IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP, PHD, OFR, bpa PRESIDENT, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

DATE: 18 MARCH 2026                                                               

SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/165/2024

BETWEEN

1. The Incorporated Trustees of National Association of Plants Operators (NAPO)
2. Comrade Harold I. Bestowe
3. Comrade Onyeka Chukwudi Christopher
4. Comrade Christian Ifeanyichukwu Uwuamaiam (For themselves and on behalf of members of National

Association of Plants Operators (NAPO)) - Claimants

 

AND

1. Minister of Labour and Employment
2. Registrar of Trade Unions
3. National Union of Civil Engineering Construction,

Furniture & Wood Workers (NUCECFWW) - Defendants

 

REPRESENTATION

Marx Ikongbeh, with Miss Sylvia Nkemakosi and Miss Victoria Uche, for the claimants.

A. O. Igeh, withMrs F. H. Maikano and J. O. Ameh, for the 3rd defendant. No legal representation for the 1st and 2nd defendants.

 

RULING

INTRODUCTION

1. The claimant filed this suit on 21 June 2024 vide an originating summons, which originating summons was later amended. By the amended originating summons, the claimant posed two questions for the determination of the Court, namely:
   1. Whether having regard to sections (sic) 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and the International Labour Organization Convention No. 87, the 1st Claimant can be registered as a trade union to represent the interest of the 2nd to 4th claimants and their members who are plants operators in Nigeria, notwithstanding the provision of sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the Trade Union (sic) Act.
   2. Whether on a proper construction of sections (sic) 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and the International Labour Organization Convention No. 87, the claimants and all members of the 1st claimant have a civil right to join any Association or Trade Union of their choice for the protection of their interests.

 

2. The claimants then prayed for the following reliefs against the defendants:
3. A DECLARATION that by the provisions of sections (sic) 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and the International Labour Organisation Convention No. 87, the 1st claimant can be registered as a trade union to represent the interest of the 2nd to 4th claimants and the members of the 1st Claimant who are plants operators in Nigeria, notwithstanding the provision of sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the Trade Union (sic).
4. A DECLARATION that pursuant to sections (sic) 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and the International Labour Organization Convention No. 87, the claimants and all members of the 1st claimant have a civil right to join any Association or Trade Union of their choice.
5. A DECLARATION that considering the provisions of sections (sic) 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and the International Labour Organisation Convention No. 87, the claimants and any member of the 1st claimant cannot be compelled to belong to any Trade Union or association against their wishes.
6. AN ORDER directing the Registrar of Trade Unions, the 2nd defendant in this case, to register the 1st claimant as a Trade Union and issue her with the certificate of registration to represent the interest of the 2nd to 4th claimants and the members of the 1st Claimant who are plants operators in Nigeria without any further delay.
7. SUCH FURTHER ORDERS as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case.

 

 

 

 

 

 

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANTS

 

 

 

 

 

 

13. That the other factors which necessitated the filing of this action as alluded to earlier led to the filing of a sister suit on the same day in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/166/2024. However, at the hearing of 10 April 2025, the Court drew the claimants’ attention to the possibility of abuse of process in the separate filling of the two suits and the claimants’ counsel withdrew Suit No. NICN/ABJ/166/2024 with the intention of amending this suit to include all the issues in one Suit. That the Court graciously granted the claimants the opportunity to put their house in order, while

 

also allowing the application to amend the originating summons to include the present 3rd defendant.

 

 

 

16. The claimants’ position is that this Suit is not caught by statute-bar on 2 distinct grounds, namely:
    1. Time has not begun to run in absence of an action by 1st Defendant.
    2. Okoronkwo v. INEC is not applicable to the present case.

 

 

 

(2) Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person, for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act; Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect:

(a) The action, prosecution shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within months (sic) next after the damage ceasing thereof.

 

 

 

 

 

24. As to whether Okoronkwo v. INEC applies to the instant case (the second issue), the claimants submitted that Okoronkwo v. INEC was handed down by the Supreme Court on 7 February 2025 but it was reported in the Nigerian Weekly Law Report only on 19 May 2025. That it stirred quite some excitement in the labour law jurisprudence circles as the reports indicate that the Supreme Court held that statute of limitation now applies to labour and employment matters. That the question of the applicability of the statute of limitation including the POPA to labour and employment before this Court has recently been in a state of flux, with every new decision emanating from the apex Court seeming to cast the position hither and thither. However, a careful reading of the many decisions of the Supreme Court on the point, will show that the question of applicability of statute of limitation including the POPA and the Limitation Act to labour and employment matters is not a blanket question, but rather it varies with the status of the employment and the parties to the employment.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

31. That it is in this light that Okoronkwo v. INEC must be viewed. That the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether POPA applies to breach of contract of employment. That the Court was emphatic in holding that POPA only applies to contracts of employment of public

 

officers (i.e. contracts with statutory flavour) but not to simple contracts of master-servant relationship. To the claimants, when Okoronkwo v. INEC is viewed within its context, it does not make a blanket postulation that statute of limitation apply willy nilly in all labour and employment matters. That the decision is confined to the question of whether it applies in employment of public officers. That as can be seen, in the matter, what has arisen, it not a question of employment but rather of registration of a trade union under the provisions of the TUA, thus the decision in Okoronnkwo v. INEC is not directly material. However, that the action is not caught by the provisions of POPA since the 1st defendant has failed to act till date and there is no definite date to compute limitation from.

