IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM

 

DATE: 13^TH JULY, 2026                            SUIT NO.: NICN/ABJ/174/2026

 

BETWEEN:

OLUMORIN OLUWAYOMI TITILAYO   ….        APPLICANT

AND

V. F. GLOBAL SERVICES NIGERIA LTD ….                    RESPONDENT

 

REPRESENTATION:

CHUDI PATRICK NWANA, ESQ., FOR DEFENDANT/APPLICANT

JOSEPH EZE AJALLI, ESQ., FOR CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT.

 

RULING

INTRODUCTION

[1] The Defendant/Applicant by way of preliminary objection dated and filed on the 1^st August 2025. The Preliminary objection is brought pursuant to the provisions of the Section 7 and Section 21(1) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006; Order 2 Rule 1 (1) and Order 7 Rule 1 (h) (i) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 and under the inherent jurisdiction of this honourable court. The Applicant is praying this court for the following orders:

1.An ORDER setting aside all the originating processes purportedly served on the defendant at any location outside it registered/head office in Lagos.

2.AND FOR SUCH FURTHE OTHER ORDER as this honourable court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of the case. The suit is predicated on three grounds viz,

The grounds upon which the application is brought are as follows:

a. That the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter as the defendant was not served with the claimant's originating processes at its registered Head Office in Lagos State. 

b. That the defendant's registered office address/head office is outside Judicial Division of this Honourable.

c. That the Principal Officers of the Company reside outside the Judicial Division of this Honourable Court.

d. That any service of originating processes on the defendant at its branch in Abuja the Federal Capital Territory is bad and an ineffective service.

[2] The Defendant’s Preliminary Objection was supported by an affidavit sworn to by Bartholomew Eburuekwe, annexing the Defendant's Corporate Affairs Commission status report as Exhibit VF1 and the letter of employment as Exhibit VF2. The Claimant opposed the application with a Counter-Affidavit, annexing the Defendant's motion papers of January 20, 2026, as Exhibit C1, a printout of the Defendant's website as Exhibit C2, and the letter of redeployment as Exhibit C3. 

BACK GROUND FACTS OF THE CASE

[3] On April 24, 2008, the Defendant employed the Claimant as an Officer in its Lagos office. The Defendant subsequently redeployed the Claimant to its Abuja branch office as a Deputy Manager on September 12, 2014, where she continued to perform her employment duties.

[4] The Claimant commenced this action by filing a Complaint on June 19, 2025, in the Abuja Judicial Division of this Court. The originating processes were served on the Defendant at its Abuja branch office located on the 3rd Floor, Sterling Bank Plaza, Plot No. 1083, Muhammadu Buhari Way, Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.

[5] The Defendant responded by filing a Statement of Defence and a Notice of Preliminary Objection on August 1, 2025, challenging the Court's jurisdiction on the grounds of improper service and lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Claimant filed an eighteen-paragraph Counter-Affidavit and a Written Address on February 4, 2026, and the Defendant responded by filing a Reply on Points of Law on February 6, 2026.

EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

[6] The burden of proving that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction and that the service of originating processes is incompetent rests on the Defendant/Applicant who has raised these jurisdictional objections, while the Claimant/Respondent bears the ultimate burden of showing that the jurisdiction of this Court has been properly activated by competent service and filing in the correct Judicial Division. This burden must be discharged on the standard of a preponderance of evidence or the balance of probabilities as required in civil proceedings, where the court must weigh the competing affidavit depositions and the documentary exhibits annexed thereto to determine where the scale of justice tilts.

[7] In evaluating the evidence presented by the Claimant/Respondent, this Court looks closely at the Counter-Affidavit sworn to by the Claimant, Olumorin Oluwayomi Titilayo, and the exhibits annexed thereto. The Claimant deposed in paragraph 4 of her Counter-Affidavit that "person of Bartholomew Eburuekwe in this suit cannot be relied upon. As the deponent of the affidavit in support of the Preliminary objection, he described himself as the Administrative Manager in the employment of the defendant; whereas in the affidavit in support of the Motion filed before this court on the 20th January 2026, he described himself as the Counsel in the law firm of Chuks Nwana & Co, counsel engaged to conduct this case for the defendant." To support this assertion of material inconsistency, the Claimant annexed Exhibit C1, which comprises the Motion on Notice and its supporting affidavit filed by the Defendant on the 20th day of January 2026. Regarding the Defendant's business operations and presence within the jurisdiction, the Claimant admitted in paragraph 7 that "the defendant has its registered office in Lagos" but asserted that they "also maintain a branch office here in Abuja on the 3rd Floor Sterling Bank Plaza, Plot No: 1083 Muhammadu Buhari way, FCT Abuja", as shown in Exhibit C2, which is a printout from the Defendant's website. Furthermore, she deposed in paragraph 9 that "on the 12th of September 2014, I was redeployed from the Lagos office to the Abuja office as a Deputy Manager", which is supported by Exhibit C3, the Letter of Redeployment. In paragraph 10, the Claimant deposed that she "worked and performed my duties at the Lagos office from 2008-2014 and was then transferred to the Abuja Office in 2014 where I worked and performed my duties from 2014 till date."

