IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP,
PHD, OFR, bpa
PRESIDENT, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
DATE: 8
MAY 2025 SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/421/2024
BETWEEN
Nigerian Association of Medical and Dental Academics (NAMDA) - Claimant
AND
1. National Universities Commission (NUC)
2. Minister of
Education
3. Attorney General of the Federation - Defendants
REPRESENTATION
A. J. Osayande, with Miss D. O. Gabriel,
for the claimant. Akin Adewale, for the 1st
defendant.
B. S. Kpenkpen, for the 2nd defendant — holding the brief of P. C. Ike.
No legal representation for the 3rd defendant.
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
1. The
claimant filed this suit on 15 November 2024 vide an originating summons. The
claimant submitted seven questions for determination, namely:
(1) WHETHER
by Section 25 (1) of the Trade Union Act Cap T14, LFN 2004, The Claimant as a
registered Trade Union is not entitled to recognition by the Defendants?
(2) WHETHER
by the 2nd Defendant’s letter Ref. No. NUC/ES/138/Vol.65/112 of 2nd September, 2024, entitled: IMMEDIATE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WHITE PAPER ON THE 2021 PRESIDENTIAL VISITATION PANELS TO FEDERAL
UNIVERSITIES
AND INTER – UNIVERSITY CENTERS on the basis of meeting of the 1st and 2nd Defendants with the
leadership of Academic Staff Union
of Universities (ASUU) alone does not amount to denial of recognition of the
Claimant by the Defendants?
(3) WHETHER
by section 25 (2) of the Trade Union Act, Cap T14, LFN, 2004 the purported
decision conveyed by 1st Defendant’s letter Ref No. NUC/ES/138/Vol.65/112 of 2nd September, 2024 upon denial
of recognition of the Claimant
is not illegal, null and void?
(4) WHETHER
by Section 36 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as Amended), the Claimant is not entitled
to be heard before the purported decision conveyed by the 1st Defendant’s letter Ref. No. NUC/ES/138/Vol.65/112 of 2nd
September,
2024 with far reaching negative effect on her members which the failure
constituted a denial of fair hearing and resultant nullity of the said
decision.
(5) WHETHER
by Article 1(1) (e) of the Second Schedule to the University of Benin
(Transitional provisions) Act, Cap U4, LFN, 2004; Section 2 of the University
of Benin (Transitional provisions) Act,
Cap U4, LFN, 2004; Article 3(c) of
the Second Schedule to the University of Ibadan Act, Cap U6, LFN 2004; Section 18 of the University of Ibadan
Act, Cap U6 , LFN, 2004; Article 3(d) of the Third schedule to the University of Jos
Act, Cap U8, LFN; Article 3(d) of the Third schedule to the University of
Jos Act, Cap U8, LFN, 2004; Section
26 of the University of Jos Act, Cap
U8, LFN 2004; Section 7 of the Universities
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Amendment Act 2003; and Sections 2 and 10 (g) of the Delta State University Edict No. 2
of 1998, which same provisions exist for all other Federal and State
Universities mutatis mutandis, the
Claimant members that are professors not members of University Senate as of
right?
(6) WHETHER
by Sections 28 and 29 of the University of Benin (Transitional Provisions) Act, Cap U4, LFN, 2004; Paragraph 12 of
the Third schedule of the Nnamdi Azikwe University Act, Cap N139, LFN, 2004;
Paragraphs 1,2(1) –(3) and 4 (1)-(3) of the
College of Medicine
of University of Ibadan Statute,
incorporated in the first schedule to the University of Ibadan Act,
Cap U6, LFN, 2004; Sections 1(1) and 2 of the University of Benin Teaching
Hospital Management Board Act, Cap U3, LFN, 2004; Sections 2 and 4 of the University College Hospital Act, Cap U1, LFN, 2004; Sections 5
(1) and
(2) (a) and 7 (1) (b), (2) and (3) and 19 of the University Teaching Hospital
(Reconstitution of Boards, etc) Act, Cap U15, LFN, 2004; Sections 1(2) (a) and 9(1) and
(3) of
the Medical and Dental Practitioners Act,
Cap M8, LFN 2004; and Sections 2, 7(b) and 11 of the National Medical College Act,
Cap N59, LFN, 2004; Sections 10 (1) and 11(g) of the Education (National
Minimum Standards and Establishment of Institutions) Act Cap E3, LFN 2004;
Colleges of Medicine are not unique and integral part of the Universities with
medical Postgraduate Education and Certification vested in the Medical and
Dental Council of Nigeria, and National Medical College of Nigeria?
(7) WHETHER
Section 1.2(vi) of the White Paper on the 2021 Presidential Visitation Panels
to Federal Universities and inter-University Centers which stipulates that
“Academics without the Ph.D. should not be members of the Senate” is not
inconsistent with Article 1(1) (e) of the Second Schedule to the University of
Benin Transitional Provisions) Act, Cap U4, LFN, 2004; Section 2 of the
University of Benin (Transitional Provisions) Act, Cap U4, LFN, 2004; Article
3(c) of the Second Schedule to the University
of the Ibadan Act, Cap U6, LFN, 2004; Section
18 of the University of Ibadan
Act, Cap U6, LFN, 2004; Article 3 (d)
of the Third Schedule to the
University of Jos Act. Cap U8, LFN,
2004; Section 26 of the University of Jos Act, Cap U8, LFN, 2004; Sections 2
and 10 (g) of the Delta State University Edict No. 2 of the 1998; and Sections
5(1) and (2) (a) and 7 (1) (b), (2) and (3) and 19 of the University Teaching
Hospitals (Reconstitution of Boards,
etc.) Act, Cap U15, LFN, 2004; Section
1(2) (a) and 9(1) and
(3) of
the Medical and Dental Practitioners Act, Cap M8, LFN, 2004; Sections 2, 7 (b)
and 11 of the National
Medical College Act, Cap N59, LFN, 2004; and Sections
10 (1)
and 11
(g) of the Education (National Minimum Standards and Establishment of
Institutions) Act Cap E3, LFN 2004, and therefore illegal, null and
void?
2. Upon the questions being resolved in favour of the claimant,
the claimant prayed for the following reliefs:
(1) A
DECLARATION that by Section 25 (1) of the Trade Union Act, Cap T14, LFN, 2004,
the Claimant as a registered Trade Union is entitled to recognition by the Defendants.
(2) A DECLARATION that the 2nd Defendant’s letter
Ref. No. NUC/ES/138/Vol.65/112 of 2nd September,
2004, entitled: IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WHITE PAPER ON THE 2021 PRESIDENTIAL VISITATION PANELS TO FEDERAL
UNIVERSITIES
AND INTER – UNIVERSITY CENTERS on the basis of meeting of the 1st and 2nd Defendants with the
leadership of Academic Staff Union
of Universities (ASUU) alone amount to denial of recognition of the Claimant by
the Defendant.
(3) A
DECLARATION that by section 25 (2) of the Trade Union Act, Cap T14, LFN, 2004,
the purported decision conveyed by 1st Defendant’s letter Ref No. NUC/ES/138/
Vol.65/112 of 2nd September, 2024 upon denial of recognition of the Claimant is
not illegal, null and void.
(4) A DECLARATION that by Section 36(1) of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as Amended), the Claimant is entitled to be
heard before the purported decision conveyed by the 1st Defendant’s letter
Ref. No. NUC/ES/138/Vol.65/112 of 2nd
September, 2024 with far reaching negative effect on her members which the
failure constituted a denial of fair hearing and resultant nullity of the said
decision.
(5) A DECLARATION that by Article 1(1) (e) of the Second Schedule
to the University of Benin (Transitional provisions) Act, Cap U4, LFN, 2004;
Section 2 of the University of Benin (Transitional provisions) Act, Cap U4,
LFN, 2004; Section 2 of the University of Benin (Transitional Provisions) Act, Cap U4, LFN, 2004; Article 3(c)
of the Second Schedule to the University of Ibadan Act, Cap U6, LFN 2004;
Section 18 of the University of Ibadan Act,
Cap U6 , LFN, 2004; Article 3(d) of
the Third Schedule to the University of Jos Act, Cap U8, LFN; Section 7 of the Universities (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Amendment Act 2003; and Sections 2
and 10 (g) of the Delta State University Edict No. 2 of 1998; which same
provisions exist for all other Federal and State Universities mutatis mutandis, the Claimant members
that are professors are members of University Senate as of right.
(6) A
DECLARATION that by Sections 28 and 29 of the University of Benin (Transitional
Provisions) Act, Cap U4, LFN, 2004; Paragraph 12 of the 3rd schedule to the
Nnamdi Azikwe University Act, Cap N139, LFN, 2004; Paragraphs 1,
2(1) – (3) and 4 (1)-(3) of the
College of Medicine of University of Ibadan Statute, incorporated in the first schedule
to the University of Ibadan
Act, Cap U6, LFN, 2004;
Sections 1(1) and 2 of the University of Benin Teaching
Hospital Management Board Act, Cap
U3, LFN, 2004; Sections 2 and 4 of the University
College Hospital Act, Cap U1, LFN, 2004; Sections 5
(1) and
(2) (a) and 7 (1) (b), (2) and (3) and 19 of the University Teaching Hospital
(Reconstitution of Boards, etc) Act, Cap U15, LFN, 2004; Sections 1(2) (a) and 9(1) and
(3) of
the Medical and Dental Practitioners Act,
Cap M8, LFN 2004; and Sections 2, 7(b) and 11 of the National Medical College Act,
Cap N59, LFN, 2004; Sections 10 (1) and 11(g) of the Education (National
Minimum Standards and Establishment of Institutions) Act Cap E3, LFN 2004; and
Colleges of Medicine are unique and integral part of the Universities with
Medical Postgraduate education and certification vested in the Medical and
Dental Council of Nigeria, and National Medical College of Nigeria.
(7) A
DECLARATION that by Section 1.2(vi) of the White Paper on the 2021 Presidential
Visitation Panels to Federal Universities and inter-University Centers which
stipulates that “Academics without the Ph.D. should not be members of the
Senate” is inconsistent with Article 1(1) (e) of the Second Schedule to the
University of Benin Transitional Provisions) Act, Cap U4, LFN, 2004; Section 2
of the University of Benin (Transitional Provisions) Act, Cap U4, LFN, 2004; Article 3(c) of the Second Schedule
to the University of the Ibadan Act, Cap U6, LFN, 2004; Section 18 of
the University of Ibadan Act, Cap U6,
LFN, 2004; Article 3 (d) of the Third
Schedule to the University of Jos Act. Cap U8, LFN, 2004; Sections 2 and 10 (g)
of the Delta State University Edict No. 2 of the 1998; and Sections 5(1) and
(2) (a) and 7 (1) (b), (2) and (3) and 19 of the University Teaching
Hospitals (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, Cap U15, LFN, 2004;
Section 1(2) (a) and 9(1) and (3) of the Medical and Dental Practitioners Act,
Cap M8, LFN, 2004; Sections
2, 7 (b) and 11 of the National Medical
College Act, Cap N59, LFN, 2004; and Sections 10 (1) and 11 (g) of the Education (National
Minimum Standards and Establishment of Institutions) Act Cap E3, LFN 2004, and therefore
illegal, null and void.
