IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL

DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM

DATE: 15^TH JULY, 2026                              

SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/198/2024

 

BETWEEN:

MR. IFEANYI UGADOGWU…………………………. CLAIMANT

(Suing as the Administrator of the 

Estate of Late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga)

 

AND

1. NPF PENSIONS LTD

2. JOYCE OKOYE

3. MUKTARI MOHAMMED                                    ….... DEFENDANTS

4. NATIONAL PENSION COMMISSION

5. IFEANYI OKWOR

 

REPRESENTATION:

FAVOURITE O. OKOROMA ESQ., FOR CLAIMANT

UJAH ISREAL ESQ., FOR THE 1^ST, 2^ND, AND 3^RD DEFENDANTS

E. O. AWA ESQ., WITH E. M. NWANKWO ESQ., FOR THE 4^TH DEFENDANT

R. C. NWEKE ESQ., FOR THE 5^TH DEFENDANT

 

 

                                                            JUDGMENT.

 

1.The Claimant via a Complaint dated and filed on the 10th day of July, 2024 sought the following reliefs from the Honourable Court against the Defendants.

1. A Declaration that the defendants are bound to pay the Pension and death benefits accruing to the Estate of Late DSP Ogadogwu Dennis Uga with Force No. AP: 87498 who died intestate and in active service with the Nigerian Police Force, to the Claimant who is the surviving recorded next of kin and named beneficiary of the said Estate, said Claimant having met all the requirements and conditions precedent to be entitled to the said benefits.
2. A Declaration that having been named as such by the Late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga, the 3rd and 4th Defendants have no powers or vires to decline or refuse to accept the Claimant as the recorded next of kin of the deceased DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Ugawith Force No. AP: 87498.
3. A Declaration that the Claimant being the recorded next of kin and having met all the requirements entitling him to same is accordingly entitle to the benefits accruing to the Estate of Late Ugadogwu Dennis Uga with Force No. AP: 87498 from the 1st-4th defendants.
4. A Declaration that the 5th Defendant is not the Claimant and that the Claimant, to the exclusion of any other person particularly the 5th Defendant, is the surviving recorded next of kin to Late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga with Force No. AP: 87498 and is therefore the only person entitled to the benefits accruing to the said Estate.
5. A Declaration that the acts of the 1st-4th Defendants in refusing, rejecting and declining to accept and pay over the Pension, death benefits and other entitlements accruing to the Estate of Late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga with Force No. AP: 87498 to the Claimant who is entitled to same and but rather, frustrating every effort of the Claimant up to this moment have caused emotional and or psychological trauma to the Claimant for which he is entitled to compensation.
6. An Order of perpetual Injunction restraining the 5th Defendant from parading himself as the Claimant and consequently from claiming that he is entitled to the Estate of the Late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga with Force No. AP: 87498.
7. An order of specific performance and or Injunction mandating the defendants by themselves or through their agents, servants or privies to compute, process and pay the Pension, death benefits and all other Entitlements accruing to and due to the Estate of Late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga with Force No. AP: 87498 to the Claimant forthwith as the recorded next of kin who is entitled to same.
8. An Order of this Honourable Court mandating the Defendants to pay to the Claimant the sum of fifty million naira (N50,000,000.00) only as general damages.
9. An Order of this Honourable Court mandating the Defendants to pay to the Claimant the sum of five million naira (N5, 000,000.00) only as cost of prosecuting this suit.
10. 25% interest per month of the judgment sum from the date of judgment till the judgment sum is liquidated.

2.Following the service of the Claimant’s Complaint on the defendants, the 1st – 3^rd defendants jointly filed their memorandum of appearance and Statement of Defence respectively dated the 11th day of October 2024 but filed on 06/11/2024 alongside with other front-loaded processes denying liabilities. The 4th defendant on its own part denied any liability and equally filed a memorandum of appearance and statement of defence respectively dated and filed on the 18th day of September 2024. The 5th Defendant on his own part entered appearance and filed his memorandum of appearance and statement of defence/counter-claim respectively dated the 9th day of January 2025 but filed on the 13th day of January 2025 counter-claiming against the Claimant as well as the 1st-4th Defendants as follows:

1. A declaration that the claimant/defendant to counter-claim is not entitled to the pension benefits accruing to late DSP Dennis UgadogwuUga with Force No. AP: 87498 from the 1st defendant.
2. A declaration that the 5th Defendant/counter-claimant is the rightful person entitled to the pension benefits accruing to late DSP Dennis Ugadogwu Uga with Force No. AP: 87498 from the 1st Defendant.
3. An order of Injunction restraining the Claimant/defendant to counter-claim from posturing himself or in any way or manner claiming that he is entitled to the pension benefits or other benefits accruing to late DSP Dennis Ugadogwu Uga with Force No. AP: 87498.
4. An order of the Honourable Cout mandating the 1st-4th Defendants to counter-claim to release forthwith all the pension benefits accruing to late DSP Dennis Ugadogwu Uga with Force No. AP: 87498 in their possession to the counter-claimant.
5. An order of the Honourable Court mandating the claimant/defendant to counter-claim to pay to the 5th defendant/counter-claimant the sum of N5, 000, 000. 00 (Five Million Naira only) being general damages and cost of the defence of this suit.

OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE

3.The Claimant thereafter filed his various reply to the defendants’ processes. After the close of pleadings and regularizing of processes filed out of time as well as discharging all interlocutory applications, the coast became clear for the hearing of the case on its merit.

BACKGROUND STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Claimant, Ifeanyi Ugadogwu, sues as the Administrator of the Estate of the late Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Ugadogwu Dennis Uga, Force No. AP:87498. The 1st Defendant, NPF Pensions Limited, is the Pension Fund Administrator holding the retirement savings account of the deceased. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants, Joyce Okoye and Muktari Mohammed, are staff of the 1st Defendant. The 4th Defendant, the National Pension Commission (PenCom), is the statutory regulator of the pension industry and the body charged with approving the release of death benefits under the Pension Reform Act 2014. The 5th Defendant, Ifeanyi Okwor, is a member of the same Obeagu Autonomous Community of Ishielu Local Government Area of Ebonyi State from which the deceased hailed, and is a rival claimant to the estate of the deceased.

4.The deceased, DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga, died intestate on 30 October 2014 while in active service with the Nigerian Police Force at the Department of Finance and Administration, Enugu State Command. He died without a wife, children, or surviving parents, leaving as his closest surviving nuclear family member his immediate younger brother, William Ugadogwu. The deceased had, during his lifetime, recorded two persons as his next of kin with his employer and Pension Fund Administrator: William Ugadogwu and Ifeanyi Ugadogwu. Following the death of the deceased, the Claimant — who is the nephew of the deceased, being the son of the deceased's elder sister — and William Ugadogwu jointly obtained Letters of Administration over the estate of the deceased. William Ugadogwu thereafter died on 30 July 2016, leaving the Claimant as the sole surviving Administrator. The Claimant proceeded to process the pension and death benefits of the deceased with the 1st Defendant and, according to his case, met all the documentary requirements for payment. During the pendency of the verification exercise conducted by the 1st Defendant, the 5th Defendant surfaced and raised an objection, claiming entitlement to the benefits. The 5th Defendant's case is that, following the death of William Ugadogwu, the extended OkworNwalu family met and, on the advice of a retired police officer, the 5th Defendant changed his name from Ifeanyi Okwor to Ifeanyi Ugadogwu in order to present himself as the next of kin recorded by the deceased. The 1st Defendant, confronted with two persons bearing the same name and making rival claims, halted the processing of the benefits. A police investigation was subsequently carried out, which the Claimant asserts established him as the real Ifeanyi Ugadogwu and led to the prosecution of the 5th Defendant for impersonation. The 4th Defendant, upon being notified, issued a response dated 29 June 2020 drawing attention to the conditions for accessing death benefits under the Pension Reform Act 2014 and the applicable Regulation for the Administration of Retirement and Terminal Benefits, and withheld its approval for payment on the ground, among others, that the Letters of Administration had become defective by reason of the death of one of the joint Administrators. The Claimant had earlier filed Suit No. CU/1829/2020 before the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory against the 1st to 4th Defendants over the same subject matter, but that suit was struck out for lack of jurisdiction by Justice Kayode Agunloye, who held that jurisdiction over pension and retirement benefits vested in the National Industrial Court; that ruling was tendered at trial as Exhibit Muktari B.

COMMENCEMENT OF HEARING

5.At trial, the Claimant testified as the sole witness for his case (CW1) and tendered eight documents admitted in evidence as Exhibits Ugadogwu 1 to 8, including his permanent Voter's Card admitted as Exhibit Ugadogwu 8. He was cross-examined by counsel for all the Defendants. The 1st to 3rd Defendants opened their defence on 7 July 2025 through the 3rd Defendant, Muktari Mohammed (DW1), who tendered three documents admitted as Exhibits Muktari A, B and C, and was cross-examined by all parties. The 4th Defendant called one Abubakar Jidda (DW2), who tendered two documents admitted as Exhibits Jidda A and B, and was cross-examined. The 5th Defendant testified in person (DW3), tendered four documents admitted as Exhibits Ifeanyi 1 to 4, and was cross-examined by all parties. Trial was formally concluded on 3 December 2025. The Claimant filed a Motion on Notice, supported by a ten-paragraph affidavit deposed to by his counsel, Favourite O. Okoroma Esq., seeking an extension of time to file his Final Written Address and an order deeming the address properly filed and served, on the ground that counsel had been absent from jurisdiction since January 2026 due to family matters and was not timeously informed of service of the earlier addresses. At the conclusion of hearing, the Court directed all parties to file and exchange Final Written Addresses, which all parties have now done, and the matter is before the Court for determination on the addresses so filed.

EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

6.The burden of proof in this civil proceeding rests squarely on the Claimant, Ifeanyi Ugadogwu, who seeks declaratory reliefs, specific performance, injunctive orders, and damages. The standard is proof on the balance of probabilities, that is, a preponderance of evidence. Where the Claimant seeks declaratory relief, the burden is particularly heavy: he must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the Defendants' case. The 5th Defendant, as Counter-Claimant, equally bears the burden of proving his counter-claim on the balance of probabilities. These principles are well settled and are not in dispute among the parties.

7.Turning first to the Claimant (PW1), Ifeanyi Ugadogwu, he testified as the sole witness for his case. He adopted his written statement on oath and tendered eight documents admitted as Exhibits Ugadogwu 1 through 8. He was cross-examined by counsel for all Defendants. The core of his testimony was that he is the nephew of the late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga (the deceased), that he was recorded as one of the deceased's next of kin, that he and William Ugadogwu (the deceased's biological brother) jointly obtained Letters of Administration over the deceased's estate, that William Ugadogwu subsequently died in 2016, and that he thereafter proceeded as the surviving Administrator to process the pension and death benefits. He further testified that the 5th Defendant fraudulently changed his name to Ifeanyi Ugadogwu to impersonate him and lay claim to the benefits, that a police investigation confirmed the Claimant's true identity and recommended prosecution of the 5th Defendant for impersonation, and that despite his compliance with all documentary requirements, the 1st to 4th Defendants refused to release the benefits.

