IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP, PHD, OFR PRESIDENT, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

DATE: 25 JULY 2023

SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/336/2022

 

 BETWEEN

Academic Staff Union of Universities                                                          -               Claimant

 

AND

1.  Minister of Labour and Employment

2.  Registrar of Trade Unions

3.  Congress of University Academics (CONUA)

4.  National Association of Medical and Dental Academics, NAMDAD   -           Defendants

 

REPRESENTATION

Femi Falana SAN, with Abubakar Marshall and Dr Hassan Bala, for the claimant.

J. U. K. Igwe SAN, with Senator (Dr) Ita Enang OFR, Moedu Chukwulo, Mathias Agboni, E. D. Gbetsere, Imoh Bassey Valentine O. Nonso, Miss Florence Ani Oku-Ita and Don Eyoette, for the 1st and 2nd defendants.

Alex Akoja, for the 3rd defendant.

A. J. Osayande, with Mrs R. A. Obama, for the 4th defendant.

 

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

1.  The claimant filed this suit on 26 October 2022 vide an originating summons pursuant to the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 (NICN Rules 2017), sections 6(6)(b) and 40(2) of the 1999 Constitution, sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the Trade Unions Act (TUA) Cap T14 LFN 2004 and under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. The claimant submitted two questions for determination, namely:

(1)    Whether by virtue of section 40(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the Trade Unions Act Cap T14 2004 the 1st defendant is competent to register the 3rd and 4th defendants to co-exist alongside and carry out the same functions with the claimant in the Universities in Nigeria.

(2)    Whether by virtue of section 40(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the Trade Unions Act Cap T14 2004 the 2nd defendant is competent to register the 3rd and 4th defendants to co-exist alongside and carry out the same functions with the claimant in the Universities in Nigeria.

 

2.  The claimant then claimed the following eight reliefs:

 

(1)  A DECLARATION that by Virtue of section 40(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the Trade Unions Act Cap T.14, 2004 the 1st defendant is not competent to register the 3rd and 4th defendants (respectively) to co-exist alongside and carry out the same functions with the claimant in the Universities in Nigeria.

(2)  A DECLARATION that the claimant is the only trade union legally recognized under the Trade Unions Act, 2004 (as amended in 2005) and legally empowered by Trade Union Act to serve as a trade union for all academic staff in all universities in Nigeria.

(3)   A DECLARATION that the registration of the 3rd and 4th defendants by the 1st defendant on or about the 4th day of October, 2022 is illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

(4)   A DECLARATION that the certificate of registration issued by the 2nd defendant to the 3rd and 4th defendants on or about the 4th day of October 2022 to function as trade unions in the Universities in Nigeria is illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

(5)  AN ORDER MANDATING the 1st and 2nd defendants to withdraw the Certificate of Registration issued to the 3rd and 4th defendants respectively and cancel same forthwith.

(6)    AN ORDER RESTRAINING the 1st and 2nd defendants from recognizing and dealing with the 2nd and 3rd defendants as trade unions in any manner whatsoever and howsoever.

(7)    AN ORDER RESTRAINING the 3rd and 4th defendants from further parading themselves as trade unions capable of unionizing academic staff in the Universities in Nigeria in any manner whatsoever and howsoever.

(8)    AND any order or orders this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance of this case.

 

3.  In support of the originating summons is an affidavit with two exhibits and a written address.

 

4.    The defendants respectively entered formal appearances and filed their defence processes consisting of counter-affidavits and written addresses. The 4th defendant had also filed a preliminary objection but withdrew it; and so it was struck out on 21 June 2023.

 

5.  At the Court’s sitting of 11 May 2023, where all counsel in the matter were present, this case was adjourned to 21 June 2023 for hearing. On this appointed day, all but the claimant’s counsel were present. The Court Registrar informed the Court that counsel for the claimant, Abubakar Marshall, sent a text message vide Phone number 08136570994, which was read in open court, urging the Court to stand down the case till 2.00pm. All counsel for the defendants did not object. The case was accordingly stood down to 2.00pm as requested by counsel for the claimant.

 

6.  At 2.05pm, the Court resumed but counsel for the claimant was still not in court. No reason whatsoever for the absence was given despite that it was counsel for the claimant who asked for the stand down. The Court accordingly ruled that the matter should proceed to hearing accordingly despite that the other counsel in the matter prayed the Court to strike out the case in accordance with Order 38 Rule 3(1) of the NICN Rules 2017.

 

 

7.  The matter then proceeded to hearing as originally slated. Given that the claimant was not in court, the defence processes having been served on the claimant but the claimant did not file any reply on points of law, and the time for this had elapsed, on the authority of Order 45 Rule 7 of the NICN Rules 2017, the claimant’s written address in this suit was deemed by the Court to have been adopted. The other counsel in the matter then proceeded to respectively adopt their written addresses.

 

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT IN SUPPORT OF THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS

8.  The claimant adopted the two questions it earlier submitted to the Court for determination as the issues for determination. Accordingly, on issue (1) i.e. whether the 1st defendant is competent to register the 3rd and 4th defendants to co-exist alongside and carry out the same functions with the claimant in the Universities in Nigeria, the claimant answered in the negative. That the 3rd and 4th defendants cannot be clothed with the vires to co-exist alongside claimant in the same sector to carry out the same functions, duties and responsibilities as so doing (either by the 1st and or 2nd defendants separately and or jointly) is a gross violation of sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA 2004 as amended in 2005. That pursuant to section 3(1) of the TUA, it is the Registrar of Trade Union (RTU) that is clothed with the vires to receive applications for the registration of trade unions.

 

9.  The claimant went on that the 1st defendant lacks the vires to register trade unions and to issue certificate of registration to such registered trade union, by the lucid provisions of section 5(b) of the TUA, upon the refusal of the RTU to favourably consider an application for registration of trade union. That the 1st defendant having registered the 3rd and 4th defendants and thereupon issued them with Certificates of Registration, such registration even on that leg alone (taken in isolation from the plethora of germane grounds canvassed herein) renders such an action ultra vires the powers of the 1st defendant herein and liable to be set aside, urging the Court to so find.

 

10.  It is the further submission of the claimant that the registration of the 3rd and 4th defendants by the 1st defendant is still be null and void in view of the existence of the claimant herein, referring to item 4 Part C of the Third Schedule to the TUA. That this submission finds validation in sections 3 and 5(4) of the TUA, which sections bar the registration of a trade union where there already exists a trade union representing same interest. That these sections lend themselves to no conjectures, urging the Court to so hold.

 

11.   Additionally, that these provisions of the TUA are without deference to the constitutional provision which guarantees the right to form or belong to any trade union for as held in Nig Seafarers Collaborating Union v. NUPENG & ors [2013] 31 NLLR (Pt. 88) 84, “The fundamental rights guaranteed in Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution are not absolute. Section 45(1)(a) and (b) provides for derogation from these rights”. That the provisions have also been judicially interpreted and pronounced upon in a plethora of cases to wit: Osawe & ors v. Registrar of Trade Unions [1985] 4 NWLR (Pt. .4) 755, Registered Trustees of National

 

Association of Community Health Practitioners (RT, NAGHPN) & ors v. Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria (MHWUN) & ors [2008] LPELR-3196(SC); [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1072) 575, Nig Seafarers Collaborating Union v. NUPENG & ors [2013] 31 NLLR (Pt. 88) 84, Non-Academic Staff Union of Education & Associated Institutions (NASU) v. The Honourable Minister of Labour and Employment & ors (unreported) Suit No. NICN/ABJ/373/2021.

 

12, That in Osawe & ors v. Registrar of Trade Unions (supra), section 3(2) of the TUA of 1978 was challenged on the ground that it was an infringement on section 37 of the 1979 Constitution (now section 40 of the 1999 Constitution) which guaranteed freedom of association. The Supreme Court held inter alia that the right of association guaranteed by section 37 of the 1979 Constitution like other rights in Chapter IV of the Constitution was not an absolute right and could be derogated from in accordance with section 41 of the same Constitution (now section 45 of the 1999 Constitution). That the TUA of 1978 was a law passed in the interest of public order. It was necessary to ensure order in the chaotic proliferation of trade unions which was the practice before the promulgation of the law. Section 3(2) of the TUA was, therefore, declared by the Supreme Court not unconstitutional. Indeed, that the Supreme Court held that by section 3(2) of the TUA, it was mandatory for the RTU to refuse a registration of a trade union once there is in existence a trade union that caters for the same interest as the one applying for registration.

 

13.   That the Supreme Court followed and upheld its decision in Osawe in the latter case of Registered Trustees of National Association of Community Health Practitioners (RT, NAGHPN) & ors v. Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria (MHWUN) & ors [2008] LPELR-3196(SC); [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1072) 575. That Aloma Mariam Mukhtar, JSC (as he then was) delivering the lead judgment quoted Osawe with approval in holding that section 3(2) of the TUA makes it mandatory for the RTU, on receiving an application to register any trade union, to ensure that there is no other registered trade union in existence which caters for the same interest as the one applying for registration. That if there is, it becomes incumbent on the Registrar, as the custodian of such information, to decline to proceed to put into effect the machinery for registration of the new trade union. As to whether section 3(2) is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court’s decision on this issue in Osawe was reaffirmed by Aloma Mariam Mukhtar, JSC (as he then was).

 

14.  That this Court had cause to review the provisions of sections 3 and 5(4) of the TUA vis-a- vis, as to whether the provision of section 5(4) is discretionary in Non-Academic Staff Union of Education & Associated Institutions (NASU) v. The Honourable Minister of Labour and Employment & ors (unreported) Suit No. NICN/ABJ/373/2021, the judgment of which was delivered on 30 March 2022 p. 24 para 101. The 3rd defendant (The Non-Teaching Staff Union of Polytechnics) relying inter alia on section 5(4) of the TUA had argued that 1st and 2nd defendants’ (Minister of Labour & Employment and the Registrar of Trade Unions respectively) powers under the TUA are discretionary. That this Court, disagreeing with the submission of counsel to the 3rd defendant, held thus:

A look at sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the Trade Unions Act will reveal the fallacy of the 3rd defendant’s argument. Section 3(2) is very specific and categorical in stating that ... no

 

trade union shall be registered to represent workers or employers in a place where there already exists a trade union," So when section 5(4) talked of “... if it appears to him that any existing trade union is sufficiently representative of the interests of the class of persons whose interest the union is intended to represent” this cannot be qualification on section 3(2) of the Trade Unions Act. The issues of appearance to the Registrar of Trade Unions and sufficiency as used in the sub-section do not entail any discretion on the part of the duty imposed on the Registrar of Trade Unions as the 3rd defendant seems to think. Section 3(2) is mandatory enough for the Registrar of Trade Unions to act. The duty to act under section 5(4) is dependent on the criterion placed by section 3(2). Once there exists a trade union, the Registrar of Trade Unions shall not register a new one seeking registration.

