BACK

NICN - JUDGMENT

 

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

 

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM

 

DATED: 24TH JULY, 2025                            

SUIT NO: NINC/ABJ/32/2024

 

BETWEEN:

 YUSUF ADAMS DANLAMI                                  -                      CLAIMANT 

  AND

  1. STANBIC IBTC BANK PLC
  2. INTEGRATED CORPORATE                                                    

SERVICES LIMITED                                                                DEFENDANTS

  1. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA           

 

REPRESENTATION:

O. S. Adebiyi Esq., with Phillip Okwechime Esq., and Mary Adesola Esq., for Claimant

Marcel Osigbenhe Esq., for the 1st Defendant

G. E. Ejimai Esq., for the 2nd Defendant

I. K. Animasaun Esq., for the 3rd Defendant

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

  1. By a General Form of Complaint dated and filed on the 26th day of January, 2024 and subsequently amended on 12th day of April 2024, Claimant instituted this action against the Defendants claiming the following:

 

  1. A declaration that the termination of the appointment of the Claimant by the Defendants is illegal as same was done in contravention of due process.

 

  1. A declaration that the entire process leading up to the termination of the Claimant’s appointment by the 1st and 2nd Defendants breaches the Claimant’s right of fair hearing as guaranteed under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria as amended.

 

  1. A declaration that the subsequent listing of the Claimant’s name in the banker’s black book with the Central Bank of Nigeria by the 1st and 3rd Defendants is illegal and unconstitutional.

 

  1. An Order directing the 1st and 3rd Defendants to within 7 days of the judgment of court ensure the delisting of the Claimant’s name from the banker’s black book of the Central Bank of Nigeria.

 

  1. An Order for general damages in the sum of ?750, 000, 000. 00 (seven hundred and fifty million naira only) against the 1st and 2nd Defendants for the unlawful termination of the claimant’s appointment and subsequent inability of the claimant to secure another appointment because of the actions of the 1st and 2nd Defendants who maliciously inserted his name in the Central Bank of Nigeria’s banker’s black book.

 

  1. The sum of ?5,000, 000. 00 (five million naira only) as the cost of prosecuting this suit.

 

CLAIMANT’S CASE

 

  1. It is the Claimant’s case that he was employed as a contract staff by the 1st Defendant through the 2nd Defendant. However sometime in June 2019, 1st Defendant terminated the contract of employment and subsequently paid him accumulated gratuity through the 2nd Defendant. Shortly after terminating the contract of employment with the 1st Defendant, Claimant was shortlisted for employment by First City Monument Bank Plc (FCMB) but was denied employment on the premise that his name was on the Central Bank of Nigeria Bankers Black Book. On getting this information, claimant quickly swung into action to find out what that meant and the problem. Claimant, to his dismay, discovered that being on the Bankers Black Book means he has been tagged fraudulent as that was the criteria for such blacklisting and that he would not be able to work in the financial sector of Nigeria for as long as his name remains on the list. Claimant went on to state that during the course of investigation he was informed that 1st Defendant forwarded his name to be listed in the black book thereby making it impossible for claimant to enter into a new employment contract with any other Bank. Consequently, Claimant briefed a lawyer who wrote the 1st Defendant twice requesting for immediate De-listing of his Bank Verification Number from the Central Bank of Nigeria watch list and his name from the bankers’ black book. The 1st Defendant responded and confirmed the said blacklisting based on the 2nd Defendant disciplinary action that led to claimant’s termination and eventual blacklisting of his name with the Central Bank.   

 

  1. The 1st Defendant in response entered appearance and filed its Statement of Defence dated 29th day of February 2024 which was subsequently amended on the 16th day of May 2024. It is the case of the 1st defendant that Claimant was employed as a contract staff by the 2nd Defendant and subsequently deployed to work as a Teller in the 1st Defendant’s Organization. That Claimant engaged in dishonest and fraudulent acts in the course of his employment and after due investigation was asked to return to his employer (2nd Defendant). 1st defendant stated that it only complied with its statutory duty to report the Claimant’s dishonesty to the Central Bank of Nigeria as set out in Clause 3 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Operational Guidelines for blacklisting.

 

  1. By way of counterclaim, 1st Defendant/counterclaimant avers that the claimant/defendant to counterclaim in the course of his services with the counter claimant as contract staff engaged in fraudulent transaction that led to his disengagement from the counter claimant’s organization but despite the termination, he has indulged in dragging the Counter Claimant from one Court to another. That the Claimant/Defendant to counterclaim first instituted suit No. FCT/HC/2904/2020 at the FCT High Court which has put the Counter Claimant to immense expenses and litigation cost.

 

The 1st Defendant (Counter-Claimant), Counter-Claims against the Claimant, (Defendant to Counter-Claim) as follows: 

 

  1.  The sum of N10, 000, 000.00 (Ten Million Naira) being general damages against the Counter-Defendant for his conduct in engaging the Counter Claimant in harassing and vexatious litigation (s) arising from the termination of his services owing to his fraudulent conduct.
  2. Cost of this action

 

  1. Also, the 2nd Defendant entered appearance and filed its statement of defence dated 13th day of March 2024. 2nd defendant stated that it was responsible for the disciplinary action that led to the termination of appointment of the Claimant but deny the fact of blacklisting the name of the Claimant with the 3rd Defendant. That sometime in 2019 the 1st Defendant reported a case of alleged fictitious Point of Sale (POS) transactions in which the Claimant was involved and that upon receipt of the said report it duly notified the Claimant by issuing him with a compliance report form which he adequately responded and positively admitted to committing the infractions. The 2nd Defendant then caused a disciplinary hearing which recommended that claimant be sanctioned. Consequently, Claimant’s employment with the 2nd Defendant was terminated vide letter of termination of appointment.

 

  1. The 3rd Defendant entered a conditional appearance and filed its statement of defence on the 15th day of March 0224, subsequently amended on the 19th day of June 2024. 3rd defendant stated that it is a regulatory agency that oversees banking matters in Nigeria and that it has no relationship with the Claimant hence not responsible for listing the Claimant in the Black Book. It went on to state that in line with its regulatory functions it established the Black Book to prevent the re-employment of nefarious and fraudulent individuals in the banking industry but not responsible for listing individual’s manes as this is done by the employer-financial institution who is equally responsible for forwarding of names of their dismissed staff for blacklisting. It is also the averment of the 3rd Defendant that the objectives of Blacklisting as contained in operational guidelines for blacklisting is to prevent discredited and fraudulent staff from being recycled within the financial system and not to prevent Claimant from getting a job. It reiterated that under the Review of Operational Guidelines for Blacklisting made pursuant to the Bank and Financial Institutions Act stipulates the procedures for blacklisting and it never at any point blacklisted the Claimant as it does not deal with private individuals hence could not possibly pave the way for his ill treatment.

 

 

CLAIMANT’S REPLY TO 1ST DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF DEFENCE AND DEFENCE TO COUNTER CLAIM

 

  1. Claimant vide his reply dated 4th day of July 2024 contended that he never engaged in any dishonest or fraudulent act in the course of his engagement with the counter Claimant as he only carried out direct orders from his superiors and that the counter Claimant only resolved to using him as a scape goat for offences of others as they never verified from the said HSS Owolabi when her instruction to him which he carried out was termed fictitious/fraudulent by the counter Claimant and that in fact the said HSS Owolabi who directed him to do what the counter Claimant termed fictitious/dry posting was retained in the bank while he was relieved of his duty. That he was never shown any policy of the bank old or new that suggested the instruction given to him by HSS Owolabi is not allowed. He reiterated that he was shortlisted for interview with several banks but denied on account of his name being on the CBN Black book. That the entire narrative of him engaging in a fraudulent and dishonest act is a contrive of the 1st Defendant/counter Claimant and not true because he was diligent while acting as a Teller in Dei-Dei branch of the counter Claimant. He urge the Court to dismiss in its entirety the claim of the counter Claimant as it is not meritorious and manipulative.

