Defendant stated that the need to appoint Aides is for the convenience of the
Legislators who enjoy the freedom to choose and keep their aides. The 1st
Defendant averred that upon the conveyance of the Senator’s pleasure, the aide
is only entitled to one month’s notice or salary in lieu from the 1st
Defendant.
[8] The 1st Defendant averred that the Claimant is not a
regular public servant whose employment is subject to public service rules but
a temporary political appointee whose terms of engagement are contained in his
appointment letter and endures at the pleasure of the 2nd Defendant. The 1st Defendant stated that it
not dabble into disagreements between Legislators and their Aides but
concentrates primarily on statutory functions and responds to the pleasure of a
law maker with regards to appointment and termination of appointments. The 1st
Defendant stated that it’s joinder by the Claimant is wrongful as the pleadings
do not reveal any injury to the Claimant as a result of its actions. The 1st
Defendant states that there is no cause of action disclosed, and that this
action is an abuse of the process of court.
[9] The 1st Defendant’s witness is Margaret Nonju (DW) Legal
officer in the 1st Defendant. DW adopted her statement on oath, it
was in terms of the pleadings. In cross-examination, DW told the court that the
Claimant was appointment by the 1st Defendant on the 2nd Defendant’s
recommendation. DW told the court that
there was no disciplinary action against the Claimant by the 1st
Defendant for not discharging his duties. DW informed the court that the 1st
Defendant did not give the Claimant a letter terminating his appointment, and
he was not paid one months salary in lieu of notice. DW told the court that
Exhibit C2 did not emanate from the 1st Defendant but is addressed
to the 1st Defendant. DW informed the court that the 2nd
Defendant does not have the power to terminate the employment; and that Exhibit
C2 is a recommendation for termination.
Final Address
[8] The 1st Defendant’s final address is dated 21st July
2026 and filed the same day. The Claimant’s final address is dated 4th
September 2026 and filed on the same day. The Parties adopted their respective
addresses and made oral submissions.
[9] The 1st
Defendant submitted four issues for determination:
i.
Whether the Claimant is a civil/public servant whose
disengagement is subject to application of Public Service Rules or a Political
appointee?
ii.
Whether a willing servant can be hoisted on an
unwilling master?
iii.
Whether the Claimant’s claim discloses any
reasonable cause of action warranting the filing of same against 1st
Defendant?
iv.
Whether the Claimant’s claim is not based purely on
sentiment and what is the place of sentiment in the judicial process?
[10] Learned counsel
submitted on issue 1 that the Claimant is not a regular civil or public
servant whose disengagement is governed by the Public Service Rules or the
Conditions of Service (COS) in the National Assembly Service, but rather a
political appointee whose terms of service are contained in his letter of
appointment, admitted as Exhibit C1. He submitted that the COS constitutes the
principal regulatory framework governing the National Assembly Service and was
made pursuant to Section 19 of the National Assembly Service Act, 2014. He
referred to COS: Section 5, Rules 02501, 02503, 02504. He further submitted
that by the Claimant’s own evidence, his appointment is non-pensionable, short
term, and is at the pleasure of the 2nd Defendant. Counsel submitted
that the Claimant is a political appointee who despite being 61 Years old at
the time of appointment, the appointment inured because he is not a regular
civil servant.
[11] Learned counsel submitted that the Claimant’s demand for
administrative proceedings over alleged misconduct is misconceived because his
appointment terms do not contemplate such proceedings but instead leave its
continuation to the discretion of the 2nd Defendant citing Ibama v. Shell Dev. Co. Ltd. (2005) 24 NSCQR
190 at 192. submitting that the contract document governs the determination
of a wrongful termination claim. He submitted that the Claimant’s claim of
wrongful termination is premature because the 1st Defendant has not
issued a termination letter, and has not ststed that Exhibit C2 is a valid
termination letter.
