IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE KADUNA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT KADUNA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE BASHAR A. ALKALI

DATE: MONDAY 20^TH JULY, 2026

SUIT NO: NICN/KD/13/2021

BETWEEN:

(Next-of-Kin of the late Mallam Mahmud Bani Al-Maja)

(Next-of-Kin of the Late Muhammed Baba Musa)

(Next-of-Kin of the Late Musa Alfa)

4. SUNDAY CHUKWUMA NWACHUKWU                             
5. BULUS JATAU

(Next-of-Kin of the Late Jatau Tsaku)

AND

KADUNA TEXTILES LIMITED                                                  DEFENDANT

REPRESENTATION

Mr. Ogbonna M. Nwanya Esq for the Defendant

JUDGMENT

The Claimants filed a Complaint pursuant to Order 3 Rule 2 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 on the 24^th of February 2021. The Claimants filed a consequential Amended Statement of Facts on the 6^th of April 2023 whereat the Claimants claim against the Defendant the following reliefs:

 

2. An injunction restraining the Defendant, her agents, servants or privies and any person(s) from taking over the 2 property lying, situate at and known as No. 04 Challawa Cresent, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna, housing Block 4A, Block 4B, Block 8A and Block 8B and property No. 4 Kasugu Close, Gashash, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna, and from further tempering with same or any part thereof or trespassing into same or developing or assigning same or disturbing the peaceful and quiet occupation of the property by the Claimants without paying them their up-graded salaries and benefits.
3. A DECLARATION that the claimants who have not been paid their up-graded salaries and benefits by the defendant have an equitable interest and/or lien over the 2 subject properties and the right of first refusal in the event of sale.

The Claimant predicated their claims on the Consequential Amended Statement of Fact and Witness’ Statement on Oath filed on the 6^th of April 2021, and Reply and Further Witness Statement filed on the 25^th of April 2024. The Defendant, upon being served with the Complaint, filed a Statement of Defence and a Witness’ Deposition on Oath on the 8^th of March 2024. The Defendant counterclaims against the Claimants and prays the Court for the following reliefs:

 

 

 

 

At the plenary trial on the 21^st of May 2024 where the Claimants called their first witness. The 1^st Claimant who testified for the Claimants hereinafter refers to as CW1 identified his Depositions made on Oath on the 6^th of April 2023 and Further Witness Statement on Oath made on the 25^th of April 2024 and adopted the same as his evidence in support of their case. CW1 thereafter tendered the following documents as follows:

1. Claimants’ payslip for month of April 2002; admitted and marked Exhibit CW01.
2. Internal memo from the Defendant dated the 25^th of September 1998 titled ‘ Mgt Information System’; admitted and marked Exhibit CW02.
3. Document dated the 21^st of March 2005 titled ‘Re: Request for Settlement of our Entitlement’; admitted and marked Exhibit CW03.
4. Document dated 31^st of January 2003 titled ‘Re: Request for Intervention in Settlement of our Entitlement’ addressed to the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Defendant; admitted and marked Exhibit CW04.
5. Document dated the 12^th of November 2002; admitted and marked Exhibit CW05.
6. Document dated the 19^th of April 2006 titled ‘Re: Request for Settlement of our Entitlement’; admitted and marked Exhibit CW06.
7. Document dated the 5^th of May 2003 titled ‘Computation of Terminal Benefits’ address to Alhaji Mahmoud Bani Al-Maja; admitted and marked Exhibit CW007.
8. Document dated the 6^th of September 2002 titled ‘Disengagement from the Services of the Company’ address to Alhaji Mahmoud Bani Al-Maja; admitted and marked Exhibit CW008.

The Claimants called their second witness, the 4^th Claimant who testified for the Claimants hereinafter refers to as CW2 who identified his Depositions made on Oath on the 6^th of April 2023 and Further Statement on Oath filed on the 25^th of April 2024 and adopted the same as his evidence in support of their case. CW2 thereafter tendered the following documents as follows:

9. Employee gratuity history dated the 31^st of March 2005; admitted and marked Exhibit CW09.
10. Letter of confirmation of appointment dated the 15^th of June 2004; admitted and marked Exhibit CW10.
11. Memorandum titled ‘Return of Departmental Keys in your Custody’ dated the 6^th of July 2007; admitted and marked Exhibit C11.
12. Agreement on New Gratuity Scheme for Managers dated 28^th of April 2000admitted and marked Exhibit C12.
13. Internal Memorandum titled ‘Supervision of Security Staff on Duty by Management’; admitted and marked Exhibit CW13.

