IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE YENAGOA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT YENAGOA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE BASHAR A. ALKALI

 

DATE: THURSDAY 15^TH JANUARY, 2026

SUIT NO: NICN/KD/18/2024

 

BETWEEN:

MR OGUNGBUYI AJIBOLA EMMANUEL                           CLAIMANT

AND

UAC FOODS LIMITED                                                                       DEFENDANT

REPRESENTATION

S. K. Dawi Esq for the Claimant

J. D. Jefia Esq for the Defendant

 

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

The Claimant commenced this suit vide an Originating summons pursuant to Order 3 Rule 3 and Rule 17 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedures) Rules 2017 on the 18^th of April 2024. Due to the nature of the claim of the Claimant, on the 15^th of October 2024, the Court directed the parties to exchange pleadings. The Claimant filed Statement of Fact on the 13^th of November 2024 wherein the Claimant claims as follows:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Claimant predicated his claims on the Statement of Facts and the Witness’ Deposition on Oath filed on the 13^th of November 2024 and Reply and Further Statement on Oath filed on the 16^th of December 2024. The Defendant, in opposing the claims of the Claimant, predicated its defence on the Statement of Defence and Witness’ Deposition on Oath filed on the 4^th of December 2024. 

The suit proceeded to a hearing on the 4^th of February 2025, where the Claimant, hereinafter referred to as CW1, testified for himself. CW1 identified his Statements on Oath filed on the 13^th of November 2024 and Further Witness’ Statement on oath filed on the 16^th November 2024 and adopted the same as his evidence in aid of the claim of the Claimant. CW1 thereafter tendered the following documents: 

1. Letter of contract of appointment dated the 2^nd of November 2001; admitted and marked Exhibit CW01.
2. Confirmation of appointment dated the 15^th of November 2002; admitted and marked Exhibit CW02.
3. Internal memo dated the 20^th of September 2013, and 13^th January 2014; admitted and marked Exhibit CW03A and B.
4. Letter of Promotion dated the 24^th of May 2013; admitted and marked Exhibit CW04.
5. Suspension from duty dated the 10^th of February 2014; admitted and marked Exhibit CW05.
6. Records of Proceedings of the Chief Magistrate Court, dated 31^st of January 2023; admitted and marked Exhibit CW06.
7. Solicitors’ Letter from the Chambers of John Olusola Baiyeshea SAN & Co dated the 19^th of December 2023; admitted and marked Exhibit CW07.
8. Claimant’s Statement of Account with Polaris Bank from the 6^th of October 2013 to 31^st of May 2014; admitted and marked Exhibit CW08.

Under cross-examination of CW1, Counsel for the Defendant tendered a Motion on Notice with an affidavit filed at the Kaduna State High Court in Suit No. KDH/KAD/348/2014; admitted and marked Exhibit UAC01.  

On the 28^th of April 2025, the Defendant opened its defence. Abdulhameed Babalola, hereinafter referred to as DW1, testified for the Defendant. DW1 identified his Statement on Oath filed on the 4^th of December 2024 and adopted the same as his evidence in support of the defence of the Defendant. 

After the close of the hearing of the suit, on the 20^th of October 2025, the matter came up for the adoption of the Final Written Addresses filed by Counsel. Learned Counsel for the Defendant, J. D. Jefia, Esq. identified his Final Written filed on the 17^th of August 2025 and Reply on Point of Law filed on the 17^th of October 2025 and adopted the same as his legal submission in aid of the case of the Defendant and urged this Court to dismiss this suit.

Counsel for the Claimant, A. A. Lanlege, Esq, identified his Final Written Address filed on the 30^th of September, 2025 and adopted the same as his legal submission in aid of the case of the Claimant while urging this Court to grant the claim of the Claimant.

CASE OF THE CLAIMANT

The facts as pleaded in the Statement of Claim of the Claimant are that the Claimant was employed by the Defendant on the 2^nd day of November 2001. On the 15^th of November 2002, the said appointment was confirmed. The Defendant gave the Claimant several targets. Some of the said targets are evidenced from the internal memoranda dated the 20^th of September 2013 and the 13^th of January 2014.

The Claimant was promoted to Job Class 13, and by the terms of service. It is the said appointment and promotion letters that guide the relationship between the parties herein. The Claimant's salary and benefits are: a basic salary in the sum of N761,102 per annum; a rent subsidy of N223,080 per annum; car/transport allowance of N149,500 per annum; a vehicle grant of the sum of N300,00 every 4 years; vehicle maintenance reimbursement of N66,000 per annum; leave allowance being 12% of the annual basic salary, education reimbursement of the sum of N40,000 per annum and medical allowance of N55,000 per annum. The term of the employment of the Claimant also provides for the pension contribution. 

The Claimant further states that on the 10^th of February 2014, the Claimant received a letter of suspension from the Defendant. The Defendant, as part of its investigation, carried out its activities which eventually led to initiating a complaint before the Police authorities and asked the Claimant to prove his innocence as per the allegations before the appropriate authorities. The Police authorities initiated a criminal Suit against the Claimant based on the Complaint of the Defendant. On the 31^st of October 2023, the Court in Suit No: KMD/48C/2021 held that the Charge does not disclose any offence against the Defendant and discharged the Claimant. 

