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NICN - JUDGMENT

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

 

DATED: JUNE 11, 2025                                          SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/189/2023

 

Before Their Lordships:

HON. JUSTICE O. A. OBASEKI-OSAGHAE    -           PRESIDING JUDGE

HON. JUSTICE R. B. HAASTRUP                                  -           JUDGE

HON. JUSTICE S. O. ADENIYI                            -           JUDGE

 

Between:

 

MARITIME WORKERS UNION OF NIGERIA                        -  APPELLANT

 

AND

 

1.     HOTEL AND PERSONAL SERVICES SENIOR

STAFF ASSOCIATION

 

2.     NATIONAL UNION OF HOTELS AND PERSONAL              RESPONDENTS

      SERVICES WORKERS         

 

3.      CATERING FACILITIES SOLUTIONSLIMITED                

 

REPRESENTATION:

B. C. Anyanwu, with James Odeh Abah, E. F. Obidigwe for the Appellant.

Omoniyi Akinmola, with N. I. Ihionu for the 1st Respondent.

R. O. Irikefe, with C. O. Ebhodaghe (Mrs), Chiamaka Anyaegbu for the 2nd Respondent.

Tonnie Anoruewhom, with Florence Okparaocha for the 3rd Respondent.

 

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

[1] This matter was referred by the Permanent Secretary Federal Ministry Of Labour and Employment by virtue of the provisions of the Trade Disputes (Delegation of Certain Statutory Functions) Order, under the Minister’s Statutory Powers and Duties (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, CAP M14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004; and thereof in the exercise of the powers conferred on the Honourable Minister of Labour and Employment pursuant to Section 14 (1) of the Trade Dispute Act, CAP T8, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, by instrument dated 27th June 2023 and a cover letter to the referral instrument dated 11th July 2023 with reference No ML.HE/1060/CON.1/36. The Honourable Minister of Labour and Employment in exercise of the powers conferred on him by Section 9 (1) of the Trade Disputes Act had earlier referred the trade dispute to the Industrial Arbitration Panel (hereinafter referred to as the IAP). The IAP made an award on the 5th May 2023 that was objected to by the First Party/Appellant herein, Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria and this gave rise to the referral to this Court. The IAP award is attached to the referral instrument. The terms of reference as contained in the referral instrument are as follows:

 

 “To inquire into the trade dispute existing between Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria (MWUN) and Hotel and Personal Services Senior Staff Association and National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers and Catering Facilities Solutions Ltd over the following issue:

Clarification of jurisdictional scope between Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria (MWUN) and Hotel and Personal Services Senior Staff Association and National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers over the workers of Catering Facilities Solutions, Port Harcourt.”

FACTS

[2] The case of the 1st Party/Appellant herein is that it is the trade union with jurisdiction to organize the employees of the 4th Party/3rd Respondent herein who work on board and in the catering department of Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph which are offshore marine vessels. It is the position of the 1st Party/Appellant that all workers engaged to render services on board ocean going vessels are regarded as seafarers, whose services are regulated by the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency Act 2007. As such, the workers engaged by the 4th Party/3rd Respondent to fulfill its contract of rendering services on board Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph are seafarers by virtue of their services. The 1st Party/Appellant states that the workers of the 4th Party/3rd Respondent voluntarily sought membership of the union and they have been accepted and inaugurated its union executives; but the 4th Party/3rd Respondent refused to recognize the 1st Party/Appellant as the trade union organizing its workers who work on board the FPSO’s. Following this, the 1st Party/Appellant declared a trade dispute against the 4th Party/3rd Respondent.

 

[3] The case of the 2nd Party/1st Respondent herein is that the trade union and associations of the Appellant and Respondents are created by the Trade Unions Act and the 3rd Schedule Part B of the Act describes the jurisdictional scope of each established trade union. The 2nd Party/1st Respondent states that the employees of the 4th Party/3rd respondent herein have been its members as far back as 1980 when it operated under the name of Sodexho Nigeria Limited and after it was taken over by the 4th Party/3rd Respondent. They paid their monthly check off dues and actively participated in trade union activities. The 2nd Party/1st Respondent states that it represented its members during the acquisition of Sodexho Nigeria Limited by the 3rd Respondent. The 2nd Party/1st respondent states that it inaugurated its branch in the 3rd Respondent Catering Facilities Solutions Ltd (CFSL) and inducted its new executives on 7th June 2022. The 2nd Party/1st Respondent states that this dispute arose when the 1st Party/Appellant interfered with the activities of its members in the employment of the 3rd Respondent CFSL and tried to organize them.

 

[4] The case of the 3rd Party/ 2nd Respondent herein is that the 3rd Schedule Part B of the Trade Unions Act described the jurisdictional scope of each of the established trade unions. The 3rd Party/2nd Respondent states that the employees of the 4th Party/3rd Respondent CFSL have been its members and the 1st Respondent’s members as far back as 1988 when the company was operating under the name Sodexho Nigeria Limited. The 3rd Party/2nd Respondent states that the workers consistently paid their monthly check off dues and actively participated in its trade union activities and that of the 1st Respondent till date even after it transformed to the 3rd Respondent Catering Facilities Solutions Ltd (CFSL). During the take over by the 3rd Respondent CFSL, it held series of meetings with CFSL in respect of unionization of the staff and a communiqué was signed by the 1st, 2nd, and new management of the 3rd Respondents in respect of the welfare of its members and that of the members of the 1st Respondent. The 3rd Party/ 2nd Respondent states that it inaugurated the 3rd Respondent’s branch and inducted its new executive on 7th June 2022. That this dispute arose sometime in 2022 when the 1st Party/Appellant interfered with the activities of its members, and the members of the 1st Respondent in the employment of the 3rd Respondent CFSL in Port Harcourt, and by intimidation and force compelled some employees of the 3rd Respondent into their union when same employees were members of the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

 

[5] The case of the 4th Party/3rd Respondent herein is that it is in the business of providing catering services as an independent service provider in line with its registered objects. That it is a sub contractor providing catering and domestic services to FPSO Mac Lorenzo, FPSO Knock Adoon, and FPSO Abigail-Joseph. That they are not vessels, or ships, or floating craft, but Floating Production Storage and Off Loading (FPSO) and its catering services are not on board a ship, vessel, or crafts afloat. The 4th Party/3rd Respondent’s position is that the 1st Party/Appellant is not a recognized trade union within its facilities by reason of differences in business objects, operational status and its activities. The 4th Party/3rd Respondent states that the 1st and 2nd Respondents exist and are recognized trade union within its facilities by reason of the related activities, its business and operational status; and that its executive organs have existed within its operations and activities since 1980 when it operated under the name of Sodehxo Nigeria Limited. The 1st Respondent represents its senior staff and the 2nd Respondent represents its junior staff. The 4th Party/3rd Respondent states that the 1st Party/Appellant was unknown to it until their disruptive and violent activities became repeated following the resistance and opposition of the 1st and 2nd Respondents who are the recognized and existing trade unions in its facilities.