 

15.   That it is lucid from the foregoing statutory and judicial authorities that the 1st defendant lacks the capacity to register or mandate the 2nd defendant to register the 3rd and 4th defendants in a sector that the jurisdiction of the claimant herein covers. That the 1st defendant in the instant suit purported to have issued certificate authorizing the 3rd and 4th defendants to co-exist alongside the claimant. That under the enabling law, the 1st defendant cannot so issue, only an appeal arising from a refusal of the 2nd defendant over an application competently and properly brought by a body seeking to be registered as a trade union can be lodged with the 1st defendant.

 

16.   On account of the foregoing, the claimant urged the Court to resolve issue (1) in its favour and grant the reliefs sought thence.

 

17.    For issue (2) i.e. whether the 2nd defendant is competent to register the 3rd and 4th defendants to co-exist alongside and carry out the same functions with the claimant in the Universities in Nigeria, the claimant adopted the arguments it marshalled in support of issue (1) above as if same is argued and reproduced in support of issue (2) herein.

 

18.   The claimant, however, further submitted that the 2nd defendant in exercising the power to register trade unions cannot register the 3rd and 4th defendants herein in view of the facts and circumstance of this case particularly the affidavit evidence and documents in support of same as advanced by the claimant herein. This is because there cannot co-exist two unions in the same sector exercising the same jurisdiction by virtue of sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA. That this issue was addressed and laid to rest by this Court in Non-Academic Staff Union of Education & Associated Institutions (NASU) v. The Honourable Minister of Labour and Employment & ors (unreported) Suit No. NICN/ABJ/373/2021, the judgment of which was delivered on 30 March 2022 p. 24 para 101.

 

19.  In that case, the 3rd defendant (The Non-Teaching Staff Union of Polytechnics) relying inter alia on section 5(4) of the TUA had argued that 1st and 2nd defendants (Minister of Labour & Employment and the Registrar of Trade Unions respectively) can exercise discretion to register other unions in the same sector as the wordings in section 5(4) are merely discretional and not directory/mandatory. The 3rd defendant (The Non-Teaching Staff of Polytechnics) had applied

 

for registration as a trade union to the 2nd defendant (The RTU). The 2nd defendant, vide a letter dated 18 January 2013 refused to register the 3rd defendant. In 2021 (eight years later), the 3rd defendant appealed to the 1st defendant (The Minister of Labour and Employment) against the decision of the 2nd defendant refusing to register the 3rd defendant as a trade union. The 1st defendant considered the appeal favourably and in a letter on its behalf by the Director of Trade Union Services and Industrial Relations in the Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment dated 24 August 2021 addressed to the General Secretary of the 3rd defendant, the 3rd defendant was informed that the 1st defendant’s approval had been forwarded to the 2nd defendant for the issuance of the Certificate of Registration to the 3rd defendant. Pursuant to the said directive, the 2nd defendant on 7 December 2021 issued a Certificate of Registration to the 3rd defendant. The claimant, believing that the issuance of the said Certificate of Registration to the 3rd defendant was wrongful, filed a suit on 22 December 2021 vide an originating summons praying amongst others, an order withdrawing the approval and registration of the 3rd defendant as a trade union since the claimant’s jurisdictional scope covers all members of the 3rd defendant and the claimant is already in existence. This Court found that the suit was not properly commenced since it was neither a member nor an officer of the claimant that deposed to the affidavit that activated the suit as required by section 5(5)(b) of the TUA. The Court accordingly held that the suit was incompetent and accordingly struck it out. However, the court, in the event out was wrong, proceeded to decide the case on its merits; and held inter alia that the 1st and 2nd defendants were wrong to have approved, registered and issued the certificate of registration, as a trade union of the 3rd defendant.

 

20.   It is the claimant’s further submission that it has to the exclusion of any other body the authority to unionize lecturers/academic staff in all the Government owned Universities throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria, referring to Part C of the 3rd Schedule to the TUA. That it is settled law that where a particular trade union is registered and same exists in a particular sector or industry, there shall not be registered another union in that same sector as held in National Union of Local Government Employees v. Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria [2005] NLLR (Pt. 4) 166.

 

21.    Furthermore, that by registering the 3rd and 4th defendants to co-exist alongside the claimant, the 1st and 2nd defendants ingloriously seek to factionalize and defeat the essence of the sectoral unions brought by the 1978 restructuring of trade unions, citing Udoh v. OHMB [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 142) 52 CA at 67, Nig Seafarers Collaborating Union v. NUPENG & ors [2013] 31 NLLR (Pt. 88) 84, NCSU v. ASCSN [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 3) 429, Osawe v. Registrar of Trade Unions [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 75 and RTNACHPN v. MHWUN & ors [2013] 34 NLLR (Pt. 99) 227.

 

22.    That in the instant case, the claimant avers in the affidavit in support of the instant application that it is the only trade union recognized legally to unionize academic staff of all State and Federal Government owned Universities. As such, the 1st and 2nd defendants lack the vires to register the 3rd and 4th defendants as they did in the instant case, citing the decision of this court in NIC/ABJ/7/2009 - The Registered Trustees of National Association of Community

 

Health Practitioners of Nigeria v. The Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria & 3 ors. That it is trite that when an authority or person takes an action or decision without proper authority, such an action or decision shall be set aside and declared ultra vires, null and void and of no effect, citing Margaret Chinyere Stitch v. AGF [1986] 12 ILAW/SC, AGF & ors v. Alhaji Atiku Abubakar [2007] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 1 SC, Williams v. Dawodu [1988] 4 NWLR (Pt. 86)

189 at 218, Fawehinmi v. President [2008] 23 WRN 65, Nwankwo v. Ononage Madu [2009] 1

NWLR (Pt. 1123) 671 at 715 - 716, INEC v. Balarabe Musa & ors [2003] 3 NWLR (Pt. 806) 72,

IGP v. ANPP & ors [2008] 12 WRN 65, Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Ltd & 5 ors v. E. N. Nwawaka & anor [2001] FWLR (Pt. 48) 1383; and Maja v. Stocco [1968] 1 All NLR 141, which held that “where what was being done (by an institution) was something beyond what the law or statute authorizes, a court of law is duty bound to declare it illegal”.

 

23.   The claimant went to cite section 47 of the TUA, which mandates the publication of the registration of the 3rd and 4th defendants in the Federal Gazette. That the 2nd defendant having failed to comply with the provisions of section 47(a) of the TUA, this Court is imbued with the vires to mandate the cancellation of the registration of the 3rd and 4th defendants for failure to comply with mandatory statutory provision, urging the Court to so find.

 

24.   In the final analysis on issue (2), the claimant urged te Court to come to the finding that the power of the 2nd defendant to register trade unions is circumscribed by law. Whereas in the instant case the 1st and 2nd defendants violated the enabling law empowering them to exercise such power, the exercise of such powers shall be declared null and void and ultra vires their powers, urging the Court to so find by resolving issue (2) in favour of the claimant.

 

25.  The claimant concluded by urging the Court to grant all the reliefs it seeks.

 

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE 1ST AND 2ND DEFENDANTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS

26.   The 1st and 2nd defendants submitted a sole issue for determination i.e. whether issues (1) and (2) raised by the claimant are not speculative, academic and liable to be dismissed. On issue

(1) raised and argued by the claimant, the 1st and 2nd defendants submitted that there is no iota of evidence before this Court to show that the 1st defendant (Minister of Labour and Employment) registered the 3rd and 4th defendants as alleged by the claimant. That in the absence of any particulars of such registration of the 3rd and 4th defendants by the 1st defendant, issue (1) as raised and argued by the claimant is speculative and academic; and so liable to be dismissed as this Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain academic and speculative questions and issues and lacks jurisdiction to grant academic and speculative reliefs, citing Ugba & anor v. Suswan & 2 ors [2014] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1427) 264 at 313 - 314 and Oke & anor v. Mimiko & 4 ors [2014] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1388) 225 at 254 - 255 and 264. That reliefs 1, 3, 5 and 6 (in the principal reliefs) as contained in the originating summons dated 24 October 2022 but filed 26 October 2022 are liable to be discountenanced and set aside by this Court, citing Obafemi Awolowo University v. Ina Olaji Builders Limited [2020] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1714) 347 CA at 371 which harp

 

that the dexterity and eloquence of counsel, no matter how persuasive shall not take place of evidence and the law.

 

27.  That from the foregoing, all the cases cited by the claimant in the assumption of registration of the 3rd and 4th defendants by the 1st defendant are thus not on all fours with the facts and circumstances of this matter and clearly cited out of context by the claimant. Accordingly, that issue (1) as raised and argued by the claimant ought to be resolved against the claimant.

 

28.  The 1st and 2nd defendants continued that the same submission applies to issue (2) as raised by the claimant. That nothing before this Court shows that the 2nd defendant registered the 3rd and 4th defendants to co-exist alongside and carry out the same functions with the claimant in the Universities in Nigeria as alleged by the claimant. That in the absence of such a proof, the claim of the claimant, particularly reliefs (2), (3), (4) and (7) of the reliefs as sought by the claimant in the originating summons are speculative.

 

29.    The 1st and 2nd defendant went on (referring to paragraphs 7 and 13 of their counter- affidavit) that contrary to the thinking of the claimant, members of the 3rd and 4th defendants are not members of the claimant and there is no trade union in existence that caters to the peculiar interests of the 3rd and 4th defendants. And that the 1st defendant has the statutory power to approve the registration of a trade union where he is satisfied that it is expedient to do so either by regrouping an existing trade union or registering a new trade union, particularly, as relating to the circumstances of the 3rd and 4th defendants where no existing trade union protects their peculiar interests. Accordingly, that the cases cited by the claimant are not on all fours with the facts and circumstances of this case and thus do not apply to this case.

 

30.   In conclusion, the 1st and 2nd defendants submitted that in the absence of evidence before this Court in proof of its claim, reliefs (1) to (7) are speculative and academic. They ought to be dismissed. Accordingly, the principal reliefs having collapsed, the consequential relief (8) in the claimant’s originating summons will have no foundation to stand, citing Awoniyi & 2 ors v. The Registered Trustee of the Rosicrucian Order (AMORC) of Nigeria [2000] 6 SC (Pt. I) 103 at 116 and Hamason (Nigeria) Ltd v. Pedrotech (Nigeria) Ltd [1993] 3 NWLR 548.

 

31.  In orally adopting their written address, the 1st and 2nd defendants urged th Court to consider Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Oyebola [2020] LPELR-51806(CA) and ILO Convention No. 87 (especially Articles 2, 3, 8 and 11), which should be read along with section 254C(1)(f), (h) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution, and NASU v. Comrade Niyi Akinnibi Suit No. NICN/ABJ/ 250/2022, the judgment of which delivered on 30 May 2023 especially at paras. 51 to 59.