The letter of suspension shows that the Claimant was suspended pending the outcome of the investigation activities. After the verdict of the Court that exonerated the Claimant, the Claimant was expecting the Defendant to sack the Claimant or recall the Claimant from suspension, but the Defendant refused to. The Claimant knows that due to the Defendant's conduct, the Claimant's employment with the Defendant was terminated on the 31^st day of October 2023 when the Defendant refused to recall the Claimant from suspension after the Claimant was discharged of all allegations.

From the 10^th of February 2014 until the 31^st of October 2023, which is the period of the Claimant's suspension, the Defendant refused to pay the Claimant's salaries and benefits. Part of the recent salaries paid to the Claimant by the Defendant before the said suspension are: the sum of N51,332.34 paid on the 23^rd of October 2013; the sum of N83,790.66 paid on the 25^th of November 2013; the sum of N51,332.34 paid on the 23^rd of December 2013, and the sum of N51,332.34 paid on the 27^th of January 2014.

From the salaries and basic allowances as stated in the terms of service, the Claimant is entitled to the following salaries and benefits that were not paid during the period of the Claimant's suspension from the 10^th of February 2014 to the 31^st of October 2023, as follows:

1. Salaries:
2. 2014=N761,102 per annum ÷ 12= N63,425.16×11 months = N697,676.76
3. 2015 Salaries to 31^st of October 2023 =N6,849,918

Total salaries for the period of suspension=N7,547,594.76

2. Fringe Benefits 2014-2023:
3. Rent: N223.080 × 10 = N2,230,800
4. Car/Transport: N149,500 x 10 = N1,495,000
5. Vehicle maintenance: N66,000 x 10 = N660,000
6. Vehicle grant (every four years) N300,000 x 2 = N600,000
7. Medical: N55,000 x 10 =N550,000
8. Education: N40,000x10=N400,000
9. Leave Allowance N91,332 × 10=N913.322.40

Total fringe benefits are N6,849,122.40.

The Claimant further stated that there is nothing in the "Letter of Contract of Appointment" to the effect that the Claimant can be suspended without pay. There is nothing in the Promotion Letter to the effect that the Claimant can be suspended without pay. Non-payment during the period of suspension is wrongful. The Claimant is entitled to the salaries and benefits during the said suspension. During the period of the suspension, the Claimant was placed on hold; the Claimant lived day to day in anticipation of being recalled or laid off. The Claimant was not at liberty to utilize his time elsewhere or as desired until after closing hours.

The Pension contribution that is expected to have been made up to date, as stated in the terms of service, is N8,091.76 x 12 = N97,101.12 x 10= N971,011.35 (i.e. from 2013 to 2023). Pension contribution is domiciled in UNICO/CPFA Ltd (a subsidiary of UACN Plc). The Defendant has refused to sign the necessary documents to allow the Claimant to access the pension contribution expected to have been paid up to the 31^st of October 2023, domiciled in UNICO/CPFA Ltd.

The Claimant is entitled to the sum of N971,011.35k in the Pension Contribution account. The Claimant is now out of work. It became apparent to the Claimant that he was being laid off when the Defendant did not recall the Claimant after the conclusion of the lawsuit arising from the investigation. The Claimant is over 50 years old. The Claimant has made demands on the Defendant to pay the said Salaries and Benefits during the period of the Claimant's suspension, but to no avail. 

DEFENCE OF THE DEFENDANT

The Defendant pleaded in the defence of the claim of the Claimant that the Claimant was promoted to Job Class 13 by letter dated 24 May 2013. It wrote the letter dated 10^th of February 2014 to the Claimant; it is, however, denied that the purported letter of suspension inadvertently written by Defendant after Claimant had voluntarily resigned from the Defendant's employment, effective the 13^th January 2014, had any legal or contractual effect. The Claimant, having resigned, could not and did not attend any disciplinary action.

The Claimant, by letter dated the 13^th of November 2013, gave notice of not attending any disciplinary hearing, his resignation from the Defendant's employment effective from the 13^th of January 2014, thereby effectively terminating and ending the employment contract between the Claimant and the Defendant. The letter's original copy has been lost, and the Defendant's possible search for it has proved futile.

The Defendant initiated a complaint before the Police authorities, the complaint was initiated after the Defendant wrote the letter of suspension, but then realised that the Claimant's employment had been effectively terminated and ended by the Claimant's resignation and that it had become impracticable for the Claimant to be subjected to the Defendant's disciplinary procedures of suspension and investigation.

The Claimant voluntarily ended the Claimant's employment with the Defendant on January 13, 2014. The Claimant cannot, therefore, in one breath, in Suit No. KDH/KAD/348/2014- Pastor Emmanuel Ajibola Ogungbuyi V. UAC Foods Ltd & Anor., which was filed after the Claimant received the purported letter of suspension dated the 10^th of February 2014, affirm his resignation from the employment of the Defendant and in another breath, after his "discharge" in Case No. KMD/48C/2021 "expect" his employment to be terminated by the Defendant after about nine years of the cessation of his employment. 

The claimant is not entitled to any salaries and benefits as alleged or at all, his employment with Defendant having been terminated on January 13, 2014, following his voluntary resignation. 

