IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM

DATE:16^TH JULY, 2023                     

SUIT NO.: NICN/ABJ/385/2023

BETWEEN:

 

MRS. JOYCE WILLIAMS NCHELEM .............................  CLAIMANT

 

AND

 

MRS. BERNADETTE ODDIAH-AJILA .............................  DEFENDANT

(Doing business under the name and style of BON HOTEL BOUTIQUE GARKI, 2)

REPRESENTATION:

AYODEJI ADEMOLA ESQ WITH EMMANUEL C. OBETTA ESQ, TUNDE OGUNDANI ESQ FOR THE CLAIMANT

FRANCIS MADUBUKO WITH E.E. NNAMANI ESQ WITH FENG N. PWAJOK ESQ FOR THE DEFENDANT. 

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

1.By an Amended Complaint filed on 14th May, 2024 (the original Complaint having been filed on 22nd December, 2023), together with the accompanying Statement of Material Facts and Reply to the Statement of Defence filed on 2nd October, 2024, the Claimant approached this Court against the Defendant, Mrs. Bernadette Oddiah-Ajila (doing business under the name and style of BON Hotel Boutique Garki, 2), seeking the following reliefs:

(i) A DECLARATION that the termination of the Claimant's employment without any wrong done, no investigation and/or just cause is in contravention of the Employee's Handbook binding on the parties, and is wrongful.

(ii) A DECLARATION that the act of luring the Claimant from her former employer with a lucrative or juicy contract of employment and thereafter terminating the said employment without just cause within one month is wrongful, malicious, despicable, unjust and inimical to international best practice on labour law.

(iii) A DECLARATION that the letter of termination of contract of employment dated 25th September, 2023 is null, void and of no effect whatsoever.

(iv) AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of ?450,000.00 (Four Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira only) in lieu of notice.

(v) AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the sum of ?10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira only) representing the unfulfilled conditions of service.

(vi) AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant ?80,000,000.00 (Eighty Million Naira only) as general damages for unlawful and/or wrongful termination of employment.

(vii) AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant ?100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira only) as exemplary and aggravated damages for the physical, psychological and emotional trauma occasioned by the abrupt, unjust and wrongful termination.

(viii) AN AWARD of the sum of ?5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira only) as costs of instituting and maintaining this suit.

(ix) AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay post-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per month until final liquidation.

2.The Defendant filed her Statement of Defence on 9 July 2024, denying liability and asserting that the employment relationship was strictly regulated by the contract of employment, which allowed termination within six months upon one week's notice or payment in lieu. 

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

3.The undisputed factual context is that the Claimant, having served as General Manager of Excel Tourism International Limited at Garki 2, Abuja for over thirteen (13) years, was interviewed and offered employment as General Manager of BON Hotel Boutique Garki 2. She accepted the offer of employment (Exhibit Joyce 1) dated 17th July, 2023, resigned from her previous employer, and resumed duty on 21st August, 2023. Her employment was terminated by a letter dated 25th September, 2023 (Exhibit Joyce 5). She was paid ?300,000.00 upon termination.

CLAIMANT’S STATEMENT OF FACTS

4.The Claimant's case is that her termination was wrongful and in breach of the Employee's Handbook (Exhibit Joyce 2) applicable to the Defendant's business, no query having been issued and no reason having been given for the termination; that the sum paid to her did not include her full monthly salary; and that the termination was actuated by malice and constitutes an unfair labour practice under sections 254C(1)(f) and (h) of the Constitution. She called four witnesses (CW1 to CW4) and tendered Exhibits Joyce 1 to 14 through CW1, and Exhibits Frank A and B through CW3 (the latter, Exhibit A and B, was admitted subject to objection).

DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF FACTS

5.The Defendant's case, on the other hand, is that the Claimant was outsourced by BON Hotels (the management company that conducted the interview) and that the terms of the employment are exclusively embodied in the Contract of Employment (Exhibit Joyce 1); that clause 8.1.2 thereof empowered either party to terminate within the first six (6) months by one (1) week's notice or salary in lieu of notice; that the management company elected to terminate the employment of the Claimant and forwarded the termination letter (Exhibit Joyce 5) to the Defendant who signed it; that the Claimant was paid her earned salary for the twenty-five (25) days worked plus one week's salary in lieu of notice; and that the alleged Employee's Handbook (Exhibit Joyce 2) is a foreign document meant for the South African BON Hotels franchise, unsigned, never issued by the Defendant, and inapplicable to the Claimant's employment. The Defendant testified as sole witness (DW1) and tendered Exhibits D2, D3, D3A and D4.

COMMENCEMNT OF HEARING

6.At the trial, the Claimant testified as CW1 and called three other witnesses, namely Dr. Haruna D. Defwan as CW2, Iorhemen Terzuhum Frank as CW3, and Mr. Oluwabamise Ogundare as CW4, while tendering Exhibits Joyce 1 to 14, and Frank A and B. The Defendant testified as the sole witness, DW1, and tendered Exhibits D2, D3, D3A, and D4 in support of her defence. Upon the close of evidence, the court adjourned the suit for the adoption of the parties' final written addresses.

