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NICN - JUDGMENT

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE IBADAN JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT IBADAN

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE Y. M. HASSAN

DATE: 22ND JULY, 2026                                              

SUIT NO: NICN/IB/58/2024

BETWEEN

MR. ADEDIRAN ADEWALE GBOLAGADE  ------------------------------ CLAIMANT

AND

1. OYO STATE UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION BOARD

2. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OYO STATE -------------------------- DEFENDANTS

REPRESENTATION

  • Abiodun Aikomo, A.G. and Commissioner for Justice,

Oyo State with K.B. Ayangbade, Senior State Counsel, 

Ministry of Justice, Oyo State for the Defendants.

 

  • Y.A. Azeez for the Claimant.

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

1.         The Claimant commenced this suit by a General Form of Complaint and Statement of Facts dated and filed on 27th day of September, 2024.

            The Claimant claims against the Defendants as follows:

  1. DECLARATION that the dismissal of the Claimant from the service of Oyo State Universal Basic Education Board vide letter ref. SUBEB/G1680/288 dated the 24th August, 2017 dismissing the Claimant from the service of Oyo State Government is wrongful, unlawful and null and void. 
  2. AN ORDER setting aside the said Oyo State Universal Basic Education Board letter ref. SUBEB/G1680/288 dated 24th August, 2017 dismissing the Claimant from the service of Oyo State Government. 
  3. AN ORDER reinstating the Claimant to his appropriate level and grade as an officer of the Oyo State Universal Basic Education Board and/or as an officer of Oyo State Government as a civil/public servant.
  4. AN ORDER directing the Defendants to pay the Claimant the sum of N16,783,174.00 (Sixteen million, Seven Hundred and Eighty-Three Thousand, One Hundred and Seventy-Four Naira) being his arrears of salaries, accrued salaries, emoluments, allowances and all other perquisites of office due to the Claimant for the months of April, May and June, 2017 before the issuance of letter of suspension and since the issuance of the said letter of suspension Ref. SUBEB/G.1680/6 dated 13th July, 2017 before his purported dismissal letter ref. SUBEB/G1680/288 dated 24th August, 2017 till September, 2024 and any other salaries and benefits that may be accrued thereafter. 
  5. AN ORDER for the payment of 10% interest by the Defendants on the judgment sum from the date of judgment until the final liquidation of the same. 

2.         Upon being served with the originating processes, the Defendants filed statement of defence dated 7th day of May, 2025 but filed on 8th day of May, 2025. However, the Defendants amended same by the Order of the court granted on 13th day of November, 2025. The Defendants then filed their Consequential Amended Defendants’ statement of defence dated the 17th day of November, 2025 but filed on 24th day of November, 2025. On the other hand, the Claimant filed Consequential Amended Statement of Facts dated the 28th day of November, 2025 but filed the 1st day of December, 2025.

3.         Pleadings have been settled, trials in this suit commenced on 2nd day of November, 2025 and was concluded on 18th day of February, 2026. Both the Claimant and the Defendants called one witnesses each.

CASE OF THE CLAIMANT

4.         The Claimant opened his case of 2nd December, 2025 where he testified as CW1, adopted his two statements on oath as his evidence-in-chief and tendered in evidence 14 documents which were admitted and marked as Exhibits A to M respectively.

5.         Under cross-examination, CW1 testified inter alia that he worked with 1st Defendant as an Accountant. That on 13th July, 2017 he was given a query and told to proceed on suspension and he responded to the query within 24 hours as stipulated therein. That the query was founded on the outcome of the report on irregularities in salary payment.

            That he was invited to a panel set up to investigate the issue and was given opportunity to express or explain the side of his story. That thereafter, he got a letter on 27th August, 2017 dismissing him from the service of the 1st Defendant. That he wrote a letter to the 1st Defendant’s Chairman begging to be reinstated on compassionate ground. That Exhibit G1 was for plea for mercy. That the panel set up did not re-write the wrong done by the first panel.

CASE OF THE DEFENDANTS

6.         The Defendants opened their defence on 6th day of December, 2025 by calling on Mr. Adesina Lateef Olalekan, Deputy Director in the Office of the Auditor General for Local Governments, who testified as DW1, adopted his statement on oath as his evidence-in-chief and tendered two documents in evidence which were objected by the Claimant’s Counsel. Leave was granted Counsel to address the court on the grounds of his objection at address stage while the documents were provisionally admitted in evidence and marked as Exhibits N and O respectively.

7.         In his testimony under cross-examination, DW1 stated amongst other things that he is not a staff of SUBEB. That he signed his statement on oath in this Honourable Court. That he played a role in the whole season leading to dismissal and trial of the Claimant. That he was not part of the Administrative Panel that tried the Claimant but was the one that submitted that report to the panel. That the report was signed by the Auditor General.

8.         Under re-examination, DW1 stated that the report they submitted to the panel was irregular promotion and increment of steps and over payment of salaries.

FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS

9.         At the close of trial, Learned Counsel were directed to file their final written address in accordance with the Rules of this Honourable Court. The Defendants filed their final written address dated 4th day of March, 2026. The Claimant on the other hand, filed his final written address dated 8th day of June, 2026 but filed on 9th day of June, 2026.

 

 

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF 1ST AND 2ND DEFENDANTS

10.       In the said Defendants’ final written address, Learned Counsel to the 1st and 2nd Defendants, Abiodun Aikomo distilled two issues for determination, to wit:

  1. Whether this Honourable Court possesses the jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit which was commenced outside the Statutory Limitation period.
  2. Whether the appointment of the Claimant having statutory flavour was properly and lawfully determined by the Defendants. 