[12] Learned counsel on
issue 2 submitted that Exhibit C2 is a request by the 2nd
Defendant to the Chairman of the 1st Defendant for the Claimant’s
formal disengagement. He submitted that on the evidence, the Claimant is a
willing servant who cannot hoist himself or be hoisted on the 2nd
Defendant who has indicated his unwillingness to keep the Claimant. He
submitted further that an unwilling employer cannot be compelled to accept an
employee merely because the employee is willing to work, citing Obo v. Commissioner of Education (2001) 5
NSCQR 192 at 194.
[13] Learned counsel on 1ssue 3 submitted that the Claimant’s pleadings
and evidence do not disclose a reasonable cause of action against the 1st
Defendant. He submitted that a cause of action comprises the combination of
facts and circumstances giving rise to a right to seek a remedy in court,
including the material facts necessary to establish entitlement to success citing
Udoh v. Abere & Anor (2001) 6 NSCQR
579 at 580, Ratio 1. He submitted that the absence of a cause of action affects
the court’s jurisdiction, and that the
principal claim, rather than ancillary reliefs, determines whether a cause of
action exists. He cited Onadeiko v. UBN
(2006) All FWLR (Pt. 301) 1873 at 1875, Sea Trucks Limited v. Aniboro (2001) 5
NSCQR 120 at 121.
[14] Learned counsel on
issue four submitted that the Claimant’s action is founded on
sentiment rather than enforceable legal rights, and that sentiment has no place
in the judicial process citing Ogele v.
Omoleye (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 276) 809 at 82. Counsel submitted that this
suit is an abuse of court process and cited Ogoejeofo
v. Ogoejeofo (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 301) 1792 at 1795. He then urged the
Court to dismiss the suit with substantial costs to the 1st
Defendant.
[15] The
Claimant submitted three issues for determination:
I.
Whether the Claimant’s employment as a
Non-Pensionable staff of the 1st Defendant is a creation of Statute
and therefore regulated by the National Assembly Service Commission Guidelines,
2023 having regard to the combined effect of Exhibits C1 and C3?
II.
Whether the 2nd Defendant’s letter of
termination of appointment of the Claimant dated 27th August, 2025
is competent in law same having not been issued by the 1st Defendant?
III.
Whether the purported termination of the Claimant’s
appointment is not unlawful and therefore liable to be set aside for violating
the principles of natural justice and the Claimant’s constitutional right to
fair hearing?
[16] Learned counsel argued
issue 1 and 2 together. He submitted that the National Assembly Service Commission Guidelines, 2023 (Exhibit C3) is
the extant regulatory framework for the appointment, administrative regulation
and management of legislative aides for Senators. He submitted that the
Guidelines were made pursuant to Section 19 (1) of the Act, which empowers the
National Assembly Service Commission to make staff regulations concerning
conditions of service, appointments and disciplinary matters. He submitted that the Claimant
was appointed by the 1st Defendant by letter dated 11th August
2023 (Exhibit C1), as Senior Legislative Aide to the 2nd Defendant, and
that the 2nd Defendant’s authority is limited to recommending the
termination, while the actual power to terminate rests with the 1st
Defendant. He argued that the Claimant’s employment enjoys statutory flavour because
it is regulated by the Act and the Guidelines citing Central Bank of Nigeria v. Igwillo (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1054) 393 at 420,
para. A.
[17] Learned counsel referred to Article 1 of the National Assembly
Service Commission Guidelines 2023 and submitted that it is the prerogative of
the Parliamentarian to select and recommend for a non-pensionable appointment
his legislative aide to the National Assembly Service Commission, and the
tenure of the legislative aide is subject to the discretion of the principal.
It was also his submission that disengagement is to follow due process. He
submitted that although the Claimant’s employment is at the pleasure of the 2nd
Defendant, the Guidelines must be followed before his appointment can be
validly terminated, and that the 2nd Defendant’s letter of
termination is incompetent in law having not been issued by the 1st
Defendant.
[18] Learned counsel on issue 3 submitted that the purported termination
is unlawful and liable to be set aside for violating the principles of natural
justice and the constitutional right to fair hearing under Section 36(1) of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). Counsel
submitted that administrative tribunals are bound to observe the rules of
natural justice, which are principles of fairness also enshrined in the
Constitution, citing Adigun v.