(8) AN ORDER
setting aside the 1st Defendant’s letter Ref No. NUC/ES/138/Vol.65/122 of 2nd
September, 2004 and the purported white paper on the 2021 presidential
visitation panels to Federal Universities and Inter University centers.
(9) AN ORDER
compelling the Defendants to include the Claimant as a Trade Union in all
academic activities and welfare of academic staffs in the Universities.
(10) AN ORDER
compelling the Defendants to the Claimant as a Trade Union in all matters,
academic activities and welfare of academic staff in the Universities by the Defendants.
(11) PERPETUAL INJUNCTION retraining the Defendants from
denying recognition of the Claimant as a trade Union in all matters affecting
academics in the Universities.
AND ANY OTHER RELIEF(S) as this
Honourable Court may find the Plaintiff further entitled.
3. The
claimant’s originating summons is supported by an affidavit with Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H, and a written
address.
4. The 1st
defendant responded to the originating summons. All through the hearing, the
3rd defendant entered no appearance, nor was he represented by counsel. The 2nd
defendant on 5 May 2025 filed a motion on notice praying for extension of time
within which to file and serve his memorandum of appearance, as well as a
preliminary objection. The said motion for extension of time was moved today 8
May 2025, and granted. The preliminary objection was, however, withdrawn
today 8 May 2025 by the 2nd defendant; and so was struck out — thus
paving the way for this judgment to be delivered. In essence,
the 2nd defendant filed no defence processes.
5. The
claimant reacted to the 1st defendant’s processes by filing a reply to the
defendant’s counter-affidavit and written address. This case is accordingly
fought only on the defence processes of the 1st defendant, which are a
counter-affidavit with Exhibits NUC1A, NUC1 (unsigned), NUC2 (a circular), NUC3
(unsigned guidelines) and NUC4 (unsigned highlights of an interactive meeting),
and a written address.
THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT
6. The
claimant was registered as a trade union on 13 January 2023. See Exhibit A. Its members are drawn from Medical and
Dental academics of Universities or institutions accredited by the National
Medical College of Nigeria or its equivalent. See Article 3(a) of Exhibit B,
the constitution of the claimant. To the claimant, because it is a registered
trade union, it is compulsory for the 1st and 2nd defendants to grant due
recognition to it as any other sister trade union of academics in the
University system. That on 28 August 2024, the 1st and 2nd defendants held a meeting with the leadership
of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), where far reaching
resolutions were made, notably on purported immediate implementation of the
White Paper on the 2021 Presidential Visitation panels to Federal Universities
and Inter University Centers.
7. The
claimant went on that the 1st and 2nd defendants denied recognition of the
claimant by not inviting her
leadership, the courtesy granted to her sister academic trade union (ASUU), for
the meeting of 28 August
2024 to make input to the purported
resolutions reached, notably
on the purported immediate
implementation of the White Paper.
8. That
apart from denying the claimant recognition, the claimant’s leadership was
denied fair hearing on fundamental issues comprised in the purported White
Paper affecting the interest of the claimant’s members. That the 1st and 2nd
defendants, by inviting the ASUU leadership alone,
denied the claimant the opportunity to “present” her members despite obvious
peculiarities, their respective and distinctive stream of qualifications, and
progression to academic eminence of University Professors, a distinction
recognised, defined and protected by law.
9. To the
claimant, the 2nd defendant has not provided any reason whatsoever why Medical
and Dental Practitioners, who have developed their career through the
Fellowship to Professor pathway need a PhD. That the 2nd defendant has not shown
anywhere how the non-possession of PhD has caused either loss of quality
to undergraduate Medical and Dental training (where many of them perform their
duties), or decline in the quality of Medical and Dental Practice in Nigeria.
And that the 2nd defendant has neither shown anywhere how holders of Medical
Fellowship without PhD, demonstrate with empirical evidence whether by study,
report, etc, which Fellowship only are less scholarly as those with PhD.
10. To the 1st defendant, the claimant’s suit is predicated on the 1st defendant’s Memo addressed
to Pro-Chancellor and Chairmen of Governing Councils of Federal Universities
and Inter- University Centres, attached as Exhibit C, directing for immediate
implementation of the White Paper on the 2021 Presidential Visitation Panels to
Federal Universities and Inter-University Centres. That the grouse of the
claimant is that the Memo states that academics without the PhD should not be
members of the Senate. That the second grouse is that the 1st defendant does
not recognise the claimant as a trade union body due to failure to invite them
for meetings.
11. That by this criterion for eligibility to be a member of the Senate,
the claimant’s grouse
is that their members who
have Fellowship but have no PhD or MD degrees have been unjustly excluded from
being members of the Senate. The claimant asserted that having a Fellowship is
equivalent to a PhD or MD. That the claimant went into a treatise to prove that
Fellowship is equivalent to a PhD or MD and for this, their members who have
Fellowship should not be made to obtain PhD or MD for career progression.
12. Accordingly,
to the 1st defendant, the claim of the claimant is on the core issue of
eligibility to be a member of the Senate and the status of the claimant as a
trade union which to a large extent is a wrong perception and interpretation of
the actions of the 1st defendant.
THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE
CLAIMANT
13. The claimant
submitted the seven
questions it posed
in this originating summons as the issues
for determination. The claimant then proceeded to argue questions (issues) (1),
(2), (3) and (4) together. Citing section 25 of the Trade Unions Act (TUA)
2004, the claimant submitted that because it was restored pursuant to section
5(7) of the TUA, it is entitled to recognition as such, with all the powers,
duties and privileges of a trade union. That denial of recognition is
sanctioned by section 25(2) of the TUA.
14. The
claimant proceeded to cite sections 28 and 29 of the University of Benin
(Transitional Provisions) Act Cap U4 LFN 2004, Article
12(1)(a) of the Third Schedule
to the Nnamdi Azikwe
University Act Cap N139 LFN 2004, paragraphs 1, 2(1) - (3) and 4(1) - (3) of
the College of Medicine of the University of Ibadan statute incorporated in the
First Schedule to the University of Ibadan Act Cap U6 LFN 2004, sections 1(1)
and 2 of the University of Benin Teaching Hospital Management Board Act Cap U3 LFN 2004, sections 2 and 4 of
the University College Hospital Act
Cap U1 LFN 2004, and sections 5(1) and (2)(a), and 7(1)(b), (2), (3) and (19)
of the University Teaching Hospitals (Reconstitution of Boards etc.) Act Cap
U15 LFN 2004. The claimant then submitted that a calm reading of all these laws
reveals the peculiar place of the discipline of Medicine in the University
System and the distinctive character and architecture of Medical and Dental education. That most instructively, they reveal that members of the claimant, whether in the College of
Medicine or Teaching Hospitals are integral parts of the University system and,
therefore, employees within the employment of the 3rd defendant and the FMOH.
15. The
claimant went on that it is entitled to recognition by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
defendants on matters affecting Federal Universities and inter-University centers as representatives of a critical
segment
of the University system just like her sister trade union, ASUU. That the
failure of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants to invite the claimant for the
meeting of 28 August 2024, which resulted in Exhibit C, is a denial of
recognition. That section 25(2) of the TUA 2004 sanctions denial of recognition
as the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants have done to the claimant thereby making it
illegal, null and void, citing Huebner v.
A.j.e. & Pm. Co Ltd [2017] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1586) 397, which held that the court must act to enforce and protect the law of the land regarding
illegal transactions.
16. It is the
further the contention of the claimant that the denial of recognition, which
was bad enough, carried with it the denial of fair hearing as ASUU does not represent the interest of
the entire academic community of the University System. That the claimant represents the interest of Medical and Dental Academics that
constitute an integral part of the University System. That denial of fair
hearing is a denial of justice and is a prejudice for any man to be denied
justice, citing Adigun & ors v. Attorney
General of Oyo State & ors [1987] 7 NWLR (Pt. 53) 678 at 709 and Amaechi v. Okoye [2008] 12 NWLR (Pt.
1101) 546 at 580
17. The
claimant continued that most crucially, it is actually its members that the
decision conveyed in the 1st defendant’s letter aforesaid targeted; and not the
members of ASUU, whom the 1st
defendant collaborated with to take very harmful decisions targeting the
claimant’s members being those to be affected with the decision. That it was,
therefore, incumbent on the 1st 2nd and 3rd defendants not only to recognise
the claimant and its members, but to avail them the opportunity to be heard on
such critical issues which touch on, and affect careers and status they have individually built over the years. The claimant then urged that issues (1), (2), (3) and
(4) should be resolved in its favour.
18. The
claimants took the remaining questions (issues) (5), (6) and (7) together.
Citing section 2 of, and Article
1(1) of the Second Schedule to, the University of Benin (Transitional
Provisions) Act Cap U4 LFN 2004; section 18 of, and Article 3(e) of the Second Schedule to, the University of
Ibadan Act Cap U6 LFN 2004; section 26 of, and Article 3(d) of the Third
Schedule to, the University of Jos Act Cap U8 LFN 2004; section 7 of the
Universities (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Amendment Act 2003, and sections 2 and 10(9) of the Delta State University
Edict No. 2 of 1998, the claimant submitted that these randomly picked statutes
are the same — as the provisions for virtually all of Universities enabling
statutes are same for all Federal and State Universities and inter-University
centres on attainment of the status of a Professor conferring automatic
membership of University Senate on such person on an individual right. That the
background qualifications, and processes, including appraisal and progression
through the ranks before the attainment of the enviable rank of Professor, do
not count at this stage.
19. The claimant
went on that section 7 of the Universities (Miscellaneous Provisions)
(Amendment) Act 2003 is unique.
Firstly, it is intended to supersede individual University’s Act on composition of the University
Senate and in making a general provision for all Federal Universities. Secondly, it is latter
in time and thus has undertaken an implied repeal
of individual University’s Act provision on the composition of the University Senate. That the general rule is
that
where two laws are in conflict, the later law abrogates prior contrary laws.