11.       In arguing the issue, Counsel submitted on issue one that jurisdiction is the legal capacity of a court to hear and determine judicial proceedings. That is the limit imposed upon the power of a validly constituted Court to hear and determine issues properly brought before it by due process with regard to the subject matter in issue, the persons between whom the issue is joined; and the kind of relief(s) sought. Jurisdiction is the bedrock of any proceedings and its absence or defect renders any proceeding a nullity, notwithstanding how well it may have been conducted. When the court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine any cause before it is in issue, it is a threshold matter that must be determined before taking any further step(s) in the case. At the Challenge to its jurisdiction, the only jurisdiction the Court can exercise is to determine whether it has jurisdiction in the matter. In this respect, he cited the cases of BRITANNIA U (NIG.) LTD v. SEPLAT PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD (2016) ALL LFWLR (part 15030) page 541 at 602, paras. B-F; UBA v. ETIABA (2008) 6 NWLR (pt. 1082) at 154.

12.       Learned Defendants’ Counsel submitted that this Suit as it is presently constituted is Statute Barred and consequently incompetent. Thus, this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate thereon as jurisdiction is a lifeblood of adjudication. Without it, the whole case collapses, as if it never was. He relied on the case of WULANGS v. C.B.N. (2021) 16 NWLR (pt. 1802) 195 p. 245, paras. C-E. 

13.       In another argument, Counsel stated that for a Court to exercise jurisdiction over a matter before it, the following conditions must co-exist: 

  1. The Court must be properly constituted as regards the number and qualification of the members of the bench; 
  2. The subject matter of the case must be within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising the jurisdiction; and 
  3. The case must be initiated in court by due process of law and upon fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. 

He relied on the case of MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM (1962) SCNLR 341.

Consequently, Counsel submitted that the instant suit as presently constituted is incompetent as it is clothed with certain features that robs this Court of jurisdiction to hear and determine the same. In this instance, the Claimant’s action is statute barred and liable to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 

He added that the records of this Court and Evidence before the Court particularly the testimony of the Claimant shows that the cause of action herein arose in August, 2017 while this Suit was instituted in September, 2024. The period between the accrual of the cause of action and actual commencement of this Suit is in excess of a period of seven (7) years. In the circumstances, this Suit is no longer justiciable in any Court of Law and should be terminated without much ado. Counsel cited Section 18 of the Limitation Law of Oyo State, 2000. 

14.       Submitting further, Counsel stated that the word “shall” that is used in Section 18 of the Limitation Law connotes that it is mandatory that where a cause of action arises from a contract, the Claimant must institute the action within five years after the cause of action arose. That the word ‘shall’ is mandatory and not permissive. Reference was made to AGIP (NIG.) LTD v. AGIP PETROLEUM INTERNATIONAL, (2010) 5 NWLR (pt. 1187) pg. 348 at 419, paras. F-H; SHENA SECURITY CO. LTD. v. AFROPAK (NIG.) LTD. (2008) 9 SCM p. 169 at 180 (quoting from the Labour Act).

15.       Learned Counsel maintained that having established that the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendants was contractual. He submitted that any alleged wrongful act committed against the Claimant, relating to his contract of service, must be initiated in Court within the time stipulated in the Limitation Law of Oyo State. That the Claimant has failed to institute an action within the 5-year Limitation period provided by the above-cited Law and as such renders this Suit unenforceable by this Honourable Court. Counsel further submitted that the 5-year window for the Claimant to institute this Suit has lapsed and the right to bring the case to Court is extinguished, regardless of the merits of the claim. He cited the cases of N.N.P.C v. ABDULRAHMAN (2006) 12 NWLR (pt. 993) at 202; USENI v. ATTA (2023) 8 NWLR (pt. 1887) 519; ABACHA v. A.G. FED. (2021) 10 NWLR (pt. 1783) at 129.

16.       Moreso, Counsel submitted that the Claimant’s claims as contained in his Originating Processes show that the crux of the Claimant’s case is the termination of his contract of employment by the Defendants. This action ought to have been filed within a period of five (5) years from the 24th of August, 2017 but the Claimant filed his Originating Processes on 27th September, 2024, after the 5-year statutory Limitation period provided by Section 18 of the Limitation Law of Oyo State had passed and submitted that this suit is Statute Barred and incompetent and urged this Honourable Court to so hold. 

17.       To this extend, Counsel submitted that having found that this suit is statute barred and incomplete, the proper Order of this Honourable Court is to dismiss this suit. Reliance was placed on the case of A.P.C v. ADELEKE (2023) 2 NWLR (pt. 1868) 309 at 336 at para F-G; IBENEME v. BAYELSA STATE GOVERNMENT (SUPRA) page 202, para. B.

18.       On whether statute of limitation is applicable to contract of employment, Counsel cited the cases of MICHEAL IDACHABA & ORS v. UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE MAKURDI & 4 ORS (2021) 11 NWLR (pt. 1787) 209; ANOLAM v. F.U.T.O (2025) 5 NWLR (pt. 1984) p. 673-676; OKORONKWO v. I.N.E.C (2025) 8 NWLR (pt. 1991) 131 at 156, para D; MRS. ADIJAT BOLANLE ESANJU v. OYO STATE UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION BOARD & 1 OR (NICN/IB/22/2024; OLATUNBOSUN SUNDAY v. EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR OF OYO STATE & 2ORS (NICN/IB/04/2025; MR. BABALOLA TAOFEEK v. OYO STATE UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION BOARD & 1 OR (NICN/IB/03/2025).