 

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE 3RD DEFENDANT IN OPPOSITION TO THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS

32.   The 3rd defendant stated off by stating that the claimant has not placed anything before the court to show that the members of the 3rd defendant are members of the claimant and that their interests are being protected by the claimant. Also, that the depositions in the affidavit in support

 

of the originating summons are largely vague, imprecise and nebulous. The 3rd defendant then submitted three issues for determination, namely:

(1)  Whether or not the 3rd defendant was registered by the 1st defendant.

(2)  Whether or not the 3rd defendant was registered in compliance with the dictates of the law.

(3)  Whether the claimant’s reliefs are not liable to be dismissed.

 

33.   On issue (1), the 3rd defendant submitted that by the questions submitted for resolution by the claimant in this case, the interpretative jurisdiction of this Court is being invoked by the claimant. In other words, the claimant is inviting this Court to consider and interpret identified provisions of the Trade Unions Act (TUA) Cap T14 LFN 2004, especially sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA together with section 40(2) of the 1999 Constitution. It is the 3rd defendant’s submission that the sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA, and section 40(2) of the 1999 Constitution are very clear and unambiguous such that no technical rule of interpretation is required in interpreting them, citing Yantaba v. Gov, Katsina State [2022] I NWLR (Pt. 1811) 250 at 330, which held that where the words used in an enactment are clear and unambiguous, they should be given their ordinary, literal and grammatical meaning. Also referred to is Aya v. Hensaw [1972] ALNR (Reprint) 460 at 465.

 

34.  The 3rd defendant continued that from the way issue (1) of the claimant was drafted, the 1st defendant was erroneously stated to be the one that registered the 3rd defendant. That the argument of the claimant is far from the truth as will be shown. To start with, that the claimant has placed nothing before the Court to substantiate its assertion that it was the 1st defendant that registered the 3rd defendant or that in registering the 3rd defendant the 2nd defendant acted contrary to the law by registering the 3rd defendant, citing sections 133 and 134 of the Evidence Act, which place the burden of proof on he who alleges any particular fact and the standard of proof is on balance of probabilities in civil cases. Furthermore, that proof based on balance of probabilities means that a party must prove all the elements of his claim on the balance of probabilities. It is not for the other side to disprove it. This means that the claimant or the party who wants the judgment of the court must fail if he does not prove the required elements on the balance of probabilities even if the other side says nothing in its own defence, citing Maihaja v. Gaidam [2018] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1610) 454 SC at 496. That the claimant failed woefully to place before the Court credible and compelling evidence to substantiate that the 1st defendant acted per contra to the TUA by registering the 3rd defendant.

 

35.  Quoting section 3 of the TUA, the 3rd defendant submitted that it is crystal clear from section 3(1) of the TUA the Registrar of Trade Unions (RTU) i.e. the 2nd defendant in this suit has the inherent duty to receive applications for registration of trade unions as permitted under the TUA. Put differently, that every application for registration of trade unions shall be made to the RTU. Also, that by section 3(2) of the TUA, the RTU shall register trade unions only by the approval of the Minister only if he is satisfied that it is expedient to register the union. That it is very clear and unambiguous that all applications for registration of trade unions are made to the Registrar, the Minister gives his approval for registration of prospective unions in deserving circumstances and it is the RTU that registers trade unions. That the 1st 2nd and 3rd defendants complied fully

 

with the provisions of the TUA as there is nothing placed before this Court to show that the 1st defendant registered the 3rd defendant as the claimant has tried to make this Court to believe.

 

36.    The 3rd defendant had deposed in its affidavit that it applied to the 2nd defendant for registration vide a letter dated the 30 April 2018 (Exhibit CONUA 3). The said application was refused on the ground that the class of persons the proposed union wishes to unionize are under the jurisdictional scope of an already registered trade union, Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU). The pioneers of the 3rd defendant thereafter exercised their right of appeal to the Honourable Minister of Labour and Productivity vide an appeal letter dated 28 January 2019 (Exhibit CONUA 5). That the appeal letter of the 3rd defendant to the 1st defendant is in compliance with section 5(5)(b) of the TUA, which provides that if the Registrar refuses to register the union, any official or member of the union may within the period of thirty days beginning with the date so specified, appeal to the Minister against the refusal. What is more, that the letter that conveyed the registration of the 3rd defendant to its members was authored by the RTU (Exhibit CONUA 6).

 

37.  Furthermore, that even by the claimant’s own showing precisely on page 3 of Exhibit 1 (page 8 of the originating process filed by the claimant), the Minister of Labour and Employment only gave approval for the registration of the 3rd defendant which is in strict compliance with the law. The Honourable Minister for Labour and Employment was quoted in the said exhibit thus:

“In view of the above, I senator Chris Ngige, in the exercise of the power conferred on me as the Honourable Minister of Labour and Employment, do hereby approve the registration of – Congress of Nigeria University Academics (CONUA), and Nigeria Association of Medical and Dental Lecturers in Academics (NAMDA).

 

The Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment in the discharge of her mandate in the management of employment relationships and the administration of Trade Unions to ensure harmonious industrial relations system in the nation has decided to approve the registration of two (2) more Trade Unions in the Nigeria University academic sub sector. The University sub-sector is a major development plank of any nation’s socio economic growth.

 

38.   To the 3rd defendant, the argument of the claimant that the 1st defendant acted contrary to the law when it registered the 3rd defendant is baseless and unwarranted. It is predicated on fallacy. The 3rd defendant then prayed Court to hold that the application for the registration of the 3rd defendant was made to the RTU who also registered the 3rd defendant as a trade union thereby resolving this issue against the claimant..

 

39.   For issue (2), the 3rd defendant submitted that the 3rd defendant was registered in strict compliance with the law. The 3rd defendant adopted its submissions under issue (1) and further submitted that the TUA was complied with in the registration of the 3rd defendant. That it is clear from its counter-affidavit that an application for the registration of the 3rd defendant was

 

made to the RTU and that the Minister of Labour and Productivity gave his approval before the 3rd defendant was registered by the 2nd defendant in this suit.

 

40.   That the 3rd defendant was able to demonstrate to the Honourable Minister of Labour and Productivity vide its appeal for registration of trade union dated the 28 January 2019 (Exhibit CONUA 5), that the applicants for the registration of the 3rd defendant were at the relevant time expelled from the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) i.e. the claimant and that their interest was not being protected by any union. That this clear indication/information swayed the mind of the Honourable Minister who gave approval for the registration of the 3rd defendant as it is necessary to do so for the advancement of the welfare, rights and privileges of the members of the 3rd defendant. The 3rd defendant then submitted that having demonstrated that the pioneers of the 3rd defendant were expelled from the membership of the claimant, it does not lie in the mouth of claimant to argue that the 1st and 2nd defendants were wrong to register the 3rd defendant as a union when it has in its membership those that were initially expelled from the claimant.

 

41.  The 3rd defendant proceeded that the natural and salient question that comes to mind is “how does the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) expect the rights and privileges of those that were expelled from the union to be protected considering the provision of Section 40 of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (As Amended)?” That there is absolutely no way except they belong to a union. It is this the submission of the 3rd defendant that the approval and registration of the 3rd defendant by the Minister of Labour and Productivity and the RTU respectively are fully in compliance with section 40 of the 1999 Constitution. That the members of the 3rd defendant have every right as every other citizen of Nigeria to free assembly, to form and belong to trade unions or associations for the protection of their respective interests. That the moment some members of an association are expelled as in this case, their interests as members of the former union or association ceases.

 

42.  The defendant continued that the reliefs sought by the claimant is an invitation of the Court by the claimant to breach the fundamental rights of the members of the 3rd defendant to assemble freely and associate with other persons and to form or belong to a trade union or any other association for the protection of their interest, praying the Court not to grant the reliefs sought in the originating summons. Furthermore, that by section 5(4) of the TUA, the Registrar shall not register a trade union if it appears to him that any existing trade union is sufficiently representative of the interest of the class of persons whose interest the union is intended to represent.

 

43.   That having established beyond any per adventure that the defendants were expelled from membership of the claimant, it cannot be rightly said that the interest of the members of the 3rd defendant are protected by the claimant. That it has been shown in the counter-affidavit against the affidavit in support of the originating summons that all the members of the 3rd defendant were formerly members of ASUU, Obafemi Awolowo University Branch, but were expelled. Also that the pioneers of the 3rd defendant were those that were expelled from the membership

 

of the claimant but had a common intention and vision of protecting their collective interest. That the issues that led to the expulsion of the said pioneers of the 3rd defendant were internal issues of ASUU, Obafemi Awolowo University Branch, which were investigated by the Expanded Ethics, Grievances, and Crisis/Conflict Management Committee (EEGCCMC) of the National body of ASUU. Also, that the interests of the members of the 3rd defendant are not sufficiently represented by the claimant as the latter has attempted to show in both her affidavit in support of the originating summons and the written address.

 

44.    The 3rd defendant went on that in discharging its interpretation function, the Court is enjoined to interpret the provisions of the law as provided and not concern itself with what the law ought to be or filling any imagined gap in the law, citing Dabup v. Kolo [1993] 9 NWLR (Pt. 317) 254 SC at 285 and Abioye v. Yakubu [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt.190) 130. That the wordings of section 5(4) of the TUA are clear and unambiguous, and so need no further interpretation by the Court, praying the Court to so hold.

 

45.  The 3rd defendant continued that relying on section 40(2) of the 1999 Constitution, sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA, to grant the reliefs sought by the claimant in the originating summons will amount to the Court allowing the claimant to use the legislation relied on as instruments of fraud and oppression against the members of the 3rd defendant. That this is because the facts in the supporting affidavit cannot be relied on to give effect to the cited provisions. On the point that courts should not allow a party to use legislation as instrument of fraud, the climate referred to Idika v. Uzoukwu [2007] LPELR-12864(CA) and Kotoye v. Saraki [1994] 7 NWLR (Pt. 3) 524 at 564.

 

46.  It is thus the 3rd defendant’s submission that the its registration was lawfully and legitimately done in order to secure and protect the interests of its members and to enjoy the protection of section 40 of the 1999 Constitution. That by the claimants showing precisely at page 6 of Exhibit

1 of the claimant, the Minister of Labour and .Productivity had given approval for the registration of the 3rd defendant since year 2020 but same was not done before the advent of COVID-I9. Therefore, the argument of the claimant that the 3rd defendant was registered to rival the claimant cannot hold water. That the reliefs being sought by the claimant in this case is an invitation of this Court to abuse the fundamental right of the members of the 3rd defendant to freedom of association and membership of a union which this Court should not subscribe to.

 

47.    The 3rd defendant proceeded that the RTU complied with section 47 of the TUA by publishing in the Federal Gazette the registration of the 3rd defendant as it is the law that acts done in official/public capacity enjoy presumption of regularity until otherwise proven, referring to section 168 of the Evidence Act 2011 and Nwachukwu v. State [2002] LPELR-2084(SC); and the onus of proving the contrary lies on him who alleges such contrary position. That the claimant has not placed any evidence whatsoever to establish its position or support its argument that the Registrar failed to publish the name of the 3rd defendant in the Federal Gazette. That this is contrary to the position of the law on the principle of he who alleges must prove, relying on Maihaja v. Gaidam [2018] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1610) 454 at 496.