 

The claimants are lawyers. They belong to a body called, the Law Officers Association of Nigeria (LOAN). This body consists of all lawyers serving in Minister of Justice of the 36 States of the Federation and the Federal Ministry of Justice. On 29 June 2012, they applied to be registered as a trade union under the Trade Unions Act (TUA) Cap T14 LFN 2004. The Registrar of Trade Unions (RTU) declined vide a letter dated 19 September 2012. The claimant, as members of the LOAN, appealed against the decision of the RTU to the Minister of Labour and Employment. No immediate response from the Minister of Labour was received until 3 November 2021 when the claimants received a reply from the Minister of Labour declining their request for registration.

 

The letter from the Minister of Labour asked the claimants to align with the Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria (JUSUN), the 4th Defendant in this matter.

 

Exhibit B, dated 13 November 2018, is the appeal by LOAN to the Minister of Labour against the decision of the RTU not to register LOAN as a trade union. In Exhibit B, the claimants apologized for not following up the matter and gave the reason for this as the “tussles for a change of our leadership”. Exhibits C, D and E are reminders from LOAN. Exhibit F, dated 21 June 2021, is a letter from LOAN to the Attorney-General of the Federation & Minister of Justice, the 3rd defendant in this suit, seeking the intervention of the Attorney-General of the Federation in the matter.

 

34. The claimants then urged the Court to take judicial notice of this and resolve the issue in their favour. That a public officer who has not carried out his duties in compliance with the law is not

 

entitled to shelter under the provisions of POPA. That the habitual posture of the 1st defendant to neglect appeals duly filed to his office is not compatible with the faithful discharge of his duties and cannot be used to now deprive the claimants of their rights.

 

 

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE 3RD DEFENDANT

 

 

 

39. It is 3rd defendant’s submission that the factual circumstance that given rise to the 1st claimant’s instant suit as can be seen from the originating summons and the accompanying affidavit is Exhibit C, the 1st defendant’s letter dated 11 November 2013. That Exhibits D and E, the 1st claimant’s appeal letters to the 1st defendant, did not constitute or add up to the cause of action having regards to the claims of the claimant on record. That there is no relief or claim with respect to the said appeal upon which any finding of fact can be made in favour of the 1st claimant with respect to the cause of action more so that the 1st claimant did not commence this action within 90 days after Exhibit E, the letter dated 4 February 2014. That the fact of the 1st defendant having not considered the 1st claimant’s appeal did not give rise to any enforceable claim for the claimants. Exhibit E, the 1st claimant’s letter dated 4 February 2014, did not and

 

cannot give rise to an enforceable claim — and even if it does, the inordinate delay or failure of the claimants to commence action until 2024, after 10 (ten) years is fatal.

 

 

 

 

COURT’S DECISION

43. I took time to consider the processes and submissions of the claimant and the 3rd defendant. The issue at stake is whether this suit is not statute-barred given section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act (POPA). It was raised suo motu by the Court. See Yau-Yau v. APC & ors [2023] LPELR-60287(SC), which held that because the issue of statute-bar touches on the jurisdiction of the court, it can be raised suo motu by the court. The 1st and 2nd defendants are public officers and so qualify as such under POPA given the authority of Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State & ors [1998] 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1; [1998] 12 SC 20. The law as to whether a matter is statute-barred is to determine when the cause of action arose, and when the suit was filed. See Olateju v. Commissioner for Lands & Housing, Kwara State & ors [2024] LPELR-62589(SC). By Incorporated Trustees of Roman Catholic Diocese of Kano v. Ministry of Lands and Physical Planning, Kano State & ors [2024] LPELR-80084(CA), in determining the issue when a cause of action becomes statute-barred, the Court must confine itself to only the processes filed by the plaintiff and not averments contained in other processes, be they even affidavits, of the defendants. If the period within which the suit was filed is more than 3 months since the cause of

 

action arose, then the suit will be held to be statute-barred. See Owoniyi v. Aiyewumi & ors [2025] LPELR-81500(SC).

 

In University of Port Harcourt v. Mr Edwin Chira Nwuzor [2024] LPELR-62382(SC), Hon. Justice Ogunwumiju, JSC rationalised the limitation law in these words:

The Limitation Act or Law sets out the time when an action can be brought and in the case of the Public Officers Protection Act, is meant to protect the government from stale claims. It also protects individual defendants from the injustice inherent in defending one's settled legal or factual position after evidence or memory of witnesses have faded and one has adjusted one's position and done far reaching things with a believe in the factual and legal authority to do so. In this case, the Public Officers Protection Act by Section 2(a) gives a Plaintiff only a period of 3 months within which to complain. The calculation of the 3 months is usually from the date when the cause of action arose and the violation complained of by the Plaintiff has completed. The Plaintiff must seek redress in a Court of law within the 3 months, after which the action becomes unenforceable.

 

[2025] LPELR-80425(SC); [2025] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1991) 131 specifically held thus:

A cause of action could be said to be statute-barred, where the proceedings cannot be commenced because the period prescribed under the law of limitation has already lapsed. And this can be determined simply by critically, albeit dispassionately, considering the originating process (the writ of summons and the statement of claim, or originating summons or motion, and the supporting Affidavit), alleging when the wrong was actually committed, thereby giving the Plaintiff a cause of action. Thus, once the date on which the Originating process was filed is beyond the period prescribed by the limitation law, then the action is deemed to be statute-barred.

