
IN THE NATIONAL
INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE ABUJA
JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
BEFORE HER LADYSHIP
HON. JUSTICE O. A. OBASEKI-OSAGHAE
DATE: JANUARY 13,
2025 SUIT
NO: NICN/ABJ/274/2023
BETWEEN:
MOSES AMBAKINA
JITOBOH CLAIMANT
AND
POLICE SERVICE
COMMISSION DEFENDANT
REPRESENTATION:
Joseph Onu Silas for
the Claimant.
Prof. Edoba Omoregie
SAN for the Defendant, with Babatunde Dada, J. D. Awolola, O. N. Ibiam, J. H.
Abdulkadir, Aisha Hassan Abdulkadir, Happiness Jelili Dele.
JUDGMENT
Introduction and Claims
[1] The Claimant filed this Complaint against
the Defendant on October 10, 2023 together with the accompanying processes
seeking the following reliefs:
a) A Declaration that the purported compulsory retirement and
or termination of the Claimant's appointment as Deputy Inspector-General of
Police by the Defendant before his mandatory 60 years retirement age or 35
years in service by a letter dated 25th August, 2023 is wrongful,
unconstitutional, unlawful and a flagrant violation of Rule 020810 of the
Public Service Rules and Section 18 (8) of the Nigeria Police Act, 2020,
respectively.
b) A Declaration that the Claimant was and remains an officer
of the Nigeria Police Force until the 10th day of June, 2029 when he
would have attained 35 years in service and duly retire and is therefore
entitled to his salaries, emoluments and all other paraphernalia of office due
to him.
c) A Declaration that pursuant to Section 4 (3) of the Police
Service Commission Act, 2001 the Defendant had no valid Board to take any
decision whatsoever purporting to retire or promote any Police Officer.
d) An Order of this Honorable Court setting aside the
purported compulsory retirement of the Claimant as Deputy Inspector-General of
Police on the 25th day of
August, 2023 by the Defendant.
e) An Order setting aside all the unlawful and
embarrassing decisions taken by the Defendant, including the retirement of the
Claimant and the promotion of another to replace the Claimant, same having been
done unlawfully and illegally.
f) An Order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant
the sum of N500, 000,000.00 (Five Hundred Million Naira) only as general
damages for the unwarranted embarrassment caused by the purported termination
of his employment.
g)
The sum of N50, 000, 000.00 (Fifty Million
Naira) only as the cost of prosecuting this action.
[2] The Defendant filed it statement of
defence and the accompanying processes on February 16, 2024. The Claimant filed
a reply on February 28, 2024.
Case
of the Claimant
[3] The Claimant’s
case on the pleadings is that he is a Deputy Inspector General of Police,
Nigeria Police Force; and he was born on 1st June, 1970. The
Claimant averred that he obtained a B.Sc Hons Degree in Gegraphy/Regional
Planning in 1992 from the University of Calabar; and he was enlisted into the
Nigeria Police Force as Cadet Assistant Superintendent of Police Course 4/94 by
offer of appointment dated 10th June, 1994. The Claimant averred
that while in active service in the Defendant's employment and without any
wrong doing or query, his attention was drawn to some publications on social
media on 28th of August, 2023 that he was listed among senior Police
Officers of the rank of Deputy Inspector-General of Police compulsorily retired
by the Defendant. The Claimant stated
that the social media report was confirmed by a formal letter addressed to him,
which was backdated to August 25th 2023.
[4] The Claimant
averred that being a Public Servant whose appointment is governed by the
provisions of the Public Service Rules and the Nigerian Police Act, 2020 and in
the absence of any established wrong doing leading to dismissal from service or
voluntary retirement, it was unlawful to be compulsorily retired by the
Defendant from service before attaining the statutory age of sixty (60) years or thirty-five (35)
years of service whichever is earlier as
provided under Rule 020810 of the
Public Service Rules and Section 18 (8)
the Nigeria Police Act, 2020. The Claimant stated that he still had up to 10th
June, 2029 to attain the statutory 35 years in service for retirement from the
service of the Nigeria Police Force. The Claimant stated that at the time of
the purported compulsory retirement, he was and is still willing to serve in
the Nigeria Police Force. That the only reason advanced in the media
publication and the letter of notification for his compulsory retirement by the
Defendant through its Chairman Mr. Solomon Arase, is that his purported junior,
Mr. Egbetokun Olukayode Adeolu, was appointed as the Inspector-General of
Police.
[5] The Claimant
averred that in the history of the Nigeria Police Force, evidence abounds that
where a junior officer is appointed to a higher rank, his senior (s) before
such a promotion are not compulsorily retired but are allowed to serve in
different capacities until their statutory retirement age is attained or upon
attaining of thirty-five (35) years in service, whichever comes first. He
stated the promotions, appointments and postings of the following senior
officers: Mr. Ogbonnaya O. Onovo; Mr Tafa Balogun; Mr. Sunday Ehindero; Mr.