 

 

48.  Also, that the argument of the claimant that the Registrar did not publish the name of the 3rd defendant in the Federal Gazette has no evidence whatsoever to prove same. That a written address no matter how beautiful written cannot take place of evidence, citing Olonade v. Sowemimo [2014] All FWLR (Pt. 750) 1311 at 1329 and Ogbuefi v. ASEC [2011] All FWLR (Pt. 603) 1873 at 1916.

 

49.  The 3rd defendant rounded up discussion on issue (2) by submitting that the entire argument and judicial authorities cited by the claimant are unfounded and at best are attempts to mislead this Court. Accordingly, they are bound to be discountenanced, praying the Court to so hold.

 

50.   Regarding issue (3), the 3rd defendant submitted that a perusal of the claimant’s claim will reveal that the main claims sought are for declarations while some others are in form of a mandatory order and restraining orders. To the 3rd defendant, a party who seeks declaratory reliefs must succeed on the strength of the evidence provided by him as a court will not grant declaratory relief either based on admission by the defendant or due to lack of evidence from the defendant or based on a perceived weakness in the case of the defendant, referring to Ogunjumo

v. Ademolu [1995] 4 NWLR (Pt. 389) 254 at 269 and Onwugbufor v. Okoye [1996] 1 SCNJ 1 at

23. That where a party who seeks declaratory relief fails to prove his entitlement to it by either failing to adduce necessary evidence or bring his case within established legal frontiers, the court will be left with the only alternative of dismissing his case for want of proof.

 

51.  The 3rd defendant went on that to be entitled to reliefs from a court of law, a claimant must discharge the onus placed on him by law by bringing before the court weighty and substantial evidence which outweighs the one provided by the defendant such that the court can on the balance of probability decide in his favour, referring to OBC Ltd v. MBS Ltd [2005] All FWLR (Pt. 261) 216 at 233 - 234.

 

52.    Against the foregoing settled legal principles, the 3rd defendant called attention to the affidavit in support of originating summons which to it failed to substantiate the deposition in paragraph 6 that the 3rd defendant is a member of the claimant. Also, that the claimant failed to establish the averment in paragraph 8 that the 3rd defendant is a break out/splinter faction of the claimant. Furthermore, the claimant failed to prove the assertion in paragraph 10 that the 1st defendant approved the registration of the 3rd defendant as a union as a result of the industrial action embarked upon by the defendant on February 14, 2022. That no court of law will grant declaratory reliefs based on this kind of materials placed before this Court by the claimant as all the depositions in the affidavit in support of the originating summons have been debunked by the paragraphs of the counter-affidavit.

 

53.   It is the 3rd defendant’s further submission that the nature of this case in dispute requires credible and compelling evidence before the claimant could be entitled to the reliefs of declarations, citing Nwokidu v. Okanu [2010] All FWLR (Pt. 522) 1633 SC at 1655 and Aiyeola

v. Pedro [2014] All FWLR (Pt. 744) 17 at 39.

 

 

54.   The 3rd defendant rounded up its consideration of issue (3) by submitting that the various cases cited by the claimant in its written address including Osakwe v. Registrar of Trade Unions and others are clearly excluded by the peculiar facts of this case, urging the Court to so find and hold. That the case of the claimant is starved of credible and compelling evidence to entitle it to the reliefs sought more especially when the principal reliefs are declaratory, praying the Court to dismiss the case of the claimant in its entirety.

 

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE 4TH DEFENDANT IN OPPOSITION TO THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS

55.  The 4th defendant started off with what it termed a synopsis of the facts of the case. To the 4th defendant, the case of the claimant is a purported registration of the 3rd and 4th defendants by the 1st and 2nd defendants on 4 October 2022. That the claimant seeks to challenge the purported registration of the 3rd and 4th defendants by 2nd defendant for failure to comply with section 5(4) of the Trade Unions Act (TUA). The 4th defendant denied any wrong doing both in the process of its registration by the 2nd defendant and that its union was not registered on 4 October 2022. In proof thereof, 4th defendant tendered Exhibits A, B and C. Exhibit B is the Certificate of Registration of the Nigerian Association of Medical and Dental Academics, dated 13 January 2023. Exhibit C is the constitution of the above-named association, which clearly shows that members of the association so registered are not just in a place and for workers covered by the claimant.

 

56.     The 4th defendant then submitted a lone issue for determination: whether in the circumstances of this case, claimant has shown that there was any violation of any law in the registration of the 4th defendant as a trade union in this suit. To the 4th defendant, by affidavit evidence, backed with documentary evidence, the it has shown to this Court that its association was not registered on 4 October 2022 and, therefore, could not have been the proper target of this suit. That it must also be stated again that the affidavit in support of the originating summons in this case is lacking in details and most unhelpful as to the actual circumstances of the application and registration certificate, the subject matter of this suit.

 

57.  That the issue before the Court is quite narrow i.e. that the claimant’s case is purely based on section 5(4) of the TUA 2004. That is whether or not the 2nd defendant's purported registration of the 4th defendant on 4 October 2022 violated extant taws, particularly section S(4) aforesaid. That no proof having been made in the affidavit or sufficient particulars given of the 4th defendant’s earlier application of 2016 and refusal by the 1st defendant; which facts the 4th defendant vehemently denied; paragraph 16 stands controverted. That the claimant also failed to give particulars and sufficient evidence of the so-called approval after rejection by the 1st defendant. That argument based on this issue on how application is made after rejection thereof goes to no issue. The law remains that he who asserts has the evidential burden to prove.

 

58.    That the claimant’s case on the issue of appeal to the Minister as being the basis or foundation of the Certificate of Registration purportedly issued to the 4th defendant is founded

 

on unfounded rumour. That it has been shown by evidence that the 4th defendant was not registered on 4 October 2022. That the point, therefore, is: assuming but not conceding that the 4th defendant was registered on the 4 October 2022, the factual depositions in the claimant’s affidavit is so bereft of facts about the statutory procedure that was followed before registration. That given the claimant’s empty facts on the actual procedure and how the rigours of the process of registration was followed or even bypassed, the facts contained in the 4th defendant’s affidavit becomes unassailable. That this is because no part of the claimant’s case challenged the due process or procedural steps taken by the 4th defendant leading to its registration as a trade union.

 

59.   The 4th defendant went on that the claimant having not complaint about the process, and given the weight of Exhibit A (the official Gazette of 13 October 2022), the claimant ostensibly did not know when and how the 4th defendant’s application was processed before the 2nd defendant, the averments in the claimant’s affidavit having been shown to be manifestly untrue and most unreliable. But a fact remains clear i.e. the official Gazette made pursuant to section 5(2) of the TUA 2004 is a notice to the whole world, and same fixed the claimant with notice, constructive or actual; that as at the date of the publication, the public including the claimant was invited to put in written objection for consideration by the 2nd defendant.

 

60.    That the 4th defendant deposed to copious affidavit that the claimant failed to use that window to put its case before the 2nd defendant. Apart from the failure to so act and the legal implications thereof (as earlier submitted), the claimant’s affidavit is completely silent about what it did, during the window of publication, a condition precedent for the registration of any trade union, under the TUA 2004. Even in the purported registration story, in respect of the registration of the 4th defendant on 4 October 2022, the claimant did not tell this Court what it did during the window of the 3 months in which the 2nd defendant is mandatorily required to wait for, receive and consider objections, to the registration of any trade union.

 

61.    Also, that the claimant has approached this Court, claiming that the 2nd defendant’s registration of the 4th defendant on 4 October 2022 violated section 5(4) of the TUA 2004. The 4th defendant took note of the claimant’s struggle trying to take some preemptive precautions to argue that the 4th defendant’s members’ constitutional right could not be violated.

 

62.  The 4th defendant continued that this Court is not permitted to consider the registration done after the institution of this action; and that there some salient issues glossed over by the claimant. That the affidavit of the claimant are bereft of facts. The claimant did not even bother to put before this Court its constitution and regulations as registered with the 2nd defendant. That the claim of its exclusivity as the only union operating in Nigerian Universities is backed by no “documentational” evidence, apart from the scanty ipse dixit contained in its affidavit. The fundamental point is that sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA 2004 talked about no trade union shall be registered to represent workers or employers in a place where there already existed a trade union. That the section talked of employers in a place where there already existed a trade union. That the claimant ought to have satisfied this Court with credible evidence that all the members of the 4th defendant are all in a place where there already existed a trade union. The

 

claimant who did not even bother to show vide its constitution who are its members (i.e. the one that should be very well known to them), of course, did not bother about who are the members of the 4th defendant. That the 4th defendant has shown with evidence that members of its union cut across universities, teaching hospitals, federal medical centres and other institutions involved in the whole training and teaching of medical/dental students at all levels of their education and training (including the post graduate programmes which do not even happen in Nigerian universities. The 4th defendant has exhibited before this Court its constitution which defines its membership, referring to Article 3, 24 (vii), (x) and (xix) of the said constitution.

 

63.  That the claimant being very quick to lay claim to exclusivity and monopoly of presence in the University space cited item 4 Part C of the Third Schedule to the TUA 2004. Believing in its exclusivity in the University space, the claimant made heavy weather of the decision of this Court in Non-Academic Staff Union of Education & Associate institutions (NASU) v. The Hon. Minister of Labour and Employment (supra) as cited at page 11 of the claimant’s address (hereinafter referred to as “NASU Case”).

 

64.  To the 4th defendant, these laws being derogatory and expropriatory in their nature, they are construed strictly and contra proferentem. But very importantly too, a very distinctive feature in the NASU case, and the present suit is that the exclusive jurisdictional scope of NASU in respect of the scope of its space, is specifically provided for under item 27 Part B of the Third Schedule of the TUA. The jurisdictional scope of NASU, having been statutorily recognized, factual proof of its exclusivity may not require so much rigour. The same cannot be said of ASUU. Item 4 of Part C of the Third Schedule to the TUA has no scope of coverage recognized for ASUU. Just as ASUU is named in item 4 of Part C, item 17 of same Part C of Third Schedule named “Senior Staff Association of Universities, Teaching Hospitals, Research Institutes and Associated Institutions” as also a registered union, (ostensibly operating in the same University space and other spaces too).

 

65.  That the 4th defendant's right to freedom of association, including formation of trade union is guaranteed by “Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution as amended”. That the TUA comes under section 45(1) of the 1999 Constitution to restrict the right as reasonably justifiable in democratic society. That it is well settled law that any law that derogates or restricts rights must be constructed strictly. The provision of the claimant in item 4 of Part C of Third Schedule to the TUA must be construed strictly. There is no express exclusivity of scope for the claimant therein. Since there is no express conferment of exclusive scope on the claimant, the claimant cannot claim it. That statutes taking away right must be construed strictly, citing Nangibo v. Okafor [2003] 14 NWLR (Pt. 839) 78.