8.Exhibit Ugadogwu 1 is the Letters of Administration issued in the names of Ifeanyi Ugadogwu and William Ugadogwu. This is a court-issued document of considerable probative weight. It is a judgment in rem and, as the law provides, remains valid and operative until set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. No party before this Court has obtained an order revoking or setting aside this grant. The Letters of Administration therefore stand as valid and subsisting. The 4th Defendant's own letter, Exhibit Muktari C, which is a response from the National Pension Commission to the 1st Defendant, contains a significant admission: the 4th Defendant stated therein that the Claimant, having obtained the Letters of Administration, 'ought to be entitled to the payment of the deceased's death benefit, notwithstanding a rival claimant,' and further acknowledged that the existence of a rival claimant cannot stall compliance with the terms of the Letters of Administration where that rival claimant has produced neither Letters of Administration nor a court order setting aside the extant grant. This admission, made in the 4th Defendant's own documentary exhibit, is of very high evidential value and is binding on the 4th Defendant. It substantially undermines the 4th Defendant's trial position that the Claimant failed to produce necessary documentation.

9.Exhibit Ugadogwu 8 is the Claimant's permanent Voter's Card bearing the name Ifeanyi Ugadogwu. This documentary evidence directly corroborates the Claimant's identity. The 5th Defendant's oral assertion that the Claimant's real name is Fredrick Ifeanyi Aja was not supported by any documentary evidence. The 5th Defendant tendered no identity document, no school record, no official document of any kind to establish that the Claimant bears a different name. In the face of a subsisting documentary exhibit — the Voter's Card — the bare oral assertion of the 5th Defendant on this point carries no weight. Documentary evidence is the best evidence and oral testimony cannot be admitted to contradict or displace it where a document speaks clearly to the fact in issue.

10.Exhibit Ugadogwu 4 is a third-party affidavit deposed to by one Chukwudi Uga, described as the Claimant's younger brother, corroborating the Claimant's identity and relationship to the deceased. The 5th Defendant's address points out that the deponent is the Claimant's blood brother, and that the Claimant reached out to his own family rather than to the deceased's family for this corroboration. This observation is noted but does not, in itself, invalidate the affidavit. The 1st to 3rd Defendants specifically requested a third-party affidavit from a family member, and the Claimant provided it. The 1st to 3rd Defendants' own witness, DW1, admitted under cross-examination that the Claimant submitted all required documents. That admission is fatal to any argument that the Claimant failed to comply with documentary requirements.

11.The Claimant's testimony that the 5th Defendant admitted to changing his name is corroborated by the 5th Defendant's own Final Written Address, which openly narrates that the 5th Defendant changed his name from Ifeanyi Okwor to Ifeanyi Ugadogwu on the advice of a retired police officer, ASP Wilfred Innocent Nnaji, in order to pursue the Letters of Administration and the pension benefits. This is not a disputed fact — it is a fact the 5th Defendant himself has placed before the Court in his own address. The 5th Defendant's explanation is that this was done on the advice of the extended family and with the family's consent, and that it was a legitimate strategy to access the benefits on behalf of the family. However, the legal consequence of this admission is stark: the 5th Defendant concedes that the name Ifeanyi Ugadogwu was not his birth name, that he adopted it for the purpose of claiming the benefits, and that the Claimant — who bears that name as his own — is a different person. This admission effectively demolishes the 5th Defendant's primary challenge to the Claimant's identity.

12.The Claimant's testimony was cross-examined by all Defendants. Under cross-examination by the 1st to 3rd Defendants' counsel, the Claimant admitted that he has no documentary evidence showing that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants communicated with the 5th Defendant to invite him to raise a rival claim. This concession is significant. The Claimant's allegation that the 1st to 3rd Defendants deliberately brought in the 5th Defendant to frustrate payment is therefore unproven. The 5th Defendant himself confirmed under cross-examination by the 1st to 3rd Defendants' counsel that he raised his objection suo motu and wrote to the 1st Defendant of his own accord. This evidence from the 5th Defendant, elicited under cross-examination, corroborates the 1st to 3rd Defendants' position that the 5th Defendant's intervention was self-initiated. The allegation of deliberate collusion between the 1st to 3rd Defendants and the 5th Defendant is accordingly not established on the evidence.

13.Turning to DW1, Muktari Mohammed, the 3rd Defendant who testified on behalf of the 1st to 3rd Defendants, he adopted his written statement on oath and tendered Exhibits Muktari A, B, and C. Under cross-examination by the Claimant's counsel, DW1 admitted that the 1st Defendant has no documentary evidence before the Court showing that the Claimant was ever asked to produce a court declaration as a condition for payment. This admission is critical. The 1st to 3rd Defendants had pleaded in their Statement of Defence that the Claimant failed to produce a valid court declaration, but their own witness conceded under cross-examination that there is no evidence that such a demand was ever made. A pleading unsupported by evidence at trial is of no probative value. DW1 further confirmed that the 1st Defendant paused the process on three grounds: the matter was in court (Exhibit Muktari B), there was a directive from the 4th Defendant that the Letters of Administration was void (Exhibit Muktari C), and the 1st Defendant's regulations provided that payment should be halted where there is a dispute as to beneficiaries. DW1 also confirmed that a Letter of Administration is the document required by a beneficiary to claim the funds, and that where there is a dispute between next of kin, the 1st Defendant's role is to mediate or refer the parties to court.

14.Exhibit Muktari B is a Ruling of the High Court of the FCT, per Justice Kayode Agunloye, striking out a suit filed by the Claimant against the 1st to 4th Defendants for lack of jurisdiction, with the court noting that the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction over pension and retirement benefits. This exhibit establishes that the Claimant had previously sought judicial intervention in 2022 over the same failure to pay, and that the matter was struck out on jurisdictional grounds. It does not establish that the 1st to 3rd Defendants were legally justified in withholding payment because of the pendency of that suit. The logic of using the pendency of a suit — which the Claimant filed precisely because payment was being withheld — as a justification for continued non-payment is circular and self-serving. The suit was struck out in 2022, and the 1st to 3rd Defendants still did not pay between 2022 and the filing of the present suit in July 2024. Exhibit Muktari B therefore does not provide a valid legal basis for the continued withholding of the benefits.

15.Exhibit Muktari C is the 4th Defendant's letter to the 1st Defendant. As already noted, it contains the 4th Defendant's own admission that the Claimant, as holder of the Letters of Administration, ought to be entitled to payment notwithstanding a rival claimant. The same letter, however, also raises the concern about the death of one of the joint Administrators and the question of whether the Letters of Administration remained valid. The 4th Defendant's position in Exhibit Muktari C is therefore internally contradictory: it acknowledges the Claimant's entitlement in principle but raises the inchoateness argument as a practical obstacle. The legal position on the death of a co-Administrator is clear: the Supreme Court in Eseme Sunday Eyiboh v Dahiru Sheikh Mujaddadi & Ors (2021) LPELR-5710 (SC) held that upon the death of one of multiple Administrators, the interest vests in the survivor without any new grant. The 4th Defendant's concern about the Letters of Administration becoming inchoate upon William Ugadogwu's death is therefore legally unfounded. The 4th Defendant's own Exhibit Muktari C, read in its entirety, thus provides more support for the Claimant's position than for the 4th Defendant's.

16.As to the 1st Defendant's regulation providing for halting payment where there is a dispute, DW1 referred to this regulation under cross-examination but the regulation itself was never tendered in evidence. The 1st to 3rd Defendants' Final Written Address refers to it but no exhibit was produced. A regulation that is not placed before the Court cannot be relied upon as evidence. The Court cannot speculate as to its contents. This ground of justification therefore fails for want of evidence.

17.Turning to DW2, Abubakar Jidda, the witness for the 4th Defendant, he adopted his written statement on oath and tendered Exhibits Jidda A and B. Under cross-examination by the 1st to 3rd Defendants' counsel, DW2 confirmed that where there are rival beneficiaries, the 1st Defendant is not expected to make payment to any of the rival parties. This evidence is consistent with the 1st to 3rd Defendants' position but does not advance the 4th Defendant's case on the specific question of whether the 4th Defendant's withholding of approval was lawful. DW2 also confirmed, critically, that the 4th Defendant does not itself requisition documents — that is the function of the 1st Defendant. This admission directly contradicts the 4th Defendant's pleaded position that the Claimant abandoned the need to produce necessary documentation. If the 4th Defendant does not requisition documents, it cannot credibly assert that the Claimant failed to produce documents to it.

18.Exhibits Jidda A and B are solicitors' letters. The Claimant's address challenges these exhibits on the basis that they are mere photocopies without acknowledgment, and that there is no evidence they were received by the Claimant's counsel. Exhibit Jidda A, on its face, appears to have been addressed to the Claimant's then counsel but the Claimant's address suggests its content was directed at the 5th Defendant's counsel. Without acknowledged copies, the probative value of these letters as evidence of communication with and guidance to the Claimant is limited. The Court cannot infer receipt or compliance from unacknowledged photocopies. These exhibits establish that the 4th Defendant issued guidance on the conditions for accessing death benefits, but they do not establish that the Claimant received and ignored that guidance.

19.Turning to DW3, the 5th Defendant, Ifeanyi Okwor, who testified in person, he adopted his written statement on oath and tendered four documents admitted as Exhibits Ifeanyi 1 through 4. He was cross-examined by all parties. His testimony, as reflected in his Final Written Address, rests on three pillars: first, that the Claimant is not truly Ifeanyi Ugadogwu but is rather Fredrick Ifeanyi Aja; second, that even if the Claimant is the recorded next of kin, being named as next of kin does not automatically confer inheritance rights; and third, that the applicable customary law of the deceased's community is patrilineal, which favours the 5th Defendant's family over the Claimant.

20.On the first pillar, the 5th Defendant's own admission that he changed his name to Ifeanyi Ugadogwu is, as already found, fatal to his challenge to the Claimant's identity. The 5th Defendant's assertion that the Claimant's real name is Fredrick Ifeanyi Aja is unsupported by any documentary evidence. The Claimant's Voter's Card (Exhibit Ugadogwu 8) stands uncontradicted by any documentary counter-evidence. The 5th Defendant's claim that the Claimant denied attending school but speaks English fluently is an observation that, standing alone, does not constitute evidence of a different identity. It is a matter of common knowledge that literacy and fluency in English can be acquired through informal means. This observation does not displace the documentary evidence of the Claimant's identity.

21.On the second pillar, the 5th Defendant is correct as a matter of law that being named as next of kin does not automatically confer inheritance rights. The Court of Appeal in Mohammed v. Tijani (2021) LPELR-54215 (CA) so held. However, this legal proposition, while accurate in the context of general inheritance law, must be applied with care in the specific context of pension and death benefits governed by the Pension Reform Act 2014. Under Section 8(2) of the PRA 2014, the pension fund administrator is required, upon receipt of a valid Letters of Administration, to release the funds to the personal representative of the deceased. The Claimant holds valid Letters of Administration. The PRA 2014 does not require the administrator to be a blood heir or to satisfy customary law inheritance criteria. The statute creates a specific legal mechanism for the release of pension funds, and that mechanism is triggered by the Letters of Administration. The 5th Defendant's argument on this point, while legally interesting in the abstract, does not engage with the specific statutory framework that governs this claim.