 

AWARD OF THE IAP

[6] The Award of the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) is reproduced as follows:

 

1. The 2nd and 3rd Parties are the rightful and statutorily recognized unions for all the categories of staff of the 4th Party.

 

2. The 2nd and 3rd Parties are entitled to the check off dues and other accruals.

3. The 1st Party is devoid of the jurisdictional scope to unionize the staff/workers of the 4th Party.

 

APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS

[7] Upon the referral of the matter to this Court, the parties filed their respective briefs of argument. The Appellant filed its brief of argument dated 4th March 2024 and filed the same day, the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument is dated 5th February 2025 and is filed the same day, the 2nd Respondent’s brief of argument is dated 3rd February 2025 and is filed on 5th February 2025, the 3rd Respondent’s brief of argument is filed on 5th February 2025. The Appellant’s reply briefs are dated 7th March 2025, and filed on 25th March 2025.

 

[8] The Appellant submitted one issue for determination:

Whether the Industrial Arbitration Tribunal was right when it found and held that the Appellant has no jurisdiction to unionize the workers of the 3rd Respondent who work on board Mac Loranzo, Knock Adoon FPSO And Abigail Joseph as catering crew complement?

 

[9] Learned counsel argued that the dispute between the parties which was the issue for determination before the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) is not whether the Appellant has the jurisdictional scope to unionize all the staff/workers of the 3rd Respondent, but whether the Appellant is the appropriate trade union with the jurisdictional scope to unionize the staff/workers of the 3rd Respondent who have become seafarers by virtue of their services onboard Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph. She submitted that the Third Schedule of the Trade Unions Act LFN 2004, Part B item 3 specified the jurisdictional scope of the Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria as all workers in the Nigerian Ports Authority and all persons employed in the manning of ocean going, inland waterways, coastal and harbour vessels or crafts afloat, dock-workers including workers engaged by shipping, clearing and forwarding agencies, but excluding managerial, professional and administrative staff.

 

[10] Learned Counsel submitted that the jurisdictional scope of the 2nd Respondent as specified in the said 3rd Schedule to the Trade Unions Act (TUA), is to unionize workers in service involving the care of the person or his apparel, hotels, restaurants, cafes, taverns and other drinking and eating places. The 1st Respondent is the Senior Staff Association with jurisdiction to unionize senior staff of Hotel and Personal Services Workers in Nigeria. Counsel further submitted that the question is between the Appellant, the 1st and 2nd Respondents, who has the appropriate jurisdiction to organize and unionize the employees of the 3rd Respondent who work onboard the FPSO’s known as Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph in the capacity of cooks, housekeepers, laundry men, cleaners/utility, kitchen assistants, etc. Counsel argued that for a clearer understanding of the jurisdictional scope of the Appellant as spelt out by the TUA it is necessary to x-ray the meaning of certain key words in the Appellant’s jurisdictional scope as outlined in the Act.  

 

[11] It was the contention of learned counsel that the word “manning” a vessel is synonymous with staffing, working and /or crewing. That the Merriam Webster Dictionary defines manning as the working force as distinguished from the employer. It therefore means that the phrase “all persons employed in the manning of ocean going, inland waterways, coastal and harbour vessels or crafts afloat” means all workers onboard ocean going, inland waterways, coastal and harbour vessels or craft afloat.” Counsel stated that although the TUA is the appropriate law that gives directions on the appropriate trade union workers should belong as found by the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP), it is instructive to examine the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency Act (hereafter called NIMASA) Act 2007, to get a better understanding of what maritime labour is so as to understand the jurisdictional coverage of Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria as encapsulated in the Third Schedule of the TUA (T14). Counsel referred to Sections 2 (1), 2 (3) and 64 of the NIMASA Act and submitted that anyone who works onboard a vessel (except masters and pilots) be it as cooks, housekeepers, laundry men, utility personnel, cleaner, etc, is a seafarer, and the employer of such a personnel is a seafarer employer and both require certification and registration under the NIMASA Act 2007 to carry out such functions.

 

[12] Learned counsel submitted that while it is true that it is the Trade Unions Act and not NIMASA Act that regulates membership of trade unions, the NIMASA Act regulates  maritime labour which is distinct from regulating membership of trade unions. She submitted that the NIMASA Act specifies what constitutes maritime labour and the Trade Unions Act vests the jurisdiction to unionize persons engaged in maritime labour on the Appellant. That the Appellant’s reliance on NIMASA Act is simply to show what constitutes maritime labour and the fact that the maritime labour industry is regulated by statute. It was the contention of counsel that in determining whether or not the personnel supplied by the 3rd Respondent as crew complement on board Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph are engaged in maritime labour, the provisions of the NIMASA Act must be examined.

 

[13] Learned counsel contended that Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon  and Abigail Joseph are  Floating Production Storage and Off-loading (FPSO) platforms converted to marine vessels retrofitted for use as oil and gas processing and storage facility, and can be navigated on the water if need be. That they are marine vessels known under the Trade Unions Act (T14) LFN 2004 as ocean going, inland waterways, coastal and harbour vessels or crafts afloat. Counsel referred to Nigerian Union Of Petroleum And Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) v Maritime Workers Union Of Nigeria (unreported) delivered on the 16th day of December 2016 in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/214/2015. It is the submission of counsel that this case is similar to the present case as the 3rd Respondent also has as its object some element of maritime business in Article 11 of its Memorandum and Articles of Association. That the contract for provision of catering and housekeeping services between the 3rd Respondent and Yinson Operations and Production West Africa Ltd on Abigail Joseph described the personnel supplied by the 3rd Respondent onboard those vessels as “catering crew complement” meaning a group of people who work and operate a ship (refer to google search engine). The crew of a ship is defined by Collins Dictionary @ https://wwww.Collinsdictionary.com as “people who work on or operate a ship”; and the word complement is also defined by the Collins Dictionary as “1. A person or thing that completes something, 2. One of two parts that make up a whole or complete each other, 3. A complete.” Merriam-Webster’s dictionary http:www.merriam-webster.com also defines complement as “something that fills up, completes or makes better or perfect”.

