NICN - JUDGMENT
IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM
DATE: 14TH JULY 2026
SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/03/2025
BETWEEN:
MR IGBOKE WILLIAMS MBOTO -------- CLAIMANT
AND
1) NIGERIA IMMIGRATION SERVICE
2) THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF NIGERIA IMMIGRATION SERVICE DEFENDANTS
3) ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
FEDERATION
REPRESENTATION:
S. D. KALAT ESQ., WITH NDUBUISI KALU FOR THE CLAIMANT.
K. A. UDUOJIE ESQ., WITH A. T. AYANDE ESQ., FOR THE 1ST AND 2ND DEFENDANTS
HABIBATU U. CHIME ESQ., WITH OLUGBANKE O. ODULANO ESQ., HALIMAT S. IBUTI ESQ., FOR THE 3RD DEFENDANT
NO APPEARANCE FOR THE 4TH DEFENDANT
OYEBISOLA BAJULAIYE ESQ., WITH JULIUS YENDA HAMLAK ESQ., FOR THE 5TH DEFENDANT.
JUDGMENT
1.The Claimant commenced this action by a general form of Complaint dated 10 January 2025, which was subsequently amended on 16 July 2025 and filed on 5 August 2025. The claimant via the amended copy of complaint sought the following reliefs:
1. A DECLARATION that the purported termination of the employment of the Claimant by the 1st Defendant via a letter dated 13/8/2008 without a prior notice is wrongful, arbitrary and therefore null and void.
2. A DECLARATION that the abrupt stoppage of the claimant’s salary by the 1st defendant from March, 2005 to August, 2008 without any notice nor suspension and without terminating the appointment of the claimant from service is arbitrary and wrongful.
3. A DECLARATION that the failure of the 1st Defendant to follow the due process of law and otherwise exhaust the procedure laid down in the Public Service Rules, 2021 before terminating the employment of the Claimants is wrongful, unlawful and illegal.
4. AN ORDER nullifying and/or setting aside the purported termination of employment of the Claimant on the 13the day of August, 2008 by the 1st defendant.
5. AN ORDER directing the 1st and 2nd Defendants to immediately re-instate the Claimant to his position with all outstanding salary arrears together with other benefits and entitlements including promotions benefits fully computed and paid to the Claimant.
6. AN ORDER DIRECTING the 1st and 2nd defendants to forthwith upload the biometric details of the Claimant into its database and accord him all the rights, privileges and opportunities appurtenant to him as employee of the1st Defendant.
7. AN ORDER DIRECTING the 1st and 2nd Defendants to pay to the Claimant the sum of N697,600 (six hundred and ninety-seven thousand six hundred naira only) being the total outstanding arrears of salaries of the Claimant from the months of March 2005 to August, 2008 when the salary of the claimant was arbitrarily stopped and his appointment purportedly terminated.
8. AN ORDER DIRECTING the 1st, and 2nd Defendants to pay to the claimant the sum of N21,800 or any other amount which officers of the claimant’s cadre are entitled to and other benefits/entitlements beginning from the month of September, 2008 till the date of judgment and until the entire judgment sum is liquidated.
9. AN ORDER of this honourable court directing the defendants to pay to the claimant general damages in the sum of N60, 000,000.00 (sixty Million Naira) for the wrongful termination of the Claimants’ employment.
10. Interest at the rate of 15% monthly on the judgment sum from the date of judgment until final liquidation of the judgment sum.
ALTERNATIVE PRAYER:
IN THE EVENT THAT THE COURT FINDS REASON NOT TO ORDER FOR THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE CLAIMANT:
11. An order of this honorable court directing the defendants to jointly and severally pay to the claimant the sum of N100,000,000 (one hundred million naira) as compensation for putting the claimant out of work unlawfully with no reinstatement possibility.
2.The 1st and 2nd Defendants filed a joint Statement of Defence on 30th January 2025, contending that the Claimant's salary stoppage resulted from his failure to attend the verification exercise and that his dismissal was lawful. The 1st and 2nd Defendants also filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection on 26th February 2026, asserting that the suit is statute-barred under Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. The Attorney General of the Federation filed a final written address contending that the action discloses no cause of action against his office and that he is not a necessary party to the suit.
BACKGROUND STATEMENT OF FACTS
3.The Claimant, Mr. Igboke Williams Mboto, was an officer of the 1st Defendant, the Nigeria Immigration Service, which is headed by the 2nd Defendant, the Comptroller-General of Nigeria Immigration Service. The Attorney General of the Federation, the Civil Defense, Correctional, Fire and Immigration Service Board, and the Minister of Interior are also joined as defendants to this action.
4.The Claimant suffered a fractured leg in a motor accident on 24th December 2004 and consequently failed to attend a nationwide personnel verification exercise. The 1st Defendant stopped the Claimant's monthly salary in March 2005, and subsequently terminated his employment via a letter dated 13th August 2008. Prior to the termination, the Claimant was redeployed by the 1st Defendant on 12th January 2007 and was promoted to the rank of Immigration Assistant II.
COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL
5.At the trial, the Claimant testified as the sole witness, CW1, and tendered fifteen documentary exhibits, which included his letter of appointment, medical reports, letters of appeal, and promotion lists. The 1st and 2nd Defendants did not call any witnesses or adopt their witness depositions on oath. The Attorney General of the Federation cross-examined CW1 but did not lead any oral or documentary evidence.
EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE
6.In this action, the burden of proving the assertions upon which the claims are founded rests squarely on the Claimant, in line with the statutory prescriptions of Sections 131, 132, and 133 of the Evidence Act 2011, and the standard of proof is on a preponderance of evidence or the balance of probabilities. Where the Claimant alleges wrongful termination of employment with statutory flavor, he bears the initial evidentiary burden to place before the court the contract of employment, the terms governing his service, and the specific manner in which those terms were breached by his employer. Conversely, where the Defendants raise the statutory defense of limitation of action under Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, they bear the burden of establishing that they are public officers and that the action was commenced outside the three-month statutory limit, whereupon the burden shifts back to the Claimant to prove that his case falls within any recognized exceptions, such as a continuing injury or damage.
7.To discharge his burden, the Claimant testified as CW1, adopting his 56-paragraph witness statement on oath dated 5th August 2025 and tendering fifteen documentary exhibits. CW1 deposed that he was employed by the 1st Defendant on 19th December 1997, relying on Exhibit 1, the letter of appointment, which states that "Mr. Igboke Williams Mboto is hereby offered a temporary appointment as Immigration Assistant III". CW1 further testified that he was involved in a ghastly motor accident which fractured his leg, tendering Exhibit 2, a medical report from Holy Catholic Family Hospital dated 24th December 2004, which states that the patient "sustained a severe fracture and is currently unfit for active duty". CW1 asserted that despite his ill-health, he remained in service and was redeployed to the Administration Department of the Cross River State Command via Exhibit 3, a letter of redeployment dated 12th January 2007. CW1 also placed reliance on Exhibit 5, the 2007 junior officers' promotion interview result dated 9th June 2008, pointing out that his name appeared as "No. 18 on the promotion list to the rank of Immigration Assistant II." He testified that his salary was abruptly and arbitrarily stopped in March 2005, prompting him to write Exhibit 6, a letter of apology dated 28th September 2005, and Exhibit 7, a letter of appeal for the restoration of his salary dated 24th July 2007. CW1 further testified that his employment was eventually terminated via Exhibit 4, a Notice of Termination dated 13th August 2008, which states "your services are no longer required with effect from 13th August 2008." Following his termination, CW1 wrote several letters of appeal, including Exhibit 8, a letter of appeal dated 12th February 2019, and received Exhibit 10, a letter from the 1st Defendant dated 24th April 2024 titled "reminder of appeal letters...", which acknowledged his appeals but did not restore his position.