Attorney-General, Oyo State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 53) 678 at 707, para. G. That
the principles of natural justice extend beyond strictly judicial tribunals to
bodies empowered to adjudicate matters involving civil consequences for
individuals, he cited Adeniyi v.
Governing Council of Yaba College of Technology (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 300) 426 at
451, paras. B–C.
[19] Learned counsel argued that Exhibit C2 in which the 2nd Defendant’s
notified the 1st Defendant that the Claimant indulged in activities
unbecoming of his appointment is a denial of his right to a fair hearing as the
2nd Defendant is the accuser, prosecutor and judge in his own cause.
He contended that he was not issued a query, or afforded an opportunity to
respond to the allegation or defend himself before the termination and that fair
hearing requires that the person accused know the allegation against him, be
present when evidence against him is presented, and have a fair opportunity to
contradict or correct that evidence, citing Garba
v. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550 at 618, paras. D–E,
Cross River State v Young (2013) 11 NWLR
(PT.1364)1 at 25, paras F-H, Shell
Petroleum Development Co Ltd v Olarewaju (2008)18 NWLR (PT.1119)1, at 20 par A.
He argued that the 1st Defendant stopped the Claimant’s salary on
the strength of Exhibit C2 without independently investigating the allegation;
and that these acts breached the principles of natural justice.
[20] Learned counsel submitted that there is a cognizable legal right of
the Claimant requiring protection of the Court. He submitted that the suit has
disclosed a reasonable cause of action against the Defendants citing Hado Nigeria Lid & Anor v Chrisbrown
Intl Ltd & Anor (2013)
LPELR-21171, Okonjo v Omuni (2007) LPELR-8734 CA, Rinco Construction Co Ltd v
Veepee Industries Ltd (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt 929) 85 for the meaning of cause of
action. He submitted that the Claimant’s action is founded on law and not on
sentiments. It was his further submission that the 2nd Defendant
failed to defend the suit; and that the evidence of the Claimant was not
challenged or controverted by the 2nd Defendant and is therefore
deemed admitted. He cited Nwokolo v
Nwokolo (2018) LPELR-45035 (CA). He submitted that where an employer gives
a reason for terminating the employment of the employee, the burden is on the
employer to justify the reason citing Skye
Bank Plc v Adegun (2024) LPELR-62219 (SC), Institute of Health ABU Hospital
Management Board v Mrs Jumman R.I.Anyip (2011) LPELR-1517 (SC). He then
urged the Court to enter judgment in favour of the Claimant.
Decision
[21]
I have carefully
considered the processes filed by the parties, the oral and documentary evidence,
the submissions by counsel and the authorities cited in final addresses. The
law is settled that in the determination of employment rights, it is the
employee who complains that his/her employment contract has been breached that
has the burden to place before the Court the terms and conditions of his/her
employment that provides for his/her rights and obligations, and the manner
such terms and conditions were breached; see Oforishe v Nigerian Gas Co Ltd (2017) LPELR-42766 (SC), Buka Modu Aji v
Chad Basin Development Authority & Anor (2015) 3-4 SC (Pt III) 1 at 15, Idoniboye-Obe v. NNPC [2003] 2 NWLR (Pt. 805) 589 at 630. The Claimant has placed before the Court his
letter of appointment (Exhibit C1), 2nd Defendant’s letter (Exhibit
C2), NASS Guidelines (Exhibit C3). The 1st Defendant did not place
any documentary evidence before the Court but relied on the Claimant’s
documents.
[22] The issues that arise for determination
are as follows:
1)
Whether the Claimant’s employment is one with
statutory flavor?
2)
Whether there is a cause of action disclosed against
the 1st Defendant?
3)
Whether on the pleadings and evidence the
Claimant ought to be entitled to judgment?
[23]
The Claimant’s letter of appointment written by the 1st Defendant is
reproduced:
11th
August, 2023.
NASS/SEN/SLA/PF/311
Usman Saliwu Zuru
C/o
Senior Garba Musa (Maidoki)
National Assembly Complex,
Abuja.