 

[14] Learned counsel submitted that the staff of the 3rd Respondent form part of the crew of those vessels and they are as such seafarers.  She contended that it was the intention of the parties for the 3rd Respondent to supply seafarers to the vessels; and that the 3rd Respondent’s principal Geoplex Drillteq Ltd, is licensed by NIMASA to employ personnel to man/work onboard vessels otherwise known as manning agent.  Counsel argued that the Appellant’s quest for unionization in this case is only limited to the 3rd Respondent’s  staff who work on board the marine vessels/FPSOs and does not extend to all staff of the 3rd Respondent which the IAP failed to take cognisance of when it misdirected itself by accepting the 2nd Respondent’s argument that it has been unionising the 3rd Respondent’s workers as far back as when the company was known as SODEXHO Ltd before it changed to its present name and thereupon relied heavily and solely on the case between National Union of Hotels and Personal Service Workers v. NUPENG to arrive at its decision and held as follows;

“ It is interesting to note that the 4th Party (3rd Respondent herein) was formally Sodexho Ltd. The company name was merely changed by a special resolution while the Article remain the same. Consequently as the rule of stare decisis directs this Tribunal is bound by that decision the 3rd Party is the rightful and statutorily recognised Union for the 4th Party workers”  

[15] Learned counsel argued that the IAP failed to take cognisance of the fact the there is no shred of evidence that the particular group of workers working on board the FPSOs sought to be unionized by the Appellant are already unionized by the 2nd Respondent.  She submitted that the case of National Union of Hotels and Personal Service Workers v. NUPENG relied upon by the IAP to arrive at its decision is clearly distinguishable from the present case, and that the IAP was wrong in relying on National Union of Hotels and Personal Service Workers v. NUPENG to hold that it is bound by that decision and that the Appellant has no jurisdictional scope over employees of the 3rd Respondent. She further submitted that by virtue of the nature of industry, the 3rd Respondent has ventured into supplying workers working as seafarers, and as such the Appellant is the appropriate Trade Union with jurisdiction to unionize the class of workers of the 3rd Respondent working onboard Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph and cited NUPENG V. MWUN (2012) 28 NLLR (PT. 80) 309 .

[16] Learned counsel argued that none of the 3rd Respondent’s personnel who voluntarily subscribed to membership of the Appellant fall within the exemptions to the jurisdiction of the Appellant as outlined in item 3 Part B of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act (Cap T14) LFN 2004. The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary 9th Edition at page 1227 defines “professional as being connected with a job that needs special training or skill especially one that needs a high level of education”. That the personnel working on board Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph and who sought for membership in the Appellant are cooks, cleaners/utility personnel, laundry men, housekeepers, camp boss, room boys, kitchen helpers bakers. Counsel in conclusion urged the Court to hold that the Appellant is the appropriate trade union with jurisdiction to unionize the staff of the 3rd Respondent who work as seafarers onboard Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph which are offshore marine vessels/ships retrofitted for use in oil and gas production and storage offshore and regarded in law as ocean going, coastal and harbour vessels or crafts afloat and set aside the award of the IAP.

 

1ST RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS

[17] The 1st Respondent raised one issue for determination as follows:

 

Whether the Industrial Arbitration Tribunal was right when it found and held that it is the 1st and 2nd Respondents that are the rightful and statutorily recognized unions for all the categories of staff of the 3rd Respondent.

 

[18] Learned counsel argued that the contention of the Appellant in paragraph 4.3 of its brief of argument is an academic argument and that the referral to the IAP is “To inquire into the trade dispute existing between Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria and Catering Facilities Solutions Port Harcourt and Hotel and Personal Service Senior Staff Association and National Union of Hotel and Personal Services Workers over the following issue: “Clarification of jurisdictional scope between Maritime workers Union of Nigeria and Hotel and Personal Services Workers over the workers of Catering Facilities Solutions Port Harcourt”. He stated that no party objected to it and that it has been the decision of this Court in many cases that the IAP is not empowered to go outside the issue referred to it and cited Suit No. NICN/ABJ/50/2014: HAPSSSA & Anor V Tourist Company Of Nigeria Plc.

 

[19] Learned counsel stated that the addition of “who have become seafarers by virtue of their services on board Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph which are all offshore Marine Vessels up retrofitted for use in oil and gas production and storage an offloading (FPSO) platforms” is the making of the Appellant. He argued that whether the 3rd Respondent is a seafarer or not was not an issue referred to the IAP by the Hon Minister. He stated that the IAP had no jurisdiction to go outside the issue referred and it did not go out side the determination of the issue referred. He submitted that since the sole ground upon which the appeal is based is on an issue not referred and decided by the IAP, the appeal is empty and should be dismissed.

 

[20] Learned counsel argued that the contention of the Appellant that manning a vessel includes all the persons listed in Third Schedule of Trade Unions Act (T14) L.F.N 2004 Part B item 3 and the workers of the 3rd Respondent is wrong. He submitted that the 3rd Respondent and its workers are not named or listed among persons whose workers are among “all workers” and by that they are excluded.  Counsel argued that the 3rd Respondent is a supplier of professional services, and is not a worker of Nigeria Port Authority, not manning an ocean-going vessel, not an operator of inland water ways, not an owner of Coastal and labour vessels or craft afloat, not a dock-worker, and its workers  are not into shipping, clearing and forwarding; and there is no evidence that they are one. That merely interpreting and defining terms is not enough, it must be clothe with facts as the Respondents did not agree that the 3rd Respondent and its workers are seafarers, dock-workers, manning ocean going vessels or workers in a ship.

 

[21] Learned counsel submitted that the NIMASA Act 2007 did not contradict the Trade Unions Act (TUA) and it is not superior to the TUA. He submitted that there is no provision in TUA that subjects its provisions to the provisions of NIMASA Act and NIMASA Act does not have any provision that subjects the provisions of TUA to its provisions. That in functions they are independent of each other and do not overlap. He further submitted that NIMASA Act did not create the Appellant and the Respondents, neither did it create their jurisdictional scope. The jurisdictional scope of the Appellant and the 1st and 2nd Respondents are found and defined in the TUA. He argued that the 3rd Respondent and its workers are not part of the items listed in Section 2(1) of the NIMASA Act and so this section did not apply to the 3rd Respondent and its workers. He further submitted that Sections 2(3) and 64 of NIMASA Act did not create any jurisdiction over workers in the Maritime corridor for the Appellant but that the TUA does.

 

[22] Learned counsel argued that NIMASA Act covers all activities in the maritime corridor and is not a Trade Unions Act or Labour Act. It was his contention that the sections of the NIMASA Act referred to by the Appellant covers all activities in the entire maritime corridor which includes the Appellant, the Respondents, Dock-workers Union, N.P.A workers Union, National Union of Seaman and Water Transport workers, etc. NIMASA is an Act that regulates all activities which includes all workers union and they must comply with its provisions. He argued that NIMASA Act is not created for the Appellant or intended to place all workers in the Maritime corridor under the Appellant. That Section 64 merely defines the ambit for maritime labour as including Seafarers and Dockworkers. It did not create a new or elongated jurisdiction for the Appellant.  Counsel stated that the jurisdictional scope of Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria in the TUA is

 “All workers in the Nigeria Ports Authority and all persons employed in the manning of Ocean going, inland waterways, Coastal and harbour vessels craft afloat. All Dock-workers including workers engaged by shipping, clearing and forwarding agencies but excluding managerial, professional and administrative staff”.