 

CLAIMANT'S SUBMISSIONS

7.Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Ayodeji Ademola, SAN, submitted that the Claimant is entitled to all the reliefs sought in her Amended Complaint. In presenting the Claimant's arguments, Counsel first addressed the Defendant's objection to the admissibility of Exhibits Frank A and B, which are the bank statements of the third Claimant’s witness (CW3). Counsel submitted that this objection is fundamentally misconceived because under settled law, a party is only required to plead material facts and not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved. Counsel pointed out that the Claimant, in paragraph 17 of her Amended Statement of Facts, clearly averred that CW3 was an employee of the Defendant whose appointment was terminated without notice. He argued that Exhibits Frank A and B are merely the evidential instruments to substantiate this pleaded fact of employment, which is crucial given that the Defendant failed to issue a formal letter of employment to CW3. Counsel relied on the Supreme Court decisions in Aminu & Ors v. Hassan & Ors [2014] LPELR-22008(SC) and Sani v. Kogi State House of Assembly & Ors [2019] LPELR-46404(SC) for the proposition that documentary evidence does not need to be specifically pleaded to be admissible, as long as the material facts are expressly pleaded. He further submitted that the bank statements are highly relevant under Section 1 of the Evidence Act, 2011 because they establish a nexus between the Defendant and CW3, showing consistent salary payments which serve as the most potent evidence of an employment relationship in the absence of a written contract. Counsel contended that these exhibits satisfy the three-tier test set out in Agboola v. A.S.B. Inv. Ltd because they are supported by pleadings, are directly relevant to the issue of the Defendant's operational practices, and are legally admissible without violating any statutory prohibition. Furthermore, Counsel urged the Court to invoke its powers under Section 12(2)(b) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 and Order 1 Rule 9(2) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 to depart from the technical rigours of the Evidence Act and admit the documents in the interest of substantial justice.

On Issue 1: WHETHER THE TERMINATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE CLAIMANT WAS WRONGFUL?

8.Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Ayodeji Ademola, SAN, submitted that the Defendant wrongfully terminated the Claimant’s employment without any stated reason or established misconduct, directly contravening the provisions of Exhibit Joyce 2, which serves as the Defendant's Code of Operational Conduct. Counsel argued that although the initial burden of proof lies on the Claimant under Section 131 of the Evidence Act, 2011, she successfully discharged this burden by tendering Exhibit Joyce 2, thereby shifting the evidential burden to the Defendant. He submitted that the Defendant failed to lead any credible evidence to rebut this document, and that a bare denial is worthless in law. In support of this contention, Counsel relied on Eweje v. O. M. Oil Ind. Ltd (2021) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1765) 117 to argue that when a party asserts a fact and supplies probable evidence, the opposing party must supply concrete facts in rebuttal. Since the Defendant failed to tender any contrary document or call any witness to show that Exhibit Joyce 2 was not operational, the facts must be deemed admitted. Counsel further submitted that the termination was carried out in bad faith and in breach of the contractual procedures. He noted that while the Claimant’s monthly salary was fixed at N300,000.00 under Exhibit Joyce 1, and both parties agreed she was entitled to one week's notice or salary in lieu, the Defendant only paid her the sum of N300,000.00 upon termination. Relying on Section 15 of the Labour Act, Counsel argued that once an employee remunerated on a monthly basis enters and works within a new month, their entitlement to the full monthly salary accrues. He submitted that the Defendant could not unilaterally prorate the salary on a per diem basis for the 25 days worked in September 2023. He cited the National Industrial Court decision in Abe Adewunmi Babalola v. Equinox International Resources Ltd. (Suit No. NICN/LA/166/2015) for the proposition that an employee terminated mid-month is entitled to the full month's salary, meaning that the N300,000.00 paid was strictly her earned salary. Consequently, Counsel submitted that the Defendant paid no additional sum in lieu of notice, thereby violating the termination notice requirement in Exhibit Joyce 1. Counsel further argued that the Defendant breached the disciplinary guidelines of Exhibit Joyce 2 by failing to issue any query or warning letters to the Claimant before terminating her employment, and cited Idufueko v. Pfizer Products Ltd (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1420) 96 and Ebere Onyekachi Aloysius v. Diamond Bank Plc (2015) 58 NLLR (Pt. 1992) 92 to support the submission that under modern international best practices and Section 254C(1)(f) and (h) of the Constitution, it is unfair and unlawful for an employer to terminate an employee without any justifiable reason connected to their work, thereby rendering the old master-servant doctrine obsolete. Counsel highlighted that the Claimant was headhunted and lured from her secure 13-year employment at Excel Tourism International Limited, and then summarily terminated within a few weeks without cause, which points directly to premeditated malice. He urged the Court to award substantial damages going beyond the notice period. Counsel also noted that the subpoenaed witness (CW4), an agent of the Defendant’s management company, admitted in court that he provided Exhibit Joyce 2 to the Claimant. He argued that under Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011, admitted facts need no further proof. Relying on Section 14 of the Evidence Act, 2011 and the cases of Aondoakaa v. Obot [2022] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1824) 523 and Aregbesola v. Oyinlola [2011] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1253) 458, Counsel submitted that relevance governs the admissibility of a document rather than the mode of obtaining it. He further argued that because the Defendant's hotel operates as a franchise of a South African brand (BON Hotels), the use of the global manual is standard practice, and the Defendant's own witness admitted under cross-examination that the handbook applies to the hotel. Thus, the Defendant is estopped from denying its applicability. Relying on Suleiman v. Civil Service Commission of Ondo State [2015] 20 NWLR (Pt. 1489) and Olaniyan v. University of Lagos [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599, Counsel submitted that handbooks and manuals provided to an employee form an inseparable, binding composite contract of service with the letter of appointment, meaning Exhibit Joyce 1 and Exhibit Joyce 2 must be read together.

9.On Issue 2: WHETHER THE CLAIMANT HAS MADE OUT A CASE NECESSITATING THE GRANT OF RELIEFS, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 AND 9 OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT.