19.       On issue two, Counsel submitted that where an employment has statutory flavor, the employee can only be disengaged in line with the Public Service Rules upon which the employment and renewal of employees are rooted. That where the employment of a civil servant is terminated in accordance with the Civil Service Rules, the civil servant has no valid cause of action against the terminating authority or body. Consequently, Counsel submitted further that the Claimant was dismissed from the Service of Oyo State Government following Due Process of the Law upon the findings that arose from the Audit Report that was published by the Office of the Auditor General for Local Government of Oyo State on the Financial Impropriety committed by some of the Staff of the 1st Defendant including the Claimant. 

20.       Arguing issue two further, Counsel contended that the Claimant appeared before the panel that was constituted by the State Government to investigate and make recommendations on the outcome of its investigation and he was given fair hearing as mandated by the Nigerian Constitution. He added that, the Claimant having appeared before the Panel where he was given the opportunity to defend the allegations against him, which defence the Panel found insufficient to vindicate the Claimant leading to his eventual dismissal from Service and submitted that the Claimant was granted the opportunity to defend the alleged misconduct and that his consequential dismissal from the Public Service was rightfully done in the circumstances. In this respect, he cited the case of OVUNWO v. WOKO (2011) All FWLR (pt. 587) p. 596 at 620-621, paras. D-B.

21.       Learned Counsel stated again that in ensuring compliance with the Oyo State Public Service Rules 2013, the Oyo State Government notified the Claimant of the alleged misconduct, and he also appeared before the Panel of Enquiry set up in 2017. Consequently, Counsel contended that the Oyo State Government acted in compliance with the Public Service Rules before dismissing the Claimant from the Defendant’s employment. He referred the court to the cases of OBAJE v. N.A.M.A (2013) 11 NWLR (pt. 1366) 527; ADEDEJI v. C.B.N (2023) 5 NWLR (pt. 1878) 531; BAMGBOYE v. UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (1999) 10 NWLR (pt. 620) 290.

22.       In another argument on issue two, Counsel stated that the Claimant did not raise any objection to the composition of the Panel in his statement on oath which he admitted before the Court nor however at the Trial of this Suit. That it is settled principle of Law that where a Party submits itself to the jurisdiction of a Panel when he had reasonable opportunity to complain, he cannot be heard to complain after a decision had been taken and urged the court to hold that the disciplinary measures meted to the Claimant i.e. Dismissal from Service upon his appearance before the panel duly constituted by the Defendant in this case were valid and in accordance with the Civil Service Regulation. Reference was made to the case of IDERIMA v. R.S.S.C (2005) 16 NWLR (pt. 951), 378 S.C.

23.       Finally, Counsel submitted that the termination of the Claimant is valid and urged the Court to so hold and dismiss the Claimant’s suit against the Defendants in its entirety. Reliance was place on the case of AZENABOR v. BAYERO UNIVERSITY, KANO (2009) 17 NWLR (pt. 1169) at 96(CA).

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE CLAIMANT

24.       In the said Claimant’s Final Written Address, Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Yisau Adesope Azeez, Esq., distilled three issues for determination, to wit: 

  1. Whether considering all the circumstances surrounding this case, the action is governed by Limitation Law of Oyo State or is statute barred. 
  2. Whether the appointment of the Claimant was terminated by the Defendants with strict observance of the principles of fair hearing. 
  3. Whether on the preponderance of evidence or balance of probabilities the Claimant is not entitled to all the reliefs sought.

25.       In arguing the issues, Counsel submitted in one that the word “arose” and “accrued” literarily means different thing. Arose, the past tense of arise means emerged/happened, while accrued, the past tense of accrue means accumulated. Consequently, Counsel submitted that the drafters of the Limitation Law of Oyo State decidedly used the word accrued as against arose. 

26.       Learned Counsel contended that the action that gave rise to this case was the suspension of the Claimant by the Defendants in line with the Oyo State Public Service Rules, 2017 under Chapter 3 (DISCIPLINE), Section 3, Rule 030301 admitted as Exhibit M vide a letter of suspension dated 13th July, 2017 admitted as Exhibit F1, and to which the Claimant replied to by his letter dated 14th July, 2017 admitted as Exhibit F2. That when the Claimant was about to be punished, he was not punished under Section 3, Rule 030301 by which he was tried and given a hearing, but was by a letter dated 24th August, 2017 admitted as Exhibit G1, dismissed for offences under Section 4, Rule 030401 in respect of which he was not informed, tried or given a hearing at all.

27.       Arguing further, Learned Counsel submitted that the Defendants’ reliance on Section 18 of the Limitation Law, Cap 76, Vol. III, Laws of Oyo State, 2000 to the effect that any action filed after the expiration of five years from the date on which the cause of action accrued to submit that this action is statute barred was grossly misconceived. 

To that extend, Counsel submitted that in order to determine whether an action is statute barred, it is the duty of the court to examine the Claimant’s originating processes and statement of claim to ascertain the date the cause of action accrued and compare it with the date the action was filed. Reference was made to paragraphs 21, 23, 33 and 34 of the CW1 Amended Statement on oath, and the case of AMCON v. CHIEF ENGINEERS (NIG.) LTD & ORS (2023) LPELR-61121.

28.       Claimant’s Counsel maintained that there is exception or extensions to the limitation period that might be pleaded by the Claimant which could potentially toll the running of time as in where there has been a continuance of the damage or provision of administrative redress or remedy as in the instant case, a fresh cause of action arises from time to time as often as the damage is caused, or the avenue for redress remain open. He referred to the case of AREMO II v. ADEKANYE (2004) ALL FWLR (pt. 224) 2113 at 2132.