That the rule is known as the doctrine of implied repeal, citing Maidoki v. Police [1978] NWLR 104 and
108 (this citation is questionable) and Olanre
Wajii v. Oyeyemi & ors [2003] 2 NWLR (Pt. 697) 729 at 259 - 260; and Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd Ed., Vol. 36 para 703 at page 462),where the
doctrine is stated as follows:
Repeal by implications, the rule as to where is summarised in the maxim,
leges posteriors priores contrarious abrogant is not favoured by
the Courts, but the principle is clear that if two enactments conflict and
cannot be reconciled, the later in time must prevail.
20. That the
general policy is that the courts lean against a repeal of an existing
legislation by implication. For the doctrine to apply, the two laws must be
inconsistent and repugnant to each other that the two laws are incapable of
standing together, referring to Maidoki
v. Police (supra).
21. That the
interesting and distinctive provision of “7A(1)(3) of Section 7 of the
Universities (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Amendment) Act 2003” is that
membership of Senate consists of “all Professors of the University”. That under
the various Universities Act, which state “all Professors and heads of academic
for departments as recognised by Senate” “which interests of element of
recognition by University Senate that can be manipulated by any of the
Defendants”. Therefore, section 1.2(vi) of the
White Paper on the 2021 Presidential visitation panel to Federal
Universities and Inter-Universities (Exhibit D), must be tested against section
7 of the Universities (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Amendment) Act 2003, for validity. That it will
return an unambiguous verdict of patent illegality and nullity of Exhibit D.
22. The
claimant continued that the enabling laws it cited earlier show the special
place and integrative character of the field of medicine in the University
system as well as the peculiar nature of Medical and Dental education as one
not wholly domiciled within the University System, and therefore absolutely
beyond the control of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants; but one that straddles
in between the University and tertiary health institutions in statutory organic
manner.
23. To the
claimant, in virtue of sections 5(1) and (2)(a), 7(1)(b), (2) and (3) and 19 of
the University Teaching Hospitals (Reconstitution of Boards etc) Act Cap U15
LFN 2004; sections 1(2)(a) and 9(1) and (3) of the Medical and Dental
Practitioners Act Cap M8 LFN 2004; and sections 2, 7(B) and 11 of the National
Medical College Act Cap N59 LFN 2004, Medical and Dental education and
certification are not within the domain of the University and control of the
1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants. That in paragraphs 26 - 36 of its supporting
affidavit, it showed the different academic and professional pathways between
her members and other class of academics
in the University system.
24. That
Clinical Lecturers do not operate the University based BSc - MSc - PhD as it is
mostly MBBS/BDS - Primary
- Part 1/MWACP-FWACSFMCP/FMCSFWACS.
That this is the practice worldwide. That statutory
validation is given by the exclusive vesting of postgraduate education in the National Medical
College of Nigeria,
not in the Universities. Furthermore, statutory
validation
is provided under section 5(2)(a) of the University Teaching Hospitals (Reconstitution of Boards etc) Act Cap U15
2004, where the qualification for the Chief Medical Director is a holder of
Postgraduate Medical qualification registrable with MDCN and not Ph.D.
25. After
citing sections 10 and 11 of the Education (National Minimum Standard and
Establishment of Institutions) Act Cap E3 LFN,2004, the claimant submitted that
the power of the 1st defendant under section 10(1) of this Act to lay down
minimum standards for all Universities and other institutions of higher
learning must be given a community reading with sections 1(2)(a), 9(1)(a) and
(3) and 10(1) of the Medical and Dental Practitioners Act Cap M8 LFN 2004,
sections 2, 7(B) and 11 of the National Medical College Act Cap N59 LFN 2004.
That a community reading of these Acts will show that the powers of the 1st
defendant is general, while that of
MDCN and NMCN are specific as to Medical education. That it is settled law that
specific prevails over general provision of law, captured in the Latin maxim generalis specialia derogant (special
things derogate from general things), citing Poatson Graphic Arts Trade Ltd v. NDIC [2019]
7 NWLR (Pt. 1672) 447 at 474, Nocklink Ventures Ltd v.
Aroh [2020]
7 NWLR (Pt. 1722) 63 at 89 and CAC v. Davis [2009] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1067) 66 at 77.
26. It is the
submission of the claimant in virtue of sections 2, 7(b) and 11 of the National
Medical College Act Cap N59 LFN 2004, which is specific, the Fellowship
certificate issued pursuant to section 11 of the said Act prevails over the
purported power and policy of the 1st defendant which is general to downgrade
it in favour of its controlled University zenith qualification of PhD. That the power of the 1st defendant to
approve courses and award degrees, including the enviable degree of PhD is also
general, while the power of NMCN under section 7(b) and 11 of the National
Medical College Act Cap N59 LFN 2004 is specific. That by the authorities
cited, the Postgraduate Medical Fellowship certificate from NMCN and its
equivalent institutions prevail and stands an eminent terminal Postgraduate
education in the field of Medicine and Dentistry.
27. That the
eminence and terminal status of Fellowship issued by NMCN and its equivalent
issued by WACP/WACS is statutory as per section 11 of the National Medical
College Act and further statutory
validity is provided under section 5(2)(a) of the University Teaching Hospital
(Reconstitution of Boards, etc) Act Cap U15 LFN 2004, which makes the
possession of a Postgraduate Medical qualification, which is Fellowship, as an eminent
and terminal requirement in addition to having been
medically qualified and registered as such for appointment as Chief Medical
Director, which is also another zenith appointment over the institution, which
trains, manages and administers the whole institution of the Teaching Hospital.
28. The
claimant went on that the defendants are, therefore, incompetent to use PhD as
an entry qualification of a class of academics, as a yardstick for all University
Academics and to scandalously and shamelessly escalate it as a premium
qualification attached to Professorship to being a member of the Senate, even
with the cornucopia of legislative instruments in the manner stated in the
multitude of extant laws and statutes.
29. The
claimant drew the attention of the Court to section 11(g) of the Education
Minimum Standards and Establishment of Institutions) Act Cap E3 LFN 2004, provides that the purpose of higher
education shall be the promotion and encouragement of scholarship and research.
And then asked: when it comes to a point in academic community that a person
who has attained academic eminence of a Professor will lose his seat in the
University Senate because of not possessing a PhD, which is not even a terminal
postgraduate qualification for all players in the University academic
community, is absurdity not reigning, is that not an absurdity and repudiation
of true scholarship and research?
30. The
claimant continued that it has shown in paragraph 50 of the supporting
affidavit the progressive ranks before attainment of Professorship: Lecturer II
for PhD/MBBS/BDS/MD/ LLM/B.L; Lecturer 1 for Medical Fellowship/PhD (Law)/PhD
or DM in Medicine or Dentistry. “Qualification for Senior Lecturer is Lecturer
1 for Reader/Associate Professor is Senior Lecturer, and for Professor is
Reader/Associate Professor. However, the bottom line is appraisal based on
research and publications”.
31. That
where the defendants chose to come up with requirement that a Professor who is
a member of the Senate by virtue of attainment of that enviable status will
lose it because of class persecution, Court is competent to set it aside,
citing Adekunle v. University of
Port-Harcourt [1991] 3 NWLR (Pt. 181) 534 at 548 and Okusami v. AG, Lagos State [2015] 4 NWLR (Pt.
1449) 220 at 253.
32. To the
claimant, the membership of the University Senate is a function of law. That
the laws make attainment of the enviable status of Professorship automatic
members of the Senate. But that the pertinent
question is: whether
the defendants are competent through
section 1.2(vi) of the
purposed White Paper on the 2021 Presidential visitation Panels to Federal
Universities and Inter-University Centers, Exhibit C, is competent to add or
vary the qualification of membership of the Senate as to Professorship unless
otherwise prescribed by law?
33. That paragraphs
29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45 of the
supporting
affidavit shows the peculiarities of the medical and dental profession with
Fellowship as zenith of professional and academic training. That it is equally
shown that other disciplines have their education exclusively within the
University which is marked with PhD as zenith academic attainment. The claimant
then cited Amasike v. Reg. Gen., CAC [2010]
13 NWLR (Pt. 1211) 237 at 399, which held that a public body or authority
vested with statutory powers must act within the law and take care not to
exceed or abuse its powers; PHMB v
Ejitagba [2000] 11 NWLR (Pt. 677) 154 and SBN Plc v. CBN [2009] 6
NWLR (Pt. 1137) 237.
34. The
claimant continued that the various University enabling statutes show that
anyone the University has appointed as a Professor from whatever background and
consideration, is automatically a member of the University’s Senate. That this
means that being a Professor, and privileges such as membership of the
University Senate, is a question of law and not whimsical policy as per Exhibit C. That the claimant’s members, holding Fellowship qualification, that rose
to the
rank of Professors are members of the Senate in the various Universities in
Nigeria. That by Exhibit C the statutory right of the claimant’s members of
professorial standing with Fellowship qualification as members of the University Senate is being eclipsed just by the whims
and caprice of the 1st defendant. That it is settled law that any law that
denies any person any right must be construed strictly, citing Lawal v. EFCC [2020] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1744)
193 at 243.
35. To the
claimant, the courts have adopted the principle that every statute which
encroaches on the rights of the subjects
whether as regards
person or property
are subject to a strict
construction in the same as penal Acts. Therefore, it is recognised that
such statutes should be interpreted if possible, so as to respect such right
and if there is any ambiguity, the construction which is in favour of the
freedom of the individual should be adopted, citing Afolabi & ors v. Governor of Oyo
State & ors [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 734 at 753. That the principle has also been evolved that there is always a presumption based
upon a supposition that the Legislature would not do injustice, that the
Legislature does not intend to limit vested rights further than clearly appears
from the enactment, referring to Afolabi
& ors v. Governor of Oyo State & ors
(supra) at 754, and Re: Metropolitan Film Studies Application [1962]
1 NWLR 1315 at 1325 (this citation is questionable). That if the Legislature
and the laws it makes have been enjoined to respect vested rights in the manner
just set out, then this Court is in a very good position to put the 1st defendant (whose wheel of the use of
administrative discretionary powers has ostensibly run berserk and amok) under
control.
36. That the
claimant’s member Professors are members of their various University Senates in
accordance with the University enabling statutes. That the 1st defendant’s Exhibit C has no force of law as to
alter or vary the condition. And so,
for the fact that Exhibit C purports to take away rights of the claimant’s
member Professors as members of University Senates, it must be construed
strictly and resolved in favour of the claimant’s member Professors.
37. That it
must never be lost on this Court that the career development of members of the
claimant that rose to become Professors after entering the teaching employment, research etc (i.e. the rudiments of qualification,
through to be so crowned) have been within the 1st, 2nd and defendants’ controlled Universities. The Universities
were individually satisfied by members of the claimant before conferment of the
rank of Professors overtime, based on law. The claimant then asked: can the 1st
defendant be allowed to now jettison all those due legal and academic processes
just by mere retrogressive and oppressive policy?