LETTER OF APPOINTMENT AS SENIOR LEGISLATIVE AIDE
I write to offer you a non-pensionable
and short-term appointment as Senior Legislative Aide in the National Assembly
on Salary Grade Level 16 Step 5 which is ?4,018,340.00 per annum with effect from
the date you assume duty.
2. Your
appointment is at the pleasure of Senator Garba Musa (Maidoki) and you are to
serve as his Senior Legislative Aide.
3. On
the recommendation of your Principal the Commission may, at any time terminate
your appointment by giving you one month’s notice in writing or by the payment
of one month’s salary in lieu of notice. You may terminate your appointment by
giving one month’s notice in writing or by paying one month’s salary in lieu of
notice.
4. You
are expected to inform this office in writing of your acceptance of this offer
within two (2) weeks from the date of this letter and to take the appointment
immediately.
5. Congratulations!
Ologbonyo, S. Ayo
Director, Zonal Offices and Legislative
Aide
For: Executive Chairman.
[24] The Claimant asserts that his
employment is with statutory flavor. The status of an employment is determined
by recourse to the contents of the letter of appointment, and case law. The
mere fact that an employer is an institution established or created by statute
does not ipso facto clothe all its
appointments with statutory flavor. An employment with statutory
flavor is one that was
provided for and protected by the provisions of the law establishing his
employer. It enjoys the protection of the statute creating it as
enacted by the National Assembly; and the conditions for appointment and
termination of the employment contract are governed and protected by the
enabling statute, see Adedeji v Central
Bank of Nigeria (2023) 5 NWLR (Pt 1878) 531 at 553-554 Para E-A, Obaje v
N.A.M.A (2024) 6 NWLR (Pt 1933)119 at 150 Para B-C, Umera
v Nigeria Railway Corporation (2022) 10 NWLR (Pt 1838) 349 at 393- 394 Para
B-A.
[25] The Claimant’s letter of
appointment speaks for itself. The Claimant’s employer is the 1st
Defendant, and he is a temporary staff. His appointment is at the pleasure of
the 2nd Defendant and is one of personal service as a legislative
aide. The Claimant’s continued tenure is dependent on the will and pleasure of
the 2nd Defendant. On his recommendation, the 1st
Defendant may terminate the Claimant’s appointment by giving him one months
notice, or payment of one month salary in lieu of notice. The
letter of appointment is silent on the regulations guiding his temporary
appointment. Learned counsel to
the Claimant in Paragraph 6.4 of his final address states that it is Article
7.1 of the National Assembly Service Commission Guidelines (Exhibit C3) that
creates the position of Senior Legislative Aide to Senators and empowers the
Senator to nominate a candidate. The Guidelines (Exhibit C3) is not a statute
or enactment by the National Assembly.
[26] The Claimant’s appointment is not
one with statutory flavor; and I so hold.
Furthermore, in the cases Olaniyan
v University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt 9) 599, CBN v Igwillo (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt 1054)
393, Eperokun v University of Lagos (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt 34) 162, KSJSC v Tolani
(2019) 7 NWLR (Pt 1671) 382, Baba v Nigerian Civil Aviation Training Centre
(1991) 5 NWLR (Pt 192) 388 at 413 cited
by the Claimant, the employees who
instituted the actions were permanent employees, on pensionable
appointment, core civil servants/public servants; and each employment was
regulated by statute and/or the Public Service Rules. Employment with statutory
flavor as expounded by the Apex Court must be properly situated within context.
I find the Claimant’s appointment to be at the pleasure of the 2nd
Defendant.
[27]
The 1st Defendant asserts that there is no cause of action disclosed
against it and that its joinder is wrongful. A cause of action has been severally defined as the entire set of facts
or circumstances giving rise to an enforceable claim. It is the aggregate of
facts, which the law recognises as giving the Claimant the substantive right to
make a claim for the relief or remedy sought. It includes all those things
necessary to give a right of action, and every fact which is material to be
proved to entitle the Claimant to succeed in his claim for relief or judicial
redress. It consists of every fact that would be necessary for the Claimant to
prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the
Court. See Adamu v Ilu (2026) 15 NWLR (Pt
2062) 313, Oladapo v Kalejaye (2023) 14 NWLR (Pt 1903) 153, Sulgrave Holdings
Inc v F.G.N (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt 1329) 309, Egbe v Adefarasin (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt 3) 549. A cause of
action cannot arise until all that needs to take place to complete the complaint
has happened, see Karshi
v Gwagwa (2022) 9 NWLR ( Pt. 1834) 139.