 

  1. In response to the 2nd Defendant’s statement of defence Claimant filed a reply dated 4th day of July 2024 wherein he averred that he never admitted to any allegation but that he was compelled to carry out the action by his superior in office. That there was no disciplinary hearing, talk less a report from such hearing by the 2nd Defendant, as 1st and 2nd Defendant without due process terminated his employment and further push his name to the 3rd Defendant for blacklist. That the alleged disciplinary hearing report was rigged.

 

 

 

COMMENCEMENT OF HEARING

 

  1. On the 14th day of October, 2024 Claimant opened his case, testified on oath as CW1 by adopting his written depositions as his oral evidence in this case. Exhibits Danlami 1-5 were tendered through him. He was subsequently cross-examined by learned Counsel on behalf of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants. On the 26th day of November, 2024 One Mr. David Adeniyi testified as DW1 for the 1st Defendant by adopting his witness statement on oath as his evidence. Exhibits Adeniyi 1-4 were tendered through him. DW1 was cross examined by learned Counsel on behalf of Claimant and subsequently discharged. On the 17th day of February 2025, One Rejoice Ben-Nlemogha testified as DW2 for the 2nd Defendant by adopting her written depositions as her oral evidence in this case. Exhibits Rejoice A-E were tendered through her. She was cross examined and thereafter discharged. On the same date One Aborisade Kehinde Damilare testified as DW3 by adopting his witness depositions as his oral evidence in this case. He was subsequently cross examined and discharged afterwards and the case of the defence was closed and the matter adjourned for adoption of Final Written Addresses.

 

 

3RD DEFENDANT’S WRITTEN SUBMIISSION

 

 

  1. The 3rd Defendant equally filed its written address wherein Counsel on its behalf formulated and submits the following issues for determination before this Court viz:

 

Whether from the facts of this case viz-a-viz the prevailing regulatory framework, due process was complied with in ensuring that the claimant was validly blacklisted.

 

Whether the Claimant is Entitled to the Reliefs Sought Against the 3rd Defendant

 

  1. On issue one Counsel argued that the Claimant was validly blacklisted in accordance with the Review of Operational Guidelines for Blacklisting (the Guidelines), a subsidiary legislation made pursuant to Section 2 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 2007, and that due process was followed. He went on to state that paragraph 4.0 of the Guidelines defines a blacklisted person as one dismissed for fraud, dishonesty, or conviction. Paragraphs 5.0 and 6.0 detail the procedure for blacklisting, which includes a thorough investigation by a disciplinary committee, findings of fraud or dishonesty, a fair hearing, written notification to the affected staff, and an opportunity for the staff to respond. Also, paragraphs 7.0 and 9.0 place the obligation on financial institutions to submit verified cases to the Central Bank of Nigeria and empower the Central Bank of Nigeria to confirm due process before blacklisting is finalized. He cited in support of his assertion the case of NNPC v. Famfa Oil Ltd [2012] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1328) 148.  

 

  1. The 3rd Defendant Counsel equally relies on the evidence elicited under cross-examination of DW2 (the 1st Defendant’s witness), which confirmed that the Claimant was investigated, found culpable of fraud, informed through his solicitor, and that a report was duly submitted to the Central Bank of Nigeria before blacklisting. He placed reliance on the case of Ironbar v. FMF [2009] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1165) 506 at 534-535 H-A.  Again the 1st Defendant’s investigative report (Exhibit Rejoice A) and the Claimant’s written admission during disciplinary proceedings (Exhibit Rejoice B) further confirm that the required procedural steps were fulfilled and that this admission qualifies as evidence against interest, which Courts are bound to give probative value to. He relied on the case of Nnadozie v. Omesu [1996] 5 NWLR (Pt. 446) 110 @ 125 and Odi v. Iyala [2004] 8 NWLR (Pt. 875) 283 @ 308. Continuing, Counsel posited that the 2nd Defendant, as the Claimant's employer, also conducted its own disciplinary hearing, with findings admitted as Exhibit Rejoice C. This established that a fair hearing was conducted, the allegations were admitted by the Claimant, and the disciplinary decision was duly communicated. The 3rd Defendant, in turn, reviewed the full documentation and concluded that all requirements under paragraph 6.0 of the Guidelines were met prior to blacklisting thus the presumption of regularity under Section 168(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011 applies to the 3rd Defendant’s administrative actions.

 

  1. On the whole Counsel submitted that the Claimant was not prejudged but was given fair opportunity to respond to the allegations and that the blacklisting was executed in accordance with due process and regulatory obligations. As held in Longe v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc [2010] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1189) 1. More so, in line with CBN v. Okojie [2015] LPELR-24740(CA), such action is necessary to protect public trust and integrity in the financial sector.

 

 

  1. Regarding issue two the 3rd Defendant’s Counsel argues that since the blacklisting of the Claimant was carried out in full compliance with the applicable regulatory framework, the Claimant is not entitled to the reliefs sought. He referred the Court to the case of Ipinloju v. EFCC & Ors [2024] LPELR-61914(CA). He equally posited that in Makinde v. Adekola [2022] 9 NWLR (Pt.1834) 13 (SC), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a Claimant seeking declaratory reliefs must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence. Furthermore, in Amobi v. Ogidi Union Nigeria [2023] 1 NWLR (Pt.1864) 153 (SC); Adesina v. Air France [2022] 8 NWLR (Pt.1833) 523 (SC); and Adama v. K.S.H.A [2019] 16 NWLR (Pt.1699) 501 (SC), the Apex court consistently held that the burden remains on the claimant to prove entitlement to reliefs sought. Failure to do so renders the claim liable to dismissal, as reiterated again in Makinde v. Adekola (supra), where the Court held that where a Claimant fails to establish his case, the evidential burden does not shift to the Defendant. Moreover, in Etim v. Akpan [2019] 1 NWLR (Pt.1654) 451 (SC), the Supreme Court cautioned that Courts must refrain from granting reliefs where the requisite findings of fact are unsupported by sufficient evidence. Therefore, in the absence of cogent, credible, and persuasive evidence from the Claimant to substantiate his entitlement, the reliefs sought cannot be granted. The 3rd Defendant’s Counsel concludes that since the Claimant has failed to meet the legal threshold, his claims should be dismissed.

 

 

  1. With respect to the Claimant's prayer for an order directing the Bank to bear the costs of prosecuting this matter. Counsel placed reliance in the relevant Court of Appeal decision in UBA PLC V VERTEX AGRO LTD (2019) LPELR – 48742(CA) wherein the Court held that:

 

I think that the law on the point is as stated by the Supreme Court in Ihekwoaba V ACB Ltd (supra) thusly - "The issue of damages as an aspect of solicitor's fees is not one that lends itself to support in this country. There is no system of costs taxation to get a realistic figure. Costs are awarded arbitrarily and certainly usually minimally. I do not therefore see why the appellants will be entitled to general or any damages against the auctioneer or against the mortgagee who engaged him, in the present case, on the ground of solicitor's cost paid by them." 