22.On the third pillar, the 5th Defendant tendered Exhibit Ifeanyi 3, a letter from the Traditional Ruler of the parties' community, attesting that the applicable customary law is patrilineal. He also tendered Exhibit Ifeanyi 2, the burial poster of the deceased, which lists the 5th Defendant among the survivors but does not list the Claimant. Exhibit Ifeanyi 1 is the counterpart copy of a loan application allegedly made by the 5th Defendant to finance the deceased's burial. These exhibits are relevant to the 5th Defendant's counter-claim but their weight must be assessed carefully. The burial poster (Exhibit Ifeanyi 2) is a document produced by the 5th Defendant's own family and cannot be treated as an independent or neutral record of the deceased's family composition. The loan application (Exhibit Ifeanyi 1) is a handwritten photocopy without acknowledgment; it establishes at most that the 5th Defendant applied for a loan, not that the loan was granted or that the funds were actually used for the burial. The Traditional Ruler's letter (Exhibit Ifeanyi 3) is a statement of customary law. However, the critical question is whether customary law of inheritance governs the distribution of pension benefits under the PRA 2014, or whether the statute displaces customary law in this specific context. The PRA 2014 is a federal statute that creates a specific regime for the release of pension funds. It does not incorporate customary law as a criterion for entitlement. The personal law of the deceased is referenced in Section 8(2) only in the context of how the funds are to be distributed once released to the personal representative — not as a criterion for determining who may receive the funds from the PFA. The 5th Defendant's customary law argument, however persuasive it might be in a general succession dispute, does not override the statutory mechanism under the PRA 2014 for the release of pension funds to the holder of valid Letters of Administration.

23.A further and significant inconsistency in the 5th Defendant's case must be noted. The 5th Defendant's own narrative in his Final Written Address concedes that the 5th Defendant and his family took no interest in the pension benefits while William Ugadogwu was alive. It was only after William Ugadogwu's death in 2016 that the 5th Defendant's family became interested. The 5th Defendant then, on the advice of a retired police officer, changed his name to Ifeanyi Ugadogwu — one of the names recorded as next of kin by the deceased — and attempted to obtain Letters of Administration under that changed name. This sequence of events reveals a deliberate attempt to assume the identity of the recorded next of kin in order to access the benefits. The 5th Defendant's explanation that this was done on family advice and with good intentions does not alter the legal character of the act. The 5th Defendant was not the Ifeanyi Ugadogwu recorded by the deceased as next of kin. He adopted that name for the specific purpose of claiming the benefits. The Claimant, on the other hand, bears that name as his own and obtained the Letters of Administration in that name jointly with the deceased's biological brother. The 5th Defendant's counter-claim, which rests on his assertion that he represents the deceased's family and that customary law favours his family, does not establish that he is the Ifeanyi Ugadogwu named as next of kin, nor does it establish that the Letters of Administration held by the Claimant are invalid.

24.The 5th Defendant's alternative counter-claim relief — that the Court appoint a receiver manager to use the pension benefits to erect a structure at the family compound — is an extraordinary remedy that finds no basis in the PRA 2014 or in any other applicable law. The PRA 2014 provides for the release of pension funds to the personal representative of the deceased or as directed by a court of competent jurisdiction. An order directing that pension funds be used to build a structure at a family compound is not a relief contemplated by the statute and would require a clear legal foundation that the 5th Defendant has not provided.

25.On the question of the 1st to 3rd Defendants' liability, the evidence establishes that these Defendants are fund holders who paused the payment process in the face of a genuine dispute between two persons both claiming to be Ifeanyi Ugadogwu. The 5th Defendant confirmed under cross-examination that he raised his objection suo motu and wrote to the 1st Defendant. The 1st to 3rd Defendants' response — to pause the process and refer the parties to court — was not, in the circumstances, an act of malice or deliberate frustration. The 1st to 3rd Defendants were caught between two competing claims and acted in accordance with their regulatory obligations by seeking a court determination. The Claimant's allegation that the 1st to 3rd Defendants deliberately invited the 5th Defendant to frustrate payment is unproven. However, the 1st to 3rd Defendants' continued failure to pay after the 5th Defendant's identity fraud was exposed by the police investigation, and after the Claimant provided all required documents including the third-party affidavit, requires scrutiny. DW1 admitted that the Claimant submitted all required documents. The 1st to 3rd Defendants' reliance on the 4th Defendant's directive (Exhibit Muktari C) as justification for non-payment is understandable, given that Section 8(2) of the PRA 2014 requires the 4th Defendant's approval before the 1st Defendant can release the funds. The 1st to 3rd Defendants were therefore not in a position to pay without the 4th Defendant's approval. Their liability, if any, is therefore contingent on whether the 4th Defendant's withholding of approval was lawful.

26.On the 4th Defendant's position, the evidence as a whole — and particularly the admissions in Exhibit Muktari C — establishes that the 4th Defendant's own assessment was that the Claimant, as holder of the Letters of Administration, ought to be entitled to payment notwithstanding a rival claimant. The 4th Defendant's subsequent withholding of approval on the ground that the Letters of Administration was inchoate due to the death of William Ugadogwu is legally untenable in light of the settled law on survivorship among co-Administrators. The 4th Defendant's witness admitted that the 4th Defendant does not requisition documents. The 4th Defendant's pleaded ground that the Claimant abandoned the need to produce necessary documentation is therefore not supported by the evidence of its own witness. The 4th Defendant's conduct in withholding approval, in the face of its own acknowledgment of the Claimant's entitlement, and on legally unsound grounds, is the proximate cause of the continued non-payment of the benefits.

27.In summary, the net evidential position on each material issue is as follows. On the identity of the Claimant: the evidence firmly establishes that the Claimant is Ifeanyi Ugadogwu, the person recorded as next of kin by the deceased. The 5th Defendant's challenge to the Claimant's identity is demolished by the 5th Defendant's own admission that he changed his name to Ifeanyi Ugadogwu, and by the Claimant's Voter's Card (Exhibit Ugadogwu 8) which stands uncontradicted by any documentary evidence. On the validity of the Letters of Administration: the Letters of Administration (Exhibit Ugadogwu 1) are valid and subsisting. The death of William Ugadogwu as co-Administrator did not render them inchoate; the Claimant survives as the sole Administrator by operation of law. No court has revoked or set aside the grant. On the Claimant's compliance with documentary requirements: the 1st to 3rd Defendants admitted that the Claimant submitted all required documents. The 4th Defendant's witness admitted that the 4th Defendant does not requisition documents. The ground of non-compliance with documentation is not established on the evidence. On the justification for withholding payment by the 1st to 3rd Defendants: the 1st to 3rd Defendants were not in a position to pay without the 4th Defendant's approval, and their referral of the parties to court was not malicious. The allegation of deliberate collusion with the 5th Defendant is unproven. On the justification for withholding approval by the 4th Defendant: the 4th Defendant's grounds for withholding approval — inchoateness of the Letters of Administration and failure to produce documentation — are not supported by the evidence and are legally unsound. The 4th Defendant's own Exhibit Muktari C contains admissions that undermine its trial position. On the 5th Defendant's counter-claim: the 5th Defendant has not established that he is the Ifeanyi Ugadogwu recorded as next of kin. His customary law argument does not override the statutory mechanism under the PRA 2014. His alternative relief has no legal foundation. The counter-claim is not proved on the evidence. On damages: the Claimant has been denied his entitlement for an extended period due to the 4th Defendant's legally untenable withholding of approval and the 5th Defendant's fraudulent assumption of the Claimant's identity. The evidence supports a finding that the Claimant has suffered loss and inconvenience warranting an award of damages, though the quantum of N50 million claimed as general damages requires independent justification which the Claimant has not specifically addressed beyond the general assertion of emotional and psychological trauma.

SUBMISSION OF 5^TH DEFENDANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS

28.Learned Counsel to the 5th Defendant, F.S. Nweke Esq. (JP) and R.C. Nweke Esq. of Festus Nweke Festus & Co., submitted as follows on the two issues formulated by the 5th Defendant.

29.On Issue One — Whether in view of the facts, circumstances and evidence in this matter, the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought before this Court — Learned Counsel to the 5th Defendant submitted that the answer is in the negative. Counsel submitted that the Claimant had claimed in the Letters of Administration (Exhibit Ugadogwu 1) to be a brother to the deceased, but that it was made abundantly clear during trial that the Claimant is the nephew and not the brother of the deceased DSP Dennis Ugadogwu Uga. Counsel submitted that the 5th Defendant and the Claimant are members of the same age-grade in their village, with the Claimant as President and the 5th Defendant as Secretary, and that the 5th Defendant knew and addressed the Claimant as Fredrick Ifeanyi Aja and not as Ifeanyi Ugadogwu. Counsel submitted that the Claimant denied attending primary or secondary school or any formal education, but failed to convincingly explain how he writes and speaks English Language fluently and eloquently without any formal training.

30.Counsel submitted that even if the Claimant is actually one of the next of kin recorded by the Late DSP Ugadogwu, being named as next of kin does not automatically entitle the Claimant to inherit the estate of the deceased, and that the position of next of kin is not synonymous with inheritance, citing Mohammed v Tijani (2021) LPELR-54215 (CA) for the proposition that next-of-kinship simpliciter will not guarantee a bequeathal of an intestate deceased's property upon the person who claims to be the next of kin. Counsel submitted that the Late DSP Ugadogwu died intestate and that the personal law applicable at his death is the customary law of his community, which is patrilineal and never matrilineal, and that this customary law does not favour the Claimant.

31.Counsel submitted that the estate of the deceased is family property and not the personal property of the person named as next of kin, and that any administrator thereof is bound to render account of same, citing Adesola & Anor v Lawrence & Ors (2023) LPELR-60439 (CA). Counsel submitted that it is wrong in law for an administrator of an estate to assimilate that property to his own, citing Amos v Irabor & Ors (2021) LPELR-54871 (CA)  for the proposition that administrators or executors are trustees of the property placed in their care on trust for the beneficiaries, and that no ownership known to law can ever be conferred on an administrator in respect of the property subject-matter of that administration. Counsel submitted that the Claimant submitted his personal account number seeking to be paid the benefits of the Late DSP Ugadogwu, and that when the 1st Defendant demanded third-party confirmation, the Claimant reached out only to his younger brother of the same blood, Mr. Chukwudi Uga (Exhibit Ugadogwu 4), without seeking the consent or input of any member of the deceased's family, thereby treating the benefits and estate of the deceased as his personal property. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the Claimant's claim in its entirety with costs.

32.On Issue Two — Whether in view of the evidence before the Court, the 5th Defendant has proved that he is entitled to his Counter-Claim — Learned Counsel to the 5th Defendant submitted that the answer is in the positive. Counsel submitted that the personal law applicable in the circumstances of this case where the deceased died intestate is the customary law applicable in the deceased's community, and that the Claimant did not deny the existence of that customary law as applicable in his community and binding on him, nor did the Claimant deny that patrilineal inheritance as applicable in the community of the deceased excludes the Claimant from inheriting the benefits and estate of the deceased. Counsel submitted that the bio data form kept by the employer of the deceased is not law and did not abrogate the customary law of the deceased, neither did it confer any special right on the Claimant against the family members of the deceased.

