NICN - JUDGMENT
IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE MINNA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HONOURABLE JUSTICE O. Y. ANUWE
Dated: 3rd October 2025
SUIT NO: NICN/MN/04/2025
Between:
Maryam Daso Jibo - Claimant
And
- Niger State Judicial Service Commission
- Niger State High Court Minna Defendants
Representation:
Dr. U. Y. Hassan, with him, P. H. Malum and Najibullah Ibrahim for the Claimant
Ibrahim Angulu (SAN), with him, Christiana Sylvester, Aminu Bagudu and Chukwudumebi Okoh for the Defendants
RULING/JUDGMENT
By a notice of preliminary objection filed on 8th April 2025, the defendants sought an order striking out this suit for being Statute barred having regard to Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, CAP 110, Laws of Niger State. The grounds upon which the objection is premised are these:
1. The cause of action arose on the 8th November 2024 when the Claimant was retired but the suit was filed on 19th February 2025
2. Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, CAP 110, Laws of Niger State gives the Claimant 3months from when the cause of action arose to sue a Public Officer.
3. The Defendants are Public Officers within the contemplation of the Public Officers Protection Law, CAP 110, Laws of Niger State.
In the written address filed in support of the NPO, learned senior counsel for the defendants referred to the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, CAP 110, Laws of Niger, to submit Act provides a 3) month limitation period for filling of suits against Public Officers and that the provision is applicable where the person sued is a Public Officer and the act done by the person in respect of which the action was commenced must be an act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of law or public duty or authority. It was submitted that the defendants met the above conditions and the suit is therefore stale and unenforceable. It was further submitted that the claimant pleaded in the Statement of Fact that she was compulsorily retired on the 8th November 2024. When the claimant filed this suit on 19th February 2025, she was 11 days in excess of the 3 months limitation period in section 2[a] of POPL Niger State. This action is statute barred and the proper order for the Court to make is an order of dismissal.
Learned senior counsel for the defendants further submitted that none of the exceptions to POPA, particularly malice, lack of semblance of legal justification and bad faith, is applicable to this case. It was argued that malice and bad faith can only apply if the suit is filled within the 3 months limitation period. Since this suit was filled outside the 3 months limitation period, the Claimant cannot invoke the exceptions to the Public Officers Protection Act.
In opposing the NPO, the Claimant filed a reply address on 17th April 2025 where the learned counsel for the claimant argued that there are exceptions to the application of section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law. It was submitted that the Defendants acted in bad faith when they wrongfully terminated the employment of the Claimant without fair hearing and that the injury to the Claimant is continuing such that the limitation period begins to run from the cessation of the continuing damage or injury as provided in Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Law. It was argued that the unlawful termination of the Claimant’s employment is a continuing damage or injury for which a fresh cause of action arises from time to time as often as damage is caused. Counsel relied on the authority in NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILIZATION ALLOCATION AND FISCAL COMMISSION vs. AJIBOLA JOHNSON to submit that in employment cases, if the wrongful act is continuing, POPA will not apply.
COURT DECISION
Section 2 (a) of POPL provides as follows:
“Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect.
(a) Limitation of time:
The action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be justified unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof".
This provision limits the period to file action against public officers and to be applicable to bar a suit, the fundamental requirements of the provision are that the person sued must be a public officer; the act or neglect or default for which the person is sued must be one in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority; and the suit must have been filed more than 3 months after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, more than 3 months after the damage or injury has ceased. Where these requirements are present in a suit, the suit is statute barred and the court will no longer have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. See IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1 at 32; ELEBANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 328) 604 at 646.
The meaning of the term “public officer” or “any person” as used in section 2 of Public Officers Protection Law has been defined extensively by the Supreme Court in IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C KADUNA STATE (SUPRA) to mean not only natural persons vested with performance of duties of a public nature but extends to public bodies created by statutes, artificial persons, institutions or persons sued in their official names or titles. In view of the descriptions of the defendants in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the statement of facts, the defendants are no doubt public officers within the meaning of section 2[a] of POPL. I have also seen that the claimant’s complaint in this suit is her compulsory retirement from the service of the defendants. Thus, the action of the claimant is in respect of an act done by the defendants in pursuance of their public duties or authority.
Now, by the provision of section 2 (a) of POPL, this action ought to be commenced against the defendants within 3 months of the accrual of cause of action except in a situation of continuance of damage or injury, in which case the suit must be commenced 3 months after the damage or injury have ceased. The cause of action of the claimant accrued when she was compulsorily retired from service. This cause of action of the claimant arose on 8th November 2024. The claimant filed this suit on 19th February 2025. Between the time her cause of action arose and the time she filed this suit was a period of 3 months and 11 days. It is obvious that the claimant filed this suit more than 3 months from the date the cause of action arose.