 

  1. In Nwanji v Coastal Serv. Nig Ltd (2004) 18 NSCQR 895, the Supreme Court held that- "It is an unusual claim and difficult to accept in this country as things stand today. "The issue of damages as an aspect of solicitor's fees is not one that lends itself to support in this country. There is no system of costs taxation to get a realistic figure. Costs are awarded arbitrarily and certainly usually minimally. I do not therefore see why the appellants will be entitled to general or any damages against the auctioneer or against the mortgagee who engaged him, in the present case, on the ground of solicitor's costs paid by them." 

 

  1. The award of one Million Naira cost of Attorney's fees as special damages for breach of contract runs contrary to the legally recognised principle for the award of damages for breach of contract. Damages for breach of contract remedy the loss arising from the breach, which loss must be within the reasonable contemplation of the parties to the contract at the time the contract was made or which naturally flows directly from the breach. He also cited in support the following case Universal Vulcanising (Nig) Ltd v Ijesha United Trading & Transport & Ors [1992] LPELR - 3415 (SC), Union Beverages Ltd V Owolabi [1988] 1 SC 33, Wahabi v Omonuwa [1976] LPELR - 3469 (SC) and Machine Umudge & Anor v SBPDC Nig Ltd [1975] LPELR - 3375 (SC) or 9-11 SC II. So, damages cannot be awarded for costs incurred in an action to seek remedy for the loss suffered by a party to a contract as a result of the breach of the contract by the other party to the contract. The cost of litigation is not a loss arising from the breach of contract. The Court in Mbanugo v Nzefili [1998] LPELR - 5483 (CA) distinguishing between damages and costs held that "while costs are like damages, awarded as compensation, there is as to costs no restitution in intergum." The purpose for the award of costs is to compensate the successful party for some of the loss incurred in litigation. He placed reliance on the case of Halo Ltd v Brown (1973) 2 SC 14 and Reg. Trustees of Ifejolu v Kuku [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt 189) 65. In the case of Chijioke V Soetan [2006] 10 NWLR (Pt 990) 179 the Court held thus- "The emphasis here is the restitution of the party that had succeeded as to the cost he incurred in the litigation, either for prosecuting his claim or defending the action. The decisions referred to by learned respondent's counsel on this issue, Onabanjo v. Ewetuga [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt.288) 445 and Uzoma v. Okorie [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt. 692) 882 at 893 wherein factors the trial Court should consider in awarding costs have been outlined are apposite. These include:- (a) The summons fees paid; (b) the duration of the case; (c) the number of witnesses called by the party in victory; (d) the vexatious or frivolous nature of the action or defence of the party failed in the litigation; (e) The cost of legal representation; (f) the monetary value at the time of incurring the expenses; and (g) the value and purchasing power of the currency of award at the time of the award. The trial Court in considering the foregoing factors need not explain how it arrived at the sum it eventually awarded as cost. This has been the practice. The trial Court erred in law for awarding as special damages for the breach of the banker customer contract, the cost of respondent's solicitor's fees for prosecuting the respondent's claim. Such an award cannot stand as special damages. It is hereby set aside." The Court has historically been cautious about allowing recovery of counsel’s fees from the adversary. It can be inferred by the above authority that a claim for counsel’s fees is improper and the notion of shifting the burden of counsel’s fees is considered unethical and an affront to public policy. What is more, there is no basis upon which the counsel’s fees can stand as the Claimant has not proven that he is entitled to the judgment of this Court. He referred the Court to the case of Adama & Anor v. PDP [2020] LPELR-49962(CA) and Nwanji V Coastal Services Nigeria Limited [2004] LPELR – 2106. It is therefore the submission of Counsel that the relief the Claimant is seeking that the Defendant pays the sum of 5,000,000 as cost of prosecuting this Suit is unknown to law in Nigeria and the Courts should not and cannot grant same. He urges the Court to discountenance the reliefs sought against the 3rd Defendant.

 

 

2ND DEFENDANTS’ WRITTEN SUBMISION

 

  1. On the 13th day of March 2025, learned Counsel for the 2nd Defendant filed its final written address wherein Counsel on behalf of the 2nd Defendant distilled lone issue for the determination of this Court viz:

Whether having regards to the facts and circumstances of this case the Claimant is entitled to the claims and or reliefs sought against the 2nd Defendant in this suit.

  1. It is the position of learned Counsel that he wished to draw the attention of the Court in respect of the Claimant’s reply to its statement of defence wherein the Claimant purportedly made several averments denying the averments as contained in the 2nd Defendant’s statement of defence but negligently and or inadvertently failed to file an additional witness statement on oath in support of the said reply. That the position of the law is well settled that unchallenged evidence are deemed admitted and that pleadings by law do not amount to evidence. He placed reliance on the following cases Inko-Trariah v. Goodhead [1997] 4 NWLR (Pt. 500) 453 P.479 Paras D-F; Alade v. Awo [1975] 4 SC 215; C.C.B (Nig) Ltd v. Odogwo [1990] 3 NWLR (Pt. 140) 646 and N.N.B Plc v. Declag Ltd [2005] 4 NWLR (Pt.916) 549 @ 597 Paras. C-D. Counsel equally submitted that the Claimant’s witness statement on oath filed on the 12th day of April 2024 in support of the amended complaint be taken as the evidence in support of the pleadings contained in Claimant’s reply to the 2nd defendant’s statement of defence. That the Claimant having elected to filed reply ought to have contemporaneously filed additional witness statement on oath which would have served as oral evidence in prove of the pleadings contained in the said reply as filing pleadings without more do not in any way shape or form evidence especially in the face of denial of the Claimant’s claim by the Defendant. He cited in support of his position the case of Alao v. Vice Chancellor Unilorin [2008] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1069) 421 and Onmumelu v. Duru [1997] 10 NWLR (Pt. 525) 377. He urge the Court to deem as admitted the unchallenged and uncontroverted evidence of the 2nd Defendant as contained in its statement of defence.

 

  1. Counsel to the 2nd Defendant further incorporates its argument in relation to the admissibility of Exhibit Danlami 2 (The Review of Operational Guidelines for Blacklisting of Staff by Central Bank of Nigeria which is predicated on the ground that the document sought to be tendered is a public document and that the only secondary evidence of a public document that is admissible is a certified true copy.  He placed reliance on Sections 89 (e) and 90 (1) (c) of Evidence Act 2024 and the case of Araka v. Egbue [2003] 7 S.C 75 P. 82 and Guasa v. Lawal [2023] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1892) 297 P. 347 Paras B-C. He urge the Court to expunge the said document from its record and mark same as inadmissible.