 

 

Michael Idachaba & ors v. The University of Agriculture, Makurdi [2021] LPELR-53081(SC), which relied on INEC v. Ogbadibo Local Govt. & ors [2015] LPELR-24839(SC), reiterated thus:

…In all actions, suits and other proceedings at law and equity, the diligent and careful actor or suitor is favoured to the prejudice to him who is careless and slothful, who sleeps over his rights. The law may therefore deny relief to a party who by his conduct has acquiesced or assented to the infraction of his rights, or has led the opposite party responsible for or guilty of such infringement to believe that he has waived or abandoned

 

his right…It is therefore trite that where the law prescribes a period for instituting an action, proceedings cannot be instituted after the prescribed period.

Justice Adah, JSC summed up by holding that it is “settled that the Public Officers' Protection Act is applicable to issues of employment with statutory flavour such as the employment of the appellant in the instant case”.

 

 

 

The law is that where this Court delivers a decision that is at variance and different from a previous or earlier decision/s on an issue, the effect is that the subsequent decision is deemed to have over-ruled or departed from the previous or earlier decision/s.

 

 

 

 

 

54. By paragraph 24 of the supporting affidavit, the claimants wrote more reminders/appeals between 13 October 2018 and 31 January 2023 — Exhibits F, G, H and I. Of note is Exhibit F dated 13 October 2018, written to the 1st defendant but indicated that it is for attention of The Director Trade Union Services and Industrial Relations. Exhibit F is a further appeal against the refusal to register the 1st claimant as a trade union, notification of the amendment of the 1st claimant’s constitution, notification of dissolution of former trustees, as well as National Officers and State Executive Officers, of the 1st claimant and nomination of new ones, change of the word “Plant” to “Plants” in the name of the 1st claimant, and change of physical address of the 1st claimant. Exhibit F, unlike Exhibits D and E, which were each signed by just one person, was signed by three persons i.e. the National President General, General Secretary and National

 

Trustee. And more importantly, there is evidence on the face of it that it was received on 26 October 2018 by the office of The Director Trade Union Services and Industrial Relations.

 

 

 

 

 

59. Dr Moses U. Anolam v. The Federal University of Technology Owerri (FUTO) & ors (supra) was quite emphatic that in all actions, suits and other proceedings at law and equity, it is the diligent and careful actor or suitor that is favoured to the prejudice of him who is careless and slothful, who sleeps over his rights. As such, the law may, therefore, deny relief to a party who by his conduct has acquiesced or assented to the infraction of his rights, or has led the opposite party responsible for or guilty of such infringement to believe that he has waived or abandoned his right. Since there is no proof that Exhibits D and E of 24 November 2013 and 4 February 2014 respectively were actually received by the 1sr defendant, the natural inference is that the claimants slept over their rights and so cannot argue against the application of POPA to their instant case. They were thus careless and slothful, they slept over their rights, acquiesced or

 

assented to the infraction of their right, and have led the defendants to believe that they have waived or abandoned their right.

 

Let me further reiterate the settled position of the law that for purposes of limitation law, intervening acts, such as the letters written by the Appellant in 2011 and 2012 pleading for review of his demotion, do not count when the period of limitation is being computed, unless provision is made in the rules that before resort to Court, some laid down internal mechanisms must be exhausted.

 

v. Yusuf & ors [2019] LPELR-47918(SC) and Oteri Holdings Ltd v. Oluwa [2021] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1766) 334, would stress the point in these words: “…when the period of limitation begins to run, it does not cease to run merely because the parties engaged in discussions, consultations or negotiations”.

 

 

63. And because the employee/his counsel knows that he should have filed the suit and still negotiate, the rationale offered by Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra) that an employer raising limitation law against an employee immediately after failed negotiations “would amount to breach of good faith and will therefore constitute unfair labour practice in afront of S. 254C-(1)(f) of the Constitution and Art 8(3) of the ILO C158”, is not persuasive in my humble opinion. And I do not think it follows, as Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra) asked us, to “…note that these victims must allow the negotiations to take place before filing actions in courts”. Unless where

 

specifically allowed by law [and I do not think Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra) gave any], in which event Sirajo, JCA’s proviso in Okebu v. Delta State Judicial Service Commission & anor will come to play, I am not aware that a victim is enjoined to allow negotiation take place before he can sue. As I will indicate later in this ruling, even the ILO jurisprudence on access to labour justice acknowledges that the right to judicial review and appeal as well as the right to a hearing with due guarantees and within reasonable time and precise conditions for any derogation are components of access to (labour) justice. See paragraph 34 of ILO - Access to labour justice for all: Prevention and resolution of labour disputes (Governance and Tripartism Department, Geneva, 2025), a Report the tripartite technical meeting in Geneva on Access to Justice for All, which held from 17 to 21 February 2025, available at  https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2025-01/TMALJ-2025-

%5BGOVERNANCE-241107-001%5D-Web-EN.pdf as accessed on 1 March 2026. I say more on this later, mindful of Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra), which held that the 3-month limitation period laid down by section 2(a) of POPA is short and so unreasonable. But is the 3-month limitation period for public employment really unreasonable? Why would a litigant wait beyond 3 months, upon the occurrence of a cause of action, to file an action?