On the 5^th of February 2025, the Claimants called their third witness, the 3^rd Claimant who testified for the Claimants hereinafter refers to as CW3 who identified his Depositions made on Oath on the 6^th of April 2023 and Further Statement on Oath filed on the 25^th of April 2024 and adopted the same as his evidence in support of their case. CW3 thereafter tendered the following documents as follows:

14. The document titled ‘Re: Confirmation of Appointment’ dated the 15^th of June 2004; admitted and marked Exhibit CW14.
15. Affidavit in Support of Death; admitted and marked Exhibit CW15.
16. Medical Certificate of Cause of Death; admitted and marked Exhibit CW16.

The Claimants called their fourth witness, the 5^th Claimant who testified for the Claimants hereinafter refers to as CW4 who identified his Depositions made on Oath on the 6^th of April 2023 and adopted the same as his evidence in support of their case. CW4 thereafter tendered the following documents as follows:

17. Leave Authority dated the 10^th of May 2000; admitted and marked Exhibit CW17A.
18. Approval of Annual Leave dated 23^rd of April 1996; admitted and marked Exhibit CW17B.

On the 13^th of January 2026, the Defendant opened its Defence, Lover Wuese, who testified for the Defendant as DW1. DW1 identified his Statement on Oath filed on the 8^th of March 2024 and adopted the same as his evidence in support of the defence of the Defendant. DW1 tendered the following documents in evidence as follows:

1. Re: Voluntary Retirement dated the 11^th of September 2002; admitted and marked Exhibit KTL01.
2. Re: Voluntary Retirement dated the 17^th of September 2002; admitted and marked Exhibit KTL02.
3. House Rent due from Aggrieved Former Staff of Kaduna Textiles Ltd; admitted and marked Exhibit KTL03.
4. Aggrieved Former Staff House Rent Computation; admitted and marked Exhibit KTL04.
5. Rental Value of Properties at Various Locations in Kaduna, Kaduna State Said to Belong to Kaduna Textiles Limited dated the 9^th of April 2021; admitted and marked Exhibit KTL05.

After the close of the hearing of the suit, on the 13^th of May 2026, the matter came up for the adoption of the Final Written Addresses filed by Counsel. Counsel for the Defendant did not file the Final Written Address and informed the Court that the Defendant waived its right to file a Final Written Address. 

Counsel for the Claimants, M. O. Nwakanma, Esq identified his Final Written Address filed on the 8^th of February 2026 and adopted the same as his legal submission in the aid of the case of the Claimant while urging this Court to grant the claim of the Claimant and to dismiss the counterclaim.

 

CASE OF THE CLAIMANT

The precis of the facts leading to this case is that the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd and 5^th Claimants are next-of-kin of Late Mallam Mahmoud Bani Al-Maja, Late Mohammed Baba Musa, Late Musa Alfa and Late Jatau Tsaku, respectively, former staffers of the Defendant.

The late Mallam Mahmoud Bani Al-Maja was employed in the Spinning Department of the Defendant as a supervisor-in-Training in January, 1971. The late Mallam Mahmoud Bani Al-Maja became a full supervisor and a senior staff in 1974. As a senior staff the 1^st claimant's father was given an official quarter Known as Block 8B at No. 04 Challawa Crescent, Barnawa, Kaduna South,Kaduna. The defendant made deduction from late Mallam Mahmoud Bani Al-Maja’s salaries as rent based on Federal Government of Nigeria policy on owner-occupier basis for Block 8B, No. 04 Challawa Crescent, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna, for a period of 28 years from 1974 to March, 2002. The deductions of the late Mallam Mahmoud Bani Al-Maja 's salaries as rent on owner-occupier basis as rent for a period of 25 years qualified him to buy the official quarter which the Claimant occupies with his mother and siblings till date. The late Mallam Mahmoud Bani Al-Maja's total benefits as at March, 2002, when One Dollar was equivalent to N120 was N2,042, 239.96 and presently N8, 509, 333.17at the prevailing Dollar rate of N500/Dollar. Further stated that the Late Mohammed Baba Musa died on the 9^th day of June, 2006, and was not paid his outstanding salaries, allowances and gratuity until his demise. 