33.Counsel submitted that the 5th Defendant tendered the burial poster of the deceased (Exhibit Ifeanyi 2), which expressly stated the family of the deceased at the time of death and the survivors thereof, and that the 5th Defendant is expressly listed as one of the survivors of the deceased while the Claimant is not so listed. Counsel submitted that the father of the deceased, Uga Okwor Nwalu, is a member of the Okwor Nwalu family, just like the 5th Defendant, while the Claimant is not a member thereof. Counsel submitted that the 5th Defendant played a major role in the burial of the Late DSP Ugadogwu, borrowing a friendly loan from the Ikpele Traders Association to finance the burial (Exhibit Ifeanyi 1), while the Claimant played no role in the said burial. Counsel submitted that the Traditional Ruler of the parties, in his letter (Exhibit Ifeanyi 3), was emphatic that the customary law applicable in their place is patrilineal inheritance, and that this evidence was never contradicted at any point in time.

34.Counsel cited Chukwu v Okoh (2016) LPELR-42117 (CA) and extensively quoted from Professor B.O. Nwabueze's Nigerian Land Law (1982 Reprint) at pages 380 to 382 on the rules of patrilineal intestate succession, submitting that the custom of patrilineal succession binding on the parties in this suit is in favour of the 5th Defendant who represents the family of the deceased. Counsel submitted that the family of the 5th Defendant cannot under the said custom give out their daughter in marriage to the family of the Claimant and at the same time hand the Claimant the estate of the deceased, and that being named as next of kin is not a magic wand to transfer the estate of the deceased to the Claimant or the Claimant's family. Counsel submitted that the 5th Defendant is not seeking the benefits as his personal property but as belonging to the larger family of the deceased which the 5th Defendant represents, and that the alternative claim is for the court to appoint a receiver manager to apply the said benefits in erecting a permanent structure at the family compound of the deceased to sustain the memory of the deceased. Counsel submitted that the 5th Defendant, having participated in giving the deceased a decent burial, is entitled to participate in the administration of the estate of the deceased. Counsel submitted that Order 11 Rule 5 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 enjoins the court to act on the evidence of the 5th Defendant, especially Exhibit Ifeanyi 3, in granting the Counter-Claim. Counsel urged the court to resolve Issue Two in favour of the 5th Defendant and against the Claimant, submitting that allowing the Claimant to access the benefits of the deceased DSP Ugadogwu will amount to complete obliteration of the memory of the deceased.

SUBMISSION OF 4^TH DEFENDANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS

35.Learned Counsel to the 4th Defendant (National Pension Commission), E.O. Awa Esq., C.C. Odega Esq., and E.M. Nwankwo Esq. of the Litigation Unit, National Pension Commission, submitted as follows on the sole issue formulated by the 4th Defendant.

36.On the sole issue — Whether the Claimant has proven his case to be entitled to the reliefs he claims, having regard to the totality of the facts and the relevant provisions of the extant law and Regulations — Learned Counsel to the 4th Defendant submitted that the answer is in the negative. Counsel acknowledged and conceded to the right of the appropriate beneficiary or beneficiaries to payment of the deceased's benefits in line with the extant provisions of the statute, and submitted that it is within the judicial discretion of the court to grant, refuse, deny, or give directions in respect of the claim before the court.

37.Counsel set out Section 8(1) and (2) of the Pension Reform Act, 2014, submitting that Section 8(2) clearly places the responsibility of the 4th Defendant as regulator and the 1st to 3rd Defendants to abide by the ultimate decision of the court in relation to the subject matter, particularly in the absence of a valid Will confirming the appropriate beneficiaries under the estate of the deceased. Counsel submitted that the right to receive pension is regulated by law as provided by Section 173 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), and that the 4th Defendant's stance is to insist on following the provisions of the law and the Regulations on the subject matter, citing FGN v Zebra Energy Ltd [2002] 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 162. Counsel submitted that the issue of jurisdiction is rested in this matter and that the condition precedent to the exercise of the court's jurisdiction has been satisfied in accordance with the principle laid down in Madukolu and Ors v Nkemdilim & Ors [1962] All NLR (Pt. 4) 587.

38.Counsel submitted that the 4th Defendant had pleaded in paragraph 5 of its Statement of Defence and canvassed in evidence that the principal parties, especially the Claimant, had abandoned the need to produce the necessary documentation to prove entitlement and access the benefit, and that this valuable piece of evidence was neither denied nor controverted. Counsel submitted that evidence which is unchallenged and uncontradicted ought to be accepted if found credible, citing Inegbedion v Selo-Ojemen & Anor [2013] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 211. Counsel submitted that it is unfortunate that the party who failed to produce the requisite documentation now turns around to make the regulator an assailant in his bid to assert entitlement to damages for an alleged failure to act on nothing, and that it is appropriate for the 4th Defendant not to apply sentiments or bow to emotions in the application of the provisions of its extant law and specific directives of its Regulation.

39.Counsel submitted that Section 8(2) of the PRA 2014 does not mean that the 1st Defendant PFA should mandatorily pay the benefits of the deceased to the Claimant upon presentation of the Letters of Administration without more, and that it pertains to the approval of the 4th Defendant Commission and the need to ensure the validity of the procured Letters of Probate, submitting that the court would not import or add any other meaning to the plain words of Section 8(2), citing Musa v State [2025] 20 NWLR (Pt. 2022) 119. Counsel also cited Barde v Fed. College, Edu., Pankshin [2025] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1987) 543 for the proposition that there is a duty on the court to do justice according to law and not to be swayed by sentiment.

40.Counsel submitted that the exercise of the guidance under Section 8(2) of the PRA 2014 is dependent on the extant guidelines issued by the 4th Defendant, and that the establishment of uniform rules conforms with Section 23(d) of the PRA 2014. Counsel set out Clause 3.4 of the Regulations for the Administration of Retirement and Terminal Benefits in full, listing the documents required to be submitted to the deceased's PFA by the legal beneficiary, and submitted that there is no evidence of the Claimant's mandatory compliance with these requirements so as to assume the position of the lone beneficial interest and confer liability on the 1st to 4th Defendants.

41.Counsel submitted that to be entitled to a declaratory order of court, the Claimant must discharge the burden or onus of proof that he is entitled as per his claim, and that the burden is heavy in the sense that the grant of declaratory reliefs even on admission of the defendant is not a matter of course, citing Orient Properties Dev. Co. Ltd v Fed. Min., H. & U.D. [2025] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1996) 307. Counsel submitted that the Claimant merely bandied claims for damages against the Defendants and did nothing more, and that general damages are damages which the law presumes to flow automatically from the wrong inflicted on the Claimant by the Defendant, but that the 4th Defendant has not inflicted any wrong on the Claimant to attract such a claim, citing Rab Construction Ltd & Anor v Isaac [2012] LPELR 9787 (CA). Counsel submitted that the Claimant is in fact asking for damages from the Defendants for his own non-compliance with the extant law and Regulation, and that this is untenable and inappropriate.

42.Counsel submitted that none of the Exhibits tendered by the Claimant support his assertion against the 4th Defendant, and that no matter how impressive a pleading may be, it is of no consequence if not supported by concrete and credible evidence, citing Ogbebor v Ihasee (2025) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1986) 207. Counsel submitted that it is not the duty of the court to speculate in the absence of evidence, citing Onuegbu v Gov., Imo State [2024] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1962) 419. Counsel submitted that a Claimant must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the Defendant's case, citing Isamatu Ashiru v Adettun Olukoya [2006] 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 1 and Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011, and that the person who asserts has the primary burden of proving his assertion, citing Alh. Tajudeen Olagunju v Alhaja Habibat Yahaya [2004] 11 NWLR (Pt. 883) 24. Counsel cited Access Bank Plc v Ogboja [ 2022] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1812) 547 for the proposition that the facts elicited from the evidence of the plaintiff should so preponderate in favour of the claims made that the court should, on balance of probabilities, decide in his favour. Counsel submitted that the Claimant has no case against the 4th Defendant as there is no legal justification for the same, that the Claimant has no direct interface with the 4th Defendant save for the complaint which was duly attended to and the outcome clearly communicated in writing, and urged the court to strike out the suit against the 4th Defendant.

SUBMISSION OF 1^ST – 3^RD DEFENDANTS’ FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS

43.Learned Counsel to the 1st to 3rd Defendants, O.C. Ali Esq., P.O. Okpanachi Esq., V.C. Nwoka Esq., and G.O. Charles Esq. (Mrs.) of McAli Legal Consult, submitted as follows on the sole issue formulated by the 1st to 3rd Defendants.

44.On the sole issue — Whether the Claimant or the 5th Defendant/Counter-Claimant have proved their case against the 1st to 3rd Defendants to warrant any liability in this suit — Learned Counsel to the 1st to 3rd Defendants submitted that the answer is in the negative. Counsel submitted that in civil proceedings, the burden of proof as provided by Section 133 of the Evidence Act, 2011 is on the party who will fail if no evidence is given on either side, and that by virtue of this provision the burden lies on the Claimant, citing Oyovbiare v Omamurhomu [1999] 10 NWLR (Pt. 621) 23 at page 34 paras F–G and Ewo v Ani [2004] 3 NWLR (Pt. 861) 611 at 630–631 paras F–G. Counsel further submitted that the burden of proof does not shift from the Claimant to the Defendant until the Claimant has discharged the onus placed on him on the preponderance of evidence or balance of probability, and that in a declaratory action such as this one, the Claimant cannot rely on the weakness of the opponent's case, citing Agbi v Ogbeh [2006] 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 65 (SC), Alhaji Otaru & Sons Ltd v Idri [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 606) 330 at 342 paras A–B (SC), Atane v Amu [1970] 10 SC 237 at 243–244 (SC), and Imam v Sheriff [2005] 5 NWLR (Pt. 914) 80 at 186–187 paras H–B, 215 paras E–F.

45.Counsel submitted that the Claimant's allegation that the 1st to 3rd Defendants deliberately and maliciously halted payment and deliberately brought the 5th Defendant to stall payment has remained unproven. Counsel drew attention to the fact that the Claimant under oath during cross-examination confirmed that he has no evidence or document showing that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants communicated with the 5th Defendant to come and claim the death benefits and pension of the Late DSP Dennis Ugadogwu. Counsel further submitted that the 5th Defendant himself, under cross-examination by the 1st to 3rd Defendants' counsel, confirmed that he suo motu raised an objection when the Claimant was processing the death benefits and that he wrote the 1st Defendant on his complaint against the Claimant.