 

 

65. The Court in Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra) had asked whether given statutorily imposed Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms such as the processes laid out in Part I of the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) imply, section 2(a) of POPA would apply to an action coming to the NICN freshly for the first time after failed ADR sessions ordained by the TDA, which might drag beyond three months. In the first place, it is most unlikely that any matter that went through the processes of Part I of the TDA would come “to the NIC freshly for the first time” even if the ADR processes failed as the Court put. Those matters can only come to the NICN on referral by the Honorable Minister of Labour and

 

Employment. Secondly, should even the scenario played out by the Court in Dr Mrs Regina Eze

v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra) be the case, the doubts expressed therein would be resolved by Sirajo, JCA’s qualification in Okebu v. Delta State Judicial Service Commission & anor (supra) i.e. “unless provision is made in the rules that before resort to Court, some laid down internal mechanisms must be exhausted”.

 

2(d) if in the opinion of the court the plaintiff has not given the defendant a sufficient opportunity of tendering amends before the commencement of the proceeding, the court may award to the defendant all the costs which he has properly incurred in defending the action.

 

 

 

69. The argument of the claimants that in the instant case time has not begun to run in the absence of an action by the 1st defendant is not supported even by section 2(a) of POPA, which talks of “neglect” and “default”. When adopting their written address, the claimants made an

 

issue of especially the 1st defendant’s failure to act on their appeal, arguing that this failure to act is not covered by POPA. In other words, POPA applies only as to acts, not omissions or failure to act. Once again the claimants’ logic here is baffling. Section 2(a) of POPA as quoted by the claimants at paragraph 4.4 of their written address talks of “act, neglect or default”. POPA did not restrict itself to only acts, it also covers “neglect” and “default”.

 

70. The New Oxford American Dictionary defines the word neglect thus:
    • as a verb: “fail to care for properly”, “not pay proper attention to”, “disregard”, and “fail to do something”.
    • as a noun: “the state or fact of being uncared for”, “the action of not taking proper care of someone or something”, and “failure to do something”.

The applicable definition for present purposes is “fail to do something” and “failure to do something”.

 

 

v. Aiyewumi & ors (spurs).

 

 

74. What do I make of all this? Two findings are self-evident here. Firstly, the claimants cannot be said to have appealed against the non-registration as a trade union of the 1st claimant within

 

the 30-day period given by Exhibit C. This being so, the claimants have no cause of action at all. Secondly, even if Exhibits D and E were received by the 1st defendant, only Exhibit D dated 24 November 2013 is within the 30-day period that Exhibit C gave. This means that the date of Exhibit D i.e. 24 November 2013 is the date that the cause of action of the claimants arose, for which they has 3 months within which to file any action against the defendants. By the time Exhibit E was supposedly written i.e. 4 February 2014, the claimants should have been approaching this Court, not appealing. Okebu v. Delta State Judicial Service Commission & anor (supra) is quite specific that pleas for review do not stop the running of time. This means that the claimant’s appeals did not stop the running of time. And I so hold.

 

 

 

 

78. Specifically, the claimants argued that when Okoronkwo v. INEC is viewed within its context, it does not make a blanket postulation that statute of limitation applies willy nilly in all labour and employment matters. That the decision is confined to the question of whether it applies in employment of public officers. That as can be seen, in the matter, what has arisen, it is not a question of employment but rather of registration of a trade union under the provisions of the TUA, thus the decision in Okoronkwo v. INEC is not directly material. Accordingly, that this suit is not caught by the provisions of POPA since the 1st defendant has failed to act till date and there is no definite date to compute the limitation period from.

 

 

 

The expression in the Section [i.e. section 2(a) of POPA] reproduced “…against any person for any act…” demonstrates the fallacy in the contention that the protection under the Act is restricted to the public officer whose act or neglect gave rise to the suit. In my view, a defendant sued alone or together with the public officer whose act or omission is questioned is entitled to raise and rely on the defence under the Act, irrespective of its title. However, a non-public officer raising the defence in a purported status of a public officer would lose not because he is not entitled to it but because he does not possess the status in which he raised the defence…

 

 

The fundamental essence of the Public Officers Protection Act is the protection of public officers. The appellant herein is not a public officer. The 2nd sets of respondents who are public officers have not expressed any grouse against the judgment of the trial Court.

 

They objected to the jurisdiction of the trial Court on a different ground and were overruled. They did not appeal against the said decision neither did they appeal against the final judgment. The appellant not being a public officer has no benefit to derive from the protection offered by the Public Officers Protection Act and thereby rendering the issue academic as it resolves no real conflict between the parties in this appeal.

 

84 It is equally true that by Aiyetan v. The Nigerian Institute of Oil Palm Research (NIFOR) [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) 48 SC, an employee can rely on the Public Officers Protection Act against his employer and third parties.

 

 

 

87. The claimants cited this Court’s decision in Yusuf Abdullahi Abdulkadir, Esq & ors v. Minister of Labour & Employment & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/AK/04/2022, the judgment of which was delivered on 16 May 2023, and urged the Court to take judicial notice of the 1st defendant’s penchant to delay response to appeals filled under the TUA. In fact, that the records show that, similar to the claimants in this case, the claimants in that case wrote several reminder letters to the 1st defendant and it took the intervention of the Attorney-General of the Federation for them to secure a response.

 

 

A Court of law is advised to take judicial notice of judgments of Court to assist it one way or the other to decide on issues before it…Where a Court takes judicial notice of a matter to decide a case one way or the other judiciously and judicially, it cannot be accused of breach of fair hearing, but should rather be commended.