Mike Okiro; Mr. Hafiz Ringim; Messrs. I. V. Okoronkwo; Azubuko Udah; Dawodu
Ganiyu A; Mr. M.D. Abubakar; Mr. Suleiman Abba; Mr. Danazumi Job Doma; Mr.
Solomon Arase; Mamman Ibrahim Tsafe; Mr. Saliu Arugungu Hashimu; Mr. I.T
Mamman. The Claimant further averred that no senior officers to the Inspector-General of Police was compulsorily
retired, and further that none of the senior officers to the former
Inspector-General of Police Solomon Arase was compulsorily retired.
[6] The Claimant
averred that the reason for his compulsory retirement as stated by the
Defendant in its letter dated 25th August, 2023 signed by Mr.
Solomon Arase, who himself served under his junior as DIG, was that his junior
Mr. Egbetokun Olukayode Adeolu was appointed as the Inspector-General of Police
is inexplicable. That it has never been the policy of Nigeria Police Force to
retire officers ahead of their due retirement dates because a junior officer
was promoted above such an officer (s), if that were to be the policy, the
current Acting-Inspector-General of Police, being senior to the Claimant by
enlistment into the Police Force, would have been retired a long time ago when
the Claimant was promoted ahead of him. The Claimant averred that through his
Solicitors letter of complaint, he served the Defendant with a pre-action
notice.
[7] The Claimant
stated that he knows that the Police Service Commission cannot function or take
decisions relating to its mandate unless it has a validly constituted board
with the lawfully prescribed quorum at any meeting where it intends to exercise
its powers as provided under Section 2 (4) of the Police Service Commission
Act, 2001. He further stated that the Police Service Commission Board enjoys a
joint tenure as members or the Chairman cannot be appointed to enjoy separate
term from others under Section 4 (3) of the Police Service Commission Act,
2001. The Claimant averred that as at 25th August, 2023 the Police
Service Commission Board was not in existence as the last appointed Board had
already served out its tenure on 24th July, 2023. That Mr. Solomon
Arase, Chairman of the Police Service Commission was and could only be
appointed to complete the tenure of Mr. Misliu Smith as required by the
establishment Act, after Mr. Smith resigned as the Chairman of the Commission
on 15th September, 2022. The Claimant further stated that under the
Police Service Commission Act, 2001 Mr. Solomon Arase was not competent to take
a board decision alone; and that the decision was designed and deliberately
carried out to cause him serious professional career embarrassment.
[8] The Claimant
testified in support of his case. He adopted his statement on oath which was in
the exact terms of the pleadings. In cross-examination, he confirmed to the
Court that the Defendant is the supervisory body of the Police and that he is
familiar with the mandate of the Defendant. He confirmed that the Defendant has
an oversight of the Nigeria Police Force that includes appointment, discipline
and promotion. The Claimant told the Court that he joined the Police Force on
10th June 1994 as a graduate; and that in 1992-1993 he did his NYSC
in Makurdi and presented his certificate to the Nigeria Police. The Claimant
told the Court that he was only given a letter of retirement after it was
announced on the media. He stated that the normal channel of communication is
through the Force Secretary, and that he received the letter through the Force
Secretary. He told the Court that the step he took after receiving the letter
was to challenge it in the Court.
Case of the Defendant
[9] The case of the Defendant on the pleadings is that
it is vested with both constitutional and statutory mandates to undertake
external oversight of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) including the mandate to
appoint, promote, dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over persons
holding positions in the NPF other than the Inspector General of Police. The
Defendant averred that the Claimant was lawfully retired from the Nigeria
Police Force pursuant to the decision reached at a meeting of the Defendant’s
Management Committee held on 7th July, 2023 which was subsequently
communicated to the Claimant on 25th August, 2023. The Defendant
averred that the compulsory retirement of the Defendant is within
constitutional and statutory powers and functions and therefore not in
violation of any rule or law including the Public Service Rules and the Nigeria
Police Act. 2020.
[10] The Defendant stated
that the Claimant’s service in the Nigeria Police Force is governed by the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Police Service Commission
(Establishment) Act, 2001, the Nigeria Police Act 2020, and the Public Service
Rules. It stated that the decision to compulsorily retire the Claimant was not
communicated to him on the social media but by formal letter of compulsory
retirement dated 25th August, 2023 delivered in the normal channel
of official communication between the Defendant and officers of the Nigeria
Police Force of the rank then occupied by the Claimant; which is through the
office of the Inspector General of the Police. The Defendant averred that in
exercising its disciplinary control over the Nigeria Police Force, the
Defendant is neither compelled by law or policy to adhere to previous episodes
nor barred from taking decisions on a case by case basis as was done in the
decision to compulsory retire the Claimant. The Defendant further averred that
its Chairman was lawfully appointed into office and exercises his powers as
Chairman lawfully.