[8] On the other part, the evidence of the Defendant/Applicant is contained in the 14-paragraph supporting affidavit sworn to by Bartholomew Eburuekwe. He deposed in paragraph 2 that "I am the Administrative Manager in the employ of the defendant and that by virtue of my position I am conversant with the facts of the case." In paragraph 6, he deposed "That the registered office address/head of the defendant is in Lagos and not in Abuja." To substantiate this, he annexed Exhibit VF1, which is a Status Report generated from the Corporate Affairs Commission database showing the company details of "VF GLOBAL SERVICES NIGERIA LIMITED" with its registered address at "THE MANDR, PLOT 110, ADMIRAL AYINLA WAY, OPP. TREASURE GARDEN ESTATE, LEKKI PHASE 1". In paragraph 10, he deposed "That the contract of employment was made in the Lagos Judicial Division of this Honourable Court. The terms of employment and employment letter of the claimant are hereby annexed and marked as Exhibit VF2". Exhibit VF2 is an offer letter dated April 24, 2008, addressed to the Claimant at Shomolu, Lagos, offering her the position of "Officer in our UK Unit-VI" based in Lagos. He further deposed in paragraph 11 that "The claimant worked and performed her job at the office of the defendant located in Lagos", and in paragraph 13 "That any service of originating processes on the defendant at its branch office in Abuja the Federal Capital Territory is bad and ineffective service."

[9] A direct confrontation of the two competing accounts reveals major areas of conflict. First, on the status and credibility of the Defendant's deponent, Bartholomew Eburuekwe, there is an irreconcilable conflict between his deposition in paragraph 2 of the supporting affidavit that he is the "Administrative Manager in the employ of the defendant" and the document marked Exhibit C1, where he is disclosed as a Counsel in the law firm of Chuks Nwana & Co. The Defendant, in its Reply on Points of Law, attempted to mitigate this by stating that "Mr Batholomew Eburuekwe is one and the same person who deposed to the affidavit in support of the preliminary objection and also the legal practitioner whose seal was affixed on the court processes and the designation 'Administrative Manager' is a mere irregularity." This Court finds that this is not a mere irregularity but a grave misrepresentation. A legal practitioner representing a party in court cannot falsely depose under oath that he is an internal administrative manager of that party to clothe himself with personal knowledge of the facts. This misrepresentation severely damages the credibility of the supporting affidavit.

[10] Second, on the issue of the Claimant's place of employment and where the dispute arose, Bartholomew Eburuekwe's deposition in paragraphs 11 and 12 that the Claimant worked in Lagos and lived in Lagos during the "initial duration of her employment" is silent on her subsequent posting. The Claimant's counter-deposition in paragraphs 9 and 10 that she was transferred to the Abuja office in September 2014, where she has worked for over ten years, is supported by Exhibit C3, the Letter of Redeployment. The Defendant has not challenged the authenticity of Exhibit C3, nor has it denied that the Claimant was indeed working at its Abuja branch. Therefore, this Court accepts the Claimant's evidence as credible and finds that the Claimant's place of employment since 2014 was the Abuja branch, and consequently, the cause of action arose within the Abuja Judicial Division.

[11] Third, on the issue of service, the Defendant does not deny that it has a physical business office at "3rd Floor Sterling Bank Plaza, Plot No: 1083 Muhammadu Buhari way, FCT Abuja," and that service was effected there, but rather contends that such service is bad because it is a branch office. The Claimant's evidence in Exhibit C2 shows that the Abuja address is a major, active place of business of the Defendant. By the express provisions of Order 7 Rule 1(1)(h)(i) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Rules 2017, service can be effected on a corporate body at "its main place of business within the Judicial Division in which the dispute first arose." Having established that the dispute arose from her employment in the Abuja branch, the service of the originating processes at the Abuja branch office was in full compliance with the Rules of this Court.

[12] In conclusion, this Court makes the following net evidential findings on the issues adopted: first, that the deponent of the Defendant's supporting affidavit, Bartholomew Eburuekwe, is an external legal practitioner and not an Administrative Manager in the Defendant's employ, making his claims of direct personal knowledge unreliable; second, that the Claimant was redeployed from Lagos to Abuja in 2014 via Exhibit C3 and worked in the Abuja branch of the Defendant until the dispute arose, meaning the cause of action and dispute arose in Abuja; third, that the Defendant actively maintains a business office in Abuja as shown by Exhibit C2; and fourth, that the service of the originating processes at the Defendant's Abuja branch office was valid, effective, and in accordance with the rules governing service on corporate bodies in this Court.

DEFENDANT/APPLICANT'S SUBMISSIONS

[13] Learned Counsel to the Defendant/Applicant, Chudi Patrick Nwana, Esq., submitted that this Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit as presently constituted and that the originating processes should be set aside and the suit dismissed in limine.

[14] On Issue 1: Whether the Defendant ought not to be served at its registered office address/head office in Lagos State as provided by the statutes and rules of court.

[15] Learned Counsel to the Defendant/Applicant, Chudi Patrick Nwana, Esq., submitted that the Defendant is a company registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2020 (CAMA), and that under Section 104 of CAMA, any court process must be served on a company in the manner provided by the rules of court, or by leaving it at, or sending it by post to, the registered office or head office of the company. Counsel submitted that the Defendant's registered office address is "The Mandr, Plot 110, Admiral Ayinla Way, Opp. Treasure Garden Estate, Lekki Phase 1, Lagos, Apapa," which is outside the geographical jurisdiction of the Abuja Judicial Division of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria. Counsel argued that Order 7 Rule 1 (h) (i) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, is in total agreement with the statutory provision of CAMA, and mandates that service on a company or body corporate must be effected by serving a copy of the document or process on a senior or a responsible employee of the company at its registered office. Counsel referred to Exhibit VF1, the Corporate Affairs Commission Status Report, to confirm that the registered address of the Defendant is in Lagos. Counsel further referred to Exhibit VF2, the Claimant's letter of employment dated 24th April, 2008, and the Claimant's own written statement on oath, to assert that the Claimant was employed as an Officer at the Defendant's Lagos office, and that the employment contract was made, performed, and lived out by the Claimant in Lagos. Counsel argued that under the applicable statutory provisions and rules of court, the only valid venue for service of the originating processes on a corporate entity is its registered or head office, which represents its principal place of business. To support this contention, Counsel relied on the case of Nigerian Bottling Company Plc v. Ubani [2009] ALL FWLR (Pt. 497) 80 at 90-101 and the Supreme Court decision in Kraus Thompson Org. Ltd v. UNICAL [2004] 9 NWLR (Pt. 879) 631 at 655, where the apex court held that the residence of a corporation is the place of its central management and control, where the board of directors functions or where the managing director works, and not a branch office or liaison office.