The Late Musa Alfa who was employed by the defendant on the 3^rd day of January, 1961 and served the defendant for 59 years and 6 months until his death on the 21^st day of June, 2020, as Weaving Manager. The late Musa Alfa until his death was a Management Staff of the defendant. 

The Sunday Chukwuma Nwachukwu was employed by the defendant in 1976 and deployed to Printing/Finishing Unit of the defendant Company. The 4^th Claimant by dint of hard work rose through the rank to the position of Printing Manager and Head of Department (HOD) in 2002 and has put up 45 years of active and meritorious service in the Kaduna Textiles Limited and has remained in the service of the defendant till date. The 4^th Claimant's entitlement from the Defendant as at 31/03/2005, was N5,413, 359.49. 

The late Jatau Tsaku who was the Head of Spinning of the defendant and served the defendant for 60 years until his demise on 7/4/2019. 

On the 6^th day of January, 2021, M.A. Abdullahi (Senior Manager Procurement) came with the Chief Security Officer of the defendant Mr. Asugu and Armed Policemen and some Estate Agents and Valuers to property No. 04 Challawa Cresent, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna, housing Block 4A, Block 4B, Block 8A and Block 8B and also property No. 4 Kasugu Close, Gashash, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna. The Estate Agents and Valuers entered into the 2 properties in question and took photographs of the property in concert with M.A. Abdullahi and Mr. Asugu without prior notice to the Claimants. M.A. Abdullahi and Mr. Asugu are making frantic efforts to dispose property No. 04 Challawa Cresent, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna, housing Block 4A, Block 4B, Block 8A and Block 8B and also property No. 4 Kasugu Close, Gashashi, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna, where the Claimants and their families reside for decades without paying them their upgraded salaries and benefits and without the consent and approval of the Board of Directors of Kaduna Textiles Limited. 

There is no guarantee that if the 2 subject property situate at No. 04 Challawa Cresent, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna, housing Block 4A, Block 4B, Block 8A and Block 8B and property No. 4 Kasugu Close, Gashashi, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna, are sold that the Claimants would be settled going by the antecedents and antics of M.A. Abdullahi (Senior Procurement Manager) and his collaborators. If the 2 subject properties are sold and the Claimants are evicted without settling them, they will become destitute and subject to untold hardships.

DEFENCE OF THE DEFENDANT

The Defendant stated that the Claimants' employment with the Defendant was determined in 2002 further to their voluntary retirement and/or termination of their employment. The Defendant's Factory was closed down finally on the 16^th day of December 2002. None of the Claimants occupied the Defendant's houses on owner-occupier basis. The Claimants were having their rent deducted from source (their Salaries).

The Defendant magnanimously extended the period of the Claimants' residence in the premises up to December 2006 and that from 2007, the Claimants and/or their successors-in-title or next of Kins became Tenants at-will of the Defendant. The Defendant is entitled to mense profits in the form of damages against all the Claimants for use and occupation of the Defendant's premises from 2007 until the claimants and/or their next-of-kins deliver vacant possession to the Defendant.

Further stated that the 1^st Claimant is entitled to N2,042,239.96 (Two Million, Forty-Two thousand, Two Hundred and Thirty-Nine Naira, Ninety-six Kobo) as gratuity as at 31/12/2002 and N381,420,00 as salary arrears from July 2002 to December 2002. The total sum of the 1^st Claimant father's entitlement up to 31/12/2002 is N2,423,659.96 (Two Million, Four Hundred and Twenty-Three Thousand, Six Hundred and Fifty-Nine Naira, Ninety-six Kobo).

Mohammed Baba Musa (deceased) is entitled to his Gratuity up to July 2002 and salary arrears from July to December 2002.