 

[23] Learned counsel submitted that the Appellant is in the category of junior workers while the 1st Respondent is a senior staff association and therefore, the Appellant cannot unionize senior staff because it is a junior staff union and the 1st Respondent members in the 3rd Respondent’s employment are senior staff. He submitted that the Appellant did not deny this and is deemed admitted and established. He argued that it did not form an issue for resolution and cited Akibu v Oduntan (1992) 2 NWLR (222) 210 AT 226 – 7; Aliyu Vs Bulaki (2019) LPELR – 46513(CA); Akinlagun v Oshoboja (2006) LPELR – 348 at 33, Taiwo v Adegboro (2011) 11 ALL NWLR (pt. 259) 562. That it is very clear that it is not all workers in the maritime corridor that are members of the Appellant. He referred to the Appellant’s jurisdictional scope in the TUA and stated that the components of the Appellant as a restructured union are Dock-workers Union of Nigeria, Nigeria Ports Authority Workers Union, National Union of Seaman and Water Transport Workers, Union of Shipping, Clearing and Forwarding Agencies Workers of Nigeria. That any worker who is a member of the Appellant’s component members are maritime workers and members of the Appellant and no any other person. Before you can be a member of the Appellant you must have been engaged by one of its components and or employed by one of them.

 

[24] Learned counsel contended that the 3rd Respondent and its employees are not one of the components, therefore the jurisdictional scope of the Appellant does not extend to the employees of the 3rd Respondent irrespective of the fact that they render services in the FPSO. He argued that the employees of the 3rd Respondent are not employed by the N.P.A. or by the owners of any ocean-going vessel or in inland waterways, coastal and harbour vessels or craft afloat, they are not employees of dock owners and they are not  dock-workers or engaged by a shipping, clearing and forwarding agencies. That it is not the intendment of the Act that every worker no matter his or her category of work must be member of the Appellant. He submitted that the duty of the Court is to ascertain the intention of the legislature in the TUA with respect to the jurisdictional scope of the parties and to give effect to the intention using the literal rule of interpretation and citing Olofu v Itodo (2010) 18 NWLR (PT. 1225) 545 at 585 Paras F – G. Global Excellence Comm. Ltd v Donald Duke (2007) 16 NWLR (PT 1059) 22. He submitted that where the Act mentioned or listed those that are to be members of the Appellant, it has excluded others citing Ehuwa v O.S.I.E.C (2006) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1012) 544 at 568 – 569.

 

[25] Learned counsel argued that the 3rd Respondent is not one of the persons/authorities or companies listed in the jurisdictional scope of the Appellant and simply engages in rendering professional services as a contractor in respect of catering, housekeeping and auxiliary services on board Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph which are only FPSO. He stated that Paragraph 2.4 of the Appellant’s brief is untrue, and that the 3rd Respondent’s contract is to “provide services in a PROFESSIONAL and Workman like manner …” and not provision of persons to man their catering department. The Appellant cannot read what is not in the contract between the 3rd Respondent with the owners of these FPSOs to it. He submitted that neither the Appellant or any other Union cannot go outside the scope created for them by the TUA and that the services rendered by the 3rd Respondent and its workers is professional.

 

[26] Learned counsel submitted that the 1st & 2nd Respondents’ jurisdictional scope are clearly defined in the TUA as “workers in service involving the care of the person or his apparel, hotel, restaurants cafe, taverns and other drinking and eating places..” He contended that if the Act intended the jurisdiction of the 1st and 2nd Respondents limited, it would have excluded FPSOs, vessels, ships etc, but it did not and the Appellant is not allowed to read into the statute what is not stated therein citing Kwara State Independent Electoral Commission v PDP (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 920) 25 at 53 – 54, Nnabude V G.N.A. (W/A) LTD (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1216) 365 at 385. He argued that the statute having not limited the operations of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, the Appellant cannot by any stretch of imagination or argument limit it, and even the Court cannot do so. Again, the Act has excluded catering service from the operation of the Appellant. The maxim expressio unius personal vel re est exclusion alterius and this simply means the express mention of one thing is the exclusion of others.

 

[27] Learned counsel submitted that the case of NUPENG v Maritime Workers Union Of Nigeria is not applicable. That although this judgment separated the services of a contractor from oil and gas and there is no place in NUPENG’s jurisdictional scope where service contractors were listed. And there is no contract placed before the Court stating or showing that they are oil and gas workers and no evidence that the services the contractors were providing was managerial, professional or administrative unlike this case where, it is expressly stated that it is a professional contract and proved. He further submitted that the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the 3rd Respondent is not in dispute but the services rendered.  Learned counsel submitted that the judgment in National Union Of Hotels And Personal Service Workers v NUPENG was correct and urged the Court to follow it as it is the authority on this subject and most especially when there is no relief or prayer asking the Court to depart from it or vary it or set it aside.

 

2nd RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS

[28] The 2nd Respondent submitted one issue for determination:

 

Whether the lower Tribunal was right in its findings and award that the Appellant has no jurisdictional scope over the Employees of Catering Facilities Solutions Ltd, the 3rd Respondent, in this suit?

 

[29] Learned Counsel submitted that the IAP was right in its findings and award that the Appellant has no jurisdictional scope over the workers of the 3rd Respondent Catering Facilities Solutions Ltd. He referred to the Paragraph 4.3 of the Appellant’s brief and submitted that the reformulation of the issue before the IAP is aimed at misleading the Court in view of the fact that the Appellant on appeal is now focused on a section of workers of the 3rd Respondent. He stated that the issue before the IAP remained   “Clarification of jurisdictional scope between Maritime workers Union of Nigeria and Hotel and Personal Services Workers over the workers of Catering Facilities Solutions Port Harcourt”. He submitted that no distinction was made on the issue between half of the workers of the of the 3rd Respondent as suggested by the Appellant. He submitted that the issue was the appropriate union to unionize “all workers” of the 3rd Respondent and no issue was made about the percentage of workers who work onboard Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph.

 

[30] Learned Counsel stated that the central plank upon which the IAP came to its decision that the Appellant has no jurisdictional scope over the employees of the 3rd Respondent is the judgment of this Court in National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers v. NUPENG (2008) 13 NLLR 365 which is a subsisting judgment and is on sound legal footing. He submitted that the contentions of the Appellant amounts to an attempt to use oral evidence or oral arguments to contradict the content of a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction citing Madu v. Madu [2008] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1083) 296 at 324 Paras. F-H and referring to Section 128(1) Evidence Act. He stated that the task before the IAP was to clarify the jurisdictional scope of the Appellant and 1st and 2nd Respondents’ that was a question of law and facts; and the IAP found that this Court had already resolved the appropriate union to organize the workers of the 3rd Respondent.

 

[31] Learned counsel submitted that the judgment applied to all workers of the 3rd Respondent without any exception. He argued that for the Appellant to suggest that it desires to unionize only a section of the workers would require rendering the judgment impotent; and that it is tantamount to an application to set aside a portion of the judgment so that the Appellant can have an entrance to unionize some of the workers of the 3rd Respondent. It was his further submission that the Appellant is making a case on appeal different from that made at the IAP as there was no argument by the Appellant that it was seeking to unionize a fraction of the workers of the 3rd Respondent. That the implication of this is that the Appellant would unionize some of the 3rd Respondent’s workers under the NIMASA Act while the 1st and 2nd Respondents would unionize another section under the Trade Unions Act which is a recipe for chaos and an illegality. He submitted that this is not the context of the judgment relied on by the IAP, nor is it the intention of the TUA.