38. It is the
submission of the claimant that Medical Fellowship which by law (and proven
acknowledgments of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants through the years) has been
adjudged higher than PhD in terms of
the rigour of training ex-facie and
proven proficiencies of its holders.
Therefore, any policy of the 1st 2nd and 3rd defendants suggesting that such
certification, without any empirical justification of how it suddenly became
inferior to PhD, such policy should be firmly and strongly condemned and
declared by this Court to be repugnant to natural justice, equity and good
conscience.
39. That
paragraphs 56 - 57 of the supporting affidavit show how the 1st defendant
engaged the National Medical College of Nigeria in development of Doctor of
Medicine degree certified as equivalent to PhD. That this underscores the absolute fact that the defendants (particularly the 1st defendant),
deliberately targeted the claimant and its members, when they came to this
decision of their purported “Mandatoriness” of the possession of PhD,
notwithstanding the rank of their members as Professors. That the defendants
deliberately also neglected to acknowledge the MD Degree, which the 1st
defendant had acknowledged as equivalent to their most coveted PhD, as being a
Degree in lieu of PhD, because they are aware that there is alternative was
available in the MD (though the degree is just about three years old which
confers another disadvantage) for to members of the Claimant, whom the
Defendants have targeted for humiliation by this policy.
40. The
claimant went on that the 1st defendant has been shown by affidavit evidence to
have deliberately refused to consult with the claimant and its members, but
preferring to meet with ASUU; which indeed breached all rules of natural
justice in the tripartite form the principle operates thus:
(i) by audi alterem pertem, requiring hearing
from the other side, the 1st defendant did not hear from the claimant;
(ii) by
consulting with only ASUU, in whose court the 1st defendant knew the claimant
will never be innocent, the 1st defendant demonstrated bias and therefore
failed the rule against bias; and
(iii) of
course, the rule, memo judex sua was
not observed when the 1st defendant with pre-determined policy it was hell bent
on implementing, chose ASUU as the only trade union in the University it sought
to validate its premeditated policy, targeting mostly the claimant’s members,
thereby also discriminating against them.
41. Furthermore,
that myriad of principles of equity were also breached by the actions of the
defendants. The 1st defendant stood
by over the years and saw laws and regulations made by the Universities for how
the Universities set their pathways to Professorship. Members of the claimant
before becoming Professors, went through them without hindrance. That assuming
but not conceding that there were no statutory protection of the rights of the
claimant’s members, the defendants would still be caught by the equity of
standing by, and allow the claimant’s members to be Professors, such that the
privileges attached thereof such as the legal right of membership to Senate of the University cannot be
stopped or infringed upon by mere policy or White Paper, citing Kamalu v. Umunna [1997] 5 NWLR (Pt. 505)
321.
42. That
given the above scenario, where a party has failed the above twin limbs of
repugnancy tests such as stated above, to wit, repugnant to rules of natural
justice, (in its tripartite form and application), and equity, his conscience
oftentimes will always be found not to be good. That affidavit evidence
abounds, showing the 1st defendant’s deliberate preference of only ASUU for consultation whose majority
members are neither to be affected nor targeted by the policy. It is also clear
that the 1st defendant members are not Medical Doctors, and have shown demonstrable disdain and malice against
the claimant. The claimant then urged
the Court to hold that there could not have been anything good in the
conscience and soul of the defendants’ policy
as has been shown both in this address and more particularly
in the supporting affidavit; resolve issues (5), (6) and (7) in its favour.
43. The
claimant concluded by urging the Court to resolve all the issues in its favour
and grant all the reliefs it seeks in
the originating summons with substantial costs awarded in its favour against
the defendants.
THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE 1ST DEFENDANT
44. The 1st
defendant submitted a lone issue for determination, namely: whether or not the
1st defendant has excluded members of the claimant who are Fellows from being
members of the Senate and whether failure to invite members of the claimant to
meetings amount to not recognizing the claimant as a trade union body.
45. To the
1st defendant, the claimant instituted this suit when the 1st defendant’s Memo
addressed to Pro-Chancellor and Chairmen of Governing Councils of Federal
Universities and Inter-University Centres, attached as Exhibit C, directing for
immediate implementation of the White Paper on the 2021 Presidential Visitation
Panels to Federal Universities and Inter- University Centres. That the grouse
of the claimant is that the Memo states that Academics without the PhD should
not be members of the Senate. The second grouse is that the 1st defendant does
not recognise the claimant as a trade union body due to failure to invite them
for meetings.
46. The 1st
defendant went on that the claimant’s grouse with the PhD requirement is that
their members who have Fellowship in clinical aspects of Medicine and Dentistry
do not usually have PhD and for this they have been excluded from being members
of the Senate. That the 1st defendant in its Exhibit NUCIA, went ahead to state
its position on the vexed issue of PhD and MD vis-a-vis Fellowship and
proceeded to enlighten the Hon. Minister of Education on the matter. The 1st
defendant then reproduced the relevant portion of Exhibit NUCIA thus:
Thus, the NUC hereby reiterates that the Ph.D.
is the highest qualification for a career
in academics, while the Fellowship is the highest qualification for
professional practice for medical personnel. However, the respective
Federal University Council are by law empowered to spell out the eligibility
criteria for appointment to the position of Vice- Chancellor in their various
Universities. This should be seen to be inclusive, non- discriminatory and provide a level playing
ground for all eligible contestants (emphasis is the 1st
defendant’s).
47. From the
foregoing, the 1st defendant submitted that it is abundantly clear that the 1st
defendant is emphatic that the Fellowship is the highest
qualification for professional practice for medical
personnel and this shows that those with Fellowship without PhD are eminently qualified to be members of Senate and can
even vie for the position of Vice-Chancellor. That the phrase “Academics without the
PhD should not be member of the Senate” in Exhibit D refers to those in career
in academics and not those in professional practice of Medicine and Dentistry.
48. It is the
further submission of the 1st defendant that the highest qualification in
medical practice is Fellowship, and there are professional Medical
Practitioners in Teaching Hospitals who have attained the enviable status of
Professor through this career path. And that the 1st defendant has no axe to grind
with this at all. That in view of the foregoing, the 1st defendant has not created confusion of any kind in the academic arena of
our Universities so as to exclude the holders of Fellowship from being members
of the Senate.
49. That the
1st defendant has not mandated members of the claimant who have Fellowship and
are in professional practice of Medicine and Dentistry to have MD or PhD for career
progression, but it is only those in academic career in Clinical
Sciences that need to make a choice as to whether or not to have PhD or MD. To
the 1st defendant, if a wrong interpretation is given to Exhibits C and D by
anyone, it is not the fault of the 1st defendant and it should not be blamed
for that.
50. On
cardinal rule of construction of a document i.e. that the meaning of the
document must be gathered from the document as a whole, due weight being given
to all the terms and expressions used in it, the 1st defendant referred
to Ayorinde v. Oyo State Government [2015] 15 WRN 147 at 164, Amokwandoh v. UAC & anor 1 WACA 182, Alh. Aliyu Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Committee & anor [1998]
12 SCNJ 255 and Artra Industries Nig. Ltd
v. The Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry [1998] 3 SCNJ 97. And then
submitted that it is a wrong principle of interpretation of document to
speculate on the intention of the 1st defendant’s Exhibit C and D on issue of possession on MD or PhD before
one can become a member of the Senate as applying to holders of Fellows amounts
to speculation, citing
Kano State Oil and Allied Products Ltd v. Kofa Trading Co. Ltd [1996]
2 SCNJ 325, which held that it is not proper to speculate while constructing
the content of a document.
51. That when
different interpretations were being given to the circular of the 1st defendant
on issue of PhD, the latter corrected the wrong interpretation of the phrase,
“Interested Medical Practitioners and for their career progression”, by sending
another circular to the Nigerian Universities by removing the phrase above,
referring to Exhibit NUC1.
52. The 1st
defendant went on that, the 1st defendant, Joint House Committee on Health and
Tertiary Education and Services along with MDCAN held tripartite meeting to
resolve the contentious issues between the parties and the following decisions
were reached:
(a) Another circular
would be reissued
without the phrase “for their
career progression”.
(b)
The statement “For the avoidance of doubt, the
PhD, degree is highly recommended but optional” would be inserted in the
circular.
(c) The new circular would supersede the earlier circular
of 24 December 2019.
(d) NUC should
send the new circular to Nigerian Universities after the meeting.
(e)
The president of MDCAN should present the resolution to the NEC meeting of the
Association with a view to calling off the strike action, referring to Exhibit
NUC4.
53. The 1st
defendant then submitted that in view of the foregoing, there is no dispute
between the claimant and the 1st defendant on the questions raised by the
claimant and on which their reliefs are anchored.
54. On the
issue of the failure to invite the claimant to meetings by the 1st defendant,
which was construed as their non-recognition as a trade union body, the 1st
defendant submitted that the 1st defendant does not liaise with unions in the
Universities on issues of curriculum except professional bodies such as MDCAN
of which NAMDA is part and parcel of. That the 1st defendant always hold
extensive deliberations with MDCAN of which NAMDA is part of, and consultation
with the whole is consultation with the branch. That failure to invite the
claimant to meetings by the 1st defendant is a result of their representation
by their parent body, MDCAN, and this does not amount to their non-recognition
as a trade union. That MDCAN adequately represents the claimant; and for this,
there is no denial of fair hearing on issues concerning them before decisions
are taken, urging the Court to so hold.
55. In
conclusion, the 1st defendant submitted that there is no real dispute between
the claimant and the 1st defendant because all the documents authored by the
latter did not in the slightest way
disqualify the members of the claimants who have Fellowship from being members
of Senate. That there is no denial of fair hearing to the claimant on issues
concerning them before decisions are taken. The
1st defendant then urged the Court to dismiss this suit as it relates to the
1st defendant with substantial cost.
THE CLAIMANT’S REPLY
ON POINTS OF LAW
56. In
reacting on points of law, the claimant submitted that it could not find flow
between the issue the 1st defendant reformulated and their
argument. That the claimant will, therefore, hazard its
argument with response to the argument and documents submitted to the Court,
particularly drawing appropriate legal implications from the documents in
relation to the argument of the 1st defendant as it affects the claimant’s case
architecture.
57. To the
claimant, for a court to come to any decision in a case where documentary and
oral evidence (including depositions in affidavit) are placed before the court,
documents are used as a hanger with a view to testing the veracity of the
factual averments and depositions before the court, citing Kimdey & ors v. Military Governor of Gongola State (supra) at 473 (citation is not given).