[11] The Defendant stated
that the Claimant did not issue a pre-action notice within the meaning and
letters of the Police Service Commission (Establishment) Act and that this suit
is incompetent.
[12] The Defendant’s
witness is Obinna Vincent Malokwu (DW) Assistant Director. He adopted his
statement on oath which was in the exact terms of the pleadings. Under
cross-examination DW admitted that the word “retire” is not included in
paragraph 1 of the statement of defence. He told the Court that the Claimant
was retired from the Nigeria Police Force.
Final
Address
[13] The Defendant’s
final address is dated September 17, 2024 and filed on September 19, 2024. The
Claimant’s final address is dated September 26, 2024 and filed on the same day.
The Defendant’s reply on point of law is dated October 15, 2024 and filed on
October 16, 2024.
[14] The Defendant submitted four issues for
determination as follows:
1. Whether by the non-compliance with the
provision of Sections 20 (3) and (4), and 21 of the PSC Act, this suit is
liable to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
2. Whether the Defendant duly acted within its
Constitutional, and statutory power in the PSC Act when it retired the
Claimant.
3. Whether by failing to tender documentary
evidence of service under the National Youth Service Corps Act Cap N84 LFN
2004, the Claimant’s claim to being validly employed in the NPF is
unsustainable and fatal to the entire Suit.
4. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the
reliefs sought in his Statement of Material Facts.
[15] Learned Counsel submitted that the
Claimant failed to comply with the mandatory statutory requirement in on
Section 20 (3) and (4) of the PSC Act to issue the appropriate pre-action
Notice on the Defendant. That it is trite that for a Court to exercise
jurisdiction over a matter, the matter must have been initiated by due process
of law and all conditions precedent for the exercise of the Court’s
jurisdiction must have been met, relying on Madukolu
v. Nkemdilim [1962] 2 NLR p.581. He submitted that the clear effect of Section
20 (3) and (4), read together with Section 21 of the PSC Act is that service of
pre-action notice on the Defendant is a condition precedent to the institution
of any action against the Defendant, whether by itself or through its officers
as expressly mentioned in the provisions. He further submitted that the
provisions of Sections 20 (3) and 21 of the PSC Act presupposes that the
Secretary of the Defendant is the alter
ego of the Commission for the purpose of receipt of pre-action notice, and
therefore any mention of the Secretary for the purpose of issuance of
pre-action notice is a reference to the Commission. He submitted that Exhibit C6 cannot suffice
as a pre-action notice as it does not satisfy the requirements of Section 20
(4) of the PSC Act citing Umukoro v.
Nigeria Ports Authority [1997] 4 NWLR
(Pt. 502) 656.
[16] Learned Counsel submitted on issue two `that the Defendant is an
established Federal Executive body which exercises its powers pursuant to
Section 153
(1) (m) and (2), and paragraph 30 Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1999
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He submitted that the Supreme Court has interpreted the
above powers and functions of the Commission in Nigeria Police Force v. Police Service Commission [2023] 95 NSCQR 262
Pt.1 p.318. It was his submission that the Public Service Rules is a
subsidiary legislation subordinate to both the Constitution and the PSC Act, both of which empower the
Defendant to exercise disciplinary control over officers of the NPF and the
Claimant. That Section 18 (8) of the Police Act 2020 relied upon by the
Claimant to claim that his retirement is 60 or 35 years whichever comes earlier
does not exist, having been nullified by the Supreme Court in Nigeria Police Force v. Police Service
Commission (supra).
[17] Learned Counsel submitted on issue 3 that
to be entitled to claim any benefit as a public servant, including as a member
of the NPF, the individual concerned must demonstrate his eligibility to have
been employed into the public service upon which the claim derives. That one of
such eligibility test is the mandatory service under the National Youth Service
Corps (NYSC). Counsel argued that the presentation of NYSC Certificate is a
pre-requisite for employment in the Defendant. That by failing to produce any
evidence of participation or service with the NYSC at the trial, the Claimant
is caught by the imputation that the evidence not produced is unfavourable,
relying on Section 167 (d) of the Evidence Act 2011.
[18] Learned Counsel submitted that the
Claimant is not entitled to the reliefs he is seeking as the Defendant acted in
accordance with its constitutional powers. He submitted that the constitutional powers of the
Defendant do not extend to payment of salaries of Police Officers which is the
responsibility of the NPF who is not a party in this suit, citing AMCON v. Sure Worldwide Ventures Nig. Ltd
and Ors. [2024] LPELR – 62162 (SC). He submitted that no claim of general damages
can be maintained in a suit based on contract. Counsel in conclusion urged the
Court to hold that the Claimant’s case is frivolous, unwarranted, unmeritorious
and liable to be dismissed with a substantial cost of ?10,000,000.00 (Ten
Million Naira).