LEGAL SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT

Counsel for the Claimant nominated three issues for the determination of this suit, to wit:

1. Whether the contract of employment between the Claimant and the Defendant continued after the Defendant refused to accept the Claimant's resignation letter and the Claimant continued to work for the Defendant.
2. Whether by virtue of the employment contract between the parties, the Defendant can suspend the Claimant without pay indefinitely.
3. Whether the Defendant can unilaterally deny the Claimant his pension and other benefits.

Counsel for the Claimant submitted that the Claimant gave notice of his resignation vide a notice of resignation dated the 13^th of November 2013 to take effect on 13^th of January 2014. Although, the Claimant admitted that he sent a resignation letter to the Defendant dated the 13^th of November 2013 to take effect on the 13^th of January 2014, he however, stated in his Reply to Statement of Defence, that that the Defendant informed him that it would not accept his resignation letter and because he accepted to continue working for the Defendant, the Defendant sent him the usually annual sales target and paid him his salary for that month. These averments were supported by the evidence-in-chief of CW1 contained in the additional witness deposition of the Claimant. 

It is pertinent to note that although the parties both agree that the Claimant sent in his resignation letter to take effect from 13^th of January 2014, the Defendant did not deny the averments in the Reply to Statement of Defence neither was the Claimant cross-examined nor his testimony shaken as it relates to the said averments and evidence that he accepted to continue to work because the Defendant told him that his resignation would not be accepted. It has been decided by a long line of cases that where facts pleaded in a statement of Claims are not controverted, they are deemed admitted by the other party. Cited Amacha Enterprises (Nig) Itd & Anor v. Keystone Bank (2019) LPELR-48258(CA) at Pp. 25-26 paras. E; Dalice Property Development Co. Ltd v. J. Alucon Ltd & Ors (2017) LPELR-43236(CA) at Pp. 28 paras. A; Yakassai & Ors v. Ugbor (2024) LPELR-62903 (CA) at Pp. 24-25 paras. D; Bashir Mohd. LD (Nig) Ltd & Anor v. Gidalle & Ors (2023) LPELR-61561 (CA) at Pp. 28-29 paras. D. D.

The Claimant, who testified as CW1 was not cross-examined on this material issue of his resignation. Submitted that where a party fails to cross-examine a witness on a material issue, he is deemed to have accepted that issue. See Gaji & Ors vs. Paye (2003) LPELR-1300 (SC) UBN Plc v. Obajinmi (2021) LPELR- 57354 (CA) at p. 26 paras. A. Dunkwu v. Oar (Nig) Ltd (2021) LPELR-54577 (CA) at Pp. 33-34paras. D). 

Submitted that in paragraphs 4.4 and 4.5 of his final written address, the Defendant relied heavily on Exhibit UAC 01 to argue that the Claimant has resigned his employment with the Defendant. Exhibit UAC 01 is Affidavit evidence in suit No. KDH/KAD/348/2014 before the Kaduna State High Court. It is trite that evidence given in a previous proceeding cannot be used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding except where Section 39 of the Evidence Act 2011 applies. Refers to the case of Ajagunna v. Amusan (2002) LPELR-5753(CA) at p. 26 paras. D; Maiden v. Hassan (2022) LPELR-57204 (CA) at Pp. 51-52 paras. E. The law is trite that evidence given by a witness in a previous case can never be taken as Evidence in a later case except where Section 34 (1) of the Evidence Act applies. Cited the authority of Elegushi & Ors v. Oseni & Ors (2005) LPELR 1111 (SC). 

The evidence in the previous suit is only relevant where the defendant intends to use it to cross-examine the witness to discredit his evidence. Refers to Section 232 of the Evidence Act 2011; Ewurum v. Iwuanyanwu (2021) LPELR-54909 (CA) at Pp. 46-47paras. A; Malgit & Ors v. Mallo (2021) LPELR -54762 (CA) at (Pp. 6-7 paras.A). Submitted that Exhibit UAC 01 is of no evidential value in this case.

CW1 stated during cross-examination that he continued to work for the Defendant and was arrested at his place of work. Submitted that the uncontroverted facts that the Defendant allowed the Claimant to keep coming to work and even gave the Claimant his annual sales target for that year, as shown in Exhibits CW 3A and CW 3B, after the resignation period, point to the fact that the parties were ad idem that the contract of employment continued. That was why the Defendant issued the Claimant a query and suspended him from work. The parties knew that the Claimant was still in the Defendant's employment, which is why DW1 stated in his evidence under cross-examination that he could not find the resignation letter or any document showing that the Claimant had exited the Defendant when he checked the Claimant's file.

Submit that the Defendant's position that it issued the Suspension letter (Exhibit CW05) in error is an afterthought, and this court should not regard it. That, had the Defendant sincerely issued the said letter in error, it would have issued another letter to that effect.

On issue two nominated by the Claimant, counsel for the Claimant submitted that the parties herein both agree that the Claimant herein was employed by the Defendant. The Claimant pleaded the letter of employment which was admitted in evidence as Exhibit CW01. He also tendered his promotion letter which was admitted in evidence as Exhibit CW 04. The Claimant averred in paragraph 7 of his statement of Claims that Exhibits CW 01 and CW04 were the documents that governed the contractual relationship. Although the Defendant contended in paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Statement of Defence that these two documents did not constitute the terms of service, he did not plead the complete terms of service neither did he tender any evidence. Submit that it is now trite law that a general traverse as in paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Statement of Defence is not a denial at all and is deemed to be an admission. Refers to Order 30 Rule 6 (1)of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure Rules) 2017 and the cases of: Incorporated Trustees of the Brotherhood of Cross and Star v. Nkereuwem & ors (2018) LPELR-44087(CA) at Pp. 14-15 paras. F; Balogun v. UBA Ltd (1992) LPELR-728(SC) at p. 21 paras. C; Auto Import Export v. Adebayo & Ors (2005) LPELR-642(SC) at p.55paras. A. Exhibits CW 01 and CW 04 constitute the entire terms of the contract of service between the parties.

