Media
- Home
- Details
The President of the National Industrial Court, Hon. Justice Benedict Kanyip, OFR, has dismissed a suit filed by an officer, Anthony, against the Chief of Naval Staff and the Nigerian Navy over the rejection of his application for voluntary resignation.
The Court affirmed the Nigerian Navy’s requirement that officers enlisted under the Direct Short Service Commission must complete an initial eight-year period of service before seeking voluntary resignation.
Justice Kanyip further held that the Chief of Naval Staff and the Nigerian Navy did not violate section 306 of the Constitution by refusing to approve Anthony’s resignation before the expiration of his initial 8-year service commitment.
From the facts, the claimant- Anthony, had submitted that he was commissioned into the Nigerian Navy in March 2015 under the Direct Short Service Commission Course 22 as a Surgeon Sub-Lieutenant.
Anthony stated that he applied for voluntary resignation by a letter dated 28 September 2020, which he maintained was received and acknowledged by the Chief of Naval Staff. Following the alleged failure of the naval authorities to act on his application, he submitted a second letter dated 18 February 2021, acknowledged by the defendants on 25 February 2021, reiterating his intention to leave the service.
Dissatisfied with the refusal to approve his resignation, Anthony approached the Court, seeking declarations that he had a constitutional right to voluntarily exit the service and that his resignation letter dated 28 September 2020 was valid and effective.
In their defence, the Chief of Naval Staff and the Nigerian Navy maintained that Anthony was commissioned under the Direct Short Service Commission scheme and had accepted the terms and conditions of service contained in the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers, 2017 (Revised).
The defendants relied on the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service, which prescribes a minimum initial engagement of eight years for officers under the scheme. They argued that Anthony had served for approximately five years when he applied to resign and that his application was expressly declined by a letter dated 2 November 2020 because he had not fulfilled the mandatory service period.
In opposition, Anthony’s counsel relied on section 306 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), contending that the provision guarantees every public officer an unfettered right to resign upon the receipt of a resignation letter by the appropriate authority.
Counsel further argued that the refusal of the defendants to approve his client's resignation amounted to forced labour and violated the claimant’s constitutional rights, as well as the provisions of International Labour Organization Conventions.
However, counsel to the defendants, Al-Ameen Abubakar Esq, countered that members of the Armed Forces do not enjoy an unrestricted right to resign without regard to the statutory and service conditions governing their engagement and urged the court to dismiss the case.
In a considered judgment, Justice Kanyip first addressed the issue of limitation and held that the action was statute-barred under the Public Officers Protection Act, and held that Anthony had slept on his rights by allowing more than five years to elapse before commencing the action.
On the substantive issues, Justice Kanyip held that the constitutional provisions governing the right to resign, the prohibition of forced labour and the responsibilities of the Armed Forces must be interpreted harmoniously rather than in isolation. In this regard, the Court considered sections 1, 34, 217, 254C and 306 of the 1999 Constitution, alongside ILO Conventions 29 and 105.
Although the Court acknowledged that the Constitution does not expressly exclude members of the military from its application, it held that the right to resign must be examined within the broader constitutional and international legal framework regulating military service.
Justice Kanyip reasoned that having voluntarily entered the service under the scheme and undertaken to fulfil the initial eight-year engagement, Anthony was bound by the applicable terms and conditions of service. The defendants were, therefore, entitled to insist that he complete the agreed period before seeking to resign.
On the allegation of forced labour, the Court held that the refusal to approve the claimant’s premature resignation did not amount to forced or compulsory labour within the meaning of section 34 of the Constitution or ILO Conventions 29 and 105.
The Court noted that Anthony was not being compelled to serve beyond the stipulated initial engagement period, as he had been informed that he could submit another resignation application upon completing the mandatory eight years.
The Court consequently dismissed the suit and awarded ?2 million in costs against the claimant in favour of the defendants, payable within 30 days.
Visit the judgment portal for full details