[19] The Claimant
submitted two issues for determination:
1. Whether having regard to the Constitution of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the Public Service Rules
and the Nigeria Police Act 2020, the Claimant can be compulsorily retired from
the service of the Defendant before attaining the mandatory retirement age of
sixty (60) years or thirty-five (35) years of pensionable service and or have
his employment terminated in the absence of any misconduct.
2. Whether having regard to the circumstances of this case, the
evidence adduced before this Honourable Court, the Claimant is entitled to the
reliefs sought.
[20] Learned Counsel begun by responding to
the Defendant’s issues. He submitted that
the Supreme Court has put the issue regarding the details of a
pre-action notice to rest in Amadi v. NNPC [2000] 10 NWLR (Pt.674) 76, at
p. 110-111. He submitted that the
Defendant’s issue 3 did not emanate from the case or defence made by the
Defendant and should be discountenanced in its entirety. He submitted that the
law is settled that facts elicited under cross-examination which is not based
on the pleading, go to no issue, citing Okwejiminor & Anor. v. Gbakeji [2008]
LPELR-2537 (SC) at P.19.
[21] Learned counsel
submitted on issue one that by the
combined provision of Section 318 (1)
(h) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as
amended), Rule 020810 (i) and (ii)
of the Public Service Rules, 2009 and Section 18 (8) of the Nigeria Police Act,
2020 members of the Nigeria Police Force are Public Servants whose mandatory
retirement age is sixty (60) years (now 65 years by recent amendment to Section
18 (8)) or thirty-five (35) years of pensionable service whichever is earlier.
He submitted that is trite law that where the action of a party such as the
Defendant in this case has been challenged; the Defendant is required to show
where it derived its powers to compulsorily retire and or terminate the
Claimant's employment before his mandatory retirement age, citing P.H.M.B
v. Ejitigba [2000] 11 NWLR (Pt. 677) 154 at 169 Para. D. That the
fact that there is no known law which provides for the compulsory retirement of
Defendant's employees once a junior officer is promoted ahead of a senior, the
evidence of the Claimant is uncontroverted.
[22] Learned Counsel submitted that the
Defendant's action in the purported compulsory retirement of the Claimant was
not only unlawful and against established tradition of the Nigeria Police
Force, but has also frustrated the career progression of the Claimant and it
ought to be declared null and void by the Court, citing P.H.C.N Plc v. Offoelo [2013] 4
NWLR (Pt. 1344) 380 at 409 paras. B-D. That the Defendant's action
in purportedly retiring the Claimant compulsorily before his mandatory
retirement age if not nullified in the instant case would defeat the main
objective of Rule 020810 (i) of
the Public Service Rules which is aimed at protecting employees with
pensionable employment, and he cited Comptroller-General of Customs v. Gusau
[2017] 18 NWLR (1598) 353 at 385 Para. A-G. Counsel argued further that any
employment which is protected by statute must be determined in the way and
manner prescribed by the relevant statute and any other manner of
termination/retirement or removal from office of such employee which is
inconsistent with the statute is therefore null, void and of no effect
whatsoever, citing Ibama v. SPDC Ltd [2005] 17 NWLR (Pt. 954)
364.
[23] Learned Counsel submitted on issue 2 that the Court under Section 19 (b) of the
National Industrial Act, 2006 may in
all other cases and where necessary make any appropriate order, including a
declaratory order and cited
Eperokun v. University of Lagos [1986]
4 NWLR (Pt. 34) 162; and That any promotion done by the Defendant in
disregard to Section 4 (3) of
its own establishment Act, is null and void, conveying no benefit whatsoever.
He submitted that the purported compulsory retirement and or termination of
Claimant's employment before his compulsory retirement age is in violation of
the provision of Rule 020810 (i) of the
Public Service Rules, 2009 and Section
18 (8) of the Police Act, 2020; an exercise in futility which cannot
stand citing UAC Ltd. v. Macfoy [1961] 3ALL
ER 1169.
[24] Learned Counsel argued that the action of
the Defendant in the purported compulsory retirement of the Claimant six (6)
years (now 11 years) prior to his mandatory retirement age notwithstanding
Claimant's willingness to serve his fatherland and reach the peak of his career
amounts to a wrong which requires the exercise of this Court's discretion and
award of general damages against the Defendant, citing Kupolati v. MTN (Nig) Comms Ltd
[2020] 13 NWLR (Pt.1740)1 at 16 paras. B-D. That judicial authorities and the
Rules support the principle that a successful party to a suit should be
entitled to indemnity in form of a cost as cost follows event, relying on Order 55 of the Rules of the Court. In
conclusion, he cited the decision of this Court in AIG Mbu Joseph Mbu v. Police
Service Commission (Unreported), Suit No. NICN/ABJ/198/2017 delivered
on July 3rd, 2023 and urged the Court to follow it and grant all the
Claimant’s reliefs.