58. The 1st
defendant called on the Court to note that in Exhibit NUC1 paragraph 3, the
National Postgraduate Medical College of Nigeria (NPMCN) was shown to
demonstrate a misinterpretation of the issue of interested Medical
Practitioners and for their career progression; leading to the 1st defendant
promising to issue another circular with a view to correcting the misinterpretation.
That the meeting captured by NUG 4 reached decisions (at page 5) amongst which
were that:
(i) another circular
would be re-issued without the phrase
“for their career
progression”;
(ii) the
statement for the avoidance of doubt, the PhD degree is highly recommended, but
optional, would be inserted into the circular;
(iii) the new circular would supersede the earlier circular
of the 24th December, 2019.
59. That the
Court should recall that in Exhibit G of the affidavit in support of its
originating summons (i.e. a letter of the 1st defendant to the University of
Lagos), the 1st defendant stated therein that the new MD programme as designed
by NPMCN is equivalent to PhD. Also
that in Exhibit NUC 1A, this Court would note the reluctance of the 1st
defendant to clearly state the superiority of Medical Fellowship to PhD. And
very importantly, NPMCH developed both the curriculum for MD and Medical
Fellowship as seen in Exhibit E stated without equivocation (after analysing
the process/route to Medical Fellowship) thus:
It
follows therefore that Fellowship is like a Post-doctoral degree as it has
satisfied more than all essential requirements for the award of a
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in any discipline apart from the accompanying
Professional training.
60. The
claimant went on to ask: in the face of the circular lacking in clarity, what
it actually seeks to do and requiring the 1st defendant to reissue further
circulars, what is clear in the circumstances surrounding the 1st defendant’s
circular and promises of further circulars such as would make this Court
comfortable to apply the authorities cited by the 1st defendant? None, the 1st
defendant answered. That with the
avalanche of documentary evidence showing that even the 1st defendant’s
circular have been so misleading, and confusing leading to it having to give
different interpretations and explanations of same, the claim of clarity of the
document requiring the Court to follow decisions cited by the counsel is
farfetched.
61. That the
1st defendant had argued that, given Exhibit NUC4, there is no dispute between
the 1st defendant and the claimant. That the 1st defendant even claimed that in
formulating policies leading to the issuance of their circulars, the claimant’s
parent body (the claimant doubted what this meant, as being a registered trade
union, it has no parent body), worked and cooperated with the 1st defendant. To
the claimant, this claim of no dispute between the claimant and the 1st
defendant is bereft of evidence and bare assertion by counsel. There are
documents before the Court constituting admissions against the interest of the
1st defendant on this point. That Exhibit NUC
4 clearly showed
the gulf between
the 1st defendant and MDCAN, which
body represented the interest
of the claimant, at that material time.
62. To the
claimant, Exhibit NUC 4 arose in the first place because MDCAN had called out
its members (who are all members of the claimant) for a strike action on this
same subject matter. Exhibit NUC 4 crucially in sub-decision (d) reached, agreed
that the 1st defendant was to issue a circular on the same vexed issue before
this Court. The 1st defendant has not
put anything before this Court that such circular was issued pursuant to the
agreement, which made MDCAN call off its strike. Nowhere did the 1st defendant
make reference to implementation of the decisions reached with MDCAN as at 24
March 2020. That in page 2 of Exhibit NUC 4 under the sub- head “Briefing from
the Medical and Dental Consultant Association
of Nigeria (MDCAN)”, it is reported by the document, the frustrations experienced by MADCAN, because all its attempts to
meet with
the 1st defendant on this same issue were rebuffed, leading MDCAN to call out a
strike (the reason for the intervention of the House of Representatives, and
called for the mediation, which produced Exhibit NUC 4).
63. That the
Court can also note that the briefing of the 1st defendant’s Executive
Secretary in the same Exhibit NUC 4
(at page 4), who did not deny that the 1st defendant rebutted MDCAN, but the
1st defendant’s Executive Secretary rather blamed it on his perception of MDCAN
as being “confrontational and issuing threats”.
64. The
claimant continued that the 1st defendant double-spoke when it argued that it
collaborated with the claimant, and yet turned around to say it does not liaise with trade
unions. That this behaviour of approbating and reprobating in litigation has
been deprecated by the courts, citing Jadesimi
v. Okotie-Eboh, In Re Lessey [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt. 113) 113. That contrary to
the claim of the 1st defendant that it doesn’t liaise with trade unions,
Exhibit C states that the 1st defendant had a stakeholders’ meeting with ASUU before the decision to implement the White Paper (Exhibit C). That
despite the claimant raised this issue, the 1st defendant had no answer, other
than this scant denial which is an admission against its interest.
65. That assuming
but not conceding that the story
of co-operation between
the 1st defendant and NPMCN has not been mismanaged by the 1st defendant, “can a
mere acquiescence of NPMCN derogate from and for withdraw statutory rights and
privileges of rank of Professor being automatically qualifying as members of
Senate as Exhibit C whimsically has done?” That the answer is a categorical and
resounding NO! That “even all the circular of the 1st defendant claimed
non-derogation of the rights and privileges of the claimant’s members with
Fellowship, until Exhibit C was orchestrated by the 1st defendant”. That the
1st defendant deliberately failed to address this Court on the import and
impact of Exhibit C.
66. The
claimant continued that this Court will also note the prevarication and
reluctance of the 1st defendant to state in clear distinction which is higher
or superior between
Medical Fellowship and the
PhD. That even in the 1st defendant’s letter to the 2nd defendant (Exhibit NUC
1A), the Court would still find that the 1st defendant is being very evasive;
and this is notwithstanding that when
it wrote Exhibit G, about 29 March 2021, to Unilag, the 1st defendant clearly
stated that the MD degree as newly developed is equivalent to PhD.
67. To the claimant, in Exhibit E, a Press
Release of NPMCN
titled, “Clarification on Fellowship
Versus Ph.D. for Clinical Teachers”, NPMCN (as the developer of the curriculum
of the MD which the 1st defendant had said is equivalent of PhD), stated
without equivocation (after analysing the process/route to Medical Fellowship
that:
It
follows therefore that FELLOWSHIP is like Post-doctoral degree as it has satisfied
more than all essential requirements for the award of a Doctor of Philosophy
(Ph.D.), in any discipline apart from accompanying professional training.
68. The
claimant went on that in a show of disdain for the above reality and to asset
non-existent power, with a view to subjugating holders of Medical Fellowship in
the University system, the 1st defendant in Exhibit NUC 1A, a letter it wrote
to the 2nd defendant, the 1st defendant is still out to continue to blur clarity
stated in paragraph
V that it requires Medical
Fellowship holders to obtain the MD or PhD.
69. The claimant
called on the Court to note the attempt by the 1st defendant to trivialize the case
of the claimant. That relying
on and hanging on issues
and meetings of 2019, it completely failed to tell this Court its activities
thereafter such as:
(i) constitution of Visitation Panels to Federal
Universities;
(ii)
the reports and recommendations of Visitation Panel leading to the White Paper;
(iii) the 1st
defendant charging Governing Councils of the Federal Universities for full implementation of illegal outcome and
recommendations.
70. That
having failed to address this Court on those areas, the law is that they are
deemed to have admitted and conceded to the claimant’s argument. That this is
so because, failure by a party to
proffer argument on any issue raised before the Court amounts to admission of
same, citing FMCT v. Eze [2006] 2
NWLR (Pt. 964) 221.
71. The
claimant then proceeded to address what it termed, “power that the 1st
defendant heavily relied on to cause confusion”. To the claimant, the 1st
defendant’s powers which it exacts to some ridiculous extent is captured more
in section 10(1) of the Education (Minimum Standards and Establishment of Institutions)
Act Cap E3 LFN 2004 (Education Act 2004). That in relying on this provision to
assume a “Universal ombudsman” of sorts in tertiary education matters, the 1st
defendant ostensibly failed to take into account basic statutory principles.
That even though section 10(1) of the Education Act 2004 gave power to the 1st defendant to “lay down minimum
standards for Universities and other institutions of higher learning in the
Federation…”, it can be safely argued that the 1st defendant cannot legally extend
its control to the National Medical College.
72. The
claimant went on that an understanding of the powers of the 1st defendant is
very key to the issues before this Court, apart from facts adduced vide
affidavit evidence that the 1st defendant is pushing beyond the frontiers of
its statutory powers. That the
“National Universities Act”, which set up the 1st defendant, makes it a
Commission superintending affairs of Universities even by the nomenclature (as an aside).
That how the 1st defendant shall exercise its powers as provided under section
10(1) of the Education Act 2004 is also provided in section 10(2) thus:
In the
exercise of the powers conferred under and pursuant to subsection (1) of this
section, the Commission shall have regard to the matters mentioned in section
11 of this Act.
73. That a
careful perusal of section 11 makes it clear that the purpose of the higher
education contained therein are basic and general in scope and cannot be the basis for the interference of
the 1st defendant with the statutory provisions given to other institutions, referring to section 10(3) of the Education Act 2004 as an example, and which
provides thus:
Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing or
restricting the National Board for Technical Education from carrying out its
functions under section 8 of this Act.
74. The claimant
rationalised that the framers of this Act anticipated and sought to prevent the 1st
defendant from assuming a “behemontal” status and needed to save the National
Board for Technical Education from the overbearing control of the 1st
defendant. That it is, therefore,
clear that, if the makers of the law decided to spare the National Board for
Technical Education (another’ statutory body under the Ministry of Education), which also derives
its powers from the
same statue under discussion, it will be easier to understand that other clear
bodies like the National Medical College which owes its existence and
superintendent to a completely different law, it must be spared from the
control of the 1st defendant.
75. That this
point is made clearer when this Court gives consideration to the type of
institutions which apply to the 1st defendant for their establishment. That it
is contained in section 21(1) of the Education Act 2004, under consideration
thus:
(1) Application
for the establishment of an institution of higher learning shall be made to the
Minister -
(a)
in the case of a university, through
the National Universities Commission;
(b)
in the case of a polytechnic or college of
agriculture, through the National Board for Technical Education;
(c)
in the case of a college of education, through the
National Commission for Colleges of
Education; and
(d) in any other case, through the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry
of Education.
76. To the
claimant, the above provision denotes the scope and type of “institutions of
higher learning in the Federation…” whose learning “degree and other academic
awards” the 1st defendant is empowered to regulate and perhaps perform
oversight functions over as envisaged by section 10 of the Education Act 2004.
77. That a
community reading of the referenced statutory provisions above cited will
clearly show that, assuming but not conceding that the power vested in the 1st
defendant is the power to regulate the award of degrees in all other
institutions of learning in Nigeria without limit, it is clear that such power
so vested is general and not like the specific powers given to either the Medical
and Dental Council of Nigeria (MDCN), or the one so vested in the National
Medical College as to Medical Education, particularly
in Postgraduate Medical training and certification.