 

…There is no doubt that the Federal High Court and State High Court are Courts of Coordinate jurisdiction. Being Courts of coordinate jurisdiction, their decisions are only of persuasive authority to each other. Let me clarify the issue here. The judgment of the same High Court though presided over by different Judges is binding on all Judges presiding in that jurisdiction. However, the decisions of High Courts, of different jurisdictions though not binding per se, are of persuasive authority…

 

91. So, the question now is whether I am bound by the majority of the decisions of my brother judges as to Okoronkwo v. INEC being applicable or by the decision that it is not. I indicated earlier that Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra) distinguished the Supreme Court decisions of Aba v. Board of Directors NIPOST & ors (supra), Dr Moses U. Anolam v. The Federal University of Technology Owerri (FUTO) & ors (supra) and Okoronkwo v. INEC, and held that they do not apply to the case at hand — as a result of which POPA became inapplicable. In fact, Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra) proceeded thereby to hold that POPA was unconstitutional. This is fundamental enough an issue to warrant a closer consideration of the premises upon which

 

especially Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra) was decided so as to ascertain, if any, its distinguishing qualities, and hence its persuasiveness as case law, as far as the instant suit is concerned, despite that Umahi & anor v. PDP & ors suggests that it would be binding in the instant matter. I accordingly devote the remainder of this ruling to considering the premises upon which Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra) was decided in order to ascertain its applicability to the instant case.

 

%20Durojaiye%20Nicholas-VS-%20National%20Law%20Drug%20Enforcement%20Agency as accessed on 24 February 2026), held that POPA was applicable to contracts of public employment in line with the decision of the Supreme Court in Okoronkwo v. INEC, and dismissed the suit. Hon. Justice Dele Peters, on his part, in Olukotun Adeola Aminat v. Oyo State Universal Basic Education Board & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/IB/54/2024, the ruling of which was delivered on 13 October 2025, applied Okoronkwo v. INEC and held that the matter before him was statute-barred. He accordingly struck it out. Hon. Justice Obaseki-Osaghae in Mr Liman Victor Liman v. Nigerian Office for Trade Negotiations & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/121/2025, the ruling of which was delivered on 12 December 2025, held POPA to be applicable and dismissed the suit on the ground that it was statute-barred. Hon. Justice Adeniyi, in Hon. Collins P. Okongbo v. The Judicial Service Committee, FCT & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/380/2024, the ruling of which was delivered on 19 February 2026, also applied Okoronkwo v. INEC, held that the matter was statute-barred, and dismissed it.

 

 

94. Hon. Justice Arowosegbe of the NICN, however, in Ekwo v. INEC & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/EN/04/2024, the decision of which was delivered on 15 May 2025 (available at https:// www.nicnadr.gov.ng/nicnweb/displayr.php?id=10199 as accessed on 24 February 2026), questioned the continued applicability of POPA to contracts of public employment, and held that POPA was unconstitutional under the present legal regime and struck it down. His Lordship would go on to reinforce this position in Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/EN/13/2025, the ruling of which was delivered on 19 December 2025. In the words of His Lordship in Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors:

 

…the POPA is roundly illegal, null, void and unconstitutional, and liable to be struck down. It is hereby accordingly struck down as unconstitutional. I therefore most emphatically hold that this suit is not statute barred.

 

COMPLAINT commenced this suit Jun 26, 2025 together with Statement of Facts [SF], which at its end, contained reliefs essentially asking for declaration that the suspension and termination of the claimant’s appointment are unlawful. It prays for: reinstatement, payment of arrears of salaries and damages.

 

The grounds of the NPO are: the suit is statute-barred against public officers, 1st defendant is non-juristic, agents of principals cannot be sued, and the action is improperly constituted, while pre-action notice was not issued.

 

 

 

99. I already referred to aspects of the ruling in Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra) in earlier paragraphs (paragraphs 62 to 67 above) of this

 

ruling, indicating that there are issues with especially the premises upon which the Court based its decision.

 

 

The causes of action in the three cases arose before the Third Alteration Act and were decided on the state of the law, as applicable before the Third Alteration Act. And more importantly so, the actions leading to these authorities were not filed in the NIC, which had the primary jurisdiction over the Third Alteration Act. Though, the three were decided at the Supreme Court post-Third Alteration Act. None of them considered the effects of the S. 254C-(1)(b), (f)-(h) & (2) of the Constitution; the domesticated African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Application and Enforcement) Act [ACHPRA] and, the Nigerian ratified International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR]. They all directly impact the POPA and S. 17 of the Constitution, which also impacts POPA, and also energised by the Third Alteration Act and the ACHPRA and ICESCR was not considered.

 

………………..

 

…these Supreme Court’s cases were decided under the auspices of the Third Alteration Act and so, did not address if POPA was still valid under the Third Alteration Act, as to whether it meets the requirements of sui generis statute meant specifically for industrial relations, international best practices, and scales the hurdle of the doctrine of unfair labour practices, as enjoined by S. 254C(1)(b), (f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution. And Ekwo

v. INEC had clearly distinguished these recent Supreme Court’s precedents by finding that, they were not decided under the auspices of the Third Alteration Act, particularly with reference to S. 254C(1)(b), (f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution. In the light of more recent cognate Supreme Court’s decision in Geepee Ind. (Nig.) Ltd v. The MV Kota Manis (2025) 15 NWLR (Pt. 2007) 143 (SC) [delivered Apr 25, 2025] and other more recent authorities, which did not come to my attention at the time Ekwo v. INEC was delivered, I

 

feel more fortified that the POPA, under the present constitutional configuration, does not apply to contracts of public employments.