 

66.  That the claimant had relied on section 2(4) of the TUA without linking it to item 4 of Part C of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act. That as abundantly shown in paragraph 16 of the affidavit, the 4th defendant proved to the satisfaction of the technical committee of the 2nd defendant as to the scope, aims, objectives and justification for its registration. That had the

 

claimant exploited and exhausted the domestic/administrative remedy, it would have known of these facts and not belabour this Court with this avoidable, frivolous and reckless litigation.

 

67.    To the 4th defendant, the claimant ought to approach the 2nd defendant with written objection, where it would have stated with conviction, how the 4th defendant’s union or association is registered to “represent workers or employers in a place” where they claimant is already existing as a trade union. That even before this Court, the claimant has only made bare assertions rooted in rumours and legal hearsay to claim that certain associations or unions were registered on 4 October 2022.

 

68.  The 4th defendant then paused to examine the quality of evidence adduced before this Court in the claimant’s affidavit in support of this case. That the point has been made that the news report, the foundation of the facts upon which the claimant’s case is hinged are mere rumours and hearsay evidence. That while some measure of hearsay evidence are allowed by law where affidavit evidence is involved, even those pieces of hearsay evidence are regulated by the Evidence Act. The qualification and conditions stated thereof have not been met in this case. The deponent in this case could not have relied on hearsay evidence of a reporter without meeting the requirement of the Evidence Act. That even newspaper reports/publication in themselves have been held to be inadmissible and unreliable evidence, citing Agbai v. INEC [2008] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1108) 417, Olly v. Tunji [2012] LPELR-7911(CA), Abegunde v. The Ondo State House of Assembly & ors [2014] LPELR-23683(CA) and RNHW v. Sama [1991] 12 NWLR (Pt. 171) 64.

 

69.   That apart from being ieo ipso inadmissible on the authority of the above line of cases, the newspaper publication offered as Exhibit 1 being computer generated evidence as well as secondary evidence failed to meet the relevant requirements for its admissibility as contained in the Evidence Act. That section 84 of the Evidence Act clearly provides the preconditions for the admissibility of computer-generated evidence and no such evidence shall be admitted upon failure to meet the said requirement, citing Kubor v. Dickson [2013] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1345) 534 SC; [2012] LPELR-9817(SC), Omisore and anor v. Aregbesola & ors [2015] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1482) 205 at 295 and Dickson v. Sylva & ors [2016] LPELR-41257(SC). That the claimant’s affidavit contains no iota of evidence to establish the conditions set out under section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 in relation to the computer-generated Exhibit 1. Accordingly, that the said Exhibit 1 is inadmissible in the circumstances, urging the Court to discountenance same.

 

70.   Furthermore, that newspaper publications and published articles are public documents and for the purposes of proof of their publication (not the truth of its content) only the original or certified true copy thereof is admissible. In the instant case, Exhibit 1 being newspaper publication ought to meet the added requirement of certification before they can be relied upon in the state they were attached, citing Kubor v. Dickson (supra) at page 75. That Exhibit 1, having not met the requirement of certification, is also inadmissible on that ground, urging the Court to discountenance the said newspaper publication for constituting hearsay evidence, for failure to comply with the requirement of certification required of computer-generated evidence and also certification required of public documents.

 

 

71.  To underscore the fact that the stories contained in the so-called news reports are unfounded rumours, that this court should note their inconsistencies:

•      At the 2nd page of Exhibit 1, one Onyebuchi Ezigkro in Abuja stated thus: “Federal

Government has formally registered two new University Unions, the Congress of Nigerian University Academics (CONUA) and National Association of Medical and Dental Academics (NAMDA)”.

•      At the 3rd page of Exhibit 1, the same reporter claiming to have quoted Senator Chris

Ngige stated thus: “In view of the above, I Senator Chris Nwabueze Ngige in the exercise of the power vested on me as the Honourable Minister of Labour & Employment, do hereby approve the registration of Congress of Nigeria University Academics (CONUA), and Nigeria Association of Medical Dental Lecturers in Academics (NAMDA)”.

 

72.   To the 4th defendant, a careful perusal of this report and compared to the facts before this Court will show clearly that even the reporter the claimant placed so much reliance on has created more confusion in their reportage. Whereas, the reporter by himself stated that a body called “National Association of Medical and Dental Academics (NAMDA)” has been registered. This so called body is distinct and different from the name the 2nd defendant published in the Official Gazette of 13 October 2022 that applied for registration. It is, therefore, a different body entirely the reporter was referring to. The name in the Gazette for registration is “Nigerian Association of Medical and Dental Academics”. This is the name that is registered.

 

73.   That the evidence of the claimant in a manner suggestive of self-destruct, in contradiction, further suggests that the name the report said the Minister of Labour, Dr. Chris Ngige purportedly registered, is “Nigeria Association of Medical and Dental Lecturers in Academics (NAMDA)”. This is completely another name and entity (by nomenclature) claimed to have been registered by Senator Chris Nwabueze Ngige as Minister of Labour & Employment. The question begging for answer is which of the two names did this newspaper claim to have been registered, the basis for which this action is founded? A third name is added to the mix by virtue of Exhibit A.

 

74.  The 4th defendant went on that the law remains that inconsistency in evidence renders such pieces of evidence manifestly unreliable and, therefore, cannot be used in the court as the court cannot pick and choose which to rely on.. That the law is trite that where an affidavit is self- contradictory or contains inconsistent averments or an exhibit attached thereto is inconsistent with the averment in the body of the affidavit, the affidavit should be discountenanced, citing Duruaku v. Nwoke [2015] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1483) 417.

 

75.  That the name of any artificial body that assumes legal status by virtue of registration is very crucial. Any derogation from the way and manner the name is registered, consequently attract a no name situation and the juristic personality acquired or conferred by the registration is lost. That the claimant ought to have been circumspect in throwing around different names. As have

 

been stated, it is only upon registration of a trade union by the 2nd defendant that this Court will assume jurisdiction over such a registered trade union, in the circumstances of the issues before this Court. That this claimant having sued a name not in any register of trade unions, the juristic personality of the 4th defendant either as named in this suit, or as contained in the evidence before this Court is completely flawed on yet another ground, (i.e. issue of juristic personality).

 

76.  That while not denying the popularity of ASUU in Nigeria, such popularity cannot be taken for granted in a court of law that is bound by facts adduced in its proceedings. That the affidavit of the claimant is bereft of facts, as it failed to tell this Court who is ASUU, with a view to showing to this Court its scope, since it does not enjoy statutory spacial or jurisdictional scope in terms of its place. That the claimant failed to even show how the two unions overlap, being for the same group of employees, and “in a place”. Given that there is another union under Part C of the Third Schedule (i.e. in item 17) cited by the claimant, which said union ostensibly operate in the University, and other institutions, this Court ought to be satisfied that the claimant had shown to the 2nd defendant how its scope of operation is the same as the 4th defendant’s.

 

77.  The 4th defendant continued that in its copious affidavit, it showed that, at the request of the 2nd defendant, it provided justification for its quest for registration. The facts are laid bare before this Court. The space the 4th defendant is covering transcends the University and cuts across employees of FMoH and FMoE. That these facts are unassailable and are worthy of belief.

 

78.     The 4th defer dent then reiterated that the claimant having failed to exhaust the administrative remedy within the time allowed by section 5(2) but chose to file this suit, robbed this Court of its jurisdiction to question the registration of the 4th defendant done after the commencement of this suit. That no amendment of the process of the claimant can bring the 4th defendant’s actual registration before this Court in this particular proceeding, referring to N.S.E v. Katchy (supra) — no citation supplied.

 

79.   That as shown in paragraphs 16(j) & (k), 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the affidavit, the scope and interest of the 4th defendant and the claimant do not cohere. The 2nd defendant took into account these abundant facts before registering the 4th defendant. The failure of the claimant to exploit and exhaust domestic remedy with the 2nd defendant is responsible for this avoidable, frivolous and reckless litigation. The 4th defendant concluded by urging this Court to dismiss this suit with reasonable cost.

 

COURT’S DECISION

80.   I took time to consider the processes and submissions of the parties. I indicated earlier that the claimant did not appear in court on the due date to adopt its originating summons and the supporting written address. These processes were, however, deemed adopted pursuant to Order 45 Rule 7 of the NICN Rules 2017.

 

81.  Also as indicated earlier, the claimant filed this suit on 26 October 2022. In paragraphs 10 and 11 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons deposed to by Dr Austen Amechi

 

Sado, the Investment Director and a member of the National Executive (NEC) of the claimant, it is averred thus:

10.   That as a result of the industrial action embarked upon by the claimant on February 14, 2022, the 1st Defendant decided to approve the registration of the 3rd and 4th defendants on the 4th day of October, 2022, as trade unions of academic staff in the Universities in Nigeria. Attached herewith and marked Exhibit 1 is a news report confirming same..

11.  That upon the approval of the 1st Defendant, the 2nd Defendant registered the 3rd and 4th Defendants as trade unions to operate in the universities in Nigeria.

 

82.  By these averments, the claimant put the date of the registration of the 3rd and 4th defendants as trade unions as 4 October 2022. And in reliefs (3) and (4), the claimant also put the registration of, and the issuing of certificate of registration to, the 3rd and 4th defendants, respectively by the 1st and 2nd defendants, as being on 4 October 2022. This, as will be shortly seen, is not correct and so can be misleading.

 

83.   What the claimant gave as evidence of this registration is Exhibit 1, which is an internet publication from https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/10/04/fg-registers-two-new- university-unions-in-bid-to-split-asuu/ titled, “FG Registers Two New University Unions in Bid to Split ASUU”. The 4th defendant objected to this publication, it being equivalent to a newspaper publication. Ezudyemoih v. Turkish Airlines Ltd [2023] LPELR-60297(CA) held that an online newspaper is admissible once there is a certificate of worthiness of the computer used in printing the documents in compliance with Section 84 (2) and (4) of the Evidence Act, 2011. Of course, admissibility and cogency (weight/probative value) of a piece of evidence are two different things. In the instant case, Exhibit 1 is an online newspaper publication of THISDAY Newspaper. The claimant did not give any certification of it in compliance with section 84 of the Evidence Act. But Exhibit 1 has on it the internet address from where it was printed out i.e. https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/10/04/fg-registers-two-new-university-unions-in- bid-to-split-asuu/. I accessed this internet address on 28 June 2023 and found that it existed with the contents of Exhibit 1 titled, “FG Registers Two New University Unions in Bid to Split ASUU”. The reportage is by Onyebuchi Ezigbo in Abuja as fed into the internet “9 months ago”. When Exhibit 1 was accessed and printed out by the claimant it was as fed into the internet “1 week ago” So for purposes of admissibility, Exhibit 1 is admissible as it is. The requirement of certification under section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 is uncalled for and unnecessary given the internet address on it, which I accessed and verified. I accordingly rule that Exhibit 1 is admissible; and I so admit it.