 

[32] Learned counsel submitted that workers of the 3rd Respondent do not come within the classification of persons known as seafarers or persons manning ocean going, inland waterways, coastal and harbor vessels or craft afloat. He further submitted that the workers of the 3rd Respondent who are members of the 2nd Respondent are not seafarers or dockworkers. It was his argument that being aboard an ocean going vessel cannot translate to manning the vessel or transform a person to a seafarer; and that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents denied the allegations that the 3rd Respondent’s workers are manning an ocean going vessel or are seafarers. Counsel submitted that the maritime labour industry regulated by the NIMASA Act is at best a general law for that purpose, while the Trade Unions Act is a specific law for the regulation of jurisdictional scope of trade unions. That the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant operates to exclude NIMASA Act from the category of laws regulating membership of trade unions.

 

[33] Learned counsel submitted that it is not the intention of the law to give with one hand and take what it has given with another hand, citing A-G Federation v. Abubakar [2007] All NLR 58. He argued that there is nothing in the Trade Unions Act that permits two different and opposing trade unions with different jurisdictional scope to unionize the same set of workers in the same industry or scope of work. Counsel submitted that the NIMASA Act cannot compete with the Trade Unions Act on the jurisdictional scope of trade unions or membership of applicable or appropriate trade unions. He submitted that the Trade Unions Act has covered the field in so far as trade unions is concerned, citing INEC v Musa [2003] 3 NWLR (Pt. 806) 72. He submitted that there was evidence before the lower Tribunal that the 3rd Respondent’s workers were already being unionized by the 1st and 2nd Respondents with receipts of dues collected by the 2nd Respondent from the 3rd Respondent (pages 231, 232, 233, 344 of the records). The contention of the Appellant that there is “no shred of evidence that the workers were already unionized by the 2nd Respondent” is not correct.

 

[34] Learned counsel argued that the contention of the Appellant that affected staff who work aboard certain vessels “declared their membership” of the Appellant is not only illegal but contemptuous of the subsisting judgment of the Court in National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers v. NUPENG. He submitted that until the judgment is set aside, it is binding on all, including the Appellant and the alleged workers of the 3rd Respondents who work aboard Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph. He cited Ojo Ajao & Ors v. Opoola Alao & Ors [1986] NWLR (Pt. 45) 802. He submitted that the contention by Appellant that the elements of maritime business found on the object clause of the 2nd Respondent forms one of its economic activities is not the basis on which the judgment relied on by the IAP should be distinguished. He argued that the danger in this contention of the Appellant is that to determine that workers of a trade union belong to it, the Court should examine the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the 3rd Respondent and once its objects discloses elements of maritime business, the Appellant would position itself to absorb the workers of such company.

 

[35] Leaned counsel argued that it is dangerous and misleading for the Appellant to maintain that in so far as the 3rd Respondent has in its objects some elements of maritime business and can lawfully enter into contract in relation to ships and vessels, the 3rd Respondent automatically comes within the jurisdictional scope of the Appellant. He submitted that it is the law that the business or objects of the company are the purposes for which it is formed, and that the objects may be particularized in general terms. He argued that the listing of several objects in the Memorandum and Articles does not create liability for the company with respect to membership of its employees in a trade union where the company is not engaged or has a contract running on the objects even though the objects are listed in its Memorandum and Articles. He argued that the several objects  listed in a Memorandum and Articles is to enable the company in future, venture into those areas, citing Edokpolor & Co. Ltd v. SEM-Edo Wire Industries Ltd [1984] NSCC 553 at 562.

 

[36] Learned counsel submitted that the case of NUPENG v Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria relied on by the Appellant is not applicable to this case as it did not decide on jurisdictional scope of the 1st and 2nd Respondents. He urged the Court to hold that the jurisdictional scope of the 1st and 2nd Respondents cover the workers of the 3rd Respondent. He then urged the Court to dismiss the appeal with substantial cost for lacking in merit. 

 

3rd RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS

 [37] The 3rd Respondent stated that it does not have any issues or dispute with the 1st and 2nd Respondents, whom it recognizes and deals with as the appropriate and applicable Union in its operations; and that it does not have any issues with the Appellant as it does not deal with it nor have any trade union relationship with it in its operations. The 3rd Respondent stated that it applied to be joined in this proceeding because of the disruptive activities of the Appellant claiming that it must unionize its workers who were providing catering facilities at the request of subcontractors who were carrying on business and work onboard Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph. The 3rd Respondent stated that it is a registered Nigerian company with objects specified as:

a.      To carry on the business of hotel, restaurant, café, roadhouse, motel, hotel, holiday camp caravan site and apartment- house keepers.

 

b.      To carry on business of providing catering services including industrial catering contract, food supply for factories, corporate entities, restaurants, coffee stores, holiday resorts, rest houses, hotels, recreation rooms, bars and allied activities.

 

c.      To fit up and furnish any property for the purpose of letting the same to visitors or guest whether in single rooms, suites, chalets, caravans, movable structures, cottages or otherwise and to give advice to clients on how to set up similar facilities.”

 

[38] The 3rd Respondent submitted one issue for determination:

            Whether the Industrial Arbitration Panel was right when it found and held that the Appellant has no jurisdiction to unionize the workers of the 3rd Respondent who work onboard Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph as catering crew complement.

[39] Learned counsel submitted that the Appellant has not shown how the IAP was wrong to “have found and held” that the Appellant has no jurisdiction to unionize the workers of the 3rd Respondent who work onboard Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph as catering crew complement. He submitted that Parties on appeal are bound by the issues raised and an appellate court can only come into evidential scene to evaluate evidence if the trial court either failed to evaluate the evidence or did so perversely citing Okpokpo v Uko [1997] 11 NWLR (Pt 527) 94. He referred to the Third Schedule of the Trade Unions Act Part B Item 3 which specified the jurisdictional scope of Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria and submitted that the operative words of the TUA in respect of Maritime Workers are: (i) “All workers ---------- and all persons employed in the MANNING of -----       (ii).    “excluding Managerial, Professional and Administrative Staff.”

[40] Learned counsel argued that the Appellant is seeking to foist upon the Respondents and this Court legislation that has no impact or otherwise on the extant Trade Unions Act on the jurisdictional scope of Trade Unions or the membership of appropriate trade unions in Nigeria. He submitted that Maritime Labour industry regulated by NIMASA Act is a general law made for that purpose and does not form the category of laws regulating membership of trade unions in Nigeria. It was his further submission that the  NIMASA Act was not set up to be in competition with the Trade Unions Act or the jurisdictional rights to qualify anybody or to determine the membership of the appropriate trade unions. Counsel stated that by the nature of the contracts engaged by the 3rd Respondent with Yinson Operations & Product West Africa Limited and subcontract agreement with Geoplex Drillteq Limited, it would be outlandish to describe the workers of the 3rd Respondent as seafarers or dockworkers.