[16] On Issue 2: Whether any service effected on the Defendant at their branch office in Abuja the Federal Capital Territory instead of its head or registered office in Lagos is not bad and ineffective service.

[17] Learned Counsel to the Defendant/Applicant, Chudi Patrick Nwana, Esq., submitted that any service of the originating processes on the Defendant at its branch office located at Sterling Bank Plaza, 3rd Floor, Plot 1083, Mohammadu Buhari Way, Central Business District, Abuja, is bad, invalid, and ineffective service in law. Counsel argued that the Claimant's failure to serve the originating processes on the Defendant's registered or head office in Lagos, where its central management and principal officers reside, is a fundamental defect that goes to the root of the court's jurisdiction, thereby robbing the court of its competence to hear or determine the suit. Counsel relied on the locus classicus case of Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] 2 SCNLR 341 to argue that a court is only competent to adjudicate when the case comes before it initiated by due process of law and upon the fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Counsel also cited the Supreme Court authority of Sken Consult (Nigeria) Ltd & Anor v. Ukey (1981) 1 SC 6  to argue that the service of process on a defendant is a fundamental condition precedent required before any court of law can have competence and jurisdiction in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Counsel further relied on Teno Engineering Limited & Anor v. Adisa (2005) 21 NSCQLR 563 to argue that failure to serve process where service is required is a defect that renders all subsequent proceedings a nullity. Counsel argued that the Claimant's assertion in her witness statement on oath that the Defendant's head office is in Abuja was a false and misleading attempt to foist geographical jurisdiction on this court. Counsel maintained that proper service is a condition precedent for activating the court's jurisdiction, and that where the rules of court or statutes prescribe a particular mode of service, that mode must be strictly complied with, citing Harry v. Menakaya [2017] LPELR-42363 (SC) and Treasure Line Interlink Ltd v. Taoreed [2019] LPELR-46940 (CA). In the Defendant's Reply on Points of Law, Counsel further contended that while the Defendant does not deny having knowledge of the processes, such knowledge does not validate a defective service which fundamentally violates the Defendant's right to a fair hearing. Counsel cited hat compliance with service rules is a jurisdictional requirement. Kalu Mark & Anor v. Ezenwaoha (2004) Legalpedia (SC) 58142 and Mohammed Mari Kida v. A.D. Ogunmola [2006] NGSC 145 (SC) to emphasize counsel urged the court to discountenance the Claimant's reliance on Bank of Industry v. Obeya (2022) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1821) 589 and cited Buhari v. Adebayo [2022] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1848) 533 (SC) to argue that invalid service is an incurable nullity.

[18] On Issue 3: Whether this suit is maintainable in view of Section 21 (1) of the National Industrial Court Act; Order 2 Rule 1 (1) and Order 7 Rule 1 (h) (i) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017.

[19] Learned Counsel to the Defendant/Applicant, Chudi Patrick Nwana, Esq., submitted that this suit is not maintainable because the Claimant commenced the action in the wrong judicial division in flagrant violation of Section 21 (1) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, and Order 2 Rule 1 (1) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017. Counsel argued that Section 21 (1) of the Act establishes that while the court exercises jurisdiction throughout the Federation, the President of the Court divides the Federation into Judicial Divisions for fair play, ease of adjudication, and speedy administration of justice, and that ignoring these divisions constitutes a total affront to the law. Counsel referred to Golit v. IGP (Pt. 1722) 40 SC and Macfoy v. Chola [2023] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1912) 155 to define territorial jurisdiction as the geographical area within which a court's authority is statutorily confined and outside of which the court has no power to act. Counsel also cited the National Industrial Court decision in Mrs. Sotonye Ibiminji Darego v. West African Ventures (Suit No: NICN/PHC/90/2023) to argue that territorial jurisdiction is determined by where the contract was made, where it was to be performed, and where the defendant resides. Counsel pointed out that, as admitted in the Claimant's own written statement on oath, the terms of employment were agreed in Lagos, the work was performed in Lagos, and the Claimant lived in Lagos during her initial employment, thereby stripping the Abuja Division of territorial jurisdiction. Counsel urged the court to strike out or dismiss the suit for failing to meet these statutory parameters.

[20] On Issue 4: Whether the complaints is competent as filed in the Abuja Judicial Division when there is Lagos State Judicial Division of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria.