 

In fidelity to the doctrine of stare decisis, which allows distinguishing precedents on the basis of change or difference in the laws under which they were set, and to avoid the confusion arising from implied overruling, in all humility, I consciously decline to follow Nicholas v. NDLEA and hereby accordingly overrule it. I am bound by Ekwo v. INEC…

 

…………………….

 

…if the POPA was not applicable to the special private contracts because they were freely negotiated, the Constitution now gives all contracts of employment better terms and conditions of employment that are compulsory in favour of workers such that, they are simply sui generis and as such, subject only to their own sui generis laws, conventions, rules and practices and as such, they are no longer subject to any general procedural law like the POPA.

 

…they being now wholly regulated by international conventions, ILS, international best practices, and customised municipal statutes. Hence, the POPA is not applicable to this case, which is contract of public employment…

 

…the earlier NIC’s ratio in Ekwo v. INEC [supra] that S. 7(1)(a)-(b), (2), (6) and 11 of the LA/state-versions were the applicable laws, is accordingly overruled as arrived at per incuriam. They were wrongly construed without due cognisance of the implication of sui generis contracts, which contracts of employment now are, which they did not cover.

 

 

104. In CBN & anor v. Aribo [2017 LPELR-47932(SC), Ogunbiyi, JSC in his concurring judgment held that “it is not within the power and jurisdiction of the trial Court, as a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, to upturn the judgment of Abutu J…It would…have, tantamount to judicial rascality, if the trial Court had interfered with the findings of fact made by Abutu J. being a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, to upturn the judgment of Abutu J”.

 

LPELR-3048(SC), puts it thus:

…“a judgment of a Court of law cannot be subjected to interpretation by a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction like a deed, a will or an instrument containing right and obligation of parties…If a judgment of a Court of law were to be regarded as an instrument like a deed or will, then even the judgment of the Court of Appeal or this Court could be subjected to interpretation by the High Court…which is rather absurd…the Court below was quite right in its decision that the trial Lagos High Court presided over by Shitta-Bey, J., lacked competence to subject the consent judgment of the same Court delivered by Obadina, 1 (sic) (as he then was) to interpretation of the contents or terms thereof”.

 

A High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and hear a suit for the determination of the meaning or implication of a judgment of the same or another High Court or Court of coordinate status or concurrent jurisdiction to secure the enforcement of the judgment one way or the other. If it admits such a case, it would inexorably review the said judgment, an exercise it has no jurisdiction to engage in.

 

Except actions seeking to nullify a judgment for lack of jurisdiction or fraud, a Court has no jurisdiction to review its judgment or that of a Court of coordinate status…

 

e.g. it cannot be used to relitigate issues, it can only be activated only if the enforcement of the judgment being sought to be interpreted must have been commenced and there is an issue(s) as to exact enforcement of certain aspects of the judgment.

 

107. I indicated earlier that the premises upon which Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra) was based are hinged on the fact that the Supreme Court decisions on the applicability of limitation law (especially POPA) to pubic employment were decided in respect of cases, the causes of action of which arose long before the Third Alteration Act 2010, which gave birth to especially section 254C of the 1999 Constitution (the jurisdiction section). I am not very certain if this can be a useful basis for thereby coming to the conclusion that the said Supreme Court cases are distinguishable and so not applicable to the case before the Court. This is because, if the causes of action before the Supreme Court arose long before the Third Alteration Act 2010, then that can only be a valid ground in determining the merit of the case in Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra), certainly not the question of the applicability of POPA since, as a limitation law, it goes to the jurisdiction

 

of the Court to hear the matter. His Lordship Okoro, JSC in Ngere & anor v. Okuruket 'XIV' & anor [2023] LPELR-60001(SC) had held that: “…where a statute of limitation has taken away the right of a party to enforce it in a Court of law, the Court would not have jurisdiction to determine such right”. And to His Lordship Jauro, JSC in Yau-Yau v. APC & ors [2023] LPELR-60287(SC), because the issue of statute-bar touches on the jurisdiction of the court, it can be raised suo motu by the court.

 

 

[2011] 3 SCNJ 166; [2011] All FWLR (Pt. 575) 208, His Lordship Rhodes-Vivour, JSC put it thus:

The Law in force, or existing at the time the cause of action arose is the law applicable for determining the case. This law does not necessarily determine the jurisdiction of the court at the time that jurisdiction is invoked. That is to say the law in force at the time cause of action arose governs determination of the Suit, while the law in force at the time of trial based on cause of action determines the court vested with jurisdiction to try the case. For example, Decree 107 of 1993 came into force on 17/11/93. A litigant who had a cause of action in 1990 would have his case governed by the law at the time (i.e. 1990) if trial commences before 1993 the court to try, the case would be the State High Court but if after 17/11/93 the case would be tried in the Federal High Court…

 

 

111. Aside from the fact that the causes of action in the Supreme Court decisions arose before the Third Alteration Act 2010 was passed, the Court made an issue (even if faintly) of the fact that the actions leading to these authorities were not filed in this Court (the NICN). The Supreme Court only recently in Elegbe & anor v. HP International Schools Ltd & ors [2026] LPELR-83245(SC), the decision of which was delivered on 20 February 2026 (Hon. Justice

 

Adah, JSC delivering the leading judgment), unanimously ruled on the extent to which the NICN may have jurisdiction over defamation arising from an employment or the workplace. The matter that gave birth to the Supreme Court decision arose from the Lagos State High Court. Should this fact (i.e. the fact that the case started at the Lagos High Court) count in determining whether this Court is bound by the decision of the Supeme Court in Elegbe? I do not think so.