In addition, Counsel submitted that time does not run until the cessation of the event leading to the cause of action. That the event leading to the cause of action in this case is the outcome of the sitting of the investigation panel which wrongfully dismissed the Claimant for gross misconduct for which he was not heard and the subsequent setting up a review panel to review their findings. Reliance was placed on the case of NWANKWO & ANOR v. NWANKWO (2017) LPELR-42832 (CA). 

29.       The Learned Counsel submitted therefore that considering the circumstances of this case, the cause of action in this case does not accrue until the 24th September, 2024 when the government considered and accepted the reports of the review panel and ratified the wrongful dismissal of the Claimant as no. 4 at page 18 of the report admitted as Exhibit L. Reference was made to Rule 030307 under Section 3 of Chapter 3.

30.       In another submission, Counsel stated that the cause of action will only accrues when all the facts necessary to prove the claim as enjoined by the public service rules have occurred, and the Claimant is in a position to seek a remedy from the court. In cases involving administrative decisions as herein, especially those subject to internal review mechanisms, the cause of action typically does not accrue until the administrative process has been fully exhausted and a final, definitive decision has been made and communicated. 

            Counsel again submitted that the critical date for the accrual of the cause of action in this case is when the decision becomes final and binding within the administrative hierarchy leaving no further internal recourse for the Claimant.

31.       Submitting on issue one further, Counsel stated that 24th of September, 2024 is the date when the government’s final acceptance made the dismissal decision conclusive and definite within the administrative framework and any limitation period, such as five years period prescribed by Section 18 of the Oyo State Limitation Law, 2000 for actions against public bodies, would began to run from this date. He cited in support the case of OKHILUA v. P.H.C.N (2024) LPELR-62331(CA).

32.       The Learned Claimant’s Counsel contended that the investigative panel that dismissed the Claimant and the subsequent review panels that did not give him a hearing all acted ultra vires and submitted that it is the law that a public officer is not expected to act ultra vires, and one who acts ultra vires cannot take refuge under any limitation law. Reference was made to the cases of N.F.U.C.B & ORS v. MARTINS (2024) LPELR-62210(CA); SKYE BANK PLC v. ADEGUN (2024) LPELR-62219(SC); STITCH v. A.G. FED. & ORS (1986) LPELR-3119(SC).

33.       In his further submission, Learned Counsel stated that this action being one challenging the breach of contract of employment which is a specie of contract, the limitation law is not application He referred the court to the case of GOVERNOR OF IMO STATE & ORS v. MONIER CONTRUCTION COMPANY (NIG.) LTD v. BANKOLE (1972) LPELR-2018(SC); SALAKO v. L.E.D.P & ANOR (1953) 20 NLR-169.

34.       In his final submission on issue one, Counsel stated that apart from the inapplicability of the Limitation Law of Oyo State, 2000 to the present case, the action is not one caught by Limitation Law as it was instituted within time required by the Law and urged the court to resolve this issued in favour of the Claimant. 

35.       On issue two, Counsel submitted that fair trial before a court of law or before an administrative tribunal established by the law. The fair hearing requirement is a constitutional issue which goes to the root of any adjudication and no matter how well conducted, any adjudication that violates the requirement of fair hearing will be declared null and void. He referred to Section 36(1) of the 1999 CFRN as Amended and the case of RAJI v. WEMA BANK (2015) LPELR-41699 (CA). 

36.       Learned Counsel contended that it is the case of the Claimant that he was wrongfully dismissed based on wrong allegation and wrong conclusion. He referred the court to Exhibit M and that he was suspended. Reference was made to Exhibit F1 and G1 and stated that the Defendant in dismissing the Claimant, did not follow the proper procedure as established by the Public Service Rules. The Defendants did not follow through the Provisions of Section 3 under which he was queried, and for which he defended himself, but abandoned that and decided to follow a different Section 4 which he was not aware of, and not confronted with the evidence of the supposed fake promotion letters, as well as the alleged overloaded salaries to enable him defend himself before he was found guilty and dismissed of the same. 

37.       In another argument on issue two, Counsel submitted that it is trite law that an employee’s wrong doings must be specific and he is entitled to a formal notice of such wrongdoing and a hearing on that specific act. He cited the case of AIYETAN v. NIGERIA INSTITUTE OF OIL PALM RESEARCH (1987) 3 NWLR (pt. 59)48; ADENIYI v. THE GOVERNING COUNCIL, YABATECH (1993) 6 NWLR (pt. 300) 426: FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, YOLA v. MAIWUYA (2013) ALL FWLR (pt. 677) 753 at 764, para. H. 

38.       On fair hearing, Counsel submitted that an employee who is accused of wrongdoing must be given adequate time to prepare his defence, time to read through his papers, get his witnesses and employ the services of a legal practitioners if need be. In the Claimant’s case, however, Counsel contended that he was given only 24 hours to explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. Reference was made to Exhibit F1. Consequently, Counsel added that an employer who intends to dismiss an employee for wrongdoing must accord him the basic principles of law of natural justice that is audi alteram partem and nemo dat in causa sua, which was not followed in the case of the Claimant by the Defendants before being dismissed. 

39.       Learned Counsel further submitted on issue two that for not giving the Claimant a hearing or fair hearing as the case may be under Section 4 Rule 030401 of the Public Service Rules, 2013 before finding him guilty of the same and consequently dismissing him from service upon it, the Defendant had acted against the Provisions of Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. Counsel referred the court to the case of CHITRA KNITTING & WEAVING MANUFACTURING CO. LTD v. AKINGBADE (2016) LPELR-40437(SC), (pp. 21-22, paras. A-A).