Reply
[25] Replying on point of law, learned defence
counsel submitted that the decision in AIG
Mbu Joseph Mbu v. Police Service Commission cannot be followed in the
instant suit for the Claimant must found his action on his right and
entitlement and not on that of another person. He submitted that NPF v. Police Service Commission [2023] 95
NSCQR 262 (Pt. 1) p. 318 interpreted the functions and powers of the
Defendant, and Section 18 of the Nigeria Police Act, 2020 was not considered in
AIG Mbu Joseph Mbu v. Police Service
Commission by the Court. He urged the Court to dismiss the Claimant’s
claims in its entirety.
Decision
[26] I have carefully considered the
originating processes, the evidence adduced, the submissions of Counsel and
authorities relied on by parties in their final addresses. I will begin with
the preliminary issues raised in the final address of the Defendant. The first
is the issue of the pre-action notice. The Defendant asserts that the Claimant
failed to issue a pre-action notice within the meaning and
letters of the Police Service Commission Act. This being a jurisdictional issue
is a fundamental and threshold issue. A Court is only competent to entertain a
case when the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there
is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its
jurisdiction; and the case comes before the Court initiated by the due process
of law upon the fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of
jurisdiction. See Madukolu v Nkemdilim
(1962) NSCC 374 at 379-380, Ogara
v Dialoke (2019) 11 NWLR (Pt 1683) 191.
[27] Section
20 (3) and (4) and Section 21 of the Police Service Commission (Establishment,
etc) Act, 2001 provides:
(3) No suit shall be commenced
against a member of the Commission, the Secretary, officer or employee of the
Commission before the expiration of a period of one month after written notice
of intention to commence the suit shall have been served upon the Commission by
the intending plaintiff or his agent.
(4) The notice referred to in
Subsection (3) shall clearly and explicitly state the cause of action, the
particulars of the claim, the name and place of abode of the intending
plaintiff and the relief, which he claims.
Section 21:
A notice,
summons or other document required or authorized to be served upon the
commission under the provisions of this Act or any other law or enactment may
be served by delivering it to the Secretary or by sending it by registered post
and addressed to the Secretary at the principal office of the Commission.
[28] The point to note is that the Claimant has not
initiated this suit against a member of the Commission as provided in Section
20(3). Rather, the suit is instituted against the Police Service Commission.
That notwithstanding, the Claimant by exhibit C6 instructed his counsel to
write a letter to the Defendant through the Defendant’s Secretary outlining his
grievances. He expressly stated that: “this letter serves as our Pre-Action
Notice thereof.” The Defendant
wrote to acknowledge receipt of this pre-action notice by exhibit C7. Now, a pre-action notice is a form of notice issued by an
aggrieved person which is expected to be formally served on the other party
before the commencement of an action, The purpose and nature of a pre-action
notice is to bring the grievance of the Claimant to the notice of the Defendant
who would then be in a position to decide whether or not to settle and
compromise the claim or allow the matter to go to Court, and has the benefit
and advantage of either invoking the discretion or not; see International Tobacco Co Plc v NAFDAC
[2007] 10 NWLR (Pt 1043) 613 at 631-632 para F-F.
[29] The pre-action notice must meet all the
conditions laid down in the statute stating the reasons why the aggrieved party
is instituting a legal action against the opponent, intimate the opponent of
what to expect or be confronted with should the action proceed to Court, see Nigerian Ports Ltd v SES [2016] 17 NWLR (pt
1541) 191. I find the contents of the
letter are in compliance with the provisions of Section 20 (4) of the Police
Service Commission Act, see Amadi v NNPC (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt 674) 76 at 110 -111
The Defendant is not in doubt as to the cause of action and the particulars of
the claim. I hold that the Claimant issued the Defendant with a pre-action
notice. The Court is not deprived of jurisdiction to entertain and determine
this matter.
[30]
The second preliminary issue is the failure to tender documentary evidence of
service under the National Youth Service Corp Act raised in the Defendant’s
final address as issue 3. There are no pleadings by either party on the issue
of NYSC certificate by the Claimant. The law is settled that facts elicited
under cross examination that is not based on pleadings goes to no issue, see Okwejiminor v Gbakeji (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt
1079) 172 at 212 – 213 para F-A; (2008) LPELR-2537 (SC) 19. This issue is
discountenanced in its entirety.
[31] The law is settled that in the determination
of the employment rights, it is the employee who complains that his/her
employment contract has been breached that has the burden to place before the
Court the terms and conditions of his/her employment that provides for his/her
rights and obligations; and the manner such terms and conditions were breached.