10.Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Ayodeji Ademola, SAN, submitted that the Claimant had proved her case through cogent, uncontradicted, and credible evidence, thereby entitling her to all the reliefs sought. He submitted that parties are bound by the terms of their contract, citing Allied Trading Co. Ltd v. G.B.N Line [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 74.  He argued that while the Claimant performed all her contractual obligations, the Defendant failed, refused, and neglected to fulfill its reciprocal financial obligations, instead terminating her employment arbitrarily. Counsel cited Idufueko v. Pfizer Products Ltd [2014] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1420) 96 and FBN Plc v. Akinyosoye [2005] 5 NWLR (Pt. 918) 340 for the proposition that the Court must enforce voluntarily entered contracts and compel the payment of all outstanding entitlements and legitimate benefits upon wrongful termination. He further relied on Adejumo v. Ayantegbe [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt. 110) 417 to argue that where a party's evidence is unchallenged or uncontradicted, the Court is bound to accept and act on it. Addressing the quantum of damages, Counsel submitted that the restrictive old law limiting damages to the notice period is no longer the current legal position. He relied on the Supreme Court decision in Skye Bank Plc v. Adegun [2024] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1960) 1 for the proposition that where a contract of employment is terminated contrary to agreed terms, damages are awardable in accordance with general contract law, which involves a holistic consideration of the employee's monthly wage, age, and proximity to retirement. Furthermore, Counsel relied on the landmark decision in Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Oyebola [2020] LPELR-51806(CA) to argue that under Section 254C of the Constitution, modern Nigerian labour jurisprudence empowers the Court to apply international best practices and award substantial general damages for psychological, physical, and emotional trauma caused by malicious and unfair labour practices, rather than confining the award to the notice period. He therefore urged the Court to grant all the special and general damages claimed in Reliefs 4 through 9 of the Amended Complaint.

DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSIONS

11.Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Fredricks E. Itula, SAN, submitted that the Claimant's suit is unmeritorious and should be dismissed in its entirety. 

On Issue 1: Whether the contract of employment empowers the Defendant to terminate the Claimant’s employment?

12.Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Fredricks E. Itula, SAN, first objected to the admissibility of Exhibits Frank A and B (the bank statements of CW3), submitting that they are inadmissible because they were not pleaded and are entirely irrelevant to the dispute. He pointed out that there is no reference to these documents anywhere in the Amended Statement of Facts or the Claimant's Reply, and submitted that evidence not supported by pleadings goes to no issue. He further argued that since the case before the Court is not about CW3, documents relating to him are irrelevant. Counsel relied on Agboola v. A.S.B. Inv. Ltd [2023] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1910) 241 at 262-263 and E. Fredrick v. Prince F. C. Ibekwe [2019] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1702) 467 at 480 for the proposition that a document is only admissible in civil proceedings if it is pleaded, relevant to the issues in dispute, and admissible under the law. He therefore urged the Court to reject and strike out these exhibits.

13.On the merits of Issue 1, Counsel submitted that in a claim for wrongful termination, the burden of proof rests squarely on the employee to place the terms of contract before the Court and establish how they were breached. He cited Okwusidi v. Ladoke Akintola University [2011] LPELR-4057(CA), Okomu Oil Palm Co. Ltd v. Iserhienrhien [2001] 6 NWLR (Pt. 710) 660-673, and Oloruntoba-Oju v. Abdul-Raheem [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 83-135. Counsel submitted that Exhibit Joyce 1 is the sole contract of employment regulating the relationship between the parties, which was signed by the Defendant after the Claimant was interviewed by the management company, BON Hotels. He noted that CW4, the subpoenaed witness, confirmed under cross-examination that his company prepared Exhibit Joyce 1 and the Defendant executed it as owner. Counsel argued that Clause 8.1.2 of Exhibit Joyce 1 explicitly empowers either party to terminate the contract within the first six months by giving one week's written notice. He pointed out that the Claimant resumed duty on 21st August 2023 and her employment was terminated on 25th September 2023, representing a period of less than six months. Therefore, only one week's notice was required. He submitted that Exhibit Joyce 5 (the termination letter) was issued in accordance with Clause 8.1.2, and that the Claimant was fully paid her earned salary and one week's salary in lieu of notice. Counsel presented a mathematical calculation showing that out of 30 days in September, the Claimant worked for 25 days, earning N250,000.00 of her N300,000.00 monthly salary. The excess payment of N50,000.00 paid to her constituted the payment for one week in lieu of notice. He cited Olaniyan v. University of Lagos [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599 and Gyubok v. Fedpoly, Bauchi [2024] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1965) 515 at 549 to argue that where the terms of a contract are clear, the Court must restrict itself to those terms and not rewrite the contract. Counsel vehemently denied that Exhibit Joyce 2 applied to the Claimant's employment, asserting that the Defendant never issued it and had no knowledge of it. He highlighted a material contradiction between the testimonies of CW1 (who claimed the Defendant personally gave her the handbook) and CW4 (who stated under cross-examination that he gave it to the Claimant to modify with the Defendant). Relying on Edosa v. Ogiemwanre [2019] NWLR (Pt. 1673) 1 at 20, 28, Counsel submitted that such a material, unexplained contradiction renders the testimonies of both witnesses unreliable, and that CW4's statements regarding the Defendant's alleged refusal to modify the document constitute inadmissible hearsay under Section 38 of the Evidence Act, 2011. He further argued that Exhibit Joyce 2 is unsigned, and cited Baba v. INEC [2024] ALL FWLR (Pt. 1238) SC 576 at 615 for the principle that unsigned documents carry no probative value. Counsel also pointed out that Article 27 of Exhibit Joyce 2 requires proof of South African citizenship or work permit, and failure to produce same renders the contract null and void. Since the Claimant is not a South African citizen, insisting on Exhibit Joyce 2 would mean her employment is null and void. Relying on Oruku v. Oruku [2024] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1919) CA 371 at 403, Counsel argued that the words of a document must be given their literal, ordinary grammatical meaning. He further submitted that under Clause 7 of Exhibit Joyce 1, the contract is governed strictly by Nigerian Labour Law, meaning no reference can be made to an extraneous foreign document.

14.On Issue 2: Whether the termination of the employment of the claimant was wrongful and if so whether the Court can declare the termination null and void?

Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Fredricks E. Itula, SAN, submitted that even if Exhibit Joyce 2 were held to apply, its disciplinary guidelines apply strictly to dismissals and cannot take away the mutual right to terminate the contract under Clause 8.1.2 of Exhibit Joyce 1. He argued that there is a clear distinction between a dismissal, which is punitive and carries loss of terminal benefits, and a termination, which is a mutual right of either party. He relied on Jumbo v. P.E.F.M.B [2005] 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 443, Daramola v. F.U.T., Yola [2026] 4 NWLR (Pt. 2033) SC 181, and F.B.N. Plc v. Mmeka [2015] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1456) 507. Counsel submitted that a series of documents must be read as a whole to achieve harmony, and cited Okoh v. Fedpoly, Bauchi [2024] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1961) SC 261 at 293-294 and Ovivie v. Delta Steel Co. Ltd [2023] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1904) 203 to argue that the motive for termination is completely irrelevant and does not affect the validity of a lawful termination. Counsel further argued that in a master-servant relationship, an employer is not bound to give any reason for terminating the contract, citing Obanye v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc [2018] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1648) 389. Addressing the claim for a declaration that the termination is null and void, Counsel submitted that the contract is an ordinary master-servant relationship without statutory flavor. He cited Mr. Kunle Osisanya v. Afribank Nigeria Plc [2007] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1031) 565, Damisa v. U.B.A [2025] 19 NWLR (Pt. 2021) SC 409, and Dangote Cement Plc v. Ager [2024] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1945) 1 for the settled position that the Court cannot declare the termination of a master-servant relationship null and void or order reinstatement, as the Court will not impose a willing employee on an unwilling employer.

15.On Issue 3: Whether the Claimant has proven her entitlement to reliefs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 contained in the Amended Complaint?

Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Fredricks E. Itula, SAN, submitted that because the Defendant terminated the contract in strict compliance with Clause 8 of Exhibit Joyce 1 and paid the Claimant her earned salary and notice in lieu, the Claimant is not entitled to any damages. He cited Ogunjobi v. Lawani [1988] 1 NWLR (Pt. 71) 221. Regarding the claim for N450,000.00 in lieu of notice, Counsel submitted that the notice period is one week under Exhibit Joyce 1, which translates to a weekly salary of N75,000.00 based on her monthly rate of N300,000.00, and certainly not the N450,000.00 claimed. He cited Balogun v. Union Bank (2016) LPELR-41442 for the principle that an employee cannot claim salaries not earned. On the claim of N10,000,000.00 for unfulfilled conditions of service, Counsel argued that the Defendant complied with Clause 3.4 of Exhibit Joyce 1 by providing the Claimant with hotel accommodation for the first three months, which she accepted as shown in the WhatsApp conversations (Exhibit Joyce 3). He further argued that an official car and driver were available for sales and marketing, but the Claimant opted to drive her own car and was reimbursed N20,000.00 for fuel (Exhibit D3). Counsel submitted that these facts, pleaded in paragraph 21 of the Statement of Defence, were not disputed by the Claimant and must be deemed admitted, citing Antonio Oil Co. Ltd v. AMCON [2024] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1961) 215. He contended that this claim constitutes special damages which must be strictly pleaded and proved with exactitude, and cannot be awarded based on speculative estimates, citing Anazodo v. Pazmeck Intertrade (Nig.) Ltd [2024] ALL FWLR (Pt. 1222) 126 at 147 and Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Ajabule [2011] LPELR-8239(SC). On the claim for N80,000,000.00 general damages, Counsel submitted that general damages are not awardable in contracts of employment, and that any award is strictly limited to what the employee would have earned during the notice period. He cited Umera v. N.R.C. [2022] 10 NWLR (1338) SC 349 at 395, Co-operative Bank Plc v. Essien [2001] 4 NWLR (Pt. 704) 407, Ogbaji v. Arewa Textiles Plc [2000] 11 NWLR (Pt. 678) 322, Shena Security Co. Ltd v. Afropak (Nig.) Ltd [2008] 18 NWLR (Pt. 118) 77, Osisanya v. Afribank (Nig) Plc (2007) LPELR-2809(SC), Toyinbo v. Union Bank Plc [2023] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1865) SC 403, Chukwuma v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. Ltd [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512, and ETC Agro Co. Nig. Ltd v. Abiodun [2024] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1948) 121. He submitted that the claim is a clear instance of "gold digging" which the courts must resist, citing G.K.I.F (Nig) Ltd v. NITEL Plc [2009] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1164) 344 at 384-385, and that awarding general damages alongside notice in lieu would amount to double compensation, citing C.C.B. (Nig.) Ltd v. Nwankwo (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 286) 159. Regarding the claim for N100,000,000.00 aggravated damages, Counsel relied on Western Nigeria Development Corporation v. Abimbola (1966) LPELR-25344(SC) and Addis v. Gramophone Company Ltd (1909) A.C. 488 to argue that damages for wrongful termination cannot include compensation for injured feelings or the difficulty in securing new employment. On the claim for N5,000,000.00 as cost of action, Counsel submitted that solicitor's fees must be specifically pleaded and proved as special damages. He argued that Exhibit Joyce 10 only proved a part payment of N250,000.00, and there was no document proving the alleged N5,000,000.00 fee. He cited Joseph Agbalugo & Anor v. Mr. Isaac Izuakor [2017] LCN/9870(CA) and Guinness (Nig) Plc v. Nwoke [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt. 689) 135. Finally, on the claim for 10% post-judgment interest monthly, Counsel submitted that Order 47 Rule 7 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure Rules) 2017 restricts post-judgment interest to an annual rate, rendering a monthly interest claim legally untenable.

COURT’S DECISION

16.The Claimant formulated two issues in his Final Written Address, while the Defendant formulated three issues in the Final Written Address. Having examined the pleadings, evidence and written addresses, and consolidating the parties' issues to avoid unnecessary repetition, this Court adopts the following two issues for determination:

(1) Whether the termination of the Claimant's employment was wrongful and, if so, whether it is liable to be declared null and void; and
 (2) Whether the Claimant has proved her entitlement to Reliefs (iv) to (ix) of the Amended Complaint.