            To this extend, Counsel urged the court to nullify the Claimant’s dismissal, same being a nullity not be given fair hearing under the rules for which he was dismissed.

40.       It is another contention of the Learned Counsel to the Claimant that even under the provisions of Section 3 of the Public Service Rules on Misconduct in respect of which the Claimant was queried and given a hearing to defend himself, the Defendants still acted in breach of the section and did not follow through or complied with the set down procedure under the Section. He relied on Section 3 Rule 030303 and the case of EFERAKORHO v. DELTA STATE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION (2015) ALL FWLR (pt. 779) 1184; MRS. AKINYOSOYE YEMISI v. FEDERAL INLAND REVENUE SERVICES (2013) ALL FWLR (pt. 693) 1992 at 2012-2014.

41.       In another submission, Counsel stated that employment with statutory flavour/protection or backing such as that of the Claimant must be terminated strictly in the ways and manner prescribed by the relevant statute (Public Service Rules, 2013). Any other form of termination inconsistent therewith is null and void. On this, Counsel placed reliance in the case of FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTRE, IDO-EKITI & ORS v. MICHAEL (2012) LPELR-20406(CA), (pp. 22, para. C).

42.       In his final submission on issue two, Counsel urged this Honourable Court to resolve this issue also in favour of the Claimant by nullifying his dismissal for non-compliance with the principles of fair hearing as well as the Public Service Rules. 

43.       On issue three, Counsel submitted that the Claimant through his evidence-in-chief as contained in his statement on oath and documents tendered was able to establish that he was not guilty of the allegation levied against him in the query letter of 13th July, 2017 Exhibit F1 and especially with his reply to the query letter, Exhibit F2, dated 14th July, 2017. The Claimant made himself abundantly clear that by virtue of his schedule of duties, he is not in a position to effect promotion of any staff and pay them. He referred to paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 28 of the Claimant’s amended statement on oath among others. 

44.       It is the submission of the Claimant’s Counsel on issue three also that it is the law that where an employer as in this case states a reason for terminating the employment of an employee, the employer bears the onus to establish the reason to the satisfaction of the court, otherwise the termination will be wrongful and the employee will be entitled to damages. He referred to the cases of UNION BANK v. SALAUDEEN (2017) LPELR-43415(CA) and C.G.C (NIG.) LTD v. BAKARE & ANOR (2018) LPELR-46810(CA).

Consequently, Counsel submitted that the duty imposed by the law on the Defendants as the employers of the Claimant to prove or establish the reasons for the Claimant’s dismissal and strict compliance with the Rules on dismissal has not been discharged by them.

            Reliance was placed on the case of JAMB v. ORJI (2008) 2 NWLR (pt. 1072) 552.

45.       In addition, Learned Counsel submitted that the Defendants did not materially rebut the case of the Claimant or prove any allegation of over payment and overloading of staff salaries at the trial to warrant this court giving nod to the action of the Defendants in dismissing the Claimant from his employment which enjoys statutory flavour/protection.

46.       Claimant’s Learned Counsel argued that the Claimant has established the fact that his employment is one that enjoys statutory flavour/protection, which is quite different from mere master-servant relationship, as he was still working with Oyo State Universal Basic Education Board in Ibadan North Local Government before his wrongful dismissal. Reference was made to paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Claimant's Amended Statement on oath among others and Exhibit F1 & F2 and M

            Reliance was placed on the cases of ADEGOKE v. OSUN STATE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION (2010) LPELR-3601(CA) (pp. 15, para. D); NNADI v. NATIONAL EAR CARE CENTER (2014) LPELR-22910(CA).

47.       In his submission, Counsel stated on the Claimant’s entitlements that even without Exhibit F, if this Honourable Court finds in favour of the Claimant, it has powers to make consequential order for the payment to the Claimant of his entitlements as claimed in this case. He cited in support the case of OKEKE v. NWIGENE & ANOR (2016) LPELR-41047(CA).

48.       Consequently, Counsel urged the Honourable Court to resolve issue three in favour of the Claimant that from the preponderance of evidence or balance of probabilities, the Claimant has been able to establish that he is entitled to all the reliefs sought.

49.       In conclusion, Claimant’s Counsel urged this Honourable Court to hold that:

  1. This action is not caught by Limitation Law of Oyo State. 
  2. The employment of the Claimant is one that enjoys statutory flavour. 
  3. The Claimant was wrongfully dismissed from the service of Oyo State Government by the Defendants based on the refusal of the Defendants to follow the principle of fair hearing and the laid down procedure for discipline and sanction of the Claimant. 
  4. The Claimant has proved his case to entitle him to judgement in this suit. 
  5. The Claimant is entitled to all the reliefs claimed in his pleadings.