Musa Alfa (deceased) is entitled to his Gratuity up to July 2002 and salary arrears from July to December 2002.

Sunday Chukwuma Nwachukwu's (4^th Claimant) entitlements are N3,910,275.78 as Gratuity up to 31/12/2002 and N357,919.98 as salary Arrears from July 2002 to 31/12/2002. The 4^th Defendant's total entitlement is N4,268,195.76 (Four Million, Two Hundred and Sixty-Eight Thousand, Seventy-six Naira).

Jatau Tsaku (Deceased) (5th Claimant) is entitled to his Gratuity up to July 2002 and salary arrears from July to December 2002. 

The gratuity and salary arrears for the 2^nd 3^rd and 5^th Claimants shall be calculated by the parties. Apart from the entitlements set out above, the Claimants are not entitled to any other money whatsoever from the Defendant. The document entitled “Employee Gratuity Listing By Department Sequence As At 31/03/2005 does not emanate from the Defendant. 

Neither the Claimants nor their successors-in-title (Next of Kins) has paid mense profits for use and occupation of Defendant's Houses in Challawa Crescent, Barnawa, Kaduna and Kasugu Road, Gashash Estate, Barnawa, Kaduna from 2007 till date.

LEGAL SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANTS

Counsel for the Claimants nominated two issues for the determination of this suit, to wit:

1. Whether the Claimants have by preponderance of evidence proved their case on the balance of probability as required by law.
2. Whether the Defendant/Counter Claimant has proved her counter claim so as to entitle her to the reliefs as per the endorsement on her statement of defence/counter-claim.

Counsel for the Claimants submitted that the Claimants have succinctly proved their case on the balance of probability as required under Section 131 (1) and 134 of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended 2023). In Civil matter the fate of every case depends on the pleading and the evidence in support. A matter that is pleaded but not traversed remains a fact against the other side. 

The above proposition of the law caught the Judicial fancy of the Supreme Court in the case of FRANCIS OSAWE ESEIGBE VS. FRIDAY AGHOLOR & ANOR (19993) 12NJ P.82 @ P.91, lines 22 to 24. The evidence of a witness of a party which is against the interest of the party who adduced it is acceptable as admission of the case of the adverse party on the point affected because a party guarantees the reliability of his witness. In paragraph 9 of the DW1 deposition on oath and under cross-examination he admitted that the Claimants are not been paid their entitlements by the Defendant.

The Defence Counsel under cross-examination made a heavy weather of the Claimants exhibits CW001 and CW009 implying that they are computer generated. In law simple documents made from a computer which do not have to go through complicated data processing and online communication are not computer-generated evidence. The above position of the law gained currency in the case of BUA INTL LTD V. SAIMA(NIG) LTD (2023) LPELR - 59533, PP 31-33, PARAS E – F.

The Claimants and the Defence witnesses are ad idem that the Claimants have not been paid their entitlements till date and that the Claimants are entitled to be paid by the Defendant. Submitted that where there is a right there is a remedy; Ubijus Ibi Remedium.

It is incredulous that a company that allegedly closed down finally on the 16^th day of December, 2002, decided to err on the side of generosity by confirming the appointments of the 3^rd, 4^th and 5^th Claimants. Throughout the entire gamut of the Defendant's case no letter of termination of appointment was issued to any of the Claimants especially the 4^th Claimants SUNDAY CHUKWUMA NWACHUKWU till date, which invariably means that the employment of the 4^th Claimant is still subsisting.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

Having carefully gone through the pleadings, evidence led by the parties and legal submission of the Claimants, the issues for determination of this suit are as follows:

 

 

COURT’S DECISION

I have carefully examined the pleadings and evidence placed before this Court. It is clear, without any doubt or speculation, that the Claimants are former employees of the Defendant. It is not in dispute that the Claimants occupy the properties belonging to the Defendant, namely:

2. No. 4 Kasugu Close, Gashash, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna.

The said occupation arose as a result of the employment relationship between the Claimants and the Defendant. It is equally not in dispute that the Defendant is indebted to the Claimants in respect of their employment entitlements. In the case of SALAWU V. YUSUF (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1049) 707 P. 734, paras. F-H where the Supreme Court held that

Admission of a party in law is the best evidence, in the sense that the opposing party need not make any effort to prove the admitted fact. A court of law is entitled to give judgment based on admission by a party if the admission is relevant to the facts in issue. In civil cases, admission by a party is evidence of the facts asserted against him. Unless explanations are given which satisfy the court that admissions should not be so regarded, due probative weight should be given to them as such. A party who admitted a fact in his pleading is bound by such admission and he is estopped from denying the fact admitted. 