The Defendant issued the Claimant with Exhibit CW05 which suspends him from his duties pending investigation. Submitted that where an employee is suspended, the contract has not been terminated but placed on hold and the Claimant remains in the employment of the Defendant during the suspension period. Cited Elizabeth v. Ondo State Judicial Service Commission & Anor (2021) LPELR-55177 (CA) at Pp. 22-23 paras. E; Globe Motors Holdings (Nig)Ltd v. Oyewole (2022) LPELR-56856 (CA) at Pp. 18-19 paras. B. Submitted that because Exhibits CW 01 and CW 04 are silent on the issue of suspension, the Claimant was entitled to his salary when the Defendant placed him on suspension, since he was still in the employment of the Defendant while on suspension. Cited the case of Globe Motors Holdings (Nig) Ltd v. Oyewole (supra); and the case of City Central Group of Companies Ltd v. Eze (2021) LPELR- 55725 at Pp. 40-41 paras. D.

Once an employee is accused of a crime as in this case in which the Defendant reported the issue to the police who charged the Claimant to court the Defendant cannot suspend the Claimant without pay until after the outcome of the trial. The suspension without pay was illegal. Cited Eco Bank (Nig.) Ltd v. Idemudia (2023) LPELR-61505 (CA) at Pp. 30-33 paras. C.

On issue three nominated by the Claimant, it was argued that the Defendant has an obligation to allow the Claimant access to his pension and other benefits. Since the parties have agreed that, as at the time of filing this suit, the Claimant is no longer in the employment of the Defendant, the Defendant has the obligation to sign all documents and do everything legally required to allow the Defendant has access to his pension contributions.

By the combined reading of the provisions of Sections 3 and 5 of the Pensions Reform Act 2014, the monies that were paid into the retirement scheme were a contribution for the benefit of the Claimant herein. By section 7 of the Pension Reform Act (supra) the Claimant who has already attained the age of 50 years has an unfettered right to access his pension. The Defendant has a responsibility to execute all documents that are necessary to allow the Claimant access his pension.

LEGAL SUBMISSION OF THE DEFENDANT

Counsel for the Defendant nominated a lone issue for the determination of this suit, to wit:

Whether in the entire circumstances of this action and having regard to the Claimant's admission in Exhibit UAC. 01, that he resigned his appointment with the Defendant with effect from 13^th January 2014, the Claimant has proven by credible evidence his entitlement to the grant of the reliefs sought in this suit?

Counsel for the Defendant submitted that the burden of proof in any case is on the person who desires a court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts, which that person asserts. Furthermore, it is a bright-line rule that the burden of proof lies on that person, who would fail if no evidence were given on either side. Refers to Section 131 (1) & (2),132 and 133 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended); ORLU V. GOGO-ABITE (2010) LPELR-2769 (SC) at 10 paras. B & C, FABIYI, J.S.C.; AKANDE V. ADISA & ANOR. (2012) LPELR- 7807(SC) at 19 Para. G, P. 21 para. A & P. 29 para. G, P. 30 para.E, I. T. MUHAMMAD, J.S.C. (as he then was-later C.J.N.).

It is a well-established legal principle of law that the granting of declaratory relief falls within the discretionary authority of the court, subject to a comprehensive assessment of all pertinent facts and circumstances. A party seeking such relief must provide compelling and credible evidence warranting the court's exercise of discretion in their favour. The onus rests upon the applicant to substantiate their claim based on its own merits, rather than relying on any perceived deficiencies or admissions by the Defendant. In the present case, the Claimant, who seeks declaratory relief as his principal remedy, is required to demonstrate-through clear and persuasive evidence-that he is entitled to the declarations sought. The responsibility lies with the Claimant to prove his case; it is not for the Defendant to disprove the Claimant's assertions. Where the Claimant has failed to meet the requisite evidentiary threshold for the requested declarations, as in the instant case, the action should be dismissed. Cited DUMEZ NIGERIA LIMITED V. NWAKHOBA & ORS. (2008)18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 361 at 373, Para. H, P. 374, Para. D.

Submitted that the three (3) principal or main reliefs sought by the Claimant in this action are, indubitably, declaratory reliefs. The "fate" of the other five (5) reliefs, which are ancillary to the three (3) principal or main reliefs, are inextricably linked to that of the main reliefs. Therefore, the burden of proof in this action absolutely rests on the Claimant. The Claimant is the party, who has asserted that he was illegally suspended from his work without pay by the Defendant. He is the party, who has alleged that his employment with the Defendant ended on the 31^st of October 2023, (and not 13^th January 2014) due the Defendant's alleged failure to recall him from his suspension following his discharge by the Chief Magistrate Court. He is the party, who has alleged that the refusal of the Defendant to sign necessary documents to allow him access to pension contribution expected to have been paid up to the 31^st day of October 2023 and, allegedly domiciled in UNICO/CPFA Ltd is illegal, null and void.