78. That in
the hierarchy of law, there is no gainsaying that Acts of National Assembly
take precedence immediately after the Constitution and before and higher than
all other laws, guidelines and rules including government circulars and
polices, citing Onyenucheya v. Mil. Adm.,
Imo State [1997] 1 NWLR (Pt. 482) 429 and Independent Television Radio v. ESBIR [2015] 12 NWLR (Pt.1474) 442.
79. In conclusion, the claimant submitted that the 1st defendant has clearly demonstrated itself as being a
rabble rouser not worthy of the powers it arrogates to itself. That the 1st
defendant has clearly caused disquiet
in Nigerian Universities with its clumsy
and obnoxious circulars which in many cases
were clear subversion of extant laws and more particularly, the White Paper it
orchestrated, being a flagrant violation of extant laws, must be set aside by
this Court.
COURT’S DECISION
80. I took
time to consider the processes and submissions of the parties. The claimant
came by way of an originating summons,
posing seven questions for determination, with questions (5), (6)
and (7) running over 10 lines each consisting of only one sentence each. This
certainly is not how to couch
questions for any reasonable answers. It makes little sense that you cannot
comprehend a question because it is too long, and you have forgotten what the
start of the question is by the time you get to the end. That the claimant
argued the questions in two groups, questions (1) to (4) together on the one
part and questions (5) to (7) on the other, intuits that the claimant could
have done with just two questions in this originating summons. The 1st defendant got the hint of this
when it framed its sole issue for determination on two sub-issues: the
exclusion of members of the claimant who are Fellows without a PhD from being
members of the Senate, and the
failure to invite members of the claimant to meetings, which the claimant
claims is non-recognition of it as a trade union by the defendants. And the claimant is quarreling with this,
arguing that thereby the 1st defendant did not get what the claimant’s case is
all about.
81. Some
preliminary points are necessary here. The
claimant’s written address in support of the originating summons is replete
with sentences that do not make any sense. For instance, I did not know what to
make of this sentence in paragraph 4.2.15 of the said address:
Under the various Universities Act as shown
earlier, which state
“all Professors and heads
of academic for departments as recognised by Senate” which interests of element
of recognition by University Senate that can be manipulated by any of the
Defendants.
82. And what
is one to make of the later part of this statement taken from paragraph 4.2.49
of the claimant’s written address?:
The
Defendants deliberately also neglected to acknowledge the MD Degree, which the 1st Defendant had acknowledged as
equivalent to their most coveted Ph.D., as being a Degree in lieu of Ph.D.,
because they are aware that there is alternative was available in the MD
(though the degree is just about three years old which confers another
disadvantage) for to members of the Claimant, whom the Defendants have targeted
for humiliation by this policy.
83. Long,
windy sentences can also be found in the reply on points of law. See, for
instance, paragraphs 2.1.21 of the reply on points of law. In the main, I actually struggled
to make sense of the
claimant’s written submissions. What is reflected as the submissions of the
claimant in this judgment is, therefore, my attempt at re-couching the
submissions in a sensible and readable manner.
84. I just complained about the long questions posed by the claimant, especially questions (5) to
(7). The
claimant ended up with its relief (10), a relief that makes no sense at all.
Relief (10) as prayed for by the claimant is for “AN ORDER compelling the
Defendants to the Claimant as a Trade Union in all matters, academic activities
and welfare of academic staff in the Universities by the Defendants”. As it is, what sense can one make of this
relief? Courts are enjoined to grant only reliefs that are asked for, and as
asked. See Gabriel Ativie v. Kabelmetal
(Nig.) Ltd [2008] LPELR-591(SC); [2008] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 399; [2008] 5 - 6 SC (Pt. II) 47. Courts are not
carpenters to fix or repair the
flaws of litigants. See Chief James
Onyewuke v. Modu Sule [2011] LPELR-9084(CA). So where the relief makes no
sense, is a court expected to read into the relief what is not in it? Certainly
NOT! In such a situation, there is nothing for the court to grant. This is
exactly the case with the claimant’s relief (10). As it is, therefore, relief
(10) cannot even be considered, talk more of being granted. Relief (10) is
accordingly discountenanced and so struck out.
85. There is an issue
with the claimant’s question (4) i.e. whether given
section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, the claimant was
denied fair hearing by the 1st defendant simply because it was not consulted
and so heard before the decision conveyed by the 1st defendant’s letter Ref.
No. NUC/ ES/138/Vol.65/112 of 2 September 2024 (Exhibit C) was taken. Section
36(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides that:
In the
determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or
determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be
entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other
tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its
independence and impartiality.
86. This
provision has been interpreted to apply to only courts or tribunals strictly so
called. The Supreme Court in Rev. Prof.
Paul Emeka v. Rev. Dr. Chidi Okoroafor & ors [2017] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1577) 410, relying
on Bakare v. LSCSC [1992] 8 NWLR (Pt. 266) 641 at 699 - 700 and
Ekunola
v. CBN [2013] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 224 at 262 - 263, held that breach
of a fundamental right under section 36(1) of the Constitution arises only
where the denial of fair hearing has been charged against a court or tribunal
established by law and not before a domestic or standing ad- hoc tribunal
raised departmentally by parties. In other words, there would be no case of
infringement of the right to fair hearing under section 36(1) of the 1999
Constitution when the decision alleged to have violated
one’s constitutional right to fair hearing, is that of a non-judicial body.
87. The 1st
defendant is a non-judicial body given paragraph 4 of the claimant’s affidavit
in support of the originating summons. In that paragraph, the 1st defendant is
described as “a body corporate charged with the responsibility of advising the
Federal and State Governments of all aspects of University education and the
general development of Universities in Nigeria”. So, when the decision conveyed
by Exhibit C was taken by the 1st defendant, was the 1st defendant acting as a
court or tribunal? The claimant provided no answer to this. And nothing in the
claimant’s affidavits (the one in support and the further
affidavit) suggest this to be so and the
case.
This logically means that question (4) fails on its face value given that the
1st defendant is incapable of giving fair hearing to the claimant under section
36(1) of the 1999 Constitution. This
being so, question (4) cannot be considered talk more of being resolved in
favour of the claimant. Question (4) is accordingly discountenanced for
purposes of the case of the claimant, and hence this judgment.
88. In considering the processes of the parties,
I noticed a number of issues regarding the exhibits of the
parties — issues that were not raised by any opposing party. The White
Paper on the 2021 Presidential Visitation Panels to Federal Universities and
inter-University Centers (referred to in paragraph 18 of the claimant’s
affidavit in support of the originating summons), which the claimant put
forward in evidence as Exhibit D is a one-paged document with “Complete” as its
heading. Whether this meets the threshold of admissibility remains the
question. The 1st defendant made no issue of it.
89. On the
1st defendant’s part, Exhibit NUC1, a letter dated 6 February 2020, is
unsigned. Exhibit NUC3, Guidelines for Postgraduate Studies in Clinical
Sciences in Nigeria Universities 2023, is unsigned. And Exhibit NUC4, Highlights of the Interactive Meeting of the
Joint House Committee on Health and Tertiary Education and Services with the
National University Commission (NUC) and Medical and Dental Consultants
Association of Nigeria (MDCAN), is also unsigned. Once again, whether these
defence exhibits meet the threshold of admissibility remains the question. The
claimant made no issue of it.
90. Because
the parties did not make any issue out of these, and given section 12 of the
National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006, I shall proceed with the case
accordingly by making no issue regarding the admissibility of these exhibits.
91. Questions
(1), (2) and (3) posed by the claimant all deal with the issue of recognition
as a trade union of the claimant by the defendants — all summed up in this
question: by their respective acts, did especially the 1st and 2nd defendants deny the claimant
recognition as a trade
union? The question whether the
claimant is entitled to recognition — question (1) — must right away be
answered in the affirmative given that as a registered trade union, the
claimant is so entitled. It is its right to be so recognised by all including
the defendants, it having been registered as a trade union by the Registrar of
Trade Unions (RTU) as evidenced by Exhibit A. The attempt to question the
registration as a trade union of the claimant was rebuffed by this Court in Academic Staff Union of Universities v.
Minister of Labour and Employment & ors unreported Suit No.
NICN/ABJ/336?2022, the judgment of which was delivered on 25 July 2023. As
the claimant is entitled to recognition by all including the defendants, the
only question remaining is the content and scope of the said recognition just
so that it can be answered whether the acts of especially the 1st and 2nd
defendants can be said to have amounted to a denial of recognition of the
claimant as a trade union.
92. Questions
(5), (6) and (7) all deal with the issue of members of the claimant who are
Professors (with or without PhDs) being automatic members of University Senates. This issue
comes in
the three questions posed by the claimant: whether members of the claimant who
are Professors are not members of University Senate as of right; whether
Colleges of Medicine are not unique and integral part of the Universities with
medical Postgraduate Education and Certification vested in the Medical and
Dental Council of Nigeria, and National Medical College of Nigeria; and whether
the White Paper’s directive that
“Academics without the PhD should not be members of the Senate” is not
inconsistent with the respective University Laws and so is illegal, null and void.
93. Taking
the issue of the scope of recognition, the preliminary question is as to what
exactly the claimant is even complaining about. The answer can be found in
paragraphs 12 to 17 of the claimant’s affidavit in support of the originating summons. Referring to Exhibit C, the claimant’s complaint is that the 1st and
2nd defendants had a meeting with the leadership of ASUU where far reaching resolutions were made resulting in
Exhibit C dated 2 September 2024 without inviting the claimant, a sister trade
union to ASUU. The claimant
interpreted this as a failure by especially the 1st and 2nd defendants to
recognise it as a trade union. In the words of the claimant in paragraph 16 of its affidavit in support, by
involving only ASUU leadership, the
1st and 2nd defendants thereby ensured that the interest of ASUU members are protected but denied
same opportunity to the claimant’s leadership. Because the claimant was not
invited to the meeting, does this necessarily mean that the claimant was
thereby denied recognition by especially the 1st and 2nd defendants?
94. Recognition
of trade unions is no doubt a crucial aspect of trade union rights. It enables
workers to exercise other trade union rights such as the right to collective
bargaining. In Management of Tuyil Nigeria
Ltd v. National Union of Chemical, Footwear, Rubber, Leather and Non-metallic Products Employees [2009]
14 NLLR (Pt. 37) 109, within the context of the industrial unions, this Court
held that the law is that registration is deemed, recognition automatic and deduction of check-off dues
compulsory, where mere eligibility is the determinant of membership of the
union in question. The automatic
nature of recognition upon registration of a trade union, as far as Nigeria is
concerned, extends even to the senior staff associations. The relevant
provisions in the Trade Unions Act
(TUA) Cap T14 LFN 2004 are sections 17 and 25.