[41] Learned counsel contended that there is nothing in the objects of the 3rd Respondent or in its operations that falls within such group, classifications or operations and referred to Edokpolor & Co. Ltd v Sem-Edo Wire Industries Ltd. (1984) NSCC 553 at 562 para 4 Per Nnamani JSC

“The Objects clauses are no more than the list of the object the company may lawfully carry out. They are certainty not objects that the Company must execute. It is fairly common knowledge that most companies in drawing up the objects clauses of the Memorandum of Association cover a spectrum far wider than what they can accomplish immediately”.

[42] Learned counsel referred to the Oxford Learner's Dictionaries September, 2023 Edition where “Manning” is defined “as a Verb (present participle) of personnel, who run, or operate (a piece of equipment) or defend (a fortification). He submitted that flowing from this definition, the Appellant has failed to show how the workers of the 3rd Respondent are involved or employed in the manning of the Floating Production Storage And Off-Loading platforms. He further submitted that the Appellant has also failed to show how the workers are not in the Managerial, Professional or Administrative cadre in respect of the 3rd Respondent’s catering business for clients in the FPSO platforms. It was his submission that the 3rd Respondent is an independent contractor and catering service provider to whoever needs its services; and it moves and operates with its facilities, equipment and trained personnel who are under its control and management. Counsel contended that the Appellant is consistently making repetitive claims and assumptions on the status of the 3rd Respondent’s clients Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph, whose operational status are at variance with the 3rd Respondent’s registered objects.

[43] Learned counsel submitted that in spite of the opportunity presented to the Appellant at the Industrial Arbitration Panel, the Appellant could not substantiate their claims that its workers are involved in the manning of the 3 FPSOs Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon Fpso And Abigail Joseph or that they are not in the Administrative or Professional services to the 3rd Respondent. The Appellant failed to apply to the IAP for joinder of the   Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph as parties to the proceedings, failed to establish the nature of the respective contractual relationships, tender the respective certificates of Incorporation of the companies and their registered objects. It was his further submission that the Appellant failed to lead evidence of either the maritime union workers employed by the 3rd Respondent, or the management of the alleged owners of the FPSOs before IAP to present additional insights into the matters in controversy. That the Appellant failed to prove the class of facilities and the nature of services being offered by the 3rd Respondent or the duties performed by its workers on these FPSO Platforms.

[44] The 3rd Respondent contended that the Appellant cannot forcefully seek to unionize some of its workers and by extension create rivalry between unions within the same establishment as its objects are well defined as catering and allied services. Learned counsel submitted that the Appellant cannot appropriate membership by coercion at its discretion without regard to its defined area of jurisdiction. The 1st and 2nd Respondents have jurisdiction covering “Workers in service involving the care of the person or his apparel. Hotel, restaurant, café, taverns and other drinking and eating places, Laundries services, cleaning and dyeing, barber and beauty shops, domestic services, portrait and commercial photographic studios, shops, offices and cleaning, security services, recreational and tourist organization in the private sector and related service”. He further submitted that this is the proper trade union with jurisdiction accepted and recognized within the 3rd Respondent (Catering Facilities Solution Limited) to unionize its Senior and Junior Workers and no other.

[45] Learned counsel referring to the Appellant’s brief of argument stated that the Appellant conceded that the 1st and 2nd Respondents are the proper and recognized Trade Unions to unionize the workers of the 3rd Respondent; and that the type of work done, the industry, the status, position and the work of the workers in question is the yardstick for determining jurisdictional scope of trade unions. He cited National Union Of Hotels And Personal Services Workers v NUPENG (2008) 13 NLLR 365 where this Court held as follows:

The business of Sodexho Nigeria Limited was established as contained in its Memorandum of Association is to carry on the business of hotel, restaurant, catering etc. Although NUPENG had contended that the services were rendered within the Oil and gas Sector, we hold that the services rendered by SODEXHO in the oil industry were related to catering services.

 

[46] Learned counsel stated that the company SODEHXO named in the case is still Catering and Facilities Solutions Limited the 3rd Respondent in this suit following the change of name at the Corporate Affairs Commission. He then urged the Court to hold that the business of the 3rd Respondent was established and confirmed in the award of the Industrial Arbitration Panel as carrying on the business of hotel, restaurant, catering etc; and that the IAP was right in holding that the appropriate trade union with jurisdictional scope to unionize workers of the 3rd Respondent are the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

 

 

 

 APPELLANT’S REPLY ON POINT OF LAW

[47] Learned counsel to the Appellant submitted that the interpretation of the referral instrument is akin to interpretation of statutes where the Court is enjoined not to give an interpretation that will lead to absurdity but to give an interpretation that will discover the intention of the legislature, citing Umeano & Ors v. Anaekwe & Anor [2022] LPELR-56855 (SC). It was her submission that the live issue in the referral instrument is the clarification of the jurisdictional scope of the Appellant, the 1st and 2nd Respondents; and

that an issue raised over the jurisdictional scope to unionize a segment of the staff of the 3rd Respondent is not outside the terms of reference.

 

[48] Learned Counsel submitted that everyone who works in any capacity on board a vessel/ship is a seafarer, and referred to Article II Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (MCL 2006). She submitted that this instant case is distinguishable from the recent decision reached by this Court in National Union Of Hotels And Personal Services Workers v National Union of Air Transport Employees & Anor (unreported) Suit No: NICN/ABJ/39/2023 delivered on 6th February,          2025. That in the earlier decision, it was not shown that there is a law that defined every person working on board a commercial airline in any capacity as an airline worker but the NIMASA Act and Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (MCL 2006) specifically prescribed in their respective definition clauses that any person engaged or working in any capacity onboard a ship/vessel excluding masters and pilots is a seafarer. That in National Union Of Hotels And Personal Services Workers v National Union of Air Transport Employees it was not shown that the contract specifically defined the type personnel to be supplied by the 2nd Respondent as airline personnel.

[49] Learned counsel submitted that a judgment of Court is only binding on the parties to the litigation and a Court cannot in its decision bind person who were not parties to the case before it citing Ndasuko & ors v. Mohammed & ors   (2007) LPELR -8738  (Pp. 14-15 paras. A-A),  (Haruna v. Modibbo (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt.900) p.487,  Mobil Prod. (Nig.) Unlimited v. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (pt. 789) p.1 and Ndasuko v. Mohammed supra (Pp. 14-15 paras. A-A). It was her submission that the Appellant was never a party in the case National Union of Hotels and Personal Service Workers v. NUPENG and cannot be bound by the decision in that case. The Appellant submitted that the Trade Unions Act permit multiple trade unions in an organization as long as they represent different classes of workers within the same work place but in different industry sectors.