From the state of pleading, there is no dispute that the Claimant by letter (email) on 13^th of November 2013 gave notice of his resignation from the employment of the Defendant with effect from the 13^th of January 2014. The Court is respectfully referred to the averment in paragraph 6 of the Defendant's Statement of Defence, as well as paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Witness Statement on Oath of Abdulhameed Babalola, who testified as DW1.

When Exhibit UAC01 was shown to the Claimant under cross-examination, he confirmed the truth of the declaration contained in Exhibit UAC01 and stated in addition that he gave his notice of resignation in exercise of his right under the contract of employment. The law is settled that an admission by a party made either ante motam litam or in a previous proceeding involving that party will, in a subsequent case be referred to as an admission against interest and can be relied upon by the other party as proof of his case. Cited JOE IGA & ORS. AMAKIRI & ORS. (1976) LPELR-1439 (SC), Per Obaseki, JSC @ Pp 14, Paras C-D;BALOGUN V. AKINTOLA (2000) 1 NWLR (PT. 642) 532 @550-551, Paras. G-A;See also: IPINLAYE V. OLUKOTUN  (1996) 6 NWLR (PT. 453) 146 @ 165, Paras. B-C. 

Although the Claimant's letter (email) of resignation had been lost and effort to find it has proved abortive, the deposition in paragraph 46 of the Claimant's sworn Affidavit in Exhibit UAC.01, coupled with his evidence under cross examination constitute an admission against interest, which the Defendant is entitled to rely upon to prove Claimant's voluntary resignation from the employment of the Defendant with effect from the 13^th of January 2014. 

Further submitted that the Claimant's attempt to change the narrative surrounding his voluntary resignation from the employment of the Defendant by his averment in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of his Reply to the Defendant's Statement of Defence, supported by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 of his Further Witness Deposition on Oath, are on quicksand and unsustainable. It is a firmly established principle of employment law that an employee's right to voluntarily resign from employment is, as a general rule, absolute. The employment relationship, being fundamentally consensual in nature, cannot be perpetuated against the will of one party-namely, the employee. Thus, it is respectfully submitted that once a valid notice of resignation is tendered in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment, the act of resignation becomes effective either immediately or at the expiry of the notice period stipulated. The employer's acceptance of such resignation is not a legal prerequisite for its efficacy. Cited BENSON V. ONITIRI (1960) FSC 69 @ P. 82., Ademola, CJF (as he then was) succinctly stated the position that there is absolute power to resign and no discretion to refuse to accept notice.

The holding of the Supreme Court has consistently been followed and applied in several subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal to hold that once a resignation is communicated especially where the contract or governing terms provide for a notice period, its effect is to terminate the employment at the expiration of that period, regardless of the employer's acquiescence or lack thereof. Any subsequent attempt by the employer to withhold acceptance is, for all practical and legal purposes, ineffectual. Cited YESUFU V. GOV., EDO STATE (2001) 13 NWLR (PT. 731)517@532-533, Paras. H-E; ADEFEMI V. ABEGUNDE (2004) 15 NWLR (PT. 895) 1 @ 28, Paras. C - F, per Onnoghen, JCA; MR.SOLOMON ABEKHE V. ALPHA MERCHANT BANK & 20RS. (2017) JELR 51216, @ P.7. Thus, it is respectfully submitted that in the instant case, the Claimant's notice of termination brought the employment contract between the Claimant and the Defendant to an end, the subsequent letter of suspension notwithstanding. 

In paragraph 2 of Claimant's sworn deposition in Exhibit UAC 01, which was made on 17^th of April 2014, (about two months after the effective resignation of the Claimant) the Claimant put the matter of the cessation of his employment with the Defendant beyond peradventure, when he declared and described the state of the relationship between him and the Defendant in the past tense, thus: "I know the Respondents in this case. The 1^st Respondent (Defendant herein) was my employer." The law is settled that where a person has by his declaration intentionally caused or permit another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative in interest shall be allowed in any proceeding between himself and such person, to deny the truth of that thing. Cited Section 169 of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended). Refers to the cases of YOUNG SHALL GROW MOTORS LTD V. ONALAJA (2021) 3 NWLR (PT. 1763) 300 @ 319, PARA.B; ADEWALE IDOWU V. LAGUN ADESANYA & ANOR. (2013) LPELR - 20195 (CA), Per Ikyegh, JCA, Pp. 19-20, Paras. E -C. In this instance, the Claimant is estopped from denying the truth of his resignation from the employment of the Defendant, as attested to in Exhibit UAC 01. Respectfully urge this Court to so hold and to refuse the grant of the declaration sought by the Claimant in paragraphs 34(a) - (c) of his Statement of fact, because the Claimant's employment with the Defendant was effectively brought to an end on 13th January 2014 by his resignation and, the letter of suspension issued after the cessation of his employment is for all practical and legal purpose ineffectual.

The orders sought in paragraph 34 (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), and (j) of the Claimant's Statement of Fact are dependent on the grant of the declaratory relief sought in paragraph 34(a) - (c), of the Claimant's Statement of Fact. Since the declaratory reliefs, which stand as the pivot of this action, cannot be granted because there is a clear failure of proof on the part of the Claimant that it is entitled to them, the ancillary reliefs in paragraph 34 (d) - (j) of the Claimant's Statement of Fact would, concomitantly, collapse with the declaratory reliefs. Undoubtedly, there would be nothing to stanchion the ancillary reliefs when the declaratory reliefs have given way. 

ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION

I have thoroughly reviewed the pleadings and evidence presented by both parties, along with the legal arguments provided by their counsel regarding this case. The disputes between the parties can be decisively resolved by the foregoing issue for the determination:

Whether the Claimant has proved his case on the preponderance of evidence to entitle him to the relief sought.

COURT’S DECISION

The legal precept of the Nigerian adversarial system is that whoever desires any court to give a judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. A party who pleads and asserts the existence of a fact bears the burden of proving the same: see the case of AMGBARE V. SYLVA (2009) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1121) 1. By virtue of Section 137 of the Evidence Act, 2011 in civil cases, there is the general burden of proof on the claimant to prove his claim or relief before a court. There is yet another kind of burden which is dictated by the nature of the pleadings. This is known as the burden of proof on the pleadings. Unlike the general burden, the burden of proof on the pleading rests on any party, whether claimant or the defendant, who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. This category of burden is fixed at the beginning of the trial by the state of the pleadings. It remains throughout the trial, exactly where the pleadings place it: see the case of OLANIYAN V. OYEWOLE (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1268) 445.

In this instant suit, the Claimant, who seeks relief against the Defendant, has the burden to prove his case claim; if not, the case of the Claimant will fall like a pack of cards.

It is not disputed that the Claimant was an employee of the Defendant. A crucial fact which is admitted does not require further proof, as no person would admit a fact which could work against his interest unless it is true: see the case UNIVERSAL PROPERTIES LTD. V. PINNACLE COMM. BANK (2022) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1845) 523.

The Claimant led evidence to state that on the 10^th of February 2014, the Claimant received a letter of suspension from the Defendant. The Claimant tendered Exhibit CW05 to prove his suspension. 

The Defendant, however, stated that the Defendant wrote Exhibit CW05 to the Claimant; it is, however, denied that the purported letter of suspension inadvertently written by the Defendant after the Claimant had voluntarily resigned from the Defendant's employment, effective the 13^th January 2014, had no any legal or contractual effect. The Claimant, having resigned, could not and did not attend any disciplinary action. The Defendant tendered Exhibit UAC001.

The Claimant admitted in his Reply that the Claimant sent his resignation letter to the Regional Manager's official media. But the Regional Manager informed the Claimant that the Defendant would not accept his resignation.

It is without gainsaying that an employment relationship is contractual, which is why the Courts have consistently held that a court will not compel an unwilling employer to retain employees the employer does not need: see the case of AGWU V. JULIUS BERGER NIG. PLC. (2019) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1682) 165, and the Court will not also compel an employee to continue working with an employer where the employee has indicated interest in ceasing the employment relationship.

Section 11 of the Labour Act provides that: 

11(1)          Either party to a contract of employment may terminate the contract on the expiration of notice given by him to the other party of his intention to do so. 

In conformity with Section 11(1) of the Labour Act, paragraph 2 of Exhibit CW01 also gives a window for the resignation from the service of the Defendant by giving a two-week salary in lieu of notice. For the avoidance of doubt, it reads thus:

If at any time during the period of your appointment it becomes evident that your work is NOT up to the standard the Company expects of its employees then your employment will be terminated immediately with two (2) weeks salary in lieu of notice. If you desire to leave the Company's service within this period you will be required to give two (2) weeks salary in lieu of notice.

The Courts, in a series of cases, have given life to the right of employees to resign their appointment for one reason or others. This is predicated on the principle that the Court cannot force an unwilling employer to keep its unwanted employee in its employment and the Court cannot also force the unwilling employee to continue working with his employer. This is in consonance with the provision of Section 34(1)(c) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In WAEC V. OSHIONEBO (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 994) 258 where the Court of Appeal held that:

I here pause to discuss the law relating to notice of resignation, the law is that a notice of resignation is effective not from the date of the letter, nor from the date of any purported acceptance, but from the date on which the letter was received by the employer or his agent. Tendering of a letter or resignation carries with it the right to leave the service automatically without any benefit subject to his paying any of his indebtedness to his employer.

The Court of Appeal and the National Industrial Court of Nigeria in their various decisions have echoed the right of an employee to resign from his or her employment, and the notice of such resignation is effective on the day the notice is received, whether or not the employer accepts the resignation or not. The issue of resignation becomes a vexed one where an employee resigns his or her employment during the pendency of the disciplinary action or when a disciplinary action is in contemplation.  In Suit No. NICN/UY/27/2017 Between MR. DONALD ENOBONG MICAH V. ECO BANK NIGERIA LIMITED decision of which was delivered by my Learned Brother Justice M.A Namtari on the 24^th of October 2018 where this Court held that:

Now this leaves us with whether the Defendant can reject the resignation as it sought to do in Exhibit B. The general rule is that there is absolute power to resign and no discretion to refuse to accept and it is not necessary to reply that the resignation is accepted. See Yesufu v. Gov. of Edo State (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 731) 517. But there notable exceptions and I am convinced the case at hand comes within this exception. Upon the receipt of the letter of resignation by the Claimant, the Defendant in rejecting same informed the Claimant that he was implicated in a matter awaiting the Defendant’s Disciplinary Committee. The Defendant also invited the Claimant to appear before the Disciplinary Committee to clear his name. So to me the purported resignation of the Claimant, was a ploy to pre-empt the investigation and the Defendant has the right to place the resignation on hold. I am fortified in this regard by the case of Graham-Douglas v. AG, Rivers State (1973) NMLR 77, where it was held that an employer may reject a letter of resignation on the ground that an employee has questions to answer and permitting him to go may hinder on-going investigations.