[21] Learned Counsel to the Defendant/Applicant, Chudi Patrick Nwana, Esq., submitted that the originating complaint is incompetent because it was filed in the Abuja Judicial Division instead of the Lagos Judicial Division where the Defendant is registered and where the dispute's principal connections lie. Counsel cited George v. Savannah Bank of Nigeria Plc [2010] ALL FWLR (Pt. 508) 312 at 325-326 to argue that the venue of adjudication for a corporate body is its corporate headquarters or principal office, and that instituting an action in a branch's division rather than the headquarters' division is fatal, requiring the suit to be struck out. Counsel also cited Registered Trustees of Divine Commission International Church v. Ikolodo (2018) LPELR-44199 (CA) and SPDC v. Bayelsa State Environmental Sanitation Authority [2018] LPELR-49279 (CA) to argue that failure to initiate an action in substantial compliance with court rules on geographical filing deprives the court of competence. Counsel submitted that filing in Abuja amounts to prohibited "forum shopping" calculated to gain a procedural advantage, which was heavily condemned by the Supreme Court in Bronik Motors Ltd v. Wema Bank Ltd [1983] 1 SCNLR 296 and Odu'a Investment Co. Ltd v. Talabi [1997] 10 NWLR (Pt. 523) 1 (SC). In the Reply on Points of Law, Counsel additionally challenged the Claimant's counter-affidavit, arguing that paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, and 16 contained legal arguments and conclusions in violation of Section 115(2) of the Evidence Act, 2011. Counsel cited Bamaiyi v. State [2001] 8 NWLR (Pt. 715) 270, Sodipo v. Lamminkainen OY [1992] 8 NWLR (Pt. 258) 229, and Buhari v. INEC [2008] LPELR-SC 267/2007 to contend that such offending paragraphs are incompetent and must be struck out. Counsel argued that because these defective paragraphs are interwoven with the entire counter-affidavit, the entire process should be struck out in line with General & Aviation Services Ltd v. Thahal [2004] 10 NWLR (Pt. 880) 50, Ahmed v. Central Bank of Nigeria [2015] All FWLR (Pt. 803) 1807, and Dr. Arthur Agwuncha Nwankwo v. Alhaji Umaru Yar'adua [2010] JELR 47598 (SC). Counsel also argued that any inconsistency in the description of Bartholomew Eburuekwe as "Administrative Manager" in one affidavit and "Counsel" in another was a mere irregularity or counsel's mistake which should not prejudice the litigant, citing Adeleke v. Awoliyi [1962] 1 SCNLR 401.

 

 

CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S SUBMISSIONS

[22] Learned Counsel to the Claimant/Respondent, Joseph Eze Ajalli, Esq., submitted that the Defendant was duly served in accordance with the law and the rules of this Honourable Court, and that this Court is fully clothed with the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit as presently constituted.

[23] On Issue 1: Whether service of the Originating process in this suit on the Defendant’s branch office in Abuja is a good service in law?

[24] Learned Counsel to the Claimant/Respondent, Joseph Eze Ajalli, Esq., submitted that the service of the originating process on the Defendant's branch office in Abuja is a good and valid service in law. Counsel argued that in compliance with Order 7 Rule 1 (h) (i) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, and Section 104 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2020 (CAMA), service of court processes on a corporate body is validly effected by serving a copy of the document on a senior or responsible employee at its registered office, its principal place of business within the Federation, or its main place of business within the Judicial Division in which the dispute first arose. Counsel submitted that under the combined effect of these provisions, there is absolutely no law that restricts service of court processes solely to the registered office or head office of a company, and that service at a place of business is sufficient service. Counsel cited the cases of FBN v. Kolo [2021] LPELR-56082 (CA) and Nigeria Bottling Company Plc v. Chief Uzoma Ubani [2014] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1398) 421 in support of this position. Counsel also relied on Sale & Ors v. Ocheme & Anor (2020) LPELR-51315 (CA)  to argue that court processes may be served at any office of the company, whether it is the registered office, head office, or branch office, and that the draftsman's intention was to ease the process of service on corporate bodies. Counsel pointed out that the Defendant has a branch office on the 3rd Floor, Sterling Bank Plaza, Plot No: 1083, Muhammadu Buhari Way, FCT, Abuja, where it actively carries on business daily, as demonstrated by the printout of its website marked as Exhibit C2. Counsel argued that while the Claimant was originally employed at the Lagos office in 2008, she was redeployed on 12th September, 2014, to the Abuja office as a Deputy Manager via Exhibit C3, where she has lived and worked for the Defendant for over ten years, making the Abuja office the place where the contract was actively performed and where the cause of action ultimately arose. Counsel submitted that this Court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit and that all the criteria for competence set out in Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] 2 SCNLR 341, Arewa Paper Converters Ltd v. NDIC [2006] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1002) 404, and Western Steel Works Ltd v. Iron & Steel Workers [1986] 13 (Pt. 30) 617 are fully satisfied. Counsel emphasized that a court's jurisdiction is determined by the Claimant's claim ex facie, as laid down in Gafar v. Govt., Kwara State [2007] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1024) 375 at 403. Counsel further argued that once a company has knowledge of the process, even if not served at the registered office, the service must be deemed valid, and in this case, the Defendant clearly had knowledge of the processes as evidenced by its active representation in court and the filing of its statement of defence and preliminary objection, relying on Conoil Plc v. Vitol S.A. [2012] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1285) 465. Counsel urged the court to discountenance the Defendant's reliance on Kraus Thompson Org. Ltd v. UNICAL [2004] 9 NWLR (Pt. 879) 631, noting that the Supreme Court has departed from that position in Bank of Industry v. Obeya [2022] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1821) 589. Counsel also highlighted Order 7 Rule 6 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2017, which provides that processes may be served on any responsible officer or staff of any branch or zonal office of the organization. Furthermore, Counsel challenged the credibility of the Defendant's supporting affidavit, pointing out that the deponent, Bartholomew Eburuekwe, claimed to be the Defendant's "Administrative Manager" in the affidavit supporting the preliminary objection, but described himself as "Counsel in the law firm of Chuks Nwana & Co" in the affidavit sworn in support of a motion filed on 20th January, 2026 (Exhibit C1). Counsel submitted that this dual personality is misleading and unreliable. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the preliminary objection as a mere technicality, emphasizing that modern courts have departed from technicalities in favor of substantial justice.