95. Section
17 of the TUA entitles a trade union, upon registration
and recognition, to check-off dues. What this means is that registration of
a trade union comes with it, recognition of the trade union. Section 25 of the
TUA then goes on to further provide
for recognition of trade unions. Its heading, “Recognition of registered trade
union obligatory”, emphasises that recognition of a registered trade union is
obligatory. It then goes on to provide thus:
(I) For
the purposes of collective bargaining all registered Unions in the employment
of an employer shall constitute an electoral college to elect members who will
represent them in negotiations with the employer.
(2) For the
purposes of representation at Tripartite Bodies or any other body the
registered Federations of Trade Unions shall constitute an electoral college
taking into account the size of each registered Federation, for the purpose of
electing members who will represent them.
96. When this
Court ruled in favour of the registration of the claimant as a trade union in Academic Staff Union of Universities v.
Minister of Labour and Employment & ors unreported Suit No.
NICN/ABJ/336?2022, the judgment of which was delivered on 25 July 2023, this
was done on the basis of Nigeria’a ratification of the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) Freedom of Association
and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and despite
that ASUU was already an existing trade union. In other words, it was on the
ILO principle of trade union pluralism as against trade union monopoly.
Paragraphs 485 and 486 of ILO’s Freedom
of Association: Compilation of Decisions of the Committee on Freedom of
Association (International Labour Office: Geneva), 2018, 6th Edition,
however, respectively caution that “it may generally be to the advantage of
workers to avoid multiplicity of trade union organizations”, and “it is
generally to the advantage of workers and employers to avoid proliferation of
competing organizations”.
97. The
claimant did not heed this ILO caution when it applied for registration as a
distinct trade union from ASUU. And so the fact of the existence of ASUU did not prevent the registration of
the claimant as a trade union. ILO Convention 87 permits the co-existence of
more than one trade union in an enterprise. But in having more than one trade union in an enterprise, as we have ASUU and the claimant union in the
University academic sector, is the employer obliged to negotiate or consult all
the trade unions in the enterprise on matters dealing with the conditions of service or other workplace issues? The
claimant thinks so, hence this case and its contention that it was not invited
by the 1st and 2nd defendants when it negotiated with ASUU.
98. Where two
or more trade unions exist in an enterprise, section 25(1) of the TUA shows the
way as to what happens regarding negotiations for purposes of collective
bargaining. All registered unions in the employment of an employer are required
to constitute an electoral college to
elect members who will represent them in negotiations with the employer.
Exhibit C, the basis upon which the claimant complains in this case, is
specific that only ASUU was consulted in terms of the resolutions reached. The
exact content of the resolutions reached (as stated in Exhibit C) is not
disclosed to this Court beyond the directive to all Governing Councils of the
Universities being “mandated to proceed with the full implementation of outcomes
and recommendations of the White Paper of the visitation panels as submitted”.
So it is unclear if what transpired vide Exhibit C related to collective bargaining. Exhibit C itself talks of a meeting of the Honourable Minister
of Education with the leadership of ASUU. My take, therefore, is that the meeting
was more of a consultation than a collective bargaining, which accordingly restricted the application of section 25(1) of the TUA.
99. Nigeria
is a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and in virtue of
its membership is bound by the core Conventions of Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) — ILO Convention
No. 87 — and Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No.
98) — ILO Convention 98. Nigeria ratified these two Conventions on 17 October
1960. See https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?
p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103259 as accessed on 22 April 2025.
100. Article
3(5) of the ILO Constitution includes the concept of “most representative”
organisations; and Conventions 87 and 98 acknowledge it. For purposes of
collective bargaining or consultation by Government or nomination of delegates
to international bodies, this concept gives priority in representation to the
“most representative” union in an enterprise. But the concept is not to be used
to deprive trade unions that are not recognised as being among the most
representative of the essential means for defending the occupational interests
of their members. For purposes of collective bargaining, employers are expected
to recognize the main unions represented in the undertaking or particular
industry, or the most representative of these unions See paragraphs 525, 1355
and 1356 of ILO’s Freedom of Association:
Compilation of Decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association (International
Labour Office: Geneva), 2018, 6th Edition.
101. The point
then is that for purposes of consultation, it is sufficient that the most
representative union is consulted, This is not against ILO Conventions 87 and
98. The only caveat is that unions not consulted must have the means and
opportunity to defend their occupational interests. This is what the claimant
has just done by filing this suit. The claimant was carved out of ASUU. In the
University academic section, the claimant is not the most representative union
in relation to ASSU. I do not accordingly see anything wrong with especially
the 1st and 2nd defendants consulting only ASUU,
as it did under Exhibit C, and not together with the claimant. Whatever
resolutions were reached between the 1st and 2nd defendants and ASUU as
typified by Exhibit C, the claimant retains its right to defend its
occupational interest. And this is where the second limb of the claimant’s
complaint actually comes in i.e. whether members of the claimant who are
Professors (with or without PhDs) are not
automatic members of University Senates.
102. Despite
that question (1) was answered in the affirmative (in virtue of its
registration as a trade union, the claimant is entitled to be recognised as such), I must answer questions (2) and
(3) in the
negative i.e. the meeting of the 1st and 2nd defendants with the leadership of
ASUU alone does not amount to a denial of recognition of the claimant by the
defendants; and by section 25(2) of the TUA, the decision conveyed by Exhibit C
of 2 September 2024 is not a denial of recognition of the claimant as a trade
union, and so is, by that fact alone, not illegal, null and void. I rule, therefore, that by their respective acts,
the 1st and 2nd defendants did not deny the claimant recognition as a trade
union.
103. I now
turn to the second issue: despite that the acts of especially the 1st and 2nd
defendants cannot be interpreted as denying recognition of the claimant as a
trade union, did those acts infringe on the rights of members of the claimant?
In other words, are members of the claimant who are Professors (with or without
PhDs) not automatic members of University Senates? I indicated earlier that
this issue comes in the three questions posed by the claimant: whether members of the claimant
who are Professors are not members of University Senate as of right;
whether
Colleges of Medicine are not unique and integral part of the Universities with
medical Postgraduate Education and Certification vested in the Medical and
Dental Council of Nigeria, and National Medical College of Nigeria; and whether
the White Paper’s directive that “Academics without the PhD should not be
members of the Senate” is not inconsistent with the respective University Laws
and so is illegal, null and void.
104. The
questions whether members of the claimant who are Professors are not members of
University Senate as of right; and whether the White Paper’s directive that
“Academics without the PhD should not be members of the Senate” is not
inconsistent with the respective University Laws and so is illegal, null and
void, are similar and so will be taken together in this judgment. A caveat is necessary here. No where in
the claimant’s affidavit in support did the claimant provide any evidence or
example of its members that are victims of the policy of the 1st and 2nd
defendants that the claimant complains of. The claimant did not show that any
of its members suffered from Exhibit C. Even when the claimant averred in
paragraph 57 of its supporting affidavit that the PhD/Fellowship dichotomy
being orchestrated by the 1st defendant has led to a vast majority of
Universities under the direction and control of the 1st and 2nd defendants ,
announcing vacancy of their Vice Chancellor with additional qualification of
possession of PhD in order to discriminate against the claimant’s members, no
evidence was adduced to this averment. And paragraph 58 of the affidavit in
support merely listed “several holders of Fellowship qualification” that “have
been and continue to be Vice Chancellors of Nigerian Universities with stellar
distinctive performance”. This case is accordingly fought by the claimant on the presumptive basis that
Exhibit C is injurious to it.
105. In
defending this case, the 1st defendant in paragraph 3.5 of its written address
had submitted thus: ‘The phrase “Academics
without the PhD should not be member of the Senate” in Exhibit D refer to those in career
in academics and not those in professional
practice of Medicine and Dentistry’. Paragraph 1.2(vi) of Exhibit D provides
thus:
…The highlights of the Visitor’s
directives include:
(vi) Academics without the Ph.D should not be members
of the Senate
106. Now, the
membership of Senates of Government Universities is governed by the law(s)
establishing/governing the Universities. Section 7 of the Universities
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Amendment) Act 2003, for instance, provides that
“There shall be a Senate for each of the Universities consisting of [amongst
others] all the Professors of the University”.
As for Colleges of Medicine of Medical Sciences such as the the College
of Medical Sciences of the University of
Benin, section 29(2) of the University of Benin (Transitional Provisions) Act
Cap U4 LFN 2004 provides that the academic matters of the College shall be
under the direction of a board to be known as the Academic
Board of the College, the membership of which shall
include amongst others “all
Professors of the College”.
107. The
question that presently arises is: can the directive in paragraph 1.2(vi) of
Exhibit D be read as meaning or even intuiting/implying that it supersedes the
specific statutory provisions of the Universities’ individual and general enabling
Acts, which provide
that Professors are
members of the University Senate?
The answer is NO. I do not think so. Exhibit D cannot
supersede a legislative Act.
108. Quite
rightly, the 1st defendant by its submission in paragraph 3.5 of its written
address conceded that ‘The phrase “Academics
without the PhD should not be member of the Senate”
in Exhibit D refer to those in career in academics and not those in professional practice of Medicine and
Dentistry’. I will go the extra mile to state that the directive in
paragraph 1.2(vi) of Exhibit D that “Academics without the PhD should not be
members of the Senate” does not cover all
(without any distinction) those who have attained the rank of Professor,
and whether in professional practice of Medicine and Dentistry or not. This
probably is why in paragraph 3.15 of
its written address, the 1st defendant submitted that there is no dispute
between it and the claimant on the questions raised by the claimant and on
which their reliefs are anchored.
110.
Given the respective enabling statutes of Federal
and State Universities, I will answer question (5) in the affirmative: members
of the claimant who are Professors are members of University Senate
as of right. And question
(7) thus: the White Paper’s
directive that “Academics without the PhD should not be
members of the Senate” is only inconsistent with the respective University Laws
and so is illegal, null and void where Professors are concerned — the directive
is not necessarily null and void where academics who are not Professors are
concerned.
111.