 

 

 

A worker may be deemed to have waived his right to appeal against the termination of his employment if he has not exercised that right within a reasonable period of time after the termination.

 

 

116. Worried about access to labour justice for all, the ILO in 2025 convened a tripartite technical meeting in Geneva on Access to Justice for All, which held from 17 to 21 February 2025. The Report for this meeting is titled Access to labour justice for all: Prevention and resolution of labour disputes (Governance and Tripartism Department, Geneva, 2025), which I earlier referred to in paragraph 63 of this ruling above. In paragraph 34 of the Report, the ILO stressed the right to fair trial and a public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial

 

authority as central to access to justice; and that the right to judicial review and appeal as well as the right to a hearing with due guarantees and within reasonable time and precise conditions for any derogation are components of access to (labour) justice. It should be noted here that the ILO acknowledged that “precise conditions for any derogation” is not antithetical to access to justice. What then is the limitation law, if not that it is a “precise [condition] for [the] derogation” of access to the court/justice?

 

…the absolute ban on any suit filed outside the three months sanctioned by S. 2(a) of the POPA without room for the court’s discretion to extend time in deserving cases, is an affront to Art 8(3) of the ILO C158 and SS. 4-14 of the TDA. And, being that this is a constitutionally sanctioned labour convention, the POPA cannot therefore compete with it – S. 1(1)&(2) of the Constitution and Geepee [supra] and therefore, the POPA is void…

 

…as provided for in Section 7[6] of NICA, the issue of good or international best practice in labour and industrial relations is a question of fact to be pleaded and proved satisfactorily by a Claimant before the trial Court could judiciously have regard to it in the determination of the case presented by him. There was no scintilla of pleading and proof of what the good or international best practice in industrial or labour relations is/ was and how it was applicable to the Respondent’s case to justify the exercise of the trial Court's judicial discretion to grant or make the award of the compensation to the Respondent.

 

119. To the best of my knowledge, this position of the Court of Appeal in Oak Pensions Ltd & ors v. Olayinka (supra) has not been upturned as to make the view expressed in Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra), that international best practice in labour and industrial relations applies without the necessity of pleadings and proof, sustainable, despite section 254C of the 1999 Constitution. Even when Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Oyebola [2020] LPELR-51806(CA), cited and relied on in Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra), acknowledged that vide the Third Alteration Act 2010, “a new labour jurisprudence emanated”, it did not in anyway rule against the necessity of pleading and proving International best practice in labour and industrial relations as enjoined by section 7(6) of the NIC Act 2006.

 

 

 

122. I do not see how it can be said that the limitation law offends the need for a labour dispute-resolution mechanism to be “swift-acting and time-efficient”. Addressing the issue of procedural frameworks, the ILO in paragraph 58 of the Report intoned that procedural rules are a crucial factor that determine certain essential features of labour dispute-resolution systems, for which “the criteria that determine the admissibility of claims” is crucial. And in paragraph 59, the ILO emphasized that an important feature of the labour dispute prevention and resolution (LDPR) systems is their speediness in handling disputes. And that simplified and streamlined procedures, set timelines and efficient processing of applications play a role in allowing for swift access to labour justice. The ILO went on to acknowledge that several jurisdictions specify time limits in which complaints must be heard and addressed in order to ensure that dispute resolution is

 

carried out relatively quickly. I do not see how any limitation law would be said to be antithetical to all of these ILO principles.

 

 

 

On admissibility of claims, five criteria are generally seen in countries: (a) prior attempts at amicable dispute resolution; (b) submission of claims in writing; (c) respect of the time limit for submission of claims; (d) adherence to a specified format for claims; and (e) representation by a recognized trade union.

 

Conciliation, mediation or other amicable attempts at dispute resolution are often mandatory before the dispute can be brought before a court. In such cases, criteria for admissibility…may take the form of a report or other written confirmation from the body performing the mandatory procedure that those remedies have been exhausted. Another requirement is that the claim has been submitted in the prescribed time limit. In some cases, different time limits are prescribed for different types of cases. For example, in Armenia, the general statutory limitation for individual disputes to be brought to court is three years, though there is no statutory limitation for unpaid salary claims—but there is a

 

statutory limitation of two months for unlawful termination claims and claims against disciplinary sanctions and unilateral change of essential terms of employment. In Mexico, the general statutory limitation to submit a claim is one year, however for unlawful termination claims it is two months, and to claim justified termination (on the employer’s or worker’s side) it is one month. Claims for severance owing to work hazards, claims by beneficiaries for death originating in a work hazard, and claims to enforce a judgment from a tribunal have a statutory limitation for submitting a claim of two years.