Learned counsel for the claimant cited the decision of the Supreme Court in NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILISATION ALLOCATION AND FISCAL COMMISSION vs. AJIBOLA JOHNSON to argue that the suit is not statute barred. It has been the view of this court in recent times, since the decision of the Supreme Court in 2019 in the case of NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILISATION ALLOCATION AND FISCAL COMMISSION vs. AJIBOLA JOHNSON [2019] 2 NWLR [Pt. 1656] 247, that POPA does not apply to cases founded on contract of employment. That view has recently been changed by the Supreme Court in the cases of ANOLAM vs. FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY OWERRI [2025] LPELR-80027[SC] and OKORONKWO vs. INEC [2025] 8 NWLR [Pt. 1991] 131 where the Supreme Court held that Section 2[a] of POPA applies to cases whose subject matter is contract of employment. Since the Supreme Court, by these recent judgments, is consistent in putting the controversy about the applicability of POPA to cases founded on contract of employment to rest, the view of this court on the issue has also changed to align with the decisions of the Supreme Court in ANOLAM vs. FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY OWERRI and OKORONKWO vs. INEC. That is to say NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILISATION ALLOCATION AND FISCAL COMMISSION vs. AJIBOLA JOHNSON is no longer the law. The effect is that POPA applies to cases founded on contract of employment.
Again, learned Counsel for the Claimant argued that POPA will not apply to bar this suit because the defendants acted in bad faith, abuse of office and without legal justification. Although the law is trite that a public officer who acted outside the colour of his office or acted in bad faith or in abuse of office will not be entitled to the protection under the POPA, the law is also settled that the question whether the public officer acted in bad faith or outside the colour of office can only be considered by the court if the action is brought within the period prescribed by statute. Where the action is not filed within the prescribed period, the action is not competent and the court cannot competently make any finding with respect to the liability of the public officer. See EGBE vs. ALHAJI (1990) 3 S.C (Pt.1) 63; FRED EGBE vs. JUSTICE ADEFARASIN (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.3) 549; KASANDUBU vs. ULTIMATE PETROLEUM LTD (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 417) 155. The duty of this court at this stage of determining the objection, is simply to determine whether or not the instant suit was filed within the period limited by POPL to do so against the defendants. The Court cannot proceed yet to determine the liability of the defendants. Accordingly, before the public officer can be denied the protection of POPL for the reasons that he acted in bad faith or in abuse of office or acted outside the colour of his office, the action must have been commenced against him within 3 months from the date the cause of action arose. Since this suit was not filed within 3 months from the date of the cause of action, this court cannot inquire into whether the protection afforded the defendants under the POPL has been vitiated.
Learned counsel for the claimant further argued that the acts which the claimant is complaining about in this suit is continuous and has continued till date and as a result, POPL does not apply to bar the suit. I do not agree with this view of learned counsel. It is trite that when statute of limitation is concerned, time begins to run from the time the cause of action arose. In CROSS RIVER UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY vs. OBETEN (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 641) 1567 at 1583, it was held that-
“A cause of action accrues on the particular date which gave rise to the incident in question. For the purposeful intendment of statutes with stipulation of durational limitation, the clock begins to wind down and time begins to run from the moment which culminates into the date on which the cause of action accrues”.
The compulsory retirement of the claimant, which is her cause of action in this suit, happened on a definite date being 8th November 2024. This act was not being repeated thereafter. Therefore, the compulsory retirement of the claimant was not a continued act as to imply continuing injury. This was the view of the Court of Appeal in NNAMDI AZIKIWE UNIVERSITY, AWKA vs. NWEKE (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 428) 343 where it was held that a suspension, which was the cause of action on that appeal, happened on a particular day and does not constitute “continuing injury”. It was held thus at page 350 of the report:
“From the facts of this case, it is clear that the respondent was suspended on 22nd September 2004 while he commenced the suit on 9 February 2005, a period of over four months after the cause of action. This is a clear violation of the Public Officer Protection Act. There is no basis for the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that the suspension was a continuous act not caught by the Public Officers Protection Act. The suspension started on a definite date which was the date of the cause of action for all intents and purposes. The respondent had a duty to ensure he acted timeously if he was to hold the appellant responsible for his suspension”.
It is my view therefore that the claimant’s cause of action is not a continuous injury or damage as contemplated in section 2 (a) of POPL.
The claimant did not commence this suit against the defendants within the statutorily prescribed 3 months. Where a statute prescribes for the bringing of an action within a prescribed period of time, proceedings shall not be brought after the time prescribed by the statute. An action brought outside the prescribed period is contrary to the provision of the law and statute barred. See ELEBANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 328) 604. It is clear that this suit is statute barred by the effect of section 2 (a) of POPL. The action is no longer maintainable and this court lacks jurisdiction to continue to entertain it. In the circumstance, the appropriate order to make is to dismiss the claimant’s suit. Accordingly, this suit hereby dismissed for being statute barred.
No order as to cost.
Ruling is entered accordingly.
Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe
Judge