 

COURT’S DECISION

 

[50] We have carefully considered the processes filed, the records from the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP), the authorities cited, submissions and arguments of counsel. We will begin with the preliminary issue raised by the 1st and 2nd Respondents that the Appellant in its brief of argument (Para 4.3) has raised an issue that was not referred to the IAP or considered by it. The paragraph is reproduced and the said issue is underlined:

 

The dispute between the parties herein and which was the issue for determination before the Industrial Arbitration Panel is not whether the Appellant has the jurisdictional scope to unionize all the staff/workers of the 3rd Respondent but whether the Appellant is the appropriate Trade Union with the jurisdictional scope to unionize the staff/workers of the 3rd Respondent who have become seafarers by virtue of their services onboard Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph, which are all offshore marine vessels/ship retrofitted for use in oil and gas production and storage offshore and are regarded in law as ocean going, coastal and harbour vessels or crafts afloat and are generally called (Floating Production Storage and Off-loading (FPSO) platforms.

 

[51] The trade dispute referred to the IAP by the Hon Minister is reproduced:  

“To inquire into the trade dispute existing between Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria in Catering Facilities Solution Port Harcourt and the Hotel and Personal Services Senior Staff Association and National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers over the following issue:

Clarification of jurisdictional scope between Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria (MWUN) and Hotel and Personal Services Senior Staff Association and National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers over the workers of Catering Facilities Solutions Port Harcourt.”

 

[52] It is clear that the issue referred to the IAP is the clarification of jurisdictional scope of the three trade unions mentioned over all the workers of Catering Facilities Solutions Port Harcourt, and not some of the workers. From the records before the Court, the IAP did not find that any staff/workers of the 3rd Respondent “have become seafarers by virtue of their services onboard Mac Lorenzo, Knock Adoon FPSO and Abigail Joseph”.  The IAP in the summary of the case of the 4th Party/3rd Respondent herein at page 344 paragraph 12.6 of the records states that “the 4th Party admitted that they perform services for their clients but not workers. They are not Seafarers or Dock Workers nor Manners.” It is therefore wrong for the Appellant’s counsel to attempt to mislead the Court in this manner when there was no such finding by the IAP.

 

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES

 

[53] The issues distilled for determination are as follows:

 

1)   Whether the Trade Unions Act or NIMASA Act is the appropriate law that defines and specifies the jurisdictional scope of trade unions?

 

2)   Whether the award of the IAP ought to be confirmed?

 

[54] Learned counsel to the Appellant in her submissions has conceded the trite position   of the law that jurisdictional scope of trade unions in Nigeria is statutory. It is derived from the Third Schedule Parts A, B, and C as contained in the Trade Unions Act, Cap T14 LFN 2004 (as amended). Jurisdictional scope is compartmentalized and well defined in the Trade Unions Act. It defines the limit within which such jurisdiction is to be exercised by a trade union. See Osawe v Registrar of Trade Unions [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt 4) 755. The 2005 Trade Unions (Amendment) Act did not repeal, amend or substitute any of the provisions of the Third Schedule Parts A, B and C of the Trade Unions Act Cap T14 LFN, 2004; see Nigeria Merchant Navy Officers and Water Transport Senior Staff Association & Anor v The Nigerian Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) & Anor (unreported) Suit No: NICN/ABJ/104/2011, judgment delivered on February 8, 2013); Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) v Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria (MWUN) – (unreported) Suit No: NICN/ABJ/71/2014, judgement delivered on 15th April, 2015), National Union Of Hotels And Personal Services Workers v National Union of Air Transport Employees & Anor (unreported) Suit No: NICN/ABJ/39/2023 delivered on 6th February, 2025.

 

[55] Jurisdictional scope of a trade union, and in this instance the Appellant can therefore not be derived from the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) Act 2007 as submitted by the Appellant’s Counsel in paragraph 5.1 reproduced as follows:

 

Although the Trade Union’s Act is the appropriate law that directs on the appropriate trade union for workers as found by the Industrial Arbitration Panel, it is however, instructive to examine the Act that regulates maritime labour in Nigeria, which is the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency Act (hereafter called NIMASA) Act 2007, to get a better understanding of what maritime labour is so as to understand the jurisdictional coverage of Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria as encapsulated in the Third Schedule of the Trade Union’s Act (T14) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. Part B item 3.

 

[56] We agree with the submissions of learned counsel to the 1st Respondent that the NIMASA Act 2007 does not contradict the Trade Unions Act (TUA) and it is not superior to it; and that there is no provision in the TUA that subjects its provisions to the provisions of the NIMASA Act and vice versa. The NIMASA Act does not create a jurisdictional scope over workers in the Maritime corridor on the Appellant but the TUA does. We find that the submissions and arguments by the Appellant on the NIMASA Act, Article II Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (MCL 2006) are academic exercise. Courts are to determine live issues and not to engage in academic exercise or speculation. The Court is not a proper forum for academic exercise, see Adamu v Dantiye (2022) 1 NWLR (Pt 1810) 1 SC, Ecobank (Nig) Ltd v Honeywell Flour Mills Plc (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt 1655) 55 SC, Topba v FRN (2020) 7 NWLR (Pt 1724) 464 CA.

[57] We will now reproduce the jurisdictional scope of the Appellant, and the 1st and 2nd Respondents as provided and listed in the Third Schedule, Part B, Items 3 and 12 of the Trade Unions Act as follows:

 

3. Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria

All workers in the Nigerian Ports Authority and all persons employed in the manning of ocean going, inland waterways, coastal and harbour vessels or crafts afloat. All dock-workers including workers engaged by shipping, clearing and forwarding agencies, but excluding managerial, professional and administrative staff.

        Components:

 

(1)       Dock-Workers Union of Nigeria.

 

(2)       Nigeria Ports Authority Workers Union.

 

(3)       National Union of Seamen and Water Transport Workers.

 

(4)       Union of shipping, Clearing and Forwarding Agencies Workers of Nigeria.

 

12. National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers

Workers in services involving the care of the person or his apparel. Hotels, restaurants, cafes, taverns and other drinking and eating places. Laundries and laundry services, cleaning and dyeing. Barber and beauty shops, domestic services, portraits and commercial photographic studios, shops, offices and cleaning, security services, recreational and tourist organizations in the private sector and related services.

 

[58] One of the cardinal principles in the restructuring of trade unions relates to the need for compatibility of the trade unions in terms of product, skill, services, and conditions of employment. This Court has thus held severally that unionization is industry based. See The Nigeria Merchant Navy Officers and Water Transport Senior Staff Association v NUPENG (unreported) Suit No: NIC/ABJ/104/2011, where this Court held that the workers in Lamnalco Nigeria Limited are more compatible with the Claimants as they are workers in the maritime sector by training though their services are offered to the oil and gas sector. In NUPENG v Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria (MWUN) [2015] 61 NLLR (Pt 214) 403, this Court held that employees of GAC Manning Services on board the vessel ‘FPSO Sendje Berge’ that is engaged in the oil and gas industry are workers in the maritime industry and so eligible to be unionized by MWUN. In Food Beverage and Tobacco Senior Staff Association v Royal Salt Limited Kirikiri Lighter Terminal Apapa [2009] 16 NLLR (Pt 43) 92, the Court held that Food Beverage and Tobacco Senior Staff Association cannot unionize workers who are not in the food industry as salt is a chemical substance from manufacturing industry.