[28]
The Claimant avers in his pleadings that it is only the 1st
Defendant that has the power to terminate his employment. Now, has the 1st
Defendant terminated the Claimant’s appointment? The Claimant’s evidence under
cross-examination is that the 1st Defendant did no wrong to him, but
was joined because the 1st Defendant is the employer. The pleadings
do not reveal any wrongful action by the 1st Defendant against the
Claimant to warrant its joinder. There are no averments that the 1st
Defendant has terminated the Claimant’s appointment, and there is no evidence
of this before the Court. The pleadings do not disclose any wrongful action by
the 1st Defendant against the Claimant. In other words, there is no cause of action disclosed against the 1st
Defendant in the pleadings.
[29] I find that the 1st Defendant is not a proper party to
this action, see Green v Green (1987) 3
NWLR (Pt 61) 480, Ige v Farinde (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt 354} 42, Ndukwe v UBN Plc
(2021) 4 NWLR (Pt 1765) 165,AMCON v SuruWorldwide Ventures (Nig) Ltd (2024) 18
NWLR (Pt 1970) 355, Southbeach Co Ltd v Williams (2022) 8 NWLR (Pt 1831) 147. Consequently,
the Claimant’s case, and reliefs he is seeking against the 1st
Defendant are hereby dismissed.
[30]
The Claimant submits that his case against the 2nd Defendant is
unchallenged, uncontroverted and is deemed admitted as the 2nd
Defendant failed to defend the suit.
The effect of a party’s failure to file a defence in a claim against him/her is
that he/she is presumed to have admitted the case made against him/her by the
other party; and a trial court has little or no choice than to accept the
unchallenged and un-controverted case placed before it by the claimant. See Aderonpe v Eleran (2019) 4 NWLR (Pt 1661)
141 SC; Ifeta v Shell Petroleum Development Corporation of Nigeria Ltd [2006]
Vol.6 MJSC 123, Oladipo v Moba LGA (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt 1186) 117; Okolie v
Marinho [2006] 15 NWLR (Pt 1002) 316. This however does not mean automatic
victory for the Claimant because he must succeed on the strength of his case
and not rely on the fact that there is no defence before the Court. The absence
of a defence by the 2nd Defendant does not exonerate the Claimant of
the evidential burden of proof placed on him in Section 131 (1) & (2)
Evidence Act 2011, see also Ogunyade v Oshunkeye [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt
1057) 218.
[31]
The claims of the Claimant are in the main declaratory. The burden of proof in
establishing declaratory reliefs to the satisfaction of the Court is heavy in the
sense that such declaratory reliefs are not granted even on admission of the
Defendant where the Claimant fails to establish his entitlement to the
declaration by his own evidence. In other words, the declaration of right the
Claimant is seeking against the 2nd Defendant cannot be made on
admission, in default of pleadings, or by failure of the 2nd
Defendant to file a defence. The Claimant has to succeed on the strength of his
own case, only if the Court is satisfied by evidence, and not on the fact that the
2nd Defendant failed to file a defence, see Onubogu v Anazonwu (2023) 17 NWLR (Pt 1914) 425; Obe v Mtn Nig Comms
Ltd (2021) 18 NWLR (Pt 1809) 415; GE International Operations Nig Ltd v Q Oil
& Gas Services Ltd [2016] 10 NWLR (Pt 1520) 304; Dumez v Nwakhoba (2008) 18
NWLR (Pt 1119) 361 at 373-374.
[32] I
will now reproduce the 2nd Defendant’s letter (Exhibit C2):
27th August, 2025
The Chairman,
National Assembly Service Commission,
Plot 664 T.O.S. Benson Crescent,
Utako,
Abuja, Federal Capital Territory.