 

  1. To the sole issue distilled by Counsel to the 2nd Defendant wherein he stated the settled principle of law that an action can only be declared as illegal where there is in existence a law prohibiting its commission. He cited in support of his assertion the case of Aguele v. Sufi [2015] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1458) 428 P.436 Paras. C-D; A.G Federation v. Abubakar [2007] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 1 and Awuse v. Odili [2004] 8 NWLR (Pt. 876) 481. He equally submitted that by a cursory look at Exhibit Danlami 1 (a) there is nothing contained therein that prohibits, hinders, prevents and or forbids the 2nd Defendant from terminating the employment of the Claimant and that the Claimant herein has failed to equally show and or demonstrate the existence of any law, condition of service, terms of offer or regulation as it relates to his employment with 2nd Defendant that prohibits the 2nd Defendant from terminating his employment and therefore renders the said termination illegal. That the law is clear that facts pleaded but not supported by evidence cannot be acted upon and they are deemed abandoned. He cited in support of his assertion the case of Olabanji v. Ajiboye [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt.218) 472 P. 484 Para F. It is the submission of Counsel that the effect of the Claimant merely pleading imprecise facts as to the termination of his employment by the 2nd Defendant being illegal without more is that the said fact of illegal termination of Claimant’s employment with the 2nd Defendant goes to no issue and same is deemed abandoned. He reiterated the trite position of law on when termination of an employment can be said to be wrongful. He supplied in support of his assertion the case of Texaco (Nig.) Plc v. Kehinde [2001] 6 NWLR (Pt. 708) 224 P.242 Paras F.G and Co-operative Dev. Bank v. Essien [2001) 4 NWLR (Pt. 704) 479, P. 490 Paras. D-E. Counsel reiterated that the burden of proving the existence of the facts of illegal and wrongful termination of the Claimant’s employment by the Defendant in strict compliance with the provisions of Section 136 (10 of the Evidence Act 2024 lies on the Claimant as the law is well settled that he who alleges must prove. More so, it is trite law that a party seeking declaratory reliefs required to plead and strictly prove same. he placed reliance on the case of Zaccala v. Edosa [2018] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1616) 524 P. 547 Paras C-D and Fatoba v. Ogundahunsi [2003] 14 NWLR (Pt. 840) 323 P. 352-353 Paras G-B.

 

  1. It is the contention of Counsel that not only was the Claimant given the opportunity to be heard; the Claimant duly responded to the allegations made against him vide Exhibit Adeniyi 2 where he clearly admitted to have committed the infractions levelled against him. That the Claimant was smart by half dissipated so much energy in trying to deny his admittance to the allegations of POS transactions in futility as he positively confirmed under cross examination that he was given query in 2018 because he allegedly followed the instructions of his HSS to carry out dry posting which amounts to fictitious POS transactions which was against the policy of the 1st Defendant. Furthermore, an analysis of the foregoing with the oral testimony as elicited from the Claimant under cross examination as well as the documentary evidence before the Court when put on the imaginary scale, the scale justice shall tilt in favour of the 2nd Defendant and against the Claimant. He referred to the case of Yusuf v. U.B.N Ltd [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt.457) 632 P.646 Paras F-G and F.B.N Plc v. Ejikeme [1996] 7 NWLR (Pt. 462) 597 P. 615 Para E. That although the Claimant under cross examination stated that there was never a time when he admitted to the allegations as contained in the query issued to him, he never denied the contents of Exhibit Adeniyi 2 neither did he object to the admissibility of same. The law is trite on the relationship between documentary evidence and oral evidence. He relied on the case of Shuaibu v. Muazu [2014] (Pt. 1409) 207 P. 318-319     Paras. G-A. He submitted that the contents of Exhibits Adeniyi 2 confirms that the Claimant’s right to fair hearing was not breached as he was given opportunity to be heard and exercise his right. That the steps taken by the 2nd Defendant leading up to the termination of the Claimant’s employment was done in compliance with Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria as amended as well as other extant labour and employment relations law similarly, the Claimant having failed to place cogent and credible evidence before the Court in proof of any loss suffered by him which flows naturally from the act of the 2nd Defendant as it relates to the termination of his employment is not entitled to any general damages in the sum claimed against the 2nd Defendant. He placed reliance on the case of Durowaiye v. U.B.N Plc [2015] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1484) 19 P. 36 -37 Para B and Anike v. S.P.D C. N Ltd [2011] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1246) 227 P. 244 Para B. 

 

 

 

1ST DEFENDANT’S WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

  1. On the 9th day of April 2025, learned Counsel for the 1st Defendant filed his final written address though belated but regularized wherein Counsel on behalf of the 1st Defendant formulated five (5) issues for the Court’s determination thus;
    1. Whether the Claimant was a Contract staff of the 1st Defendant whose relationship with the 1st Defendant was lawfully determined.
    2. Whether (given the provisions of Article 4.4 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Guidelines on Blacklisting), the criminal conviction of the Claimant was mandatory before the 1st Defendant can report the Claimant to the CBN for an act of dishonesty and fraud 
    3. Whether the Claimant’s claim for damages and cost is grantable in the circumstances of this case
    4. Whether it was not necessary for the Claimant to particularize the purported act of alleged bad faith, malice, negligence and alleged procedural irregularities in the stated blacklisting of his name by the 3rd Defendant.
    5. Whether the 1st Defendant/ Counter Claimant is not entitled to the grant of its Counter claim in this suit. 
  2. On issue one learned Counsel submitted that the evidence presented in this case points to the irresistible fact that the Claimant was an employee of the 2nd Defendant. That nowhere in the offer of employment is it stated that the 1st Defendant is the employer of the Claimant and that the burden of proof lies on the Claimant to establish that he was indeed an employee of the 1st Defendant which no such proof was brought forth by the Claimant. He cited in support of his assertion the case of Nimanteks Assoc Ltd & Anor v. Marco Construction Co. Ltd & Others [1991] 2 NWLR (Pt. 174) 411; Olusesi v. Oyelusi and Others [1996] 3 NWLR (Pt.31) 634; Chukwudi and Anor v. Unachuku [1979] 3 C.A; Bank of the North Ltd v. Memudu Adigun Pniyo [2002] 20 NRN 83 and Messrs Lewis & Peat (NRI) Ltd v. A.E Akhimen [1976] 7 S.C Page 157. Counsel also submitted that the practice of outsourcing of employees as in the present is a recognized labour practice. He placed reliance on Section 91 of the Labour Act and the case of Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria v. Mobil Producing Nig. Unlimited [2013] 3er62 NLLR (Pt. 92) 243. According to learned Counsel the International Labour Organization (ILO) has also grouped outsourcing under the broad term of Triangular employment and also by virtue Section 254C (2) this Court is empowered to deal with any matter connected with application of any international convention, treaty or protocol ratified by Nigeria related to labour, employment, work place, industrial relations or matters connected thereto. Thus, this Court has always treated a contract employment as a relationship where you have an employer and employee and an end user to whom the employee is seconded to by his or her employer. He reiterated that this Court have recognized the practical realities of the economic benefit of triangular employment relationships and declared it as being lawful. He cited in support of his position the case of PENGASSAN V. Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited [2013] 32 NLLR (Pt. 92) 243.   Continuing, Counsel stated that it is clear from the evidence before the Court that the 1st and 2nd Defendants are different companies and that the 2nd Defendant employed the Claimant and outsourced him to the 1st Defendant. That the 1st Defendant properly determined its relationship with the Claimant having investigated and found that Claimant’s conduct was unethical, fraudulent dishonest thereby violating its core value of upholding highest level of integrity. He urge the Court to decide issue one in favour of the 1st Defendant.