The Defendant, in its defence, admitted that the Defendant is indebted to the 1^st Claimant in the sum of N2,423,659.96 and the Defendant is indebted to the 4^th Claimant in the sum of N4,268,195.76. While the gratuity and salary arrears of the 2^nd, 3^rd and 5^th Claimants are to be calculated by the parties.

The Claimants in their pleadings and evidence prayed the court for the payment of their upgraded salary. The basis for the demand for the payment of the upgraded salary is the skyrocketed increase in the value of dollars and devaluation of Naira over the period of time because the entitlement of the Claimants is due for the payment immediately in 2002 when the employment relationship between the parties ceased. Excessive delay in the payment of the entitlement of the Claimants is a crass wickedness and lack of empathy for the financial need of the Claimants. To say this does not mean that the Claimants have led any credible evidence to use the current value of the dollars to determine the upgraded salary/entitlement of the Claimants. The claim for the upgraded salary/entitlement of the Claimants would have been justified if there is any agreement between the Claimants and the Defendant to use the value of foreign currency to determine the entitlement of the Claimants. 

Besides, Section 20 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act 2007 states that the Naira is the sole legal tender in Nigeria. The Central Bank of Nigeria Foreign Exchange Manual 2026 reinforces that transactions involving goods and services exchanged between Nigerian entities must be dominated and settled in Naira, with exceptions of specified activities within the oil and gas, maritime, aviation and free zone sectors.

It is worthy of note that the amount admitted by the Defendant to be the entitlement of the 1^st and 4^th Claimants is higher than the amount claimed by the 1^st and 4^th Claimants. While the 2^nd, 3^rd and 5^th Claimants and the Defendant did not state any amount to be the entitlement of the 2^nd, 3^rd and 5^th Claimants.

Since the 2^nd, 3^rd, and 5^th Claimants and the Defendant have not yet ascertained the exact entitlements due to the 2^nd, 3^rd, and 5^th Claimants, it is not the function of this Court to determine issues that have not been properly proved or placed before it. 

No doubt, the Defendant put the Claimants in possession of the properties at No. 04 Challawa Crescent, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna (housing Block 4A, Block 4B, Block 8A, and Block 8B; and No. 4 Kasugu Close, Gashash, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna and the Claimants do not claim to be the owners of the said property. Adefolake Olachi Adewusi, in her academic article titled ‘Taking Another Look at Employees' Service Occupancy in Nigeria’ available on (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/378182643_TAKING_ANOTHER_LOOK_AT_EMPLOYEES'_SERVICE_OCCUPANCY_IN_NIGERIA/citation/download ) noted that:

Service occupancy is the relationship that exists when an employee is permitted to occupy premises belonging to his employer to ensure greater convenience in the performance of his duties. Service occupancy has been identified as creating a mere licence to occupy premises. A licence has been regarded as arising when a landowner permits another to enter into or remain on his property in circumstances that if the permission were absent that other would be a trespasser. Generally, at common law, an employee who is permitted to occupy premises belonging to his employer for the more convenient performance of his duties acquires no estate. The test is whether or not the employee is required to occupy the premises in the performance of his contract of employment. In other words, the residence must be ancillary and necessary to the proper performance of the duties of the employee…

The significance of being adjudged a licensee is that the service occupant has no security of tenure but may be requested to vacate the premises at any time, subject only to an entitlement to a reasonable notice to vacate the premises.