46.Counsel submitted that DW1, Muktari Mohammed, under cross-examination by Claimant's counsel, stated that the 1st Defendant paused the process on three grounds: first, that the matter was in court (Exhibit Muktari B); second, that there was a directive from the 4th Defendant as regulatory body because the earlier Letter of Administration was void (Exhibit Muktari C); and third, that the 1st Defendant's Regulations provided that where there is a dispute as to beneficiaries, payment should be halted. Counsel also submitted that DW1 under cross-examination by the 4th Defendant clarified that a Letter of Administration is the document required by the beneficiary to claim benefit, that the 1st Defendant is mandated by law and its guiding regulations to verify the authenticity of a Letter of Administration, and that where there is a dispute between next of kin, the 1st Defendant is to act as mediator or refer the parties to a court of competent jurisdiction, as confirmed in Exhibit Muktari C, paragraph 3(iii). Counsel further submitted that DW1 under cross-examination by the 5th Defendant stated that he was aware of the contention regarding the beneficiaries of the death benefit owing to the rivalry claim of the 5th Defendant, that he communicated this to the Claimant as one of the reasons why payment was on hold, and that the Claimant did not take any step to resolve the said contention. Counsel also submitted that the 4th Defendant's witness, Abubakar Jidda, under cross-examination by the 1st to 3rd Defendants, confirmed that where there is a contention between rival beneficiaries, the 1st Defendant is not expected to make payment to any of the rival parties.

47.Counsel submitted that from the foregoing, the evidence elucidated from witnesses under cross-examination makes it clear that the 1st to 3rd Defendants have done no wrong to warrant liability in this suit, and that they are nothing but fund holders who have demonstrated neutrality, with the mandate of paying the death benefit to whoever a competent court declares as the lawful beneficiary and who has satisfied the laid down requirements for processing a deceased person's pension benefits. Counsel submitted that the Claimant has not discharged the burden of proof placed on him so as to warrant liability on the part of the 1st to 3rd Defendants. Counsel also submitted that the same conclusion applies to the 5th Defendant's Counter-Claim, as the 5th Defendant himself confirmed under cross-examination that he sued the 1st to 4th Defendants because he had a next of kin rivalry with the Claimant and that he raised objection to the processing of the death benefits in writing to the 1st Defendant, thereby discharging the 1st to 3rd Defendants of any form of liability. Counsel urged the court not to grant the reliefs sought by the Claimant or the 5th Defendant/Counter-Claimant against the 1st to 3rd Defendants.

SUBMISSION OF CLAIMANT

48.Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Favourite O. Okoroma Esq. of Ikechukwu Ezechukwu SAN & Co., submitted as follows on the four issues formulated for determination.

49.On Issue One — Whether the Claimant is entitled to the pension and death benefits accruing to the Estate of the Late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga — Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the answer is in the affirmative. Counsel submitted that the identity of the Claimant as Ifeanyi Ugadogwu, the recorded next of kin of the deceased, has been concretely established beyond any form of doubt at trial. Counsel drew attention to the fact that the 5th Defendant, who had previously claimed to be the Claimant, admitted both in his pleadings and under cross-examination by Claimant's counsel that he had fraudulently changed his name to Ifeanyi Ugadogwu in order to gain access to and process the pension and death benefits of the Late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga. Counsel submitted that the 5th Defendant's assertion that the Claimant's real name is Fredrick Ajah was made without any evidential basis and that the Claimant produced and tendered his permanent Voter's Card, admitted as Exhibit Ugadogwu 8, which confirmed his name as Ifeanyi Ugadogwu — the same name recorded by the deceased as his next of kin. Counsel submitted that the 5th Defendant's claim about the Claimant's identity is frivolous and untenable, and that this Court is not permitted to speculate or conjecture in its findings where there is no evidence, citing Olalolmi Industries Ltd v NIDB [2009] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1167) 266 (SC), Saipem Nig Ltd v Agip Nig. Ltd [2018] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1639) 329 (SC), and Oshodi v Eyifunmi [2000] 13 NWLR (Pt. 684) 298 (SC). Counsel further submitted that documentary evidence is the best evidence and that oral evidence cannot be admitted to contradict or displace it, citing Arije v Arije [2018] LPELR-44193 (SC), Eghaevba v Osagie [2009] NWLR (Pt. 1173) 299, and Tejumade v Olarenwaju [2015] LPELR-25975 (CA).

50.On Issue Two — Whether the 1st to 4th Defendants had any valid reasons to withhold consent and stall payment of the pension and death benefits to the Claimant. Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the answer is in the negative. Counsel submitted that the 1st to 3rd Defendants admitted both in their pleadings and under cross-examination that the Claimant met all the requirements and conditions precedent to be entitled to the pension and death benefits of the Late DSP Ugadogwu, but that they stalled payment for four reasons: first, that the Claimant failed to produce a valid court declaration; second, that there was a directive from the 4th Defendant that payment be stalled because the Letters of Administration had become inchoate owing to the death of one Administrator; third, that the matter was in court; and fourth, that the 1st Defendant's Regulations provided that where there is a dispute as to beneficiaries, payment should be halted.

51.On the first reason, Counsel submitted that DW1 under cross-examination admitted that there was no evidence before the court that the Claimant was ever asked to produce a court declaration. Counsel submitted that the Letters of Administration already issued to the Claimant constituted prima facie proof of his identity and entitlement, and that such Letters remain valid and operative unless and until set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction, citing Oshodi v Eyifunmi [2000] 9 NWLR (Pt. 684) 298 (SC), Olowu v Olowu [1985] 3 NWLR (Pt. 13) 372 (SC), Adebayo v Johnson [1969] 1 ALL NLR 176 (SC), and Wilson v Oshin [2000] 9 NWLR (Pt. 673) 442 (SC). Counsel submitted that it was for the 5th Defendant, as the party asserting a rival claim, to approach the court and seek revocation of the Letters of Administration, not for the Claimant to prove their validity, relying on Sections 131 to 133 of the Evidence Act, 2011 and Kate Enterprises Ltd v Daewoo Nig. Ltd [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 116 (SC).

52.On the second reason — that the Letters of Administration became inchoate upon the death of co-Administrator William Ugadogwu — Counsel submitted that this argument is erroneous in law. Counsel submitted that the death of one Administrator does not render the Letters of Administration invalid, and that the interest of the deceased Administrator vests in the survivor without any new grant by the court, citing Eseme Sunday Eyiboh v Dahiru Sheikh Mujaddadi & Ors [2021] LPELR-5710 (SC) and Ibrahim v Ojomo [2004] 4 NWLR (Pt. 862).

53.On the third reason — that the matter was in court — Counsel submitted that Exhibit Muktari B is a ruling of the High Court of the FCT in which the earlier suit was struck out for lack of jurisdiction, the court having held that the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction over pension and retirement benefits. Counsel submitted that the pendency of that earlier matter, which was itself caused by the 1st to 3rd Defendants' failure to pay the Claimant, cannot be turned around by those same Defendants as a justification for their continued failure to pay.

54.On the fourth reason — the alleged internal regulation halting payment in cases of dispute — Counsel submitted that this assertion is not backed by any iota of evidence, as the 1st to 3rd Defendants neither referenced nor tendered the said regulation before the court, and that the court cannot speculate on facts not supported by evidence, again citing Olalolmi Industries Ltd v NIDB [2009] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1167) 266 (SC), Saipem Nig Ltd v Agip Nig. Ltd [2018] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1639) 329 (SC), and Oshodi v Eyifunmi [2000] 13 NWLR (Pt. 684) 298 (SC).

55.Counsel then addressed the 4th Defendant's reasons for withholding consent. On the 4th Defendant's claim that the Claimant abandoned the need to produce necessary documentation, Counsel submitted that the 4th Defendant's witness under cross-examination categorically stated: 'We do not requisition documents, the 1st Defendant does the documentation,' and that the 1st to 3rd Defendants had already admitted that the Claimant produced all required documents. Counsel further submitted that the 4th Defendant herself, in paragraph (ii) of Exhibit Muktari C, admitted that the Claimant, having obtained Letters of Administration, ought to be entitled to payment of the deceased's death benefit notwithstanding a rival claimant, and that the existence of a rival claimant cannot stall compliance with the terms of the Letters of Administration. Counsel submitted that these are admissions which require no further proof, citing Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011, AG Federation v Abubakar [2007] 10 NWLR (Pt. 104) 1, and Ojukwu v Obasanjo [2004] 12 NWLR (Pt. 886) 169. Counsel also submitted that Exhibits Jidda A and B were mere photocopies without acknowledgment and that there was no evidence of service on the Claimant's counsel, particularly Exhibit Jidda B, and that both letters therefore hold little or no probative value. On the 4th Defendant's claim of non-compliance with Clause 3.4 of the Regulation for the Administration of Retirement and Terminal Benefits, Counsel submitted that the 1st to 3rd Defendants had already admitted that the Claimant complied with all necessary documentation requirements, and that admitted facts need no further proof, again citing Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011, AG Federation v Abubakar [2007] 10 NWLR (Pt. 104) 1, and Ojukwu v Obasanjo (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 886) 169. Counsel submitted that the 4th Defendant's withholding of consent was wrongful and that this leaves the 4th Defendant liable.

56.On Issue Three — Whether the Claimant is entitled to damages from the Defendants — Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that having established that the Claimant was entitled to the pension and death benefits and that same was denied him for wrongful reasons, the Claimant is entitled to damages, especially from the 4th and 5th Defendants. Counsel submitted that costs are awarded to indemnify the successful party for expenses incurred as a result of litigation, citing Guinness (Nig) Plc v Nwoke [2000] 25 NWLR (Pt. 689) 135 at 150–151 (SC) and Nigerian Ports Authority v Aminu Ibrahim & Co [1977] 11 NSCC 464 at 470 (SC). Counsel further submitted that the costs to be awarded against the 5th Defendant should be punitive in nature to deter his fraudulent and reprehensible conduct, citing Okoebor v Police Council [2003] 12 NWLR (Pt. 834) 444 at 471 (SC) and Mobil Producing Unlimited v Monokpo [2003] 18 NWLR (Pt. 852) 346 at 430 (SC).

57.On Issue Four — Whether the 5th Defendant has proved his Counter-Claim against the Claimant — Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the answer is strongly in the negative. Counsel submitted that the 5th Defendant unambiguously admitted in his Defence, Counter-Claim, and during trial that he fraudulently changed his name and started claiming to be the Claimant in order to access the pension and death benefits of the Late DSP Ugadogwu, and that this admission is an express acknowledgment that he is not the recorded next of kin of the deceased. Counsel submitted that this singular admission is fatal to both the 5th Defendant's Statement of Defence and his Counter-Claim. Counsel further submitted that the 5th Defendant's reliance on the custom and tradition of Umu-agu Ikpele Obeagu is of no relevance, as the issue before the court is primarily governed by the Pension Reform Act, 2014, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, and the Rules of this Court, and that customary law has no place in the determination of entitlement to pension and death benefits. Counsel submitted that the 5th Defendant's argument, being solely embedded in custom and tradition and the approval of the Okwor Nwalu family, is bound to fail, citing UAC v Macfoy [1962] AC 152 (PC) and Madukolu v Nkemdilim [1962] 2 SCNLR 341. Counsel also submitted that the 5th Defendant failed to establish the facts he alluded to, including the alleged loan for the burial of the deceased, as no receipt was tendered and the letter of application for the loan was a mere photocopy of a handwritten letter without acknowledgment. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the Counter-Claim with substantial costs for being frivolous, intended to annoy, and constituting a waste of judicial time.