 

 

COURT’S DECISION

[25] In order to effectively resolve the Defendant's preliminary objection, which fundamentally challenges the competence of this suit, this Court adopts and consolidates the issues formulated by both parties into two pivotal questions for determination. The issues are:

1. Whether the service of the originating processes on the Defendant's branch office in Abuja constitutes valid and effective service in law.

2. Whether this suit is competent and maintainable before the Abuja Judicial Division of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria.

[26] Let me say at the onset that the consolidation of overlapping issues into a single analytical frame is a well-recognised judicial technique for avoiding the fragmentation of reasoning and promoting judicial efficiency. See Adelusola v. Akinde [2004] 12 NWLR (Pt. 887) 295; Ugo v. Obiekwe [1989] 1 NWLR (Pt. 99) 566; Ikweki v. Ebele [2005] 11 NWLR (Pt. 936) 397. In the instant case, both issues formulated speak to different but intrinsically related aspects of the competence of the suit—one concerning the mode of service, the other territorial jurisdiction—and they are best resolved together to provide a holistic determination.

ISSUE ONE

[27] In resolving the first issue, which goes to the fundamental challenge to the mode of service, this Court must meticulously examine the statutory framework and the specific rules of this Court governing service of processes on corporate entities. This examination must be conducted in light of the undisputed physical presence and extensive operational activities of the Defendant within the Abuja Judicial Division.

[28] The Defendant's counsel has strenuously argued that as a corporate entity registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2020, service must be strictly effected at its registered head office in Lagos. This argument relies heavily on Exhibit VF1 (the Defendant's Corporate Affairs Commission status report) and the authority of Kraus Thompson Org. Ltd v. UNICAL [2004] 9 NWLR (Pt. 879) 631 for the proposition that a corporation's residence is exclusively confined to its place of central management.

[29] While this argument might hold sway in general civil litigation under other procedural regimes, it is fundamentally out of step with the special jurisdiction, unique subject matter, and specific procedural rules of this Court, which are meticulously tailored to the exigencies of industrial relations and the promotion of accessible labour justice. It is trite law that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides on the specific facts before it, and not for every proposition that may logically flow from it. As Tobi, J.S.C. profoundly observed in Adegoke Motors Ltd v. Adesanya [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250:

“It is a mis-statement of the law to say that all decisions of the Supreme Court are binding on the lower courts in every given situation. Each case must be decided on its own peculiar facts. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not for what may seem to follow logically from it.” See further the case of Skye Bank Plc v. Iwu [2017] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1590) 24; Fawehinmi v. NBA (No. 2) [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 105) 558. 

[31] The authority of Kraus Thompson (supra) did not interpret the specific, expansive provisions of the National Industrial Court Rules, which are sui generis; it is therefore inapposite as a controlling authority for the present question, which demands an interpretation of our unique procedural framework.

[31] To determine the validity of service on a corporate body in employment matters before this Court, the Court must look first and foremost to its own enabling rules, which are designed to facilitate, not frustrate, access to justice for employees. Order 7 Rule 1(1)(h)(i) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 is the unequivocal pivot of this reasoning. It provides explicitly that service of processes on a company or corporation may be effected by:

“Serving a copy of the document or process on a senior or a responsible employee of the company at its registered office, its principal place of business within the Federation, or its main place of business within the Judicial Division in which the dispute first arose.”

[32] This provision is patently disjunctive, offering distinct, independent, and equally valid avenues for effecting service. It clearly permits a claimant to serve the corporate employer at any of the following locations: (i) its registered office; or (ii) its principal place of business anywhere in Nigeria; or (iii) crucially, at its main place of business within the specific Judicial Division where the dispute giving rise to the action originated. The deliberate and conclusive use of the word “or” between these three alternatives is not accidental; it signifies that satisfaction of any one condition is sufficient. As Fabiyi, J.S.C. observed in A.G. Federation v. A.G. Lagos State [2013] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1380) 249, “the word 'or' is a term of alternative, whereas 'and' is a term of aggregation.” See also Ibrahim v. Barde [1996] 9 NWLR (Pt. 474) 513; Nafiu Rabiu v. State [1980] 8–11 SC 130. The Defendant's insistence on service exclusively at the registered office would, in effect, unlawfully read the second and third limbs of the rule out of existence, rendering them superfluous or nugatory—a course this Court is not permitted to take, as it violates fundamental canons of statutory interpretation.

[33] Before evaluating the physical act of service itself, this Court must first interrogate a severe procedural and ethical controversy regarding the Defendant's affidavit evidence, which casts a long and indelible shadow over the credibility and bona fides of its preliminary objection.

[34] The Defendant's Preliminary Objection is supported by a fourteen-paragraph affidavit sworn to by one Bartholomew Eburuekwe. In paragraph 2 of the supporting affidavit, the deponent stated under oath: “I am the Administrative Manager in the employ of the defendant and that by virtue of my position I am conversant with the facts of the case.” In paragraph 13, he further deposed: “That any service of originating processes on the defendant at its branch office in Abuja the Federal Capital Territory is bad and ineffective service.”