This leaves question (6): whether Colleges of
Medicine are not unique and integral part of the Universities with medical
Postgraduate Education and Certification vested
in the Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria,
and National Medical College of Nigeria. In arguing questions/issues
(1) to (4), the claimant had
submitted in paragraph 4.1.10 of its written address that a calm reading of sections
28 and 29 of the University of Benin (Transitional Provisions) Act Cap U4 LFN
2004, Article 12(1)(a) of the Third Schedule to the Nnamdi Azikwe University
Act Cap N139 LFN 2004, paragraphs 1, 2(1) - (3) and 4(1) - (3) of the College
of Medicine of the University of Ibadan statute incorporated in the First
Schedule to the University of Ibadan Act Cap U6 LFN 2004, sections 1(1) and 2
of the University of Benin Teaching Hospital Management Board Act Cap U3 LFN 2004, sections 2 and 4 of
the University College Hospital Act Cap U1 LFN 2004, and sections 5(1) and
(2)(a), and 7(1)(b), (2), (3) and (19) of the University Teaching Hospitals
(Reconstitution of Boards etc.) Act Cap U15 LFN 2004 reveals the peculiar place
of the discipline of Medicine in the University System and the distinctive
character and architecture of Medical and Dental education. The claimant would
continue that these laws reveal that members of the claimant, whether in the
College of Medicine or Teaching Hospitals are integral parts of the University
system and, therefore, employees within the employment of the 3rd defendant and
the FMOH. The 3rd defendant in this suit is the Attorney General of the Federation. I do not think I understand
the context in which the claimant submitted
that its “members…whether in the College of Medicine or Teaching Hospitals are…
employees within the employment of the 3rd defendant…” I do not see how the
Attorney General of the Federation
can be the (or an) employer of members of the claimant.
112.
Because the claimant discussed questions/issues
(5), (6) and (7) together in it written address, it never really discussed
question/issue (6) in terms of its uniqueness. Instead, the claimant subsumed
it within the context of questions/issues (5) and (7). In paragraph 4.2.48 of its written address, the claimant would
submit that Medical Fellowship by law has been adjudged higher than PhD in
terms of the rigour of training and proven proficiencies of its holders. How
true this is can only be ascertained by recourse to the very laws the claimant
itself relied on.
113.
Taking sections 28 and 29 of the University of
Benin (Transitional Provisions) Act
2004 as an example, there is established within the University as an integral
part thereof, a college to be known as the College of Medical Sciences
of the University of Benin.
The College is responsible
for its day-to-day affairs, save that it shall be responsible to the Senate in
respect of academic matters and to the Council through the Vice-Chancellor in
respect of financial matters. And by section 19 of the University Teaching
Hospitals (Reconstitution of Boards, etc) Act 2004, Teaching Hospitals
take the names of the respective Universities from which the hospital derived its name. Provisions such as this
makes the College and the Teaching Hospital integral parts of the respective
Universities as the case may be. This
means that in terms of question (6), Colleges of Medicine and Teaching
Hospitals are integral parts of the University.
114.
Are they unique, with medical Postgraduate
Education and Certification vested in the Medical and Dental Council of
Nigeria, and National Medical College of Nigeria? Taking first the Medical and
Dental Council of Nigeria, a look at sections 1(2)(a) and 9(1) and (2) of the
Medical and Dental Practitioners Act
2004 will show that the Council established under the Act has responsibility for, inter alia, “determining the standards of knowledge and skill to be attained by persons seeking to become
members of the medical or dental profession”, and may approve “any course of
training which is intended for persons who are seeking to become, or are
already members of the medical or dental profession”. What is noticeable in
these provisions is that in terms of section 1(2)(a) of the Act, the responsibility of the Council to
determine the standards of knowledge and skill required of those seeking to
become members of the medical and dental profession is obligatory given the use
of the word “shall”. But when it comes to the course of training needed for
those seeking to become, or are already members of the medical or dental
profession, section 9(1)(a) of the Act
does not make the responsibility of the Council obligatory given the use of the
phrase “may approve”. And it is only in respect of approval of course of
training that the responsibility of the Council extends to those who “are
already members of the medical or dental profession”. For purposes of section
1(2)(a) of the Act i.e. “determining the standards of knowledge and skill to be
attained”, the responsibility of the Council does NOT extend to those who “are
already members of the medical or dental profession”. It is necessary to stress
this point given that the claimant went on in its submissions as if the Medical
and Dental Council of Nigeria is vested with powers over medical postgraduate
education and certification for all intents ad purposes. This is not the case.
115.
For the National Medical College of Nigeria, its
responsibility, by section 2 of the National Medical College Act 2004, is “for
the conduct of professional post-graduate examination of candidates in the various
specialised branches of medicine, surgery,
obstetrics and gynecology
and dental
surgery and making awards in relation thereto accordingly”. By this provision,
medical Postgraduate Education and Certification is vested in the National
Medical College of Nigeria. The Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria by its
enabling Act MAY (and this is optional) approve any course of training for
those who “are already members of the medical or dental profession”. It has not
been shown to this Court that there is any conflict in these medical
postgraduate roles between the Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria, on the
one hand, and the National Medical College of Nigeria, on the other.
116.
Section 11 of the National Medical College Act
2004 provides that “where the College awards its diploma under this Act, the
holder shall be entitled to status as a fellow in the specialised branch of
which the diploma is evidence”. I indicated earlier that the claimant had
argued in paragraph 4.2.48 of its written address that Medical Fellowship by
law has been adjudged higher than PhD. Section 7 of the National Medical
College Act 2004 permits the College to award degrees, diplomas and such other
qualifications as may be prescribed in connection with examinations held. And by section 11 of same Act, “Where the College awards its diploma
under this Act, the holder shall be entitled to status as a fellow in the
specialised branch of which the diploma is evidence”. If section 11 of the
National Medical College Act 2004 is anything to go by, the submission of the
claimant that Medical Fellowship by law has been adjudged higher than PhD
cannot be correct. A diploma (even if a postgraduate diploma) conferring
medical fellowship cannot be equated with the PhD. In most Nigerian academic
institutions especially Universities, a postgraduate diploma is often a prelude
to pursuing a Masters or Doctoral degree as the case may be — sometimes in
courses other than the primary degree course of the candidate. In this sense,
the diploma, even if a postgraduate one, is never equivalent, not to talk of it
being higher than, the PhD. Accordingly, I do not agree with the submission of
the claimant that Medical Fellowship by law has been adjudged higher than PhD.
In any event, no where in the National Medical College Act 2004 is it provided
that medical fellowship is equivalent to or higher than the PhD as the claimant
would want this Court to believe.
117.
The New
Oxford American Dictionary defines the word ‘unique’ as “being the only one of its
kind; unlike anything
else”. So when the claimant
asked “WHETHER…Colleges of Medicine
are not unique…with medical Postgraduate Education and Certification vested in
the Medical and Dental Council of
Nigeria, and National Medical College of Nigeria”, my answer is in the
affirmative but only to the extent that
the respective enabling laws allow. And
I have shown how this is in the earlier discourse. In answer to question/issue
(6), I hold that Colleges of Medicine are integral parts of the University; and
are unique but only to the extent that
the respective enabling laws allow. Accordingly,
medical Postgraduate Education and Certification is shared as allowed by law
with the Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria, and National Medical College of Nigeria.
118.
For the avoidance
of doubt, I answer the questions posed
by the claimant thus:
•
Question
(1) — By section 25(1) of the TUA, the claimant as a registered trade union is
entitled to recognition by the defendants.
•
Question
(2) — The claimant was not denied recognition by the defendants simply because
the 1st and 2nd defendants met with the leadership of ASUU alone, and not also
with the claimant.
•
Question
(3) — By section 25(2) of the TUA,
the decision conveyed by Exhibit C of 2 September 2024 is not a denial of
recognition of the claimant as a trade union, and so
is, by that fact alone, not illegal, null and
void.
•
Question
(4) — This question fails on its face value given that the 1st and 2nd defendants
are incapable of giving fair hearing to the claimant under section 36(1) of the
1999 Constitution, the claimant not being, or not having acted as, a court or tribunal established by law.
•
Question
(5) — Members of the claimant who are Professors are members of University
Senate as of right.
•
Question
(6) — Colleges of Medicine are integral parts of the University; and are unique but only to the extent that the respective enabling laws allow. Accordingly,
medical
Postgraduate Education and Certification is shared as allowed by law with the
Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria, and National Medical College of Nigeria.
• Question (7) — The White Paper on the 2021 Presidential Visitation Panels to Federal
Universities
and inter-University Centers directive in section 1.2(vi) that “Academics
without the PhD should not be members of the Senate” is only inconsistent with the respective University Laws and so is
illegal, null and void where Professors are concerned — the directive is not
necessarily null and void where academics who are not Professors are concerned.
119.
Since all the questions posed were not resolved in
favour of the claimant, the claimant cannot be entitled to all the reliefs it
prayed for. This means that the claimant is only
entitled as follows:
Relief (1) — It is declared that by section 25(1) of the TUA,
the claimant as a registered trade union is entitled to recognition by the
defendants.
Relief (2) — This relief
fails and is not granted.
It is accordingly dismissed.
Relief (3) — This relief
fails and is not granted. It is accordingly dismissed.
Relief (4) — This
reliefs fails and is not granted given that the 1st and defendants did not act
in the capacity of a court or tribunal established by law. It is accordingly
dismissed.
Relief (5) — It is declared that members of the claimant who
are Professors are members of University Senate as of right.
Relief
(6) — It is declared that Colleges of Medicine are integral parts of the
University; and are unique but only to
the extent that the respective enabling laws allow. Accordingly, medical Postgraduate Education and Certification is
shared as allowed by law with the Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria, and
National Medical College of Nigeria.
Relief (7) — It is declared
that the White Paper on the 2021 Presidential Visitation Panels to Federal Universities and inter-University Centers
directive in section 1.2(vi) that “Academics without the PhD should not be
members of the Senate” is only inconsistent
with the respective University Laws and so is illegal,
null and void where Professors are
concerned
— the directive is not necessarily null and void where academics who are not
Professors are concerned.
Relief
(8) — This relief cannot be granted given that the 1st defendant’s letter Ref
No. NUC/ES/138/Vol.65/122 of 2 September 2004 and the White Paper on the 2021
Presidential Visitation Panels to Federal Universities and Inter University
Centers were not declared null and void. The relief fails and so is dismissed.
Relief
(9) — The order prayed here is too general to be granted since the claimant may
not qualify to be consulted
on the concept of “most representative” trade union. Relief (9)
cannot accordingly be granted as prayed.
Relief
(10) — As prayed, this relief makes no sense at all. Since it could not even be
considered, it cannot be granted. It is accordingly discountenanced and so
struck out.
Relief
(11) — This relief cannot be granted. The claimant did not make out the case
that the defendants denied it recognition. The relief fails and so is
dismissed.
120.
Judgment is entered
accordingly. I make no order as to
cost.
…………..…………………………………… Hon. Justice
B. B. Kanyip, PhD, OFR, bpa