8.The 1st and 2nd Defendants filed a Joint Statement of Defense dated 30th January 2025 but failed to call any witnesses or adopt their written depositions at the trial. Consequently, their pleadings, lacking the breath of oral testimony, remain dead letters and are deemed abandoned in law. However, they rely on the cross-examination of CW1 and the documents already admitted in evidence. The 3rd Defendant also fielded no witness but vigorously cross-examined the Claimant to establish the absence of a cause of action against his office. Under cross-examination by the 3rd Defendant's counsel, CW1 made critical admissions that fundamentally undermine his case against the Attorney-General of the Federation. Specifically, under cross-examination, CW1 admitted that "I have never reported any of my employment procedures and processes to the 3rd Defendant." CW1 further admitted: "I have never written any kind of letter to the 3rd Defendant on this matter, however informal, even a love letter." When questioned about the staff auditing exercise, CW1 admitted that "I do not remember whether the 3rd Defendant was part of the team from Abuja that conducted staff auditing in 2005." Furthermore, under cross-examination and within his own deposition, CW1 made a pivotal admission regarding his salary stoppage, stating in paragraph 18 of his deposition that "I could not attend the nationwide personnel verification exercise."
9.The court must now directly confront the conflicting positions of the parties on the material issues. The first major conflict centers on the stoppage of CW1's salary. While CW1 asserts that the stoppage of his salary from March 2005 to August 2008 was an "arbitrary, malicious, and wrongful act of the Comptroller," the documentary evidence and CW1's own admissions paint a different picture. Exhibit 10, the 1st Defendant's letter dated 24th April 2024, states that "the Claimant's non-attendance at the nationwide personnel verification exercise led to his not being captured by the computerized salary system which became operational in April 2005." This administrative explanation is fully corroborated by CW1's own admission in paragraph 18 of his deposition where he stated "I could not attend the nationwide personnel verification exercise." Consequently, the court finds that the stoppage of the Claimant's salary was not a punitive, unilateral disciplinary action by the 1st Defendant, but a direct system-generated consequence of the Claimant's failure to participate in a mandatory, nationwide computerized biometrics update. The conflict is resolved in favor of the Defendants' version, as the Claimant's assertion of malice is totally displaced by his admitted default.
10.The second conflict relates to whether the Claimant was given a fair hearing prior to his termination. CW1 deposed in paragraph 48 of his statement on oath that "there was no orderly room trial and I was never invited by any committee before my employment was terminated." However, CW1 also admitted in paragraphs 19, 20, and 21 of his deposition that "I was issued queries by the 1st Defendant." CW1 failed to place any replies to these queries before the court, only tendering Exhibit 6, which is an apology letter. Exhibit 4, the notice of termination, states that the action was taken following disciplinary procedures. Although the 1st and 2nd Defendants did not lead oral evidence to detail the proceedings of the Junior Officers' Orderly Room Trial Committee, the burden remains on the Claimant to prove his assertion of a total denial of fair hearing. By admitting that he received queries, and failing to show that he replied to them or that he was denied the opportunity to do so, the Claimant's assertion of a breach of fair hearing is severely weakened. The court finds that the issuance of queries to CW1 and his subsequent letter of apology (Exhibit 6) satisfied the basic threshold of fair hearing under the Public Service Rules, as he was given an opportunity to explain his absenteeism.
11.The third and most decisive conflict is whether the Claimant's action is statute-barred. The Defendants contend that the cause of action accrued in March 2005 (salary stoppage) and August 2008 (termination), making this suit filed on 10th January 2025—nearly twenty years later—grossly statute-barred under Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. The Claimant argues that the injury is a continuous one which renews the cause of action monthly and that POPA does not apply to outstanding salaries. The court, in comparing the date of the completed act of termination on 13th August 2008 (Exhibit 4) with the date of filing this suit on 10th January 2025, finds a massive, unexcused gap of over sixteen years. A termination of employment is a single, completed, and definitive act, not a continuous injury. The continuous non-payment of salary after termination is merely a consequence of the termination, not a continuing damage that postpones the limitation period. The various appeal letters written by the Claimant, including Exhibit 8 in 2019 and Exhibit 11 in 2023, cannot revive a cause of action that had already expired three months after 13th August 2008. The court therefore resolves this conflict in favor of the Defendants, finding that the Claimant's action challenging his termination is hopelessly statute-barred.
12.The court notes several material inconsistencies and gaps in the Claimant's evidence. First, while CW1 claims his absence was entirely due to his accident on 24th December 2004, his letter of apology (Exhibit 6) was written on 28th September 2005, leaving an unexplained gap of nine months during which he remained absent without formal leave. Second, the medical report (Exhibit 2) was issued in December 2004, yet the computerized verification exercise took place in April 2005. The Claimant failed to produce any medical record showing he was hospitalized or completely incapacitated in April 2005 such as would physically prevent him or a representative from reporting his status. Furthermore, there is a gaping void of twelve years between the 1st Defendant's forwarding letter in 2007 (Exhibit 9) and the Claimant's next appeal letter in 2019 (Exhibit 8). This prolonged period of complete dormancy and total inaction on the part of the Claimant strongly indicates abandonment of his claims and acquiescence to the termination, which completely destroys the credibility of his equitable claims for reinstatement.
13.In conclusion, the court makes the following net evidential findings: first, the Claimant's challenge to the termination of his employment on 13th August 2008 is statute-barred, having been instituted nearly seventeen years after the cause of action accrued; second, the stoppage of the Claimant's salary in March 2005 was an administrative consequence of his admitted failure to attend the nationwide personnel verification exercise, and not an arbitrary or malicious act of suspension by the Defendants; third, the Claimant was afforded a fair hearing through the issuance of multiple queries which he admitted receiving but failed to prove he replied to; and fourth, no cause of action whatsoever was proved against the 3rd Defendant, who was shown to be an entirely unnecessary and misjoined nominal party to this dispute. These established findings will be carried forward to determine the final reliefs.
CLAIMANT'S SUBMISSIONS
14.Learned Counsel to the Claimant, S.D. Kalat, Esq. and Ndubuisi Kalu J, Esq., submitted that the Claimant's case is fully competent, that the action is not statute-barred, and that the Claimant has proved his claims on a preponderance of evidence to entitle him to all the reliefs sought.
15.On Issue 1: Whether this suit is statute-barred under Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act.
Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that this suit is not statute-barred notwithstanding that the cause of action commenced in March 2005 when the Claimant's salaries were stopped. Counsel contended that the cause of action has not ceased till date, as evidenced by several written correspondences between the Claimant and the Defendants which show that the Claimant has never stood by over his claims and has continuously pursued his rights. Counsel argued that these letters, which are exhibits before the Court, acted to continuously renew the cause of action. Counsel further submitted that because the Defendants never challenged or reacted to the demand letters sent by the Claimant, they are deemed to have admitted their indebtedness by conduct, relying on Joe Iga v. Chief Amakiri [1976] 11 SC 1 for the proposition that silence in the face of a demand letter leads to a presumption of admission. Counsel argued that in determining whether a suit is statute-barred, the Court must restrict its examination to the Complaint and the Statement of Facts to compare the date the cause of action accrued with the date of filing, citing the case of Elabanjo v. Dawodu [2006] 6-7 SC 24. Counsel submitted that the suit is not caught up by Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act because the injury of non-payment of the Claimant's outstanding salaries and the admission of indebtedness has continued till date, as captured in paragraphs 23, 41, and 42 of the Claimant's witness statement on oath. Counsel relied on Umar Ibrahim v. Federal Capital Territory Administration (Suit No: NICN/ABJ/324/2024) to argue that the non-payment of salary arrears each month continues to renew the cause of action. Counsel also relied on Okoronkwo v. INEC [2025] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1991) 131 to contend that the Public Officers Protection Act applies in employment contracts only where the injury is a continuous one and not a temporary one like suspension, and cited Popoola v. A.G. Kwara State [2011] All FWLR (Pt. 604) p. 173 at 190 and Abdulraham v. NNPC [2021] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1791) 421-422 to support the position that the limitation under the Act does not apply to claims for gratuity, pensions, and outstanding salaries. Counsel further submitted that the 2nd Defendant's statement of defence is a mere pleading and does not constitute evidence because the witness deposition on oath was never adopted, meaning the facts pleaded therein are deemed abandoned under the rules in Alalade v. Ododo [2019] LPELR-46888(CA), Oduwole v. West [2010] Vol. 5-7 (Pt. IV) M.J.S.C. pg. 1, Housing Corporation v. Emekwue [1996] 1 SCNJ 93 at 133, and Honika Sawmill Nig Ltd v. Hoff [1994] 2 NWLR (Pt. 326) 93. Counsel submitted that civil suits are decided on a preponderance of evidence, citing CBN v. Ochife & Ors [2025] LPELR-80220(SC).
16.On Issue 2: Whether the termination of the Claimant's contract of employment by the 1st and 2nd Defendants is proper and lawful.
Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the Claimant's appointment is statutorily flavoured and cannot be terminated like a mere master-servant relationship. Counsel submitted that the employment is governed by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Immigration and Prisons Service Board Act, the guidelines issued by the 2nd Defendant, and the Public Service Rules, which must be strictly complied with, citing Oloruntoba-Oju v. Abdul-Raheem [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) p. 83. While conceding that the Claimant bears the initial burden to prove the terms of employment and how they were breached under Section 131-133 of the Evidence Act 2011, Bamgboye v. University of Ilorin [1999] 10 NWLR (Pt. 622) p. 290; Zenith Bank v. Akinniyi [2015] LPELR-24715(CA), Counsel argued that the Claimant discharged this burden by tendering his offer of appointment dated 19th December, 1997. Counsel submitted that only the Civil Defense, Fire, Immigration and Prison Service Board (now Civil Defense, Correctional, Fire and Immigration Service Board) has the power to discipline the Claimant under Section 4(2) of its enabling Act, and this power cannot be delegated to the 1st Defendant's Staff Disciplinary Committee or any other person, citing Bamgboye v. University of Ilorin (1999) (supra). Counsel submitted that the Claimant was never invited to defend himself before any committee, there was no orderly room trial, and the failure to give the Claimant a fair hearing before a panel is fatal to the case of the Defendants, citing F.C.S.C. v. Laoye (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 106) pg. 52. Counsel argued that under Public Service Rule 030307(xiii) and Part V. A(i) of the guidelines, all disciplinary procedures must commence and be completed within 60 days, whereas the Defendants' disciplinary procedure commenced in 2005 and was concluded in 2008, taking three years. Counsel submitted that the stoppage of the Claimant's salary was motivated by victimization, and that even if the Claimant was interdicted or suspended, the suspension was illegal because under Part VI (8)(v) of the Guidelines, suspension must not exceed three months. Counsel contended that the Claimant was never validly suspended because, while his salary was stopped from March 2005, he was promoted in 2007 and redeployed on 12th January, 2007. Counsel argued that promoting and redeploying the Claimant during the period of salary stoppage constitutes condonation of any alleged infraction, meaning the Defendants are estopped from relying on the infraction to dismiss him, citing Ekundayo v. University of Ibadan [2000] 12 NWLR (Pt. 681) 220 CA, ACB Plc v. Nbisike [1995] 8 NWLR (Pt. 416) 725 CA, and Nigeria Army v. Brig. Gen. Maude Aminu Kano [2010] LPELR-2013(SC). Counsel further submitted that the Claimant complied with Rule 070301 of the Public Service Rules by notifying his sectional head of his ill-health via a medical report dated 24th December, 2004. Counsel cited Dr. Henry Effiong Bassey v. Attorney General of Akwa Ibom State [2016] LPELR-41244(CA), Idongesit Udom v. NABTEB (NICN/AK/21/2016), R v. Chancellor of the University of Cambridge [1723] 1 Str 557, and Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works [1863] 14 CB NS 180 to argue that the absence of a written invitation to the panel is a fatal breach of fair hearing. Counsel contended that the 60-day limit for disciplinary proceedings is mandatory and its breach nullifies the entire process, relying on Thomas v. F.J.S.C. [2019] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1671) 284, Iderima v. R.S.C.S.C. [2006] Vol. 133 LRCN 218, Longe v. FBN Plc [2010] Vol. 185 LRCN 33, and Oloruntoba-Oju v. Abdul-Raheem [2010] Vol. 178 LRCN 131.
17.On Issue 3: Whether the Claimant has proved his case on a preponderance of evidence to entitle him to the grant of the reliefs sought.
Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the Claimant has placed compelling oral and documentary evidence before the Court proving his statutory employment through his letter of appointment. Counsel submitted that the Claimant was denied fair hearing because no orderly room trial was conducted, and his absence from office was due to a motor accident as deposed to in paragraph 15 of his witness deposition and supported by the medical report. Counsel cited UBN v. Ogboh [1995] 2 NWLR (Pt. 380) 649 to support the proposition that employment with statutory backing must terminate in the manner prescribed by the relevant statute, and any inconsistent termination is null and void. Counsel argued that where the termination of a statutory employment is wrongful, the legal effect is that the employee never left the employment and is entitled to reinstatement, outstanding salaries, and allowances, relying on FMC Ido-Ekiti v. Olajide [2011] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1258) 256 CA and Governor of Kwara State v. Ojibara [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 348) 864. Counsel further submitted that the 1st and 2nd Defendants never filed any defense or challenged the Claimant's evidence through cross-examination or an adopted statement of defense, meaning the Claimant's evidence remains unchallenged, uncontroverted, and must be accepted, citing Efet v. INEC [2011] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) p. 423 and Gonzee Nigeria Ltd v. NERDC [2005] 13 NWLR (Pt. 943) p. 634.
1ST AND 2ND DEFENDANTS' SUBMISSIONS
18.Learned Counsel to the 1st and 2nd Defendants, Oluwatoyin A. Yusuf and Kennedy A. Uduojie, Esq., submitted that the Claimant's suit is incompetent, statute-barred, and completely unmeritorious, and should be dismissed in its entirety.
19.On Issue 1: Whether the Claimant's suit as presently constituted is competent before this Court.