[35] The Claimant has directly and effectively attacked the competence and credibility of this deponent. In paragraph 4 of her Counter-Affidavit, the Claimant deposed that “the person of Bartholomew Eburuekwe in this suit cannot be relied upon. As the deponent of the affidavit in support of the Preliminary Objection, he described himself as the Administrative Manager in the employment of the defendant; whereas in the affidavit in support of the Motion filed before this court on the 20th January 2026, he described himself as the Counsel in the law firm of Chuks Nwana & Co, counsel engaged to conduct this case for the defendant.” That assertion is fully and irrefutably corroborated by Exhibit C1, which contains the Defendant's motion papers and supporting affidavit filed on 20th January, 2026, where the very same Bartholomew Eburuekwe unequivocally deposed to being a legal practitioner in the law firm representing the Defendant in this very suit.

[36] In its Reply on Points of Law, the Defendant attempted to dismiss this grave inconsistency as a mere irregularity or a counsel's mistake. This Court cannot and will not accept such a casual, dismissive, and self-serving explanation for what amounts to a material misrepresentation under oath. A legal practitioner is an officer of this Court and is bound by the most stringent duty of candour, honesty, and integrity to the Court. See Rule 30 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners, 2007; settled principle of legal ethics and judicial integrity that a legal Ariori v. Elemo [1983] 1 SCNLR 1; Awoniyi v. Registered Trustees of AMORC [2000] 10 NWLR (Pt. 676) 522. It is a practitioner representing a party in litigation should not depose to affidavit evidence of contentious facts, particularly those requiring direct personal knowledge of internal corporate affairs, unless he is genuinely an internal employee with such knowledge. See Horn v. Rickard [1963] 1 All NLR 40; Ojukwu v. Yar'Adua [2009] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1154) 50; Nigerian LNG Ltd v. African Development Insurance Co. Ltd (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 416) 677.

[37] A lawyer cannot, chameleon-like, assume the persona of an internal “Administrative Manager” in one affidavit to establish personal knowledge of internal corporate facts, and then conveniently revert to the persona of an external Counsel in another affidavit in the same suit when it suits the tactical convenience of his legal team. This constitutes a material misrepresentation under oath—a deliberate attempt to mislead the Court regarding the deponent's true identity and capacity—which fundamentally compromises the integrity, credibility, and probative value of the entire supporting affidavit. Such conduct is an affront to the administration of justice and an abuse of the court's process.

[38] It is settled law that an affidavit containing material falsehoods, fundamental misrepresentations, or deliberate inconsistencies regarding the deponent's identity or capacity must be rejected by the Court as inherently unsafe, unreliable, and unworthy of belief. See Akpakpuma v. Nzeka (2001) 3 NWLR (Pt. 700) 320; Falobi v. Falobi (1976) 9–10 SC 1; Josien Holdings Ltd v. Lornamead Ltd (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 371) 254. Consequently, where the depositions of Bartholomew Eburuekwe are demonstrably in conflict with the credible and corroborated depositions of the Claimant on material facts, this Court will unhesitatingly resolve the conflict in favour of the Claimant, whose evidence is supported by unimpeachable documentary proof.

[39] It is a well-established judicial practice that where there is a conflict in affidavit evidence on material facts, and there is documentary evidence before the Court that can resolve the conflict, the Court should rely on that documentary evidence to resolve the conflict without the need for oral evidence. The Supreme Court, per Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C., in Fashanu v. Adekoya (1974) 6 SC 83, enunciated this principle in the following terms:

“Where there are irreconcilable conflicts on material facts in the affidavits of the parties, the Court has three options: it may order the parties to call oral evidence; it may refer to the pleadings and any documentary evidence before it; or it may consider undisputed documentary evidence capable of resolving the conflict. Where documentary evidence is available to resolve the conflict, the Court should adopt that course.” See further Nwosu v. Imo State Environmental Sanitation Authority [1990] 2 NWLR (Pt. 135) 688; Eboh v. Oki [1974] 1 SC 179; Magnusson v. Koiki [1993] 9 NWLR (Pt. 317) 287. 

[40] Exhibit C1 conclusively resolves this conflict against the Defendant's deponent, rendering his entire affidavit tainted and unreliable for the purpose of this objection.

[41] Turning to the actual facts of service, the Defendant's CAC status report, marked as Exhibit VF1, confirms its registered office address as “THE MANDR, PLOT 110, ADMIRAL AYINLA WAY, OPP. TREASURE GARDEN ESTATE, LEKKI PHASE 1”. The Defendant's deponent further deposed in paragraph 6 that “the registered office address/head of the defendant is in Lagos and not in Abuja.”

[42] However, the Claimant has established through uncontroverted and compelling evidence that the Defendant maintains an active, fully operational, and substantial branch office in Abuja. The Claimant deposed in paragraph 7 of her Counter-Affidavit that “the defendant has its registered office in Lagos” but “also maintain[s] a branch office here in Abuja on the 3rd Floor Sterling Bank Plaza, Plot No: 1083 Muhammadu Buhari Way, FCT Abuja,” a fact robustly corroborated by Exhibit C2, being a printout of the Defendant's official website clearly indicating the Abuja branch as a functional operational base.