17.Before descending into the merits, it is proper to situate the controversy within the constitutional matrix within which this Court operates. By virtue of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act, 2010, this Court was inserted into section 6(5)(cc) of the Constitution as a superior court of record and vested, by section 254C(1), with exclusive jurisdiction over civil causes and matters relating to labour, employment and industrial relations, including—by section 254C(1)(f) and (h)—unfair labour practice and the application of international best practice in labour, employment and industrial relations. The Supreme Court, per Nweze, J.S.C., in Skye Bank Plc v. Iwu [2017] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1590) 24, held:

“By virtue of the Third Alteration Act, 2010, the National Industrial Court has been elevated to the status of a superior court of record. Its jurisdiction in labour matters is exclusive and its decisions on such matters are, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, final. The Court is invested with such expansive powers as are necessary to do substantial justice between employers and employees.”

18.It follows, as a necessary consequence of the constitutional elevation of this Court, that the classical common-law master-and-servant doctrine—that an employer may terminate employment for good reason, bad reason or no reason at all, provided notice or pay in lieu is given—has been significantly qualified under our labour jurisprudence. This Court, in a growing body of jurisprudence, has held that an employer's exercise of the contractual power of termination must nevertheless conform to international best practice, and that a termination effected without reason—or for a bad reason—in circumstances amounting to unfair labour practice, will attract this Court's corrective jurisdiction. See Aloysius v. Diamond Bank Plc (2015) 58 NLLR (Pt. 199) 92; Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Mrs. Olawunmi Oyebola (Unreported, Suit No. NICN/LA/191/2014, judgment delivered 14th July, 2016); Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Oyebola [2020] LPELR-51806 (CA); Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria v. Schlumberger (Anadrill) Nigeria Ltd [2008] 11 NLLR (Pt. 29) 164; Aero Contractors Co. of Nigeria Ltd v. NAAPE [2014] 42 NLLR (Pt. 133) 664. Section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, and the Court's own Rules, expressly authorise this Court to depart from the strict common-law posture where the interests of justice so require. That is the interpretive lens through which the present controversy will be examined.

19.Let me also address a preliminary issue raised by the Defendant. The Defendant, in the cause of trial, objected to the admissibility of Exhibits Frank A and B (bank statements tendered through CW3), on the grounds that (i) the documents are not pleaded and (ii) they are not relevant to the case. She relies on the cases of Agboola v. A.S.B. Investments Ltd (2023) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1910) 241 and Fredrick v. Ibekwee (2019) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1702) 467 (per Eko, J.S.C.) for the three-limbed test that a document must be (a) pleaded, (b) relevant and (c) admissible in law. The Claimant answers that paragraph 17 of the Amended Statement of Facts pleaded the fact of CW3's employment with the Defendant, and that the bank statements are the evidential instruments by which that pleaded fact is proved.

20.The Supreme Court, per Peter-Odili, J.S.C., in Aminu v. Hassan (2014) LPELR-22008 (SC), stated the applicable rule clearly:

“It is to be said that documentary evidence needs not be specifically pleaded to be admissible in evidence so long as facts and not the evidence by which such a document is covered are expressly pleaded.” See also Sani v. Kogi State House of Assembly (2019) LPELR-46404 (SC); A.G. Federation v. Abubakar (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 1.

21.A litigant pleads facts, not evidence; and the documents by which those facts are proved need only be relevant and legally admissible. The Claimant having pleaded the fact of CW3's employment relationship with the Defendant, the bank statements demonstrating the payment of salary into an account maintained by CW3 by or on behalf of the Defendant are obviously relevant to that pleaded fact within the meaning of section 1 of the Evidence Act, 2011.

22.This is reinforced by the special dispensation available to this Court under section 12(2)(b) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 and Order 1 Rule 9(2) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, which authorise the Court to depart from the strict provisions of the Evidence Act in the interest of substantial justice. The apex Court in Aondoakaa v. Obot (2022) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1824) 523 reaffirmed that the true test of admissibility is relevance in the following words:

“Relevance and admissibility of a document are separate matters in contradistinction to weight to be attached to it. Therefore, in consideration of the admissibility of any evidence, oral or documentary, the test remains that once it is relevant, it is admissible and the court is not bothered with how it was obtained or proper custody.” See also Aregbesola v. Oyinlola (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1253) 458. 

23.On this premise, I find that the Defendant's objection to Exhibits Frank A and B is accordingly hereby overruled, and the documents shall be considered in the analysis that follows, with the weight to be given them being a matter for judgment.

 

ISSUE ONE

24.Whether the termination of the Claimant's employment was wrongful and, if so, whether it is liable to be declared null and void.

Let me state that the resolution of the first issue requires this Court to answer three sub-questions: (a) what documents constitute the contract of employment; (b) whether, on those documents, the termination was procedurally regular; and (c) whether the termination was, even if regular on its face, an unfair labour practice within the meaning of section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution.

25.The question is which of the documents constitutes the contract of employment? The Defendant contends that Exhibit Joyce 1 alone regulates the employment, and denies knowledge or issuance of Exhibit Joyce 2 (the BON Hotels Handbook). On the other hand, the Claimant contends that both documents form a composite contract of their employment relationship. The law, and the evidence on the record, weigh in favour of the Claimant's position for four reasons.

26.First, the foundational proposition on this question was settled by the Supreme Court in Olaniyan v. University of Lagos [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599, and was followed again in Suleiman v. Civil Service Commission of Ondo State [2015] 20 NWLR (Pt. 1489), that a contract of employment is not a single piece of paper and handbooks, manuals and service regulations provided to an employee form part of the composite contract of service. This principle has been endorsed by the apex court in Okoh v. Federal Polytechnic Bauchi [2024] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1961) SC 261, per Abiru, J.S.C. where the court held:

“Where there are series of documents governing a transaction, the documents must be read as a whole and not in isolation. The different documents must be interpreted in the light of the whole documents and an effort must be made to achieve harmony amongst them.”