TERMINATION
OF THE APPOINTMENT OF MY SENIOR LEGISLATIVE AIDE, USMAN SALISU
This is to notify you and the National
Assembly Service Commission that I have terminated the appointment of my Senior
Legislative Aide, Usman Salisu, with immediate effect.
This development is consequent on his
indulgence in activities unbecoming of his appointment. Please do ensure his
immediate disengagement from my services.
I will be forwarding to you details of
the new candidate to serve as my Senior Legislative Aide. (Underlining mine).
While thanking you for your usual
cooperation, please accept the assurances of my esteemed regards.
Senator Garba Musa Maidoki
CC: 1. Clerk, Senate.
2. Usman Salisu.
[33] The letter is written to the Chairman of the 1st
Defendant, and not to the Claimant. The Claimant was copied. The letter informs
the Chairman that he has put an end to the Claimant’s service as his
Legislative Aide. The 2nd Defendant is empowered to do this at
anytime, as the Claimant’s service to him is one of ‘personal service’ that
subsists at his pleasure. The underlined portion is a request to the Chairman
to ensure the Claimant’s disengagement as an employee from the service of the 1st
Defendant. The 2nd Defendant’s letter to the Chairman is the
recommendation mentioned in paragraph 3 of Exhibit C1 (see paragraph 23 above)
for the reason of “indulgence in activities unbecoming of his
appointment”. The
2nd Defendant has simply severed the personal service relationship
with the Claimant.
[34] From the underlined statements, it is my considered view that
the 2nd Defendant who is a Senator of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria is very much aware that he cannot terminate the Claimant’s employment
having not issued him the letter of employment (Exhibit C1); and he is also
aware that he can recommend to the 1st Defendant, the Claimant’s
employer, that he be disengaged. I find that this is the action the 2nd
Defendant has taken, and this is in accordance with the Claimant’s letter of
appointment (Exhibit C1). There is no evidence that the 2nd
Defendant has usurped the powers of the 1st Defendant as the
employer of the Claimant to hire, fire, and discipline; and I so hold. Therefore,
the declaration sought in relief (i) fails. It is refused.
[35] The Claimant has alleged that the 2nd Defendant did not give him a fair
hearing before terminating his appointment by Exhibit C2. The 1st
Defendant who is the Claimant’s employer is responsible for enforcement of
discipline, and this is stated at page 7 of Exhibit C3. I therefore find that
it is the duty of the 1st Defendant to activate the disciplinary
process by the issuance of a query to the Claimant; and this is upon the
receipt of a complaint and/or recommendation by the 2nd Defendant. The
complaint of the 2nd Defendant against the Claimant is “his
indulgence in activities unbecoming of his appointment.” This is contained in Exhibit C2 that is dated 27 August 2025. The Claimant filed this action against the Defendants
on 8 September 2025, a period of about 12 days. Having found that it is not the
responsibility of the 2nd Defendant to enforce discipline in the 1st
Defendant by activating the disciplinary process, the Claimant’s assertion that
the 2nd Defendant breached his fundamental right to a fair hearing before
purporting to terminate his appointment holds no water. It is baseless. Consequently,
the declarations sought by the Claimant in reliefs (ii), (iii), and (iv) must fail.
They are refused.
[36] For all the reasons given
above, the Claimant has failed to prove his case. He is not entitled to the
declarations he is seeking. The declarations having failed, the ancillary
orders he seeks in reliefs (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), and (ix) must also fail
having no foundation, see Olayemi v. FHA
(2023) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1872) 445 at 500, Para E (SC); Ogoke v. Nduka (2020) 4 NWLR
(Pt. 1715) 509 at 529, Paras A-G (CA); Nwaogu v Atuma (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1364)
117 at 156, Para D (SC).
[37]
The Claimant’s case is dismissed. Costs awarded the 1st Defendant in
the sum of N250,000.00.
Judgment is entered accordingly.
____________________________
Hon Justice O. A.
Obaseki-Osaghae