[43] The Claimant further deposed, in paragraph 9, that “on the 12th of September 2014, I was redeployed from the Lagos office to the Abuja office as a Deputy Manager,” and, in paragraph 10, that she “worked and performed my duties at the Lagos office from 2008–2014 and was then transferred to the Abuja Office in 2014 where I worked and performed my duties from 2014 till date.” This crucial factual assertion is powerfully supported by Exhibit C3, the Letter of Redeployment, the authenticity and content of which the Defendant has neither denied nor challenged. It is hornbook law that uncontroverted averments of an affidavit are deemed admitted and must be acted upon by the Court. See Long-John v. Blakk [1998] 6 NWLR (Pt. 555) 524; Ajomale v. Yaduat (No. 2) [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 191) 266; Alagbe v. Abimbola [1978] 2 SC 39.

[44] It is therefore unequivocally established that the Claimant was a bona fide employee of the Defendant, working continuously and performing her duties in its Abuja branch office for over ten years, and that the employment dispute giving rise to this action occurred while she was serving in Abuja. Given that the Abuja office is demonstrably the Defendant's main place of business within the Abuja Judicial Division where the dispute arose and where the Claimant was employed, service of the originating processes on a senior employee at this active Abuja office is in absolute and unassailable compliance with the clear and unambiguous provisions of Order 7 Rule 1(1)(h)(i) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Rules, 2017.

[45] It is a well-settled principle that service of originating processes on a corporate branch office is valid and competent where the rules of court expressly permit service at the branch or place of business where the dispute arose or where the defendant carries on business. See Bank of Baroda v. Iyalabani Ltd [2002] 13 NWLR (Pt. 785) 551; N.B.C.I. v. Alfijir Mining Ltd [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) 346; Adegbuyi v. APC (2015) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1442) 1. The fundamental purpose of service is to give the defendant adequate notice of the action to enable it to defend itself. As emphatically noted by the Supreme Court in Bank of Industry v. Obeya (2022) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1821) 589, that once a party has been served in a manner that brings the litigation to its attention, thereby achieving the substantive purpose of notice, it cannot seek to set aside that service on a mere technicality, especially where no prejudice is shown.

[46] The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated this principle of substantive rather than technical justice. In Amaechi v. INEC [2008] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1080) 227, Oguntade, J.S.C., stated with characteristic force:

“The days of technical justice, if they were ever with us, are long gone. Justice can only be done if the substance of the matter is examined. Reliance on technicalities leads to injustice. In the light of this reality, the court must be reluctant to embrace technicalities that will drive litigants from the seat of justice.”

[47] Similarly, in Nishizawa Ltd v. Jethwani [1984] 12 SC 234, and more recently in Ihedioha v. Okorocha [2016] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1492) 147, the apex court has emphasised that the primary purpose of service is notice, and where actual notice has been achieved, objections founded on mere technicality will not be countenanced. The Defendant's active and robust participation in this suit—including the filing of its Statement of Defence, its preliminary objection, and various other processes—unequivocally confirms that it had proper, timely, and effective notice of this action. The Defendant has suffered no prejudice whatsoever. It is trite that a party who has taken steps in proceedings after service cannot turn around to complain of defective service, any such irregularity being deemed waived by active participation in the proceedings. See Ariori v. Elemo (supra); Odua Investment Co. Ltd v. Talabi [1997] 10 NWLR (Pt. 523) 1; Attorney-General, Anambra State v. Okeke [2002] 12 NWLR (Pt. 782) 575; Ezomo v. Oyakhire [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 2) 195. Accordingly, the service in the instant case is therefore declared valid, effective, and proper in law, and the Defendant's objection on this ground is entirely without merit.

ISSUE TWO 

[48] The second issue for determination is whether this suit is competent and maintainable before the Abuja Judicial Division of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria. The Defendant's counsel has argued that because the contract of employment was originally made in Lagos in April 2008, as shown by the letter of employment marked as Exhibit VF2, and because the Claimant's initial duties were performed there, the Lagos Judicial Division has exclusive territorial jurisdiction over this dispute.

[49] In assessing this argument, the Court must apply the clear and expansive rules governing the commencement of actions in this specialized Court. Order 2 Rule 1(1) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 provides:

“All suits shall be commenced and determined in the Judicial Division of the Court in which— (a) the Defendant resides or carries on business; or (b) the contract was made or was to be performed in whole or in part; or (c) the cause of action arose.”

[50] This rule is framed disjunctively, as emphatically indicated by the use of the word “or”. It is a fundamental canon of statutory interpretation that the use of the word “or” in a statute or rule of court is disjunctive and indicates that any of the alternative conditions listed may be satisfied independently to confer jurisdiction or determine venue. See A.G. Federation v. A.G. Lagos State (supra); Ibrahim v. Barde (supra); Amadi v. NNPC [2000] 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) 76. A claimant is therefore legally entitled to commence an action in any judicial division where the defendant carries on business, or where the contract of employment was to be performed in whole or in part, or where the cause of action actually arose. The rule does not impose a hierarchical or exclusive choice, nor does it mandate that all conditions must be met.

[51] In this case, the Defendant's deponent deposed in paragraph 10 of the supporting affidavit “That the contract of employment was made in the Lagos Judicial Division of this Honourable Court. The terms of employment and employment letter of the claimant are hereby annexed and marked as Exhibit VF2,” and in paragraph 11 that “The claimant worked and performed her job at the office of the defendant located in Lagos.”

[52] However, these depositions deliberately suppress and omit the subsequent, crucial material history and evolution of the employment relationship. While the employment relationship indeed commenced in Lagos in 2008, the Defendant unilaterally and unequivocally redeployed the Claimant to its Abuja branch office on 12th September, 2014, via Exhibit C3. The Claimant's deposition that she was “transferred to the Abuja Office in 2014 where I worked and performed my duties from 2014 till date” stands unchallenged and unrefuted, and is fully corroborated by documentary evidence.