See also Adetoun Oladeji (Nig.) Ltd v. Nigerian Breweries Plc [2007] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1027) 415; Agbareh v. Mimra [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) 378; Nigerian Army v. Aminun-Kano [2010] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1188) 429.

27.Secondly, CW4 (Mr. Oluwabamise Ogundare), the subpoenaed witness who works for BON Hotels, admitted under cross-examination that he handed over Exhibit Joyce 2 to the Claimant. That is an admission against interest and requires no further proof. See section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011; Cardoso v. Daniel [1986] 2 NWLR (Pt. 20) 1; Seismograph Service (Nig.) Ltd v. Ogbeni [1976] 4 SC 85.

28.Thirdly, DW1 (the Defendant herself) admitted under cross-examination to wit: “By virtue of my management agreement with BON International Hotel, its employment handbook should also apply to my hotel.” The Defendant cannot enjoy the brand and prestige of the BON franchise while, in the same breath, disowning its employee-protection framework. The law is trite that a party cannot approbate and reprobate. See Ude v. Nwara [1993] 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) 638; Ajide v. Kelani [1985] 3 NWLR (Pt. 12) 248; Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry v. Integrated Gas (Nig.) Ltd [2000] 8 NWLR (Pt. 668) 322.

29.Fourthly, on the Defendant's argument that Article 27 of Exhibit Joyce 2 renders the document inapplicable to non-South African employees, that argument is also self-defeating. Article 27 does not, on its face, restrict the applicability of the entire Handbook to South African citizens; it is a citizenship-and-permit clause the effect of which is contingent on the primary applicability of the Handbook. It cannot both be asserted that the Handbook is inapplicable and that a particular clause of the same Handbook renders the Claimant's employment void. It is hornbook law that the Defendant may not selectively invoke portions of a document she otherwise disowns. See Olaleye v. Trustees of ECWA [2011] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1230) 1; Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Adewunmi [2007] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1042) 399.

30.On the question of the Defendant's contention that Exhibit Joyce 2 is unsigned and therefore of no probative value, that argument, though ordinarily forceful, cannot save the Defendant on the peculiar facts of this case. I must say that an employee handbook or operational manual is not a bilateral contractual document that requires the mutual signature of employer and employee. Its probative value derives from its issuance to the employee and its adoption by the employer as the framework of its operations. The evidence before this court establishes both—issuance by an agent of the management company (CW4) and adoption by the Defendant through her franchise relationship (as admitted under cross-examination). From the foregoing, I therefore find that Exhibit Joyce 2 accordingly forms part of the composite contract of service.

31.On the procedural regularity of the claimant’s termination, Clause 8.1.2 of Exhibit Joyce 1 confers on either party a right to terminate the contract within the first six (6) months upon one (1) week's notice. On the face of it, the Defendant, in exercising that right to terminate the employment contract by Exhibit Joyce 5 dated 25th September, 2023, was acting within the four corners of the employment contract. In the classical master-servant paradigm under the common law, that would ordinarily have suffice. See Osisanya v. Afribank Nigeria Plc [2007] LPELR-2809 (SC); Obanye v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc [2018] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1648) 375; Umera v. Nigerian Railway Corporation [2022] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1338) SC 349.

31.However, the composite employment contract in this case is not only restricted to Exhibit Joyce 1. Exhibit Joyce 2 also contains an employee-protection framework (including the disciplinary and corrective-action guidelines at page 18 of that Handbook). The Defendant argues that Exhibit Joyce 2's disciplinary framework applies only to dismissal, and that termination of employment is a distinct and lesser step which requires no reason. She relies on Jombo v. PEFMB [2005] 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 443 and F.B.N. Plc v. Mmeka [2015] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1456) 507. As matter of general common-law taxonomy that distinction is well-taken. But the underlying question is not one of labels; it is whether the termination, however denominated, was fair in this circumstance. This Court, in a settled line of decisions applying the Third Alteration Act, has held that even a contractually-regular “termination” may still amount to an unfair labour practice where it is arbitrary and unaccompanied by any reason connected to the employee's work. In the case of Aloysius v. Diamond Bank Plc (supra), Kanyip, J. (now President) held:

“By the provisions of section 254C(1)(f) and (h) of the Constitution as amended, this Court can now move away from the harsh and rigid common law posture of allowing an employer to terminate its employee for bad or no reason at all. It is now contrary to international best labour standard and international best practice and therefore, unfair for an employer to terminate the employment of its employee without any reason or justifiable reason that is connected with the employee's work. I hold that it is no longer conventional in this twenty-first century labour law practice and in industrial relations for an employer to terminate the employment of its employee without any reason even in private employment.”

32.See further Sahara Energy Resources v. Oyebola (supra); Bello Ibrahim v. Ecobank Plc (Unreported, Suit No. NICN/ABJ/144/2018, judgment delivered 17th December, 2019 per Hon. Justice Sanusi Kado); Miss Ebere Ukoji v. Standard Alliance Life Assurance Co. Ltd [2012] 31 NLLR (Pt. 90) 373.

33.From the evidence presented before this court, the Claimant is, by any measure, a professional. She served as General Manager of Excel Tourism International for over thirteen (13) years before being recruited by the Defendant through the BON Hotels management company. She resigned that long-standing employment engagement and moved to the Defendant's employ. She resumed duty on 21st August, 2023. On 25th September, 2023—barely five weeks later—her employment was terminated without any query, warning, appraisal, or reason. In the modern labour jurisprudence anchored on section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution and section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, such a termination must have cried out for justice in the circumstances. Unfortunately, in the instant case, none was offered by the Defendant.