 

84.    However, the other ground of objection of Exhibit 1 by the 4th defendant is that as a newspaper publication, its content is nothing but hearsay. Here, I agree with the 4th defendant. The concurring judgment of Boloukuromo Moses Ugo, JCA in Abegunde v. Ondo State House of Assembly & ors [2014] LPELR-23683(CA), relying on RNHW v. Sama [1991] 12 NWLR (Pt. 171) 64 at 77, held that a newspaper report is hearsay evidence and so irrelevant and inadmissible in proof of whatever is reported there. When Exhibit 1 stated that “FG Registers

 

Two New University Unions in Bid to Split ASUU” and paragraphs 10 and 11 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons averred that the 3rd and 4th defendants were registered as trade unions by the 2nd defendant upon the approval of the 1st defendant, all these are not entirely correct given that by Exhibit B attached to the 4th defendant’s counter-affidavit, the 4th defendant, for instance, was not registered until 13 January 2023.

 

85.   Exhibit CONUA 6 dated 21 September 2022 and attached to the 3rd defendant’s counter- affidavit is titled, “Registration of Congress of University Academics (CONUA) as a Trade Union”. It is a letter by the 2nd defendant to the General Secretary of the 3rd defendant informing him of the approval of the 1st defendant of the registration of the 3rd defendant as a trade union. However, that the 3rd defendant’s application will soon be published in the Federal Government Official Gazette in line with sections 5(2) and (3) of the TUA LFN 2004; and that the 3rd defendant will be informed of the date for collection of the certificate of registration after the completion of all necessary procedures for registration. There is no evidence before the Court that the said “all necessary procedures for registration” were completed and the 3rd defendant was issued with a certificate of registration as trade union.

 

86.  With the 4th defendant, Exhibit B is composed of two documents — a letter dated 11 January 2023 from the 2nd defendant to the Secretary General of the 4th defendant informing him that the 4th defendant has formally completed all processes for registration as a trade union and so he was invited to come and collect approved constitution of the 4th defendant and the presentation of the Certificate of Registration on 17 January 2023. The second document is the Certificate of Registration itself as given on 13 January 2023.

 

87.    Now, when the claimant filed this suit on 26 October 2022, none of these documents frontloaded by the 3rd and 4th defendants were exhibited by the claimant in order to prove its case. Reliefs (1) to (4) prayed for by the claimant are all for declaratory orders. And it is upon these declaratory orders that reliefs (5) to (7) are hinged. By Dmez Nig Ltd v. Nwakhaba & 3 ors [2008] 2 SC (Pt. III) 142 at 152 paras 10 to 25, relying on Bello v. Eweka [1981] 1 SC 101 and Motunwase v. Sorungbe [1988] 12 SC 1, the claimant praying for a declaratory relief proves his case on his own evidence and not the evidence of the defendant. What this means is that the claimant has no evidence to prove its case since Exhibit 1 is nothing but hearsay evidence.

 

88.   The only other piece of documentary evidence the claimant exhibited is Exhibit 2, which aside from being unreadable, paragraph 13 of the claimant’s affidavit in support of the originating summons states it to be a letter dated 9 April 2013 under which “the 2nd Defendant refused to register the Academic Staff Union of Inter-University centers pursuant to Sections 3

[2]    and 5 [4[ of the Trade Union Act”. Now, “the Academic Staff Union of Inter-University centers” is not a party before this Court as to make any sense in the case of the claimant. So what the claimant actually has as documentary evidence to prove its case is only Exhibit 1. Since I held Exhibit 1 to be hearsay evidence, I reiterate that it cannot substantiate and so prove the case of the claimant.

 

89.  In fact, it was on this score that the 4th defendant argued that in coming to court as it did, the claimant simply put the cart before the horse — it had no evidence as at the time it came to court to show that the 3rd and 4th defendants were registered trade unions.

 

90.   The 4th defendant also made an issue about its name as sued by the claimant i.e. “National Association of Medical and Dental Academics, NAMDA”. The 4th defendant’s name as registered as a trade union is “Nigerian Association of Medical and Dental Academics”. To the 4th defendant since it was sued in a wrong name, and at a time it was not even registered as a trade union, there can be no competent suit against it. I tried very hard to discountenance this argument as one that relates to a mere misnomer in the name of the 4th defendant, the difference being only “National” as against “Nigerian”. But hard as I did, I could not but agree with the 4th defendant given the Supreme Court’s decision in Omisore & anor v. Aregbesola & ors [2015] LPELR-24803(SC); [2015] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1482) 202. The 2nd respondent, All Progressive Congress, had been sued as “All Peoples Congress”. An objection was raised as to this fact on the basis that there was no party known in law as such. Even before considering the objection, the Supreme Court itself changed the name to the correct name as would be seen in the name of the case as reported in Law Reports. But, and this is where it becomes interesting, the Supreme Court held thus:

For sure, it is the law that where the description of a party on a process in a litigation (as happened here) is a mere misnomer, an amendment would suffice to put it right provided that the person misnamed is a juristic entity and is in existence, just like the second respondent A. B. Manu & Co. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Costain (WA) Ltd. (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 367)

112. The essence of such an amendment is to ensure that justice is done to all parties to the dispute, Vulcan Gases Ltd. v. G. F. Industries A. G. (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 719) 610, 653 (emphasis is this Court’s).

 

91.  Exhibit A attached to the 4th defendant’s counter-affidavit is the Federal Government Official Gazette of 13 October 2022 No. 183 Vol. 109 of the Notice of Application for the Registration of a Trade Union relating to the 4th defendant but it is dated 21 September 2022. In it, the 4th defendant is indicated as “Nigerian Association of Medical and Dental Academics”. Exhibit A called for objection as to the request by the 4th defendant for registration, which objection is to be lodged in writing with the Registrar of Trade Unions (RTU), the 2nd defendant, during the period of three months beginning from the date of the Gazette Publication of the notice. There is nothing before the Court to show that the claimant filed any objection to this. In fact, the argument of the 4th defendant is that the claimant did not. Instead on 26 October 2022, the claimant ran to this Court with this suit.

 

92.   It was on 13 January 2023, that the 4th defendant as “Nigerian Association of Medical and Dental Academics” was issued by the 2nd defendant with the certificate of registration as a trade union vide Exhibit B attached to the 4th defendant’s counter-affidavit, after completing all the necessary procedures.

 

93.   Now, the point is that Omisore & anor v. Aregbesola & ors held that the rule as to a mere misnomer in the description of a party to a suit applies only when the person misnamed is a juristic entity is in existence. This is the essence of the Supreme Court’s proviso in the case i.e. “provided that the person misnamed is a juristic entity and is in existence”. Was the 4th defendant in existence when the claimant filed this suit? The answer is a capital NO. So in misnaming the 4th defendant, it cannot be said that this was a mere misnomer. This being so, there is no known 4th defendant before this Court as to make the claims of the claimant against the 4th defendant competent in this suit as filed. I accordingly, hold that there is no competent 4th defendant before this Court in this suit.

 

94.   In fact, to the extent that there is no evidence before the Court that the 3rd defendant has been registered as trade union, it cannot be said that there is a competent 3rd defendant before this Court. I so hold.

 

95.  The 1st and 2nd defendants had argued that there is no iota of evidence before this Court to show that the 1st and 2nd defendants registered the 3rd and 4th defendants as alleged by the claimant. That in the absence of any particulars of such registration of the 3rd and 4th defendants by the 1st defendant and 2nd defendants, issues (1) and (2) as raised and argued by the claimant are speculative and academic; and so liable to be dismissed as this Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain academic and speculative questions and issues and lacks jurisdiction to grant academic and speculative reliefs. To the extent that the claimant filed this suit when the 3rd and 4th defendants were yet to be registered as trade unions, I agree with the 1st and 2nd defendants that the claimant’s case is academic and speculative. And I so hold.

 

96.  This Court as a court of first instance is enjoined to consider and make a pronouncement on all issues properly raised before it by the parties.. See Monguno v. Bluewhales & Co. & ors [2023] LPELR-59997(SC), Nwokoro & ors v. Ashue [2023] LPELR-59744(SC), Ovivie & ors v. Delta Steel Co. Ltd [2023] LPELR-60460(SC) and Aminu & ors v. Subair & ors [2023] LPELR-60052(SC). I shall proceed accordingly. In any event, section 14 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006, sanctioned by Omang v. Nsa [2020] LPELR-50225(CA), and Adegboye v. UBA [2022] LPELR-58778(CA) per Amadi, JCA, enjoins this Court to “in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it by or under this Act in every cause or matter, have power to grant, either absolutely or on such terms and conditions as the Court thinks just, all such remedies whatsoever as any of the parties thereto may appear to be entitled to in respect of any legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by the Court so that, as far as possible, all matters in dispute between the parties may be completely and finally determined and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of those matters avoided (emphasis is this Court’s).

 

97.   The 3rd defendant stated off by stating that the claimant has not placed anything before the Court to show that the members of the 3rd defendant are members of the claimant and that their interests are being protected by the claimant. Also, that the depositions in the affidavit in support of the originating summons are largely vague, imprecise and nebulous.

 

 

98.    A look at paragraphs 8 and 9 of the claimant’s affidavit in support of the originating summons will show that the claimant averred that the 3rd and 4th defendants are break out/ splinter factions of the claimant desirous of being recognised as separate, distinct unions covering the same sphere of jurisdiction as the claimant; and that the members of the 3rd and 4th defendants applied for registration as trade unions in 2016 but were not registered by the 2nd defendant because of the existence of the claimant. Other than this averment, the claimant placed nothing before the Court in proof of the said averments, hence the submission by the 3rd defendant that the averments in the claimant’s affidavit in support are largely vague, imprecise and nebulous. I agree with the 3rd defendant. The averments are largely unsubstantiated. This being so, they cannot serve as proof of the reliefs the claimant is seeking for in this suit. I so hold.

 

99.  It is the contention of the 4th defendant that it is well settled law that any law that derogates or restricts rights must be construed strictly. That the provision of the claimant in item 4 of Part C of the Third Schedule to the TUA must be construed strictly. As such, there is no express exclusivity of jurisdictional scope for the claimant therein. That since there is no express conferment of exclusive jurisdictional scope on the claimant, the claimant cannot claim it. The 4th defendant made this submission within the context of the failure of the claimant to state to this Court its jurisdictional scope, and how the 3rd and 4th defendants have encroached on this jurisdictional scope as to warrant the filing of this suit. The 4th defendant’s argument is that its jurisdictional scope in no way impugns or eats into that of the claimant. That because Part C of the Third Schedule to the TUA did not state the jurisdictional scope of the claimant, the claimant cannot lay claim to any exclusivity as to the remit to unionise all academic staff of Universities in Nigeria.