Learned Counsel to the 1st and 2nd Defendants submitted that the Claimant's suit is incompetent and statute-barred because it was filed on 10th January, 2025, which is twenty years after the cause of action accrued. Counsel argued that the cause of action accrued in March 2005 for the alleged stoppage of salary, and in August 2008 for the alleged unlawful dismissal from employment. Counsel submitted that statutory bodies qualify as public officers and are entitled to invoke the protection of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, citing Okorokon v. INEC [2016] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1532) 234 and Ibrahim v. J.S.C. Kaduna State [1998] 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1. Counsel contended that time begins to run for the purposes of limitation from the date the cause of action accrues and the plaintiff becomes aware, citing Okenwa v. Military Gov. Imo State [1997] 4 NWLR (Pt. 392) 655 and Woherem v. Emeruwon [2004] 7 SCNJ 119 at 130. Counsel argued that once an action is brought outside the three-month period, even by a single day, the right of action is extinguished, the action is statute-barred, and the court is divested of jurisdiction, relying on Uti v. Egoh [1990] 5 NWLR (Pt. 153) 771 at 773, I.T.F. v. N.R.C. [2007] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1020) 28 at p. 62, Egbe v. Adefarasin [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) 549, and A.G. Akwa Ibom v. Essien [2004] 7 NWLR (Pt. 872) pg. 288. Counsel further submitted that the Court cannot ignore the mandatory provisions of a limitation statute to do justice, citing C.C.C.T. C.S. Ltd v. Ekpo [2008] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1083) 362 at p. 398. Counsel also submitted that a preliminary objection dealing strictly with law does not require a supporting affidavit, citing A.G.F. v. ANPP & Ors [2003] 12 SCNJ 67 at 81.
20.On Issue 2: Whether the 1st and 2nd Defendants stopped the Claimant's salary and granted him fair hearing before terminating his employment.
Learned Counsel to the 1st and 2nd Defendants submitted that the Defendants did not stop the Claimant's salary. Counsel argued that the Claimant failed to attend the nationwide personnel verification exercise in April 2005, as admitted in paragraph 18 of his deposition, which led to his omission from the computerized salary system. Counsel contended that the Claimant was consequently treated as a ghost worker by the Office of the Accountant General, which stopped the salary, as detailed in Exhibit 10. Counsel further submitted that the Claimant admitted receiving queries in paragraphs 19-21 of his deposition but failed to prove that he replied to them or submitted any medical report at that time. Counsel argued that the Claimant's apology letter of 28th September 2005 admitted absenteeism due to an accident but omitted any medical report, and the medical report now before the Court was issued on 24th December, 2024, which is a year and nine months after the verification exercise, rendering it incredible. Counsel argued that the Claimant's assertions of performing duties, being promoted, and redeployed are unsupported by evidence, and that the Claimant's habitual absenteeism led to his summary dismissal on 13th August 2008 following a trial before a Junior Officers' Orderly Room Trial Committee where he made representations. Counsel submitted that fair hearing only requires providing a party with an equal opportunity to be heard, citing INEC v. Musa [2002] 17 NWLR (Pt. 796) 412, Peters-Pam v. Mohammed [2007] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1) 1, Nwabueze v. The People of Lagos State [2018] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1630) 201 SC, Awoniyi v. Registered Trustees of AMORC [2000] 10 NWLR (Pt. 676) 522, and Garba v. University of Maiduguri [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550. Counsel contended that a query and response satisfy the requirements of natural justice, citing Ansamba v. Bank of the North Ltd [2005] 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 650, Isong Udofia v. Industrial Training Governing Council [2001] NWLR (Pt. 703) 281, and Imonikhe v. Unity Bank Plc [2011] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1262) 624 SC. Counsel argued that summary dismissal is justified on grounds of serious misconduct, including continuous absenteeism, and that the Defendants acted within their statutory powers, citing Jibril v. Mil. Admin. Kwara State [2007] NWLR (Pt. 1021) pg. 357, ACB Plc v. Nbisike [1995] 8 NWLR (Pt. 4160) CA, New Nigeria Bank Plc v. G.C. Osunde [1998] 9 NWLR (Pt. 566) p. 511, Sule v. Nigeria Cotton Board [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 17, Patrick Zideeh v. Rivers State Civil Service Commission [2007] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 554 SC, Gwawoh v. Bendel State Hospital Management Board (1989) 3-12 FCA 84, and LCRI v. Mohammed [2005] 11 NWLR (Pt. 935) 1.
3RD DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSIONS
21.Learned Counsel to the 3rd Defendant, Habibatu U. Chime (Mrs), submitted that the Claimant has no cause of action against the Attorney General of the Federation and the suit against him should be dismissed for misjoinder.
On Issue 1: Whether from the preponderance of evidence in this case, the Claimant has proved his case against the 3rd Defendant as to be entitled to any reliefs at all against the 3rd Defendant whether jointly or severally.
22.Learned Counsel to the 3rd Defendant submitted that the 3rd Defendant has no knowledge of the Claimant's person or the facts leading to this suit, and the Claimant's witness statement on oath fails to disclose any act or omission by the 3rd Defendant that caused harm to the Claimant. Counsel argued that no cause of action exists against the 3rd Defendant, citing Thomas v. Olufosoye [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669 and Ifeanyichukwu Osondu Co. Ltd v. Akhigbe [1999] 11 NWLR (Pt. 625) 1 at 17. Counsel contended that the Attorney General is merely a nominal party who is not involved in the Claimant's contract of employment or dismissal, and that the suit can be determined effectively without his presence. Counsel relied on A-G Anambra State v. A-G Federation [2007] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1047) 4 for the proposition that no liability can arise where a party owes no duty and has breached no obligation. Counsel submitted that the 3rd Defendant is not vested with operational or supervisory control over the day-to-day duties of the 1st and 2nd Defendants under Section 174 of the 1999 Constitution, citing A-G Federation v. Atiku Abubakar [2007] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 1. Counsel contended that the 3rd Defendant is not a necessary party, and that joining him constitutes a misjoinder, relying on Igbokwe v. Kehinde [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1072) 441 at 451, Daar Comm. (Nig) Ltd v. W.D. (Nig) Ltd [2012] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1287) 370 at 383, Ojo v. Ogbe [2007] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1040) 542 at 557, and Archibong Umo Udo v. Cross River State Newspaper Corporation & Anor [2001] 14 NWLR (Pt. 732) 116 at 162. Counsel submitted that the Court must restrict itself to the Claimant's pleadings to determine whether a cause of action is disclosed, citing 7Up Bottling Ltd v. Abiola & Sons [2001] 13 NWLR (Pt. 730) 469 at 495. Counsel argued that the Attorney-General can only be sued in a civil claim when the complaint is directly against the Federal Government itself and not against an independent statutory agency, citing Ezomo v. A.G. Bendel State [1986] 4 NWLR (Pt. 36) 448, G.O.K. Ajayi v. Attorney General of the Federation [2000] 12 NWLR (Pt. 509), and A.G. Kano State v. A.G. Federation [2006] 6 MJSC. Counsel argued that the Claimant's grievances are against independent corporate bodies and not the Federal Government, citing A.G. Rivers v. A.G. Akwa Ibom [2011] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1246) SC 31 at 202. Counsel argued that the advisory role of the Attorney General under Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act for judgment enforcement does not justify joining him as a trial party. Counsel submitted that a plaintiff seeking declaratory reliefs must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defense, citing INEC v. Atuma [2013] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1366) pg. 494 and Attorney General of Rivers State v. Attorney General of Bayelsa State [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) pg. 123. Under cross-examination, the Claimant admitted he never wrote any correspondence to the 3rd Defendant regarding his employment dispute, and could not recall if he copied him with his letter of acceptance of appointment or if the 3rd Defendant's office was involved in the 2005 staff audit. Counsel submitted that under Section 131(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2011 and Ashcroft v. Heritage Banking Co. Ltd & Ors [2018] LPELR-44913 CA, the claimant has failed to discharge his burden of proof against the 3rd Defendant.