However, His Lordship Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD, OFR, bpa in the case of INEH MONDAY MGBETI V UNITY BANK PLC. Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/98/2014 judgment of which was delivered on the 21^st of February 2017,  the handbook of the defendant bank prohibited the resignation by an employee who is under investigation if it is suspected that the resignation was a ploy by the employee to avoid facing a disciplinary panel. When the claimant brought a claim against the bank on the basis that he had resigned his employment, the bank challenged the resignation relying on the said clause. a clause in the employee handbook, as in the instant case which provided, inter alia, that the management reserves the right to reject a notice of Resignation or payment in lieu of notice from an employee if it is seen as a strategy to cover up a fraud or misconduct to avoid disciplinary action, was not only struck down by this court, but it was held to approximate to forced labour contrary to section 34(1)(c) of the 1999 Constitution and section 73(1) of the Labour Act; as such the provision was held to be illegal and unconstitutional. In arriving at this decision, the court placed reliance on the ILO Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour,1930(No.29) otherwise called the Forced Labour Convention. The point was stressed that there is absolute power to resign and no discretion to refuse to accept; and it is not even necessary for the person to whom the notice of resignation is addressed to reply that the resignation is accepted.

Also in the decision of my Learned Brother, Honourable Justice S. H. Danjidda in the case of GINIKA CHIANUGO V KEYSTONE BANK LIMITED (Unreported) the judgment of which was delivered on the 17^th of October 2025, the gist of the case of the claimant is that he worked with the Defendant from August 2013 to June 2015 and resigned voluntarily via a letter dated the 23^rd of June 2015, but the defendant rejected the resignation, alleging that he was under suspension and investigation. That after the resignation, the Bank set up a Disciplinary Committee which led to the dismissal of the Claimant. That in March 2016, the claimant was Blacklisted by the Central Bank of Nigeria based on alleged fraud. He however secured a job with Unity Bank Plc in 2019, but was later terminated when Unity Bank Plc discovered that he was Blacklisted. It was contended by the claimant that his inclusion in the CBN Blackbook was illegal and ultra vires and directly caused him loss of employment and reputation in the banking industry. 

The Court held that the Claimant resigned with immediate effect on the 23/6/2015 and the Defendant received the said letter of resignation on the same date. Going by the above case law authorities, the Claimant’s resignation was effective from 23/6/2015, the date the Defendant received the letter of resignation and I so find and hold.  This being the case, there was no employment relationship between the parties which the defendant can reject and so dismiss the Claimant afterwards. By the case of JOMBO V PEFMB (2005) 14 NWLR PT. 945)443 SC, it is elementary that an employee cannot be dismissed from an employment that had ceased to exist. Therefore, a dismissal coming after the termination of appointment would be a futile exercise. The claimant effectively resigned his employment on 23/6/2015; there was no employment relationship on 23/6/2015 for the Defendant to suspend the Claimant, neither was there any employment relationship on the 23/6/2015 for the Defendant to dismiss the Claimant and I so hold.

In this instant suit, the Defendant led evidence to state that the Claimant had resigned from the employment of the Defendant vide a letter dated 10^th of February, 2014 and to take effect on the 13^th of February, 2014.

It is crucial to note that the Defendant did not tender the letter dated the 10^th of February 2014 which the Defendant relied on to have said the Claimant had resigned from the employment of the Defendant. The Claimant, vide paragraph 2 of his Reply to the Statement of Defence, admitted the content of the letter dated the 10^th of February 2014. The Claimant’s admission of the content of the letter dated the 10^th of February 2014 has relieved the Defendant the need to tender it. In OGBUJI V. OGBONNA (2025) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1981) 63 P. 95, paras. A-C the Supreme Court held that the need to tender or produce a document in evidence is dispensed with if the document and its content is pleaded and admitted by the parties in their respective pleadings.

The Defendant tendered Exhibit UAC01, where the Claimant stated in his affidavit that:

46.    On 13^th November 2013, I gave the 1^st Respondent a notice of my resignation from its employment with effect from 13^th January 2014.

47.  I handed over to my superior including the list of debtors who could not be found or who had promised to pay which he was already aware of.

Counsel for the Claimant argued in paragraph (e) of his Final Written Address that Exhibit UAC 01 is Affidavit evidence in suit No. KDH/KAD/348/2014 before the Kaduna State High Court. That evidence given in a previous proceeding cannot be used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding except where Section 39 of the Evidence Act 2011 applies. See Ajagunna v. Amusan (2002) LPELR-5753(CA) at p. 26 paras. D; Maiden v. Hassan (2022) LPELR-57204 (CA) at Pp. 51-52 paras. E. 