 

100.  It is the further argument of the 4th defendant that while the jurisdictional scope of the Non- Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated Institutions (NASU) is specifically stipulated in Part B to the Third Schedule to the TUA, those of ASUU, the claimant, and Senior Staff Association of Universities, Teaching Hospitals, Research Institutes and Associated Institutions are not so provided for in Part C of the Third Schedule to the TUA. This is the context in which the 4th defendant argued that the jurisdictional scope of ASUU must be strictly construed in such a way that it must not be construed as to derogate or restrict the rights of others.

 

101.     There is a gross misunderstanding by the 4th defendant of the actual tenor of the jurisdictional scope of the trade unions under Parts A, B, and C of the Third Schedule to TUA. This Court as far back as 2007 gave an insight into this in Air Transport Services Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (ATSSSAN) v. Senior Staff Association of Statutory Corporations and Government Owned Companies (SSASCGOC), unreported Suit No. NIC/8/2005, the judgment of which was delivered on 27 June 2007 in the following words:

The policy structure of trade unions in the country may be said to have roots in the 1978 ‘Restructuring of Trade Unions’ Government Notice No. 92, Federal Republic of Nigeria

 

Official Gazette No. 6, Vol. 63 of 8th February, 1978 where trade unions in the country were reduced to 71. This policy structure was then reflected in legislation vide the Trade Unions (Amendment) Decree No. 22 of 1978. In 1986, vide the Trade Unions (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 17 of that year, there was an amendment to this policy in that a formal distinction and categorisation into workers unions on the one hand, and senior staff/employers’ associations on the other hand was made. In providing for senior staff/employers’ associations under Part B of Schedule 3 to Decree 17 of 1986, item 36 permitted the registration of any other unions of senior staff after the commencement of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act No. 22 of 1978. This basic policy continued until 1993 when it was revised vide Government Notice No. 44, Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 24, Vol. 80 of 31st August, 1993 under the title, ‘Revised Structure of Industrial/Workers Unions’. This revision in policy saw to the reduction of the industrial/workers’ unions to 29. One of the principles considered in approving the revised trade union structure is the desirability that there should be corresponding senior staff and employers’ associations to the new emerging unions. Although this 1993 revision was cancelled in 1995 vide Government Notice No. 2, Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 2, Vol. 32 of 8th February, 1995, Decrees 4 and 26 of 1996 and 1 of 1999 cumulatively restored the policy thrust of the 1993 revision…

 

102.  In thus providing for the “corresponding senior staff and employers’ associations to the new emerging unions”, there was no need to specifically state what the jurisdictional scope of the “corresponding senior staff and employers’ associations” was since their jurisdictional scope would simply follow those of “the industrial/workers’ unions”, the only distinction being that the industrial/workers’ unions were for junior staff while the senior staff and employers’ associations were respectively for senior staff associations and employers’ associations.

 

103.  How then did this work out for the trade unions in the academic sector? Part A of the Third Schedule to the TUA deals with the “List of restructured trade unions affiliated to the central labour organisation”; and Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated Institutions (NASU) is listed as item 27. It should be noted that the list in Part A ends with item 30, which states thus: “Any other workers’ trade union registered under this Act and published, from time to time, in the Federal Gazette”.

 

104.   Part B of same Third Schedule to the TUA deals with “The jurisdictional scope of each of the restructured trade unions” listed in Part A. The Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated Institutions (NASU) listed as item 27 has as its jurisdictional scope the following:

All non-academic workers employed in publicly and privately owned education, research and associated institutions including university teaching hospitals except professional, administrative, medical and paramedical staff such as nurses, pharmacists, radiographers, laboratory technologists, physiotherapists, occupational therapists, speech therapists, optometricians, audiornetricians, limb fitters, dieticians, dental technologists and hygienists, limb makers, instrument engineers (or curators of instruments), blood donor

 

organisers, catering officers (medical), health superintendents, stores officers (medical), leprosy control officers and inspectors; dispensing assistants, nutritionists, medical illustrators, midwives, medical entomologists, medical social workers, x-ray technicians, medical statistical assistants, assistant physiotherapists, physiotherapy technicians.

 

105.   As can be seen, and as pointed out in ATSSSAN v. SSASCGOC (supra), Parts A ad B are reserved for the industrial or workers' trade unions, which unions are essentially composed of junior staff. In thus specifying the jurisdictional scope of NASU in Part B of the Third Schedule to the TUA, the senior staff associations in the academic sector, which include ASUU, would have to take their jurisdictional scope following that of NASU.

 

106.  And so, as would be seen, Part C of the Third Schedule to the TUA is reserved for “Senior staff and employers’ associations”. The claimant, Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), is listed as item 4 in Part C, while Senior Staff Association of Universities, Teaching Hospitals, Research Institutes and Associated Institutions is listed as item 17 in same Part C. The list Part C ends with item 45, which states thus: “Any other Unions of Senior Staff registered after 3 August, 1977”.

 

107.   Before going any further, it should be stressed that both Parts A and C acknowledge that “any other workers’ trade union” or “any other unions of Senior Staff” not listed in either Part A or Part C may be subsequently registered.

 

108.    I now go back to the point being made. Both ASUU and Senior Staff Association of Universities, Teaching Hospitals, Research Institutes and Associated Institutions are thus the senior staff trade unions in the academic sector — while ASUU is for academics, Senior Staff Association of Universities, Teaching Hospitals, Research Institutes and Associated Institutions is for non-academics who are nevertheless senior staff. It should be noted that under item 27 of Part B of the Third Schedule to the TUA, all non-academic workers employed in publicly and privately owned education, research and associated institutions including university teaching hospitals who are “professional, administrative, medical and paramedical staff such as nurses, pharmacists, radiographers, laboratory technologists, physiotherapists, occupational therapists, speech therapists, optometricians, audiornetricians, limb fitters, dieticians, dental technologists and hygienists, limb makers, instrument engineers (or curators of instruments), blood donor organisers, catering officers (medical), health superintendents, stores officers (medical), leprosy control officers and inspectors; dispensing assistants, nutritionists, medical illustrators, midwives, medical entomologists, medical social workers, x-ray technicians, medical statistical assistants, assistant physiotherapists, physiotherapy technicians”, are all precluded from being members of NASU. These category of workers are easily within the jurisdictional remit of the Senior Staff Association of Universities, Teaching Hospitals, Research Institutes and Associated Institutions. Academics in Universities accordingly fall within the remit of ASUU.

 

109.  This is the actual tenor of the jurisdictional scope of the trade unions in the academic sector under Parts A, B, and C of the Third Schedule to TUA that the 4th defendant did not appreciate

 

when it made its submissions as to strictly construing item 4 of Part C of the Third Schedule to the TUA as it relates to the jurisdictional scope of the claimant.

 

110.   I thought it necessary to give this insight just so that the record is straightened as well as show the inappropriateness of the argument of the 4th defendant in that regard. The claimant in this suit is not expected to prove its jurisdictional scope in the manner canvassed by the 4th defendant. I so hold.

 

111.   The claimant had relied heavily on Osawe & ors v. Registrar of Trade Unions [1985] 4 NWLR (Pt. .4) 755, Registered Trustees of National Association of Community Health Practitioners (RT, NAGHPN) & ors v. Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria (MHWUN) & ors [2008] LPELR-3196(SC); [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1072) 575. The claimant had also relied on this Court’s decision in Non-Academic Staff Union of Education & Associated Institutions (NASU) v. The Honourable Minister of Labour and Employment & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/373/2021, the judgment of which was delivered on 30 March 2022, where this Court, aside from holding that the suit was incompetent, given that it was neither a member nor an officer of the claimant that deposed to the affidavit that activated the suit, it went on to decide the case on merit — holding that the Minister of Labour and the RTU were wrong to have registered “The Non-Teaching Staff Union of Polytechnics” as a trade union when the claimant, NASU, was still in existence, contrary to sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA. NASU v. The Honourable Minister of Labour and Employment & ors was decided without any reference to ILO Convention 87. This is not the case with the more recent cases decided by this Court where ILO Convention 87 and its jurisprudence was considered and applied. Had ILO Convention 87 and its jurisprudence been considered and applied in NASU v. The Honourable Minister of Labour and Employment & ors, the decision would have been different.

 

112.     The more recent cases decided by this Court where ILO Convention 87 and its jurisprudence was considered and applied are: Tricycle Owners Association of Nigeria v. Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/216/2022, the judgment of which delivered on 17 January 2023, Yusuf Abdullahi Abdulkadir, Esq & ors v. Minister of Labour & Employment & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/AK/04/2022, the judgment of which was delivered on 16 May 2023, Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational & Associated Institutions (NASU) v. Comrade Niyi Akinnibi unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/ 250/2022, the judgment of which was delivered on 30 May 2023 and Federal Government & anor v. Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/270/2022, the judgment of which was delivered on 30 May 2023.

 

113.   Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational & Associated Institutions (NASU) v. Comrade Niyi Akinnibi is particularly instructive. Compared to Non-Academic Staff Union of Education & Associated Institutions (NASU) v. The Honourable Minister of Labour and Employment & ors, aside from it being latter in time, its fact situation and the issues it dealt with were similar to but the outcome was diametrically opposed to that in Non-Academic Staff Union of Education & Associated Institutions (NASU) v. The Honourable Minister of Labour and Employment & ors.

 

All because ILO Convention 87 and its jurisprudence was considered and applied in NASU v. Comrade Niyi Akinnibi but not in NASU v. The Honourable Minister of Labour and Employment & ors.

 

114.  This explains why the 1st and 2nd defendants in orally adopting their written address urged th Court to consider Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Oyebola [2020] LPELR-51806(CA) and ILO Convention No. 87 (especially Articles 2, 3, 8 and 11), which should be read along with section 254C(1)(f), (h) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution, and NASU v. Comrade Niyi Akinnibi Suit No. NICN/ABJ/250/2022, the judgment of which delivered on 30 May 2023 especially at paras. 51 to 59.

 

115.  For purposes of the instant suit, I adopt in toto this Court’s reasoning in NASU v. Comrade Niyi Akinnibi (supra). For ease of reference, however, this is what this Court held in paragraphs 46 to 62 of NASU v. Comrade Niyi Akinnibi:

[46]   I am aware that Registered Trustees of National Association of Community Health Practitioners of Nigeria (RTNA) & ors v. Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria & ors (MHWUN) [2008] LPELR-3196(SC) affirmed Osawe & ors v. Registrar of Trade Unions. However, both cases are distinguishable to the case at hand. They were all decided before the coming into effect of section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution.

 

[47]   The Court of Appeal decision in Nasarawa State Specialist Hospital Management Board & ors v. Mohammed [2018] LPELR-44551(CA) recognized the necessity to treat/ apply older case law authorities with caution, especially case law authorities that pre-date the Third Alteration. For instance, on the Supreme Court case of Osoh v. Unity Bank Plc [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) 1, this is what the Court of Appeal said:

Osoh v. Unity Bank Plc supra, which the lower Court relied on is inapplicable to the instant matter as it was decided on the basis of the Trade Dispute Act and the 1979 Constitution which did not give jurisdiction on matters relating to employment to the National Industrial Court. The Supreme Court was not called upon to consider sections 6(1)(5)(cc) and 254C(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria.