 

  1. Regarding issue two Counsel submitted that the provision of Clause 4.0 of the Review of Operational Guidelines for Blacklisting makes the following conditions for blacklisting fraud, Act of dishonesty and conviction. He went on to say that the stated conditions are distinct and separate grounds and are by no means dependent on each other. That this Court is being inviting to re-write the provisions of Article 4 of the Guidelines by the contention that an erring staff of the Bank which in this case the Claimant can only be reported for blacklisting strictly upon conviction of the said staff by a Court of law. Counsel noted that Claimant has not prayed for this relief hence cannot be allowed to bring it in through the back door in this proceeding. More so it is the trite position of law that in construing or interpreting the provision of statute the Court is always mindful of the most proper way of making such interpretation in that the provision of the statute should be given its ordinary and natural grammatical meaning unless an absurdity will result thereby. He placed reliance on the case of Aya v. Henshaw [21972] 5 S.C 87; Lawal v. G.B. Oluvant [1972] 2 S.C; Ogbuniya v. Okudo [1976] 6-7 S.C 32 and Adah v. NYSC [2001] 1 NWLR (Pt.693) 65 @ 79-80.

 

  1. Respecting issue three learned Counsel submitted that there is no credible evidence before the Court showing that the Claimant has suffered any injury arising from the conduct of the 1st Defendant. however, assuming without conceding that the 1st Defendant’s premise above is wrong, Counsel contended that the Claimant’s claim for damages and cost are liable to fail given the state of the pleadings and the circumstance of this case. That the Claimant has not proffered evidence before the Court to justify the grant of the claim for damages and cot, assuming he has establish his case of unlawful termination which is not conceded, his action is premised and founded on a purported breach of a contract of employment and the damages cognizable for a breach of contract must be specially and specifically pleaded, there is equally  no particularization of the alleged damages or injuries allegedly suffered by the Claimant in the pleadings in this case and there is also no evidence or proof of the cost of prosecuting this case as claimed by the Claimant. He cited in support of his assertion the case of Nigeria Produce Marketing Board v. A.I Adewumi [1972] 1 All NLR (Part 2) 433 @ 437 and International Drilling Co. (Nigeria) Ltd v. Moses Eyeimofo Ajijala [1976] 1 All NLR 117 @ 131. Furthermore, it is the position of Counsel that what the Claimant is doing in this case is that he has lumped what should be claimed under special damages and characterized same as general damages as he has failed to plead what measure of damages he has suffered from any conduct of the 1st Defendant and what he still stands to lose from the act of the 1st Defendant. He referred the Court to the case of Shell Petroleum Development Company v. Tiebo [2005] 5 NWLR (Pt. 931) 439; Xtoudos Service Limited v. Taisei Ltd [2006] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1003) 533; Hadley v. Baxendale [1854] 9 EXCH 341; Ihezukwu v. University of Jos [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 598 @ 610 and Imoloame v. West African Examination Council [1992] 9 NWLR (Pt. 265) 303 @ 319. Similarly, assuming the Claimant’s claim herein is founded on tort of negligence the damages permissible should be such that arose from a loss or damage occasioned by the conduct of the Defendant. he relied on the case of International Messengers Nig. Ltd v. Engr. David Nachukwu [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 543. 

 

  1.  On issue four it is the position of Counsel that Section 51 of the Banks and Other Financial Institution Act 2020 and the Central Back of Nigeria Act of 2004 creates a legal presumption that any act of the Central Bank of Nigeria pursuance of its duties as an act of good faith until contrary is proven. He equally stated that for a Claimant to set up an action against the 3rd Defendant, he has to state in his statement of claim that a placement was done in bad faith and also state the constituent elements and particulars of the alleged bad faith because the burden lies on the Claimant to so prove. He placed reliance on the case of Lord Greene Mr [1974] 2 All ER 680 @ 682, [1948] 1 KB 223 @ 228 and NDIC v. Central Bank of Nigeria & Anor [2002] 7 NWLR (Pt.766) 272. Again, Counsel contended that Claimant did not plead any particulars of negligence or malice in his statement of claim although he insinuated and maintained same in his statement of claim. He relied on the case of Koya v. U.B.A Ltd [1997] 1 NWLR (Pt. 481) 251 @ 291; U.T.B Ltd v. Ozoemena [2007] 1 SCNJ 318; [2007] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 448 and U.B.A Ltd v. Achoru [1990] 6 NWLR (Pt. 156) 254 @ 275.

 

  1. Regarding issue five, Counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant/ Counter Claimant is entitled to judgment in the terms of its Counter Claim in this suit reiterating that there is no justification for the Claimant to continue to institute constant against the 1st Defendant. he urge the Court to dismiss the case of the Claimant herein and grant judgment in favour of the Claimant as per the terms of bits counter claim.

 

 

CLAIMANT’S WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

 

  1. On the 26th day of March 2025, learned Counsel for the Claimant filed his final written address wherein Counsel on behalf of the Claimant formulated two issues for the Court’s determination thus;
  1. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the declaration sought in prayer 1,2 and 3?
  2. Whether this listing of the Claimant’s name in the banker’s black book with the Central Bank of Nigeria by the 1st and 3rd Defendant is illegal and unconstitutional?
    1. On issue one learned Counsel contended that the Claimant challenges the legality of his employment termination by the 1st and 2nd Defendants, asserting that it violated his constitutional right to fair hearing, particularly as guaranteed by Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution. He went on to state that the crux of the Claimant's case is that the Defendants alleged he committed fraud and, based solely on their internal investigations, terminated his employment and reported him to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) for blacklisting actions which, according to him, amount to both procedural unfairness and overreach. Counsel stated further that while the law permits an employer to terminate employment with or without reason, such termination must adhere to agreed procedures however in this instance the process lacked neutrality, as the Defendants his accusers acted as judges in their own cause (contrary to the "nemo judex in causa sua" principle). This breach is emphasized by the 1st Defendant’s admission that it conducted investigations, concluded the Claimant was guilty of "dry posting" (a term never defined nor proven in law), and then forwarded his name for blacklisting without any lawful or judicial process. He contended that at no point was the Claimant tried or charged for fraud before a competent Court, nor was he given the chance to adequately defend himself before an independent panel. It is also the submission of Counsel that none of the documents presented by the Defendants including the disciplinary report reference any specific law or regulation breached. Additionally, the 2nd Defendant, acting primarily as a manpower contractor, cannot reasonably claim impartiality, and its reliance on internal reports to justify termination only reinforces the Claimant’s assertion that his right to fair hearing was violated. That the Defendants’ unilateral declaration of guilt in a matter of alleged crime, without recourse to the police or Court, is constitutionally indefensible.

 

  1. Respecting issue two Counsel posited that the Claimant also challenges the legality of his blacklisting in the CBN's bankers’ black book. Counsel argued that this action, jointly carried out by the 1st and 3rd Defendants, was done in flagrant violation of the CBN’s own guidelines for blacklisting. Specifically, the guidelines (Exhibit Rejoice 4) provide that blacklisting must be based on fraud, dishonesty, and conviction, with the staff afforded full fair hearing including prior notification, opportunity to present a defense, and formal communication of the committee’s decision. That in this case, the Claimant was never notified of any blacklisting complaint, was not granted a hearing, and received no communication from the disciplinary committee regarding a final decision. More so, the 3rd Defendant, CBN, further failed in its statutory obligation to verify due process had been followed before accepting the request to blacklist which failure constitutes a dereliction of duty, and as the sole witness for Central Bank of Nigeria admitted under cross-examination, there is no documentary proof that due process was followed. Thus, the blacklisting is both illegal and unconstitutional, having been executed without adherence to mandatory procedural safeguards. In line with paragraph 10.0 of the CBN guideline, delisting can only occur upon a Court Order or a reconsideration request by the financial institution. Since the Claimant was never accorded due process, and the blacklisting was unjustified, the Court is urged to compel the Central Bank of Nigeria to immediately delist the Claimant. In conclusion it is the position of learned Counsel that the Claimant has shown that his termination and subsequent blacklisting were conducted in breach of both constitutional and procedural standards in that he was accused, tried, and convicted internally by parties with vested interests, without access to a proper forum or opportunity to defend himself and the 3rd Defendant, tasked with verifying compliance, failed to do so.  He urge the Court to grant the prayers of the Claimant as per his amended Complaint before this Court.