[53] An employment contract is not a static event frozen in the year and place of its initial execution; it is a continuous, dynamic, and living relationship that evolves over time. It is a well-established principle that an employment contract is continuous in nature, and a subsequent redeployment or transfer of the employee shifts the primary locus of performance and, consequently, the locus for any performance-based cause of action to the new station. See Ifeta v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. of Nigeria Ltd [2006] 8 NWLR (Pt. 983) 585; Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Soares [2012] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1312) 550; First Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Excel Plastic Ind. Ltd [2003] 7 NWLR (Pt. 819) 383.

[54] By transferring the Claimant to Abuja, the Defendant itself unilaterally and unequivocally shifted the primary locus of the performance of the contract to the Abuja Judicial Division. The contract has been performed in Abuja for a substantial period exceeding ten years. Consequently, the performance of the contract “in whole or in part” occurred squarely within the Abuja Judicial Division, and the cause of action arising from the dispute in that employment relationship undeniably arose in Abuja. Furthermore, the Defendant actively “carries on business” in Abuja at its Sterling Bank Plaza office, thereby satisfying the independent requirement of Order 2 Rule 1(1)(a). Any one of these three limbs would, on its own, sufficiently ground jurisdiction in the Abuja Judicial Division; taken together, they render the point beyond any reasonable argument or doubt.

[55] The Defendant's allegation of “forum shopping” is completely unfounded, without merit, and appears to be a cynical attempt to frustrate the Claimant's access to justice. Forum shopping occurs where a party deliberately seeks a court that has no natural connection to the dispute or the parties, solely to secure an unfair procedural advantage or a more favourable outcome. It is a settled principle that forum shopping is not established where the chosen forum has a natural, substantial, and legitimate connection to the dispute or the parties. See A.G. Federation v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1999] 9 NWLR (Pt. 618) 187; Saraki v. Kotoye [1992] 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 156; Central Bank of Nigeria v. Ahmed [2001] 11 NWLR (Pt. 724) 39.

[56] There is absolutely no element of forum shopping where an employee sues her employer in the judicial division where she was posted by the employer, where she has lived and worked for over ten years, and where the employer itself maintains a fully functional and active business branch. To force an employee to travel from Abuja to Lagos to litigate an employment dispute arising directly from her work in Abuja would not only be unduly burdensome and oppressive but would also defeat the constitutional guarantee of a fair hearing and the statutory mandate of this Court to provide accessible, efficient, and affordable industrial justice. Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), empowers this Court to ensure industrial harmony and justice.

[57] The Supreme Court, per Nweze, J.S.C., in Skye Bank Plc v. Iwu (supra), spoke to that mandate:

“By virtue of the Third Alteration Act, 2010, the National Industrial Court has been elevated to the status of a superior court of record. Its jurisdiction in labour matters is exclusive and its decisions on such matters are, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, final. The Court is invested with such expansive powers as are necessary to do substantial justice between employers and employees.”

[58] It is a fundamental principle that rules of court regarding the venue of filing should not be interpreted in a rigid, technical, or oppressive manner that operates as an engine of oppression or defeats the constitutional right of access to justice and a fair hearing. See Nishizawa Ltd v. Jethwani (supra); Bello v. Attorney-General of Oyo State [1986] 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 828; Amaechi v. INEC (supra). This Court, being enjoined by section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution and section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 to have due regard to good or international best practice in labour relations, will not lend its process to any interpretation of venue rules that treats vulnerable employees as itinerant litigants or allows employers to evade justice through technicalities. See Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria v. Schlumberger (Anadrill) Nigeria Ltd [2008] 11 NLLR (Pt. 29) 164; Aero Contractors Co. of Nigeria Ltd v. NAAPE [2014] 42 NLLR (Pt. 133) 664. I therefore find that this suit was competently and properly commenced in the Abuja Judicial Division, satisfying multiple, independent criteria under Order 2 Rule 1(1) of the NICN Rules.

[59] In conclusion, I find that the service of the originating processes on the Defendant's Abuja branch office is declared valid, effective, and proper in law, having fully complied with the clear provisions of the National Industrial Court Rules and achieved its fundamental purpose of notice without prejudice to the Defendant. Furthermore, I find that this Court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit as presently constituted within the Abuja Judicial Division, as the Defendant carries on business here, the contract was performed in part here, and the cause of action arose here. This Court is properly seized of the matter, having both the subject-matter jurisdiction and the territorial competence to adjudicate this dispute. 

[60] On the whole, I find that the Preliminary Objection filed by the Defendant on 1st August, 2025 is totally lacking in merit, fundamentally misconceived, and represents a strategic attempt to frustrate the substantive hearing of this matter. Accordingly, the preliminary objection is hereby dismissed in its entirety in the following specific terms:

[a] The Defendant's Notice of Preliminary Objection filed on 1st August, 2025 is hereby dismissed in its entirety.

[b] The service of the originating processes on the Defendant's branch office in Abuja is declared valid, effective, and proper in law.

[c] This Court is declared to be properly seized of the matter and vested with the requisite territorial jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit within the Abuja Judicial Division.

[d] The suit shall proceed to trial on its merits.

This suit shall proceed to trial against the Defendant on its merits without further delay.

[61] Ruling is hereby entered accordingly.

 

 

……………………………………………………………

                   Hon. Justice E. D. Subilim

JUDGE