(underlined mine for emphasis)

Speaking on the nature of holding of an employee who is given residential premises by his employer, the Supreme Court in NWANA V. F.C.D.A. (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 128 noted that:

The cardinal issue arising for determination in this appeal is whether the appellant's action against the respondents was maintainable. To answer this question, it is necessary to determine the status of the appellant, in regard to the house he was occupying, that is to say, whether he was a tenant thereof who could not be ejected therefrom without an order of court pursuant to the relevant Recovery of Premises Act or Law or whether he was merely a licensee liable to vacate the house on cessation of the employment. It is settled law that where an agent or servant is allowed to occupy premises belonging to his principal for the more convenient performance of his duties, he acquires no estate therein: See Woodfall's Law of Landlord and Tenant pages 294-295. He is merely a licensee and he has no right to continue to remain in the premises on the cessation of his employment. Consequently, he cannot maintain an action in trespass against his employer in the event of his eviction.

(underlined mine for emphasis)

The Claimants led evidence to state that the Estate Agents and Valuers, in concert with M.A. Abdullahi and Mr. Asugu, entered the two properties in dispute and took photographs thereof without any prior notice to the Claimants. M.A. Abdullahi and his collaborators are making frantic efforts to dispose of the said properties. These properties are the long-standing residences of the Claimants and their families, who have lived there for decades. The proposed sale is being undertaken without payment of the Claimants’ upgraded salaries and other benefits, and without the consent or approval of the Board of Directors of Kaduna Textiles Limited. There is no guarantee that the Claimants would be settled from the proceeds of any sale, having regard to the antecedents and conduct of M.A. Abdullahi (Senior Procurement Manager) and his collaborators. Should the properties be sold and the Claimants evicted without full settlement of their entitlements, they and their families risk becoming destitute and exposed to untold hardships.

The Claimants cannot prevent the Defendant from selling the properties which were given to them for occupation as a result of their employment relationship with the Defendant. However, it is admitted by the Defendant that it has not paid the Claimants their entitlements since 2002, when the employment relationship between the parties ended.

The Claimants have remained in the employment of the Defendant until 2002 without receiving their gratuity and salary arrears despite the termination of their employment. If the Claimants are compelled to vacate the properties at the instance of the Defendant without settlement of their long-outstanding entitlements, they will be left without any means of redress, especially given the Defendant’s failure to pay these dues for over two decades.

As a result of the continuous failure to pay the Claimants their gratuity and salary arrears, it will be just and equitable to allow the Claimants to continue to occupy the properties at No. 04 Challawa Crescent, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna (housing Block 4A, Block 4B, Block 8A, and Block 8B; and No. 4 Kasugu Close, Gashash, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna as lien pending the time the Defendant pay their entitlements. In LIVESTOCK FEEDS PLC. V. OKEZIE (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt. 775) 341 P. 354, paras A-B where the Court of Appeal held that A legal lien in its primary or legal sense means a right at common law in one man to retain that which is rightfully and continuously in his possession belonging to another until the present and accrued claims of the person in possession are satisfied. 

In view of the foregoing, the Claimants have successfully proved their claim against the Defendant, Issue One is therefore resolved in favour of the Claimants. I so hold.

On Issue Two, this issue concerns the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the Defendant/Counter-Claimant’s counterclaim. Although none of the parties raised the issue, it is a fundamental and threshold issue touching on the exercise of judicial power. The Court is therefore duty-bound to raise and address it suo motu. It is not an act of overzealousness or busybodyism for the Court to raise issues suo motu. Rather, it is a necessary judicial function aimed at ensuring the just and proper determination of the real issues before the Court. In IHEME V. A.-G., RIVERS STATE (2026) 5 NWLR (Pt. 2036) 261 Pp. 318-319, paras. G-E where the Supreme Court held that:

It is recognised that a court being a court of facts and law is entitled to raise any issue germane to the resolution of the dispute submitted by the parties for adjudication suo motu in the interest of justice. However, where a court so raises an issue suo motu, it must give the parties an opportunity to address on it before deciding the issue, particularly the party that may suffer some disadvantage or disability by reason of the issue so raised Where the court denies the parties the opportunity to address on the issue before deciding same and the issue is not an irrelevant one, but one, the resolution of which has a substantial and direct effect on its final decision, the court will be held to have compromised the right of the parties to fair hearing and the judgment is liable to be set aside as having occasioned a miscarriage of justice