34.The Defendant's contention that motive is irrelevant, and that she is not obliged to give reasons, was correct as a proposition of classical common law and has a lot of authorities to support this position. For example, see the cases of Gyubok v. Federal Polytechnic Bauchi (2024) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1965) SC 515; Ovivie v. Delta Steel Co. Ltd (2023) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1904) 203 among others. But, I need to state in unmistaken terms that, those decisions must now be read alongside the modern constitutional and NICN jurisprudence, which requires that the employer's exercise of an otherwise valid contractual right of termination be tested against the yardstick and principles of unfair labour practice. As Kanyip, J. observed in Aloysius (supra), it is no longer conventional in twenty-first century Nigerian labour law for an employer to terminate an employee without a reason connected with the employee's work.

35.The circumstances in the instant case bear the classic indications of unfair labour practice for the following reasons: (i) the deliberate recruitment of a mature professional from a stable and long-standing employment; (ii) an abrupt termination within weeks, unaccompanied by any warning, query or performance appraisal; and also (iii) the failure to give any reason for terminating the contract. This Court has recognised such patterns as unfair labour practice in the cases of Aloysius v. Diamond Bank (supra); Ejieke Maduka v. Microsoft Nigeria Ltd & Ors [2014] 41 NLLR (Pt. 125) 67; and Bello Ibrahim v. Ecobank Plc (supra).

36.From the foregoing, on these grounds, I find and hold that the termination of the Claimant's employment, though contractually regular on the surface, was substantively wrongful in that it constituted an unfair labour practice within the meaning of section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution.

37.The Claimant, in Relief (iii), seeks a declaration that the letter of termination is null and void. This Court based on the evidence before me cannot grant this relief. And this stems from the fact that the contract of employment between the parties is not one clothed with statutory flavour: it is a master-servant relationship of the private sector. It is settled law—even in the wake of the Third Alteration Act—that in a purely master-servant relationship, the Court will not declare a termination null and void, nor will it impose a willing employee upon an unwilling employer. See Osisanya v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc (supra); Damisa v. UBA Plc [2025] 19 NWLR (Pt. 2021) SC 409; Dangote Cement Plc v. Ager [2024] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1945) 1; Yusuf v. Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt. 457) 632. The corrective jurisdiction of this Court in cases of unfair termination of a private-sector master-servant employment lies not in nullification but in the appropriate monetary award. Relief (iii) is accordingly hereby refused.

ISSUE TWO 

38.Whether the Claimant has proved her entitlement to Reliefs (iv) to (ix) of the Amended Complaint

(a) RELIEF (iv)

39.The Claimant seeks ?450,000.00 as payment in lieu of notice. The Defendant answers that (i) the required notice under Clause 8.1.2 of Exhibit Joyce 1 is one (1) week; (ii) the Claimant's monthly salary was ?300,000.00, which translates to a weekly figure of approximately ?75,000.00; and (iii) the Claimant admitted under cross-examination that she had worked twenty-five (25) days at the date of termination, thereby earning ?250,000.00 for that period, leaving the balance of ?50,000.00 out of the ?300,000.00 paid, which to the Defendant represent payment in lieu of the one-week notice.

40.The Defendant's arithmetic is essentially correct. The contractually stipulated notice period is one (1) week and the equivalent monetary value is one (1) week's salary. That was, however, computed by the Defendant on a pro-rata basis, and the Claimant strongly disputes that computation, arguing that where employment is remunerated on a monthly basis it cannot be unilaterally converted to a daily wage upon mid-month termination. That argument has some force: this Court, in the case of Abe Adewunmi Babalola v. Equinox International Resources Ltd (Unreported, Suit No. NICN/LA/166/2015 judgment delivered on 17th June, 2020, has held that an employee whose employment is terminated mid-month is entitled to the full salary for that month.

Balancing these considerations, and having regard to the fact that the Defendant's reliance on Balogun v. Union Bank (2016) LPELR-41442 for the proposition that an employee is paid only for actual service rendered is not readily compatible to a monthly-salaried professional whose contract was terminated mid-month, the just outcome is to award the Claimant the balance of one full month's salary of ?300,000.00 for September 2023 (i.e. she has been paid ?300,000.00 and should have been paid an additional ?50,000.00 for the five days of the month worked but pro-rated out), plus one week's salary of ?75,000.00 as payment in lieu of notice. On this ground, I find that the Claimant is accordingly entitled to a further sum of ?125,000.00 under this head. It follows that the balance of the ?450,000.00 claimed by Claimant is not sustained and is accordingly hereby refused as unsupported by the contract or by evidence.

(b) RELIEF (v)

41.The Claimant claims ?10,000,000.00 for unfulfilled conditions of service, principally the accommodation and official-car-and-driver benefits. This is a claim in the nature of special damages. And the law is that special damages must be specifically pleaded with particulars and strictly proved. See Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Ajabule [2011] LPELR-8239 (SC); Anazodo v. Pazmeck Intertrade (Nig.) Ltd [2024] All FWLR (Pt. 1222) 126; Sommer v. FHA [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt. 219) 548. The evidence on the record before this court does not support this figure with the particularity required. Clause 3.4 of Exhibit Joyce 1 provided for accommodation within the hotel for the first three (3) months, and the evidence before me establishes that the Claimant was indeed provided with such accommodation for the duration of her actual employment. Exhibit D3 also shows the Defendant reimbursed the Claimant for fuel when she opted to use her own car for marketing. On this premise, I find that there is no evidence of a specific loss quantifiable at ?10,000,000.00. Relief (v) is therefore refused.

(c) RELIEF (vi)

42.The Claimant seeks ?80,000,000.00 in general damages. The Defendant contends that general damages are not recoverable in a wrongful termination action, and cites the cases of Umera v. Nigerian Railway Corporation (supra); Co-operative Bank Plc v. Essien [2001] 4 NWLR (Pt. 704) 407; Chukwuma v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. Ltd [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512; Western Nigeria Development Corporation v. Abimbola [1966] LPELR-25344 (SC); Addis v. Gramophone Co. Ltd [1909] AC 488.