 

 

 

Article II

 

 

Article VII

1. A complaint shall not be receivable unless the decision impugned is a final decision and the person concerned has exhausted such other means of redress as are open to her or him under the applicable Staff Regulations.
2. To be receivable, a complaint must also have been filed within ninety days after the complainant was notified of the decision impugned or, in the case of a decision affecting a class of officials, after the decision was published.
3. Where the Administration fails to take a decision upon any claim of an official within sixty days from the notification of the claim to it, the person concerned may have recourse to the Tribunal and her or his complaint shall be receivable in the same manner as a complaint against a final decision. The period of ninety days provided for by the last preceding paragraph shall run from the expiration of the sixty days allowed for the taking of the decision by the Administration.
4. The filing of a complaint shall not involve suspension of the execution of the decision impugned.

 

 

130. Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra) would stretch the issue of unreasonableness of POPA in these words: “…insufficiency of the doubtful three months of the POPA becomes more poignant, as this suggests that a worker would need time to source money or get a lawyer that would handle his case pro-bono or agree to handle it, in the interim, free but to recoup if the claimant wins”. To even minutely hint that legal fees can be recouped if the claimant wins (“We see these on daily basis in the NIC” are also words of the Court) smacks of an approval for champerty/maintenance, something that legal policy frowns on. See MT. Oryx Trader & ors v. American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection & Indemnity Association Inc [2025] LPELR-81205(CA), which although did not consider the issue of champerty and maintenance, since the issue was not properly before the court, nevertheless acknowledged that “concerns of champerty and maintenance undoubtedly raise significant

 

considerations of public policy”. But His Lordship Dalhatu Adamu, JCA in Barrister Gbenga Akingbehin v. Chief Mrs Thompson [2007] LPELR-8168(CA), relying on Aburime v. NPA [1978] 4 SC 111 and Oyo v. Mercantile Bank (Nig) Ltd [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt. 108) 213, held that where a legal practitioner sues for his charges or fees, any attempt by the legal practitioner to illegally enrich himself at the expense of his client (by way of champerty) will not be allowed by the court. I am, however, not unmindful of section 61 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2023, which permits champerty and maintenance for purposes of arbitration in these words:

The torts of maintenance and champerty, including being a common barrator, do not apply in relation to Third-Party Funding of arbitration and this section applies to arbitrations seated in Nigeria and to arbitration related proceedings in any court within Nigeria.

 

 

It is trite that for every right there is a corresponding responsibility. The right of access to Court for the ventilation of a grievance is not without limitation set by law. For a litigant to properly approach the Courts for a redress over a perceived injury or wrong, such litigant must follow due process in order to confer jurisdiction on the Court.

 

133. Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra) continued that aside from POPA offending Article 8(1) and (3) of the ILO C.158, POPA also offends section 254C-(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution and the Nigerian ratified ILO C.111 [Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111)], which is a fundamental right convention, by creating discrimination in the application of a law. The basis of this holding is that not all public service employees are employees with statutory flavour, and those without statutory flavor approximate to employees in the private sector, of the master-servant mold. That this category of public servants (who do not enjoy the protection of statutorily flavoured employees) suffer from double jeopardy i.e. the limitation of POPA (where the private sector employees enjoy more limitation time) and the non-protection of being statutorily flavoured. On this score, that POPA offends the rules against discrimination especially under C.111.

 

 

The POPA was a classic example of a statute based on the policy of discrimination against particular citizens of Nigeria because they belonged to the racial class of people of the community of the colony of Nigeria, and particularly against Nigerian public workers because they belong to the social class or the group or community of public workers, a stigma which the POPA has earned up until now”.

 

 

The precariousness and the unconstitutionality of POPA as a statute rooted in the worst form of class and racial discrimination was further compounded in 2002 when Nigeria ratified ILO C111 which its Art 1(a) forbids discrimination on ground of social origins, a discriminatory policy which the POPA applied to Nigerian public workers on the ground of their social origins of being public workers amongst the workforce of Nigeria, a policy which is equally contrary to S. 254C-(1)(g) of the extant Nigerian Constitution.

 

…declaration that the suspension and termination of the claimant’s appointment are unlawful. It prays for: reinstatement, payment of arrears of salaries and damages.

 

 

 

 

 

143. Dr Mrs Regina Eze v. Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & ors (supra) talked of public authorities being persons like the victims of their actions, who however enjoy special privileges for public authorities as contained in the POPA. The Court did not factor that by Aiyetan v. The Nigerian Institute of Oil Palm Research (NIFOR) the so-called victims of the

 

actions of public authorities (employees in our case) can also plead POPA against the public authorities. How then has this offended the equality before the law principle?

 

 

 

 

Explaining the rationale for limitation laws, His Lordship, Fabiyi, JSC held, inter alia, in Sulgrave Holdings Inc. & Ors. vs Federal Govt. of Nig. & Ors. 2012 LPELR-15520 (SC) @ 36 A- D: "It should be reiterated that a statute of limitation is a law that bars claims after a specified period. It is a statute which establishes a time limit for suing in a civil case based on the date the claim accrued. The purpose of such a statute is to require diligent prosecution of known claims thereby providing finality and predictability in legal affairs." The essence of a limitation law is that the legal right to enforce an action is not a right in perpetuity but a right generally limited by statute. Where the action is brought outside the prescribed period, the Court is divested of jurisdiction to entertain it. See:

 

Amadi & Anor. Vs INEC (2012) LPELR - 7831 (SC) @ 31 - 32 D-E; Egbe vs Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1…

 

 

 

 

 

 

…………..…………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD, OFR, bpa