 

COURT’S DECISION

50.       I have carefully perused the General Form of Complaint, the Consequential Amended Statement of Facts, the reliefs sought and other accompanying processes of the Claimant. I have equally perused the Consequential Amended Defendants’ Statement of Defence and other processes filed. I have evaluated the entire evidence adduced both oral and documentary by the parties in this suit. In addition, I have gone through the Final Written Addresses filed and also listened to the arguments of Counsel while adopting same. Having painstakingly done all these, it is my humble view that the issues for determination formulated by Counsel in their respective Final Written Addresses can be summed up into two, to wit:-

1. Whether from the facts and circumstances of this case, this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit.

2. Whether the Claimant has proved his case as required by law to be entitled to the reliefs sought in this suit.

51.       Before I consider the issues for determination raised above, let me say that it is the case of the Claimant from the pleading and evidence led briefly that he is an Accountant and former staff of Oyo State Universal Basic Education Board seconded to Ibadan North Local Government Universal Basic Education Authority, i.e. LGUBEA in the service of Oyo State of Nigeria. That since he joined the service of Oyo State Government as a public officer, he had served in several capacities in not less than 8 (Eight) Local Government Education Authorities and never received any query for any kind of misconduct whatsoever. That he was highly surprised when he received a query with suspension vide a letter dated 13th July, 2017 ref. SUBEB/IG.1680/6 titled RE: AUDIT OF SUBEB SALARY PAYMENT directing him to respond to the query within 24 hours why disciplinary action in line with Public Service Rules, Vol. 1, Rule 030301, should not be taken against him. 

That he replied to the said query letter accordingly and clearly stated his own side of the case that he neither did any illegal promotion nor increased any member staff salary during the course of his duties as Internal Auditor at Ibadan North LGUBEA or at any other time in the course of his duties as alleged. That he was also invited to a panel of enquiry on Thursday, the 27th day of July, 2017 along with two other senior officers, i.e. the Administration Officer and the Auditor of Ibadan North LGUBEA. That he clearly explained himself to the said panel of inquiry and part of his explanation was that those that were involved or promoted in the promotion exercise were those so approved by the appropriate verifying authorities. 

That while he was awaiting the reversal of his suspension, another letter with ref. SUBEB/G1680/288 dated 24th August, 2017 was served on him stating that he was found guilty of contravening a different Section 030401 of the Public Service Rule Vol. 1, 2013 and hereby dismissed. That he was dismissed under the new Section without inviting or hearing from him. That he is still willing to continue his service as an officer under the Oyo State Government as he has not breached any of the conditions of his service. That but for his purported dismissal, he would have been a Level 16 Step 09 officer by now in the employment of the Defendants. That it is now a period of 90 months (April, 2017 to September, 2024) that he had not received any salary, allowance, promotion and other benefits from the Defendants. Consequently, he approached this Court seeking among others the declaration that his dismissal is wrongful, unlawful and null and void and order of reinstatement.

52.       Having pointed out these, I will now proceed to consider the issues for determination. On issue one which is whether from the facts and circumstances of this case, this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit.

53.       It is germane to note at the onset that the Defendants pleaded in their Consequential Amended Statement of Defence at paragraphs 3 and 4 that this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit for being statute barred and that Claimant’s cause of action arose on the 24th August, 2017 when he was dismissed from the service of the 1st Defendant and the Claimant instituted this action on the 27th day of September, 2024, seven (7) years after the cause of action arose. However, the Claimant in the Consequential Amended Statement of Facts averred in paragraphs 33 and 34 inter alia that the report of the review panel of inquiry set up to review the dismissal of the Claimant among others referred to in paragraph 32 above was not ratified by government (the executive council) until the 24th of September 2024 when their 8th Executive Council Meeting was held and a letter to that effect from the office of the head of service dated 14th October, 2024 was written to notify the Chairman of the 1st Defendant of the decision for further necessary action. Be that as it may, the issue of statute bar is one that torches on the jurisdiction of the Court, which must be resolved first to determine whether the Court has jurisdiction to proceed to decide the suit on its merit. Put differently, the issue of jurisdiction when raised, the Court is duty bound to resolve same first before proceeding further.

54.       Having said this, it is settled law that jurisdiction is the authority of the Court to adjudicate over the question that give rise to the cause of action. It is fundamental and threshold issue being the life blood and bedrock of all trials. Without jurisdiction, no doubt the trial will amount to an exercise in futility and a nullity. Furthermore, a Court is only competent to entertain a case when the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction, and the case comes before the Court initiated by the due process of law upon the fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. In this respect, see the cases of OKOLONWAMU v. OKOLONWAMU (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1676) 1 at 21, para. A; GTB. v. TOYED (NIG.) LTD (2016) LPELR-4181(CA); ODOM v. P.D.P (2015) 6 NWLR (pt. 1456) 527 at 548, Paras. C-D; MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM (1962) NSCC 374 at 379-380; OLORIODE v. YUNUSA (2910) 10 NWLR (pt. 1201) 80 at 101-102; HOPE DEMOCRATIC PARTY v. OBI (2011) 12 MJSC 67.

55.       It is equally settled law that a cause of action is said to be statute barred if in respect of its proceedings it cannot be brought because the period laid down by the limitation law has elapsed. I refer to the cases of EGBE v. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1 at 20; UDOH TRADING COP LTD v. ABERE (2001) 11 NWLR (pt. 723) 114; FORESTRY RESEARCH INSTUTUTE OF NIGERIA v. GOLD (2007) 11 NWLR (pt. 723).

56.       In the instant case, it is the submission of the learned Counsel to the Defendants that this suit as presently constituted is statute barred. He relied on Section 18 of the Limitation Law, CAP 76, Vol. III, Laws of Oyo State, 2000.

57.       Counsel argued further that the Claimant’s employment with the Oyo State is a contract of employment which was determined on 24th August, 2017 vide Exhibit ‘G1’, dated 24th August, 2017 being the date the cause of action arose. That where the Claimant intends to file any action arising from the contract of employment, he ought to institute same within five (5) years after his cause of action arose. The Claimant instituted this suit, challenging his dismissal on 27th September, 2024, that is seven clear years after the cause of action arose, and two years after five-year limitation period, thus making the action statute barred and incompetent.