COURT’S DECISION
23.For the complete, effective, and definitive determination of all the disputes presented in this suit, and having meticulously considered the pleadings filed by all parties, the totality of the evidence adduced during the trial, and the comprehensive oral and written arguments of learned counsel for all parties, this Court hereby consolidates the various issues formulated by the respective parties into three principal, all-encompassing issues for determination. These issues are framed as follows, reflecting the core controversies requiring judicial resolution:
1. Whether this suit is competent and not statute-barred by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, or by any other applicable limitation statute or established equitable doctrine, thereby vesting this Court with the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the claims.
2. Whether the stoppage of the Claimant's salary and the subsequent termination of his employment by the 1st and 2nd Defendants were proper, lawful, and procedurally regular, and whether, in any event, the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought, considering the fundamental principles of laches, acquiescence, and the imperative of diligence in pursuing legal remedies.
3. Whether the Claimant has established a legally cognizable cause of action against the 3rd Defendant, thereby entitling him to any reliefs against the 3rd Defendant, whether jointly or severally, or whether the 3rd Defendant is a proper and necessary party to this suit.
24.The first issue for determination is whether this suit is competent and not statute-barred by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, or by any other applicable limitation statute or established equitable doctrine. I begin with the threshold, fundamental, and indeed jurisdictional question of the competence of this suit and, by extension, the adjudicatory power of this Court to entertain the substantive claims. It is a well-established and immutable principle of law that a plea of limitation, when successfully made out, goes to the very root of the Court's adjudicatory power, thereby stripping it of jurisdiction to entertain the substantive claim, irrespective of the perceived merits thereof. This foundational principle, which underscores the imperative of finality in litigation, the prevention of stale claims, and the avoidance of undue prejudice to defendants, has been consistently affirmed by the apex court in a long line of authoritative decisions such as Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] 2 SCNLR 341, Elabanjo v. Dawodu [2006] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) 76, and Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Commission, Kaduna State [1998] 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1. This Court is therefore legally constrained and duty-bound to address this jurisdictional point with utmost diligence and precision before delving into any other aspect of the claim, as a court without jurisdiction is merely embarking on an academic exercise, rendering any proceedings a nullity. Indeed, the issue of locus standi, much like limitation, constitutes a condition precedent to the institution of any action before a Court of Law. As observed by the Court of Appeal in Akpoti v. A.P.C. & Ors (Pp. 57 paras. C) thus:
"Locus Standi is a condition precedent to instituting an action before a Court of law. It is a legal voice with which the Plaintiff amplifies his legal rights over and above those of ordinary men. For an action to be maintainable, the person instituting it must have legal capacity, otherwise the Court is robbed of necessary jurisdiction to entertain it."
25.The absence of a valid cause of action, whether due to lack of standing or effluxion of time, is a fundamental jurisdictional defect.
Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 provides with mandatory force that:
"Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of injury or damage, within three months next after the ceasing thereof."
26.In applying this provision, we must also recognize that the term "public officer" is not limited to natural persons but extends to public bodies and institutions. In Awokunle v. NEPA (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1057) 340, the Supreme Court held that
"The words 'public officer' as found in section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap. 379, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, not only refers to natural persons but also extends to public bodies, artificial persons, institutions or persons sued in their official names or titles."
27.The 1st and 2nd Defendants, being the Nigeria Immigration Service Board and the Comptroller General of Immigration Service respectively, are undeniably public bodies and officers acting in their official capacities and in the execution of public duty, thereby falling squarely within the protective ambit of this Act.
28.Applying this clear, mandatory statutory provision to the undisputed and incontrovertible facts established by the record before this Court, the Claimant's salaries were stopped in March 2005. His employment was definitively and unequivocally terminated by a notice dated 13th August 2008, which is in evidence as Exhibit 4. The present suit was commenced by a Complaint dated 10th January 2025. On the barest and most straightforward arithmetic, this timeline discloses an astronomical, unconscionable, and legally fatal delay of over sixteen years between the operative acts complained of, namely the stoppage of salary and the definitive termination of employment, and the institution of this action. The immutable point of departure for computing time under any limitation statute is the date the cause of action unequivocally accrued, not when the Claimant chose to act upon it, as seen in Egbe v. Adefarasin [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1, Aremo II v. Adekanye [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 572, and Ibrahim v. Lawal [2015] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1489) 490. The Claimant's subjective decision to delay legal action cannot unilaterally extend a statutory time limit.
29.To escape the clear and fatal axe of this limitation law, learned counsel for the Claimant advances a two-pronged argument: first, that the injury of non-payment of outstanding salaries is a continuing one which perpetually renews the cause of action monthly; and secondly, that the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to contracts of employment or to claims for outstanding salaries. This Court must interrogate that argument with clinical precision, a thorough examination of established legal principles, and a keen appreciation of the policy objectives underlying limitation statutes. It is indeed settled by a long line of authorities that the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to claims for pensions and gratuities, nor does it defeat claims that are essentially contractual in nature, particularly where the public officer is acting in a purely private, commercial, or non-statutory capacity, as held in Federal Government of Nigeria v. Zebra Energy Ltd [2002] 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 162, Nigerian Ports Authority v. Construzioni Generali Farsura Cogefar Spa [1974] 12 SC 81, and Salako v. LEDB [1953] 20 NLR 169. However, a dispute over the termination of employment by a public body, and the consequential loss of salaries arising therefrom, stands on a fundamentally different footing. Such termination, even if it affects a contract, is undeniably an administrative act carried out by public officers in the purported execution of their public duty or authority. The termination of employment is a single, completed, and definitive act. Once an employee is terminated, the contract of service is thereby severed, and any subsequent non-payment of salary is not a "continuing injury" in the statutory sense, but merely a continuing damage or consequence flowing from the single, completed, and finite act of termination. The cause of action accrues at the point of termination, not indefinitely thereafter. The nature of the act complained of, being an administrative decision by a public body, determines the applicability of the Act, not merely the existence of an underlying contract.
30.The critical distinction between a "continuing act" and a "continuing damage" is well drawn by the appellate courts and is crucial to the proper application of limitation laws: a continuing injury contemplates a continuation of the act which produced the damage, and not merely a continuation of the damage or the pain occasioned by a single completed act. The cause of action accrues once and for all when the act complained of occurs, as confirmed in Aremo II v. Adekanye (supra), Sanda v. Kukawa Local Government [1991] 2 NWLR (Pt. 174) 379, and Obiefuna v. Okoye [1961] 1 All NLR 357. This Court, in a long chain of its own consistent decisions, has unequivocally endorsed that principle to the effect that a cause of action in labour and employment matters accrues once the wrongful act complained of occurs, or, in dismissal or termination cases, once the dismissal or termination is communicated to the employee. Subsequent petitions, appeals, or negotiations, however persistent, do not postpone accrual or suspend time from running, except in very rare circumstances where the case truly discloses a continuing injury such as ongoing harassment, or a fresh, unequivocal admission of liability reviving the claim. This has been the consistent position of this Court in Otache Benjamin Ochohepo v. NSCDC & Ors, Unreported Suit No: NICN/ABJ/182/2024, delivered on 9th March 2026; Yusuf Tijjani Yusuf v. CAC, Unreported Suit No: NICN/ABJ/06/2021, delivered on 28th April 2022; Mrs. Raji Afusat Folasade v. Executive Governor of Oyo State & 2 Ors, Unreported Suit No: NICN/IB/78/2024, delivered on 6th May 2026; and Mr. Stephen S. Okpara v. Air France/KLM, Unreported Suit No: NICN/ABJ/64/2025, delivered on 2nd June 2026. The injury complained of by the Claimant, being the termination of his employment, accordingly ceased to run on 13th August 2008, when he was issued with Exhibit 4, and any non-payment of salary thereafter is a consequence, not a fresh act capable of resetting the limitation clock.