COURT’S DECISION

58.The issues formulated by the parties, when considered collectively, converge upon four fundamental questions that are indispensable for the just and comprehensive determination of this suit and the Counter-Claim. The Claimant's four issues are demonstrably the most comprehensive and encapsulate the entirety of the dispute. The sole issue presented by the 1st to 3rd Defendants is fully subsumed within the Claimant's second and third issues. Similarly, the 4th Defendant's singular issue is entirely encompassed by the Claimant's first and second issues. Furthermore, the 5th Defendant's two issues, though framed in reverse, directly mirror the Claimant's first and fourth issues. This Court's inherent power to consolidate cognate issues into a coherent and analytically efficient framework, thereby avoiding redundancy and focusing judicial inquiry, is a well-settled principle of law, as affirmed in: Adelusola v. Akinde [2004] 12 NWLR (Pt. 887) 295; Ugo v. Obiekwe [1989] 1 NWLR (Pt. 99) 566; Ikweki v. Ebele [2005] 11 NWLR (Pt. 936) 397. With a modest consolidation to eliminate repetition between the Claimant's first and second issues, the definitive issues for determination are accordingly adopted as follows:

(1) Whether the Claimant has unequivocally established his identity as the recorded next of kin of the late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga and is, by virtue thereof, lawfully entitled to the pension and death benefits accruing to the Estate of the said deceased.

(2) Whether the 1st to 4th Defendants possessed any valid and legally justifiable basis to withhold consent, stall, or otherwise impede the payment of the pension and death benefits accruing to the Estate of the late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga to the Claimant.

(3) Whether the Claimant is entitled to an award of damages from any or all of the Defendants for the unlawful denial and delay in accessing the said benefits.

(4) Whether the 5th Defendant has discharged the burden of proof to establish his Counter-Claim against the Claimant and the 1st to 4th Defendants.

ISSUE ONE

59.The resolution of this pivotal issue commences with the fundamental question of identity, as the entire contestation in this suit demonstrably flows from the 5th Defendant's deliberate assumption of the Claimant's name. It is a foundational principle of law, often referred to as hornbook law, that the burden of proving a fact rests squarely on the party who asserts it, and that in civil proceedings, the requisite standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. See sections 131, 132, 134 and 135(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011; Mogaji v. Odofin [1978] 4 SC 91; Agbi v. Ogbeh [2006] 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 65. Furthermore, where declaratory reliefs are sought, the Claimant bears the onerous burden of succeeding on the inherent strength of his own case, and can never rely on the perceived weaknesses of the Defence. See Alhaji Otaru & Sons Ltd v. Idris [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 606) 330; Bello v. Eweka [1981] 1 SC 101; Dumez (Nig.) Ltd v. Nwakhoba [2008] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 361.

60.The Claimant tendered his Permanent Voter's Card as Exhibit Ugadogwu 8, which unequivocally bears the name Ifeanyi Ugadogwu. This document is an official, state-issued identity document, carrying a presumption of regularity and authenticity, and it speaks for itself as unimpeachable evidence of the Claimant's identity. In stark contrast, the 5th Defendant, who directly challenges the Claimant's identity and asserts that his true name is Fredrick Ifeanyi Aja, failed to produce a single corroborating document in support of that assertion. No school certificate, no official identity card, no birth certificate, nor any official record of any description was presented. The apex Court has consistently and repeatedly held that documentary evidence constitutes the best form of evidence, possessing a superior probative value, and that unimpeached documents cannot be displaced or contradicted by mere oral assertion, however vehemently made. See Arije v. Arije [2018] LPELR-44193 (SC); Eghaevba v. Osagie (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 299; Oduntan v. Aina (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1330) 615; Egbunike v. ACB Ltd (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 375) 34. The bare, uncorroborated oral assertion of the 5th Defendant, entirely unaccompanied by any documentary support, is therefore wholly insufficient and lacks the requisite probative weight to displace the clear and compelling evidence of the Claimant's Voter's Card.

61.The observation that the Claimant exhibits fluency in English despite his denial of formal education is, at best, a mere curiosity and certainly not evidence of a different identity. Literacy and fluency in any language are commonly acquired through diverse informal and non-institutional means within this country, and this Court will not engage in speculation or draw inferences beyond the concrete evidence actually placed before it. See Olalomi Industries Ltd v. NIDB Ltd [2009] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1167) 266; Onuegbu v. Governor, Imo State [2019] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1668) 237.

62.More decisively, the 5th Defendant's own case, through his pleadings, testimony, and Final Written Address, utterly demolishes his challenge to the Claimant's identity. He openly and unequivocally narrated that he deliberately changed his name from Ifeanyi Okwor to Ifeanyi Ugadogwu upon the advice of a retired police officer, ASP Wilfred Innocent Nnaji, following a family meeting of the Okwor Nwalu extended family after the death of William Ugadogwu in 2016. The stated and admitted purpose of that name change was to present himself as the next of kin recorded by the deceased and thereby fraudulently access the benefits. By this explicit concession, the 5th Defendant necessarily admits and concedes that the name "Ifeanyi Ugadogwu" was not originally his, that a real and distinct person legitimately bears that name, and that he was actively attempting to impersonate that person. That real and distinct person is unequivocally the Claimant. Admissions made by a party in the course of proceedings are binding on him, constitute the strongest form of evidence against him, and require no further proof. See section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011; Attorney-General of the Federation v. Abubakar (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 1; Cardoso v. Daniel (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 20) 1; Seismograph Service (Nig.) Ltd v. Ogbeni (1976) 4 SC 85. The Supreme Court, per Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C., in Cardoso v. Daniel (supra), emphatically stated that an admission against interest is the strongest evidence obtainable against the party making it. This Court so holds on the identity question: I find that the Claimant has discharged the burden of proof beyond any reasonable doubt; and the 5th Defendant's fraudulent claim to identity is utterly disproved by his own admissions.

63.The Claimant's identity having been definitively established, the next crucial question is whether he is lawfully entitled to the pension and death benefits as the surviving Administrator of the estate. Exhibit Ugadogwu 1, the Letters of Administration, was duly issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in the joint names of Ifeanyi Ugadogwu and William Ugadogwu. It is a well-established principle that Letters of Administration constitute a grant in rem, meaning they are valid against the whole world and operative until such time as they are lawfully set aside or revoked by an order of a court of competent jurisdiction. See Oshodi v. Eyifunmi [2000] 13 NWLR (Pt. 684) 298; Olowu v. Olowu [1985] 3 NWLR (Pt. 13) 372; Adebayo v. Johnson [1969] 1 All NLR 176; Wilson v. Oshin [2000] 9 NWLR (Pt. 673) 442. Crucially, no party in these proceedings has obtained, or even sought, an order from the appropriate probate court revoking or setting aside that grant. It was incumbent upon the 5th Defendant, as the party asserting a rival claim and challenging the validity of the grant, to approach the appropriate probate court and seek its revocation. He conspicuously failed to do so. He cannot, therefore, in these proceedings, invite this Court to treat the Letters of Administration as invalid when no court of competent jurisdiction has so declared them. I therefore find that this Court, not being a probate court, lacks the jurisdiction to entertain such a challenge or to invalidate a grant in rem that remains valid and subsisting on its face.

64.The 4th Defendant raised a concern that the Letters of Administration became inchoate or defective upon the death of the co-Administrator, William Ugadogwu, on 30th July, 2016. This argument is fundamentally untenable and represents a clear misapprehension of settled law. Where Letters of Administration are granted to two or more persons jointly, the death of one co-Administrator does not, under any circumstance, extinguish the grant or render it inchoate. Instead, the interest and authority of the deceased Administrator automatically devolve upon the surviving Administrator(s) by operation of law, without any necessity for a fresh grant or further court order. The Supreme Court unequivocally affirmed this principle in Eseme Sunday Eyiboh v. Dahiru Sheikh Mujaddadi & Ors [2021] LPELR-57110 (SC), and this principle is likewise consistently reflected in the case of Ibrahim v. Ojomo [2004] 4 NWLR (Pt. 862) 89; Sogunle v. Akerele [1967] NMLR 58; and Yusuff v. Dada [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 657. Therefore, upon the death of William Ugadogwu, the Claimant became the sole surviving Administrator, fully vested with the complete authority and powers conferred by the grant. The 4th Defendant's concern, however sincerely held, rests on a profound misapprehension of the law and cannot, under any legal interpretation, justify the withholding of regulatory approval.

65.The 5th Defendant's counsel argues, relying on Mohammed v. Tijani [2021] LPELR-54215 (CA) and Amos v. Irabor & Ors [2021] LPELR-54871 (CA), that merely being named next of kin does not automatically confer inheritance rights, and that an administrator acts as a trustee, not a beneficial owner. This is a correct general statement of succession law. However, the Claimant does not assert a claim to the pension and death benefits as his personal property or as a direct beneficiary by virtue of being named next of kin. Rather, he claims them strictly in his capacity as the Administrator of the estate, acting pursuant to valid, subsisting, and unrevoked Letters of Administration.

66.The Pension Reform Act, 2014 (PRA 2014) creates a specific and comprehensive statutory mechanism for the release of pension funds upon the death of a contributor. Section 8(2) of the PRA 2014 explicitly provides that where a contributor dies before retirement, the Pension Fund Administrator (PFA) shall, subject to the approval of the Commission, make payment of the retirement savings account balance to the named beneficiaries as specified in the contributor's will, or, in the absence of a will, to the beneficiaries as may be determined by the personal representative of the deceased. It is undisputed that the deceased died intestate. The Claimant, as the holder of valid Letters of Administration, is unequivocally the personal representative of the deceased within the meaning of the Act. The statutory mechanism is thereby fully engaged and activated. The PRA 2014 does not impose a requirement for the personal representative to satisfy customary law inheritance criteria as a condition precedent for receiving funds from the PFA. While customary law may ultimately govern the distribution of the funds within the estate to the rightful heirs, it does not, and cannot, govern who receives them from the PFA in the first instance. The statute is clear and occupies the field on this specific point.

67.On the first issue, therefore, I find and hold with absolute certainty that the Claimant, Ifeanyi Ugadogwu, has conclusively established his identity as the Ifeanyi Ugadogwu recorded by the late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga as his next of kin; that he holds valid, subsisting, and unrevoked Letters of Administration over the estate of the deceased; and that he is, by virtue of these facts, the lawful personal representative of the deceased within the clear meaning of section 8(2) of the Pension Reform Act, 2014. He is accordingly and lawfully entitled to receive the pension and death benefits accruing to that estate. The first issue is resolved entirely in favour of the Claimant. This I so hold.

ISSUE TWO

68.The analysis of the second issue necessitates a separate and distinct examination of the positions of the 1st to 3rd Defendants, on the one hand, and the 4th Defendant, on the other, given that their respective roles, legal obligations, and the evidence concerning them are materially different.

69.The 1st Defendant, NPF Pensions Limited, is the Pension Fund Administrator (PFA) legally entrusted with holding the retirement savings account of the deceased. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants are its staff. The 1st Defendant paused the processing of the benefits upon the emergence of the 5th Defendant as a rival claimant. Its witness, DW1 Muktari Mohammed, testified that the 1st Defendant halted the process on three primary grounds: first, that the matter was in court; secondly, that there was a directive from the 4th Defendant questioning the validity of the Letters of Administration; and thirdly, that the 1st Defendant's internal regulations provided for halting payment where a dispute exists as to beneficiaries.