 

 

COURT’S DECISION

 

  1. I have carefully considered the processes filed by parties to this suit and the Written addresses filed by Counsels to 3rd Defendant, 2nd Defendant and 1st Defendant and also the written address of the Claimant. I am also mindful of the written submission of Claimant to 1st Defendant’s counter claim. To my mind two issues are germane for the determination of this suit to wit:

 

  1. Whether the termination of the Claimant’s contract of employment is without due process and therefore wrongful. 

 

  1. Whether the Blacklisting of the Claimant by the 3rd Defendant duly complied with the provisions of the Review of Operational Guidelines for Blacklisting issued by the 3rd defendant.

 

  1. Before I delve into the main substance of these issues let me address the objection raised by counsel to the 2nd Defendant on the admissibility of the Review of Operational Guidelines for Blacklisting issued by the 3rd Defendant. According to the 3rd Defendant counsel Exhibit Rejoice D is a subsidiary legislation made pursuant to Section 2 of the Central Bank Act, 2007. The 2nd Defendant on the other hand argued that being a public document it is only the certified true copy that can be admissible as evidence before this Court. 

 

  1. I have with keen interest perused at Section 2 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act under reference and it in unmistaken terms spells out the principal objectives of the 3rd Defendant and no more. I must restate it has nothing to do with the making of subsidiary legislation as 3rd Defendant’s counsel want this Court to believe. However, I find that Section 33 (1) (b) of the Act specifically gives power to the 3rd Defendant to make subsidiary legislation and or regulations. Be that as it may it goes without saying that this Court under Section 122 (a) Evidence Act, 2011 can take judicial notice of Exhibit Rejoice D without having it tendered as Exhibit before this Court. On this ground this Court hereby take judicial notice of Exhibit Rejoice D in line with Section 122 (a) of the Evidence Act 2011. 

 

  1. As regards the other arm of the objection that has to do with the non-filing of additional Witness Statement on Oath to accompany the Claimant’s reply to 2nd Defendant’s statement of defence, I have carefully listened to the submissions of Counsels and find as a fact that the reply to statement of defence of the 2nd Defendant had accompanying it an additional Witness Statement on Oath filed on the 4/07/2024. This goes to confirm the existence of the process as oppose to the argument of 2nd Defendant. The objection is accordingly hereby discountenance.

 

  1. The natural course is that the Claimant should bring his own cause of complaint before the Court in every case where he has anything to prove, either as to the facts necessary for his obtaining a verdict or as to the amount of damage to which he conceives the proof of such facts may entitle him. In line with provision of Section 133 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011, the burden of first proving the existence or non-existence of a fact lies on the party against whom the judgment of the Court would be given if no evidence were produced on either side, regard being had to any presumption that may arise on the pleadings. See Olaniyan v. Oyewole (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1268) 445.

 

  1. In cases of termination of employment, the Supreme Court in the case of Okoebor v. Police Council & Ors [2003] LPELR-2458 by a majority decision of 4 (four) to 1 (one) held that when an employee complains that his employment has been wrongfully terminated, or that he was wrongfully dismissed, he has the burden not only to place before the Court the terms and conditions of the employment but the manner in which the said terms or conditions were breached by the employer. In our labour jurisprudence, there are three categories of contracts of employment. They are: those regarded as purely master and servant; those where a servant is said to hold office at the pleasure of the employer; and where the employment is regulated or governed by statute, often referred to as having statutory flavour. See KSJSC v. Tolani [2019] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1671) 382; C.B.N. Igwillo [2007] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1054) 393; Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (No.2) [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599. As can be gleaned from the nature of this case and the parties involved, it is clear that this a case of master and servant relationship.

 

 

  1. One other point worth noting is the fact that a look at the reliefs sought by the Claimant the foundational claims are declaratory. The law is that in a suit where the Claimant is seeking for a declaratory order, the burden of proof rests on the party seeking the order to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that they are entitled to the declaration. In the case of Sanusi v. Ameyogun [1992] 4 NWLR (Pt. 237) 527, the Supreme Court noted that the first stage of enquiry in a claim for declaratory relief is to consider whether the Claimant has made out a prima facie case. It follows therefore that the burden of proof in a claim for declaratory reliefs as in the instant case is on the Claimant and the Claimant must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the Defendant’s case. The Claimant would not be entitled to judgment even on admission of the Defendants to the Claimant’s claims. This is more so as it is the duty of the Claimant to first prove the existence or non-existence of what he asserted by relevant, admissible and credible evidence. Once this burden so placed on the Claimant is discharged, the onus then shifts to the Defendant. See the case of Uzodinma v. Ihedioha [2020] 5NWLR (Pt 1718) 529 @ 578, Paras D-G. However, the exception to this general rule is that a Claimant is allowed to rely on aspects of Defendant’s case that support his own. See the case of Hanatu v. Amadi [2020] 9 NWLR (Pt 1728) 128, Paras A-C and; Salisu v. Mobolaji [2016] NWLR (Pt 1535) 280-281, Paras H-A and; C.D.C. (Nig) Ltd v. SCOA [2007] 6 NWLR (Pt 587)410

 

 

  1. The Court of Appeal in Luck Guard Ltd v. Adariku & ors 2022) LPELR-59331(CA) Pp. 24-25 paras. C) captured this principle in the following words:

 

"Furthermore, all the reliefs claimed are declaratory reliefs. A declaratory relief implies a declaration by the Court of the action, cause or right of the parties before the Court. It is the law that declaratory reliefs are not granted as a matter of course and on a platter of gold. They are only granted when credible evidence has been led by a person seeking the declaratory relief.” 

See Anyanru v. Mandilas Ltd (2007) 4 SCNJ and Chukwumah v. S.P.D.C (Nigeria) Ltd., [1993] LPELR - 864 SC. 

 

It invariably therefore means that a declaratory relief cannot be granted in the absence of any evidence or where the evidence led is unsatisfactory. A declaratory relief such as what was sought by the claimant is discretionary. If a substantial question exists to which one person has a real interest to raise, and the other to oppose, then the Court has a discretion to resolve it by a declaration which it will exercise if there is a good reason for so doing. It is the form of judgment which should be granted only when the Court is of the opinion that the party seeking it is, when all facts are taken into consideration, fully entitled to the exercise of the Court's discretion. The power of the Court to make a declaration where it is a question of defining rights of two parties is only limited by its own discretion. The discretion should of course be exercised judicially, but it seems to me that the discretion is very wide. See Ibeneweka v. Egbuna & Ors., (1964) 1 WLR 210.

 

 

  1. In the Statement of Facts, a close look at reliefs (a), (b) and (c) will show that they are nothing but declaratory reliefs sought against the Defendants. Therefore, it follows that the burden of proof of these reliefs which are foundational to the suit lies on the Claimant who asserts a claim. By this it means that the Claimant must by evidence show that his version of events is more likely than not to be true. It is only when the Claimant has succeeded in establishing a prima facie case proving the existence of an employment relationship and wrongful termination, that the burden will shift to the Defendants. Saying it in other words the claimant must provide minimal proof for specific elements in an employment relationship. 