31.The Claimant's further contention that his various letters of appeal, including Exhibit 8 written on 12th February 2019, and Exhibit 11 written in 2023, acted to continuously renew the cause of action, or that the Defendants' silence amounted to an admission of indebtedness, is a profound legal misconception and an ill-fated attempt to circumvent clear statutory provisions and established jurisprudence. The law is long settled that once a cause of action has accrued and the limitation clock has begun to tick, no subsequent unilateral letter of appeal, demand, or negotiation, however persistent or well-intentioned, can arrest, suspend, or postpone that clock. To hold otherwise would render limitation laws nugatory and allow parties to indefinitely extend their rights of action by merely writing letters, thereby undermining the very purpose of such statutes, as established in Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Commission (supra), Ajayi v. Adebiyi [2012] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1310) 137, and Nasir v. Civil Service Commission, Kano State [2010] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1190) 253. A party cannot, by the simple expedient of writing self-serving letters of demand or appeal, unilaterally revive a cause of action that the law has long since interred, nor may he postpone by his own conduct the operation of a statutory time-bar. The Defendants' silence cannot, in these circumstances, be construed as an admission of liability or as a waiver of their right to plead limitation. Furthermore, as the Court of Appeal pointed out in Oko-Jaja v. FCSC & Ors (2022) LPELR-57627 CA, the pursuit of internal administrative remedies under the Public Service Rules is advisory and does not prevent the limitation period from running:
"The said Rule does not make exhaustion of the internal remedies a pre-condition for recourse to Court. It is the constitutional right of the citizen to have his grievances ventilated before the Courts vested with judicial powers.... An officer, who after the cause of his action had accrued, chooses to pursue the internal remedies runs the risk of the said cause of action being caught by the limitation law, just as it has happened in this matter."
32.It is true, and this Court acknowledges, that recent decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly in National Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission v. Ajibola Johnson [2019] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 247, have narrowed the application of the Public Officers Protection Act in the specific context of employment where the claim is for arrears of salary or other entitlements arising from a subsisting contract of employment. However, even upon that narrower and more nuanced reading, the claims of the Claimant in the present suit, which are primarily declaratory of the unlawfulness of the termination itself and seek the equitable remedy of reinstatement into an employment that was definitively severed in 2008, remain subject to established equitable and statutory time limits. The Ajibola Johnson case (supra) did not abolish limitation periods for all employment claims; rather, it meticulously distinguished between claims for entitlements under a subsisting contract and claims challenging a completed act of termination. The Claimant's case falls squarely into the latter category, seeking to reverse a completed administrative act of termination. The Ajibola Johnson case does not, and cannot, grant an indefinite window for challenging a completed act of termination, particularly where the primary relief sought is the reversal of that termination and reinstatement. In consequence, the Claimant's right of action in respect of his salary stoppage in March 2005, and his definitive termination on 13th August 2008, has been totally, irrevocably, and conclusively extinguished by his sixteen-year delay in instituting this action. This Court is, therefore, completely divested of jurisdiction to entertain the suit. This lack of jurisdiction is of a substantive nature. As our jurisprudence distinguishes between procedural jurisdiction and substantive jurisdiction, we must note that procedural defects may be waived if not raised timeously, but substantive jurisdictional defects can never be waived and render the entire proceedings a nullity. Since the plea of limitation here is substantive and absolute, the entire suit is fundamentally incompetent. On the first issue for determination, I find, and so hold, that this suit is fundamentally incompetent, hopelessly statute-barred, and consequently, this Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to proceed further.
Alternative Finding on Merits
33.The second issue for determination is whether the stoppage of the Claimant's salary and the subsequent termination of his employment by the 1st and 2nd Defendants were proper, lawful, and procedurally regular, and whether, in any event, the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought, considering the fundamental principles of laches, acquiescence, and the imperative of diligence in pursuing legal remedies. Although I have found the suit to be fundamentally incompetent and statute-barred, thereby divesting this Court of jurisdiction, it remains the settled and imperative duty of a trial court to pronounce upon every substantive issue joined by the parties. This practice is crucial to assist the appellate court in the event of an appeal, ensuring that all issues are addressed and thereby avoiding a remand for retrial, which would occasion further delay and expense, as emphasized in Katto v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1991] 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 126, Ojogbue v. Nnubia [1972] 6 SC 227, and Brawal Shipping (Nig.) Ltd v. F.I. Onwadike Co. Ltd [2000] 11 NWLR (Pt. 678) 387. I therefore proceed, in the alternative and for that limited purpose, to address the second issue on its merits.
34.On the question of the stoppage of the Claimant's salary in March 2005, the Claimant asserts that the stoppage of his salary was an arbitrary, malicious, and punitive act by the Defendants. That characterisation does not, however, withstand the overwhelming weight of the evidence adduced before this Court. In the evaluation of evidence, this Court is guided by the principles outlined in Yakubu Ent. Ltd v. Vandu & Anr [2013] LPELR-220079, which require us to consider whether the evidence is admissible, whether it is credible, whether it is conclusive, and whether it is more probable than that given by the other party. Under searching cross-examination, and indeed in paragraph 18 of his own deposition on oath, CW1, the Claimant himself, unequivocally admitted, in words that require no gloss or interpretation, that "I could not attend the nationwide personnel verification exercise." This crucial and self-damning admission is further corroborated and explained by Exhibit 10, being the 1st Defendant's letter dated 24th April 2024, which explicitly states that "the Claimant's non-attendance at the nationwide personnel verification exercise led to his not being captured by the computerized salary system which became operational in April 2005." An admission against interest, particularly an unequivocal one made by a party under oath, is considered the best evidence available on the point admitted, as it is presumed to be true and requires no further proof, as held in Seismograph Service (Nig.) Ltd v. Ogbeni [1976] 4 SC 85, Cardoso v. Daniel [1986] 2 NWLR (Pt. 20) 1, and Akintola v. Eyiyola [1986] 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 855. Taken together with the clear administrative record contained in Exhibit 10, this admission establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that the stoppage of the Claimant's salary was not a punitive, arbitrary, or unilateral disciplinary act of suspension by the 1st and 2nd Defendants. Rather, it was an automated, system-generated, and entirely foreseeable consequence of the Claimant's own failure to present himself for a mandatory, nationwide staff database audit. It is a fundamental maxim of law that no man may profit from his own wrong—nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam conditionem facere potest, as stated in Adedeji v. National Bank of Nigeria [1989] 1 NWLR (Pt. 96) 212 and Ibrahim v. Osim [1987] 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 965. The Claimant cannot, therefore, be heard to complain of an injury which was the direct and unavoidable product of his own omission and non-compliance with a lawful directive. His failure to participate in a mandatory exercise directly led to his non-capture on the new salary system, and he cannot now seek to hold the Defendants liable for the consequences of his own default.