The provision of Section 39 of the Evidence Act cited by the Claimant is inapplicable here. Section 39 of the Evidence Act 2011 deals with statements made by persons who cannot be called as witnesses. Exhibit UAC01 is admissible under Sections 231 and 232 of the Evidence 2011, which provides that:

231.   If a witness upon cross-examination as to a former statement made by him relative to the subject matter of the trial and inconsistent with his present testimony does not distinctly that he has made such statement, proof may be given that he did in fact make it; but before such proof can be given the circumstances of the supposed statement sufficient to designate the particular occasion must be mentioned to the witness, and he must be asked whether or not he has made such statement.

232 A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing and relative to matters in question in the suit or proceeding in which he is cross-examined without such writing being shown to him or being proved, but if it is, intended to contradict such witness by the writing, his attention must, before such writing can be proved, or such contradictory proof given, be called to those parts of the writing which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him:

Provided always that it shall be competent for the court at any time during the trial to require the production of the writing for its inspection and the court may thereupon make use of it for the purposes of the trial, as it deems fit.

Exhibit UCA01 is admissible and can be used by the Court in resolving the issue in dispute. Exhibit UAC01 was made on the 17^th of April 2014. The Claimant stated in paragraph 46 and 47 of the Affidavit that the Claimant gave the Defendant (1^st Respondent) a notice of resignation from the employment of the Defendant with effect from the 13^th of January 2014 and that the Claimant had handed over to his superior the list of the debtors of the Defendant. With this unequivocal piece of evidence, I have no doubt that the Claimant submitted his letter of resignation to the Defendant; the resignation of the Claimant from the employment of the Defendant took effect on the 13^th of January 2014, notwithstanding whether the Defendant approved it or not. In YESUFU V. GOV., EDO STATE (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 731) 517 pp. 532 – 533 paras H – D where the Supreme Court held that

Having regard to the contents of appellant's letter of 2^nd July 1992, particularly the portion of it italicized by me in this judgment, the appellant, by that letter, effectively resigned his appointment as Pro-Chancellor and Chairman of Council of Edo State University. He also by that letter requested for a waiver of the notice he should have given. It does not lie in his mouth to say that he had no reply from the 1^st respondent on his request for waiver of notice. The requirement of notice was not for his benefit but that of the respondents. I think the two courts below were right in finding that appellant resigned his appointment. The resignation need not to have been formally accepted by the respondents before taking effect - T.O.S. Benson v. A. Onitiri (1960) 5 FSC 69, (1960) SCNLR 177, where the facts are not too dissimilar with the facts of the present case as regards the issue of resignation from an appointment. In Benson v. Onitiri, Ademola, CJF (as he then was) said at page 82 of  the report:

"There is absolute power to resign and no discretion to refuse to accept notice. In the present case, I do not think it matters to whom the notice of resignation was addressed, whether to the Minister who made the appointment or to the board, on which Benson was serving."

Though the Claimant stated that when he submitted his letter of resignation, the Regional Manager of the Defendant informed the Claimant that the Defendant would not accept his resignation, and the Claimant agreed to continue working for the Defendant, and the Defendant paid him a salary for that month. Information given by the Claimant by the Regional manager of the Defendant is not a decision of the Defendant. Linguistically, there is a difference between ‘will not’ and ‘did not’. The Claimant led evidence to state that the Regional Manager ‘informed him officially that the company will not accept his resignation’, the Claimant did not say the Defendant did not accept his resignation.

Besides, the Claimant in paragraph 2 of the affidavit attached to Exhibit UAC01, the Claimant referred to the Defendant as ‘the Respondent was my employer.’ Coupled with paragraphs 46 and 47 of the Affidavit attached to Exhibit UAC01, the Claimant is no longer in the employment of the Defendant. Thus, Exhibit CW05 is ineffectual as the Claimant ceased to be the employee of the Defendant as of the 13^th January 2014. I so hold. 

Having held that the Claimant ceased to be the employee of the Defendant as of the 13^th of January 2014, the Claimant does not have the right to claim any entitlement from the Defendant arising after the cessation of the contract of employment between the Claimant and the Defendant. I so hold.

On the issue of signing the necessary document to enable the Claimant to access his pension contribution. The Claimant led evidence to state that the Defendant has refused to sign the necessary documents to allow the Claimant to access the pension contribution domiciled in UNICO/CPFA Ltd. Though the Defendant merely denied the assertion of the Claimant.

The Defendant, upon the resignation of the Claimant from its employment, is obligated to sign all necessary documents to enable the Claimant to have access to his pension, because the Defendant does not have any right under any guise to deny the Claimant access to his pension. In MOMODU V. N.U.L.G.E. (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 362) 336 P. 350 paras A – B where the Court of Appeal held that:

Pension is an accrued right of an employee, be the right in money or other consideration, on retiring from the services of his employer and satisfying the conditions for payment of the said pension. It is a right which cannot be unilaterally taken away by the employer. On this issue, the only question is whether the 1^st respondent can or has the right to stop the payment of the pension in the manner it did for the reason it gave. The answer is not far-fetched. The 1^st respondent has no such right.

In view of the foregoing, the Claimant must be given unfettered access to his pension contribution account. The lone issue for the determination is partly resolved in favour of the Claimant. It is hereby ordered as follows:

 

 

 

 

Judgment is entered accordingly. 

HON. JUSTICE B. A. ALKALI

HON. JUDGE

NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

KADUNA JUDICIAL DIVISION