 

  1. In considering the first issue whether termination of Claimant’s employment was wrongful, it is in evidence that the Claimant by Exhibit Danlami 1 was an employee of the 2nd Defendant as a Teller and seconded to the 1st Defendant as a contract staff. The Claimant’s employment was terminated on June 3, 2019 on the ground that his “services are no longer required” vide Exhibit Danlami 2. It is the case of the Claimant vide paragraph 7 of Claimant Witness Statement on Oath that it is the 1st Defendant that terminated his appointment on or about June 2019 and paid him his accumulated gratuity through the 2nd Defendant. However, by paragraphs 4 and 6 of 1st Defendant’s Witness Statement on Oath dated 9/12/2024 the Claimant was said to be an employee of the 2nd Defendant but only deployed to the 1st Defendant as a contract staff. I am aware that in legal cycle, parties are bound by the clear terms of their contract. Therefore, any claim outside the lucid words of the contract will be insupportable because the Court is powerless to go outside the party’s contract. See Int. Drilling Company (Nig) Ltd. v. Ajijala [1976] 2 S.C. 115 at 127 College of Medicine of University of Lagos v. Adegbite [1973] 5 S.C. 149. It follows therefore that under the common law and based on the principle of privity of contract, claimant’s relationship can be said to be only restricted to the 2nd Defendant. While the need to plead and tender in evidence the letter of appointment with 1st Defendant for wrongful termination of appointment is crucial, and failure to do so may be fatal to the Claimant's case. However, in substance the failure to tender the letter of appointment and termination in evidence will not necessarily be fatal to the Claimant's case so long as there is otherwise ample evidence to establish the terms of the contract of employment between the parties. Under our Laws, Section 91 of the Labour Act defines contract of employment to mean any agreement whether oral or written, express or implied, whereby one person agrees to employ another as worker and that other person agrees to serve the employer as worker. I am not surprise that Claimant in his evidence despite Exhibits 1 (Letter of offer of appointment) and 2 (Letter of termination) still believe that 1st Defendant is his employer. From the evidence led, it is the 1st Defendant that pays claimant salary and also paid him his gratuity when his appointment was terminated.

 

  1. The truth be told, the practice of outsourcing as a form of work is already with us. The ILO describes it as disguised or objectively ambiguous employment relationship. I must stress here that with the evolving labour jurisprudence, in any determination of outsourcing; the privity rule should have no place at all once it is noted that what we are dealing with is a disguised employment relationship where the employer deliberately made it look like he is not the employer of the employee in question. Remember, the contract of engagement as in Exhibit Danlami 1 was made so that we do not see the employee as an employee. Instead, he is to be seen as a sub-contractor or an outsourced worker as in the instant case. Despite the semantics, the current position of the law as espoused by the Court of Appeal in Luck Guard Limited v. Mr Felix Adariku & ors [2022] LPELR-5933l(CA); Total E & P Nigeria Limited v. Mr Felix Adariku & Ors Unreported Appeal No. CA/ABJ/CV/563/2020 delivered on 20 December and The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited v. Mr Felix Eyuro & Ors [2020] LPELR-5 1259(CA) 2022 seem to apply the common law in its restrictive understanding of only the binary relationship of an employment relationship, forgetting that the reality of the world of work has gone far beyond the binary relationships hitherto known of employment relationships. With due reverence to my Law Lords, it appears the Court of Appeal did not consider some existing decisions which upheld the fact of co-employer status between employers and in relation to an employee as was the case in Onumalobi v. NNPC and Warri Refining and Petrochemical Company [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 2) 304. This case not only 'recognized the doctrine of co-employer (a variant of triangular employment) in a transfer of employees within a parent/subsidiary company arrangement as an exception to the privity rule, it also relied on Section 91 of the Labour Act as its basis for holding a parent company and subsidiary to be co-employers even in the absence of a written contract between the subsidiary and the employees.

 

 

  1. The injunction of the ILO that a triangular employment relationship is a disguised or objectively ambiguous employment relationship, which is meant to either mask the identity of the employer, (where the person designated as an employer is an intermediary with the intention of releasing the real employer from any involvement in the employment relationship and above all from any responsibility to the workers), or mask the form in which the relationship is established (as where the nature of the employment relationship is intentionally misrepresented so as to deny certain rights and benefits to dependent workers) was referred to by the Court of Appeal in the three cases cited above despite citing ''ILO The Scope of the Employment Relationship (ILO Report V) International Labour Conference 91st Session Geneva 2003 @ pg. 38''. We are always in this court admonished that we should give due priority to the primacy of facts and look to the substance, not the form of the relationship or what the parties chose to call it. In other climes this court being a specialist court in labour as expounded in Sahara Energy Resources v. Oyebola [2020] LCN/15462(CA) ought to be deferred to due to the expertise of this court in labour and employment matters. The Court of Appeal with admirable lucidity, foreign decisions and tertiary sources on the leaning of a specialist Court on matters peculiarly within its province or area of specialist adjudication, correctly stated that “employment judges have a good knowledge of the world of work and a sense, derived from experience, of what is really there and what is window-dressing.”

 

  1. Drawing from the ILO jurisprudence, Section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court, Act, 2006 as well as Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) this Court is empowered to apply international best practices and labour standards in the adjudication of labour and employment matters. It is now an open secret that the current circumstances in the world of work are unique. It is no longer the case that employment relationship can be as simplistic as contemplated in only binary relationships. From available legal frameworks and the evidence, this court is free to draw necessary inferences from the facts before it in deciding who the true employers are in employment relationships.

 

  1. In the instant case the employment letter clearly states that claimant was employed as a Teller to be seconded to 1st Defendant as a contract staff. I am therefore not surprise when copious references are made of claimant by 1st defendant as its staff. The bottom line is that 1st Defendant refused to formally recognized Claimant as its staff but however pays all his emoluments. Perhaps 1st Defendant is being wise by half in the light of the provision of section 91 of the Labour Act that steers us in the face. 

 

  1. However, in the light of current judicial authorities, I am bound to find that Claimant though in practical terms an employee of the 1st Defendants, but in the context of this case and the doctrine of stare decisis, is an employee of the 2nd Defendant. And this I so hold.

 

  1. Having establish the fact that Claimant is an employee of the 2nd Defendant, the Claimant again insisted that his employment was not lawfully determined. In dealing with this claim, I had cause to look at Exhibit Rejoice B a respond to a query by the Claimant where he is not denying his blameworthiness; Exhibit Rejoice C which is the Disciplinary Hearing conducted by the 2nd Defendant; and even Exhibit Adeniyi 2 which is a Compliance Report Form where Claimant wrote down his statement after being interrogated. 

 

  1. The Claimant argued that the 1st and 2nd Defendants cannot be both accusers and judges in their own cause. Not only this Counsel argued that 1st and 2nd Defendants have no right to investigate an offence/crime created by law. 

 

  1. To put the records strait, the Courts have recognized the employers right to investigate misconduct internally this is beyond any dispute. In the classical case of Baba v. Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt 192) 388, the Supreme Court held that employers can discipline employees for misconduct without requiring a criminal conviction, provided the investigation adheres to fair hearing procedures. It is not mandatory that there must be a criminal conviction by a Court of law before an employer can terminate an employment contract for fraud. Fraud is considered a gross misconduct, which justifies summary dismissal under the common law and section 11 of the Labour Act. In the case of Olarewaju v. Afribank Nig. Plc [2001] 13 NWLR (Pt731) 691, the court affirmed that an employer can dismiss an employee for misconduct such as fraud without a prior Court conviction, as employment matters are distinct from criminal proceedings.  Indeed, the Court of Appeal in the case of Mr. Victor Adegboye v. UBA Unreported Appeal No. CA/IL/20/2021 emphasized that employers need only prove misconduct to a degree that justifies termination, based on reasonable evidence from internal investigation. 