70.On the first ground, Exhibit Muktari B is the ruling of the High Court of the FCT striking out the earlier suit for lack of jurisdiction in 2022. It is a fundamental principle of law that a suit struck out for lack of jurisdiction, as opposed to being dismissed on the merits, does not determine substantive rights and leaves the parties free to re-litigate the issues in a court of competent jurisdiction. See Anachebe v. Ijeoma [2014] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1426) 168; Eyesan v. Sanusi [1984] 4 SC 115; Panalpina World Transport (Nig.) Ltd v. J.B. Olandeen International [2010] 19 NWLR (Pt. 1226) 1. More critically, using the pendency of a suit as justification for non-payment is inherently self-defeating and legally untenable where the Claimant was compelled to file that very suit only because payment was being unlawfully withheld. The 1st to 3rd Defendants cannot rely upon litigation which the Claimant was forced to commence by their own inaction and the 4th Defendant's unlawful directive. In any event, that suit was struck out in 2022, yet non-payment persisted until the filing of the present suit in July, 2024, demonstrating that the "pendency of suit" was not a continuous or valid justification. This ground therefore fails entirely.

71.On the second ground, the 1st to 3rd Defendants relied upon the 4th Defendant's directive contained in Exhibit Muktari C. That reliance, in the context of their statutory obligations, is understandable, as section 8(2) of the PRA 2014 explicitly requires the approval of the Commission (the 4th Defendant) before the PFA (the 1st Defendant) can lawfully release the funds. The 1st to 3rd Defendants were not, in law, in a position to effect payment without the 4th Defendant's regulatory approval. Whether that direction was itself lawful or justified is a matter that falls to be definitively resolved in the subsequent analysis of the 4th Defendant's conduct.

72.On the third ground, DW1 referred to an internal regulation purportedly providing for halting payment in cases of dispute, but the regulation itself was never tendered in evidence before this Court. It is a fundamental rule of evidence that a document or regulation not formally placed before the Court cannot be relied upon as evidence of its own existence, contents, or legal effect. See Nigerian Agip Exploration Ltd v. NNPC & Saipem Nig. Ltd (2009) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1126) 424; Kotoye v. Saraki [1994] 7 NWLR (Pt. 357) 414. This ground therefore fails entirely for want of proof.

73.The Claimant's allegation that the 1st to 3rd Defendants deliberately colluded with or brought in the 5th Defendant to frustrate payment is not established on the evidence presented. The Claimant conceded under cross-examination that he had no documentary evidence of any such communication or conspiracy, and the 5th Defendant himself confirmed under cross-examination that he raised his objection suo motu, without prompting from the PFA. Furthermore, DW1 admitted under cross-examination that the 1st Defendant had no documentary evidence that the Claimant was ever asked to produce a court declaration as a condition for payment, and further admitted that the Claimant had, in fact, submitted all required documents. Admissions against interest are binding and conclusive. See Seismograph Service v. Ogbeni (supra); Cardoso v. Daniel (supra). The 1st to 3rd Defendants' pleaded ground that the Claimant failed to produce a court declaration is therefore directly contradicted by their own witness and is of no probative value whatsoever.

74.The 1st to 3rd Defendants emerges from the evidence as a fund holder legitimately caught between two competing claims, one of which was demonstrably and fraudulently manufactured. Their posture was to pause the process and await a court determination rather than risk paying the wrong person, which could expose them to further liability. That posture, though it undeniably caused the Claimant significant delay and hardship, was not, in itself, malicious or independently legally wrongful in the complex circumstances confronting them. Their ultimate obligation to pay was, in any event, statutorily contingent on the 4th Defendant's regulatory approval under section 8(2) of the PRA 2014, and that approval was unlawfully withheld. Therefore, liability for the continued non-payment must rest primarily and proximately with the 4th Defendant, whose unlawful withholding of approval was the direct, proximate, and legally operative cause of the prolonged deadlock.

75.The 4th Defendant, the National Pension Commission, is the statutory regulator whose approval is the indispensable key that unlocks the payment mechanism under the PRA 2014. Its own letter to the 1st Defendant, Exhibit Muktari C, contains a remarkable and highly damaging admission. In unequivocal terms, the letter states that the Claimant, having duly obtained Letters of Administration, ought to be entitled to the payment of the deceased's death benefit notwithstanding the existence of a rival claimant, and that the mere existence of a rival claimant cannot lawfully stall compliance with the terms of the Letters of Administration where that rival claimant has produced neither Letters of Administration nor a court order setting aside the extant grant.

76.This constitutes a clear and binding admission by the 4th Defendant, contained within its own documentary exhibit, and is therefore conclusive against the 4th Defendant. See section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011; AG Federation v. Abubakar (supra); Ojukwu v. Obasanjo [2004] 12 NWLR (Pt. 886) 169. A party cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate at once, taking contradictory positions to suit its convenience. See Ude v. Nwara [1993] 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) 638; Ajide v. Kelani [1985] 3 NWLR (Pt. 12) 248. Yet, the 4th Defendant's trial position—that the Claimant failed to produce necessary documentation and that the Letters of Administration were inchoate—is squarely and irreconcilably contradicted by its own pre-trial assessment and binding admission in Exhibit Muktari C.

77.The 4th Defendant then proceeded, in the very same letter, to raise the concern about the alleged inchoateness of the Letters of Administration by reason of William Ugadogwu's death. As I have already definitively found under Issue One, this concern is entirely and fundamentally unfounded in law. The Claimant survived as the sole Administrator by clear operation of law, without any need for a fresh grant. The 4th Defendant's withholding of approval on this ground therefore rested on a profound and inexcusable misapprehension of settled law, and not on any genuine or legally cognizable deficiency in the Claimant's title or the validity of the Letters of Administration.

78.The 4th Defendant's further ground—that the Claimant abandoned the need to produce documentation—is utterly demolished by the evidence of the 4th Defendant's own witness. DW2 Abubakar Jidda confirmed under cross-examination that the 4th Defendant does not itself requisition documents from claimants, and that the primary documentation function belongs to the 1st Defendant. If the 4th Defendant does not requisition documents, it cannot credibly or logically assert that the Claimant failed to produce documents to it. Moreover, DW1 (of the 1st Defendant) unequivocally confirmed that the Claimant submitted all required documents to the 1st Defendant. Any reliance by the 4th Defendant on Clause 3.4 of the Regulation for the Administration of Retirement and Terminal Benefits therefore fails completely on the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

79.Exhibits Jidda A and B, which are solicitors' letters tendered by the 4th Defendant's witness, are unacknowledged photocopies. There is no evidence whatsoever on the record that these letters were ever received by the Claimant or his counsel. The Court cannot infer receipt or compliance from unacknowledged photocopies, as this would violate fundamental rules of evidence and due process. See Kubor v. Dickson [2013] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1345) 534; Uzodinma v. Izunaso (No. 2) [2011] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1275) 30. These exhibits establish, at most, that the 4th Defendant issued guidance on the conditions for accessing death benefits; they do not, by any stretch of the imagination, establish that the Claimant received and ignored such guidance.

80.The 4th Defendant's counsel submits that section 8(2) of the PRA 2014 requires a court direction in the absence of a valid will before payment can be made. This is a fundamental misreading and misinterpretation of the clear statutory provision. Section 8(2) explicitly provides that in the absence of a will, the PFA shall pay to the beneficiaries as determined by the personal representative of the deceased. The personal representative is, by definition, the Administrator. The Claimant is the Administrator. The section does not require a separate court order before payment can be made to the personal representative; it requires the Commission's approval, which the Commission unlawfully and unjustifiably withheld. The 4th Defendant thereby withheld the very approval which its own considered analysis in Exhibit Muktari C acknowledged ought to be granted. That conduct is not consistent with the lawful, impartial, and judicious exercise of regulatory authority; rather, it constitutes an arbitrary and unlawful obstruction of a statutory entitlement.

81.On the second issue, therefore, I find and hold that the 1st to 3rd Defendants did not possess an independent valid legal basis for withholding payment, but that their failure to pay was directly and proximately caused by the 4th Defendant's unlawful withholding of the approval which the law explicitly required as a precondition for payment. The 4th Defendant, by contrast, had no valid legal basis whatsoever for withholding that approval. The grounds it relied upon—the alleged inchoateness of the Letters of Administration and the alleged failure to produce documentation—are entirely unsupported by law or evidence, and are directly and conclusively contradicted by the 4th Defendant's own binding admissions in Exhibit Muktari C. The second issue is therefore resolved entirely in favour of the Claimant as against the 4th Defendant, and in favour of the 1st to 3rd Defendants on the question of independent liability.

ISSUE THREE 

82.Issue three deals with entitlement to damages. General damages are those which the law presumes to flow naturally and inevitably from the wrong done. They do not require specific proof of any precise monetary loss; rather, they are assessed by the Court on the objective standard of what constitutes fair and reasonable compensation for the injury suffered. As the Supreme Court, per Uwais, J.S.C., in Osuji v. Isiocha [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 623, lucidly explained:

“The quantum of general damages need not be pleaded or proved; for it is generally presumed by law. The manner, therefore, in which general damages is quantified is by relying on what would be the opinion and judgment of a reasonable person.”

See further the case of Odulaja v. Haddad [1973] 11 SC 357; Rab Construction Ltd v. Isaac [2012] LPELR-9787 (CA); Ogbebor v. Ihasee [2025] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1986) 207.

83.The Claimant has been unlawfully denied pension and death benefits to which he is legitimately entitled since at least 2016. The 5th Defendant's deliberate and fraudulent assumption of the Claimant's identity in 2016 initiated a chain of events that has unjustly kept the Claimant from receiving those benefits for a period spanning nearly a decade. This prolonged denial compelled the Claimant to file suit at the High Court of the FCT in 2020, which was subsequently struck out for lack of jurisdiction in 2022, and he was thereafter constrained to file the present suit in July, 2024. The cumulative effect of this protracted delay, the necessity of engaging in multiple rounds of litigation, and the prolonged uncertainty surrounding his uncle's estate have plainly caused the Claimant considerable inconvenience, significant anxiety, emotional distress, and unavoidable financial expenditure. These are real, tangible injuries that unequivocally warrant compensation.

84.However, the Claimant's specific claim for ?50,000,000.00 as general damages is not supported by any specific evidence of quantum that would justify a figure of that magnitude. While general damages do not require proof of specific loss, they must bear a reasonable and proportionate relationship to the injury suffered and the circumstances of the case. See Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Ajabule [2011] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1278) 152; Ogbebor v. Ihasee (supra); First Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Associated Motors Co. Ltd [1998] 10 NWLR (Pt. 570) 441. The Court must assess damages based on the evidence adduced and not on figures merely asserted without a discernible evidential foundation.

85.The 1st to 3rd Defendants' failure to pay was, as found, proximately caused by the 4th Defendant's unlawful withholding of regulatory approval. They are not independently liable for damages. The 4th Defendant, by contrast, unlawfully withheld approval on legally unsound grounds, in direct contradiction of its own prior acknowledgment in Exhibit Muktari C. As the primary regulatory authority, its unlawful conduct is the direct and proximate cause of the continued non-payment and the resultant injury to the Claimant. See Ekpu v. AG Federation [1998] 1 NWLR (Pt. 533) 341; FRN v. Ifegwu [2003] 15 NWLR (Pt. 842) 113.