See Buka Modu Aji v Chad Basin Development Authority & Anor [2015] 3-4
SC (Pt. III) 1 at 15, Oforishe v Nigerian Gas Co Ltd (2017)
LPELR-42766 (SC), Nigeria
Security Printing & Minting Plc v Charles Umoh [2022] LPELR-56924 (CA) Idoniboye-Obe v. NNPC [2003] 2 NWLR (Pt. 805) 589 at 630. The Claimant has placed before the Court his
statutory declaration of age (Exhibit C1), letter of appointment as a Cadet ASP
(Exhibit C2), University degree certificate (Exhibit C3), letter of promotion
to DIG (Exhibit C4), notification of compulsory retirement (Exhibit C5),
Solicitor’s letter/pre-action notice (Exhibit C6), Defendant’s acknowledgement
(Exhibit C7), newspaper/on line publications (Exhibit C8). The Defendant placed
before the Court extracts from minutes of the 21st plenary meeting
(Exhibit D1).
[32] I will adopt the issues formulated
by the Claimant as they encompass all the issues submitted by the parties for
adjudication. They are reproduced below for ease of reference:
1. Whether having regard to the Constitution of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the Public Service Rules
and the Nigeria Police Act 2020, the Claimant can be compulsorily retired from
the service of the Defendant before attaining the mandatory retirement age of
sixty (60) years or thirty-five (35) years of pensionable service and or have
his employment terminated in the absence of any misconduct.
2. Whether having regard to the circumstances of this case, the
evidence adduced before this Honourable Court, the Claimant is entitled to the
reliefs sought.
[33] By Section 318 of the 1999
Constitution as amended, “Public service of the Federation” means service of
the Federation in any capacity in respect of the Government of the Federation,
and includes service as:
(h)
Members or Officers of the armed forces of the federation or the Nigerian
Police Force….
The Public Service Rules (PSR) regulate the conditions of service of
Federal Public Servants. They invest the Public Servant, over whom they
prevail, a legal status, which places their employment over and above the
common law relationship of master and servant; and introduces in such employment
relationship, the vires element of administrative law; see Comptroller-General of Customs v. Gusau
[2017] 18 NWLR 353 at 385 paras A-G; P.H.C.N Plc v. Offoelo [2013] 4
NWLR (Pt. 1344) 380, Iderima v. RSCSC [2005] 16 NWLR (Pt. 951)
378, Shitta-Bey v Federal Public Service Commission [1981] 1 SC 26 at 35, Stephen
Imuzei Akhiojemi & Anor v. Administrative Staff College of Nigeria &
Anor [2014] 43 NLLR (Pt. 135) 240. I find that the Claimant’s appointment
is one with statutory flavor.
[34]
The Public Service Rules have
been made pursuant to the powers conferred by the 1999 Constitution (as
amended) and have constitutional force, see Comptroller-General
Of Customs v Gusau (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt 1598) 353 at 385 Para. A-G, where the
Supreme Court per Ejembi Eko JSC succinctly stated the legal status and the aim
of the Public Service Rules as follows:
It
is crystal clear from the express provisions of section 153(1)(a), 159(1), and
160, read together with paragraph II of the Third Schedule, of the 1999
Constitution, (as amended) that the Public Service Rules are made pursuant to
the powers conferred on the Federal Civil Service Commission by the
Constitution. See Civil Service Commission v. J.O. Laoye (1989) 4 SC (Pt.11) 1;
(1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 106) 652. They are accordingly a bye-law of the
Constitution. They have been made with the main object and intention of
protecting officers, particularly those holding pensionable employment, in the Public Service of the Federation.
[35] The Claimant is a
public officer, with the rank of Deputy Inspector General in the Nigeria Police
Force. The gravamen of his complaint is that the Defendant without complying
with the regulations in the Public Service Rules, specifically Rule 020810, and
Section 18 (8) of the Nigeria Police Act which both provide that an officer
shall retire from service upon attaining the age of 60 years or thirty-five
(35) years in service whichever is earlier compulsorily retired him when he had
not attained 60 years or 35 years in service, and when there was no allegation
of wrong doing against him. The evidence adduced (exhibit C1) reveals that the
Claimant was born on 1st June 1970. He
would therefore attain the age of 60 years on 1st June 2030. It is
the evidence of the Claimant that the Defendant first announced his compulsory
retirement on the media through newspaper/on line publications on the 28th
August 2023 (Exhibit C8) before he received the letter through the Force
Secretary. The newspaper/on line publications on the 28th August
2023 announced the Claimant’s compulsory retirement together with 3 other
Deputy Inspector-Generals of Police for violating police tradition, and
disloyalty (Exhibit C8). The Defendant failed to provide a shred of evidence to
justify the on line publications.
[36] The official letter
of notification of compulsory retirement (C5) is reproduced as follows:
PSC/CHR/IGP/VOL.1/094 25th
August, 2023
AP. NO. 46489 DIG Moses
Ambakina Jitoboh, mni
Department of Information
and Communication Technology,
The Nigeria Police Force,
Force Headquarters,
Abuja.