43.The classical common-law rule is indeed as the Defendant rightly stated it: damages for wrongful termination are prima facie limited to what the employee would have earned during the notice period. However, the Third Alteration Act, 2010, and the interpretive jurisprudence of this Court and of the Court of Appeal, have opened a distinct head of damages where the termination is not merely wrongful in a technical sense but is an unfair labour practice. In Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Oyebola [2020] LPELR-51806 (CA), the Court of Appeal expressly recognised the availability of general damages where an employer's conduct in dismissing an employee is malicious or amounts to an unfair labour practice. Similarly, in Skye Bank Plc v. Adegun [2024] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1960) 1, the Supreme Court held:

“Where a contract of employment is brought to an end by the employer contrary to the terms agreed, the quantum of damages awardable cannot be based on remuneration of the employee during the period of notice prescribed in the agreement for either party to terminate the agreement. The quantum of damages awardable to the employee in such a situation should be in accordance with the general law on contract on award of damages for breach of contract, which would involve a consideration of the consequential loss that has arisen or would arise from the breach of contract of employment.”

44.Applying that principle in the instant case, the Claimant, having been unfairly terminated from an employment for which she resigned a long-standing prior post, is entitled to a monetary award that reflects the true consequential loss. However, the sum of ?80,000,000.00 is disproportionate to the injury and unsupported by particularised evidence. Damages, even in the wake of Sahara Energy (supra) and Adegun (supra), it was held that it must be principled and proportionate. See G.K.I.F. (Nig.) Ltd v. NITEL Plc [2009] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1164) 344 (Fabiyi, J.S.C. on gold-digging); Ogbebor v. Ihasee [2025] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1986) 207. Therefore, taking a broad view of the mid-career disruption of the Claimant, the resignation from a long-standing employer, the abrupt termination without reason, the reputational injury, and the documented distress to the Claimant, this Court considers the sum of ?3,000,000.00 (Three Million Naira only) to be a fair, principled and proportionate award of general damages against the Defendant. Therefore, I find that relief (vi) is granted in that reduced sum.

(d) RELIEF (vii)

45.Exemplary and aggravated damages are of a punitive character and are awarded only in restricted categories of cases where the conduct complained of is oppressive, malicious, cynical or calculated to harm a party. See Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129; Eliochin (Nig.) Ltd v. Mbadiwe [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 14) 47; Odiba v. Azege [1998] 9 NWLR (Pt. 566) 370. The unfair labour practice found in this case though it is serious, but the evidence does not rise to the level of calculated oppression that justifies exemplary damages beyond and in addition to the substantive general damages already awarded. To award both general damages and further exemplary/aggravated damages of the magnitude claimed would offend the long-established rule against double compensation. See C.C.B. (Nig.) Ltd v. Nwankwo [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 286) 159; ETC Agro Co. (Nig.) Ltd v. Abiodun [2024] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1948) 121. On this premise I find that relief (vii) is hereby refused.

(e) RELIEF (viii)

46.The Claimant claims ?5,000,000.00 as costs of instituting and maintaining this suit, and tendered Exhibit Joyce 10 (a receipt for ?250,000.00 as part payment) in support. The law is trite that legal fees, though claimable, must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. See Joseph Agbalugo v. Mr. Isaac Izuakor [2017] LCN/9870 (CA); Guinness (Nig.) Plc v. Nwoke [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt. 689) 135. Exhibit Joyce 10 proves only ?250,000.00. It is a trite law that costs, however, follow the event, and this Court has a discretion to award costs on a broader basis. See Rewane v. Okotie-Eboh (1960) SCNLR 461; Order 55 of the NICN (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017. Therefore, doing the best that can be done on the evidence before me, this Court shall and hereby awards costs assessed at ?500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira only) in favour of the Claimant. It flows that the higher sum claimed is hereby refused for want of strict proof.

(f) RELIEF (ix)

47.The Claimant claims post-judgment interest at 10% per month. I must say that the rate claimed is not only extravagant, but is also unsupported by any contract, and it is inconsistent with the Rules of this Court. Order 47 Rule 7 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 prescribes post-judgment interest at a rate not less than 10% per annum. From the foregoing, it follows therefore that the claim for 10% per month is unjustifiable and is accordingly hereby refused. I find and that post-judgment interest is hereby awarded at 10% per annum from thirty (30) days after the date of this Judgment until final liquidation.

48.On the whole, for the reasons given and for the avoidance of doubt I hereby make the following orders:

[1] It is hereby DECLARED that the termination of the Claimant's employment by a letter dated 25th September, 2023 (Exhibit Joyce 5) is wrongful, having been effected as an unfair labour practice within the meaning of section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

[2] The Claimant's Relief (iii), seeking a declaration that the letter of termination is null and void, is hereby REFUSED as the employment contract is a private-sector master-servant relationship.

[3] The Defendant is hereby ordered and shall pay to the Claimant the sum of ?125,000.00 (One Hundred and Twenty-Five Thousand Naira only) as the balance of her contractual entitlements for September, 2023 and one (1) week's salary in lieu of notice.

[4] Relief (v) for ?10,000,000.00 as unfulfilled conditions of service is hereby REFUSED for want of specific pleading and strict proof.

[5] The Defendant is hereby ordered and shall pay to the Claimant the sum of ?3,000,000.00 (Three Million Naira only) as general damages for the unfair labour practice.

[6] Relief (vii) for ?100,000,000.00 as exemplary and aggravated damages is hereby REFUSED.

[7] The Defendant is hereby ordered and shall pay to the Claimant assessed costs in the sum of ?500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira only).

[8] This judgment sum shall be paid within thirty (30) days of the date of this Judgment, failing which it shall attract post-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum until final liquidation, in accordance with Order 47 Rule 7 of the NICN (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017.

49.Judgment is hereby entered accordingly.

…………………..

Hon. Justice Subilim

JUDGE