86.The 5th Defendant bears a separate, distinct, and more egregious liability. His deliberate, calculated, and fraudulent assumption of the Claimant's identity was the initial, wrongful act that set in motion the entire chain of events. But for that fraudulent intervention, the 1st Defendant would have had no legitimate reason to pause the payment process, and the 4th Defendant would not have been confronted with a rival claim which it then unlawfully used as a pretext to withhold approval. His conduct was not merely negligent but was calculated, deliberate, and reprehensible, causing the Claimant years of litigation, profound anxiety, and financial strain. He is therefore liable to the Claimant for the full consequences of his fraudulent impersonation. See Nishizawa Ltd v. Jethwani [1984] 12 SC 234; Attorney-General, Oyo State v. Fairlakes Hotels Ltd (No. 2) [1989] 5 NWLR (Pt. 121) 255. Where a party's conduct is characterized by fraud, an award of aggravated damages is available under our jurisprudence to reflect the malicious or high-handed nature of the wrong. See Odiba v. Azege [1998] 9 NWLR (Pt. 566) 370; Eliochin (Nig.) Ltd v. Mbadiwe [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 14) 47.

87.Taking a broad and holistic assessment of the severe inconvenience, the necessity of compelled litigation, the emotional and psychological trauma, and the prolonged denial of a legitimate entitlement over nearly a decade, and calibrating the damages to a principled figure that is fair, reasonable, and supported by the totality of the evidence, this Court awards the Claimant the sum of ?2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira only) as general damages against the 4th Defendant. Furthermore, the Court awards the sum of ?3000,000.00 (Three Million Naira only) as general damages against the 5th Defendant, with the higher figure against the 5th Defendant specifically reflecting the deliberate, fraudulent, and reprehensible character of his initiating conduct.

88.The Claimant's claim for interest at an exorbitant rate of 25% per month is extravagant and also unconscionable. Accordingly, a post-judgment interest is hereby awarded at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of this Judgment until the final liquidation of the judgment sum.

89.On the matter of costs, the general principle is that costs follow the event, meaning they are typically awarded to the successful party. See Nnaemeka Agu v. Ozomgbachi [2013] LPELR-20456 (CA); Rewane v. Okotie-Eboh [1960] SCNLR 461. The Claimant has substantially succeeded in his claims. Costs are accordingly assessed at ?500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira only) against the 4th Defendant and ?500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira only) against the 5th Defendant, both sums payable to the Claimant. No order as to costs is made against the 1st to 3rd Defendants, whose conduct, though it contributed to the delay, was not found to be independently wrongful or malicious.

90.On the third issue, therefore, I find the Claimant unequivocally entitled to damages against the 4th and 5th Defendants as assessed above, but not against the 1st to 3rd Defendants. The claim for ?50,000,000.00 general damages and for interest at 25% per month is refused. The third issue is resolved in favour of the Claimant in part.

ISSUE FOUR

91.Issue four deals with whether the 5^th Defendant has proved his counter-claim. A counter-claim constitutes a distinct and independent cause of action. The 5th Defendant, as the counter-claimant, bears the full burden of proving his case on the balance of probabilities, and must succeed strictly on the strength of his own case, not on any perceived weakness in the defence to the counter-claim. See Ogbonna v. AG Imo State [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt. 220) 647; Dabup v. Kolo [1993] 9 NWLR (Pt. 317) 254; Jeric (Nig.) Ltd v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt. 691) 447.

92.The Counter-Claim rests on two alternative and mutually exclusive foundations: first, that the 5th Defendant is the rightful person entitled to the pension and death benefits; and secondly, that the Court should appoint a receiver-manager to apply the benefits towards erecting a permanent structure at the family compound of the deceased in his honour.

93.On the first foundation, the 5th Defendant's own binding admission that he deliberately changed his name from Ifeanyi Okwor to Ifeanyi Ugadogwu for the express purpose of fraudulently claiming the benefits is, as already found, conclusive against him on the fundamental question of identity. He is demonstrably not the Ifeanyi Ugadogwu recorded by the deceased as next of kin; he adopted that name fraudulently and with malicious intent to impersonate. He cannot, in the same proceedings, claim to be the rightful beneficiary on the basis of that fraudulently assumed identity. It is a fundamental principle of law that nothing can be built on a void foundation; an act founded on fraud is incurably bad. See the classic dictum of Lord Denning, M.R., in UAC v. Macfoy [1962] AC 152 (PC):

“If an act is void, then it is in law a nullity. It is not only bad, but incurably bad. And every proceeding which is founded on it is also bad and incurably bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse.”

See further Skenconsult (Nig.) Ltd v. Ukey [1981] 1 SC 6; Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341. 

94.Additionally, no court of law will ever assist a party to profit from his own fraud—the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio (no action arises from a dishonourable cause) applies with full force. See Sodipo v. Lemminkainen OY (No. 2) [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 15) 220; Alao v. ACB Ltd [1998] 2 NWLR (Pt. 542) 339. The primary Counter-Claim is built entirely on a foundation of fraud and must, therefore, inevitably and completely fail. And this I so hold.

95.The 5th Defendant's customary-law argument, asserting that the patrilineal custom of the deceased's community entitles the OkworNwalu family, which he claims to represent, to the benefits, does not salvage the Counter-Claim. As definitively established under Issue One, customary law does not govern the specific question of who receives pension funds from a PFA under the Pension Reform Act, 2014. The PRA 2014 is a federal enactment which comprehensively occupies the field on this precise question, overriding any conflicting customary norms for the purpose of initial release of funds. See Attorney-General of Ogun State v. Aberuagba [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) 395; A. G. Ondo State v. A. G. Federation [2002] 9 NWLR (Pt. 772) 222. The 5th Defendant holds no Letters of Administration, has obtained no court order, and possesses no other legal instrument whatsoever entitling him to receive the funds from the 1st Defendant. The Traditional Ruler's letter (Exhibit Ifeanyi 3), while it may attest to the existence of patrilineal custom, does not and cannot confer any legal entitlement under a federal statute like the PRA 2014; the burial poster (Exhibit Ifeanyi 2) is a self-serving document produced by the 5th Defendant's own family and carries no independent evidential weight in establishing legal entitlement; and the loan application (Exhibit Ifeanyi 1) is an unacknowledged handwritten photocopy which establishes at most an application, not a grant or a disbursement, and is entirely irrelevant to the issue of pension benefits.

96.The 5th Defendant's argument that the Claimant, as Administrator, is a trustee who cannot treat the estate as personal property is legally correct as a general proposition, but it does not, in any way, assist the Counter-Claim. The appropriate legal remedy for a beneficiary who genuinely believes an administrator is misapplying estate assets is to approach the court for an account of administration or for the removal of the administrator. See Yesufu v. Kupper International NV [1996] 5 NWLR (Pt. 446) 17; Adigun v. Attorney-General of Oyo State [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 53) 678. The 5th Defendant has not taken that proper legal course; instead, he has asserted a personal entitlement inconsistent with his own narrative that the benefits belong to the larger family, further exposing the contradictory and self-serving nature of his claims.

97.On the second, alternative foundation—the appointment of a receiver-manager to erect a memorial structure—no legal authority has been cited, nor does any exist, for this extraordinary and unprecedented relief in the context of pension funds. The PRA 2014 provides only for the release of pension funds to the personal representative of the deceased, or as specifically directed by a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the Act. It does not contemplate, nor does it permit, the application of pension funds to the construction of buildings or other such projects. The appointment of a receiver is a discretionary equitable remedy, granted only in exceptional circumstances where the property in dispute is demonstrably at risk and the applicant has clearly established a legal or equitable interest in that property. See Intercontractors (Nig.) Ltd v. UAC of Nigeria Ltd [1988] 2 NWLR (Pt. 76) 303; Sodipo v. Lemminkainen OY (supra). The 5th Defendant meets none of these essential preconditions. This relief is therefore unequivocally refused as being without legal basis and outside the scope of this Court's powers under the PRA 2014.

98.On the fourth issue, I find that the 5th Defendant has utterly failed to prove his Counter-Claim on any of its asserted foundations. The Counter-Claim is therefore dismissed in its entirety. The fourth issue is resolved definitively against the 5th Defendant.

99.On the whole, for the reasons giving and based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, this court hereby ordered as follows:

[a] It is hereby DECLARED that the Claimant, Ifeanyi Ugadogwu, as the sole surviving and lawful Administrator of the Estate of the late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga (Force No. AP:87498), is the only person lawfully entitled to receive the pension and death benefits accruing to the estate of the said deceased from the 1st Defendant, NPF Pensions Limited, pursuant to the clear provisions of section 8(2) of the Pension Reform Act, 2014.

[b] It is hereby DECLARED that the 5th Defendant, Ifeanyi Okwor (also known as Ifeanyi Ugadogwu), is not the Ifeanyi Ugadogwu recorded as next of kin by the late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga, and is not, and has never been, lawfully entitled to the pension and death benefits of the said deceased.

[c] The 4th Defendant, the National Pension Commission, is hereby ORDERED to forthwith, and in any event within seven (7) days from the date of this Judgment, grant its unconditional approval for the immediate release of the pension and death benefits standing to the credit of the retirement savings account of the late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga (Force No. AP:87498) to the Claimant as the Administrator of the estate of the said deceased.

[d] The 1st Defendant, NPF Pensions Limited, is hereby ORDERED, upon receipt of the 4th Defendant's approval as directed in Order [3] above, to immediately compute, process, and pay the full pension and death benefits accruing to the estate of the late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga (Force No. AP:87498) to the Claimant, Ifeanyi Ugadogwu, as the Administrator of the said estate, forthwith and without any further delay or imposition of additional conditions.

[e] AN ORDER of perpetual injunction is hereby made restraining the 5th Defendant, Ifeanyi Okwor, whether by himself, his agents, servants, privies, or any person claiming through or under him, from parading himself as Ifeanyi Ugadogwu, the next of kin of the late DSP Ugadogwu Dennis Uga, or from taking any step whatsoever to claim, receive, interfere with, or obstruct the payment of the pension and death benefits of the said deceased.

[f] The 4th Defendant shall pay to the Claimant the sum of ?2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira only) as general damages for the unlawful withholding of regulatory approval and the consequent delay and hardship caused to the Claimant.

[g] The 5th Defendant shall pay to the Claimant the sum of ?3,000,000.00 (Three Million Naira only) as general damages for his deliberate, fraudulent assumption of the Claimant's identity and the initiation of the protracted dispute.

[h] The 5th Defendant's Counter-Claim is hereby DISMISSED in its entirety for failure of proof and for being founded on fraud.

[i] Costs are assessed at ?500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira only) against the 4th Defendant, and ?500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira only) against the 5th Defendant, both sums payable to the Claimant. No order as to costs is made against the 1st to 3rd Defendants.

[j] The claim for interest at 25% per month is refused. The total judgment sum (comprising the benefits, damages, and costs) shall attract post-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of this Judgment until final liquidation.

100.Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

…………….

Hon. Justice E. D. Subilim

JUDGE