LETTER OF
NOTIFICATION OF COMPULSORY RETIREMENT
In
consonance with Section 6 of the Police Service Commission Act, 2001, para d,
e, & f, which empowered the commission to formulate and implement policies
aimed at efficiency and discipline to the Nigeria Police Force, as well as
identifying factors inhibiting or undermining discipline in the NPF, you are by
this letter officially notified and mandated to proceed on compulsory
retirement from the service of the Nigeria Police Force, with immediate effect
from Friday, 25th August 2023.
2. This decision of the Commission is
premised on the fact that you were senior to the acting Inspector-General of
Police, prior to his appointment on 19th June, 2023. Consequently, it is imperative that
discipline which is the bedrock of the NPF is upheld, aimed at discouraging
status reversal which is inherently dangerous to the exercise of authority by
the Inspector-General of police.
3. While wishing you a successful life in
retirement, you are to note that your contributions to peace and security of
our country, Nigeria, are appreciated, please.
Dr.
Solomon E. Arase, CFR, NPM, fdc, FCIArb,
Inspector-General
of Police (rtd)
Chairman
Police
Service Commission
[37] The reason given for
the compulsory retirement of the Claimant with immediate effect is: “that you
were senior to the acting Inspector-General of Police, prior to his appointment
on 19th June 2023”. This is not evidence of wrongdoing by the
Claimant. The Claimant asserts that the Defendant had no valid Board to take
any decision purporting to retire or promote any Police Officer. There is no
evidence of this before the Court. The Defendant has placed before the Court
extracts of minutes of its 21st Plenary meeting held on 7th
July 2023. The meeting considered the memorandum on re-organization of the
Nigeria Police Force following the appointment of a new Inspector General of
Police. It is stated in the extract of the minutes that there is no policy in
the Nigeria Police Force unlike the Armed Forces where superiors were by
tradition and policy expected to tender their resignations on the appointment
of their juniors as Service Chiefs. The meeting decided that DIG’s who were
senior to or at co-ordinate level with the Acting Inspector-General of Police
should voluntarily retire from Force on or before Friday 14th July
2023; and that on failure to comply, the Commission should retire the affected
DIG’s in the public interest with effect from the 14th July 2023.
[38] It is my considered
view that the reasons proffered in the extract from the minutes, and the notice
of compulsory retirement are at best mere statements of policy intent. They
have no force of law, and they are in conflict with the provisions of the
Public Service Rule 020810, and Section 18 (8) of the Nigeria Police Act which
read together provide that the compulsory retirement age for all grades of
officers in the public service shall be 60 years or 35 years of pensionable
service whichever is earlier. I find from the extract of the minutes that it is
not the custom of the Nigeria Police, and there is no policy that senior
officers are expected to tender their resignation on the appointment of their
junior as Inspector General of Police. It is imperative on the Defendant to
show the Court where it derived its powers to compulsorily retire the Claimant
who is a public officer with no blemish, thereby terminating his appointment
before the constitutional/statutory mandatory retirement age, see PHMB v Ejitigba (2000) 11 NWLR (Pt 677) 154
at 169. The Defendant has not shown this to the Court. Furthermore, the
Defendant has not placed any evidence before the Court showing that it notified
the Claimant to voluntarily retire from service on or before Friday 14th
July 2023. The Defendant did not compulsorily retire the Claimant on or before
Friday 14th July 2023 in the public interest as stated in the
extracts of the minutes (Exhibit D1). The evidence before the Court is that the
Claimant first heard about his compulsory retirement from the media on August
28, 2023 before he received the notification dated 25th August 2023.
[39] I find that the
Claimant has been in the service of the Nigeria Police Force since 1994 without
any allegations of wrongdoing in the course of his duties; nor has he been
found wanting in the performance of his duties. There is no evidence before the
Court that the position of Deputy Inspector General in the Police Force has
been abolished. The state of the law today is that the Claimant cannot be
compulsorily retired from service by the Defendant unless he has attained 60
years of age, or has spent 35 years in service whichever is earlier, see Comptroller-General Of Customs v Gusau supra.
The Defendant in its letter of compulsory retirement appreciates the Claimant’s
“contributions to peace and security of our country, Nigeria.” This is
indicative of the fact that the Claimant discharged his duties creditably. He
was not compulsorily retired in the public interest as there would have to be
proof of public interest and justification before the Court in such a
situation.
[40] The Claimant
testified that in the history of the Nigerian Police Force there is in
existence evidence that when a junior officer is appointed to a higher rank,
his seniors are not compulsorily retired but allowed to serve in different
capacities until retirement and he gave several instances and named the
officers in his deposition. All of this evidence is unchallenged, deemed
admitted, and must be accepted by the Court, see Elizabeth Mabamije v Hans Wolfgang Otto [2016] LPELR-26058 (SC).
This corroborates the extract of the minutes that there is no policy in the
Nigeria Police Force where superiors are by tradition and policy expected to
tender their resignations on the appointment of their juniors as Inspector
General of Police.