58.       Let me pause here and refer to the provision of the said Section 18 of the Limitation Law, CAP 76, Vol. III, Laws of Oyo State, 2000. It provides thus:

“No action founded on contract, tort or any other action not specifically provided for in parts 2 and 3 of this law shall be brought after the expiration of five years from the date on which the Cause of Action accrued.”

59.       It is clear like day light from the wordings of the provision of Section 18 of the Limitation Law quoted above that no action founded on contract shall be brought after the expiration of five years from the date on which the cause of action arose.

60.       Therefore, it is trite law that in deciding whether a case is statute barred or not, the Court is to look at the originating processes, in this instant case, the general form of complain and Statement of Fact to ascertain when the alleged wrong was committed giving rise to the cause of action and the date when the case was filed in Court. This position was re-echoed by Supreme Court in the case of FROZEN FOODS (NIG.) LTD & ORS v. ESTATE OF OBA JOHN AGBOLA OJOMO & ORS (2022) LPELR-57815, Per JOHN INYANG OKORO, JSC, at page 21-22, paras. A-A where it was held thus:

“…what the Court is enjoined to do to ascertain when the Cause of Action arose so as to determine whether the action is statute barred or not is to look at the originating processes filed by the Plaintiff which include the Writs of Summon and avernments in the Statement of Claim to ascertain therefrom when the wrong giving rise to the enforceable claim was allegedly committed, and thereafter comparing it with the date on which the suit was initiated. If the period of persistence of the wrong from the date of accruals thereof exceeds the period of limitation as provided by the statutes, then the suit is statute barred...”

See also the cases of KARSHI & ORS v. GWAGWA (2022) LPELR-57544 (SC) 1; ABDULLAHI v. LOKO (2023) 6 NWLR (pt. 1881) 445; LFS INVESTMENT LTD v. BRAWAL LINE LTD & ORS (2020) LPELR-1610(SC); ELABANJO v. DAWODU (2006) 6-7 SC 24; YAU-YAU v. APC (2024) 8 NWLR (pt. 1941) 403(SC). 

61.       In the instant case therefore, before I proceed, let me refer to paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 21 22 and 35 of the Consequential Amended Statement of Facts. For clarity and ease of reference, I shall reproduce them hereunder.

            

 

Paragraph 5 reads thus:

“The Claimant avers that he joined the services of Oyo State Government through Ona Ara Local Government sometime in year 1992 as Accountant Officer Grade II on salary Grade Level 08 Step 01 and had since then absorbed by the Defendants and had risen to the position of Assistant Director of Finance in the year 2014.”

Paragraph 6 reads thus:

“The Claimant states that since he joined the service of Oyo State Government as a public officer, he had served in several capacities as Finance Officer, Senior Accountant, Principal Accountant, Assistant Chief Accountant, Chief Accountant and Assistant Director of Finance, and had served in not less than 8 (eight) Local Government Education Authorities and never received any query for any kind of misconduct whatsoever. The last promotion letter is hereby pleaded.”

Paragraph 7 reads thus:

“The Claimant avers that he was highly surprised when he received a query with suspension vide a letter dated 13th July, 2017 ref. SUBEB/IG.1680/6 titled RE: AUDIT OF SUBEB SALARY PAYMENT directing the Claimant to respond to the said query within 24 hours why disciplinary action in line with Public Service Rules, Vol.1, Rule 030301, should not be taken against him. The said query letter is hereby pleaded.”

Paragraph 9 reads thus:

“The Claimant states that he replied to the said query letter accordingly and clearly stated his own side of the case that he neither did any illegal promotion nor increased any member staff’ salary during the course of his duties as Internal Auditor at Ibadan North; LGUBEA or at any other time in the course of his duties as alleged, on his own, but always acted on the directives of his superiors. The said letter in reply of the query dated 14th July, 2017 is hereby pleaded and the Defendants are hereby put on notice to produce the original.” 

Paragraph 10 reads thus:

“The Claimant avers that despite his written explanation and response to the query letter of 13th July, 2017, he was also invited to a panel of enquiry on Thursday, the 27th day of July, 2017 along with two other senior officers, that is the Administration Officer and the Auditor of Ibadan North LGUBEA.”

Paragraph 11 reads thus:

“The Claimant states that he clearly explained himself to the said panel of inquiry and part of his explanation was that those that were involved or promoted in the promotion exercise were those so approved by the appropriate verifying authorities.”

Paragraph 21 reads thus:

“The Claimant states that while he was awaiting the reversal of his suspension, another letter with ref. SUBEB/G1680/288 dated 24th August, 2017 was served on him stating that he was found guilty of contravening a different Section 030401 of the Public Service Rule Vol. I, 2013 and hereby dismissed. The said letter is hereby pleaded.”

Paragraph 22 reads thus:

“The Claimant states that he was dismissed under the new Section without inviting or hearing from him.”

Paragraph 35 reads thus:

“The Claimant avers that he is still willing to continue his service as an officer under the Oyo State Government as he has not breached any of the conditions of his service.”

62.       From the avernments in the paragraphs of the Consequential Amended Statement of Facts reproduced above, it is apparently clear that cause of action in this suit arose in 2017 when the Claimant was dismissed from the Service of 1st Defendant as shown in Exhibit ‘G1’ dated the 24th day of August, 2017. However, this suit was filed on 27th September, 2024, over five years of the period that the cause of action arose as stipulated by Limitation Laws of Oyo State. In other words, the Claimant did not file this suit until after seven (7) years when the cause of action arose over and above the five (5) years period allowed by the law.