35.The nature of suspension under our labour jurisprudence is temporary; it is a temporary relief of duties for investigation or discipline, and does not terminate the employment contract, as held in University of Calabar v. Esiaga [2004] 7 NWLR (Pt. 872) 366 and Longe v. FBN Plc. [2010] 6 NWLR (pt. 1189) 1 SC. If the employer suspends an employee, the default position is that the employee remains entitled to wages during suspension unless the terms of contract state otherwise, as re-echoed in Globe Motors Holding Ltd v. Oyewole [2022] LPELR-56856 (CA). However, the Claimant's case was not a case of formal disciplinary suspension with or without pay, but rather a direct consequence of his failure to participate in the mandatory verification exercise. He was not on a formal suspension; his salary was stopped because his records were not captured in the new system. Even if we were to consider the Claimant's failure to attend the verification due to his accident, Exhibit 2, the medical report from Holy Catholic Family Hospital, was issued on 24th December 2004, stating that the patient "sustained a severe fracture and is currently unfit for active duty." However, the verification exercise was conducted in April 2005. The Claimant failed to produce any medical record or credible evidence showing that he remained completely incapacitated or hospitalized in April 2005 in such a manner that physically prevented him or his representative from notifying his command of his status or participating in the exercise. The medical report from December 2004 does not cover the period of the verification exercise in April 2005.
36.Turning next to the question of the termination of the Claimant's employment, learned counsel for the Claimant strenuously argued that the employment, being one clothed with statutory flavour, could not be lawfully brought to an end via Exhibit 4 without strict adherence to the disciplinary procedures prescribed by the Public Service Rules. Exhibit 4, on its face, states that "your services are no longer required with effect from 13th August 2008." The law is indeed clear that an employment enjoying statutory flavour cannot be terminated by a simple letter stating that the officer's services are no longer required. The employer must issue queries, receive and consider responses, and subject the officer to a formal disciplinary process, including, where applicable, a hearing before a disciplinary committee or board, before termination can be effected lawfully. Failure to adhere strictly to these procedures renders the termination null and void, as laid down in Olaniyan v. University of Lagos [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599, Shitta-Bey v. Federal Public Service Commission [1981] 1 SC 40, Bamgboye v. University of Ilorin [1999] 10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 290, and Iderima v. Rivers State Civil Service Commission [2005] 16 NWLR (Pt. 951) 378. In Nasarawa State Specialist Hospital Management Board & Ors v. Mohammed [2018] LPELR-44551(CA), the Court of Appeal confirmed that the National Industrial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of termination of employment, whether private or public, and has the full powers of a High Court to grant declaratory and injunctive reliefs under Section 254D(1) of the Constitution. While the Claimant admitted in paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 of his deposition that "I was issued queries by the 1st Defendant", the 1st and 2nd Defendants, regrettably, failed to lead any evidence whatsoever to establish that they conducted an orderly room trial, or that the Board authorised the termination in strict compliance with the Public Service Rules. Pleadings unsupported by evidence go to no issue and are deemed abandoned, as held in Adeleke v. Iyanda [2001] 13 NWLR (Pt. 729) 1 and Uzodinma v. Izunaso (No. 2) [2011] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1275) 30. This Court has consistently held that where a public employment enjoys statutory flavour, the applicable statute, regulations, or Public Service Rules must be strictly complied with before dismissal or termination; otherwise, the process is null and void. This is reflected in K.V. Ateb v. FCSC, Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/278/2013, delivered on 22nd June 2020; Ikem Chiejina Victor v. Comptroller General of Prisons & 3 Ors, Unreported Suit No. NICN/AWK/32/2019, delivered on 23rd July 2025; and Dr. Dogo Isaac v. The Nigerian Immigration Service & Ors, Unreported Suit No. NICN/BEN/37/2018, delivered on 11th October 2022. Ordinarily, therefore, such procedural non-compliance would render a statutory termination ultra vires and void.
37.However, in this case, the Claimant's entire case is completely defeated by his own egregious, inexplicable, and unexcused sleeping on his rights. Learned counsel for the Claimant argued that the Claimant's promotion to Immigration Assistant II in 2007, via Exhibit 5, and his redeployment in January 2007, via Exhibit 3, together constituted a condonation of his previous absenteeism, so that the Defendants were estopped from terminating him in 2008. That argument overlooks the elementary point that the termination in August 2008 was a fresh and independent administrative act, distinct from any prior disciplinary issues. More fundamentally, even assuming, without conceding, that there was any form of condonation for prior acts, a party seeking the equitable and discretionary remedy of reinstatement into an employment with statutory flavour must approach the Court with clean hands and with utmost expedition. Equity aids only the vigilant, not those who slumber over their rights. The classic articulation of the doctrine of laches was captured by Lord Selborne, L.C. in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd (1874) LR 5 PC 221 and adopted by the Supreme Court in Ariori v. Elemo (1983) 1 SCNLR 1 in the following terms:
"The doctrine of laches and acquiescence is one which requires the party seeking equitable relief to be diligent. Equity aids only the vigilant and not those who slumber over their rights. Where a party has stood by and allowed another to alter his position on the faith of the former's inaction, it would be inequitable to permit him afterwards to assert his right." See further Aliu Bello v. Attorney General, Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 828 and Nwadike v. Ibekwe (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 718.
38.The Latin maxim vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt—the law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights—captures the same fundamental idea in an older tongue and remains a cornerstone of equitable jurisprudence.
39.The Claimant's complete dormancy and inaction for a period of twelve years—between the 1st Defendant's forwarding letter in 2007/termination in 2008 and his next letter of appeal in 2019, culminating in a suit filed in 2025—constitutes an unreasonable, inexplicable, and unexcused slumber. This prolonged and inexcusable delay of sixteen years in instituting this action has undoubtedly occasioned severe prejudice to the Defendants. They would be faced with an impossible task of reinstating an individual after such a long absence, reconstructing records from nearly two decades ago, and potentially paying decades of back-wages, which would place an unbearable and unjustifiable burden on public funds and the efficient administration of public service. This Court, sitting as a specialised labour tribunal, has repeatedly refused to grant reinstatement, or its financial equivalents, where a Claimant has abandoned his post and delayed inordinately in pursuit of his remedy. In Oko Michael Okata v. Head of the Civil Service of the Federation, Unreported Suit No: NICN/ABJ/162/2018, judgment delivered on 3rd June 2019, the National Industrial Court of Nigeria held that the claimant did not satisfactorily explain his absence from work for over eight years and that the dismissal for abscondment was not unlawful. Because the main declaratory relief failed, the Court also refused the consequential reliefs seeking a declaration that he remained in service, backlog of salaries, allowances and entitlements, and damages. This is a direct and compelling authority that where the Court finds prolonged abandonment or abscondment, it will not grant reinstatement or its financial equivalents. Similarly, in Mrs. Emaediong Nnanah Umoren v. University of Uyo Teaching Hospital, Unreported Suit No: NICN/CA/54/2014, judgment delivered on 7th December 2016, where the claimant failed to return after the expiration of approved study leave, and the defendants treated that conduct as absence from duty and abandonment of duty-post under the Public Service Rules, this Court refused the claims for nullification of dismissal, reinstatement or reabsorption, and broader damages. The Court only allowed salary for the period of the approved study leave itself, while rejecting salary claims beyond that period. This is a highly persuasive authority for the proposition that once abandonment or prolonged absence is established, reinstatement and wider financial claims will not be granted, even if there were initial procedural issues. Furthermore, in Mr. George Felix Egwu v. Senior Staff Association of Nigerian Universities & Anor, Unreported Suit No: NICN/CA/21/2024, judgment delivered on 4th May 2026, the Court found, on the evidence, that the claimant was absent from duty for the period in issue and had failed to prove that he rendered service during that time. On that footing, this Court refused the claim for arrears of salary for the period of absence and also refused the reliefs seeking to treat the employment as subsisting, emphasizing that a servant is not entitled to wages for a period in which he did not work for the employer.