[41] I find that on the
25th August 2023 the date the Claimant was compulsorily retired, he
had not attained the age of 60 years, or spent 35 years in service; neither was
he found wanting in the discharge of his duties. There is no evidence of wrong
doing against the Claimant before the Court. The Claimant would have spent 35
years in service on 10th June 2029, and would be 60 years on 1st
June 2030. Therefore, the Claimant would qualify for retirement on 10th
June 2029 after 35 years in service, being earlier than 60 years as provided by
the Public Service Rules. Now, to force a Public Officer into retirement before
he gets to retirement age is an unusual action against him, see PHMB v Ejitagha supra. The Public Service Rules are to
engender in the Public Officer security of tenure that is psychologically
needed for patriotic and honest discharge of his/her duties especially as in
this instance a Senior Police Officer,
Comptroller-General Of Customs v Gusau supra. The Claimant is a career Police Officer of the established and
pensionable cadre who is guaranteed security of tenure by the Public Service
Rules.
[42] I hold that the
Claimant’s premature compulsory retirement through newspaper publications, and
by the letter of notification (exhibit C5) is unlawful, null and void and of no
effect, his employment being one with statutory flavor. See P.H.C.N Plc v. Offoelo [2013] 4 NWLR (Pt.
1344) 380 at 409 paras B-D, Comptroller-General
of Customs v. Gusau supra, AIG
Mbu Joseph Mbu v Police Service Commission (unreported) Suit No:
NICN/ABJ/198/2017 judgment delivered July 3, 2023. The compulsory
retirement of the Claimant as Deputy Inspector General of Police on the 25th
August 2023 by the Defendant vide Exhibit C5 is hereby set aside.
[43]
The Claimant is entitled to automatic reinstatement; and he remains Deputy
Inspector General of Police up until 10th June 2029
when he would have served for 35 years.
He is entitled to his salaries, allowances, and the perquisites of his rank and
office as Deputy Inspector General from the 25th August 2023. It is
ordered that the Claimant be paid all his outstanding salaries and allowances,
see Shitta-Bey v Federal Public
Service Commission [1981] 1 SC 40, Idoniboye-Obu v NNPC [2003] 2 NWLR (Pt 805)
589; PHCN Plc v. Offoelo [2013] 4 NWLR (Pt 1344) 380.
[44] The Claimant has
asked for an award of general damages. General damages are the damages that the
law presumes to be the consequence of the act complained of and unlike special
damages, a claim for general damages does not need to be specifically pleaded
and specially proved by evidence. The award is quantified by what in the
opinion of a reasonable person is considered adequate loss or inconvenience
that flows naturally, as generally presumed by law from the wrongful act of the
Defendant; see Kupolati v MTN (Nig) Comms
Ltd [2020] 13 NWLR (Pt 1740) 1 at 16 para B-D; Diamond Bank Plc v. Wellcare Alliance Ltd [2015] LPELR-40762 at 27-28.
[45] There can be no
doubt that the premature compulsory retirement of the Claimant after years of
meritorious service to his Country, and when no wrongdoing was found against
him has caused him embarrassment and pain. His appointment was abruptly terminated
and this carries a stigma that will be with him for the rest of his life; his
career progression suddenly came to a halt, his dignity and self worth as Deputy Inspector General of Police no doubt
affected. The Claimant is entitled to
an award of general damages pursuant to the provisions of section 19 (d) of the
National Industrial Court Act 2006. I award the Claimant general damages in the
sum of N50 Million Naira (Fifty Million Naira) for the embarrassment, pain and
stigma caused by the wrongful action of the Defendant.
[46] The Claimant has
proved his case. I hereby Declare and make following Orders:
a) It is Declared that the compulsory retirement of the Claimant
as Deputy Inspector-General of Police by the Defendant before his mandatory 60
years retirement age or 35 years in service by a letter dated 25th
August, 2023 is wrongful, unlawful, null and void, and is a violation of Rule
020810 of the Public Service Rules and Section 18 (8) of the Nigeria Police Act
2020, respectively. The compulsory retirement of the Claimant is hereby set
aside.
b) The letter of notification of compulsory
retirement dated 25th August 2023 with reference number
PSC/CHR/IGP/Vol 1/094 is set aside.
c) It is Declared that the Claimant was and remains an officer
of the Nigeria Police Force until the 10th day of June, 2029 when he
would have attained 35 years in service and be qualified for retirement.
d) The Claimant is reinstated into the Force with
effect from 25th August 2023 and is entitled to all his salaries and
allowances. It is ordered that the Claimant be paid his outstanding salaries
and allowances immediately.
e) The Defendant is ordered to pay the Claimant
general damages in the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira).
f)
Costs
awarded that Claimant in the sum of N750,000.00 (Seven Hundred and Fifty
Thousand Naira).
Judgment is entered accordingly.
_______________________________
Hon Justice O. A. Obaseki-Osaghae