 

  1. In the instant case, I have taking note of the fact that it was the Head, Legal Team and Legal and Compliance Officer that conducted the Disciplinary hearing distinct from Claimant’s accusers whom he named in his statement marked as Exhibit Adeniyi 2, 3 and Exhibit Rejoice B. From the foregoing it shows that the 1st and 2nd Defendants went the whole hog to investigate this case and gave claimant all the opportunity to react to the charges pressed against him. What more from the available evidence before this court, claimant never denied the charges of fraud against him. On this ground, I have no doubt in my mind that due process was followed in the termination of Claimant’s employment with the 2nd Defendant. I hold that there is no merit in Claimant’s claim that his employment was not lawfully determined or that termination of his employment was illegal as same was done in contravention of due process. I find and hold that claimant’s employment with the 2nd defendant was lawfully terminated. This I so hold.

 

  1. On the second issue that has to do with whether the Blacklisting of the Claimant by the 3rd Defendant complied with the provisions of the Review of Operational Guidelines for Blacklisting issued by the 3rd Defendant. According to the 1st Defendant it is one of its statutory functions to compile list of staff who are disciplined and had their appointment terminated as a result of fraud or dishonesty within the system and forward same to the 3rd Defendant. However it is the Claimant argument that to initiate blacklist action based on paragraph 5.0 of the said Guideline, the Staff is required to be granted fair hearing through the Disciplinary Committee and the decision of the Committee must be communicated to the staff involved. Claimant submitted that he was not given fair hearing by the Committee and secondly, the decision of the committee was never communicated to him. 

 

Paragraph 6.0 of the guideline clearly states THE FAIR HEARING PROCESS as follows;

 

“Upon verification of the existence of grounds for blacklisting, the financial institution SHALL NOTIFY THE STAFF IN WRITING, informing him that;

 

A complaint for blacklisting has been filed against him, stating grounds of such and the consequences of being blacklisted.

 

The staff MUST be given the opportunity to present documentary or verbal testimony that may affect the decision.

 

The final decision of the Disciplinary Committee must be communicated to the Staff.”

 

 

  1. Claimant argued that none of these procedures was followed in his case. The 1st Defendant in responding to this issue submitted that the Claimant’s right was duly respected and Claimant was informed of all the accusations against him which he admitted and even pleaded for forgiveness. For Claimant to insist that he must be informed of the decision to forward his name to the 3rd Defendant, 1st defendant submitted that this is not envisaged by the Guidelines. The 3rd Defendant in his response submitted that it is the duty of the 1st Defendant to investigate and adjudicate upon the existence of grounds for blacklisting of any of its staff on grounds of forgery and fraud through a Disciplinary Committee as provided for in item 5.0 of the Guidelines. Counsel to 3rd defendant submitted that there was no breach of any provision of the Guidelines by the 1st Defendant. 

 

  1. I have read in between lines and also tried to comprehend the provisions of Paragraph 5, 6 and 7 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Guidelines in the context of the facts of this case. In the first place, Paragraph 4 listed the offences for which a staff of a financial institution can be blacklisted to wit: fraud; dishonesty; and conviction. Paragraph 5 provides the structural basis for initiating the blacklisting against a staff accused of the offences in para. 4.0. And para. 6 provides for the fair hearing process. The provision of para. 7.0 then provide in the following words thus:

 

“The financial institution shall forward the return on dismissed or terminated staff (including temporary and contract) on grounds of frauds and forgeries to the CBN along with a declaration from the bank that:

It followed due process before arriving at the decision

And signed by the Managing Director”

 

  1. From the content of the Guidelines, it appears that the process of blacklisting is another gamut of reviewing the disciplinary processes of the 1st and 2nd Defendants by the 3rd Defendant. But a literal interpretation of paragraph 7.0 of the Guidelines will show that this is a process that should be carried out by the financial institution making the returns on the staff. Does this interpretation align with the provisions of paragraph 5.0 and 6.0 of the Guidelines? Of course, I must admit that there is some sort of ambiguity in the understanding of the provisions under reference. But the Court of Appeal in the case of F.A.T.B. v. Ezegbu [1994] 9 NWLR (Pt. 367) 149 had this to say in situations such as this in the following words:

 

“It is trite that it is most desirable that a court in interpreting and construing the words of a statute should ascertain and acquaint itself with the objective of the statute to know the true intendment of its provisions. Where the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous effect must be given to the statute and should be literally interpreted without turning to any extraneous matters. Where, however, there is a gap or there is a mischief which ought to be avoided in the provisions of the statute, the court should endeavour and in fact has a duty to give the statute a proper and thorough construction so as to arrive at the correct intendment of the legislature. The provisions should not be used to perpetrate illegality which was not the spirit of the statute.” 

See also the following cases I.B.W.A. v. IMANO [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 85) 633; Emerah & Sons Ltd v. A.-G., Plateau State [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 147) 788.

 

  1. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation that provisions of a statute should not be read in isolation. The provisions should be read as a whole.  See Ogbo v. Adoga [1994] 3 NWLR (Pt. 333) 469 and Obayuwana v. Governor of Bendel State [1982] 12 S.C. 147. It follows therefore that a community reading of paragraph 4.0; 5.0; 6.0 and 7.0 must be done in such a way that will not result into absurdity as this Court has a duty to give the statute a construction that will enable it to arrive at the intendment of the legislature. As regards the role of the 3rd Defendant in paragraph 7.0 is only to receive the returns signed by the Managing Director and ensure that the financial institution followed due process before arriving at the decision. In view of the foregoing, I find that Claimant was lawfully black listed in accordance with the Review of Operational Guidelines for Blacklisting with the 3rd Defendant. This I hold.

 

  1. In considering the counter claim of the 1st Defendant which borders on the numerous cases claimant has made it undergo should earn him damages. The Claimant responded that it is in a quest of exercising his right to look for justice in the context of the relationship that existed between Claimant and 1st and 2nd Defendants that propel him to act. I must say it is the right of every citizen to access justice in an effort to ventilate once grievances. In this suit the Claimant has a valid cause of action of wrongful termination and evidence was adduced to prove these heads of claims. I cannot say Claimant filed this case out of mischief as counterclaimant has not led evidence to that effect. In view of this the counterclaim must fail. This I so hold.

 

 

  1. In view of the foregoing and for the reasons advanced reliefs ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’ must fail. This I so hold. And in view of the fact that reliefs ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’ are the foundational claims on which reliefs ‘d’, ‘e’, and ‘f’ hinges it goes without saying that reliefs ‘d’, ‘e’, and ‘f’ must also fail. This I so hold.

 

 

  1. And based on the submissions and the conclusion drawn in respect of the counterclaim, I find that the counter claim is frivolous and vexatious and is hereby dismissed.   

 

[[

  1. On the whole the case of the Claimant is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

 

  1. Judgment is hereby entered. There is no order as to cost.

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                              ……………………………

                          Hon. Justice E. D. Subilim

                                                                                                        JUDGE