63.       It should be borne in mind that in cases of wrongful dismissal, the cause of action typically accrues on the date the dismissal is communicated to the employee. In this respect, see the case of SAKI v. APP & ORS (2019) LPELR-47703(CA). In the instant case therefore, as pointed out earlier, from the facts and evidence led, the Claimant’s dismissal was communicated to him via Exhibit ‘G1’ dated the 24th August, 2017. This without doubt was the date the cause of action arose.

64.       However, the avernments of the Claimant in the Consequential Amended Statement of Facts particularly at paragraphs 33 and 34 as well as the argument of the Claimant’s Counsel in their Final Written Address particularly at paragraphs 4.2 to 4.22 inter alia that the cause of action in this case does not accrue until the 24th September, 2024 when the government considered and accepted the reports of the review panel and ratified the wrongful dismissal of the Claimant, is to say the least, misconceived and that does not reflect the correct position of the law. The law is as stated in the case of SAKI v. APP & ORS (SUPRA) where Court of Appeal explicitly held that:

“The time spent to petition the Appeals committee of the party does not stop the time from running.”

65.       Therefore, the correct position of law is that time begins to run from the moment the cause of action accrued and the fact that a party chose to explore internal resolution mechanisms does not suspend the statutory period unless a specific law provides otherwise. I so hold.

            Similarly, I refer to the case of UMTH MANAGEMENT BOARD v. HUSSEINI & ANOR (2022) LPELR-72815 Per JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, JCA at Page 14-15, paras. C-D, where it was held thus:

“Appellant has argued that the provisions of the Act ought to have applied to prevent the lower Court from assuming jurisdiction over this matter at trial, based on the alleged date of accrual of the Cause of Action, which is 24th July, 2017, a date which renders the date the action was instituted, that is: 23rd January, 2018, a period of six months, which is obviously outside the three months provided by the Act. The 1st Respondent was however able to satisfactorily counter this, by stating that the Appellant formally requested that the 1st Respondent pause any legal action, which to my mind is a form of admission, an act which pushed the accrual of the Cause of Action over three months from 24th July, 2017. The foregoing is a well-known exception to the running of time for the purpose of limitation period, to the effect that where the tortfeasor admits wrongdoing, the Cause of Action is revived and time would start running from the date of the latest admission. This Court recently restated this principle of law in the case of ETIEMONE v. APINA (2019) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1696) P.557 (Pp. 587-588, Paras. G-C) (CA), thus: “Negotiations do not stop time from running in limitation of action. But where an admission is made in the cause of the negotiations, the admission revives the Cause of Action and the period of reckoning would no longer be from the date of the accrual of Cause of Action but rather from the date the admission was made.” OKPA v. OKPA (2013) LPELR 20396; IKOSI IND. LTD. v. LAGOS STATE GOVERNMENT (2017) LPELR-41867...”

66.       Therefore, In the instant case, there is nothing placed before this Honourable Court by the Claimant to prove that there was negotiation and/or admission of wrongdoing by the Defendants for this case to fall under the exception. I so hold.

67.       In addition, the Claimant’s Counsel equally submitted in their final written address particularly at paragraph 4.26 among other things that Limitation Law is not applicable in an action challenging the breach of contract of employment.

68.       However, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ABA v. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS NIPOST & ANOR (2023) 5 NWLR (pt. 1878) 475 reaffirmed the application of statute of limitation to contract of service earlier decided by the Supreme Court in the case of MICHAEL IDACHABA & ORS v. UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE MAKURDI & 4 ORS (2021) LPELR-53081(SC). Also, see the case of OKO-JAJA v. FCSC & ORS (2022) LPELR-57627(CA) 35-39, para. B; See also the case of OKORONKO v. INEC (2005) 8 NWLR (pt. 1991) 131.

69.       Consequently, from the decision of Supreme Court in the case cited above, it is now the law that Limitation Law applies to contract of service i.e. employment contract. To that extend, the view held by the Claimant’s Counsel does not reflect that of the current position of law. I so hold. See also the decision of this Honourable Court in the case of GODDY EZEZOBU OBANEKE v. NATIONAL DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY unreported: Suit No. NICN/ABJ/77/2023, delivered on the 20th day of July, 2023 per B.B. Kanyip, the President of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria.

70.       To this end, I refer to the case of USENI v. ATTA (2023) 8 NWLR (pt. 1887) 519 at 560, paras. A-C where Supreme Court held per His Lordship Jauro, JSC delivering the lead judgment, held thus:

“Where a suit is statute barred, the Court is prohibited from considering its merit irrespective of how genuine the Plaintiff’s complaint may appear to be, as the essence of Limitation Law is not in the lack of a right action, but in the extinguishing of that right. It follows therefore, that no matter how promising the case of the Plaintiff may appear to be, once it is statute barred, it is dead and buried forever. Such a Plaintiff is left with an empty Cause of Action that is rendered unenforceable.” 

See also the case of AROYANE v. GOV. EDO STATE (2003) 1 NWLR (pt. 1866) 549; TOYIN v. MUSA (2019) 9 NWLR (pt. 1676) 22.

71.       In the light of the foregoing, it is my considered opinion that this suit is statute-barred. Consequently, this Honourable Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear it. Accordingly, I resolve Issue One in favour of the Defendants and against the Claimant.

            Having held that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit, I cannot proceed to consider Issue Two, as jurisdiction is the foundation upon which every judicial proceeding rests.

            In the circumstance, this suit is hereby dismissed in its entirety for being statute-barred.

72.       No order as to cost.

73.       Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

 

 

____________________________

Hon. Justice Y. M. Hassan

Presiding Judge.