Also, in AMOS V. PRINCEWILL (2026) 5 NWLR (Pt. 2037) 617 P. 638, paras. F-H where the Supreme Court held that:

Jurisdiction has been characterised as the spinal cord, lifeline, lifeblood, fulcrum, epicentre, touchstone, bedrock and linchpin of adjudication. It impregnates and nourishes the power and duty of courts in adjudication. A court without jurisdiction is equivalent to a de-oxygenated animal. An issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even before this court, without leave of court. Any party is at liberty to invite it in any manner, either viva voce or writing. The law grants to any court the undiluted licence to invoke an issue of jurisdiction suo motu without any insult to the law. Hence, it occupies an Olympian position in the pyramid of adjudication. It admits no argument, as an atomised supra, that an issue of jurisdiction: rotates outside the perimeter of raising an issue, exproprio motu. In other words, once the point/issue is staked on jurisdiction, a court can, proprio vigore (on its own strength) rake it up without being offensive to the law. It follows that the allegation of raising issue suo motu, paraded and brandished brazenly by the appellant, is not only uncharitable, but unsustainable in the legal hemisphere. The decision was not guilty’ of the pseudo-charge as the lower court acted in due allegiance with the letters and spirit of the law. The net effect is clear. The appellant’s inalienable right to fair hearing did not suffer any erosion in the unbiased judicial hands of the lower court. Indubitably, the appellant cannot harvest from the sanctuary of the beneficent provision of section 36 of the Constitution, as amended. The foregoing legal expositions, with due deference, puncture the learned appellant’s counsel’s seemingly sterling contention on the point of raising the issue of the incompetence of the preliminary objection suo motu. It is disabled from its birth! In the end, I have no choice than to resolve the solitary issue against the appellant and in favour of the respondents.

The Court is entitled to raise and determine suo motu any issue that touches on its jurisdiction once such issue is apparent from the record: see ASHAKA V. NWACHUKWU (2024) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1942) 149. In the instant case, the issue in contention directly affects the jurisdiction of this Court. The crucial question is whether this Court is competent to entertain the counterclaim of the Defendant/Counter-Claimant. In view of the above exposition of the law, the coast is clear for the Court to raise and determine the issue raised suo motu without hearing from the parties. I so hold.

It is trite and well-settled that the jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a matter is the foundation and lifeblood of all judicial proceedings. Without jurisdiction, the entire proceedings, no matter how well conducted, are a nullity and void ab initio.

In AKINDELE V. ABIODUN (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1152) 356 at 387, para. C, the Court of Appeal held that jurisdiction is the competence of a court to adjudicate on the matter before it. The issue of jurisdiction is fundamental and radical. Its absence constitutes an incurable defect which is fatal to the entire adjudication. Any proceedings conducted without jurisdiction, including the findings and orders made therein, are invalid, null and void ab initio, regardless of how brilliantly they may have been conducted.

By way of recap, the competence of a court to exercise jurisdiction over a matter is determined by the satisfaction of the following conditions, as authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 and affirmed in A-G FEDERATION V. GUARDIAN NEWSPAPERS LTD (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt. 618) 187:

1. The Court must be properly constituted as regards the number and qualifications of its members;
2. The subject matter of the action must be within its jurisdiction;
3. The action must be initiated by due process of law; and 
4. Any condition precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction must have been fulfilled.

These conditions must be satisfied conjunctively. Failure to satisfy even one of them renders the Court incompetent to adjudicate on the matter and prevents the suit from activating the Court’s jurisdiction. The jurisdictional issue is on the subject matter of the counterclaim which must be within Section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), specifically by the Third Alteration Act, 2010.