 

[59] We carefully looked at the records and the evidence adduced at the proceedings before the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP). The findings of the IAP (page 345, paragraph 13.0 of the records) are as follows:

 

13.0 FINDINGS

13.1 In the case of NATIONAL UNION OF HOTELS AND PERSONAL SERVICE WORKERS V NUPENG (2008) 13 NLLR 365 – NUPENG contended that the Catering, Laundry and Domestic services rendered by the company Sodexho Ltd were rendered within the Oil and Gas sector and ought not to be unionized by the National Union Of Hotels And Personal Service Workers Union. The Court found and held that the services rendered by SODEXHO Ltd were related to catering services, that the object of Sodexho Ltd falls within the jurisdictional scope of the National Union of Hotels And Personal Service Workers and the latter was therefore the rightful union to unionize them.

 

13.2 It is interesting to note that the 4th Party herein was formally Sodexho Ltd. The company name was merely changed by a special Resolution – Annexure CFS2 while the Article remained the same.

 

13.3. Consequently, as the Rule of Stare Decisis directs, this Tribunal is bound by that decision that the 3rd Party is the rightful/statutorily recognized Union for the 4th Party Workers.

1) The TUA is the appropriate law to direct as to the appropriate Union for the workers.

2) The NIMASA ACT expressly states the categories of personnel under its Jurisdiction, and the Activities of the 4th Party’s workers/staff is not covered therein.

 

3) The 1st Party has no jurisdictional scope over the Employees of the 4th Party.

 

[60] It is the law that it is not the function of the Appellate Court to interfere with the findings of a trial court on facts. In other words, an Appellate Court rarely disturbs the findings of facts by the trial court, but would be compelled to do so if the findings are not supported by credible or cogent evidence, or the findings are perverse. See Polaris Bank v Forte Oil Plc [2023] 5 NWLR (Pt 1876) 179 at 206,  Mamman v Salaudeen (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt 958) 478, Ecodrill (Nig) Ltd v A.B.I.R [2015] 11 NWLR (Pt 1470) 303; R-Benkay Nigeria Ltd v Cadbury Nigeria Plc [2012] 2 NWLR (Pt 1306) 596;  Woluchem v Gudi [1981] 5 SC 291. The findings of the IAP are consistent with the evidence adduced. This Court has already decided in National Union Of Hotels And Personal Service Workers v NUPENG (2008) 13 NLLR (Pt 36) 365 that the appropriate trade union to organize the workers of the 3rd Respondent is the 2nd Respondent for the junior workers and the 1st Respondent for the senior staff. This is a subsisting decision, and it is a precedent that has resolved the issue of clarification referred to this Court by the Hon Minister of Labour.

 

[61] Learned counsel to the Appellant has argued that the case National Union Of Hotels And Personal Service Workers v NUPENG supra, and the case National Union Of Hotels And Personal Services Workers v National Union of Air Transport Employees supra are distinguishable from this instant case, and has urged the Court to depart from these decisions. We find no distinguishing facts and circumstances in this instant case, and reject the arguments of the Appellant. They are tantamount to turning the Trade Union Law upside down, and a recipe for chaos in the trade union movement. The ascertainment of the jurisdictional scope of a trade union is found and defined in the Trade Unions Act; and we so hold.

 

[62] The Memorandum and Articles of Association of a company and its objects provide what the company was set up to do. It is common knowledge that the objects clause of a company covers a very wide range and is no more than a list of businesses the company may lawfully carry out, not that it must execute, see Noga Hotels International SA v NICON Hotels Ltd & Ors (2007) 15 NWLR 1 at 34, Edokpolor & Co Ltd v Sem-Edo Wire Industries Ltd (1984) NSCC 553 at 562. The listing of various objects in the Memorandum and Articles of a company does not translate to jurisdictional scope of a trade union, or jurisdictional scope of the workers of the company, or jurisdictional scope liability for the company as suggested by the Appellant where the company is not engaged in the particular object/business but has merely listed it.

 

[63] On the issue of voluntarism, we will begin by reproducing Section 12 (4) of the Trade Unions Act:

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act, membership of a trade union by employees shall be voluntary and no employee shall be forced to join any trade union or be victimized for refusing to join or remain a member.

This clearly provides that membership of a trade union by an employee is voluntary, in other words, he has the freedom to decide which union he wishes to belong. However, the right of a worker to decide which union he wants to belong to is not absolute but must be exercised within the limits of the Trade Unions Act and the subsisting decisions of the Court. Voluntarism and the freedom to choose which union to belong to is limited to the unions empowered to operate within a clearly defined jurisdictional scope. Voluntarism must exist within and not outside all existing relevant laws and regulations, see NCSU v ASCSN [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt 3) 429; Osawe v Registrar of Trade Unions (supra); PERESSA v SSACGOC [2009] 14 NLLR (Pt 39) 345.

 

[64] The fundamental rights guaranteed in Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) are not absolute. Sections 45 (1) (a) and (b) provides for derogation from these rights. The right to choose which union to belong to is a qualified right. The workers of the 3rd Respondent must obey the laws of the land by belonging to a trade union in the industry in which they are employed. We hold that the jurisdictional scope contained in the Third Schedule Part B, and Part C to the Trade Unions Act is applicable to the Appellant, the 1st and 2nd Respondents, and to all the trade unions. The Appellant is bound by the decision of this Court in National Union Of Hotels And Personal Service Workers v NUPENG supra, that has decided that the 1st and 2nd Respondents are the appropriate union/association to organize/unionize the workers of the 3rd Respondent; and we so hold.

 

[65] We have no reason to depart from our earlier decision in National Union Of Hotels And Personal Service Workers v NUPENG (2008) 13 NLLR (Pt 36) 365, and the recent decision of this Court in National Union Of Hotels And Personal Services Workers v National Union of Air Transport Employees (unreported) Suit No: NICN/ABJ/39/2023 delivered on 6th February, 2025.

 

[66] For all the reasons given above, the award of the Industrial Arbitration Panel in the trade dispute with DISPUTE NO:IAP/HB/3927 made on 5th May 2023 is hereby affirmed.

 

[67] Costs in the sum of N500,000.00 is awarded to each of the Respondents.

 

Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

  ___________________________________

HON. JUSTICE O. A. OBASEKI-OSAGHAE

PRESIDING JUDGE

 

 

____________________________                       ____________________________

HON. JUSTICE R. B. HAASTRUP                      HON. JUSTICE S. O. ADENIYI

JUDGE                                                                       JUDGE