40.We must also keep in mind the classic formulation of constructive dismissal under Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v. Sharp (1978) QB 761, where Lord Denning MR stated that:
"If the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment, or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract, then the employee is entitled to treat himself as discharged from any further performance. If he does so, then he terminates the contract by reason of the employer’s conduct. He is constructively dismissed. The employee is entitled in those circumstances to leave at the instant without giving any notice at all or, alternatively, he may give notice and say he is leaving at the end of the notice. But the conduct must in either case be sufficiently serious to entitle him to leave at once. Moreover, he must make up his mind soon after the conduct of which he complains: for if he continues for any length of time without leaving, he will lose his right to treat himself as discharged. He will be regarded as having elected to affirm the contract."
41.Applying this to the present case, even if the Claimant's salary stoppage was wrongful and amounted to a repudiatory breach of contract, the Claimant failed to make up his mind soon after the conduct of which he complains. He did not seek immediate judicial redress, but rather slept on his rights for two decades. By continuing to remain dormant and failing to take prompt legal action to challenge his termination in 2008, he lost any right to treat himself as discharged or to seek reinstatement and associated damages.
42.In the instant case, the massive, sixteen-year delay in filing the present action completely destroys the foundation for any claim to reinstatement or to outstanding salaries, regardless of any procedural irregularity in the termination itself. The Claimant's prolonged inaction constitutes an abandonment of his rights and a clear case of laches and acquiescence. It cannot be, on any principled view of the law and in the light of the international best practices to which this Court is enjoined by Section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, to have regard, that an employee may sit at home for nearly two decades and thereafter expect a court of law to order his reinstatement with twenty years of back-duty salaries. Such an outcome would be an affront to justice, public policy, the efficient administration of public service, and the fundamental principle of finality in administrative actions. The Claimant's delay has rendered the equitable remedies he seeks impossible and unjust to grant. While recent decisions like Skye Bank Plc v. Adegun [2024] LPELR-62219(SC) emphasize that under the new labour jurisprudence, courts should have recourse to international best practices and can award substantial general damages (such as two years' salary and allowances) in cases of wrongful or humiliating dismissal, such remedies are reserved for litigants who approach the court timeously and establish their claims with diligence. They cannot avail a claimant who has slumbered over his rights for sixteen years. On the second issue, I find, and so hold, that while the procedure adopted in Exhibit 4 was indeed irregular under the Public Service Rules, the Claimant's right of action has, in any event, been irrevocably extinguished by effluxion of time, and his claim for reinstatement and associated reliefs is wholly and completely defeated by the doctrines of laches and acquiescence.
43.The third issue for determination is whether the Claimant has established a legally cognizable cause of action against the 3rd Defendant, thereby entitling him to any reliefs against the 3rd Defendant, whether jointly or severally, or whether the 3rd Defendant is a proper and necessary party to this suit. I turn now to the position of the 3rd Defendant, the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation, who is sued in his capacity as the chief law officer of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It is crucial to note that the Claimant's contract of employment, being Exhibit 1, was executed solely between the Claimant and the Nigeria Immigration Service Board, the 1st Defendant. The 1st Defendant is a statutory body clothed with corporate personality and is fully capable of suing and being sued in its own name, independent of the Attorney General. Under searching cross-examination, CW1, the Claimant, candidly and conclusively admitted that "I have never reported any of my employment procedures and processes to the 3rd Defendant", and further admitted that "I have never written any kind of letter to the 3rd Defendant on this matter, however informal, even a love letter." When questioned about the staff auditing exercise of 2005, CW1 also admitted under cross-examination that "I do not remember whether the 3rd Defendant was part of the team from Abuja that conducted staff auditing in 2005." These admissions are conclusive of the absolute absence of any connection, privity, or involvement between the office of the 3rd Defendant and the impugned administrative acts. There is, in truth, nothing in the Claimant's pleadings or in the evidence led before this Court that establishes any link whatsoever between the office of the Attorney General of the Federation and the stoppage of the Claimant's salaries, the staff audit of 2005, or the termination of his employment in 2008.
44.The Attorney General of the Federation is not a party to the contract of employment, had no direct hand in the administrative decisions complained of, and is not a general guarantor or insurer for the actions of all federal agencies or statutory bodies. A party may not be joined to a suit as a defendant merely because he holds the office of the Attorney General, where the substantive cause of action lies exclusively against a distinct statutory body with independent legal personality. The Attorney General is a nominal party only where the action is against the Federal Government itself or where a specific statute mandates his joinder, and neither condition is met here, as established in Attorney General of the Federation v. ANPP [2003] 18 NWLR (Pt. 851) 182, Green v. Green [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 480, and Peenok Investments Ltd v. Hotel Presidential Ltd [1982] 12 SC 1. A cause of action must disclose, on the face of the pleading, a reasonable and legally cognizable basis for holding the named defendant liable, as seen in Thomas v. Olufosoye [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669 and Bello v. Attorney General of Oyo State [1986] 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 828. A court of law cannot decide any matter or make any order in favour of or against a person who is not a proper party before it, and as held in PDP v. Ekeagbara & Ors [2016] LPELR-40849 (CA):
"A Court of law cannot decide any matter in favour of person(s) who are not parties before it.... If a Court cannot grant a party before it a relief not asked for then there can be no basis for a Court making order in favour of a non-party to the proceedings who necessarily has not asked for any relief."
Similarly, no order can be made against a party where no cause of action has been established against him.
45.Furthermore, the inclusion of unnecessary parties or the multiplication of actions can be viewed as an abuse of the judicial process. In Lokpobiri v. Ogola & Ors (2015) LPELR-40838(SC), the Supreme Court held that
"the multiplicity of actions on the same matter between the same parties even where there exists a right to bring the action is regarded as an abuse. The abuse consists in the intention, purpose and aim of the person exercising the right to harass, irritate and annoy the adversary and interfere with the administration of justice...."
46.While the present suit is not a case of multiple active suits, joining nominal public officers who have no connection to the subject matter of the dispute merely to expand the net of litigation serves only to clog the wheels of justice and constitutes an improper use of the court process. In the present case, no basis has been established against the 3rd Defendant. The Claimant's own admissions confirm the lack of any nexus. On the third issue, I find, and so hold, that there is no cause of action disclosed against the 3rd Defendant, and that he is a misjoined nominal party against whom no joint or several relief can be granted. His inclusion in this suit is entirely misconceived and without legal foundation.
47.In the final result, and drawing together the definitive findings on all three issues, this action is fundamentally incompetent, hopelessly statute-barred, and completely lacking in merit.
48. The Claimant, through his own inexplicable and unexcused inaction, slept upon his rights for sixteen years, now asks this Court to disturb long-settled administrative acts, and seeks reliefs against a party against whom no cause of action is disclosed.
49. Courts of law do not give judgments according to public opinion or to reflect public opinion, but must decide cases solely on the law and the facts presented. I end with the timeless quote of the American Civil Rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King, which is "The moral arc of the universe bends at the elbow of justice."
50. The justice of this case, rooted in both law and equity, demands that the stale claims of the Claimant be laid to rest. The action must be, and is hereby, dismissed in its entirety.
51.On the whole, for the reasons giving I hereby make the following orders:
1. The claims of the Claimant for declarations, reinstatement, outstanding salary arrears, and damages are dismissed in their entirety for being statute-barred and defeated by the doctrines of laches and acquiescence.
2. The suit against the 3rd Defendant, the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation, is dismissed for disclosing no reasonable cause of action against him.
3. Parties shall bear their respective costs of this action.
52.Judgment is hereby entered accordingly.
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Hon. Justice E. D. Subilim
JUDGE