Prayers A and B seek a declaration of title to the properties situate at No. 04 Challawa Crescent, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna (housing Block 4A, Block 4B, Block 8A, and Block 8B) and No. 4 Kasugu Close, Gashash, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna. It is settled that disputes relating purely to title to land, declaration of title, trespass, or ownership simpliciter fall outside the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria unless it forms part of the terms and conditions of employment between the employer and the employees. Such matters fall within the residual jurisdiction of the State High Court pursuant to Section 272 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

Prayers C and D, on the other hand, relate to tenancy and/or payment of rent or mesne profits. These equally fall outside the ambit of Section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution. Although the employment relationship between the fathers of the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, and 5^th Claimants/4^th Claimant and the Defendant ceased in 2002, the Claimants have continued in occupation of the said properties. Any agreement — whether express or implied — for the payment of rent or mesne profits arising after the cessation of the employment relationship is, in my view, a post-employment transaction and therefore outside the jurisdiction of this Court as conferred by Section 254C(1) of the Constitution.

It is therefore the finding of this Court that it lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the Counterclaim of the Defendant/Counterclaimant, the same having fallen outside the provisions of Section 254C(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). This Court is bound by the jurisdiction expressly conferred upon it by the Constitution and will not expand or confer upon itself jurisdiction beyond the limits so prescribed. I hereby resolve Issue Two in favour of the Claimants.

Assuming I am wrong to have declined jurisdiction to entertain the counterclaim of the Defendant/Counterclaimant, I will now proceed to Issue Three, a counterclaim is separate from the main claim, with a life of its own. The independence of a counterclaim from the main claim dictates that it can generally survive on its own even when the main claim is withdrawn or struck out: see the case of NNADUAKA V. ANUNOBI (2025) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1994) 65. 

The Counterclaim, being a separate and independent claim, imposes on the Defendant/Counterclaimant the burden of proving same. By virtue of Sections 131 and 132 of the Evidence Act, 2011, whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent upon the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, the burden of proof lies on that person. In other words, the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on the party who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.

The Defendant/Counterclaimant led evidence to state that neither the Claimants nor their successors-in-title (Next of Kins) has paid mesne profits for use and occupation of Defendant's Houses in Challawa Crescent, Barnawa, Kaduna and Kasugu Road, Gashash Estate, Barnawa, Kaduna from 2007 till date. The Defendant/Counterclaimant is entitled to mesne profits for use and occupation of the premises by the Claimants/their successors-in-title. The Defendant/Counterclaimant tendered Exhibits TKL03, TKL04 and TKL04.

It is not in dispute that the Claimants are in occupation of the Defendant’s properties situate at Challawa Crescent, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna and Kasugu Close, Gashash Estate, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna, as a result of the employment relationship between the parties. The Claimants are therefore licensees of the Defendant in respect of the said properties. However, there is no evidence before this Court that, following the cessation of their employment in 2002, any agreement was reached between the parties for the payment of rent, or that the Defendant demanded or requested rent from the Claimants.

Rent payable is determined by agreement between the landlord and the tenant. It is neither unilaterally determined by the landlord nor automatically fixed by the prevailing rental value in the area, although the prevailing rental value may serve as a guide in negotiating the applicable rent. In the case of METIBAIYE V. NARELLI INTL LTD. (2009) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1167) 326 where the Court of Appeal held that the agreement between a landlord and a tenant is a contract of agreement governed by the law of contract.  In UDIH V. IZEDONMWEN (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 132) 357 P.365, paras. E-F where the Court of Appeal held that, being a contractual agreement, a landlord's unilateral decision to increase the amount of rent payable under a tenancy agreement will be ineffective unless there is an agreement to that effect between the landlord and the tenant.

In the absence of any agreement between the Claimants and the Defendant as to the rent payable for the occupation of the Defendant’s properties situate at Challawa Crescent, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna and Kasugu Close, Gashash Estate, Barnawa, Kaduna South, Kaduna, this Court cannot lend itself to the enforcement of Exhibits TKL03, TKL04 and TKL05, which were unilaterally prepared by the Defendant to impose liability for rent on the Claimants.

In view of the foregoing, Issue Three is therefore resolved in favour of the Claimanta, the counterclaim fails for lacking in merit. I so hold.

On the whole, I hereby order as follows:

 

 

 

 

 

Judgment is entered accordingly. 

 

 

HON. JUSTICE BASHAR A. ALKALI

HON. JUDGE 

NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA 

KADUNA JUDICIAL DIVISION