 

[48]    This Court has quoted and applied this reasoning of Nasarawa State Specialist Hospital Management Board & ors v. Mohammed in National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers (NUHPSW) v. National Union of Air Transport Employees (NUATE) & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/207/2018, the judgment of which was delivered on 4 July 2019 and Road Transport Employers’ Association of Nigeria (RTEAN) v. Comr. Celestine Afam Anere & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/ 269/2021, the judgment of which was delivered on 28 April 2022, at paragraph 81.

 

[49]   NASU v. O. A. Ajagbe & 2 ors Suit No. NICN/LA/407/2017 (supra), equally relied on by the claimant, is also distinguishable on the ground that the ambit of the guarantees

 

under Convention No 87 were not considered. In fact, ILO Convention 87 was neither referred to nor canvassed by any of the parties in that case.

 

[50]   Section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution and section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 permits this Court to, when adjudicating, apply international best practices in labour and the Treaties, Conventions, Recommendations and Protocols on labour ratified by Nigeria. The claimant did not address its mind to this point. The Supreme Court had as far back as 2000 in two concurring judgments of Achike, JSC and Uwaifo, JSC in Abacha & ors v. Fawehinmi [2000] LPELR-14(SC); [2000] 6 NWLR (Pt 660) 228 respectively held that “conventions and treaties create rights and obligations not only between Member States themselves but also between citizens and Member States and between ordinary citizens”; and that “the spirit of a convention or a treaty demands that the interpretation and application of its provisions should meet international and civilized legal concepts… concepts which are widely acceptable and at the same time of clear certainty in application”. Additionally, by section 19(d) of the 1999 Constitution, the foreign policy objectives of Government include the respect for international law and treaty obligations. Accordingly, section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution and section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 merely keep faith with section 19(d) of the 1999 Constitution.

 

[51]    By 2020, His Lordship Ogakwu, JCA in Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Mrs Olawunmi Oyebola [2020] LPELR-51806(CA) would read section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution as imposing an “obligation on [the National Industrial Court of Nigeria - NICN] to now apply good or international best practices in adjudication”. His Lordship proceeded to hold thus:

…I am mindful of the fact that it may appear that international best practices, like public policy, may be an unruly horse and might be difficult to apply. Alluding to a similar situation as it relates to public policy in ENDERBY TOWN FC vs. FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION (1971) 1 CH 591 at 606-6077, Lord Denning, MR

asseverated that public policy is an unruly horse. So obstreperous is the horse that no judge should ever try to mount it lest it runs away with him. I disagree. With a good man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control. It can jump over obstacles. It can leap the fences put up by fictions and come down on the side of justice. Now, on my part, I ask if a judge is such a good man (jockey)? I would think so. If the Judge of the lower Court, that specialized Court in employment and labour related matters, be that intrepid man of great learning, then the application of international best practices would not be difficult, abstruse or arcane in its application and would always end up on the side of justice…

 

[52]     In an earlier case, Ferdinand Dapaah & anor v. Stella Ayam Odey [2018] LPELR-46151(CA); [2019] 16 ACELR 154, His Lordship Nimpar, JCA held that this Court “was also empowered by the Constitution to rely and apply international

 

conventions which have close bearing to claims related to workplace, employment and labour matters… ([2019] ACELR at 181).

 

[53]   Now, Nigeria is a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and in virtue of its membership is bound by the ILO Convention No. 87, a core Convention, which Nigeria ratified on 17 October 1960. See https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f? p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103259 as accessed on 2 May 2023. The key provisions of Convention No. 87 are Articles 2, 3, 8 and 11, which provide thus:

Article 2

Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation.

 

Article 3

(1)   Workers' and employers' organisations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organise their administration and activities and to formulate their programmes.

(2)   The public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof.

 

Article 8

(1)      In exercising the rights provided for in this Convention workers and employers and their respective organisations, like other persons or organised collectivities, shall respect the law of the land.

(2)   The law of the land shall not be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, the guarantees provided for in this Convention.

 

Article 11

Each Member of the International Labour Organisation for which this Convention is in force undertakes to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that workers and employers may exercise freely the right to organise.

 

[54]    Since this Court is now obliged to apply this ratified Convention No. 87, I will proceed to consider the ILO jurisprudence relating to it in order to ascertain how it is understood and applied by the ILO, something that the claimant, even when he relied on Articles 2 and 8 the Convention, did not in greater details delve into.

 

[55]   The ILO jurisprudence regarding Article 2 of Convention No. 87 dictates that workers and employers have the right, without distinction whatsoever, to establish and join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorization. This accords with section 40 of the 1999 Constitution. Paragraph 336 at page 63 of ILO’s Freedom of Association: Compilation of Decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association

 

(International Labour Office: Geneva), 2018, 6th Edition is emphatic in stating that public servants, like all other workers, without distinction whatsoever, have the right to establish and join organisations of their choosing, without previous authorization, for promotion and defence of their occupational interests. But in paragraph 340, it is acknowledged that there are no grounds for challenging the validity of special legal regulations which govern public servants’ right to organise in so far as such regulations comply with the provision of Convention No. 87.

 

[56]   Paragraph 419 under Chapter 4 dealing with the right of workers and employers to establish organizations without previous authorization, in elaborating on the requirement of previous authorization, explains that the principle of freedom of association would often remain a dead letter if workers and employers were required to obtain any kind of previous authorization to enable them establish an organization. That in cases where registration is optional, the fact that the competent authority to effect registration has discretionary power to refuse this formality is not very different from cases in which previous authorization is required.

 

[57]     By paragraph 421, a law providing that the right of association is subject to authorization granted by a government department purely in its discretion is incompatible with the principle of freedom of association.

 

[58]    Chapter 5 deals with the right of workers and employers to establish and join organizations of their own choosing. By paragraph 475, “the right of workers to establish organizations of their own choosing implies, in particular, the effective possibility of forming…organizations independent both of those which exist already and of any political party”. Accordingly, “the right of workers to establish organizations of their own choosing implies, in particular, the effective possibility to create — if the workers so choose — more than one workers’ organizations per enterprise” (paragraph 479). And by paragraph 477, “the existence of an organization in a specific occupation should not constitute an obstacle to the establishment of another organisation, if the workers so wish”. As can be seen, these principles, which provide guarantees under Convention No. 87, are far beyond what the claimant envisages in terms of sections 2(1) and 3(2) of the TUA; or even section 5(4) of the TUA, which provides that:

The Registrar shall not register the trade union if it appears to him that any existing trade union is sufficiently representative of the interests of the class of persons whose interest the union is intended to represent.

 

[59]   From all of this, the generally accepted principle by ILO is trade union plurality. But if the workers or employers so wish, the decision being theirs, they can settle for trade union monopoly. Paragraphs 478 to 501 then go on to espouse on this principle of trade union plurality relative to the principle of trade union monopoly. And so statutory (including constitutional) provisions prohibiting the creation of more than one trade union for a given occupation or economic category (paragraph 478) or a law which does

 

not authorise the establishment of a second union in an enterprise (paragraph 481) or require a singe union for each enterprise, trade or occupation (paragraph 482), the prevention of two enterprise trade union coexisting (paragraph 480), all fail to comply with Article 2 of Convention No. 87.

 

[60]   So, “while it may generally be to the advantage of workers to avoid a multiplicity of trade union organizations, unification of the trade union movement imposed through state intervention by legislative means runs counter to the principle embodied in Articles 2 and 11 of Convention No. 87…” (paragraph 485). Additionally, “while it is generally to the advantage of workers and employers to avoid the proliferation of competing organizations, a monopoly situation imposed by law is at variance with the principle of free choice of workers’ and employers’ organizations”. (paragraph 486). By paragraph 487, “unity within trade union movement should not be imposed by the State through legislation because this would be contrary to the principles of freedom of association”. Trade union unity voluntarily achieved should not be prohibited and should instead be respected by public authorities (paragraph 498).

 

[61]    ILO feels strongly about trade union pluralism that in paragraph 492, it is stated thus:

The Committee has suggested that a State should amend its legislation so as to make it clear that when a trade union already exists for same employees as those whom a new trade union seeking registration is organizing or is proposing to organize, or the fact that the existing union holds a bargaining certificate in respect of such class of employees, this cannot give rise to objections of sufficient substance to justify the registrar in refusing to register the new union.

 

[62]   This is the labour jurisprudence that should today guide the adjudication of labour and employment disputes such as the instant case. Already, this Court, in Tricycle Owners Association of Nigeria v. Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/216/2022, the judgment of which was delivered on 17 January 2023, had started applying the said labour jurisprudence. This is because the power and jurisdiction (and hence obligation) of this Court under section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution and section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 to, when adjudicating, apply international best practices in labour and the Treaties, Conventions, Recommendations and Protocols on labour ratified by Nigeria, inures “notwithstanding…anything contained in this Constitution”. And section 45 of the 1999 Constitution is one of such “anything contained in this Constitution” that must be read subject to section 254C(1)(f) and (h) of the 1999 Constitution. All of this signifies that sections 2(1), 3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA, and section 45 of the 1999 Constitution cannot be used to thwart or frustrate the application of ILO Convention No. 87 in the manner canvassed by the claimant in this case.

 

116.    Given this Court’s reasoning in NASU v. Comrade Niyi Akinnibi (supra); and on the assumption that the claimant properly filed this suit and the 1st and 2nd defendants actually registered the 3rd and 4th defendants at the time that this suit was filed and to prevent multiplicity of suits (going by the spirit of section 14 of the NIC Act 2006) if this suit were simply to be struck out for incompetence, I shall proceed to answer the questions posed by the claimant, which two questions can actually be simply made one i.e. “Whether by virtue of section 40(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the Trade Unions Act Cap T14 2004 the [1st and 2nd defendants are] competent to register the 3rd and 4th defendants to co-exist alongside and carry out the same functions with the claimant in the Universities in Nigeria”.

 

117.    On thus the questions submitted by the claimant as just rephrased, I answer in the affirmative given ILO Convention No. 87 and its jurisprudence, which is now applicable in virtue of section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution and section 7(6) of the NIC Act 2006.

 

118.  Like I pointed out in NASU v. Comrade Niyi Akinnibi (supra) at paragraph 67, section 25 of the TUA, in talking of “all registered trade unions in the employment of an employer” intuits that there can be more than one trade union in an employment; and for purposes of collective bargaining, these registered trade unions in an employment shall constitute an electoral college to elect members who will represent them in negotiation with the employer. Section 25 accordingly does not intuit trade union monopoly. It intuits trade union plurality.

 

119.    Having answered the questions posed by the claimant against the claimant, the reliefs prayed for by the claimant are not grantable. They must fail. All the reliefs are accordingly dismissed, as is this suit. I so order.

 

120.  Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost.

 

 

 

…………..…………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD, OFR